UB RANR[ISA. CCSC FT. LEA yEN WORTH. !<

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USA. ,G 1 . LP VEt WOi U, k

A RESEARCH REPORT

Prepared at

THE ARMORED SCHOOLV®rt Knox Kentucky

1949- 1950

t 2 91988ACCESSION NO, . t

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TIM, A.UMLOD SCHOOL

1949-19,5O

MAJOR WILLIAM F. JACKSON

MAJOR JOHN E. WAALES III

MAJOR MUARSHALL B. GARTH !(3 s r.

MAJOR JOHN A. RANKIN

MA&JO AIFR -. L.. DPIBLLA.

MAJOR ROBERT HALL, U'SMC

CA TIOE R E F A YRC.T

N R B R . P R E

APTAIN JAME S L. HIGGINS

FORT. KNOX, KENTUCKY

MAY 1950

ARMOR -The Mag : ine of~ Mobile Warf~are'Suite 418, 1145-19th St, N.W., ..--Washington, D.C. 20036

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .

2 GENERAL MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OFTAiK DESTROYER UNITS . . ..

6 TIE 628TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION(SELF-FROPELLED) .....

4 644TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION OPERATIONSIN THE ARDENNES....... . . . . ..

5 704TH TAAK DESTROYER BATTALION . . . . ..

6 THE 823D TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (TOWED)AT IORTAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . 1

. . . . . 6

. . . . .12

. . . 38

. . . . .64

. . . . .81

7 C ONTENIPORARY COMNT ... . . . . . . . . . .... . 112

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOYIENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . .125

AF ~:NDICES ..... . ........ .......

I. 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training. . 132

II. 623th Tank Destroyer Battalion - CombatHistory... . .......... ... . 135

III. 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training. . 141

IV. 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion - Training . 144

V. Maps ..... .... ....... .... 147

Chapter Page

PREFACE

Preparing a researah report on tank destroyers proved to be

a more interesting task than most members of the Committee antici-

pated. The announcement of the subject oast some doubt upon the

worth of a r®eort on a now obsolete weapon of war, but not for Iong.

The splendid achievements of tank destroyer units in action, the

outstanding esprit of officers and men in these units under all con-

ditions of combat, and the ingenuity and bravery they combined to

stop the most feared menace of the battlefield in World War II

created admiration for them and professional interest in their

methods. It is hoped that this report adequately describes the

courage and tenacity with which they fought and the skilful techni-

ques they employed in outmaneuvering and outfighting their armored

foe.

Because tank destroyer units were employed as small elements

attached to major combat organizations, reports of their activities

have been found difficult to trace. Organizations to which they were

attached sometimes failed to mention these subordinate attached

units in after action reports, and parent tank destroyer battalions

were unaware, at times, of the scope of combat activities in which

their companies and platoons took part. Considering this, and the

fact that tank destroyer organizations provided only a comparatively

small group of combat units, it is not surprising that after action

reports on their activities tre few in numbe:' aic are not prepared

with as much attention to detail as those cf, foL example, an Infan-

try Division or a Corps Headquarters.

There is additional reason for the shortage of reports from

tank destroyer companies and platoons. They were often separated

from parent organizations for days and weeks at a time. Individuals

interviewed in connection with this study agree this was a deterrent

to preparing more than casual records.

With no complaint intended, it is an observation of the

Committee that combat records of battalion-size units are few in

number and sketchily prepared.. This is apparently a result of the

disinclination, on the part of line officers, to spend time preparing

reports, and a lack of appreciation, in terms of improved combat

efficiency, of the various purposes for which after action reports

are used. In the directicn of correcting this situation and assist-

ing battalion staffs in simplifying their work of recording,. the

standard form of report used by lower echelons of the British Army

could be examined as a method of preparing paperwork with no more

than reasonable pangs of authorship.

After some time was spent on research and interview, seeming

conflicts of fact made it desirable to analyze the slim stock of

available documents pertaining to tank destroyers and to determine

their validity. It was decided that all could be more closely

scrutinized. For instance, more than one after action report listed,

with understandable pride, the elimination of thret: or more German

"Tiger" tanks in a day's operation. However, ivsion and Corps

staff officers who were at the scene of action dciare no enemy

tanks of this type were near the areas described in post combat

iii

records. One ironically suggested "Tigert" tanks must have been

the xmzost prolific item of German war production, considering the

Vast numbers knocked out in after-action reports.

Committee members have noted that well planned offensive

operations were invariably recorded with greater preciseness than

defensive actions. German accounts, particularly in the ARDENNES

Offensive, gave a more accurate picture, a check of eyewitnesses

reveals, than reports from United States units on the defensive.

The Committee received invaluable assistance in the pre-

paration of the report from former members of the four tank des-

troyer battalions. Without their aid it would not have been

possible to approach any semblance of accuracy in presenting the

details of combat which are condensed in an after-action report

and, of necessity, lost in the condensation. For their kindness

and cooperation, the Committee expresses its appreciation and

thanks to Lieutenant Colonel James W. Bidwell, former commanding

officer of the 704th TD Battalion, now stationed at Fort Knox,

Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Dettmer, former commander of

the 823d TD Battalion, now residing at San Anselm.. California;

Lieutenant Colonel Kfilliam A. Hamberg, commanding officer of the

10th Tank Battalion, 5th Armored Division, now stationed at Fort

Knox, Kentucky; Lieutenant Colonel Ashby I. Lohse, former operations

officer of the 823d TD Battalion, now living in Tucson, Arizona;

Major Edward R. Garton, executive officer of the 644th TD Battalion,

now at The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; Major Crosby P.

Miller, $-3 of the 7Q4th TD tMtale ,, now at % e Amored School,

Fort RZox,, Oentua; a S W'We :m O, a f r0-

mandi; t e o :4err the $23d T *tw 11Ov, in i

Battalion, naw a resident t Greensburg, Pannsylvania; Captain

James Leach, commanding "B" Company, 37th Tank Battalion, ano on

duty at Fort knox, Kentucky; Captain Edwin Leiper, commander of the

3d Platoon, Company "C", 704th TD Battalion, now a resident of

Indianapolis, Indiana; Captain T. L. Raney, commander of the lst

Reconnaissance Platoon, 823d TD Battalion, now stationed at Fort

Meade, Maryland; Lieutenant John E. Barron, commander of the 1st

Platoon, Company "C", 823d TD Battalion, now residing in El Paso,

Texas; Lieutenant Ellis McInnis, commanding officer of a platoon

of Company "C", 823d TD Battalion, now living in Odessa, Texas;

Lieutenant Leon L. Neel, commander of. the 1st Platoon, Company "B",

823d TD Battalion, now residing in Thomasville,, Georgia; and

Lieutenant Thomas Springfield, commander of the 1st Platoon,

Company "A", 823d TD Battalion, now living in Dodge City, Kansas,

CHAPTER 1

INTS1DUCTION

The motivating impulse for this report dates back to the

European Campaigas of 1940, wt) the French Azy surrendered to swift-

moving German divisions whose success rested primarily on the spee4,

firepower and shook action of tanks supported by planes, when rem-

nants of the British Expeditionary Force prepared airplane and tank

obstacles throughout the British Isles and regrouped for the last-

ditch battle of England, and when, in the United States, the majority

of military thought was centered on a method by which the terrify-

ingly successful tnk-air combination could be stopped.

One of the outcoes of those urgent times was the formation

of tank destroyer units as a part of the United States Army and their

use, particularly during the later European Campaigns of 1944-1945,

in the greatest combined-arma offensive in h story.

That tank destroyer units never fulfilled the naster role

for which they were intended is a quirk of circumstance plus the

introduction of other ingenious devices contrived to combat tanks.

The original subject assigned this committee for research

and report was "The Operation of the Tank Destroyer Battalion." The

topic covers a wide field, which fortunately was narrowed with the

announcement of the scope as "A study of the employment of the tank

destroyer battalion in the European Theater, with conclusions and

recommendations," with limiting dates extending from June of 1944,.

to May of 1945.

Confined within reasonable bounds, the title assumed more

workable proportions, though it was still considered too general

when committee members initiated individual research. After a more

thorough look at source material it was determined the best output

of the committee's efforts would be achieved if the subject was

restricted to operations of four outstanding tank destroyer batta-

lions. Thus the subject was chosen.

Research concerning tank destroyer operations has revealed

an interesting and important field for further investigation. It is

suggested that the overall subject, "The Operation of the Tank

Destroyer Battalion," could be the basis for a group of studies aimed

at a more complete picture of combat operations involving tank

destroyers versus tanks. The subject is important because of its

possible effect on current antitank doctrine.

Tank Destroyers entered and emerged from World War II as the

center of a doctrinal controversy. Conceived in haste, they were

designated "Tank Chasers," before birth, by the French; "Antitank

Regiments," by the British; "Self-propelled Artillery," by the

Russians; and "Tank Destroyers" by our forces. They had common

characteristics as well as a common purpose. All were team-operated,

super-velocity, low-trajectory weapons, self-propelled or towed,

suitable for employment on direct-fire missions against tanks -

primarily German tanks.

The argument which centered on tanks replacing tank destroyers

in an antitank role entered the theoretical phase in this country as

tank armament was improved to exceed that of existing tank destroyer

weapons. Major factors in the difference of opinion were the tank's

heavier vehicle, armor and weapons weight, with loss of mobility, as

against a lighter, thin-skinned, more agile and heavier-armed anti-

tank vehicle.

This controversial side issue is not a part of the report,

though it well might be. The facts of combat operations, high-v

lighted during the period June 1944, to May 1945, were an important

influence on the decision which eliminated tank destroyers from'

U. S. Army organization in 1946.

Although some aspects of the study were not immediately

obvious to the researcher, one feature of tank destroyer employment

was quickly noted. This was the wide variety of combat assignments,

outside the scope of antitank combat, in which tank destroyer organ-

izations participated. Many missions were considered, by those in

subordinate command of the units, to be beyond the sphere of organi-

gational training or equipment. Surprisingly, the unorthodox

missions were quite successful from an overall viewpoint and added

to the versatile reputation of the anti-tankers.

This report is not concerned with the application of prin-

ciples to a combat situation facing a commander, harassed by the

problem of taking an objective with the means at hand. However, the

statements of tank destroyer unit officers that they were rarely

able to utilize the potential of their weapons and personnel because

of restrictions imposed by unusual missions and attachments, directed

by higher authority, is of interest.

The purpose of this report is to present a series of

illustrative general actions hiaging on the assignment of tank

destroyer Units in two well-recognized roleas Supporting a muaor

organization and its subordinate elements on :the offensive, and

providing the same support when the larger element is in a defensive

situation. The combined actions will show the various methods of

employment of tank destroyers by major unit cammanders; the adherean

to ar departure from tank destroyer doctrine extant at the time of

employment; and a comparison of unit actions with the objective of

highlighting successful features of operation.

The four battalions selected for illustration are the 628th

Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 644th, 704th and 823d. Although they

were shifted within Corps, the battalions spent the majority of com-

bat time attached to the following divisions:

628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 5th Armored Division

644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 2d Infantry Division

704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 4th Armored Division

823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, O0th Infantry Division

The first part of the report is concerned with background

material, the organization of units for combat, types of equipment

used during the period of operations and a brief of doctrine govern-

ing the training and contemplated employment of tank destroyers in

the combined arms fighting team. Following background data, opera-

tions of the four tank destroyer battalions are described in separate

chapters, with another section devoted to comment by selected tank

destroyer unit commaders and 'the final ohapter devoted to eon-d

a usi ns rind re dtos

CstER 2

GENERAL MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF

TANK DESTROYER UNITS

Thishapter is pter eveted to a general discussion of te hnioal

material on the employment of tank destroyer units. It contains in-

formation on the missions for which tank destroyer units were trained,

the contemplated principles of employment and methods of employment.

he chapter also includes organizational charts prepared and later

modified during World War II by the Tank Destroyer School at Camp

Hood, Texas.J

As with other special organizations of the armed forces, tank

destroyers were given a specific goal to achieve. This goal, or pri-

mary mission, was the destruction of hostile tanks by direct gunfire.

It is of interest to note that even the wording of direct gunfire

implies an aggressive as well as an offensive role. When approach-

ing the subject of tank destroyer use, it is of importance to dif-

ferentiate between antitank and tank destroyer units. Unquestion-

ably the two elements have a great deal in common and are closely

related. However, they are also quite different,

Antitank units are set up and equipped to be used in

relatively fixed roles. Even when the larger units of which they

form a part are on the offensive, their role is primarily defensive.

Antitank units function generally by successively setting up defenses

of certain critical areas such as avenues of approach of possible

armored counterattack. When they do not succeed in stopping an

attack, their purpose is to disrupt, ay,delay and canalite hostile

armored forces, thus creatig conditions favorable for counterattack

by highly mobile reserves, Here is where tank destroyers enter the

picture,

...Tank Destroyers are the highly mobile elementin operations against armored forces. In contrastto Antitank units, their role is purely offensive,even when supporting large-scale defensive operations.Because of their characteristics, Tank Destroyers are notbound up with positions and places on the ground.In fact,°..to bind their operations down to placestakes much of the power out of their wallop. TankDestroyers are organized and equipped to strike andstrike hard at tanks with great fire power and greatmaneuverability. Their function is not to deny theuse of certain terrain feature to tanks but to seekout and destroy the tanks themselves..

Suitable secondary missions for tank destroyer units are:

1. To reinforce or supplement the fire of artillery units

with direct or indirect fire.

2. To destroy pill boxes and permanent defensive works.

3. To support landing operations.

4. To defend beaches against waterborne attack.

5. To be used on roving gun and roving battery missions

(more applicable to self-propelled units).

With regard to the use of tank destroyers on secondary

missions, the field manual on employment has the following to say:

,*.,Employment of tank destroyers on secondary missionsis a command decision. When ammunition requirements forreinforcing artillery missions exceed the supply facilitiesof the units, higher headquarters assumes the responsibilityof supplying the additional ammunition required. Exceptin an emergency, the organic ammunition loads of tankdestroyer units should remain intact for primary missions,

Most sedndary missions require the use of high-explosive ainmunition. Since the trajectory of anti-taik guns is too flat for the exeoution of many 2missions, reduced charges are often referable.

In order to use a ta destroyerw to their best advantage, and

to gain the maimnum possible results from their favorable character-

istics, a commander would be governed in tank destroyer action by

application of the following principles:

1. The seeking of information of hostile tanks by continuous

reconnaissance,

2. The movement to firing positions so as to intercept

hostile tanks by arriving sufficiently in advance of the tanks to

permit proper emplacement and concealment of tank destroyers. Tank

destroyers ambush, ho le tanks, but do not charge nor chase them.

3. Holding ground and not firing until tanks get within

as close range as possible.

4. Occupying forward positions from which to pursue with-

drawing tnks by fire.

5. Using every practicable measure to secure concealment.

This is necessary because tank destroyers are vulnerable to hostile

tank, antitank and artillery fire.

6, Digging in towed guns whenever time permits,

7. Digging in and camouflaging tank destroyers in feature-

less terrain,

It is important that tank destroyers be used aggressively.

Their mobility permits them to be concentrated rapidly in an

advantageous position. SteIth and deoeptein are predomiate factors.

Tank destroyers are not ea l.e of indeSsp ent action; they should be

used in close ooperAtiN With other troops.

The or g=aitio of took destroyer units was a subject of

much discussion and the usual controversy, but was finally decided

and established as brought out in Feld Manual 16-5

..a. Tank destroyer units are organized as battalions,groups, and brigades. The battalion is both a tacticaland administrative unit. Groups and brigades areorganized only as tactical units. There are two typesof battalions, classilied according to their equipment asself-propelled d nd towed

b. The self-propelled battalion consists of a head-quarters and headquarters company, a reconnaissancecompany, three gun companies, and a medical detachmentsEach gun company has three platoons of four self-pro-pelled guns each--a total of 36 guns within the batta.lion.

c. The towed battalion is similar to the self-propelledbattalion except that it is equipped with towed guns andhas no reconnaissance company Two reconnaissance platoonsare included in the headquarters company.

d. Group. The group consists of a headquarters andheadquarters company and two or more battalions.

e. Brigade. The brigade is composed of a head-quarters nd headquarters company and two or moregroups...

As to methods of employment, tank destroyer units certainly

have flexibility and maneuverability beyond the scope of most armored

elements. They can be employed to attack the head, flanks, or the

rear of a hostile armored formation. These points may be hit

simultaneously, or successively, engaging one while maneuvering to

hit another. The choice of method is largely influenced by the

relative size of the olements involved. A tank destroyer battalion

ahotud be able to atta*k a hostile task cmcpany at three points

simultaceosly. If the terrain is favorabe it might be poesible to

attack a hostile tank battalion at three points.

Tank destroyers shoald be kept in oncealed positions well

to the rear initially. Their mobility will permit their use in mass

in particular areas anywhere over a wide zone.

Tank destroyers use the concept of surprise attack in masse

Therefore, they should hold out small or no reserves, initially

employing their maximum fire power and shifting it continuously to4

gain and maintain the maxium tactical advantage.

An outline distributed by the Tank Destroyer School at Camp

Hood, Texas, compared the employment of tank destroyer units to that

of the man backing up the line in football, "...he stays well back

until he sees where the play is coming and then hits it with every-

thing he has."

14OTE8 FOIR ORAPTER 2

"T-6111 (school doe trte), T xk Destroyer School, Departmentof . actijg, C*amp Hood, Texas, p 1,

P'ield Manual 18v.5, Tactical Employment x ~k Destroyer Unit,18 July 1944, p 3.

I bid, p 1,4

Op ci, "T'61" (school doctrine), p 6.

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119

CHAPTER 3

TPE 628th TAK DESTR(OYER TATTALION(StL' PROPELLED)

Introduction and Buildup

General. The 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)

was selected for study in the preparation of this report

on tank destroyer operations in the European Theatre of

Operations after a careful consideration of factors,

situations and missions; the more important of which are

as follows:

(1) This unit was employed extensively in theprimary tank destroyer role.

(2) A self propelled unit, it worked throughoutcombat on the European Continent, except for one briefperiod, with an armored unit, the 5th Armored Division.

(3) In the Battle of 'WALLENDORF, the battle selectedfor detailed study, this tank destroyer battalion wasemployed with an armored division in the penetration of aheavily fortified position; the SIEGFRIED LINE.

(4) Also in the Battle of JVALL'NDORF, this battalionwas heavily enga;ed in repelling armored attacks.

(5) In addition to the above listed roles thisbattalion was employed in just about every manner towhich it could be adapted, for example; reinforcingartillery, as assault guns, against personnel in theopen, as road blocks, and to provide flank protection,

On 5 August 1944, only a few days after the 628th

Tank Destroyer Battalion landed in Europe it was attached to

the 5th Armored Division. Neither the Battalion nor the 5th

Armored Division had been committed to combat. Thus a team

that was to work together through most of the European

Campaign was formed. It is of crurse important that a team

remain intact if the ultimate in cooperation and coordination

is to be achieved. This permanent attachment was, therefore,

very desirable and led to understandings that could ohly

have been bettered if the units had trained together.

In order to understand the operating procedure of

this team, of which the 628th was a member, it is necessary

to explain that the 5th Armored Division employed "married

companies" to make up tank-infantry teams.

One tank battalion and one infantry battalion wereassigned to each combat command, but the cooperation be-tween tanks and infantry was to go further than that.The "A" tank companies and "A" infantry companies werepaired off. Likowise paired were the "B" and "C" tankand infantry companies. Within the companies each in-fantry platoon of five squad half-tracks was pairedwith a platoon of five medium tanks. Within theplatoons each medium tank crew of five men was pairedwith its own infantry squad of 12 men, The final re-sult of the marriage was a Sherman tank, a half-trackand 17 men who were to eat, sleep and fight togother.1

It was also customary to att:.ch a platoon of tank destroyers

to a mar"ied company.

CCB's tank-infantry teams were made up from the

81st Tank Battalion and the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion,

The B Companies of the medical battalion, engineer battalion,

ordnance battalion, and Troop B or the cavalry reconnaissance

squadron were the normal supporting troops, and the 71st

Armored Field Artillery Battalion was normally in direct support.

It normally fought as two task forces; one heavy, containing

two "married .companies", and one light, containing one

"m-Lrriod company".

Each task force bore the name of its commander. During

the "TALL:E'..DORF operation the commanders were Lt. Col.

13

Anderson and Lt. Cole Winteemutea

CCr's two units were the 10th Tank Bat' alion andthe 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, Its regularlysupporting artillery the 95th Armored Field ArtilleryBattalion and its normal supporting companies the "C"companies of the Engineers, ordnance and Medics and"C" Troop of the Cavalry. The heavy task force duringthis operation was commanded by rt. Col, Hamburg theCO of the 10th Tank Battalion and contained the married"A" and "C" Cos, Task force Boyer named for Lt, Col,Boyer the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion Commander wasthe light task force and was made up of the "married' , Cos".2

Since CCA was occupied in a different sector pro-

tecting the City of Luxemburg, during the period while the

5th Armored Division was on German soil, and did not figure

in the '"TALLENDORF operation, its organization is not im-

portant and is omitted.

The 628th Ta~k Destroyer Battalion was committed

to combat with the 5th Armored Division 2 August 1944, and

with them fought through France into Belgium and liberated

Luxemburg. During the advance the major actions participated

in were at the 'ALAISE-ARGENTAN Gap and the SEINE River,

Friendly Situation, By the end of August the

Allied force on the Continent included twenty American

divisions, twelve British divisions, three Canadian div-

isions, one French division, and one Polish divisions and

the necessary supporting troops. Against a defeated and

demoralized enemy they were advancing rapidly. Due to

limited port facilities and conditions of the railroads in

France it was impossible to support the armies as the

supply lines lengthenend indefinitely. There was bound

to be a time when the rapid advance would of necessity

stop, if not due to enemy resistance, then because the

supply lines had been stretched to their elastic limits.

