G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS,petitioners,vs.THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,respondents.G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988LUIS D. BELTRAN,petitioner,vs.THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,respondents.G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.LUIS D. BELTRAN,petitioner,vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of aprima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of aprima faciecase against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain thestatus quocontained in the Resolution of the Courten bancdated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.____________

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 110436 June 27, 1994ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR.,petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,respondents.REGALADO,J.:The present original action forcertiorari, prohibition andmandamusseeks the reversal of the Orders issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14252, dated February 17, 19931and May 12, 1993,2denying petitioners Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.The facts are summarized in the Memorandum of public respondents as follows:1. The Government Service Insurance System (the GSIS, for short) filed two separate criminal complaints against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public official who used to be the President and General Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President of the Manila Hotel, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The first complaint against petitioner was filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (the OSP, for short) and docketed as OSP-88-02028 while the second, which involved the same set of facts, was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG, for short) but which was later endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-0-91-0986. . . .2. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG where petitioner duly submitted his counter-affidavit. As a consequence of said investigation, an Information was filed with the first Division of the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14134, charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. . . .3. During the proceedings before the OSP, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The OSP, however, denied the motion and filed with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan an Information charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents (Articles 171 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code), docketed as Criminal Case No. 14252. Petitioner was deemed by the OSP to have waived his right to submit a counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. . . .4. As a result of the filing of two informations with respondent Sandiganbayan involving the same accused (herein petitioner) and the same set of facts, Criminal Case No. 14252 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 14134 which was pending before the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan. . . .5. Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the consolidated cases against petitioner to the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation inasmuch as:a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14134 was ordered dismissed in compliance with the ruling of the Supreme Court inCojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, which declared null and void the preliminary investigations conducted by the PCGG in all criminal cases involving matters which were the subject matter of civil cases earlier filed; andb) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 was correctly assailed by petitioner as having been filed without the proper preliminary investigation. . . .6. During the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit and supporting documents. After the completion of said investigation, Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo of the Office of the Ombudsman prepared a Resolution dated February 11, 1992, which recommended the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252. . . .7. Respondent Ombudsman, however, despite the above recommendation of the investigating prosecutor ordered the prosecution to proceed under the existing Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 on his observation,viz:Let us not do the defending for the accused. The explanations offered are too strained to be believed. At best they are matters of defense for the accused to prove at the trial.The alleged character of the funds involved being confidential and requires no auditing is totally immaterial. It could even explain why this anomaly was committed. . . .8. Petitioner thus filed with respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information, dated September 17, 1992, wherein he prayed ". . . for the production of (the) record of the preliminary investigation), and that the information be quashed outright or the disapproval of the Ombudsman set aside, or in the alternative, that the Office of the Ombudsman be ordered to conduct further proceedings, particularly the handwriting analysis prayed for by the petitioner which would establish who committed the alleged falsification. . . .On February 17, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution dated February 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .10. A Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 12, 1993, of the aforequoted Resolution was filed by petitioner . . . .11. On May 12, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. of this Courts Resolution dated February 17, 1993 is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .12. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.3Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsmans approval of the order dismissing the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor;2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in wanton disregard of petitioners right to due process;3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance; and4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.We do not find the instant petition to be impressed with merit as to warrant the extraordinary writs prayed for.The information filed against herein petitioner charging him with estafa through falsification of public documents and for which he stands to be tried before respondent court alleges:That on or about or during the period from March 26, 1984 to May 11, 1984, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Roman Cruz, Jr., then President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and likewise President of the Manila Hotel, hence a public official having been duly appointed/elected and qualified as such, taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit, committing an offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Manila Hotel Invoices, Transportation, Charge, Cash, Budget for Food and Drinks vouchers in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 and then make it appear that the GSIS management and staff had a five-day coordination meeting at the Manila Hotel from March 23 to 30, 1984 at the cost of P350,000.00, for which reason the GSIS paid/issued its check with No. 039511 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of P350,000.00 