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8/10/2019 Consti Digest All

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ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConstitutionalConvention and whether the parameters set by such a call isconstitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a ConstitutionalConvention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specificprovisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 ofConstitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority topropose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votesand these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and isenough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable.

Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that casegranted more representatives to provinces with less population andvice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates Iother provinces with more population.

- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters toqualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualificationis only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent politicalfigures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote moretime to the Constituional Convention.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process andalso to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates mustnow depend on their individual merits, and not the support of politicalparties. This provision does not create discrimination towards anyparticular party/group, it applies to all organizations.


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TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971

Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention heldon November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session onJune 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, theConvention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to

amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the votingage to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform theConstitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together withthe senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed apetition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that OrganicResolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null andvoid.

ISSUE:

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec,the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a

constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable oneand thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not becausethe Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject tothe Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a singleamendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XVof the Constitution which states that all amendments must be


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submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover,the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assessthe amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, notseparately but together.

Almario vs Alba

Amendment to the Constitution

As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electoratewill go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or rejectamendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104,105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposedamendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to beanswered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek toenjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3(grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to thepublic domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a landreform program and a social reform program), which coverResolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejectionon the ground that there has been no fair and proper submissionfollowing the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. Thepetitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite butonly ask for more time for the people to study the meaning andimplications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature andeffect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the

electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to thepeople on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposedamendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate.

Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban landreform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposedamendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people candecide. The questions are presented for their determination.Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may findundesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or anurban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the


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plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposedamendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity toexpress their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothingto do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, theirdesirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is

whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, orthe dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a casethat the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" ofpublic land or of "urban land reform."

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

[270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997]

FACTS:Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of PeoplesInitiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed withCOMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits ofelective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on

Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right ofthe people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to theConstitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing thepublication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter setthe case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Rocofiled a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which iscognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,

Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfinpetition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) Theconstitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution canonly be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law hasbeen passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a

revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. TheSupreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executingprovision.


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Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering theabsence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a

revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, withoutimplementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although theConstitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannotexercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules andregulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,

is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated,cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannotvalidly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of theright to peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it wouldaffect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization ofelections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities forpublic service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be

done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the aboveIssue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendmenthas become academic.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

FACTS:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for aninitiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition withthe COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petitionunder RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution.Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of

Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes


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will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government tounicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack ofenabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiativepetitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies withSection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to theConstitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditionsto implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion indenying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basicrequirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that theCOMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambinopetition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failedto show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at thetime of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so isdeceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of theconstitution intended a clear distinction between amendment andrevision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 ofthe constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.

Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assumingthat RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because thepresent petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, mustfirst comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735


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4. Petition is dismissed.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]

FACTS:

The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and theHouse of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H.(Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, ofthe Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the

membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, asprovided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to beapportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be accordingto the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shallhave, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to saidConstitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegatesfrom each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections tobe held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the sameConstitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementionedconstitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats inCongress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by thePresident, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providingthat the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementionedResolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the

general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:

Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituentassembly, violates the Constitution.

Held:


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have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had

been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have

been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners

filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the

constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the casebecause the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not

the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from

each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of

the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the

enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in

either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC

found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not

bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been

introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,

namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the

correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy,

be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted

between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand

that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding

the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the

provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,

signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the

secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,

provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the

Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the

Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house

thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of

secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine

Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed

by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of

the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.


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The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the

legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those

of the journals.

II. CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZPAOGR 59524. February 18, 1985.

FACTS:

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September

and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born

American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger

brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA

building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were

several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman

Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his

wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other

guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought

by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was

place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of

General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortlyafterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with

subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again

exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who

was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a

number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press conference was

broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the

conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in

effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile,

Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col.

Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported tohave exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the

General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had

finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of

Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded.

Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against

persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of

bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at


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the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of

bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the

ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped thecase against petitioner Salonga.

HELD:

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas

reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where

even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the

Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling

constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of

educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. Indela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail

bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while

his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we

nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the

Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was

mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's

legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on

the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas

corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26

petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining

petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The

fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its

symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in

the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case

against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the

government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have

taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule,

however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of

evidence against Salonga found in the records.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC

05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system. the Berjaya Group Berhad,

with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to


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offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement,

the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in. An

open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an

online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed

through.