All along the front we pressed forward in hotpursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days theBritish spearheads, paralleled by equally forcef,.ilAmerican advances on the right, covered 195 miles,one of the many fine feats of marching by our for-mations in the great pursuit across France. BySeptember 5, Patton's Third Army reached Nancy andcrossed the MOSELLE River between that city and 1\ TZ,Hodge's First Army came up against the Siegfried de-fenses by the thirteenth of the month and was short-ly thereafter to begin the struggle for AACHEN.Pushed back against the borders of the homeland, theGerman defenses showed definite signs of stiffening.On September 4, Montgomery's armies entered ANTWNCRP

,...NARSEILLE had been captured on August 28 and this

great port was being rehabilitated,3

Enemy Situation, By September Ist no organized

front existed. The remnants of the German formations were

fighting unorganized rear guard actions in an attempt to

fall back into Germany and gain the protection of the WEST

WALL.

In the meantime the Germans were making a desperate

belated attempt to prepare the defenses of the SIEGFRIED

LINE, Labor battalions and Volksturm (home guard) troops

were being employed along with crippled units that had with-

drawn from the battle of France.

Early in September 1944, when the German armedForces in the West during their withdrawal through

F'anooBolgiu app eabhodthe German frontier, thebulk of the formations could be designated only as

romanants. According to the statistics of the 0KW(High Command of the Armed Forces), the YWesthecr,including the navy and the air forces, but includingthe fortresses, had suffered a total loss of about500,000 men since 1 June 1944. Principally as aresult of the absolute air supremacy of the Allies,the losses in material were oven more conspioious.As an example,, it may be mentioned that the I SS

Pz Corps had at its disposal only one tank fTltTor-'PTiio'nnd the LXXIV Army Corps possessed only onegun, which was in full fighting order. All for-mations w.-:re heavily intermixed, so that there weredivisions consisting of men belonging to a varietyof units of every branch of arms.

During the entire withdrawal to the Germanfrrntior, the controlling organs,, however, hadremained intact, The army,, corps,, divisional,, aswell as the bulk of the regimental and battalionstaffs "oere in working order and h.d on hand more orless strong cadres of the troop formations4

The main German forces opposing the 5th Armored

Division on 13 September wore the:256th S Panzer Regiment

Elements of the- 5th Pa'achute Division

lemien-ts of the 130th anzer Lehr DivisionIiscollaneous VolIstrm formationi

Operations

Pre battle movement, The U. S. First Army planned

to make its entry into Germany with a main thrust in the

vicinity of AACH-'N. To assist in the execution of this

thrust V Corps, to the south, consisting of the 4th I-"

fantrv Division, 28th Infantry Division, and 5th Armored

Division attacked the much taunted EST' '"ALL CCR of the

5th Armored Division was ordered to cross the OTUR River and

? netrate the SIDGCFRITD LIFE in the vicinity of WALLENORr ,

The following quotation from the unit history of the 5th Armored

Division indicates the Division had already done some reconnaissance

of the Line on its own initiative.

At 1815 on September 11, 1944, a strong patrol fromB Troop 85th, crossed the Our River into Germany andmade history. Word flashed back to division, to army,to the world that the first Americans were fighting onGerman soil.

For the next three days patrols probed the SiegfriedLine and found it manned by small lightly armed forces.The enemy began building up his strength, however, andthe steep hills, mud and defiles threatened to makemovement difficult for the tanks, 6

This action proved to be correct for

On the 12th of Sept the 5th Armored Division wasdirected to conduct reconnaissance to the SIEGFRIEDLINE, demonstrate to its front and be prepared to breakthrough the German defenses in the general areaWALLEYNDORF-ECTERNACE to secure objectives in Germany.

By Corps order on 13 September the 5th Armd Div was toldto reconnoiter and demonstrate against the Line in itssector. If the Line was not held in force one CombatCommand with one Bn 112th Inf Regt was to break throughand seize the high ground east of BITBURG. 7

CCB was to assist and cover the advance of CCR withartillery support. Company A (628th TD Bn) was attachedto CCP for this purpose. The rest of the rattalion wasattached to CCR.

Operations 13 September. Elements of the 628th TD Bn

attached to CCR moved into position to fire into German on 13 Sept

1944. They fired all that afternoon, all the next morning and then

about 1300 hours on the 14th crossed into Germany. An interesting

observation made by members of the CCR task forces was that in all

the time during the two days of firing the enemy did not fire in

return,

Dispositions of troops may be noted on map Figure 3.

On the 13th the action, as is shown in the following quotations,

' t!.

No

...............

consisted primarily of moving into positions and firing

into the enemy pill-boxes,

A demonstration against enemy fortifications of theSiegfried Line with tanks, tank destroyers and artilleryfire was ordered by Corps and was carried out beginning at1500, 13 September.... CCR delivered direct t-nk andartillery fire on enemy pill boxes between AnM)ELD Tr-ESNand rETE~E,-EN ° No enemy fire was returned, 9

On 13 September 1944, 2d Platoon, Company B (628th)in position on hill mear I .ELBACH, Luxemburg, useddirect fire methods at 2000 yards range on German pillboxes and other enemy targets in the vicinity of[,TALLZNDRF and BI'SDORF. On the same day 2d Platoon,

Company "C" moved across the MOSELLE River and firedon enemy pill boxes northeast of T TCESDORF, Germany.Direct fire methods were used and six pill boxed wereknocked out, after which the platoon returned to thebivouac area,

On 13 September 1944 Company "B" with ReconnaissancePlatoon attached, moved with the 47th Armored Inf Bninto firing positions on high ground east and northeastof REISDRF, Luxemburg, on direct fire support for 47thArmored Infantry n.,, attacked fortifications of theSiegfried Line northeast of WALLT;'DORF'

Three inch gun direct fire from massed M-10s wasemployed against the permanent fortifications of theSiegfried Line, It was observed that normal AP shellshad .little effect against concrete, especially whencovered with earth.lO 0

. Company "C" with Reconnaissance Platoon, stillattached to the 10th Tank Battalion moved to an assemblyarea five miles east of GILSDnRF at 1315 hours. 1stPlatoon, Company "C' then moved to WALL0nTORP, Germanycrossing the OUR River, and set up road blocks to pro-tect the main body of CCR. 2d Platoon, Company 'C',assisted Ist Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, 28thInfantry Division also attached to CCR in the seizing ofREI DORF, Luxembourg, and the establishin of road blocksthere, 3d Platoon Company tC' moved to a position onemil north of 7AT.ID TRF, Germany to guard the rightflank of CCR. Pioneer Platoon, Reconnaissance Company,was attached to Company 'Cg 22d Armored EngineerBattalion for a bridge building mission. Company 'C'was in Germany and to Major Burgess, then Captain, go

the honors of being the first man in the Battalion to setfoot on German Soil, The remainder of the Battalion ex-copt Company .' working with CCB. crossed into Gotmany on15 September 1944 and at 1700 hours the Battalion CP wasestablished on Hill 408 one mile east of FRThLITGE'N, aporox-imatoly six miles into Germanyooa1ll

Operations 14 Septombe r . See Figure 4 o Since there

was no large caliber fire being returned from the enemy positions

the task forces decided to cross the OUR River and go into po-

sition preparatory to crossing the Gay Bach the next morning.

At 1130 B (14 September 44) Combat Command R withthe 1st Battalion212th Infantry, attacked to breakthrough in the vicinity of W;ALLEYNDORF The infantry,preceded by the armor crossod the OUR River at 1330 Bcrossing by ford since the bridge had been destroyedby the Germans before our forces reached the river....Progress was slow due to automatic weapons and smallarms fire., A hard rain also slowed the movement., 1 2

The advance continued and at 1825 the bulk of theCCR forces were across the river and on the high groundl 3

Company "C" (628th TD Bn) with Reconnaissance Platoon,still attached to the 10th Tank Battalion, moved to anassembly area 5 miles east of GILSDORF at 1315 hourse1st Platoon Company "C'"then moved to .ALLE\i'ORF,Germany, crossing the 0 r River and set up road blocksto protect the main body of CCR, 2d Platoon Company"C", assisted 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment,28th Infantry Division also attached to CCR in theseizing of REISDORF, Luxemburg, and the establishing of

road blocks there., 4th Platoon, Company "C" moved toa position one mile north of WALLENDORF, Germany, toguard the right flank of CCR. Pioneer Platoon,Reconnaissance Company, was attached to Company "C"22d Armored Engineer Battalion for a Bridge Buildingmission, 1 4

Operations 15 September,

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At 0800, 15 September CCR resumed the att ck, Fogand low clouds made visibility very pooSb Some enemytanks had moved in front of the combat command duringthe night. The advance against heavy resistance con-sisting of the enemy tanks and some 88 mm guns continuedand by noon elements had moved into HO ERDI TGEN, Soonthereafter the 1st Bn 112th Info was in BIESDORF, Theforeward momentum continued and by night Task Force Ham-burg had advanced through ENZEN and STOCHEN to BETrTNGENand Task Force Boyer was occupying Hill 408, which wasabout a thousand yards north of FREILE\TGEN and commanded

the areal 5

Company "B" 628 TD Bn occupied positions to commandthe apprnaches to Hill 408618

Company "C" had moved through the fog to attackHO :RSDTNTGEN and ORUCHTEN, Part of the company pro-vided flank protection for Task Force Hamburg andthe remainder of the company established road blocksto protect CCR Headquarters- 17

On the evening 15 September V Corps ordered CCB

released to division control to assist in the con-tinuation of the division attack to seize the ob-

jective in the vicinity of Bitburgi18

Operations 16 September,

CCB with Co "A" 628th attached crossed the Our intoGermany on the 16th, passed through WALLENDORF andstopped for the night at HOM-'RDIWEN, with a forcestill engaged in cleaning out NIEDERSGEGEN,19

Co A 628th went into direct and indirect artillerypositions po J CCR lines of communication,2 0

CCP had continued its attack but at 1500 was stillup against heavy enemy resistance and had made no ad-vance during the day, At 2145 they reported that theenemy was counter-attacking five hundred yards South-east of WETTE\TGEN.2

The 1st Bn 112th Inf, attached to CCR was dug inat WETTENGEN, During the day CCR threw back threestrong counterattacks at 'ETTE" ,GEN,. and smashed anarmored attack, 22

1st and 3d Platoon of Gom6tany "B, 62 h were inposition southeast of k~ll 408,. and the 2d platoon wason Hill 298 near STOCHEN supoorting 1st Bn 112th Inf,.

The 1st and 2d Platoons of Co "C" in anti-tankdefense of Task Force Hamburg wore in positions south-east of STOCKER and northeast of HALSDORF, respoctivly,whilb the 3d Platoon provided anti-tank defense forCCR trains near HOfVERDINGEN, 23

Operations 17 September. See Figure 5

On 17 Sept enemy small arms,.mortar and artilleryfire increased in intensity in all areas. At 0745 CCRreported that its artillery was firing on enemy tanksto the northeast, that the 1st Bn 112th Inf Regt wasreceiving enemy machine gun and artillery fire north-east of 1WETTENGEN, that the right tank column was fight--ing in the vicinity of STOCKEM, that artillery firew:s coming from the north, northeast and east and enemytanks w.re to the northeast and east. At 0830 CCR re-ported the fifth enemy counter-attack repulsed, thata total of eight enemy tanks were knocked outt... Theenemy attacks were supoortod by at least forty tanks. 2 4

The enemy counter-attacks against TaskForce Hamburg,.the right tank column of CCR, in and around HALSDORFand STOCKER were launched from the vicinity of BETTTNGENand wore made by tanks accompanied by infantry. Artilleryfire which was placed on the attacking forces separatedthe infantry from the tanks. The tank attack was thenbroken up by tank destroyers of 1st and 3d platoons ofCo "C" 628th TD bn from positions in the vicinity ofHALSDORF and STOCKE,. and tanks on the high ground north-east of HALSDORF.2 5

Meanwhile...on the unforgettable Hill 298 the secondplatoon, (Co "B" 628th) under Lt, Leon Ronnebaum, wasengaged in desperate fighting. This platoon was supprotingthe 112th R3gt of the 28th Inf Div,.... In close support ofthe foot sloggers, the platoon was successful in repulsingseveral enemy counter-attacks attempting to dislodge theTank Destroyers from their excellent firing positions,Sgt Thomas R. K.;arney and Sgt. John Kalis had fired alltheir ammunition and accounted for many enemy dead andwounded....Pvt. Grizzle and Pfc. Masters accounted fora good many casualties among the attacking force. After

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44

throe destroyers wore hit and damaged by enemy fireand the romaining forces were just aboht out ofammunition Lt. Rennobaum gave the order to withdraw,26

For this bravo show of arms, .th second platoonwas recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation andLt Rennobaum subsequently received tho DistinguishedSorvice Cross,27

1st Bn 112th Inf was withdrawn to the vicinity nfSTOCKEDM. They dug in on the high ground west of town .On the 17th CCB left elements of the married Cos "B"at HOFWERDINGEN to protect CCR's rear and moved to theWALLET',DORF, AMPI"ELDTNGEN, NIEDERSGTGEN area where theywere employed destroying pill-boxes and to protect theloft flank of the penetration, Task Force Anderson,loss the "B" Cos elements occupied Hill 375,.betweenNIEDERS(EGEN and AMELDITGET, .which commanded the terrainin that sector, Task Force Wintormute continued to holdNIEDERSEGEy, 28

By the night of the 17th Sept th.., furthest penetration

into ecrmany had been made,

Operations 18 September.

No appreciable changes in dispositions or locationstook place on 18 Sopt.. CCR with Task Force Hamburg in thevicinity of HALSDORF IAD STOCKE'r, and Task Force Boveron Hill 408 were subjected to artillery fire, but sus-tained no major attacks. CCB continued to destroy pill-boxes and to drive the enemy from NIEDERSGEGEN, FBIESDORFand .from around the bridge site at WALLENDORF, TheGermans rooccupied these localities nightly by in-filtration, 2 9

Operations 19 September,

Ninteenth of September was the high point in theBat alionts (628th TD Bn) combat history in so far asknocking out enemy tanks during any single twenty-four-hour period is concerned. Missions and positions hadremained approximately the same .as on 17 September, 3 0

At 0400,.19 September, CCR reported enemy vehiclesmoving in its sector and placed artillery concentrationon them. Considerable movement of enemy tanks wasreported in the vricinity of METTETDORF, At 0740 the

positions of CCR were being heavily shelled by enemy

artillery. At 0800 the enemy launched a two-pronged

tank and infantry attack on CCR, moving southeast and

southwest from FETTEITDORF. Eighteen enemy Mark IV

tanks are known to have been knocked out by CCR in re-

pelling this attack,.,,. At 0910 CCR reported its CP

had moved to HOMERDTNGETN to avoid enemy artilleryfire..... CCR was attacked at 1325 from the northeast.

The attack was repulsed but CCR continued to receive

heavy artillery fire,The 2d Bn,. 112th Inf Regt going up to relieve the

1st Bn with CCR had been halted by fire north of EIESDORF.

CCB was ordered to send a force to relieve the pressure on

them so they could ccntinue, This pressure was neutralized

by CCB at 1600,.,,. The 1st 3n, 112th Inf Regt, having

been relieved from CCR was given the mission of pro-

tecting the bridge at WALLENDOR for the night 19-20

September. At 1800 the Commanding Officer, Division

Artillery, was ordered to move all artillery to the west

of the German border without delay,

At 1830 CCR was ordered to have 2d Bn, 112th Inf Regt,protect its East flank while the remainder of CCR withdrew

west of the frottier to a position south of DIEKICHo....At 1845 Commanding Officer, Division irtillery, was given

a fire line and ordered to lay heavy fire east of the line

to cover the withdrawal of CCR.31

Prior to the CCR withdrawal both Companies B and C

of the TDs had an artillerymants field day, 1st Platoon,

Company "B" with Lt,. Jones commanding, while in position

north of FRFILTNGEN, Germany, protecting the left flank

of' CCR knocked out six Mark VI tanks attempting to approach

their position from the vicinity of HUTJTIFGEN, Germany,by direct fire at range's from 1500 to 3600 yards. Cpl.

Rice, Tank Destroyer gunner, knocked out three enemy

tanks in quick succession at 1800 yards while Cpl,.

Tomaszewski and Cpl, Kiwior knocked out tanks at 3600

and 3200 yards respectively, Two unidentified enemy

tanks were also knocked out by the 2d Platoon, In

addition, this Platoon assisted the tank attached to the

47th Armored Infantry Bn, in knocking out an additionalfive enemy tanks of undetermined designation, while Cpl.

Giacomino knocked out two other enemy tanks but was un-

able to identify the tanks due to enemy fire. The 3d Platoon,.

Company "C", with Lt, Feldman commanding, established OP and

firing positiona on the revers slope of a hill 1500 yards

north of HO'MERDINGEI, Germany,. Considerable enemy move-

ment was observed in the vicinity of HUTTINGEN .ad brought

under fire at ranges from 1000 to 2000 yards which resultedin one enemy Mark V tank definitely knocked out and ob-served hits scored on six Mark VI's and one other Mark V,which the enemy either recover.d or else completed the de-struction. This in one twenty-four hour period. TheBattalion received credit for six Mark VI''s., one Mark V,and four unidentified tanks destroyed; six Mark VT's andone Mark V probably destroyed and assisted in the de-struction of five unidentified tanks.,32

The sector held by CCB was also heavily attacked on

the 19th. At 0800 they reported the enemy working west and north-

west from rIESDORF with continuous light and medium enemy artillery

fire coming from east and northeast. They had cleared the enemy

out of BIESDORF by 1037, but at 1030 enemy infantry attacked

and took the bridge at WALLENDORF It was held for only a short

time for by 1250 they had been forced to withdraw to the scuth-

eastern edge of WAJLEN DORF,. At 1225 CCB repulsed an attack by

enemy tanks from the north.3 3

One platoon of the TD company with CCB was sent back

into Luxemburg to face into Germany and cover the approach lane

from the north of Hill 375 located between AM ELDTNGEN and

NEIDERSGEGE . Another TD was driven up on top of Hill 375 from

where it poured direct fire into the town of NEIDERSGEGEN in support

of Task Force YWintermute. 3 4

Enemy fire continued to increase in intensity forcing

movement of the Tank Force Anderson CP to a new saucer-like

location on Hill 375, where they organized a tight defense,35

Task Force Winter.ute and the "morried" companies B

were ordered to cover the route of march of CCR in its with-

drawal,36

'Operations 20 September. See Figure 6. CCB was

ordered to consolidate its position and prepare to follow CCR

on 20 September, Orders were, however, received from Corps

at 2005 that CCB would not be withdrawn west of the ferman

border except on Corps order, 3 7

CCR successfully completed its withdrawal from

Germany and at 0500 20 September was closing in its assembly

area south of GILSDON, The 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th

Infantry protecting the W ALLEDORF Bridge were subjected to

heavy artillery and mortar fire and enemy attacks, but retained

possession of the bridge throughout the day.38 CCB continued

to be subjected to enemy attack and intensive artillery fire.

A column of eighty Werhmacht troops, marching alongthe river road from GE~TI GEN south toward AY ELDj''GENwas caught in the open by the TD platoon from "B" Companyof the 628th Subjected to a heavy fire from the platoons'50 cal, machine guns and three inch cannons, only one ofthe German soldiers managed to crawl away, 3 9

NEIDERSGEGEN was lost to the enemy and the attempt

to retake it was unsuccessful. During the night the enemy

infiltrated through the elements of the 112th Infnatry pro-

tecting the :TALL NDORF Bridge. 4 0 Both the threadway bridge

and timber bridge were demolished, 4 1

Operations 21 September. CB was continuously attacked

during the 21st by both infantry and tanks, and was subjected

25

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to hostile artillery fire that grew in intensity as'the day

grew olde . To add to their difficulties heavy fog prevented

obser-{ien of enemy activities and enabled the Germans to

infiltrate into CCB positions before they were detecte.d. 4 2

By now the Germans had moved an Air Force infantry

division into BIESDORF, along with elements of five other

divisions, a regiment of medium field artillery and fivebattalions of assorted artillery. A tank brigade hadbeen badly beaten by CCR but the renamts were stillthrown into the fight to hurl the Americans from Germansoil, 4 3

During the afternoon the fog lifted and permit4+d

the Air Force to fly. This gave CCB temporary relief., but

as the afternoon passed and the planes had to return to their

bases the German artillery again opened up, 4 4

At 1930 CCB was ordered by dropped message to with-

draw west of the river beginning at 2130, CCR was ordered to

cover the withdrawal and to maintain forces along the river

at 1: ALLENDORF. The Division Artillery was to deliver heavy

fire to cover the withdrawal. The withdrawal was executed

as planned and by 0400 22 September CCB had cleared the ford, 4 5

Summary. The Battle of W7rALLENDORF, one of the first

battles of World War II fought on German soil was over. In

this engagement the 628th TD Battalion had been put to a sever

test, for it had operated in just about every role that could

be assigned the TDs. During this assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE

the battalion employed its M-10 Tank Destroyers in the followOng

ways;

(1) Anti-tank defense(2) Road blocks

(3) Flank defense

(4) Assault of fortified positions and pill-boxes

(5) Direct fire against ground personnel(6) Reinforcing Field i.rtillery 46

Several lessons concerning the TD's and their employ-

ment were further proven. For example:

(1) The TDs could best be employed by attaching

companies to major commands of the supported unit, be.cause the Germans continued to employ their tanks piece-

meal in delaying actions as du;g-in guns, and in suchnumbers as not to warrant the use of an entire TDbattalion against them,4 7

(2) None of the HE, AP, APC, or APCBT)F 3-inch typesof ammunition could satisfactorily penetrate the concrete

fortifications of the Siegfried Line. However, when

used against the steel doors of the fortifications the

APCBDF ammunition would make a satisfactory penetration

and often blow the door open, 4 8

(3) The much vaunted German Tiger Tank (Mark VI)could be knocked out by the 3-inch gun by a directfrontal shot even at ranges up to 1500 yards. 4 9

(4) T'e .50 cal. MG on the mount porvided on the M-10

destroyer was inadequate, particularly for firing against

ground troops. A ring mount or coaxially mounted .50 cal.MG's would be highly desirable, 5 0

(5) Mannually operated turrets were not satisfactoryin cold weather. Even when the lightest lubricants were

used it was almost impossible to turn the turret,5S

Another deficiency that existed and was costly in

this battle but which was borne out more strongly in later

operations was that most of the casualties sustained by

the TDsresulted from the lack of an armored covering over

the turret,52

An interesting light is thrown on this battle by

the statement of German Major General Frhr Von Gersdorff

who was Chief of Staff of the Seventh German Army. When

questioned in November 1945 and asked if he recalled any

action where the American troops were thought to have

blundered badly he replied6

It is my opinion that the thrust the 5th AmericanArmored Div and the 28th Am Inf Div through the West,Wall near WALLENDORF mid September 44 was neither plannednor executed skillfully. Admittedly the terrain pre-sented special difficulties in that it restricted tankattacks to certain directions so that it would have beennecessary to use strong forces. The objective of theoperation is not known to me, but I presume it was anattempt to breach the West Wall in the First attack andto thrust forward up to the Rhine- Strategically thisdrive represented a grave danger for the German commandbut its execution was weak and inefficient and there-fore we were able to contain and later eliminate by com-parativoly weak German forces. This enterprise causedthe Americans heavy losses and greatly improved the moraleof the German troops who had suffered a series of defeatspreviously, For the first time once again it had beenpossible to defeat the American troops who were superiorin every respect. The steady increasing feeling of in-feriority on the German side was reduced substantiallyby this fighting, Thus the operation was disadvantageousto the American command in every respect, even if itwas meant to be only a scouting raid or an attempt&For particulars I refer to the report presented to theTwelfth Army Group by General Bayerlein in April 1945,53

This of course need not in any way reflect on TD's

or TD operations

LOGISTICS AND PERSO.NEL

General, The status of logistics and personnel, of

course, has a direct bearing on military operatinns. It is

appropriate then that brief comments be made concerning these

matters and how they affected the 628th TD Bn.

