De Leon vs. EsguerraGR No. L-78059

Facts:Alfredo de Leon won as Barangay captain and other petitioners won

as councilmen of Barangay Dolores, taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, de Leon received memo antedated December 1, 1986 signed

by OIC Gov. Benjamin Esguerra, February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local

government and similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue: Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held: No, memoranda have no legal effect.

1. Effectively of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. It was February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in effect then because 1987 constitution

has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure

until fixed term of office for Barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with

COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which

provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the

COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang

Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Centre, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenes-oppositions.

Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The

petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional

provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) the people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits

constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the

conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate.

Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its

implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative

on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated cannot be delegated

(potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly

promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to

be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the

constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be

done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or

amendment has become academic.

Lambino v. Comelec GR No. 174153October 25 2006

Facts:Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered

voters with each legislative district represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the

constitution seeks to modify Sec. 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These

proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino

group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the

ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties

within that case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: The proponents of the initiative secured the signatures from the people. The proponents secured the signatures in their private

capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages

and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favourably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents,

or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the

constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - which the petition contained, or incorporated, by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed

out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the

constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only

contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even

includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand

can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to

resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme

Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.

****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore

IMBONG V. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28Potente: Makasiar, J

NATURE: In the matter of a petition for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of R.A. No. 6132, otherwise known as the

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES , petitioner, vs. COMELEC, respondent.

FACTS:These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers

and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their

rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Tañada,

Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally. On March 16, 1967 the Congress

acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress,

acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically

restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed

Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of

320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants:

Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives, and that

any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the

Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the

provisions of this Resolution. " On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing

Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.

ISSUESI. Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as

well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the

constitutionality of only par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner

Gonzales.

II. Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional

representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of

the Constitution with which it collides.

III. Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected

delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the

government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

IV. Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expression,

freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

HELDBoth petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs.

2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.

RATIOI. The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that

the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does

not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8 (a) of

R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 is sustained because

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution has full and plenary authority to propose

Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled

but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-

fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of

the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the

power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to

meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other

implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned

details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting

as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters

within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or

removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific

provision of the Constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a

constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as

amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such

power in Congress as a legislative neither body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the

Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required

implementing details.

II. Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such

apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a

Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of

economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of

delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so

in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts.5 The apportionment provided for in

Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of

Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according

to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The

impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of

congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each

province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., italics supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as

may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.

III. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his

time to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high and well-nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the

land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification

embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or

appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power,

entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise

the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of the welfare of the

general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but only temporary — only to continue until the

final adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months — from July 30,

1934 to February 8, 1935. As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in

full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to

the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention.

The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on

the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of 'talents' or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10,

Answer in L-32443.) The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise

constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.7 The function of a delegate is more far- reaching and its effect more enduring than

that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and

powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses

such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the

sense of justice of the community.As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of

the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the

enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.

IV. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. Any candidate for delegate to the convention.(a) From representing, or (b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization;

2. Any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of

whatever nature from. (a)

Intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or (b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favourable to or against his campaign for election. The ban against all political parties or

organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance,

whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8 (a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full

exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will

be violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as

long as such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy

with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to

advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments. It is therefore patent that

the restriction contained in Sec. 8 (a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and

inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners. According to

Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a)

of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection ofthe laws by according them equality of chances. The candidates

must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator

Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion,

predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent

political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country

and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This

position is further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the

guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration.17 While it may be true that

a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority

can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization

support proscribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons

foretasted.

CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Topic: TreasonLaurel vs. Misa

77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter

aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth

which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No

transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that thePhilippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty

cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the

exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name of government,

from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason

under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the lawsof the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of

sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines weren’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United

States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines are now indeed sovereign.

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by

the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the

Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury.

Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in

jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount.

The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that

the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to

file a complaint against the respondent bank?

HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of

the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the

government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945

Facts of the case:Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese

occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge

Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had

invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower

courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of

the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during

the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes

of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas

of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases

pending before them.

Ratio:Political and international law recognizes that all acts and

proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines

under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their

authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is

expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the

laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation

abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of

the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial

proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and

judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it

could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other

possible construction remains.”Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a

particular construction or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear

and unequivocal words.”Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese

occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law; therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of

any other governments.”In the case of US vs. Reiter, the court said that if such laws and

institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the

Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.”

Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had

become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now,

it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the

Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said

government.

DECISION:Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final

judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:

1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a

construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the

case pending before it.***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through

rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the

rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of

the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an

independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, petitioner, VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondent

FACTS:Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued

a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the

Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the

registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and

administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut

processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply

from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new

coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES:At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a

license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.

