*1. The Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP, GR no. 183591, October 14. 2008

Decision: CARPIO MORALES, J.: 

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. 

Facts: 

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. 

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. 

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 

Issues: 

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and 

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] 

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself 

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; 

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; 

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] 

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 

Held: 

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. 

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. 

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual

dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. 

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. 

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. 

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

2. Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad, GR no. 9959, December 13, 1916Parens Patriae

The Government of Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ahorras de ManilaG.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

Facts:                On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the Spanish  Crown, that devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365703.50 to the various sufferers name in its resolution.                These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the first month,

directed its treasured to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of 20,000 each. These amounts received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of Monte de Piedad.                The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in honor of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause. The Monte de Piedad then contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation of the former was wiped out when their was a change of sovereignty.

Issue:                Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against the Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.Ruling:                Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the “rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign powers. The supreme court then held the right of the government to file the case.

*3. Lee vs. Director of Lands, GR no. 128195, October 3, 2001*4. Tecson vs. COMELEC, GR no. 161434, March 3, 2004Facts:Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.Issue:Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.Ruling:1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held."Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal"  in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." 

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the

Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,  was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

5. Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543Facts:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez on citizenship grounds, in May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother, who ran for governor of Davao Oriental. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.Issues:1. Whether or not respondent is a Filipino.2. Whether or not, if proven that she is a Filipino, did she, in anyway renounced   her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.

Held:YES. Respondent is a Filipino since her father is a Filipino.

In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.

As for issue number two, respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship.

6. In re: Application of Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999Facts: Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship: 1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant; 2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and 3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La UnionOn April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.In his report:1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from  "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

7. Bengzon III vs. HRET, GR no. 142840, May 7, 2001Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization

Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

*8. Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

QuickGuide: Edu Manzano ran for the position of vice mayor in 1998 and got the most number of votes. His co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen (US and PH). Petition was dismissed. There is no doubt that Manzano is a dual citizen upon birth being born to both Filipino parents in California. Court held that the disqualification of dual citizens contemplates dual allegiance and by merely registering as a voter, filing CoC and electing in the said certificate Philippine citizenship, Manzano has effectively renounced his US citizenship. Facts:–          Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998

–          Manzano got the most number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the PH but of the US–          On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position–          Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws–          31August: COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998–          In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati–          Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition Issue/s:

1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit2. Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified

from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City Ruling:   Petition DISMISSED. Ratio:

1. 1.       YES – Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioner’s Motion to Intervene justifies petitioner to file this case 

1. 2.       DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS DUAL ALLEGIANCE –          DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states–          DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states; result of an individual’s own volition–          Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their country of origin–          Disqualification based on “dual citizenship” contemplates dual allegiance–          For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect Philippine citizenship upon filing their CoC to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship – JAGB

9. Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692Facts:On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.

ISSUE/s:

1.)    Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;2.)    Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and3.)    WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:

1.)    Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.2.)    Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.3.)    Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.  Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

10. Moya vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292FACTS:Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with herapplication for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962

11. Republic vs. dela Rosa, GR no. 104654, June 6, 1994FACTS:September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.

October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.

January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.

ISSUE:Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:

No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

12. Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, GR no. 178831-32FACTS:Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

ISSUES:1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.

13. Coquilla vs COMELEC, GR no. 151914, July 31, 2002

[Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.  In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.  This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

14. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 731[Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

*15. Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, GR no. 125793, August 29, 2006FACTS: Petitioner Tabasa herein was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When Petitioner was seven years old his father Rodolfo Tabasa became a naturalized citizen of U.S.A. By derivative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American Citizenship. In 1995, Petitioner arrived in the Philippines; thereafter the latter was arrested and detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the US informed The Bureau that the Petitioner’s passport has been revoked and that the latter has pending federal warrant of arrest. After an investigation was conducted by a special prosecutor he was charged of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner contends that he reacquired Philippine Citizenship through repatriation under the R.A 8171.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.

RULING: RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation.

Petitioner here failed to prove that his parents abandoned their Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Petitioner likewise contends that as he reacquired Philippine Citizenship he is not an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation. The Court in its decision held that the theory of the Petitioner is improper as the latter is not entitled for repatriation under R.A 8171for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law. The Petitioner’s petition for review is dismissed by the SC.

16. Angat vs. Republic, GR no. 132244, September 14, 1999

[Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No. 8171]

FACTS:Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.

RULING:No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper civil registry

17. Altarejos vs. COMELEC, GR no. 163256, November 10, 2004

[Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application  and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

18. Nicolas Lewis vs. COMELEC, GR no. 162597, August 4, 2006 [Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003 RA 9189; Dual Citizenship ]

FACTS:Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of 1-year residency requirement.

RULING:Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of  Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of the same Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of  said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.

19. Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR no. 160869, May 11, 2007Dual citizenshipFACTS:Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the respondent from implementing RA 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner avers the constitutionality of RA 9225, specifically its Section 3 and 3:

Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine Citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the condition of this Act.

Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.

ISSUE:Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.

HELD:During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the purpose of these contended sections is to recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the Republic.

Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section 2 and 3 say, the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the Philippines and to the United States, as the case may be. And by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.

Further it was held that the bill recognizes the Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.

Wherefore the petition is denied.