In the penetration of the SIEGFRIED LITE equipment

and material losses were heavier than at any other like

period of time in the campaign. Supply and evacuationwas difficult due to inability to protect the supply line

within German territory. In the previous phases of the

campaign it had been necessary for the combat unitsto keep their combat trains close behind, for protections

6f the trains, This policy resulted in abnormal losses

in Germany when the train areas were subject to enemyartillery and mortar fire. The withdrawal from Germany

was accomplished with the evacuation of the majorityof the damaged vehicles which were repairable, 5 4

Class I, The platoons of the 628th were, for the

most part, scattered and had no organized serving of hot

meals. The men subsisted on emergency type rations, 55

Class II and IV, During the early part of the month

supplies had to be hauled aporoximately 135 miles. This

partially immobilized the service elements of the battalion

due to the tire on the road to and from the supply point,

Later in the month a new T/O and E which would allow additional

vehicles was placed in effect lessening to some extent this

restriction caused by limited trarsportati'n.,56

Some items of ordnace were hard to replace, i, e,launchers rocket,. 2,.36 in, Replacements on M-IO and T-2recovery vehicles were slow,5 7

Class III. Class III supplies became critical during

this period4 After unit trairig had been withdrawn from Germany

CCB became out off and ammunition, gasoline and water supplies

became nearly exhausted. It became necessary to form: armored

supply convoys using half-track vehicles and fight in to

the troops, 5 8

Class V. Procurement of class V supplies presented

no problem, however, because of the inability to maintain the

supply lines open ammunition became critically short at times.

It is noteworthy that one of the heaviest TD engagements during

this period, fought by the platoon of Lieutenant Rennebaum

on Hill 298, was broken off when the TD's became very short

of ammunition, 59

Maintenance. The performance of maintenance on the

vehicles during this period was quite a problem because of

enemy action which caused considerable damage to the vehicles

and permitted little time for repair. This conditions ex-

istod for only a relatively short period of ti-e, and follow-

ing the withdrawal from Cermarrthe 628th was given time for

repair and maintenance.

Evacuation of Casualties,

During the month of September the Company Aid Menevacuated casualties through the 112th Infantry Bn AidStation and the 75th Medical Collecting Company.During the time that the aid men were evacuatingthrough the 112th Infantry Aid Station, the aidstation was located approximately two miles fromthe front which was found to be the best'method of

ovacuati on 6 0

Communication. With the normal communications

available to armored units this phase presented no un-

usual problems. Because of the excellent communications

available it was possible to keep an accurate picture of

the situation at all times.

Pers onne l..

The practice of making almost daily requisitionswas found to work well and was continued, The re-placement battalion serving the command was movedcloser thereby greatly facilitating the receipt ofreplacements. The quality of replaceomnts, as inthe preceding month, ranged from very satisfactoryto excellent, Difficulty was still experienced inobtaining certain categories of specialists., Toomuch time elapsed between requisition and receiptof personnel, This resulted in important positionsremaining unfilled over too long a period; and inT OS getting converted to meet the requisitions --Sometimes without sufficient accuracy. It isappreciated that, this being a question of stockage,it goes back ultimately to training necessary special-ists at home in sufficient numbers and of the neededkinds. To the extent that numbers and diversity ofspecialists available as replacements can be in-

creased, it should be done,

The number of our men returned to duty continuedunsatifactory. The p esent policy of holding them for30 days before use as replacements for other units isnot enough,61

Battle losses for September 62

Friendly EnemyKilled 11 Killed '527''Tounded 38 Captured 205

Since most of the action of this unit for the

month of September was fought during the battle. described

herein the casualties listed above are indicative of the

results of that battle,

Morale. Remained excellent throughout this period

despite a shortage of supplies indicated above,

Enemy Material Losses63

Tanks and SP Guns

P Kw VIPz Kw VPz Kw IV'UnidentifiedArmd Car w/20 mm gun

Destroyed Damaged

Transport

Armd Personnel CarriersCommand Cars (sedan)Gen Purpose (1 to 3 tons)Motorcycle s

Towed Guns

88 mm

40 mm

Enemy Installations

Pill-boxesOP' s

Mis cellane ous

MG (emplacements)Mortar positions

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

The Victory Divisin in Europe, a unit historycompiled bfTT-mbe- r ' i -s -'q Tt-,of t AmredT- i vi s ion (Enge hard-Rcyhersche Hofbuchdruckerei, Gotha (Germany) p4,

2Ibid; p5.

3Dwight D. Eisonhower, Crusade in Europe, (Doubleday

and Compan -y, New' o:--Ts) 1- .F

4Questions for consideration and reply by General

Frhr V'n G O T-s'su - nT JF -- g--T-- I"S o-- Lino ub-section,.:lst rl cal-sec Tn Tovmber i9F

5V Corps Operatins in the E T 0, 6 January 1942

9 IMay 194 5 .p 4y 9T" ToT

6Op cit, Th. Victory Division in Europe, p 83

7Op cit, V Corps Operations in the E T 0, P 250.

8

Victory TD, a unit history of the 628th TankDostroyer Fittalion, compiled by nembers of the unit ("Muster-Schmidt", Ltd., Germany) p 41

9After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division, Sep 1944,

p8

After-Action Report, 6e8th Tank D strovyr Battalion.September 1944, p4.

11Op Cit, Victory T D, p 4.2,

12Op cit, V Corps Ooorations in the E T 0, p 252

Op cit,.After-Action Report, 5th.Armored: Division,

14Op cit, Victory T D, p 42,

15Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

p9,

16Op Cit, Victory TD, p 122,

February 19

18

Lt, Col, William A, Hamberg, personal interview,)50,

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

p10,

19Voodoo, unit history of 81st Tank Battalion compiled

by members o~Tthat unit, (81st Tank Battalion Association 1947)p 42

20Op cit, Victory TD, p43

Op cit,After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

22Op cit, Victory Division in Europe, P 83,

23Op cit, Victory Td, p 43

24Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

25Op cit, Hamberg, personal interview,

26Op cit, Vic tor W p 123

p9.

p 10

p 10

Ibid, p 123

28

Op cit, Voodoo, p 42

pas sim.

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

30Op cit, Victory TD, p 44,

31

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division.

32

Op cit,. Victory TD, p 45

33

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

34

Op cit, Voodoo, P 43

35

Ibid, p 43.

36

Ibid, passim.

37

Op cit, After-Action report 5th Armored Division,

38Ibid, p 13,

39Op cit, Voodoo, p 44

40Ibid, p 44

41Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

p 12.

p 12.

p 12,

p 13.

Ibid, p 13,

43Op cit, Voodoo, p 46,

44Ibid, p 46.

45Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th ^rmored Division,

pas s im.

Op cit, After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer

Battalion, pass m,

47Ibid, p 7,

48Ibid, p 7,

49Ibid, p 7.

50Ibid, p 6.

51Ibid, p 6.

After-Action Report, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion,December 1944, p 7,

Op cit, Von Gersdorff,

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,p 14

Op cit, After-Action Report, 628th Tank DestroyerBattalion, Sp7T 1944, p 6.

56Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

passim,

57Op cit, After-Action Report,

Battalion, . p"T944, .p 6628th Tank Destroyer

Op cit, After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,p 14

Op cit, After-Action Report,Battalion, Tpt-944, Passim.-

628th "ank Destroyer

60Ibid, p 5

61Op cit,.After-Action Report, 5th Armored Division,

p 15.

62Op cit, After-Action Report,

Battalion, p 6628th Tank Destroyer

63Op cit, After-Action Report,.628th Tank Destroyer

Battalion, p 6-

CHAPTER 4

644th TANK DESTROYER -BATTALION OPERATIONS IN THE ARDSNNES

Introduotion

General. The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Self Propelled)

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ephriam F. Gaham, Jr., sailed from

United States on 2 January 1944, on board H.2.T. Aqutania, The

battalion landed in Northern Ireland on 13 January and there con-% 1

tinued its training with emphasis placed on indireot fire,

This unit left the United States equipped with the 3 inch

motor gun carriage, Y 10, the'vehicle it retained throughout its

operations in. Europe.

On 10 May the Battalion moved to HUNGERFORD, England where

along with more training, preparations were made for the move to

NORMANDY Peninsula. In order to provide protection for the crews

against artillery fragments, a cover for each tank destroyer turret

was made. These covers were made of one quarter inch armor plate..

They completely covered the' overhead openings of the turrets.

The battalion landed in Europe on UTAH Beach on 11 July 1944.

The major portion of the battalion moved across the English Channel

on 11 July in Landing Ships, Tank. The remainder of the battalion,

also in LST's and under the control of its executive officer, Major2

Edward R. Garton, crossed the following day.

On 15 July the battalion was attached to the US 8th Infantry

Division and although elements of the battalion were from time to

time attached to other divisions, the battalion itself remained so

38

lkV

,h4.We.Jh

i"r

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Ra.iT9Uid

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Figure 7.

,> -%t qkvo J

attached until early December 1944.

Friendly situation. In late autumn 1944, the U. S. forces

driving across Europe were confronted with the ROER River in their

northern sector. The crossing of the river itself as it flowed at

this time presented no great problem. However, located on this

German river in the vicinity of URFTTALSPERRE and PAULUSHOFF were

two very important and well defended dams. The importance of these

dams was fully realized by both the Allies and the Germans. Should

these dams be blown, the released water would cause the river below

to become so swollen and swift that a relatively small defending

force could render a military crossing in this area next to impos-

sible. The US First Army stated, in its report of operations for

that period, "Since the middle of September our attention had been

directed toward the problem presented by the ROER River dams. It

was realized at that time that no large-scale crossing of the ROER

River below the dams could be undertaken until they were in friendly

hands." The US First Army was commanded at that time by Lieutenant

General Courtney H. Hodges.

V Corps, US First Army, stretched thin its lines in the south

so that it might assemble a force in sufficient strength to attack

these dams.

... Early in December changes were made in V Corps dispodsitions in order to attack in the area of the Roer Dams. On7 December the newly attached 78th Division commenced toarrive and close one of its regiments into assembly areas inthe zone of V Corps, its second regiment arriving the fol-lowing day. On 10 December the 2d Division commenaed movingits units from front line positions in the Schnee Efel area

to the area of V Corps. On 12 December CCB of the9th Armored Division was attached to V Corps, and the2d Division was attached at 1030 hours and closed inassembly areas. On 12 December the 78th Divisiontook over the center of the corps front from Lammers-dorf to Monschau, relieving the 102d Cavalry Group.To its left the 8th Division continued along the lineof the Kall to include the Brandenberg Ridge. To itsright the 99th Division still held the front fromMonschau to the corps southern boundry in the BucholzForest northwest to the Losheim Gap. The 2d Divisionwas now assembled in the Camp Elsenborn region readyto participate in the attack by passing through partof the 99th Division front... 4

V Corps order of the battle on 13 December 1944 was as follows,

front line units being listed in order from north to south:

V Corps

8th Div78th Div2d Div99th DivCCB 9th Armd Div (in reserve)102d Cav Gp (in reserve)CCR 5th Armd Div (in reserve) 5

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his account of World War II,

wrote the following in connection with the situation existing in

this area:

... Through late November and early December the badlystretched condition of our troops caused constant concern...In order to maintain the two attacks that we then consideredimportant we had to concentrate forces in the vicinity of theRoer dams on the north and bordering the Saar on the south.This weakened the static, or protective, force in the Ardennesregion. For a period we had a total of only three divisionson a front of some seventy-five miles between Trier andMonschau and were never able to place more than four in thatregion...Our conclusion was that in the Ardennes region wewere running a definite risk but we believed it to be a mis-taken policy to suspend our attacks all along the frontmerely to make ourselves safe until all reinforcements ar-riving frcm the United States could bring us up to peak

L+senbo?s Are iIsj Doc d 4'tt

'RaA#o 0 0 P

GSc1 4 ARick -0J0

° ?* ItsI

Figure 8.

'1 cAa

strengths .

Enemy situation. In the fall of 1944 the German troops and

equipment at the front were generally in a poor state after ten

years of fighting and repeated Allied bombings of industries and

transportation.

The Germans were engaged in the east along a wide front

against the Russians. On the western front the Allies were attack-

ing the border of the Homeland. The German defenders had been

forced back to the SIEGFRIED LINE and in the north to the line of

the ROER River.

Hitler, anxious to regain the initiative and bolster home

front morale, was extremely desirous of mounting an offensive. He

reasoned that no decisive objectives could be gained on the eastern

front against the unlimited Russian manpower. In the west pros-

pects looked better to him. An attack through the difficult, but

thinly held ARDENNES could with surprise cross the MEUSE River,

capture the port of ANTWERP and destroy the northern half of the

Allied Forces. The SIEGFRIED positions were to be held with a

minimum of troops. The best units were withdrawn, reorganized, and

completely reequipped for this grand offensive,

Three armies were to attack. On the north, General Dietrich's

Sixth Panzer Army; in the center, General Manteuffal's Fifth Panzer- -

Army; on the south, General Brandenburg's Seventh Panzer Army

Sixth Panzer A assigned the major effort was forced, be-

cause of the terrain and narrow front, to attack with the I SS

Panzer Corps followed by II SS. Panzer Corps.

... The plan was that the Corps was to break through on its ownsector of the enemy's main field of combat with the three infantrydivisions: the 277 VGD (right) to reach the area of Elsenborn, the12 VGD (center) T-e-rah the area of Nidrum - Weywertz, and the3 F JD (left) to reach the area of Schoppen - Elberdingen,,.

General Kraemer, chief of staff of the Sixth Panzer Army,

in his report of the commitment of that army, wrote the following

"The best division was the 12 VGD which had an especially skilled8

Commander and had fought excellently in the Battle of Aachen,"

The 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were not to be used in

the initial breakthrough, The strength of these divisions was to9

be conserved for the thrust beyond this.

... On 14 Dec 44 at noon, the Corps took over the command ofits attack sector.

Following formations were committed in the sector:277 VGD, the right wing of which stood at the edge of the

wooe aout 2 kms southeast of Alzen, and thus, inside thesector of the contiguous corps (LXVII). The left wing wasnear Losheim.

1 Bn of the neighboring corps on the left (LXVI) was nearKrewinkel.

e. Moving into the assembly areas.In the evening of the 15 Dec 44, the 12 VGD and the

3 Para Div moved into their attack sectors aE assembly areas..g. Situation immediately before the attack....,The reinforcedn o the 27 G,which was in the LXVII

Corps sector, had not been relieved, so that it was abs~ atthe beginning of the attack. This weakened the right wingattack group.

The 12 VGD had completed its preparations according toplan, £a13 a undertaken its own security.

The 3 Para Division, which had been put under Corps com-

mand on 14 Dec 44 by Army Group (Heeresgruppe), arrivedduring the early evening of the 15 Dee 44 with only tworegiments (the second regiment of which was without heavyweapons in some of the elements.)...

At 0530 hrs, the artillery opened its preparatory firel9.

Operations

Pre-battle movement. In the early days of December, the

US 8th Infantry Division of the US First Army was fighting its way

through the HURTGEN Forest in an attempt to capture the ROER River

Dams. The resistance displayed by the Germans proved too stubborn

for such a head-on attack by this depleted division. First US Army

commander, Lieutenant General Hodges, organized a new plan calling

for a strong ground thrust from the south, just north of the ARDENNES,

aimed at these all-important dams. The attack was to be made by the

2d Infantry Division on 13 December. To add more power to the

attack, US V Corps, on 8 December ordered the 644th Tank Destroyer

Battalion (minus one gun company and one reconnaissance platoon)

detached from the 8th Division and attached to the 2d Division,

then commanded by 1Major General Walter M. Robertson.

The order was received on 8 December and the battalion com-

mander accompanied by Captain Harry L. Godshall, Jr., the battalion

S-3, proceeded immediately to the headquarters of the 2d Division

located at ST. VITH, Belgium, where orders for the battalion to

proceed to SOURBRODT, Belgium, on 11 December were received

Graham and Godshall returned to the battalion area, located at

HJRT GE , Germany, on the 9th of December and plans were formulated11

for the move.

On 10 December the 817th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed), a

unit believed to be less suited for offensive operations because

its weapons were towed, relieved the 644th TD Battalion (minus

Company B and one platoon of Reconnaissance Company). The battalion

moved to SOURBRODT the next day. From this point on in this report

when the 644th TD Battalion is mentioned, i.t is to be understood

that it is referring to the battalion minus Company B and one pla-

toon of Reconnaissance Company.

On the morning of 11 December at approximately 0930 hours, the

battalion set out on its move from HURTGEN to SOURBRODT. The dis-

tance was approximately 50 miles. The weather was very dold and

all roads were covered with snow. No enemy intereference was enco-

untered, however, and the battalion completed the move without in-12

cident at 1745 hours the same day. The battalion CP was set up in

SOURBRODT and the tank destroyers were serviced and made ready for

the operations to come.

On 12 December Company A was attached to the 9th Infantry

Regiment, then located at ROCHERATH. Company A moved to the regi-

mont's assembly area located in NONSCHAU Forest north of ROCHERATH,

and closed by dark. Company C was attached to the 38th Infantry

Regiment which was at that time located at CAMP ELSENBORN. Plans

were made to move Company C forward to the regiment's assembly area

on order. The 644th TD Battalion was attached to the 2d Infantry13

Division Artillery.

The plan to capture the ROER River Dams initially called for

the 9th Infantry Regiment to pass through the positions held by the

2d Reconnaissance Troop ard the 99th Infantry Division north of

ROCHERATH, and to attack and seize that portion of the SIEGFRIED

Line located at the WEHLERSCHEID Road Junction. The regiment was

then to swing north and seize the town of ROHREN lying to the north14

beyond the MOSCHAU Forest. When the 9th Infantry had taken

WEHLERSCHEID, the 38th Infantry was to pass through the 9th and15

advance through the MONSCHAU Forest toward DREIBORN, Germany.

Operations, 13 December. At 0830 hours the 9th Infantry began

the attack as planned. The regiment advanced through the woods

along both sides of the ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIED Road. Because the

woods on both sides of this road contained many swamps, the tanks

and tank destroyers were confined to the road. With the morning

had come a sudden thaw. The snow on the road turned to slush.

Visibility was very poor. In order to gain surprise, no artillery

preparations were fired. By 1330 hours the regiment had advanced

to within 600 yards of the 'WAEHLERSCHIED Road Junction. There it

met a German strong point impervious to quick attack. The road

junction was defended by 24 enemy pillboxes placed 20 or 30 yards

apart. In front of these pillboxes was an anti-tank ditch,. a wide

belt of barbed wire concertinas, and thickly sewn anti-personnel16

mines. The ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIELD Road was also mined, thereby

denying the infantry the direct fire support of the tanks and tank

destroyers.

Operations, 14 December. On 14 December the regiment was not

successful in its efforts to seize this strong point. This was

largely due to the lack of effective supporting artillery and to17

the weather, which kept our tactical bombers grounded. On this

45

date the 644th TD Battalion forward CP moved to ROCHERATH. The

battalion forward CP, as was normal, consisted of the battalion

commander, the S-2 and S-3 sections, and the Reconnaissance Company.

Operations, 15 December. The morning of 15 December found the

weather still too hazy for the use of tactical bombing. The 9th

Infantry spent the day patrolling and probing the objective.

The 38th Infantry made plans this date to relieve the 9th In-

fantry on the 16th. The regiment planned to employ the 3d Batta-

lion in a flank attack against the position from the southeast.

During the day routes and positions Were reconnoitered for the

attached tanks and tank destroyers so that their direct fire wea-

pons could be brought to bear on the objective, thereby assisting

the 3d Battalion in the main attack. Just after dark on 15 Decem-

ber Lieutenant Colonel Walter M. Higgins, Jr., commanding officer,

2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, sent a patrol to cross the German lines.

The patrol reported the Germans off guard and an attack in strength

was made by the 2d Battalion. The attack was successful.

Operations, 16 December. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 9th In-

fantry advanced through the gap in the enemy lines, made by the

2d Battalion, prior to daylight on 16 December. By 1200 hours,

what was to be remembered as "Heartbreak Crossroads" was taken, and

the 9th Infantry was in the process of consolidating its positions.