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing

HELD:

YES. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the

public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affectthe social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of

the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the

Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

KILOSBAYAN vs.MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein

PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the

gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is

allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and

responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the

equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because

it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to theContract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding

public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no

longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is

different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if

ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have

funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal

standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the

petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no

constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since

the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.

Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The


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parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still

apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot

again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a

different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when

substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an

instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in thefirst proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent

examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous

decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a

concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The

more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; G.R. No.L-52245; 22 Jan 1980]

FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 ofBatas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protectionand due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that anyretired elective provincial or municipal official who has received paymentsof retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at thecommencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shallnot be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he hasretired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 ofBatas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committedany act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for anyof the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activitytherein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall beconclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for thecommission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal afterpreliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue:

Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate theConstitution and thus, should be declared null and void

Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with

Held:


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No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unlessthere is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1)There must be an actual case or controversy; 2) The question ofconstitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutionalquestion must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) The

decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to thedetermination of the case itself.

As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of theprovision. His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without thebenefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantanhas been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified frombeing candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal norsubstantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case asa taxpayers suit, but the institution of a taxpayers suit per se is no

assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in thisparticular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue ofconstitutionality is absent.

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equalprotection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can betreated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years ofage are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of theprovision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regardsto the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for

being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteedto an accused.

PHILCONSA v. Villareal 52 SCRA 477

This is a petition to compel the Speaker of the House of Representatives toproduce the books of accounts of that body in which were recorded theamount appropriated by the legislators for their allowances. Before thecase could be decided, however, the 1973 Constitution became effectiveand the Congress of the Philippines was consequently abolished. The

Supreme Court thereupon dismissed the petition, holding that the samehad already become moot and academic.


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OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.

[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]

FACTS: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by

their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging inconcerted action geared for the protection of our environment and naturalresources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the newSecretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered uponproper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as ataxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of theRepublic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, useand enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgintropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who areequally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "sonumerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: theplaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by theplaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative orexecutive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the

Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear andunmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the actionpresents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse ofdiscretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting theaforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against himand that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judgefurther ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the

impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of theland.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and setaside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravelyabused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of theplaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the


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latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states acause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right toa sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code

(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creatingthe DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (PhilippineEnvironmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitutionrecognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, theconcept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept ofman's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodiedin natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlativeobligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right toa healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's allegedgrave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicialquestion.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply inthis case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that evenif TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settledthat they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest sorequires.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled. Whether or not thepetition should be dismissed.

Held:

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit thatthe same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Onceissued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually fortwenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither berevised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due noticeand hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestrylaws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs


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indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violativeof the requirements of due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest notjust to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since

the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totallyimpossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein arenumerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of allconcerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid classsuit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are presentboth in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but anincident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well asgenerations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of thesucceeding generations can only be based on the concept ofintergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced andhealthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in itsentirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve thatrhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthfulecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environmentconstitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensurethe protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to abalanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's

constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under theDeclaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill ofRights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil andpolitical rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a differentcategory of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by thepetitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all

governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights neednot even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist fromthe inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in thefundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framersthat unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health aremandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlightingtheir continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemnobligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the


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ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the questionsubmitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the factsalleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point forthe truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or

determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government isnot squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement ofa right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. Itmust, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is nolonger, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or theimpenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from

judicial inquiry or review.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same arecontracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive

issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timberlicenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passedmandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still bestigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because byits very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed inthe exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancingthe right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting theirhealth and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-

impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin therespondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing orapproving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contractwould have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respectto renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondentJudge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby setaside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead asdefendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license

agreements.


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SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior

officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, commandand direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the OakwoodBuilding in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFPand declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demandingthe resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, thePhilippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations tookplace and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of thesame day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orderswere lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the Stateof Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKASAND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does notrequire the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and thatthere is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v.Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that theproclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the sameSection 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to

Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally,they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as anexercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any suchpower to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-

Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that therewas usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), ArticleVI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears thatthe declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to theunconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime ofrebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing orlocus standi to bring suit?

Held:


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The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and GeneralOrder No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expresslyprohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to itsCommander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to

call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise ofsuch power. While the Court may examine whether the power wasexercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting graveabuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was noindication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that militaryauthorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue ofusurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment sincethe President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed

forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive andCommander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vestedon the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to thedelegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may besubject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crimepunishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a validwarrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or willsustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is beingchallenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue uponwhich the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJSOfficers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standingto challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in PhilippineConstitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of

Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since hisoffice confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution.


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