which check was deposited to the account of the Manila Hotel, and thereafter cause the Manila Hotel to issue its check with No. 007272 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of P350,000.00 payable to Roman Cruz, Jr. or himself, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that there was no such five-day GSIS management and staff coordination meeting conducted/held at the Manila Hotel; and further thereafter convert and appropriate to his own personal use and benefit/deposit the said check to his own personal account with the Far East Bank and Trust Co. the said check/amount of P350,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the GSIS and/or Manila Hotel and/or the government in the said amount of P350,000.00.4I. Petitioner initially submits that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsmans disapproval of the order dismissing the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor, in violation of the cardinal rules set forth inAng Tibay, et al. vs. CIR, et al.5The submission is premised on the theory that said rules apply to a preliminary investigation which is to be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Petitioner avers that it is the duty of the Ombudsman to assess the evidence and defenses of the respondent in deciding a case, a failure wherein constitutes a violation of ones right to due process of law. He further claims that "while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support the decision. The Ombudsman in this case not only failed to decide right but has nothing at all to support his decision."6Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Office of the Ombudsman is not exercising quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative powers because "it does not act as a court" when it conducts preliminary investigation of cases falling under its jurisdiction.It is settled that the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which is defined as "an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,"7is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. This is because, a preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. As we held inCojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al.:8. . . It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due process.As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is that the person who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer.In the present case, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated in that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioner in disapproving the recommendation for dismissal of the case by the investigating prosecutor, and his ruling is not supported by the evidence on record. The argument is specious.His submission that he was deprived of his right to due process hinges on the erroneous assumption that the order of the Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is lacking in any factual or legal basis. Such a conclusion, however, stems from the fact that said order did not entail a discussion of the rationale for the Ombudsmans action.It may seem that theratio decidendifor the Ombudsmans order may be wanting but this is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually involved here is merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his study and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another investigation but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latters report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation.9With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.As aptly pointed out by respondent court in its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, "to the Ombudsman, the narration of facts by Prosecutor Tamayo, . . . demonstrated adequate cause to prosecute the accused Cruz."10Furthermore, public respondents, in their Memorandum, correctly observed that "(f)rom the tenor of respondent Ombudsmans statement, it is clear that heagreedwith thefindings of factsof the investigating prosecutor butdisagreedwith the latters conclusion on theimportandsignificanceof said findings. On the basis of the findings of facts of the investigating prosecutor, which were not disputed by petitioner, respondent Ombudsman believed that there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime had been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof."11Petitioner argues that the indication of disapproval by the Ombudsman which consists merely of two paragraphs fails to point out the issues and relevant facts and is consequently whimsical, capricious and arbitrary. Such proposition is fallacious. The mere fact that the order to file an information against petitioner consists only of two paragraphs is not sufficient to impute arbitariness or caprice on the part of the Ombudsman, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or oppression. He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor because he sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This is an exercise of the Ombudsmans power based upon constitutional mandate, and the courts should not interfere in such exercise.The rule is based not only upon the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complaint.12II. Petitioner next avers that the error of respondent court in not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation is two-fold. First, it was in violation of the constitutional right against arbitrary arrests because probable cause was not "personally determined by the judge," considering that the records of the preliminary investigation were not elevated to the judge for examination. Second, it was in violation of petitioners right to due process of law since he was deprived of the opportunity to examine the evidence against him and prepare his defense.On the first issue, petitioner relies on the ruling inLim, Sr., et al. vs. Felix, et al.13which held that If a judge relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.The conduct of a preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or one for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first aspect of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary investigation, which is more properly called preliminary examination, is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.14For the latter, in the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.15Coming now to the case at bar, contrary to petitioners thesis, respondent court, in its resolution promulgated on February 17, 1993 denying petitioners motion to quash the information, found the existence of probable cause after making a deliberate and exhaustive review of the facts obtaining in the case. Thus:All of the above logical process, which is supported both by the finding of fact in the Resolution and by admissions in the Motion of the accused, lead to the conclusion that probable cause exists against accused Roman Cruz, Jr., for acts described in the Information in the instant case. The narration of facts culled from the record (as affirmed by both parties) support the narration of facts in the Information. The superficial analysis of the admissions made above indicate that the elements of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as well as of Articles 171 and 172 thereof may probably be established.It is true that the Manila Hotel eventually treated the P350,000.00 as a "cash