Due to the success of the 9th Infantry attack, the 38th Infan-

try did not carry out the attack planned the previous day, but ad-

vanced north to pass through the 9th Infantry as called for in the

original plan. By 1700 hours the 38th Infantry was located in a

defensive position for the night along the high ground approxi-

mately 1100 yards directly east of the WEHLERSCHIED Road Junction,.

Company C, 644th TD Battalion, which had been in support of

the 38th Infantry was disposed as follows on 16 December: 2d Pla-

toon located just east of ROCHERATH-WEHLERSCHIED Road approximately

5500 yards north of ROCHERATH; 1st Platoon located approximately

3000 yards north of ROCHERATH and 600 yards east of the ROCHERATH-

VEHLERSCHIED Road in the vicinity of 2d Battalion, 395th Infantry

Regiment, 99th Infantry Division; the remainder of Company C was

located in ROCHERATH where the company CP had been moved this18

date.

Late in the evening of 16 December Companies A and C were

ordered released to 644th TD Battalion control as of 17 December.

On 16 December the Germans launched their counteroffensive in

the ARDENNES. Their attack extended from KESTERNICH in the north,

to include all of the LUXEMBOURG frontier in the south. In the

area immediately concerning the 2d Division the Germans had attacked

the over-extended 99th Division lines and succeeded in local pene-

trations. The US lines held, however, and by the end of the day

the situation was partially restored. The Germans had, in their

attack, succeeded in breaking contact between the 99th Division on

the north of MANDERFELD, and the 106th Division on the south of19

MANDER ELD by capturing that town.

On the afternoon of 16 December the 23d Infantry Regiment,

2d Infantry Division, then located at CAMP ELSENBORN, received

orders to attach its 1st and 3d Battalions to the 99th Division,

The lst Battalion was attached to the 394th Infantry. This bat-

talion left on trucks at 2330 hours and proceeded to BULLINGEN

where the troops were detrucked and marched southeast -to HUNNINGEN

where the battalion took up a defensive position. The 3d Battalion

was attached to the 393d Infantry, and .left its area on trucks at

1400 hours. At 1630 hours the battalion arrived at the western

edge of KRINKELT Forest and immediately deployed north and south of

the road, in the 393d Infantry area.

The 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, under 23d Infantry

control, was moved at 1345 hours a distance of approximately 15

miles by truck to an assembly area 3000 yards north of KRINKELT,20

arriving at 1430 hours.

Operations, 17 and 18 December. Early on 17 December the

German 1st SS Panzer Division committed its armor in the attack.

The division smashed to the northwest on the railroad running from

LOSHIEM to BUTGENBACH, and averran the town of HONSFELD. By 0830

hours the armored force was in BDLLINGEN, and shortly thereafter

sent an armored thrust northwest toward the villages of WIRTZFELD21

and KRINKELT.

The 644th TD Battalion received information of the heavy

armor attack advancing toward BULLINGEN. One platoon of the Recon-

naissance Company, commanded by First Li tenant Edward B. Patterson,

was immediately sent to establish and maintain contact with the

enemy tanks. The platoon was surrounded in BULLINGEN and the

1st Section was captured. The 2d Section escaped capture by

breaking from the encirclement.

To meet the enemy armor thrust driving from the southeast

1st Platoon, Company C, 644th TD Battalion, and one platoon of the

741st Tank Battalion were ordered to pick up infantry of the 23d

Infantry and proceed south. At 0845 hours the tank destroyers and

tanks contacted Company E. 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, north of

ROCHERATH. With the company of infantry mounted on the tanks and

tank destroyers, the small force moved south through ROCHERATH and

into KRINKELT. Colonel Stokes, assistant division commander, 2d

Infantry Division, met these tanks and tank destroyers at KIIN~ELT.

He ordered the tank destroyers and that part of Company E mounted

on them to go to WIRTZFELD. The four tanks and accompanying infan-

try, he ordered to BULLINGEN under Captain Byrd. The tanks had

gone only a short distance out of KRINKELT when they encountered

a Mark IV tank, a half track, and an armored car. The infantry dis-

mounted and took cover while the tanks prepared to open fire. Menn-

while the three tank destroyers hich .had turned right toward

WIRTZFELD sighted the enemy vehicles.. After the infantry had dis-

mounted, the tank destroyers immediately, opened fire and knocked

out all three enemy vehicles. The infantry from the tanks and tank

destroyers joined forces and captured 12 prisoners who were hiding22

along the road in the vicinity of the three enemy vehicles.

Company A (minus 2d Platoon), 644th TD Battalion, had been

ordered to WIRTZFELD early on the morning of 17 December and ar-

rived just as the 1st Platoon, Company C, had knocked out the three

enemy vehicles. The commanding officer, Company A, was wounded by

a shell fragment and evacuated. First Lieutenant Clarence Steves

assumed command of Company A and was ordered to provide anti-armor

defense for WIRTZFELD, relieving Company C without delay. Conmand-

ing officer, Company C, was ordered to provide anti-armor defense

for ROCHERATH-KRINKELT area. With the bulk of the battalion located

in WIRTZFELD and KRINKELT, the forward CP (minus the Reconnaissance

Company) was moved to WIRTZFELD. Captain Godshall, the battalion

S-3, was ordered to take command of Company A late in the afternoon

of this date. The commanding officer 38th Infantry assumed re-23

sponsibility for the defense of ROCHERATH-KRINKELT area.

The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion (minus

Company K), 9th Infantry had moved from WEHLERSCHIED down to

WIRTZFELD about noon on 17 December. The 2d Battalion was given

the mission of protecting the road out of WIRTZFELD to the east.

The 3d Battalion (minus Company K) was positioned between WIRTZFELD

and BULLINGEN with the mission of protecting WIRTZFELD from the

direction of BULLINGEN which was in the hands of the Germans. The

commanding officer, 9th Infantry was made responsible for the de-

fense of WIRTZFELD where his CP was now located.

From the time the elements of the tank destroyer battalion

moved to WIRTZFELD and KRINKELT, heavy artillery fell throughout

the area.

On 17 December the Germans pushed forward directly from the

east in an attempt to take ROCHERATH and KRINKELT, and joined its

southern forces attacking toward BULLINGEN and BUTGENBACH. The

enemy unit making this attack directly from the east was the German

277 Volksgrenadier Division reinforced with assault guns. The plan

for this attack was recorded by General Kraemer as follows:

.. ,The 277 Volks Gren Div was to continue their attach-onboth sides of U rebrt past Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld fro a laterassault on Sourbrodt, south Elsenborn. The division was rein-forced by an assault gun detachment that had not been ready forthe commitment on 16 Dec (because the last parts of this detach-ment could only be extricated during the night 15/15 Dec).: Itwas to be expected that the division with their attack in thedirection of Elsenborn would gain terr' 4n and contain the enemyforces that were situated in this area.o.

The seriousness of the attack was realized by Major General Walter

M. Robertson, the 2d Infantry Division commander. One platoon of

Company A, 644th TD Battalion was sent to guard the crossroads

located about 1400 yards east of ROCHERATH. Also sent to this lo-

cation were the Armunition and Pioneer Platoon, Company K and 1st

Platoon, Company M,.. all elements of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry.

Orders to proceed to this location were received while this unit

was proceeding south between ROCHERATH and WIRTZFELD. The units

bearing the brunt of the German attack aimed east toward ROCHERATH

were those of: the 23d and 393d Infantry Regiments. It was apparent

that this line was about to give way to the German thrust.

The movement of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, to the south

was intercepted by General Robertson about 4000 yards north of

ROCHERATH. The battalion was ordered to move to the road junction

recently occupied by the platoon of Company A, 644th TD Battalion.

General Robertson punctuated the urgency of the situation by person-

ally loading the leading elements of the infantry in commandeered

22 ton trucks and leading them to within 1000 yards of the road25

net. The commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry had orders

to command all friendly troops in the area. The battalion managed

to get Companies A and B astride the road facing southeast just as

darkness fell.

The commanding officer, 1st Battalion, having of necessity

left all the battalion anti-tank mines in the WEHLERSCHIED area,

contacted the tank destroyer platoon leader and arranged for the use26

of anti-tank mines in the possession of the tank destroyer platoon.

The problem of setting up a defense in this area, at this time, was

extremely difficult. The elements in contact with the enemy were

falling back in a disorganized fashion. The area was subjected to

direct enemy machine gun fire. With darkness setting in the units

attempted to set up their defenses in an unfamiliar area.

The commanding officer, Company I, 23d Infantry arrived with-

out men from the east. He was shown the area he would occupy and

defend when and if he could get control of his company. A hurried

defense plan was given the company commanders at the 1st Battalion

CP, located 300 yards northwest of the crossroads.

The battalion artillery liaison officer had been out of con-

tact with his artillery battalion for over two hours. He worked

feverishly to restore cornunications and as darkness set in he

succeeded, He immediately planned his defensive fires along the27

road in front of the position.

With the darkness came the first enemy attack. The entire

situation was confusing. While the enemy was attacking, elements

of the withdrawing front line units were entering the battalion's

position from the same direction. In attempting to allow friendly

elements to pass into this position, enemy vehicles, including

tanks, were allowed to pass through, When this was discovered, a

"daisy chain", made of the tank destroyer platoon's antitank mines,

was dragged across the road. This measure along with artillery fire

support and direct fires from the battle position stopped the attack.

By midnight this force had destroyed five enemy tanks and an un-

determined number of foot troops. Throughout the night artillery

fire was placed continuously in front of the position.

At 0645 hours on 18 December the full force of the German

armor fell in this zone. Every means at hand was employed to repel

this attack, but the task became impossible. Had it not been for a

platoon of Company A, 741st Tank Battalion, which was sent forward

to the position about noon, this unit could not have been withdrawn.

By employing tremendous amounts of artillery fire and counterattacks

by the tank platoon, the defenders were able to withdraw through the

2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, and assemble 2000 yards northwest of

ROCHERATH,

For this action at the crossroads near ROCHERATH, known to the

men of the battalion as "Purple Heart Corner", the 1st Battalion,

.9th Infantry, received a Presidential Citation. Throughout this

entire defensive action, the 2d Platoon, Company A, 644th TD Batta-

lion, remained in its position at the crossroads, lending its support

to the 1st Battalion. The platoon withdrew with the 1s-t Battalion.

This platoon proceeded to KRINKELT on the afternoon of 18 December

and was attached to :Company C, 644th TD Battalion.

The German's view of the action of 18 December on this front as

expressed by General Kraemer, was as follows:

... The attempts, to win the roads from Monschau to Euskir-chen to the camp at Elsenborn, and from there the roads fromBullingen to Weismes, were continued in cooperation with277 V.G.D., that continued the attacks near Udenbreth.

The 277 V.G.D. advanced well forward on 18 Dec, and tookthe heigts n or h of Wirtzfeld. With this the Division wasfreed and together with the 12 V.G.D. could attack in thedirection of Elsenborn. This was ordered for the 19 Dec.The attacks -- Monschau -- and Elsenborn -- had to be underthe direction of LXVII Corps.

The 12 V.G.D, Cal togetr with the 12 SS Pz Div takenBuellingen aFer a hard battle. Both dTisions ought forthe village Butgenbach against a strongly defended enemy,who for the first time attacked with tanks. 2 8

When the 644th TD Battalion CP moved from ROCHERATH to WIRTZ-

FELD on 17 December, the Reconnaissance Company (minus one platoon)

remained in its position in ROCHERATH. At about 2030 hours that

night the Germans who had passed through, and to the south of the

defensive position of the Ist Battalion, 9th Infantry, forced their

attack into ROCHERATH. The attack fell in the area of the Recon-

naissance Company, The CP group was organized by the commanding

officer and the company attempted to repel the enemy attack. The

company managed to hold off the attackers until late in the morning

of 18 December, at which time the attack ceased. During this action

the company destroyed an enemy tank, damaged another, and accounted

for about 20 casualties among the enemy. The company lost all ve-

hicles open to the attackers view, but suffered only minor personnel

casualties.

On 18 December the commanding officer, 644th TD Battalion, was

made responsible for the anti-armor defense of the WIRTZFELD area.

Company C, 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed), and three guns of

the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) were attached to the

644th TD Battalion. Throughout the day of 18 December elements of

the 394th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry withdrew through

the defensive positions of the WIRTZELD-KRINKELT area,

The 801st TD Battalion had been attached to the 99th Division

since 9 November 1944. This battalion had met the brunt of the

German attack with the 99th Division. The three guns attached to

the 644th TD Battalion on 18 December were of the 1st Platoon,

Company A. These were the only guns remaining in Company A.

Lieutenant Colonel F. B. Horsfall, commanding officer, 801st TD

Battalion wrote of this in the unit's after action reports

..,18 Dec - At 0215A the 1st plat of Co A was ordered toproceed to WIRTZFELD thru KRINKELT. Upon reaching WIRTZFELDthey met with the 23d Regt, 2d Div. There they set up ATdefense on the North and East side of town with their remain-ing three guns. The rest of the Co. which had lost the majorityof its equipment were employed with the infantry...

All of the remaining guns of the Bn, less three in IRTZFELD,were placed East of Elsenborn in AT defense. A provisional

55

company was organized from these gun crews and placed underthe command of the Co C commander...

The concensus of opinions of the plat leaders and thegun crews are that if it had not been for the fact of thenon-mobility of the towed gun and the lack of armor pro-tection for the gun crews and in most cases the over-run-ning of the gun positions by the infantry many more tanksand vehicles could have been destroyed...

Enemy action on 18 December in the area consisted of armor

and infantry attacks from the south and southeast. None of the

attacks were successful, but the pressure being brought to bear by

the powerful enemy caused the U. S. forces to plan a withdrawal to

the better defensive terrain of ELSENBORN Ridge approximately two

miles west of ROCHERATH and WIRTZFELD. The pulling back of the

forward units of V Corps resulted in the concentration of force in

a tight semicircle to the west of ELSENBORN.

Operations, 19 December. The withdrawal was planned for the

night of 19 December. Enemy artillery fire was moderate during the

withdrawal. Company C covered the withdrawal from ROCHERATH -

KRINKELT as rear guard. Company A covered the withdrawal from

WIRTZFELD which was set on fire. The withdrawal was accomplished

without undue difficulty.

On ELSE BORN Ridge, Prior to daylight on° 20 December, one

platoon of Company C moved into position on the high ground east of

BERG in support of the 38th Infantry. Company A moved into reserve

in ELSENBORN. One platoon of Company A moved to high ground east

of ELSENBORN to provide anti-armor protection from the east. The

battalion forward CP was established in BERG.

On the morning of 20 December the 2d Division commander,

ajor General Robertson, called the commanding officer, 644th TD30

Battalion, to personally commend the battalion.

General Kraemer recorded the actions of the Germans in this

area on the 19th of December as follows:

... 19 December:On that day the enemy countermeasures were quite obvious..

The enemy resistance at the LXVII Army Corps was growing.Counterattacks were made in t henorth. he terrain capturedduring the preceding days had to be given up. Kalterherbergsouth of Monschau was taken. The 277 VG Div reached the roadForsterei Wahlerscheid-Rocherath. ER wole, no perceptibleprogress was made.- On 18 Dec, a Volksartillery Corps wasattached to the LjX:I Army Cors and was moving up to the newpositions.

The 12 SS Pz Div and 12 VG Div of the I SS Pz Corps couldno more aRvanoe against the increasing enemy fores. Theterrain being very muddy, the .nfantry advanced only slowly,and the tanks could not be committed off from the road. Enemyanti-tank guns and tanks were Well emplaced. Stronger artil-lery fire and the difficult terrain would probably prevent ourbreakthrough past Buettgenbaoh, because it was no more possiblef6r the attacking forces to move into the assembly positions.Evidently the two divisions did not find the appropriate ter-rain for the attack, the ba talions could not advance on themuddy ground and had to use the roads, where they were exposedto the enemy artillery. That caused temporarily an incoordi-nated direction of the two divisions, Tanks, that during themorning hours had found by-passing road south of Buettgenbachbroke down in the mud at the west end of the village and onlyat night could be removed from there with great difficulties.A further advance was impossible the weather continued likethis. Therefore, the Army gave order in the afternoon thatthe 12 SS Pz Div cease the attack, be extracted rapidly andassembe in te earea Baasen - Losheim - Mandoersfeld, and besent either after the 1 SS Pz or the 9 SS Pz Div.

mm . During the period covered by this report the 644th

TD Battalion's offensive operations were severely limited due to

the terrain and weather. The method in which the battalion opera-

ted is shown however-, As was normal, the battalion itself was

attached to division artillery. The companies were attached to the

infantry regiments. The platoons were attached to the infantry

battalions. 'hen working with infantry on the offensive, the

battalion attempted to operate in units no larger than platoon

strength.

On the defensive the battalion operated where possible in

company strength. At times however, when it was more suitable, it

operated in platoon strength. Also, because of their flexible or

ganization, there were times when platoons were attached to com-

panies of the battalion other than their parent companies.

In regard to destroying enemy armor in this operation, the

38th Infantry recorded the following:

... In the attack, every effort was made to keep tanks andTD's well forward to place direct fire on enemy fortificationsand to repel any counterattacks. When the enemy launched hisoffensive available elements of 741st Tk Bn and 644th TD Bn,SP, were employed to counter enemy armor. Because of the su-perior firepower and frontal armor of the enemy tanks, ourarmor was employed in TD fashion, taking up firing positionsalong the flanks of approaches and placing their fire on theflank and rear of enemy tanks. Normal procedure in counteringenemy armored attacks on Rochorath and Krinkelt were to takeenemy armor under fire with medium artillery before it reachedour lines; then to hit individual tanks from the flank withour tanks, TD's and 57 mm AT guns, and mop up infiltrations.Destroyed were set afire with gasoline-oil mixes poured onthem and with thermite grenades set in gunbarrels which burnedthrough the barrels. The 57mm AT gun proved very unsatis-factory, only one effective hit being scored on the turret ofone enemy tank. Medium artillery proved effective in breakingup enemy tank formations. The close teamwork between infantry,artillery, tanks and TD's accounted for 69 known enemy tanks,plus several armored trucks and scout cars3,

When the 2d Division had completed its withdrawal to the

ELSENBORN Ridge area, General Hodges phoned the following message

to General Robertson: 'WVhat the 2d Division has done in these past

four days will live forever in the history of the United States

33Army."

The 644th TD Battalion indeed playqd an important part in the

defense of this area, for during the period starting on the morning

of 17 December and ending on the night of 19 December, the batta-

lion destroyed 17 enemy tanks, knocked out two SP guns, and damaged

two enemy tanks,

Lsti@ and PerSomnl-

General. The 644th TD Battalion during the period covered by

this report was well supplied with materiels and personnel. Moving

supplies from the battalion CP located at SOURBRODT to the forward

CP in ROCHERATH became a problem when the Germans launched their

counteroffensive. The only practical route from SOURBRODT to the

forward CP was the ELSENBORN-BUTGEB3ACH-BULLINGEN-KRINKELT road.

On the morning of 17 December a battalion supply convoy moving to

the west, met the advancing Germans on the eastern edge of

BULLINGEN. The supply vehicles were able to withdraw to ELSENBORN.

Only after much difficulty did they succeed in reaching the forward

CP by moving over foot trails southeast of ELSENBORN. Many routes

appeared on the map in. this area but these routes proved to be but

trails. An engineer unit made a road from WIRTZFELD to ELSENBORN

by enlarging one of these trails and it was used by all units in

the area for both supply and withdrawal.

59

FIRST ARMOR ACROSS THE ROERFigure 9. An M-10 of the 64.4th TD Battalion.

~: -

~i--

Class I. At no time were Class I supplies short in supplyb.

Prior to 17 December the rations were picked up by company vehicles

from the battalion CP These consisted of 5 in 1 rations and wheh

available, fresh meats and vegetables were sent forward. Three

days supply of rations were carried with each unit. The company

kitchen trucks were kept in the battalion CP area.

Classes II and IV. These classes of supply presented no

problem. The only items not readily available were certain ord-

nance items. Due to the proximity of division and army supporting

ordnance units and readily available transportation, these needed

items could be obtained with little difficulty.

Class III. Because this unit was equipped with M-10 motor gun

carriage, the fuel problem would have been that of diesel fuel.

There was at no time however, any shortage in this fuel*. There was

also no problem in the supply of gasoline.

Class V. Ammunition supply was no problem during this period.

There seemed to be always more than enough small arms ammunition

available. This unit had opportunity to replace their 3 inch motor

gun carriage, M-10 with the M-18 at various times in Europe. How-

ever, because the supply of 3 inch ammunition seemed always to be

adequate, the commander retained the M-10. Such was the case during

this operation, an adequate supply of 3 inch ammunition was at all

times available. HVAP (high velocity armor piercing) proved most

effective and was in good supply.

Mnntenance this battaii h Was well traihed in Vehidular

maintenance. Because of this the maintenance problem was kept to a

minimum, Also, because of the excellent availability of Class II

supplies and the availability of ordnance units, no serious prob-

lems were encountered,.

Communications. This battalion used much wire. It made a

practice of installing wire between its CP and the switchboard of

the division to which it was attached. The forward CP also in-

stalled wire to the nearest regimental switchboard. Because of

this, radio had to be used only between platoons and as a supple-

mentary means of communications for forward and rear CP's and the

companies.

Personnel. This battalion was kept to its authorized strength

most of the time. The replacements received were seldom tank de-

stroyer personnel. However, because the battalion had lost only

between 10 and 15 percent of the personnel it landed with in

NORAtIDY, the training of these replacements presented no problem.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER Iy

1

Unit History, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, p 17.2Ibid, p 18.

"FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY, Report of Operations, 1 August1944 - 22 February 1945" (U.S. War Dept.), p 95.

4Ibid, p 96.

Ibid, p 97.6General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in

Europe, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1948),p 337.

7"Commitment of the I SS Panzer Corps during the Ardennes

Offensive (16 Dec - 25 Jan 45)", a translation of interrogationof Gruppcnfuehrer Hermann Priess, Commanding General I SS PanzerCorps, in March 1946, (MS # A-877), p 9.

8"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/

45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 PanzerArmy, (MS #A-924), p 13.