HELD:The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of

registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut

Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the

resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the

guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a

mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering

that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988 , she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

G.R. No. 143377. February 20,2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATEDVs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & the REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES

FACTS: October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title was issued in favour of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land. Lots No. 1 and

4were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favour of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and

Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. Then Mamaril et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Unknown to the

latest owner, the CIR of La Union issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-

361 declaring the deed of sale between Galvez and Mamaril et. al. (OCT No.0-381) null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Shipside Inc. Lots No.1 and 4.Twenty-four years after, the lots

havenever been executed. Consequently, acomplaint for revival of judgment andcancellation of titles was filed by the OSG.

ISSUE: WON republic of the Philippines can

maintain the action for revival of judgment herein despite the issue of prescription.

HELD: NO, while it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. Moreover, to

recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to

prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on

the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been

created merely asagents for the realization of government programs. Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party

to the original suit for cancellation of titlecommenced by the Republic twenty-sevenyears for which it is now being made toanswer, nay, being made to suffer fi

nancial losses.It should also be noted that petitioner Is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired

the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do violence

and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection.

Fontanilla v. MaliamanGR NO. L-55963

FACTS:It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup

owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651,

then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose

City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a

licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written

and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities. This petition

is an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA

before the then Court of First Instance of San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the accident. The trial court rendered judgment which directed

respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners respondent

National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to theCourt of Appeals Instead of filing the required brief in the

foresighted Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.

ISSUE:W/N the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and

attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein

petitioners.

HELD:Yes. Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by act omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-

existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers

acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is

responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art.

2176 shall be applicable.The liability of the State has two aspects. Namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortuous acts of special agents only.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, in Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed.)

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortuous acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the fore quoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents.

The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be

foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-

governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.

Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347,

1984 Ed.)Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the

government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort

liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as

to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is

an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601 Indubitably, the NIA is a

government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortuous act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility

of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon

the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an

urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by

the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a

hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been

their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling

at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their

destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing

imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of

P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the named deceased;

P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

FOR JULY 14 2011G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

E.MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS

FACTS:Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the

trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5, 000, instead of P25, 000 as claimed in the

complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage

accordingly in the sum of P2, 666, instead of P6, 000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a)in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's

motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent oremploye

e of the Government; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff

as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to thenegligence of the chauffeur; an

d (c) inrendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.Consequently, the Government issued an act allowing the

plaintiff to commence a lawsuit against it.

ISSUE:1) WON the Government conceded its liability to the plaintiff

by allowing a lawsuit to commence against it.2) WON the chauffeur is a government employee or agent.

HELD:1) NO. By consenting to be sued a state simply

waives its immunity from suit. It does not there by concede its liability to plaintiff, orcreate any cause of action in his

favor, orextend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing

liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defence.

2) NO. We will now examine the substantive lawtouching the defendant's liability for thenegligent acts of its officers, agents, and and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the

Civil Code reads:The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special

agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article

shall be applicable.

The responsibility of thestate is limited to that which it contractsthrough a special agent, duly empowered by a

definite order or commission to performsome act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.

The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

GR. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES B. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERTGOHIER vs.

HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.

FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases

Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.Sometime in May, 1972, the UnitedStates invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co.,

Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals

and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the

requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States,

also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects

because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. The

company filed a complaint against the defendants herein demanding specific performance that the

company be allowed to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.

ISSUE: WON the US is immune from suit having dealt with a private corporation.

HELD: YES. A State may be said to have descended the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign

functions. In this case the projects neither are an integral part of the naval base which is

devoted to the defense of both the UnitedStates and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business

purposes.

G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON

GOODGOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECONDDIVISION) and ROBERTO

S.BENEDICTO.

FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real

and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in

which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-

gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI

owned by and registered under the name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto,

PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale.

Despite filing a writ of injunction, it wasnevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into

a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on

the227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to acquire

the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this

undertaking is there cognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten

Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his

NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was

granted but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability,

petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity.

HELD: NO, In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of

its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of

a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or

reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise there from, the State may be sued even without its express consent,

precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued

is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the

other party to the agreement.

G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966 MOBIL PHILIPPINESEXPLORATION, INC. vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

and BUREAU of CUSTOMS

FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville"

consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. It was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit

of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre

Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only. Petitioner filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila

against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the

undelivered case plus other damages. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that not being persons under the

law, they cannot be sued.

ISSUE: WON the defendants can invoke state immunity.

HELD: YES, Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function

proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver

thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its own apart

from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting Lawful revenues from

imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a

necessary incident.