advance" to him. Accused Cruz, however, does not claim that there were cash advances made by him as a consequence of which he received this sum. Nor has accused Roman Cruz said that he had obtained a loan or cash advance from the Manila Hotel for a particular purpose for which he was expected to subsequently render an accounting. All that Manila Hotels subsequent description of this amount as a "cash advance," in fact, says is that when it turned out that P350,000.00 could not be properly accounted for, it had to be treated as an amount which accused Cruz had to pay back; thus, accountingwise, a cash advance.For accused to have received such a large amount from a company of which he was the President required him to sign a receipt which would specify clearly what he was receiving it for. If he received the sum as a cash advance for some future expense, the Manila Hotel documents would clearly so demonstrate. If he received it as a cash advance (against his salaries or other benefits), it would appear as a loan in Manila Hotels books. Accused Cruz, however, has said no such thing in any of his pleadings nor apparently has he so stated during the preliminary investigation.In other words, accused Cruz as President of the Manila Hotel and, therefore, in a position of great fiduciary nature received P350,000.00 in 1984 either for a non-existent reason or for a false reason.He may have an explanation.As of this time, however, if the evidence on record is actually presented at trial, enough evidence would exist to put accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. at peril of his liberty and would require him to explain his side of the matter.A case has, therefore, been demonstrated in the record and in the averment of accused Cruz himself that the crime charged has probably been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.(Emphasis supplied.)16Petitioner would have respondent court order the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in its determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. First and foremost, as hereinabove stated, in a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause.17This is precisely what respondent court did. In resolving the issue of probable cause, respondent court made an in-depth analysis of the findings of fact of Prosecutor Tamayo, as well as the Omnibus Motion submitted by petitioner. The correctness of these facts was not even questioned by herein petitioner but, on the contrary was expressly affirmed in the latters Omnibus Motion dated September 17, 1992 wherein it was stated that "(t)he Order issued by the investigating prosecutor . . . contains a lucid narration of the relevant facts."The case ofLimcited by petitioner is not applicable to the present case because, in the former, a warrant of arrest was issued by the respondent judge therein without conducting his own personal evaluation of the case even if only on the basis of the report submitted by the fiscal. Instead, the respondent therein simply declared: "Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information . . . . This is far from what actually transpired before the Sandiganbayan as reflected by the records in this case. Hence, the ruling inLimcannot be properly invoked.As to the second issue, petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:Sec. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. The record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record or any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.Petitioners prayer for the production of the record is intended not only for proper observance of the constitutional requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge, but also to enable him to examine the evidence and prepare his defenses and for trial.Public respondents contend that the production of the record of the preliminary examination is not necessary since petitioner can always resort to any of the modes of discovery available to an accused under the Rules of Court, specifically citing Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. On motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to all parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, of any written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or any other investigating officers, as well as of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case, and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any other law investigating agencies.This rule refers to the right of the accused to move for production or inspection of material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the defense to inspect, copy or photograph any evidence of the prosecution in its possession after obtaining the permission of the court. A motion showing good reasons for the granting of the permission must be filed by the defense for this purpose, with notice to all parties.18It will be noted at the outset that precisely, as suggested by public respondents, herein petitioner, in asking for the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in order to enable him to prepare for his defense and for trial, is actually trying to avail of this mode of discovery. There was good cause shown for the motion to produce the records, that is, so that they may be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for their production, which is one of the grounds provided for under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.It is true that the granting of permission lies within the discretion of the court. However, respondent court in this case has failed to sufficiently justify its refusal to have the records of the preliminary investigation produced before it so that petitioner may use them for his defense, either in its resolutions denying petitioners Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, or in the pleadings and Memorandum filed by herein respondents before this Court. Consequently, we find no reason to deny petitioner the right to avail of such mode of discovery. If only for the reason that petitioner should be given the opportunity to inspect the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation solely for the purpose of enabling him to prepare for his defense and for trial, this questioned resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan should be modified.III. It is likewise contended that respondent court abused its discretion in not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance for which he can only be held civilly liable, but which civil liability has already been extinguished. Citing the case ofYong Chan Kim vs. People, et al.,19which held that a cash advance is in the form of a loan and, therefore, there can be no estafa committed, petitioner argues that he only incurred civil liability for the cash advance he obtained from the Manila Hotel. However, he contends that such liability had allegedly been extinguished when his leave credits and other benefits were withheld, the total of which was more than sufficient to liquidate the advance made.Also, it is argued that petitioner was denied due process when respondent court failed to remand the case to the Ombudsman for further proceedings for the purpose of determining the persons who actually forged the questioned documents by conducting a handwriting analysis. This would have secured him from hasty and malicious prosecution, and would even have led to