9"Commitment of the I SS Panzer Corps during the Ardennes

Offensive (16 Dec - 25 Jan 45)", a translation of interrogation ofGruppenfuehrer Hermann Priess, Commanding General I SS Panzer Corps,in March 1946, (MS #A-877), p 10.

10"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/

45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 PanzerArmy, (MS #A-924), pp 24-26.

11After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December

1944, p 2.12Ibid, p 2.

13Ibid, p 2.

14After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, p 5.15After-Action Report, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, p 2.16

"Combat History of the Second Infantry Division in World WarII", p 84.

17After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, p 27.18After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion,

December 1944, p 2.19After-Action Report, G-2, 2d Infantry Division, December

1944, p 3.

20After-Action Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, p 10..21

After-Action Report, G-2, 2d Infantry Division, December1944, p 4.

22After-Action Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December, 1944, p 11,23

After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December1944, p 3.

24"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/

45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 Panzer Army,(MS #A-924), pp 29-30,

25After-action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, pp 12-13,.26Ibid, p 13.

27Ibid, p 14.

28

"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 PanzerArmy, (MS #A-924), p 33.

29After-Action Report, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, December

1944, pp 5-6.30

After-Action Report, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, December1944, p 4.

31"Commitment of the Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes 1944/

45", a translation of General Kraemer, chief of staff, 6 PanzerArmy, (MS # A-924), pp 36-37.

32After-Action Report, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, December 1944, p 7.33

After-Action Report, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d InfantryDivision, December 1944, p 19.

CHAPTER 8

704TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

On 11 July 1944 the T04th Tank Destroyer Battalion left the

marshalling area in southern England and boarded LCT's at South-

hampton. On the following day the battalion landed on Utah Beach on

the iormandy coast of Prance. Shortly afterwards the battalion

joined the recently arrived 4th Armored Division.

On the morning of 17 July the battalion left the beach area

with the 4th Armored Division and went into a defensive position in

the vicinity of Raids, France. The battalion was in general support

of CCB, 4th Armored Division with the mission of furnishing indirect

fire for the front line armored infantry battalions.

The battalion took up firing positions in fields approxi-

mately one half mile behind the armored infantry battalions. The

battalion remained under control of its own battalion commanddr and

his staff. It was assisted in its fire missions, which consisted of

firing at enemy observation posts, snipers in buildings and church

steeples, and area targets in the orchards, by the forward observers

of the 4th Armored Artillery battalions and by the mortar platoon

leaders of the armored infantry battalions. Although much firing

was done, the extent of damage was never ascertained.

Through the month of August and early September the 404th

moved with the 4th Armored Division in the exploitation phase of the

Battle of France. During this exploitation the 7O4th lost its in-

tegrity as a battalion operating under command of its battalion

commander. It was decentralized and its units were attached to the

64

Combat Commands of the 4th Armored Division. One company was attached

to Combat Command A; one oompany to Combat Command B; and the remain-

ing company and the Battalion Headquarters were attached to the Re-

serve Command.

In this manner of attachment the company commanders remained

at the Combat Command comoand post and received their orders from

the Combat Command commander or his representative. In turn the

company conmmanders would transmit their orders to their platoon

leaders whose platoons would normally be supporting a reinforced

tank battalion.

The battalion comrpander and his staff kept in close touch

with his company commanders by personal visits to the Combat Command

command posts. Supply, evacuation, and replacements were executed

through the logistical channels of the 4th Armored Division.

Undoubtedly one of the most descriptive and typical examples

of the use of tank destroyers with both the infantry and armored

units was the action of the 704th during the Battle of Arracourt,

France. There the speed, maneuveribility and firepower of the tank

destroyers were exploited in their fullest; with results that were

successful beyond even the highest hopes of the backers of this type1

of anti-tank tactics.

The general situation was as follows: During the early part

of September the Third Army was making rapid progress against what

appeared to be a somewhat confused German Army, The unrelenting

pressure exerted against the enemy lines was practically impossible

for the Germans to contain for more than brief periods of time.

Without a doubt the Americans were on the move; and they had every

intent of keeping the offensive rolling.

On the 16th of September General Patton got his Corps Com-

manders together and gave them two important objectives as their

next missions. The XX Corps was to advance as rapidly as possible

and seize FRANKFORT. The XII Corps' mission was the capture of

DARMSTADT and the establishing of a bridgehead east of the Rhine.

The XV Corps was to follow the XII Corps and be prepared to take

MANTHEIM on order.

The tentative target date for the XII Corps attack was set

for the 18th of September. The maneuver plan was a column of divi-

sions with the 4th Armored Division in the lead. It was decided to

2strike between SARREGUEMINES and SAARBRUCKEN.

As was stated, the penetrating force was to be the 4th

Armored Division. It was to be followed by General Paul Baade's

35th Infantry Division whose mission was to send one regiment to

accompany the armor, and to use the remainder in widening the gap,

General Horace McBride's 80th Infantry Division was told to mop up

any remaining pockets of enemy resistance, got behind the attacking

column, take SAARBRUCKEN, and continue on to the RHINE.

This was the general plan for a rapid advance to the RHINE,

but as usual, the Germans had ideas of their own. They were already

on the march to launch a counterattack with elements of their Fifth

Panzer Army, which most certainly was going to interrupjhe

66

execution of the Third Army's plans.

On the 18th of September General John 8. Wood, commander of

the 4th Armored Division, issued orders for the resumption of the

advance on the following day: CCB to move from DELME ON SAARBRUCKEN,

CCA was to move from the ARRACOURT area along the center road in the

XII Corps zone (MORHANGE, PUTTELANGE) and by using subsidiary roads

on the south flank towards SARREGUIMINES.

But the Germans did a little attacking of their own on the

18th of September at LUNEVILLE, forcing CCA to send a task force to

help CCR whose position at LUNEVILLE was being menaced.

And so, on the night of the 18th of September the 4th Armored

Division was situated as follows:

CCR had thrown off the German attack with minor losses and

was holding its position.

CCB was deployed near FRESNES-EN-SAULNOIS, ready for its

attack on SAARBRUCKEN on the following day.

CCA, minus the task force it had sent to CCR, was assembled3

about 12 miles southeast of ARRACOURT.

Since our first account of tank destroyer action concerns it-

self with the tank destroyers attached to CCA, the details as to the

position of units of that command are of importance.

The sector assigned to CCA was an extended one, reaching

from CHAMBREY south nearly to the MARNE-RHINE CANAL. The protection

of the north flank between CHAMBREY and ARRACOURT was the responsi-

bility of an armored infantry battalion reinforced with a company of

medium tanks.

Another medium tank company, Company C of the 37th Tank

Battalion, was the combat outpost at the crossroads at LEZEY, about

4 or 5 miles northeast of ARRACOURT,

CCA Headquarters, the attached field artillery, and a pla-

toon of tank destroyers were grouped in and around ARRACOURT. The

attached engineers held the south flank.

It seems that at this time, the night of the 18th of

September, CCA was additionally told to protect the city of NANCY.

Reports from air observers and ground reconnaissance patrols had

stated that elements of a German Panzer Division, the 111th Panzer

Brigade, and units of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division were con-

centrating to the southeast of ARRACOURT. It was thought that the

Germans were preparing an attack against the bridgehead at NANCY;4

hence, the mission of the protection of NANCY for CCA.

What was actually occurring was that the German 113th Panzer

Brigade, with 42 Panther tanks of the Mark V Battalion, and the

2113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had moved from BOURDONNAY in a

successful night march, reorganized its advance guard near LEY, and

was pushing its way toward BEZANGE.

At this point it is of extreme importance to talk about the

weather, for it actually played a major role throughout the fight-

ing. There was a seemingly permanent heavy fog coupled with mist

and rain at intervals. Actually, the fog was so dense at times that

visibility was to all practical purposes non-existent. This fog

68

played a dual role in that it protected the German armor from air

attack, but at the same time permitted American armor to fight at

close quarters where the larger range of the German Panther tank gun5

was of no advantage.

The stage was now set for action. It was early in the foggy

morning of the 19th of September. German armored units were gener-

ally known to be in the area. CCA was deployed as described pre-

viously, and was preparing for its own advance while awaiting the

return of the task force it had sent to the aid of CCR at LUNEVILLE.

Captain Evans, the commander of Company C, 704th Tank De-

stroyer Battalion, (the company attached to CCA) stated that at this

time his mission was that of supporting the anti-tank mission of the

tanks, and when necessary, to furnish protection for the combat

trains going to and from the Division Supply Point.

The first reported contact with the German armor occurred

near LESEY where Company C of the 37th Tank Battalion was outposted.

A section of M-4 tanks were in position just south of LESEY when

suddenly out of the dense fog which permeated the area appeared a

Panther tank, hardly 75 yards from the two American tanks. The

Panther, and two additional German tanks were destroyed almost with-

in a matter of seconds; the remaining German tanks turned away in a6

southerly direction.

Now Lt. Leiper and the 3d Platoon of Capt. Evans' company of

the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion enter the picture with their

brilliant action against the German armored thrust. As told by

Lt. Leiper, this is what happened:

For some time prior to the 19th of September, Company C of

the 704th was assisting in manning the combat outpost on the high

ground north of ARRACOURT. Its Command Post was located at XANREY

and the company had two platoons placed on the line on the ground

east of MOYENVIC and its 3d Platoon in reserve with CCA Headquarters

in ARRACOURT. Their system was alternating the platoons every three

days to give each one some rest from the guard detail. The 51st

Armored Infantry was deployed along the MOYENVIC line and the tank

destroyers were being used as an infantry support team. Along the

same line, but just west of LESEY was Capt. Tanner with tanks of the

35th Tank Battalion.

On the night of the 18th of September the 3d Platoon of

Company C, with Lt. Leiper in command, was brought back to ARRACOURT

after being relieved from its tour on the line. It had spent an

extra day on the front and was tired and ready for a little rest.

There had been no anti-tank action on the line, but the machine guns

of the tank destroyers had been used effectively against enemy night

patrols attempting to pierce the area. And so the platoon bedded

down, with no forethought of any action in the immediate future,

About 0730 of the 19th of September Lt. Webb, the Communica-

tion Officer of CCA, rushed in to Lt. Leiper and told him to alert

his platoon immediately but could offer no explanation as to the

reason for the emergency. A short time later, Capt. Dwight, a

liaison officer from the 37th Tank Battalion hurried in and asked if

the platoon was ready. By this time Lt. Leiper was sure something

big was up, and his thoughts were confirmed with the arrival of

Colonel Clark, CCA commander, who ordered the platoon to follow

Capt. Dwight to a certain HILL 279 and take up positions there as an

outpost.

But further than that, Lt. Leiper had no idea as to the

enemy situation or as to what was occurring in the immediate area.

Probably no one knew exactly what was happening, except that there

were a lot of German tanks rumbling around the zone.

Lt. Leiper and his platoon followed Capt. Dwight on the road

to RECHICOURT. It is interesting to note that Lt. Leiper, as pla-

toon leader, did not ride in a tank destroyer, but rode at the head

of his platoon in a jeep. This type of guidance had been decided

upon by the tank destroyer Battalion Commander in England who had

reasoned that it gave the platoon leader a better chance to direct

the actions of his 5 tank destroyers; whereas, if he were squeezed

in one of the tank destroyers he would be more apt to fight the one

tank destroyer rather than the five.

As they reached RECHICOURT, enemy fire started coming in

from the east, and Capt. Dwight jumped from his jeep to ask Lt.

Leiper if he thought it was direct fire; and it certainly was.

Again, the rain and fog made it impossible to determine exactly

where the shooting was coming from.

The platoon ontinued through RECHICOURT and was relieved to

recognize an American jeep barreling down the road from BESSINGEN.

Lt. Leiper turned his platoon off the main road in RECHICOURT and

started north on a narrow lane for about one thousand yards to the

vicinity of HILL 246. They then started cross country up toward

HILL 279 which had woods to the front and the right.

As the hill was approached, Lt. Leiper, who was still in

front with his jeep, was startled to see the muzzle of a German

tank gun sticking out through the trees at what seemed to be less

than 30 feet away He immediately gave the dispersal signal and the

many months of continuous practice proved its worthiness as the

platoon promptly deployed with perfect accord.

The lead tank destroyer, commanded by Sgt. Stacey, had

evidently seen the German tank at the same time as Lt. Leiper, and

opened fire immediately. Its first round scored a direct hit, ex-

ploding the German tank. The flames of the burning tank revealed

others behind it in a V-formation, and Sgt. Stacey's next round hit

a second German tank, but immediately afterwards he had his own tank

destroyer knocked out by fire from a third German tank. This enemy

Mark IV was taken under fire by the No. 2 tank destroyer, and was

destroyed. The maneuver and fire of the 3d tank destroyer got an-

other German tank as it tried to back out of the unhealthy situa-

tion, and a fifth enemy tank was destroyed almost immediately there-

after.

The entire affair was over in a matter of minutes, and as

soon as the shooting had stopped, Lt. Leiper ordered the platoon to

the area to make sure the enemy tanks were all out of action and to

be certain that there were no more there.

The box score for that short action stood at 5 Gbmn tanks

destroyed, and one tank destroyer knocked out of action. The tank

destroyer had been hit on an angle along the base of its gun barrel

and through the gun shield. The ricocheting round had bounced

around the interior of the tank.

The platoon withdrew about five hundred yards to a defi-

laded position behind a small rise. Security sections were posted

around the perimenter and the damaged tank was sent back under its

own power so that the injured could get medical care immediately.

The assistant driver had been killed at once, and all the others

except the gun sergeant had been wounded by the ricocheting shell.

After this engagement Lt. Leiper stated that he no longer permitted

the assistant driver to stay in the tank destroyer when action was

imminent. He served no practical purpose then as assistant driver

but just sat around and waited; and Lt. Leiper decided that to place

a man in such a position uselessly was not good thinking; and there-

fore he put the assistant drivers at other tasks when fighting was

close.

The tank destroyers were placed in position as near as

possible in the direction that the enemy was thought to be. The fog

stayed in all the low areas continuously--and it was still raining...

Lt. Leiper and his sergeant made a reconnaissance of the area for

the next hour trying to find the enemy locations. They succeeded

only in receiving small-arms fire from the left and in hearing tanks

moving about on the right of their positions.

Shortly after returning to the platoon defense area, Lt.

Leiper and some of his men saw a number of tanks moving on the crest

of a hill some twenty five hundred yards away in the area between

BESSINGEN and RECHICOURT. They were able to see them because the

fog was confined to the valleys and low spots. Because it was

known that the 1st Tank Destroyer Platoon of Company C was in the

area fire was withheld initially. However, when the sixth tank was

counted it was obvious that they must be German, and the platoon

opened fire. Either four or five of the tanks (they were Mark IVs)

were knocked out. At this time the attached field artillery batta-

lion under Lt Col Parker opened fire on the tanks who were accom-

panied by infantry, and the enemy was dispersed.

More time of tense waiting went by. A liaison plane was

seen overhead dodgin in and out of th$ clouds. The plane was that

of Tajor Carpenter, who had figured out a method of attaching bazoo-

kas to the wings. They saw him dive behind them into the fog and

fire his bazookas.

The flash from the exploding bazooka shells revealed three

German tanks that had obviously circled around the 3d Platoon and

were making their way up the back of the hill to their positions.

Lt. Leiper pulled a tank destroyer around and brought its

fire on the tanks destroying two of them before the 3d one's fire

hit the right sprocket of the tank destroyer knocking it out of

action. Lt. Leiper signalled for another tank destroyer to come up

with a tow to pull the damaged tank ddstroyer back, but before the

plan could be put into action the second tank destroyer was also

hit--this one through the gun shield, It was reported that most of

the tank destroyers that were destroyed were knocked out by hits on

the gun shield, and it was thought that this was probably due to the

fact that the gun blast made it a good target point.

Lt. Leiper pulled back his one remaining tank destroyer to

defilade, dismounted his other men and set up a perimeter defense

using the machine guns from the damaged tank destroyers.

There the platoon stayed until about 1500 when far to the

right near RECHICOURT the 1st Platoon of Company C 704th made its

appearance.

For some unknown reason several German tanks came out of a

wooded area and attempted to cross the cemetery near MONOCOURT mak-

ing perfect targets of themselves. Before they could get back to

cover two of them were stopped by hits in the rear of their tanks by

the 3d Platoon's last tank destroyer.

Then the enemy infantry tried an attack but the emplaced

machine guns changed their minds immediately.

Finally, Major Hunter, with a platoon of tanks from the 35th

Tank Battalion arrived and relieved the dead-tired but still deter-

mined members of the 3d Platoon who went back to ARRACOURT for their7

well-earned rest. Capt. Leach, Company Commander of Company B of

the 37th Tank Battalion stated that the entire Combat Command was

amazed at the terrific fight put up by the tank destroyer platoon

and confirmed the fact that fifteen German tanks had been destroyed8

by the platoon's fire during that day.

On the 20th of September CCA was ordered to continue toward

SARREGU MINES. However, after several hours of road marching, CCA

received word that German tanks had returned to ARRACOURT which CCA

had just left (actually, only eight German tanks had returned). CCA

dispatched a company of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers to

take care of the Germans, This was done as ordered, with the entire9

force of German tanks destroyed.

On the 21st of September CCA received orders to utilize the

remainder of the day and the nextday for a rest period. This was

needed as a result of the tank battles around ARRACOURT, and for

preparation for an attack against CHATEAU-SALINS.

However, on the morning of the 22d of September the Germans

attacked CCA on its left flank which was being protected by the 25th

Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized. Company C 704 was dispatched to

drive the Germans off.

Company C took the situation in hand, and again against

numerically superior Germans destroyed seven tanks, and then caused

the remainder of the force to go into a disorganized retreat.

While Company C 704th had been with CCA, Company A 704 was

attached to CCB, 4th Armored Division, and Headquarters 704th was

attached to Reserve Command, 4th Armored Division.

Company A worked with CCB in the area from DROUVILLE-

SALLONES on the 16th of September and remained there until the

21st of September when it moved near PRESNES'EN-SAULNOIS

On the 24th of September the enemy was encountered near

DROUVILLE-SALLONES and four tanks were destroyed. No tank destroyers

were lost. Capt. Ryan was wounded in this action and evacuated and

on the 25th, Lt. Preneta from Company B was assigned to command

Company A. On the 27th of September Company A rejoined the batta-10

lion in the vicinity of ARRACOURT.

Headquarters 704th and Company B 704th were in bivouac on

the 16th of September l~ miles southeast of LUNEVILLE. Its mission

was the protection of the left flank of CCR which had been scheduled

to attack and take LUNEVILLE. However, it was discovered that LUNE-

VILLE was already occupied by friendly troops; and so the 704th went

into bivouac on the high ground northwest of the city on the 17th of

September and stayed there until the 20th of September.

During this period the 3d Platoon of Company B, 704th moved

to LUNEVILLE, which was under heavy artillery fire, in order to out-

post the city against German armored columns which were approaching

from the east. The 1st Platoon of Company B, 704th was given the

mission of supporting the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion which was

located on the high ground north of the city.

In the area east of LUNEVILLE the 3d Platoon of Company B

fought throughout the night and destroyed 3 MK V tanks. On the 19th

the platoon destroyed one MK V .tank, one heavy SP gun, one heavy

machine gun and crew, and took five prisoners.

In the afternoon of the 19th of September both the Battalion

Headquarters bivouac area and the position of the 1st Platoon Corn-

pany B, 704th wore shelled, Lt Col Bailey, the battalion commander

was killed by enemy mortar fire in LUTEVILLE,

Headquarters 704th and Company B, 704th were relieved on the

afternoon of the 19th and moved twelve miles north to the vicinity

of SERRES. On the 20th of September these units moved again--this

time to the vicinity of ARRACOURT where Lt Col H. P. Heid Jr.

assumed command. Company B, 704th took positions guarding the right

flank of CCA. On the 20th the company destroyed 5 TMK V German tanks

nd on the 22d of September the 2d Platoon of Company B, 704th de-

stroyed 3 more enemy tanks near RECHICOURT."

As a discussion and condensation of the activities of tank

destroyers in general there are several points which can be brought

out;

(a) From the employment of Capt. Evans' company at ARRA-

COURT (page ) it is noted that tank destroyers were used in platoons

under company control, supporting an outpost line, and moving from

place to place looking for enemy tanks or other suitable targets of

opportunity. Company B had a similar mission (page ) when it was

told to support the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion north of LUNE-

VILLE.

(b) Tank destroyers fought in tank destroyer versus tank

actions as shown by the fighting of Lt. Leiper's platoon near

RECHICOUJRT (Page ), Company A's action near DROUVILLE-SALLONES,

Company B s fight with German tanks when guarding the right flank

of CGA (page ).

(c) Missions of flank and outpost security were prevalent

for tank destroyers as described throughout the battles.

(d) During the battles at ARRACOURT the Battalion Commander

of the 704th lost complete control of his battalion. The control of

his detached companies was established at Combat Command Headquarters.

However, the tank destroyer Company Commanders did conduct close

liaison with the tank destroyer platoons when they supported other

units. Both Major Miller, executive officer of the 704th and Lt Col

Bidwell, a later battalion comrmander of the 704th, confirmed the

above use of tank destroyer units. Additionally, they both thought

that throughout the battles near ARRACOURT the tank destroyers were

well employed under combat command control since the higher head-

quarters had a better picture of the overall situation and could

dispatch tank destroyers to the right place at the appropriate time.

(e) It was also generally agreed that the tank destroyer

missions at ARRACOURT could not have been as well performed by heavy

tanks, such as M-26's, inasmuch as the tank destroyers were able to

utilize speed and maneuverability over rough and muddy terrain over

which M-26 tanks would have been unable to move. It was also stated

that the open turrets of the tank destroyers were both a psychologi-

cal and an actual discouraging feature to the crews inasmuch as they

were always exposed to artillery airbursts and infantry grenades.

79

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1History o the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, p 3-6.2Dr. Hugh M. Cole, The Tank Battles in Lorraine (Military

Review, Volume XXIX Nov 194T3Ibid.