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

vs.HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO TOBACCO

PLANTERSASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINEVIRGINIA TOBACCOADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy

Sheriff, La Union

FACTS: The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan

who issued a writ of execution, followed there after by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco

Administration, deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being

alleged that such funds are public in character.

ISSUE: WON the funds are public in character, thus immune from suit.

HELD: NO, It is to be admitted that under thepresent Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set

forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without itsconsent." If the funds appertained to one of the regular departme

nts or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. It is well-settled that when thegovernment enters into commercial business,

it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself  pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private

corporations.

G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET.AL

FACTS: At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo

Balagot (owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino

Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,

several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others

suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against

the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the afo

resaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner

raised as one of its defences the non-suability of the State.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando’s immune from suit.

HELD: YES, Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by

its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf

of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the

municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of SanFernando's municipal streets." We already

stressed in the case of Palafox, et.al. Vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer

and the Provincial Treasurer (102Phil 1186) that "the construction ormaintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at

the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot

be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary

compensation.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, ET. AL

FACTS: In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, a summary of facts was set forth thus:

A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and In

ternational ConstructionCorporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,

712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. Respondent Judge Villasor, issued an Order declaring the foretasted decision

final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued]. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the

Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially on the

monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in

the said Writ of Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,

particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches

are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military

andcivilian personnel and for maintenance andoperations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity from suit.

HELD: YES, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or

garnishment to satisfy such judgments is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of

public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the

State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,

as appropriated by law.

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1,1990 MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P.

DEGUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRALFINANCE CREDITORSCONSORTIUM, INC., and

SHERIFFSILVINO R. PASTRANA

FACTS: The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated

by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors

Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements and

registered in the name of the latter. It was certified that a bank account had been opened with the PNB

Buendia Branch under petitioner's name made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due

hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision fixing the appraised value of the property at

P5, 291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment which

was earlier released to private respondent. Petitioner however refused to comply with

the garnishment despite its having two bank accounts in PNB. The first one was dedicated for expropriation

proceedings while the other was for public funds. The first bank account cannot cover the remaining amount due, while the other

account had more than enough to satisfy the amount due. Petitioner reasoned out that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch

could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper

appropriation required under the law.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Makati is exempt from paying just compensation.

HELD: NO, for three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property not

withstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Just compensation means not

only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,

compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a

long period. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair

play and justice. In the case at bar,considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed

andthe municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the

municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.

G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003 KHOSROW MINUCHERVs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHURSCALZO

FACTS: Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as

the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one

Abbas Torabian.The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents

were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the

prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

ISSUE: WON respondent Scalzo can invoke immunity from suit.

HELD: YES, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak

of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government are removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.

This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him

a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The job description of Scalzo has

tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In

conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,later acting as the poseur-buyer during thebuy-bust opera

tion, and then becoming aprincipal witness in the criminal case

against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is

constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency

allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled

to the defense of state immunity from suit.

Sanders v. Veridiano GR L-46930 (June10, 1988)

FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic

Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the

special services department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the

rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent

full-time status.

However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the

statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven,

according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievant were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."

Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the

change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libellous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary

rights.

However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that,

consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the

main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of

NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters,

the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of

public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed

to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to

the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its

courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will

have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to

satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit

against that government without its consent.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the

rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium

and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17

Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous

charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation

which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the

Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the

Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims

to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police

officers involved in the incident.

Issues: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity

(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the

Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and,

therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to

litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a

settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they

exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no

annotation in favour of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the

government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote

the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of

ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office

of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that

the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without

violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favour of

the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land

anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for

the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES

Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS:• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance

Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the

US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. • Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG

headquarters as the activity exchange manager. • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store

Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong

Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya

approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs.

Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was

found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such

search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya

can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to

suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.

• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.

• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess

of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment

& indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land

w/c are a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.

• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c

is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of

her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has

rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use

facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They

further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard

merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.

• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her

creditors. Motion granted by RTC.• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss.

She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s

authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s

act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the

factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.

• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence &

Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable,

reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for

exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from

enforcing decision. • Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee

thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the

immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his

private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside

the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances &

determine WON Bradford is immune.

ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s

permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily

appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO

Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, and Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a

cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since

petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC.

3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO

Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed

against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an

affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a

different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action

against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State

from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not

be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where

the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs.

CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with

blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was

sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the

exception to the doctrine of state immunity.

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16 (b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating

the JUSMAG Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art.

31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided

by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a

complaint for underpayment of wages, non payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay,

and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labour Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final

and executory. The Labour Arbiter issued a writ of execution to

enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and thesecurity agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on

execution themotor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical

and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be

sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the

State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other

contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be

said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it

enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any

act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guardsclearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the

consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,

however, toCommonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.