the discovery of the true culprit, if indeed documents had been fabricated.It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy.20The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.21Conformably therewith, the arguments raised by herein petitioner that the cash advance is actually in the form of a loan and therefore no criminal liability attaches, and that respondent court should have remanded the case for further investigation to determine the true identity of the forgers, are all matters of defense which are best presented during the trial before respondent court for its consideration.The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. And, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.22In the case at bar, the Ombudsman found that there was sufficient ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the factual findings of Prosecutor Tamayo in the latters Order dated February 11, 1992 which were arrived at after taking into consideration the evidence presented by the parties. A cursory perusal of the records of this case will show that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, hence the same should be considered conclusive.23Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here.24His arguments are anchored on the propriety of or error in the Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ ofcertiorariwhere neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.25Insofar as this third issue is concerned, therefore, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ ofcertiorari.WHEREFORE, the resolutions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that respondent Ombudsman is DIRECTED to produce the pertinent records of the preliminary investigation before the Sandiganbayan at the proper juncture of the proceedings therein and on sufficient justification therefor.SO ORDERED._______________

EN BANCG.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM,petitioners,vs.HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE,respondents.G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO,petitioners,vs.HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:pMay a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.An investigation of the incident then followed.Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene TuallaaliasTidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)xxx xxx xxxIn the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of aprima faciecase against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186,Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)On December 14, 1989, we issued anen bancResolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813, and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII, Section 5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally resolved.The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed for the following:1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause orprima facieevidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17,Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists aprima faciecase against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face,this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each informationwhich reads: (pp. 19-20,Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)xxx xxx xxxThe petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without bail issued against the petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:xxx xxx xxx. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing the respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest without bail issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and Antonio T. Kho.The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.This is not a novel question. In the case ofPlacer v.Villanueva(126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides:. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce . . .We ruled:. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.The case ofSoliven v.Makasiar(167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. We stated:The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.The decision inPeople v.Honorable Enrique B.Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain.Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor.The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (SeeSec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .Finally in the recent case ofPeople v.Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to bepersonallydetermined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has notpersonallydetermined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.We reiterate the ruling inSoliven v.Makasiarthat the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish aprima faciecase against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of aprima faciecase against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Pao G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985). (Rolloof G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 150185 May 27, 2004TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE,petitioner,vs.HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, that part of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 dismissing her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the August 25 and 28, 2000 Orders of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.The AntecedentsCecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint2and filed the same with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, on December 29, 1999, charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, withestafa. In her affidavit, Maruyama alleged,inter alia, that on December 11, 1998, she entrustedY11,410,000 with the peso equivalent ofP3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.During the preliminary investigation, the complainant, respondent Maruyama, submitted the affidavit of her witnesses, namely, Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu and Marilette G. Izumiya and other documentary evidence. In her affidavit, Setsu alleged that the money which was entrusted to the petitioner for delivery to the Philippines belonged to her and her sister Annie Hashimoto, and their mother Hermogena Sanchez-Quicho, who joined respondent Maruyama in her complaint against petitioner Okabe and Tanghal. Respondent Maruyama, likewise, submitted a reply3to the petitioners counter-affidavit. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution dated March 30, 2000, finding probable cause forestafaagainst the petitioner.4Attached to the resolution, which was submitted to the city prosecutor for approval, was the Information5against the petitioner and Maruyamas affidavit-complaint. The city prosecutor approved the resolution and the Information dated March 30, 2000 attached thereto.6On May 15, 2000, an Information against the petitioner was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0749. The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the court presided by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.7The accusatory portion of the Information reads:That on or about December 12, 1998 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded Cecilia Maruyama and Conchita Quicho, complainant herein, in the following manner, to wit: said accused received in trust from Cecilia Maruyama the amount of Japanese Yen 1141 (sic) with peso equivalent toP3,839,465.00 under obligation to deliver the money to Conchita Quicho at the NAIA International Airport, Pasay City, immediately upon accused arrival from Japan, but herein accused once in possession of the same, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal benefit the said amount, and despite demands accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants in the aforesaid amount.Contrary to law.8Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor. On May 19, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond ofP40,000. On June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.On July 14, 2000, the trial court issued an Order setting the petitioners arraignment and pre-trial at 2:00 p.m. of July 16, 2000. On the same day, the private prosecutor filed an urgentex partemotion for the issuance of the hold departure order, alleging as follows:3. It has come to the knowledge of private complainant that there is an impending marriage within the Philippines of either the son or daughter of the above-named accused and that the above-named accusedwho has businesses in Japan, and is presently in Japanwill soon exit Japan and enter the Philippines to precisely attend said wedding;4. Given [a] the bail was fixed at merelyP40,000.00 and [b] the considerable financial capability of the accused, it is a foregone conclusion that the above-named accused will, upon arrest, readily and immediately post bond, and leave for Japanthereby frustrating and rendering inutile the administration of criminal justice in our country. The speed with which accused Teresita Sheila Tanghal Okabe can post bond and leave for Japaneffectively evading arraignment and pleathus necessitates the immediate issuance of a Hold Departure Order even before her arrival here in the Philippines;9The trial court issued an order on the same day, granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines.10For her part, the petitioner filed on July 17, 2000 a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint forestafaand the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause forestafaagainst her. She further averred that conformably to the rulings of this Court inLim v. Felix11andRoberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,12it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court to enable it to determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented during the said investigation.On July 19, 2000, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan alleging, thus:3. Accused is (sic) widow and the legitimate mother of three (3) children, two (2) of whom are still minors, namely:3.1. Okabe, Jeffrey-18 years old born on 13 August 1981.3.2. Okabe, Masatoshi-14 years old and born on 16 October 1985, 3rd year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043-224-5804.3.3. Okabe, Tomoki-13 years old and born on 13 March 1986, 2nd year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043-224-5804.3.4. The accused has to attend the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) at the Hoshikuki High School where her two (2) minor sons aforesaid are presently enrolled and studying because Okabe, Masatoshis graduation will take place on 26 July 2000.3.5. The two (2) minor children of the accused absolutely depend their support (basic necessities) for foods, clothings, medicines, rentals, schooling and all other expenses for their survival to their legitimate mother who is the accused herein.3.6. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will impair the inherent custodial rights of the accused as the legitimate mother over these two (2) minor children which is repugnant to law.3.7. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly restrict the accused to her custodial rights and visitation over her aforesaid minor children who are permanently living in Japan.3.8. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly deprived (sic) these minor children to their right to obtain education and survival.4. Accuseds only source of income and livelihood is door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines and vice versa which has been taking place for a very long period of time and in the process she has been constantly departing from the Philippines on a weekly basis and arriving in Japan on the same frequency, as evidenced by xerox copies of the pages of her Philippine Passports which are hereto attached as Annexes "A," "A-1," "A-2" up to "A-30," respectively. To deprive her of this only source of her livelihood to which the aforesaid two (2) minor children are deriving their very survival in a foreign land will (sic) tantamount to oppression rather than prosecution and depriving the said minor sons of their right to live even before trial on the merits of this case that will (sic) tantamount to the destruction of the future of these minor children.13The private prosecutor opposed the petitioners motions during the hearing on July 21, 2000 which was also the date set for her arraignment. The hearing of the motions as well as the arraignment was reset to 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000. On the said date, the petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending motions. She alleged that her arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition for the granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order issued against her. The arraignment of the petitioner was again reset to 2:00 p.m. of August 28, 2000, pending the resolution of her two motions. On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable cause was made after the court had already found probable cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage;(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the courts finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her arraignment; and(c) The hold departure order issued by the trial court was in accord with Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, as well as the ruling of this Court inManotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.14When the case was called for the petitioners arraignment at 2:00 p.m., on August 28, 2000, she refused to plead.15Her counsel advised her, in open court, not to enter a plea and, with leave of court, left the courtroom. The court then entered a not guilty plea for the petitioner.16It also issued an order, on the said date, setting the pre-trial and initial presentation of the evidence of the prosecution at 8:30 a.m. of September 20, 2000.17The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60732. The petitioner ascribed the following errors to the trial court:I. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED WARRANT OF ARREST DESPITE OF (SIC) LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSEII. RESPONDENT COURT HAS VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESSIII. RESPONDENT COURT HAS ALREADY PRE-JUDGED THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR ESTAFAIV. RESPONDENT COURT HAS EXHIBITED ITS APPARENT PARTIALITY TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERV. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) THE MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ROBERTS, JR.VI. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) THE LIFTING/RECALL OF THE HDO AND/OR ALLOWING THE PETITIONER TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN REGULARLY FOR HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONVII. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS18On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision19partially granting the petition in that the assailed order of the trial court denying the petitioners motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set aside. However, the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was denied and her petition for the nullification of the August 25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge was dismissed. The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of the existence of probable cause. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court inCojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.20Thus, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the RTC, based on the respondent judges personal examination of respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the Information approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of probable cause was in order. However, the appellate court allowed the petitioner to travel to Japan under the following conditions:(1) That petitioner post a bond double the amount of her alleged monetary liability under the Information filed against her, as recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General;(2) That petitioner inform respondent Court of each and all of her travel itinerary prior to leaving the country;(3) That petitioner make periodic reports with respondent Court;(4) That petitioner furnish respondent Court with all the addresses of her possible place of residence, both here and in Japan; and(5) Such other reasonable conditions which respondent Court may deem appropriate under the circumstances.21The appellate court did not resolve the issue of whether the trial court had prejudged the case and was partial to the prosecution. The decretal portion of the decision of the CA reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is herebyPARTIALLY GRANTEDinsofar as the denial of petitioners Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated 14 July, 2000 and/or Allow the accused to Regularly Travel to Japan is concerned. In all other respect, the same is herebyDENIED.SO ORDERED.22On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA contending that the appellate court erred in applying the ruling of this court inCojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals23instead of Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petitioner posited that the said rule, which took effect on December 1, 2000, before the court rendered its decision, had superseded the ruling of this Court in theCojuangcocase. However, the appellate court held that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail on June 15, 2000 before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and praying that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents as follows:(a) GIVING DUE COURSE to the instant petition;(b) ORDERING the REVERSAL and PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE of the Decision promulgated on 31 January 2001 (Annex "A" hereof) of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 as well as its Resolution promulgated on 27 September 2001 (Annex "B" hereof);(c) ORDERING the DISMISSAL of Crim. Case No. 00-0749 for lack of probable cause;(d) DECLARING the entire proceedings in Crim. Case No. 00-0749 as null and void;(e) ORDERING the private respondents to pay the petitioners the following amount:(i) at leastP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;(ii) at leastP1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;(iii) at leastP500,000.00 as attorneys fees and for other expenses of litigation.(f) ORDERING the private respondent to pay the costs of this suit.(g) Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.24The petitioner asserts that the CA committed the following reversible errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT "WHATEVER INFIRMITY THERE WAS IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST, THE SAME WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE RESPONDENT COURTS JURISDICTION WHEN SHE POSTED BAIL AND FILED MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS MOTION TO LIFT/RECALL HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER AND TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO TRAVEL REGULARLY TO JAPAN (Last paragraph, Page 9 DECISION dated 31 January 2001)."IIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE RULING IN THE CASE OFCOJUANGCO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300 SCRA 367 (1998)] WHEN IN FACT SAID RULING IS NOW OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE.IVTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, WHEN THE RESPONDENT COURT MERELY RELIED ON [THE] (i) COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF CECILIA MARUYAMA; (ii) RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR; AND (iii) CRIMINAL INFORMATION.VTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE PARTIALITY OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN HANDLING THE CASE BELOW WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.VITHE FILING OF CRIM. CASE NO. 4297 (MTC, ANGAT, BULACAN) FOR ESTAFA ENTITLED "PEOPLE VS. SHEILA OKABE"; CIVIL CASE NO. 331-M-98 (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) FOR SUM OF MONEY WITH PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ENTITLED "CONCHITA SANCHEZ-QUICHO VS. SHEILA TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE"; AND CRIM. CASE NO. 00-07-19 (RTC, PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119) ENTITLED "PEOPLE VS. TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE" CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING.25By way of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General refuted the petitioners assigned errors, contending as follows:I. The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.II. The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if any, in the issuance by the respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when petitioner voluntarily submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed motions seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial court, such as the motion to lift/recall Hold Departure Order (HDO) and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.III. The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in applying the ruling in theCojuangcocase.IV. The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in finding that respondent Judge complied with the constitutional requirements on the issuance of a warrant of arrest.V. The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on the partiality of the respondent Judge in handling Criminal Case No. 00-0749.VI. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on petitioners claim of forum shopping.26The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are interrelated.The petitioner asserts that the respondent judge could not have determined the existence of probable cause for her arrest solely on the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama. She posits that the respondent judge should have ordered the investigating prosecutor to submit the affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner and the transcripts of the stenographic notes, if any, taken