4Interview with Lt Col Robert M. Parker, The Armored School,

Fort Knox, Ky.5Cole, Op Cit.

6Ibid.

7Interview with Captain Edwin Leiper, Indianapolis, Indiana.

8Interview with Captain James Leach, The Armored Center,

Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Cole, Op Cit.10

Afteraction Report, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion.11

Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

THE 823D TANK DESTROYER. BATTALION (TOWED) AT MORTAIN

Introdution arnd Buildup

General. Much thought and study has gone into the selection

of a "typical action" invoVing the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion

(Towed). The MORT IN operation was selected for four paramount

reasons, They are as follows:

(1) Heavy enemy armor was encountered,

(2) This unit remained attached to one infantry divisionthroughout the European campaign except for shortperiods.

(3) 'The great significance, tactically, of the Germancounter-stroke at MORTAIN.

(4) Last but not least, a general consensus of opinionfrom members of the 823d that this action typifiestank destroyer vs tank warfare.

A great opportunity in infantry-tank destroyer cooperation

existed early in the history of this unit but whether this coopera-

tion existed in its full potential still remains questionable. It

goes back as early as the staging at HERTEFORD, England, where it

was attached to the 30th Infantry Division in April, 1944. At this

town some 20 miles north of LONDON, began the relationship which

brought mutual understanding and respect lasting throughout the

European war.. During May and June the battalion drew vehicles,.

weapons and other equipment and found time to spend two weeks on

indirect firing training on the SALISBURY PLAIN. After completion

of this firing, it moved on to BASINGSTOKE, England, where all ve-

hiles were waterproofed and last minute preparations were made for

*81

thie thvion of the EUo.pean continent. The 823d was an extr mely

Wei -trained unit,. with high morale and plent; 6f eiprit'de4rps

this was proved correct in its later operations on the mainlad d±

Europe. It had an added advantage,, too, in that it had made the

acquaintance of and enjoyed mutual respect with the 30th Infantry

Division

Liaison officers of the 823d TD Battalion landed 13 June

1944 in France but it was not until 24 June that the battalion

proper disembarked on OMAHA Beach. The 823d participated in the

action of the beachhead breakout in and around ST. LO. This was an

indoctrination and shakedown period which placed the battalion in a

high state of combat efficiency, much to be desired for its latter

test at MORTAIN. This action was truly to be a test of tank destroyer

capabilities in their primary role against enemy armor where many

interesting aspects were brought forth regarding mobility, armament,

and lack of armor protection.

Friendly situatioa. For the proper buildup and importance

of the MORTAIN operation, as studied in the light of tank destroyer

action of the 823d, it is necessary to pause a moment for the set-

ting of the stage by the Allied Forces, 15 July to 5 August 1944.

The Allied Forces in France were gaining a foothold against stubborn

German resistance. By the middle of July, the Allied Front stretched

from CAEN through CAUMONT to ST. LO and on west to LESSAY on. the

western coast of the COTENTIN Peninsula . On 25 July General Omar

N. Bradley and his United States First Arna broke out of ST. LO,

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slashed downward to the base of .the COTENTIN Peninsula, passing

through the bottleneck at AVRANOHES and bursting out in full. force

upon the rear of the German Armies. (figure 10) On 1 August,

General George Patton (United States Third Army Headquarters) was

brought up to take over operations on the First Army's right flank

and to continue the exploitation deeper into France.

Enemy situation The German High Command wasted little time

in realizing the seriousness of the situation now confronting them.

Field Marshal von Kluge, in command of the Germans in France and

the Low Countries, reported to General Warlimontz, Hitler's personal

representative, on 31 July that AVRANCHES must be recaptured and

held at all costs. From Field Marshal von Kluge's diary of 4 August:

Estimate of situation . * the American is trying to

exploit his penetration at Avranches by pushing southwardly...... the first mission is to cut off the enemy units whichpenetrated to the south from their rear communications andto reestablish communications with the Coast . .1

On 4 August, Hitler issued direct orders to Field Marshal von Kluge

to stage a large scale counterattack with the objective of smashing

through to the sea at AVRANCHES. Von Kluge had foreseen the neces-

sity of such an operation and had commenced the assembly of forces

as early as 31 July. This counterattack plan, code named "Luttich",

contemplated an attack along the axis of the SEE River, using two

good secondary roads, one on each side of the river, for the advance

into AVRANTCHES to the west. The main objective was the capture of

the high ridge paralleling the SEE River and gaining the commanding

observation for the entire area. A secondary objective was the

capture of the tactically important HILL 314 at the eastern edge of

MORTAIN, a few miles south of the intended breakthrough corridor.

In German hands, HILL 314 would not only provide excellent obser-

vation of American dispositions south of the SEE River, but would

serve to deny the Americans almost equally good observation east-

ward. The First Army history gives this German operation the code

name "Liege", apparently the operation was the same as to mission",

troops used and commanders assigned.

Prior to this time, the German High Command had committed

its armor by division or even an element thereof at a time. How-

ever, with the very survival of the German Army itself at stake, the

High Command decided to employ no less than five Panzer divisions'

plus attachments, for the counterattack. These were the:

XLVII CORPS

1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,

2d SS Panzer Division Das Reich filled up with whatwas let of t-he 17th SS Panzer Grenadier DivisionGoetz von Berlicbiger.

116th Panzer Division, plus miscellaneous troops.

LXXXI CORPS

9th Panzer Division.

460th Artillery Battalion (motorized).

One AA Regiment, 13th AA Division.

394th Assault Gun Brigade, plus miscellaneous troops.

All of the above units were under the command of the German Seventh2 . -

Army.

Pre-battle movement. August 2d found the 823d TD Battalion

and the 30th Infantry Division in XIX Corps reserve south of ST. LO

engaged in maintenance activities. The 823d after its leading in

Europe had fought with the 3Oth Infantry Division, crossing the

VIRE River and participating in the ST. LO breakout. Personnel and

equipment replacements had been coming through in good order and the

battalion was nearly at 100% operational strength. On 5 August, the

battalion and the 30th Infantry Division were attached to VII Corps

and ordered to move into the vicinity of MORTAIN. These units were

to relieve the US Ist Infantry Division, which was in turn ordered

to extend the Allied line southward and farther into the German

rear.

Little if any information was passed down to the battalion

units in their relief of the lst Infantry Division and none was

forthcoming. Indeed a vague situation existed and along with this

went the usual relaxation that is prevalent in a quiet sector. This

statement is substantiated as follows: company commanders report

the relief of position took place without incident, that no enemy

information was turned over during the relief, and that the units to

which they were attached gave them none. One reconnaissance platoon

leader reports that information he received was "not much out there."

From these observations it is clearly apparent that a true and de-

termined defense of the sector was never considered, thus a great

initial advantage was given to the enemy. According to reports

a warning of imminent attack reached the 30th Infantry Division from

VII Corps approximately 20 minutes before the first signs of trouble

appeared: "Enemy counterattack expected vicinity MORTAIN from east4

or north within 12 hours.."

Initial dispositions. On 6 August the 823d Tank Destroyer

Battalion was disposed on the ground as follows:

Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, located inle CLOS MARION, about 3 miles west of JUVIGNY leTERTRE.

Company A1st Platoon initially south of MORTAIN guarding'roads

from Barenton

2d Platoon on HILL 285 west of MORTAIN.

3d Platoon near the 1st Platoon, protecting approachesfrom east and south of MORTAIN.

The 1st Platoon, Company A, commanded by Lt. Thomas Springfield,

moved the same day, 6 August, to ABBAYE BLANCHE which is located

north of MORTAIN. This platoon gained the distinction of halting

the enemy's efforts to clean out the MORTAIN area. This freedom of

maneuver for a thrust west was badly needed. Company A was attached

to 120th Regiment, 30th Infantry Division.

Company B1st Platoon on the road west of ST. BARTHELMY.

2d Platoon on the same road, echeloned slightly fartherwest toward JUVIGNY.

3d Platoon (reinforced) located in ST. BARTHELMY.

Actually Company B was disposed in depth from ST, BARTHELMY west

along an important road net that the Germans proposed using as one

of their supply routes in the attack to the sea to AVRANCHES. It is

not believed this disposition was I~deseen to the extent of the pur-

pose served, but it had much to do with the defeat of the enemy in

its attempted advance along that route. Company B was attached to

the 117th Regiment, 30th Infantry Division.

Company C1st Platoon near REFFtVIEILLE, in firing positions along

main highway running west from JVIGNY le, TERTRE.

2d Platoon near la DAVIAIS protecting Battalion CP.

3d Platoon, in vicinity of 1st Platoon.

Company C, although not receiving the heavy fighting of Companies A

and B, made many moves and their presence alone could have done much

to thwart off the enemy movements in those areas. Company C was

attached to the 119th Regiment, 30th Infantry Division. A recon-

naissance platoon was attached to each company and accompanied their

respective companies to their new positions. For a further descrip-

tion of the disposition of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion on

6 August, see figure 11.

In general, most of the positions were taken over lock, stock

and barrel from the preceding tank destroyer unit and remained in

the same location throughout the operation. The time fator must be

considered here, because as indicated, time was not available to do

much moving and it is doubtful whether a full study of the platoon

positions was ever made. The fact that the company commanders and

platoon leaders did not actually choose their own positions probably

had much to do with the later loss of the 3d Platoons of Company A

87

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and B. They were without infantry protection and the guns were not

mutually supporting. However, Springfield, commanding the 1st Pla-

toon, Company A, did make a study of the terrain after relief at his

particular position. He was not satisfied with the location of the

guns, so he moved them 200 yards north, just across the bridge span-

ning the railroad leading into ABBAYE BLANCHE. From this position

seven roads and trails could be brought under fire. All of these

led into ABBAYE BLANCHE and MORTAIN from the east and north. In

addition, southern approaches out of MORTAIN could be covered.. Any

two guns could take under fire the same road.

Infantry units were disposed as follows:

120th Regiment in vicinity of MORTAIN, particularly theimportant terrain feature east of MORTAIN (HILL 314)and west and north (HILL 285).

119th Regiment in an assembly area, vicinity le M SNILADELEE

117th Regiment situated in the ST. BARTHELLE.Y area,north of MORTAIN.

For a further description of infantry locations, see figure 11.

Tank destroyer gun positions as located on figures 11-14 are5

substantiated by tank destroyer commanders and after-action reports..

Directions of fire of the main guns were variable, of course, and

daily changes were made without appreciable difference in their pri-

mary mission assignments. It is interesting to note here that all

weapons were located generally to deny the use of roads to the enemy.

Roads are always the principal avenues of approach and it is a known

fact that although weather permitted cross-country operations, all

88

defenses includihg infantry were generally set up to block roads.

The 823d paid particular attention to roads and road blocks for two

reasons; their importance to the movement of enemy armor, and

secondly, the ease of movement and change of position for their own

weapons. This point is brought out as doctrines teach cross-country

operation but very limited use was ever made of same by towed tank

destroyer guns. One cannot pass from these remarks without mention-

ing the restrictions of movement due to hedgerows, most of which

could not be traversed by halftracks without the use of demolitions

or bulldozers which were not used in this operation. It can be

stated that generally the enemy was limited to the road nets, and

that they made no serious penetration without that factor being

present. Short penetrations were made by roving enemy armored units

at positions such as HILL 285 and along the deep valley on the 30th

Division's left flank, but neither penetrations were extremely ef-

fective. Weather was a great benefit to the enemy at the start of

the battle, as they attacked at night or in the early morning hours6

under cover of fog. It is not to be construed that the terrain was

a total obstacle but it did constrict, at least initially, all move-

ment to the roads. This is borne out by members of the infantry as

well as the commanders of the tnnk destroyer units.

0perations, .7 August. A dark cloud sprang out of the east on

the night of 6-7 August, the German counterattack for AVRANCHES.

The actual time of attack was set for 2400 hours on 6 August but due

to last minute difficulties encountered by the enemy in assembling

7

troops, it was delayed somewhat. Artillery observegs in the oarth

of the 30th Division zone reported tanks moving along the northern

road paralleling the SEE River, where it bends south toward ST.

BARTHELMY and MORTAIN. This enemy attack was directed along the SEE

River towards le IESNIL ADELEE. At 0130 tanks and infantry advanced

out of the FORET de MORTAIN and swept around and engulfed the road

block manned by the 3d Platoon, Company A, guarding MORTAIN from the

south, and penetrated the town itself. Actually the full force of

the enemy attack came just before daylight. The Germans had weather8

conditions in their favor; "darkness gave way to fog-laden daylight."

The first enemy action encountered at ABBAYE BL TCHE was at 0500

hours. A German armored halftraok mounting a 75mm assault gun was

knocked out by an anti-tank gun. This vehicle was closely followed

by another halftrack, loaded with ammunition, which was also taken

under fire and destroyed. "It was a foggy morning and we waited

until the cars were only 30 yards from the number three gun before we9

opened fire." The anti-tank gun referred to was undoubtedly a tank

destroyer 3-inch gun as only two anti-tank guns were in position and

one was south of the overpass and could not have taken the enemy

under fire.

Much controversy arose later as to the composition and com-

mand of the roadblock at ABBAYE BLANCHE. It was this roadblock that

stood so determinately in the way of the enemy advance throughout

the entire action. Most of the evidence points toward command by

Springfield, and as to composition it varied daily, even hourly. As

the fighting continued and pressure increased many individual soldiers

drifted into the area, ,some with crew-served weapons and others with

just individual arms. Eventually the defense of this roadblock con-

sisted of some 75 men including tank destroyer and machine gun crews.

Best accounts put composition of the road block as follows:

1st Platoon, Company F, 120th Regiment.

1st Platoon, Company A, 823d TD Battalion.

1st Platoon, Anti-tank Company (minus 2 guns), 120th Regiment

1st Mortar section and 1 machine gun section, Company F,.120th Regiment.1 0

Lt. Colonel J. W. Lockett, commanding 2d Battalion, 117th Regiment,

had this to say:

it was learned that Company A of the 823d Battalion(towed) had established a roadblock at the intersection atABBAYE BLANCHE, and that this roadblock, although supportedby Company F of the 120th Infantry, stuck out rather precarious-ly, and was weakly protected. I realized the importance ofthis position as an avenue of approach for enemy tanks andvehicles and agreed that Company E should move up and tie inwith this tank destroyer unit and that the 2d Platoon ofCompany F, 120th Infantry should cover the guns while theyorganized and made further plans. This was done - placingmachine guns and bazooka teams in support of the tank destroyerposition. The wisdom~f this decision was borne out throughoutthe period of the counterattack. The area in front of theposition became a graveyard for about 35 to 40 German tanksand vehicles.

Lockett had nothing but praise for Springfield and his unit of tank11

destroyers.

An after-action interview with Colonel Hammond D. Birks,

commanding the 120th Regiment and Lt. Thomas Andrew, of Company F,

120th Regiment, substantiates the tactical importance of the ABBAYE

BLANCHE roadblok to the effect that it *as one of ihe most important

facto Ls in the 120th infantry's successful repulse of the major enemy

counterattack of 6-12 August. If this roadblock had not held, the

whole position of the 120th Infantry would have been nullified and

the resulting gap would have permitted the enemy to smash through the12

MO RTAIN area.

The enemy had once occupied this very ground around the rail-

road bridge and had set up defensive positions there. Sprin.gfield

used these as there were no alternate positions in the area. They

were adequate and time was short. A 3-inch gun was placed on either

side of the main road, with two 30-caliber machine guns nearby for

support. A bazooka and BAR team, plus half a squad of riflemen, were

placed in former enemy dug-in positions along a small hedgerow at the

sharp left turn north of the railroad bridge. A 57mm anti-tank gun

was placed at the end of the road paralleling the main north-south

road, covering not only penetrations down this road, but from an

additional road to the left that curved into it. Two other 3-inch

guns were placed north of the railroad bridge, one to cover the main

road, the other facing southwest across the railroad to cover any

enemy penetration along a straight stretch of the road coming in from

the northeast. A 57mm anti-tank gun also covered this road from a

position at the road junction near the river in ABBAYE BLANCHE it-

self.

Immediately south of the railroad bridge, riflemen and bazoo-

ka teams were placed in dug-in positions on either side of the road.

92

The right flank was pio'teoted by 8 men and & 30.caliber madhine gun

at a big 'ddk just off the road from the northeast ahd faing towa'ds

the river. A line running through a cleft in the rook furnished the

communications with the mortar squad to the rear of this position.

Along the important left flank, a squad of riflemen and two 30-caliber

machine guns were placed in an orchard that covered two road junctions,

in addition to a short stretch of the north-south road. Six rifle-

men and a 50-caliber machine gun, manned by tank destroyer men, were

placed in and among the houses between this orchard and the railroad

bridge. Two belts of mines were laid near the bend of the road from

the southeast, at the south end of the roadblock, and these were

covered by a bazooka and BAR team.

To sum up the defensive dispositions of the roadblock force,

four 3-inch tank destroyer guns and two 57mm anti-tank guns were

posted to cover all important roads, with the main emphasis on the

north-south road to MORTAIN, and these guns were protected and sup-

ported by riflemen and bazooka and machine gun crews.

On 7 August, Lieutenant Stewart with two squads of the 2d Pla-

toon of Company F, 120th Infantry, joined the ABBAYE BLANCHE road-

block. He had established a roadblock to the south, but had been

forced to withdraw from his position. Upon joining the ABBAYE BLANCHE

roadblock, he-organized and defended the rear (south) end. From time

to time during the next few days other men from different companies

straggled into the roadblock, so that eventually Springfield had men

from Companies D, E, H, K and G, 120th Infantry, totalling some 150

men. However, the greater imber of these ieh wre battle fatigue

cased and had little part in the actual defense. The previous figure

of 75 effectives still stands. Some of these extras were concentrated13

to the south of the roadblock with Stewart,

During 7 August, the roadblock was not only shelled repeatedly,

but was also attacked by the Luftwaffe twice, which strafed the

little force with rocket guns. They were even hit by British planes

with rocket guns, two tank destroyer men being wounded in this un-

fortunate and erroneous attack. However, as far as the roadblock

force was concerned., the British were soon forgiven as they were

quick to testify that the British did a wonderful job against the

Germans on the front of the ABBAYE BLANCHE positions.

The 3d Platoon of Company A had a less important existence

particularly as to defensive contributions. Its activities can be

summed up quickly. Shortly after daylight on 7 August, enemy tanks

and infantry came out of the FORET de MORTAIN to the east and

slightly south of MORTAIN and swept into that town from the south.

The 3d Platoon was quickly surrounded and overrun along with some

units of the 120th Infantry. Much happened here to cause bitterness

and scepticism among the tank destroyer units-their guns were not14

protected by infantry. This one factor had a great deal to do with

their capture and destruction, they could not protect themselves

against an infantry attack. This story is best told by Robert L.

Hewitt, author of the 30th Infantry Division History. The tank

destroyer platoon south of MORTAIN fended off the first German attack

94

with 50-caliber machine guns mounted on half tracks but was subse-

quently split asunder when the Germans swept around its positions,

making the platoon's 3-inch guns untenable. The close-in fire of the

enemy was devastating to say the least. Sixteen men reached the ist

Platoon's positions north of MORTAIN after 5 days of fighting. Nine

others joined nearby infantry and fought their way into friendly

lines on HILL 314. One man remained hidden in a ditch for five days.

Thirteen men were still missing when the battle ended.

The 2d Platoon of Company A held an important position along

with doughboys of the 120th Infantry, that of HILL 285, northwest of

MORTAIN. Action on the slopes of HILL 285 began in the "mist" about

0500 hours on 7 August. A bazooka team led by an officer of the ist

Battalion, name unknown, went forward about 500 yards stalking a Ger-

man MK IV tank. The tank was finally stalked down and knocked out by

Sergeant Ames.Broussard of the tank destroyer platoon. Broussard was

unable to get back to his own lines for 14 hours. At 0900 two more

German tanks approached, and were knocked out at 150 yards by one of

the tank destroyer guns. Another tank moved up, firing at the Ameri-

can position, and it also suffered the fate of his team mates. This

last tank was set afire by a shot from only 50 yards by a well con-

cealed tank destroyer gun. Two enemy self-propelled guns and an ar-

mored car also fell victim to the tank destroyers on HILL 285.

The 3d Platoon of Company B met with a fate similar to that of

the 3d Platoon of Company A. This unit was located in ST. BARTHELMY

and had one 3-inch gun from the 2d Platoon of Company B and a platoon

of 57mm anti-tank guns with it.- These towed tank destroyer guns of

Company B played an important part in halting the Germans, although

particularly vulnerable to the well coordinated panzer grenadier-tank

attack. Weather enters the picture again: "handicapped by the fog"

is used in the same breath as a "well coordinated enemy attack" re-

garding the loss of positions at ST BARTHEMY. At the start the

gunners were firing at nothing more tangible than flashes of enemy

tank guns. The 3d Platoon destroyers knocked out two German tanks

early in the fight, but three of the four guns of the 3d Platoon were

soon casualties. The heavy towed tank destroyer guns were sitting

ducks when they revealed their locations by firing. Lt. Leon L.

Neel, commanding the lst Platoon, Company B, brought forward a re-

placement gun from his platoon under heavy fire in an attempt to

reach the beseiged weapons of the 3d Platoon at ST. BARTHELMY. His

platoon was 1000 yards in rear of the town-to the west. This gun

never reached ST. BARTHEL MY due to enemy action. It was forced to

take a position just west of the town and while there, knocked out a

MK V, killed another tank commander and "mowed down" supporting in-

fantry with small arms fire. A German 88 soon found the range on

this gun and promptly eliminated it, wounding most of the crew.

Another gun from the same platoon was brought forward and had an

equally short but useful career. One enemy tank approached and was

knocked out. Two more enemy tanks appeared, but halted out of gun

range. Then, one of these advanced, covered by the second, and the

tank destroyer gun knocked this tank out. About this time, however,

the second tank opened fire and destroyed the tank destroyer guns

Company B lost seven of its twelve guns and their respective half-

track prime movers during the action of 7 August. One intrepid ,crew,

however, ventured out forward of the friendly lines and extricated

one of the abandonedguns. Other members of Company B fought along-

side the infantry with their carbines or joined bazooka teams stalk-

ing enemy tanks. Company B accounted for eight MK V tanks during

that first day of operations with a probable additional two. The

2d Platoon added depth to the position and never actually engaged the

enemy on the first day of operations.

