Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-60258, 31 January 1984]

En Banc, Plana (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part

Facts: Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be declared as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of 17 May 1982 "from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group, political committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is also prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties, political committees, political organizations and other political group."

Issue: Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.

Held: The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835; Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office." Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate. There are reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social structure.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.FACTS:Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.ISSUE:Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .HELD:NO.  Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.RATIO:Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

 Javellana vs. executive secretary 50 scra 33In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and aregistered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.ISSUE:Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.HELD:

The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

Imbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)

Petitioner: ImbongRespondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)Petitioner: GonzalesRespondent: ComelecPonente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacySec 2: apportionment of delegatesSec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

IMBONG VS COMELECG.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:1.    Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?2.    Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:1.    The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.2.    The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners. 

Gonzales vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-2819621 SCRA 774November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD: 

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court.

Occena v. COMELECG.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981Fernando, C.J.

Facts:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:

                What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?

Held:

                The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

Issue:

                Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?

Held:

                Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:

                What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission?

Held:

                The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Arturo Tolentino vs Commission on Elections (1971)

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

(The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed.The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

Defensor Santiago vs COMELEC

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues

among others that the People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative.ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it constitute a revision.HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, “to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good”; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

Government of the Phils vs. Monte de Piedad

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank.HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Lawyers league vs Aquino

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

• The Court further held that:• The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;• It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; andThe community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan KehFacts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).The court resolved three issues:1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and

without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.Summary of ratio:1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

ALCANTARA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS75 PHIL 749

FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical

injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE:Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF75 PHIL 875

FACTS:Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.

ISSUE:1.    Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?2.    Is 93d Article of War constitutional?

HELD:Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922 FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar? HELD: No. REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

Festejo v. FernandoFact:The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the CFI of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express

objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

Issue:w/n this is a suit against the state?

Held:No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff’s land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff’s land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Holy See vs Rosario

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).  The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. 

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. 

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. 

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly. 

Santiago v Republic, 87 SCRA 294

Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

Held: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.

The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.

National Airports Corp vs Teodoro

FACTS:The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the

provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation.On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to

take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65, 245 as fees for

landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.

In 1951 to recover the above amount, The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 

The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 

The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued."

ISSUE:1. Whether or not government corporate agency may be sued

2. Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued

 HELD1. As a general rule, state cannot be sued without its consent and there can be no legal basis against the

authority that formulate the law and which the law depends. But the exemptions are the unincorporated type of government and functioning for proprietary. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was

organized. however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which 'it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract

2. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under section 3 of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for. the use of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon 'the Civil Aeronautics Administration the power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the Mational Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter.

According to the court, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees Association

Facts:Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association against the Bureau of Printing, the complaint alleged that the latter have been engaging in unfair  labor practices by interfering with, or coercing their employees, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage themfrom pursuing the union activities.The Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association were suspending the pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petition; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of  the Republic performing government functions. The petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer  and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such juridical question.

Issue:Whether or not the Bureau of Printing, in the proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice, lacks jurisdiction thereof.

Held:The trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature,". The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work  incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake...". It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in theGeneral Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, theBureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and

brain had suffered material injury.

Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.

As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:          Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

RULING:

No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously recognized.That according to paragraph 5 of  Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

Garcia v Chief of Staff [16 SCRA 120]

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Issue:  Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.

Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government.  It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.

Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

Section 1.  In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation….

Section 2.  The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could grant relief is applicable to this case.  The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. 

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:

The USA had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

 Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service CommissionGR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc

(Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission.

Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper

delegation of legislative power, so called “Subordinate Legislation”. It is a valid delegation because of the growing

complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC140 SCRA 455January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

Arnault v Nazareno             G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

Facts:

1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.

2.  It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:

a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person

ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for contempt

HELD:

YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power. 

 It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter  under inquiry. 

As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.

The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.

 NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

FACTS:Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation,

emoluments, and privileges as those of  a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

HELD:If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to Judges”, the

right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of  supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

  The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

RODRIGUEZ vs. GELLA

FACTS:         On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on December 16, 1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality when the Congress convened in special session. Herein petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the sum of P37, 850, 500 for urgent and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11, 367, 600 for relief from typhoons, floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by the President.

ISSUE:Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative

HELD:Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or the will of the agent. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the power lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people because we have the Constitution designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, and since our government is based on the system of separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and 546 are declared null and void.  

ARANETA v. DINGLASAN

FACTS:         The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE:Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD:CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its nature, object

to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited period”. It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. 

PEOPLE vs. VERA

FACTS:

This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Respondent Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221, which grants provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that it is applicable to a cities like Manila as it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution. It also avers that the said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards, thus it constitutes undue delegation of power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that there is no standard set by congress for its implementation.

HELD:

Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL

FACTS:

President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty- three (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power to create municipalities.

HELD:

Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the

details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:

(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and

(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN

FACTS:

The Municipality of Cardona alleged that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 1748

HELD:

No, it is not unconstitutional. The delegation of the power referred to on the Governor- General does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable so far as it touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang

FACTS:Bartolome Cabangbang was  a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Adaza v. Pacana135 SCRA 431

FACTS:Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.

ISSUE:1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if said office is vacated.

HELD:Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied. 

Osmeña vs. PendatunG.R. No. L-17144              

FACTS:

Congressman Osmeña took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled ‘A Message to Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President.  Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmeña was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives.  Osmeña argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.

ISSUE:

Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution.  Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.”  Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.  Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” in Congress.

Alejandrino vs Quezon GR No 22041 11 September 1924

Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL.

Facts:House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was going thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266, therefore, it should not be considered as a law.

Issue: WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.

Ruling: The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent.The intent of the law making body based on its journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill.

ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGOA.C. No. 7399

FACTS:Petitioner Antero Pobre invites the Court’s attention though the sworn letter/complaint dated22 December 2006, with enclosures, pertaining to the statements of Senator Miriam Defensor –Santiago which reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief JusticeArtemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.

The petitioner too sought disbarment and other disciplinary actions against the lady Senator.The respondent, however, invoked Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution explaining that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered.in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.

Issue:Was the speech of Sen. Santiago within constitutional bounds of freedom of speech?

Ruling:Yes. Although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.The Court, however, wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Facts: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that  Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

PLANAS VS. COMELEC49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973

FACTS:While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.

ISSUES:1.    Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?2.    Is PD 73 valid?3.    Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

HELD:The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.