Company B fared little better on enemy information and friend-

ly infantry support than did Company A. According to Neel:

Lack of information probably destroyed the 3d Platoonbefore it made any defensive contribution whatever ., . wewere requested at 0800 to reinforce troops within ST.BARTHELMY without being informed that our 3d Platoon waswiped out.

Contact was inadequate with the infantry as it was not be-

lieved they ever realized their obligations to protect tank destroyer15

units from enemy foot troops. A change of support mission had much

to do with this inadequate cooperation. Neel's platoon was changed

from support of the 2d Battalion to support of the 3d Battalion,

117th Infantry, but was never able to contact that headquarters,

thereby leaving the guns to operate alone. Nothing could be gained

in information other than that which came from personal observation.

Company C was quite removed from the heavy action that con-

fronted Companies A and B. They were in position initially with the

823d Battalion Headquarters and during the early morning of 7 August,

they took up direct fire positions in vicinity of LA ROCHE and

REFFUVIEItLE along the highway running from ST BARTHELMY west to

JUVIGNY and on to AVRANCHES,

As the German counterattack became more definite in strength

and direction, many hurried calls arrived for additional tank destroyer

support in the threatened sectors. Orders were received by 0630 to

send guns some 8000 yards to the south along the highway running

northeast to southwest from MORTAIN to ST. HILAIRE du HARCOUET. This

order could not be carried out at the time but by 1200 hours, the 3d

Platoon of Company C was released from control by the 119th Infantry

and proceeded to this point'to meet this threat of approximately 35

enemy vehicles, including armor, to the south.

The other two platoons moved north toward IeBLAIRIE near the

AMBROIS woods and took up direct fire positions, see figure 12.. The

mission of these two platoons was to prevent the withdrawal of a large

number of enemy soft-skinned vehicles which were reported in the

AMBROIS woods. ctually these two platoons were to go as far north as

le MESNIL ADELEE. Contact was made with a rifle company from the

119th Regiment and they proceeded to a point just south of the town.

They were informed (by whom it is unknown but it is unimportant as it

was rather obvious in a few minutes) that the enemy was just ahead.

A 57.mm anti-tank gun nearby knocked out a MK V tank with two flanking

shots. Other German tanks were heard moving around in the woods to

the north. By 0800 heavy enemy mortar fire began to fall on the tank

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destroyer positions. "This action convinced us that le MESNIL ADELEE

was no place for us to take our armored care and halftracks, towing

3-in~h guns, so we se Up a 'oad1ock in fpace," writes Captain T. L.

Raney (then 1st Lieutenant) commanding the 1 st Reconnaissance Pica

16toon. Tho American 3d Armored Division took over the mission of

taking le MESNIL ADELEE, somewhat relieving this situation.

The 3d Platoon on the right flank down south was reinforced by

a reconnaissance platoon, which moved by a circuitous route from the

northern position. Many French families were moving to the west on

foot and in wagons, and managed to constrict movements on the roads.

This type of movement by civilians usually points toward an attack or

expected attack by the enemy. It was about 1700 when the reoonnais-

sance platoon reached the 3d Platoon at their position. It was said

to have been a strong defensive position with an equally strong al-

ternate position. Generally speaking this flank of the 30th Division

was open, making any defense by this platoon almost unfeasible. For-

tunately, no enemy was encountered.

Here ends the first day of action at MORTAIN, the situation

very obscure and the final outcome yet to be determined.. It was a

touch and go proposition with a slight advantage to the defender. An

appropriate remark at this time comes from the 30th Infantry Division

History: "with a heavy onion breath that day the Germans could have

achieved their objectives."

Operations, A August. Throughout the night 7-8 August, the fog

of battle cleared a little,. probably for both sides. Stock was taken

of destruction to personnel and positions, resupply was effected

where possible and a vigilant watch was established. The Germans put

out heavy patrols, either iti in attempt to gain information or to

gain positions to continue its attack or withdra wal. It is a fact

that much field recovery of personnel and vehicles was attempted and

in some cases was carried out effectively. It was the German army

policy to pick up their dead close into the battle position even at a

great risk. This was psychological in two respects; that of building

the morale of the German soldier because he wouldn't have to face

these sights in his advance as well as that of knowing he was cared

for, and from the American side, the possibility of assessing accu-

rate enemy losses was eliminated. This was particularly bad for the

American soldier, when after a heavy fire fight and he was sure the

German had many casualties, he pushed forward to find little evidence,

if any, of same.

In telephone conversations during the night of 7-8 August by

the German commanders, the Leibstandarte was spoken of as having been

stopped and in remnants. In instructions to the 1st SS Division for

the following day we have this remark: "Each man must give his

best. . . if we have not advanced considerably by this evpning or to-17

morrow morning, the operation will have been a failure......" The enemy

had gained ground on the 7th but certainly not of any significance

and the key terrain was still in the hands of the Americans. ST.

BARTHELMY, MORTAIN and the area south of MORTAIN were in the hands of

the enemy but HILL 314 and HILL 285 were in the hands of the 30th

100

Division, who also held control of the road nets leading west,

The principal German attack of 8 Aui~it came fro the ST.

BJ3RT1M LMY area to the southwest against HILL 285 where the 2d Pla-

toon of Company A was located. The attack commenced at 0130 and con-

sisted of infantry supported by at least 8 tanks. By 0430 this

attack had pressed close to positions on HILL 285 and Company A,

120th Infantry, was forced back to a road traversing the hill. Two

flame throwers prevented tank destroyer crews from manning their guns

and again tank destroyer men fought as infantry. Artillery fire soon

broke up this attack but it was resumed again farther to the south.

From all accounts the German attack on the 8th was more intense and

better supported than it had been on the 7th. On the other hand, the

Americans had an additional regiment, from the 4th Infantry Division,

attached and an attack was launched at the Germans at 0800. This

attack was in the direction of ST. BARTHELMY and was supported by the

629th Tank Destroyer Battalion. It relieved the immediate pressure

on HILL 285, but made little progress. Apparently the tank destroyer

unit on HILL 285 spent the day licking their wounds and reorganizing

as this attacking force had now presented them with that opportunity.

All along the line the American forces attacked with negligible suc-

cess, but nevertheless it stopped the German assault.

The 1st Platoon of Company A was attacked at 1530 hours on

8 August by an enemy unit of patrol size, which was completely anni-

hilated. Four anti-tank men at the roadblock were wounded. The Geri

mans had managed to mine a road to the south which was being used as

a supply and evacuation route, A halftrack being used to evacuate

casualties was knocked out by this amnefed. This evened the score

as a Germa hial-track stopped to investigate the same minefield and

was promptly destroyed by our forces. Throughout the day, the 2d

Platoon is credited with 2 tanks, 4 half-tracks, 1 wheeled vehicle18

and 15 prisoners of war.

Company B had been receiving artillery fire all morning and at

1000 moved to a spot not so well "zeroed" in. Two ammunition trailers

had been lost. Company B positions were held during the day with

little chance to fire. This situation occurred as a result of the

American attacks to regain MORTAIN and towed tank destroyers served

little purpose, if any, in the attack.

Company C remained substantially in the same localities with

exception of the 3d Platoon which moved to the vininity of JUVIGNY.

Operations, 9 August. Fighting was almost continuous night

and day in the MORTAIN - ST. BARTHELMY area. Hours and days meant

little - survival was all important. The enemy launched another

attack to the southeast on 9 August at 0430 toward the 2d Platoon,

Company A on HILL 285. Less strength and aggressiveness was apparent

but to the soldier on the ground and at the point of contact, one

attack is as strong as another. The 3d Reconnaissance Platoon

assisted materially against this thrust by giving close-in protection.

No material gains were made by the enemy and by 1600 hours, the 117th

and 12th Infantry Regiments launched a counterattack against the

enemy attack. This left the 2d Platoon in an exposed position due to

a pocket created by earlier, Getwan gains. In order to cope wit :

the situation this platoon pulled back to a better position and the

2d and 3d Reconnaissance Platoons rendered the close protection

that was needed. (see figure 13 ) Artillery fire destroyed one

3-inch gun of the platoon and Lieutenant Cunningham, commanding

the 3d Reconnaissance Platoon was wounded by mortar fire. Spring-

field's 1st Platoon was having a field day against local attacks and

against movements across their front directed against HILL 285. The

1st Platoon had two 3-inch gun sights destroyed by artillery fire,

*ven so he mentions destroying an enemy vehicle by sighting down

the tube.

Company B remained in position with little or no activity

occuring in their area, Artillery fire continued, causing little

damage but placing heavy strain and tension on all members of the

company. They received one replacement, Lieutenant Rady, who must

have been counting his hours - entering combat at this particular

time and place.

Company C made only one change of any consequence during

the period. The 1st Platoon was moved near the 3d Platoon in

vicinity of JUVIGNY. This completed a build-up to add the

necessary strength to hold the important road west out of BARTHELMY.

Operations, 10 August. The German commander had reported

his heavy losses and inability to make any substantial gains in

the MORTAIN area, but he did not receive that much desired order

103

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to withdraw. Although he had taken MORTAIN and ST. BARTTTELMY, he20

remarked that the enemy was not entirely cleared from this area.

References were undoubtedly made to the infantry on HILL 314 and

the ABBAYE BLTANCHE roadblock. "Springfield's shooting gallery", the

lst Platoon, Company A, defense at ABBAYE BLANCHE, was creating

quite a disturbance to the German program of operations.

Hitler ordered the attack resumed and again on the early

morning of 10 August, the push continued. A vast difference was

noted as it lacked the intensity and coordination of previous days.

A local attack was made against the 2d Platoon of Company A former

position, but to the surprise of the Germans no one was present.

Contact with the 1st Plat rn had been lost during the night due to

a roadblock emplaced by the Germans, It was quickly removed and

c-ntact ws reestablished. The 1st Platoon was having its usual

field day by destroying several halftracks and nine other assorted

vehicles.

C ,paZny B suffered two casualties from intense artillery

fire which they had been subjected to for the past three days.

No other action was reported outside of an integration of re-

placc:ments into that depleted unit.

Company C remained in its former positions without incident.

The platoon :n the Division south flank made contact with the 35-i

Division now moving up on-the right flank. You will recall that

this platoon had reported being in an exposed position qarliej

Final operations, 11-14 August, On 11 August the 2d Platoon

104

of Company A was ordered back to its original position on HILL

285 alone with the 2d and 3d Reconnaissance Platoons. This was

accomplished by infiltration ih an effort to attract as little

attention as possible. No interference by the Germans was encoun-

tered. This period was reported as quiet other than local artillery

fire. The 1st Platoon, Company A lost one 3-inch gun by such fire.

Company B reports no contact for this period, only artillery and

mortar fire in the area. Company C completed movement of its 2d

Platoon to area of the other two platoons, closing at 2030 (figurel4).

This period of inactivity by the enemy meant two things;

another attack was in the making or a general withdrawal was about

to c ,mmence. The latter was more probable, as friendly infantry

successes had been greater during 11 August and on the 12th contact

was made with the besieged and isolated battalion rn HILL 314. This

c ntact also relieved pressure on the 1st P.Latoon, Company A. The

high light of the day was the return of 11 men who for the past 5

days ha ' been fighting with the infantry on HILL 314. They were men

from the 3d Pla.t"n vwhich had been destroyed when their guns were

overrun south of MORTAIN on 7 August. The 1st Platoon of Company C

relieved the 2d Platoon of Company A nn HILL 286 at 2200 with the

2d Platorn )cing into assembly position near their company command

post (sec figurel4). Company B spent the day in reorganizing the

1st and 2d Platoons. On the 13th, they moved into an assembly

position shown on figure 14 )~

The German withdrawal had cm -ooncod and the much needed rest

105

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and reorganization period had come. Company C completed the relief

of the 1it Piatoon of Company A, allowing them to assemble near their

company command post. The rest was less than 24 hours in duration;

In the late afternoon the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A moved to

ac area southwest (f MORTAIN to give close support to the 119th

Infantry* The 3d Reconnaissance Platoon was attached to the 2'

Platoon.

On 14 August the MORTAIN battle ground cea&ed to be a scene

of bitter struggle. The 30th Infantry Division published a field

order attaching A, B and C Companies to the 117th, 119th and 120th

Regime nts respectively. In turn the 823d Headquarters attached the

1st, 2d and 3d Reconnaiseance Platoons to Companies C, B and A res-

pectively. The infantry and tank destroyers moved some 14,000 yards

east of VORTAIN in a quick followup of the withdrawing enemy. This

move o-n 14 August completed the MORTAIN action, where defensive con-

tributi -ns by the tank destroyers had been great.- The 823d Tank De-

str':yer Battalion had proven it was here to stay, its losses had been

many but even so they were only proportionate to the intensity of

co mbat.

Logistics and Personnel

General. It is appropriate at this time to summarize the

logistical and personnel problems that crnfronted the 823d TD

Battalion. An account of enemy losses is also appropriate as at

no other time in the European war did this battalion contribute so

highly to the destruction of the enemy.. Generally supplies were

106

adequate during the MORTAIN operation.

Class I. Rations wore short on occasions but never to a

dc'. r, e =hre unit offici3ncy was affected. 10 in 1 rations with

some K rations were used exclusively during the operation. Hot

i od was impossible during the battle as transportation was unable

to move effectively ancd the situation was too tense for that type

of feeding. No units complained, in fact they were well satisfied.

Moals, using 10 in 1 rations could be served hot to small units at

any time desired.

Cl-ss II and IV. Class IV supplies presented no immediate

prrblem and in most cases was adequate. Class II presented a problem

with the loss of twr plat ns and tieir equipment was irreplaceable

at the ti.:-e. Pers' r nol w- uld not have been available to man the

replaced items even so. The 1st Platoon of Company A desired

additional barrels for 30- mnd 50-caliber machine guns. Company

B had a replacement of ',ne 3-inch gun and halftrack on 11 August21

and Co.'pany A h:-ad a like replacement on 10 August.

Class III. Class III supplies presented no problem. With

few exceptions no moves wore made. Company C shuffled around some

:n the 8th and 9th and again on the 11th and 12th of August, but

all those moves were short.

Class V. Class V presented a problem to those units heavily

enga ed, however, it was replenished with some difficulty. No unit

was defeated or forced to withdraw for lack of ammunition, Each

plat 'r carried a basic load of ammunition into this engagement.

107

For each 3inch gun, 90 rounds were car ied 65% armors piercing

and 35% higrh explosive with an aditi nal 50 hirnds (mixed) carried

on : thr io-quarter ton truck for each four guns. Small arms ammuni*

ti-n was always adequate.

Maintenance, Maintenance was not a major problem in this

opcration and was performed by each driver locally. Maintenance

of dostr yod or disabled vehicles was nrt acc mplished during the

operation duo to the intensity of fire which restricted evacuation

procedues. After the enemy co.mmenced his withdrawal on the 12th

some battlefield rec',very took place aad maintenance was performed

to the limit of time available. Vehicular replacements were avail-

able and c-uld be had easily as the supply lines wore short,

Evacuation of casualties, Evacuation of wounded personnel

from the front lines was performed in the usual manner with few

exceptions. The 1st Platoon, Company A, evacuated a few casualties

by use of their halftracks. One of these struck a mine as it was .-n

its way to the rear.

Communication, In some cases communication was adequate,

in other cases it did not exist. Actually the only communications

neoded were th-se with the infantry units supported, as operatirn4

control was usually taken away from the company commanders. Three

means of commurication were used; wire, radio and messenger with

wire and radi carrying the brunt of the load Lt. Colonel Ashby

I, Lohse, Battalion S-3,, says "'le were in conmmunication with higher22

headquarters at all tirie,." It was not quite the same story at

108

platoon level, where after all, the battle is being fought and in-

formation must be forthcoming to properly understand the situation

and control the units. As brought out previously, Companies A and B

had poor oommunidations Compdny A commander places the blame on

hi'.Self frr not moving his command post closer to his platoons.

Personnel. The personnel situation is hard to summarize

exactly, as strength reports are not available for an accurate

accounting of losses. From after-action reports and letter inter-

views with former unit personnel, the total losses add up as follows:

6 KIA, 47 WIA and 91 MIA with enemy losses at 130 KIA and 25 prisoners23

of war taken. No accounting of the enemy wounded is available, but

members of the 823d believe the number runs as high as 100. Losses

for the 823d were nearly 20% of their authorized strength. Somewhere

in the vicinity of 40 replacements were received to help fill these

losses. Replacements were adequate for those units still intact.

Gunners and radio operators were the most difficult replacement

problems; however, gunners were trained from old men on hand. Re-

placements were initially placed in less important positions until

they had their feet on the ground.

Companies A and B received the Presidential Citation for their

efforts at MORTAIN. Many individual acts of heroism brought indivi-

dual awards. Lt. Springfield was decorated with the Silver Star and

according to Captain Crissinger, his company Commander: "He deserved

more. I just wasn't smart enough to realize it at the time. He was24

a wonderful platoon leader and a great soldier."

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1Report of OS r ations, First United States Army, 1 Auti

1944 tpo 5. .

I id, p 6.

Lt Col Dettmer, letter interview, 29 March 1950.

Personal interview, General Freiherr von Gersdorff,November 1945.

3Dettmer, op cit.

Captain T. L. Raney, letter interview, 30 December 1949.

Lt Col Ashby I. Lohse, letter interview, 16 December 1949.4Robert L. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front -The

Story of the 30th Infantry visn, p 5.

Dettmor, op cit.

Raney, op cit.

Lt. Thomas Springfield, letter interview, 10 January 1950.

Lt. Ellis Melnnie, letter interview, 27 March 1950.

After-Action Report, 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, August1944.

6Dettmer, op cit.

Lohse, op cit.7Gersdorff, op oit.

8Hewitt, op cit, p 58.

9Springfield, op cit.

10Colonel A. H. Payton and Colonel H. A. Tribolte, Combat

Observations, 18 August 1944, Documents Section File No. 1. , TheAnnored ool, Fort Inox, Kentucky.

110

11Ibid., passim.

12Ibid, passim.

13Ibid, passim.

14Dottmer, op cit.

Lt. Leon L. Neel, letter interview, 21 December 1949.15

Dettmer, op cit.

Neel, op cit.16

Raney, op cit.17

Report of Operations, op cit.18

Dettmer, op cit.

After-action Report, op cit.

Payton and Tribolte, op cit.19

After-action Report, op cit.

Springfield, op cit.20

Gersdorff, op cit.21

After-action Report, op cit.

Springfield, op cit.22

Lohse, op cit.23

After-action Report, op oit.

Neel, op cit.

Springfield, op cit.24

Captain Bruce A. Grissinger, letter interview, 4 February 1950.

111

CHAPTER 7

C ONTEPORARY C ODMENT

The preceding chapters of this report have been concerned

with the organization and tactics of TD units and an analysis of

combat actions in which four TD battalions participated. During

the period from June of 1944 to May of 1945, members of antitank

units, observers from rearward headquarters, and foreign military

authors with the same vital interest in the subject, prepared a

number of articles and reports on the new team weapon designed to

stop armor. It is the writings of this group of officers that are

of major consequence here. Author members of TD units are considered

of primary importance, foreigh authors are touched upon lightly, and

observers passed over almost entirely because of the still confi-

dential nature of their reports. Three military writers of the

1940 era are presented because of the impact of their studies on

the subject.

Publications from which articles were considered for comment

are the Field Artillery Journal, the Infantry Journal, and Observer

Reports. There remains to the future researcher in TDs a vast field

of similar untouched source material of at least equal, if not

greater value. Particularly with reference to secret VVar Department

Observer Reports, which may be downgraded at a later date.

Authors writing for military journals and official observers

have approached the subject of TDs from varying points of view.

112

Officer-observers with instructions to obtain specific

information on various items of eqIipmehtj problems of personnel,

tactical employment, the application and correctness of .doctrines

and technique, and numerous other details of interest to those enh

gaged in long-range support of the battle forces, had the detached

and impersonal viewpoint of a reporter-commentator.

Allied officers and enemy writers discussed the subject as

it affected their battlefield successes or failures, and wrote from

a position tempered by their experiences and differences in equip-

ment and techniques.

The TD officer on the job was generally too busy with more

pressing problems to prepare choice items for analysis, but when he

write, his material was directly influenced by the immediacy of

combat requirements. His were the most personal and detailed of

all the sources of authorship.

Early Comment , 1940-1941

In the Field Artillery Journal of March, 1941, are ten

articles of major interest. Four are on topics directly related to

the gun-armor problem, and are titled, "Field Artillery Organization,

Armored Force," "The Artillery in Large Armored Units," "Can Grandma,

75-mm. 1879, Stop 'Em?" and "Some Thoughts on Emplacement of Anti-

tank Guns." Two reviews are on activities of German field artillery

units,oneis on Japanese field artillery, two are on the procurement

of artillery materiel and the establishment of an Artillery Replacement

Center, and the tenth is a seven-page article, "Suggestions for

113

Equitation Instructors." Even at that date, it can be seen that a

large share of spontaneous writing on military subjects probed

methods of aiding or abetting the armored attack, and this issue

of the Journal is typical of its time,

An erudite foreign writer of the period was an Italian

infantryman, Colonel Oete Blatto, author of "The Artillery in Large

Armored Units," translated in the March, 1941 issue previously men-

tioned. The article is outstanding for its foresight. Colonel

Blatto presented a number of principles in the use of armor which

were borne out in later combat, and of which some have since been

adopted as part of the current U. S. Armored Force doctrine.

Of these, four are considered for purposes of this report.

They are: 1. German tank success in Poland and France does not

indicate the invincibility of the tank-air team; 2. The most impor-

tant task of an armored division is the exploitation, the next most

important the breakthrough; 3, Armored divisions should be organized

for counter-armored actions as well as the exploitation; and 4. The

armored division

... must have two types of weapons. The first should havethe same mobility as the tank, to perform the functions ofantitank or accompanying artillery. The other should be morepowerful and possess long range, so that tactical mobilityis less essential; this should assume any other functionwhich the tactical situation may demand. It would seem thatin the armies of the important powers the tendency is towarda caliber between 75 and 90 rm, on a tank or self-propelledmount, for the first type; and between 105 and 120 mm, motorized,for the second type.

'hile the infantry and cavalry writers of the time were con-

triving new and ingenious methods of tracking tanks with the primary

114

antitank weapon of the U. S. Army, the 37-mm gun, a scholarly

summary; "Antitank Defenses" appeared in the liay, 1941 issue of

the Field Artillery Journal The author was 1ajor A, C - Vedemeyer,

now Lieutenant General 'edemeyer, an infantryman who, according to

the Journal of 1941,."has spent the last four years in close study

of the whole aspect of antitank defense,"

As part of a "Proposed Antitank Defense," Major Wedemeyer

wrote:

... The 37-mm, antitank gun is sufficiently powerful tostop tanks protected by 2' inches of armor. If the constantlyreported trend to thicker armor on tanks (over 3 inches)becomes an established fact, the present 37-mm, gun may bemodified to increase its penetration, or a 47-mr., a 57-mm.,or even a 75-mm. antitank gun may be necessary., . It isfurther suggested that the .8 75-mr,. antitank guns how assignedto the medium artillery battalions be removed entirely fromthe division and that 12 more 37-mrm, antitank guns be addedto the recommended division antitank unit. This would resultin a battalion of 36 37-mm. antitank guns. The commander ofthe unit would act as antitank advisor on the division staff.

... The medium tank is considered one of the most effectiveantitank weapons. It should mount at least a 3-inch gun andstress should be laid on its mobility and speed, rather thanits armor. This tank is visualized primarily as a "tankchaser" - a positive means to seek, overtake and destroy enemytanks. . .It is not believed desirable to employ the armoreddivision or its tank elements in the antitank role. Armoreddivisions and corps are decisive means in the hands of thecommander, to be employed primarily in large-scale offensiveand defensive operations,

leajor vedemoyer's article mentions the tremendous assault

aimed at the French Army by a German armored force of 45,000 motor

vehicles striking through the ARDENNES FOREST in 1940. He writes,

... The French General Staff couldn't conceive of anarmored thrust of any magnitude driving successfully throughthe rugged terrain of the Belgian Ardennes. Yet five armoreddivisions and three motorized divisions successfully penetrated

115

this deep forest and crossed the Ivhouse River in a:n unpre-cedented er ployent of arnlorod forces.

An antitank doctrine suggested by Major vedemieyer was

similar to that adopted for the employment of TD units when they

became a part of the U, S, Armed Forces. His suggested doctrine

;W:,s: "Vigorous searching for the armored foe,, tenaciously holding

on to his flanks, pursuing and destroying him at every turn."

The article ends with several pertinent conclusions, among

them the following:

... Tanks and airplanes have not deprived the infantry andartillery of their former supremacy, but have greatly acceleratedthe mcthods, changed techniques, and provided supplementary meansfor maneuver or denial of maneuver. . .The tank itself (or tankchaser) is the primary defensive weapon against tanks. Otherantitank means, active and passive, create conditions, such asdisruption, delay, casualties and canalization, which favorthe employment of tank units.

Shortly after this article appeared, the concept of tank

chasers was given additional support in a contribution to the Field

i rtill ry Journal by Lajor N. B. Palmer, which came out in September

of 1941. Writing on the subject "Field Artillery - 1941," Major

(now Lajor General) Palmer included a section on "The Antitank

Artillery." In it he asserted,

.... It is probably true that the ideal antitank gun is theantiaircraft gun, with its expensive laying devices andterrific muzzle velocity. It can blow the tank apart. Itis true, also, that an antitank gun should have a high muzzlevelocity, an arr-Lor-piercing shell, grea:t mobility, and greatmaneuverability. It should have an armored tow vehicle or aseif-propelled mount; rather definitely the latter, if it isto chase tanks around the battlefield.

The observations of these officers are of interest as examples

of informed military thought which, in 1940 and 1941, was the basis

116

for the conception and formation of tank destroyer units.

Excerpts from Comment in 1944-1945

The concentrated emphasis on counter armor operations

between 1940 and 1944 gave our ground forces a number of methods

of dealing With the tank threat, particularly by the time U. S.

forces faced nfajor German strength on the European Continent after

the invasions of 1944. TDs came into their own when a large-caliber,

high-velocity gun was placed on the mobile mount foreseen by earlier

writers. Armed with this weapon, they enlarged on their prirrary

role. On antitank missions they worked in close support of, or

attached to, infantry and armored organizations. As supporting

units for artillery they served to reinforce fires and added greater

range to the artillery capability.

Vith these changes came alterations in basic missions. The

Tank Destroyer Field i.anual of 16 June 1942 gave the units primary

antitank missions, and secondary missions as "beach defense, action

against parachute and airborne troops, and the reduction of bunkers,

pillboxes, and other weapon emplacements."l

The same manual, revised and dated 18 July 1944, lists

suitable secondary missions as:

a. Direct or indirect fire to reinforce or supplementthat of artillery units. b. Destruction of pillboxes andpermanent defensive works. c. Support of landing operations.d. Defense of beaches against waterborne attack. e. Roving'un and roving battery mission.2

Pursuing this secondary employment with reference to rein-

forcing or supplementing artillery fires, several combat authors

117

found time in 1944 to forward articles to the Field Artillery and

Infantry Journals describing successful methods of using TDs as

artillery. Others mention the practice in articles on associated

subjects.

Among interesting comments on this debated method of employ-

ment was one by a Gerr.an officer, a Colonel Seither, written in

November 1942 for a German service paper and translated in the

Larch 1944 FA Journal.3 Colonel Seither considered

...The modern antitank gun is taking on the characteristicsof a field gun, which may determine its future appearance. Inview of these facts it can readily be irnagined that the fieldgun, which has, at all events, disappeared from the GermanArmy, is experiencing a rebirth but is being provided with thespecial tochnical improvements characteristic of an antitankgun and is to be used primarily against tanks and secondarilyfor other artillery purposes.

On the other hand the necessity of at least using thedivisional artillery for antitank defense has compelled us toprovide these guns also with the technical improvements thatensure that they will have the necessary flexibility and rateof fire.

His conclusion is given as another approach to the evolution

of heavy weapons.

Returning to the employment of TDs in a role supplementing

field artillery, five combat officers, a cavalryman and four ar-

tillerymen, are quoted from contributions to the Field Artillery

Journal of August, October, and iovember of 1944.

In the August issue, lajor E. C. Hatfield, Cavalry, pre-

sented operations of four TD units in the supplementary artillery

role. 4 They were the 630th, 776th, 803d, and 808th TD Battalions.

He says,

118

The following missions were developed: a. Reinforcing thefires of field artillery battalions. b. Deepening and ex-tending the zones of fire of the field artillery. c. Targetsof opportunity. d. Counter-battery fire -- to a limitedextent. e. Harassing missions. f. Interdiction missions.

... An example of the accuracy of the 3" gun was evidencedon the night of 14 January 1945 when "C" Company, 808th TDBn, in the role of reinforcing artillery, was called upon todeliver emergency fires on a troop concentration. The targetwas over 800 mils outside the transfer limits, requiring ashift of 1612 mils, and over 12,000 yards in range. A K of/ 78 yards per 1000 was used. A check round fired at thetarget in the morning showed that the deflection was correct,range 100 short.

During a 24-hour period 21022 March 1945, Company "A" ofthe 630th TD Bn fired 17 harassing missions on a Rhine Riverbridge, a total of 4180 rounds of HE being expended.

The.comparative cheapness of 3" aimnunition in tonnage andtransport, and the fact that TDs are highly effective in per-forming harassing and interdiction missions, were the reasonswhich caused a marked increase in their use as reinforcingartillery in Europe.

In the same issue of the Uield Artillery Journal, Colonel

f. B. Bell, Field Artillery, reported tank destroyers in the XIX

Corps played a "prominent part" in providing fire support for the

ROER River crossings. 5 The value of TD guns on harassing and inter-

dicting missions, according to the Colonel, "is too well known to

require comment. ,6

The 90-mmi. guns were used mainly for long range missions.Because they can be sited well forward, their fire can beplaced on targets beyond the range of most of the CorpsArtillery. It should not be assumed, however, that theirvalue is limited to long range missions only. As an illus-tration, three 90-mm. platoons were called upon to placeinterdiction fire upon roads leading to a junction at STEIN-STRASS, approximately 11,000 yards distant. . .PWs from ahorse-d:awn 150-mm. artillery battery, captured intact by the30th Infantry Division, stated that they were unable to evacuatetheir materiel because of the terrific interdiction fire.

... A maximum degree of effect is obtained with tank des-troyer ammunition, and the great saving in shipping weight andspace (over heavier calibers) is evident. 7

119

Statements of Lieutenant Colonel J. i.. Barney Jr.,8 Field

Artillery, and Captain F Ct leacham," in the November 1944 issue

of the Field Artillery Journal, corroborate those of Colonel Bell

and 11ajor Hatfield under different circumstances of combat.

vMa jor Edward A..Raymond, Field Artillery, author of "Brass-

ing off Kraut," in the October 1944 Field Artillery Journal, con-

cludes that

...The 1o10 is one of the most versatile weapons on thebattlefield. It is a quadruple threat, not only doing itsdefensive job in spectacular fashion but also acting offen-sively as an infantry assault gun, as a mobile artilleryweapon, and as an invaluable adjunct in tank attacks.10

Coordination of TD units with armor and infantry has been

given detailed explanation in preceding chapters; however, two

additional briefs on tne operation of the TD-Infantry team are

presented here.

It was developed on the battlefield, according to Colonel

J. F. Barney, Jr., the artilleryman quoted previously, in an

article written for the Infantry Journal of November 1944.

Infantry commanders saw, he reports, "in the heavy fire

power of a TD battalion, a powerful weapon to help Doughboys

when the situation called for their use in this way."

A study of the results of Infantry-TD action is well pre-

sented in an article on the "Froper Use and Abuse of Tank Des-

troyers," by Lieutenant Eugene T. Oborn, Field Artillery, pub-

lished in the Field Artillery Journal of July, 1945. Lieutenant

Oborn declares the success of the TD weapon depends cn an under-

standing of its capabilities by the infantry commander to whom it

120

is attached for combat. 12 He produces a table showing a comparison

of accomplishments and losses in component comp.tLnie;s of the 899th

TD Battalion, covering a period of seven months. During that tin ,

gun compa ni.s worked with the same infantry regiments of the 9th

Division under varying conditions of command and supervision.

Describing the background for his statistics, Lieutenant

Oborn writes,

"A" Co was attached to a regiment which permitted use ofthe guns under company control. Recommendations of its com-mander have, in the main, been followed. This employmentfavors the present type of battalion tank destroyer organiza-tion; missions were assigned generally and the company officersand NCOs were permitted to use their own initiative in accom-plishing these missions.

In the case of "C' and (particularly) "B" companies, alsoattached to regiments, recommendations of the respectivecompany commanders were frequently not followed. The resultwas the use of their destroyers on missions which should andcould have beoo accomplished by tanks, artillery, heavyweapons, or the riflemen themselves all of which were avail-able.

A resume of the chart illustrating the article is as follows:

"A" Co "B" Co "C" Co

Enemy tanks 22 17 10Guns, all types 35 17 11Pillbox and

Strcngpoint 33 12 17iG nest 49 8 21GP vehicle 4 7 4P 465 59 1173Own i10 or 1i8

lost in action 2 13 9

Combat "Know-How"

The complete inactivation of TD units was accomplished in

1946. v'hther tey will be revived to fill anotheremergency role

121

carnnot be foreseen, However, a certain amotunt of "know-how\t,

leaIaed by units in combat through some times bitter experience, may

be repented fcr its value to other Arms. These "tips" are as

fellows:

1. Gun positions must be changed often to secure the elementof surprise. It was noted that the enemy would attempt anytrickery which he thought might have even a remote possibilitycf bagging some of our guns. In several instances he wouldwithdraw a knocked-out tank under cover of darkness and sub-stitute a live tank in its place. Close observation on thepart of the infantry and our gun crews exposed this trickery.It was found that the Kraut would re-man knocked-out tankswhich had not burned and use them as pillboxes. It has become

the policy of this TD unit to shell and setfire all enemytanks knocked out. 13

2. Hand grenades are not carried by experienced units,as they may be set off by enemy shells striking the sides ofthe destroyer.

3. This TD battalion - like others in Italy - thinksthat it should tie right in as a battalion to the divisionalartillery when acting in its secondary role as artillery.15

4. Ancther artillery function of greUt importance to thedivision artillery has boan the use of TDs as roving guns. .The battalion sends out two or three destroyers to fire a fewrounds from each of a number of positions up and down theline, firing at definitely located targets (such as houses,dugouts, trails, etc.) which ,ari6known to be in current use.

_iring is never done at random.

5. The bttalion wants the biggest gun it can carry. 17

6. ThL comparison of self-propelled TDs with the towedantitank guns of the British in the northern sector emphasizedthe superiority of the il10. Our TDs could follow the advanceof our infantry much more closely, and when enemy infantry in-filtrated into Allied positions could withdraw in daylight.The thin-skinned prime-movers fcr the towed guns could, ingeneral, only approach the front at night. The limited tra-verse of towed guns also proved a serious handicap. Thech.vrcn type rubber track was the only logical type to beused in combat.l8

122

7. A roadside position for the emplacement of heavyweapons has two advantages. I\uzzle blast will not show on thehard surface of the roadway, and extra elevation for increasedrange is readily obtained by placing vehicles on the slope ofthe ditch alongside the road.9

8. It is desirable, if the artillery can and will do it,to have the FA crew do all the survey work: this reduces thenumber of men milling around to draw enemy attention and fireupon the area. 2 0

.I believe most tank destroyers would gladly swap theair compressor in the pioneer platoon for one bulldozer, and Iknow the field artillery working with us would have parted withsome of their most prized possessions for even a pint-sizedbulldozer.

10. Amn:n'unition, and the range table for firing shell,illuminating, up to ranges of 4000 yards, should be placed ineach destroyer. This will permit one destroyer of a platoonto illuminate an area, while the other three bring direct 2ireon enemy armor, if the enemy attacks with armor at night.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

1FMI 18-5, (Washington: United States Government PrintingOffice, 16 June 1942), Far 11.

'FIF 18-5, (!s'ashington: United States Government PrintingOffice, 18 July 1944), Par 6.

33Colonel Seither, "The *odern Antitank Gun," translated

from e hrtechnische Monatshofte for August, 1943, written inNovember 1942, translator unknown, Field Artillery Journal, 34(,arch 1944) p 154.

4Major Ernest C. Hatfield, "Utilizing Tank Destroyers asArtillery," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (August 1945), p 495.

5Colonel Paul B. Bell, "Tank Destroyers in the Roer RiverCrossing," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (August 1945), p 497.

6Ibid, p 498.

7 Ibid, p 498.

8 Lt Colonel J. p. Barney, Jr., "TDs Approach katurity,"Field Artillery Journal, 34 (November 1944), pp 775-778.

123

'C.'?ptoin I. C. ieacham as told to Lt. R. L. Barnhill, "AiNw Fighting Teamr," Field Artillery Journal, 34 (NTvemnber 1944),pp 778-780.

10Major Edward A. Raymond, "Brassing Off Kraut," FieldArtillery Journal, 34 (.October 1944), p 698.

1 1Colonel J. P. Barney, Jr., "Tank Destroyers," InfantryJournal, LV (November .1944), p. 17.

1 2 Lt Eugene T. Oborn, "Proper Use and Bause of Tank Des-troyers," Field Artillery Journal, 35 (July 1945), p 399.

131iajor Edward A. Raymond, Op cit, p 697.

14bid.

15"Ibid.16 I

Ibid.

17 d.

Ibid.

1919 Lt Colonel J. P.rield Artillery Journal,

Barney, Jr., "TDs Approach Maturity,"34 (November 1944), p 776.

2 0 Ibid, p 777.

21Captain F. C. Meacham, Op cit, p 780.2 2 Lt Eugene T. bor, p cit, p 399.

Lt Eugene T. Oborn, Op cit, p 399.

124

CEAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND REC OME rNDATIONS

Findings in this chapter are derived from two sources -

an analysis of battle experiences of four TD battalions in the

European Theater during the period from hay 1944 to June 1945, and

general observations on the subject of TD combat activities written

by military authors of the same period.

It should be noted that other aspects of TD employment,

those factors outside actual tactical operations, are not incorporated

in Conclusions and kecommendations. Such factors play an important

part in determining the overall usefulness of a military Corps or

Arm. They include problems of training and logistics and, as in

the case of TDs, a comparision of the efficiency and usefulness of

the TD unit over other types of antitank equipment and personnel

combinations.

For the purposes of this study, the form followed in the

presentation of Conclusions and Recommendations is as follows: Each

conclusion is numbered and listed separately, with a brief des-

criptive explanation, followed by the Committee's recommendation.

1. Offensive and Defensive Capabilities of TDs

The initial conclusion of this study is that TD units suc-

cessfully fulfilled their primary mission, that of defense against

armored attack, and in addition proved to be capable of assuming the

offensive against hostile ground forces, including armor, by operating

125

as highly-mobile, lightly-armored and heavily-gunned assault units.

In the offensive against tanks, TDs relied on mobility and

heavy firepower to offset the disadvantage of their light protective

armor. They operated on the offensive in conjunction with friendly

armor and were utilized to supplement the speed and firepower of the

slower but more heavily armored vehicles. They were particularly

adapted to this role when soggy terrain would not support the weighty

tank. The 'TD vehicle, with less ground pressure, could maneuver

through friendly units., outmaneuvering hostile armor as well, using

this capability to attain an advantageous position, accomplish its

fire mission, and move to the flank or rear for another strike.

The Conmmittee recommends that the characteristics of the TD

self-propelled vehicle, high mobility, light armor and a large gun,

be fully exploited; and that this vehicle be incorporated in an

organization to operate with or as a part of armor, infantry or

reformed TD units, to realize on its dual capabilities on the of-

fensive as well as in a major defensive role against hostile forces.

2. TDs Can Be Used As Artillery

Inherent in TD organizations was their ability to accomplish

nany fire missions of a type normally performed only by artillery.

It was artillerymen who first realized and developed this capability

and applied their specialized knowledge and individual ingenuity to

work out successful methods of employing TDs on typical artillery

tasks.

Artilleryrmen-authors, who wrote on the use of TDs to

126

supplement their Arm, mentioned the following fire missions as having

ben successfully accomplished by TDs:

Direct or indirect fire to reinforce or supplement that of

artillery units.

Roving gun and roving battery missions.

Deepending and extending the zones of fire of artillery.

Targets of opportunity.

Counter-battery fire.

Harassing missions.

Interdiction missions.

In connection with deepening and extending the zones of'

artillery fire, several writers pointed out that TDs, because of

their mobility and armor protection, were sited well forward of

artillery emplacements and from that position placed fire on targets

beyond the range of most Corps Artillery.

It was also emphasized that the comparative cheapness of

TD ammunition, ini tonnage and transport, was a great saving in

shipping weight and space over ammunition normally required by

heavier type artillery to do the same long-range job.

It is recommended that the possibilities of the lightly-

armored, self-propelled gun for use by artillery be considered in

the future development of weapons for that arm; and should assault

units be formed in the future, employing a vehicle similar to the TD

mount, that they be well trained in a secondary mission of rein-

forcing and supplementing artillery.

127

3. Employment Against Fillboxes and Defensive WVorks

The high-velocity gun employed by TD organizations, coupled

with the armored protection its vehicle offered gun crews, gave TD

units a natural weapon to use in direct fire against fortified areas.

The mobility of the gun permitted crews to capitalize on the element

of surprise in attacking pillboxes and defensive works. Guns were

quickly placed in firing position, completed their mission of

placing rounds in embrasures or giving protective fire to units on

the ground, and withdrew before effective hostile fire could be

placed on them.

In recc Dending that this capability be retained as a

secondary mission for units with characteristics of TD organizations,

the Committee does not infer that mobile, direct-fire weapons are

the best means cf reducing emplacements.

4. TDs Posed Quadruple Threat to Enemy

The self-propelled, hard-hitting weapons used by most TD

units during the latter part of vorld Wiar II made these organiza-

tions one of the most versatile antagonists on the battlefield.

They were a quadruple threat to the enemy, being capable of main-

taining a stiff defense against armor, could operate on the offen-

sive against all hostile ground arms, supported the infantry as an

assault gun, and were successfully employed as mobile artillery.

The priim.ry factor in their successful employment was the mobility

inherent in the TD vehicle.

128

It is a general recommendation that in the future design of

vehicular gun mounts, stress be placed on the n.obility of the mount

under all conditions of terrain and weather.

5. Considerations of Command and Employment

TD units attached to major commands in combat performed

rmst successfully under commanders who had a knowledge of the tech-

niques of TD operation, or who, lacking that knowledge, accepted

the staff guidance of the attached TD unit commander. It was the

rule (correct or not) that destroyer organizations were broken down

to platoon-size units for combat, particularly on the defense against

armor.

This procedure did not utilize the full capabilities of the

TD company or battalion on the defensive (particularly in the counter-

attack) and more often placed small TD elements under junior com-

manders who were not remotely acquainted with their techniques,

and, in addition, were not amenable to staff advice from an at-

tached, subordinate commnander.

This general situation was a cause for constant complaint

by TD organization officers and non-commissioned officers, many of

whom wrote, in service papers and elsewhere, that they were in-

efficiently employed.

There is merit to the assertion they could have been used

more effectively. Statistics prepared on a small scale by a TD

unit show, over an extended period of actual combat, major organi-

zation commanders who took advantage of the technical advice of

129

attached TD personnel had a more valuable weapon at their disposal

than commanders who did not. Those coz anders using the technical

advice of their subordinate TD leader had working for them units

which inflicted more than twice p much damage to the enemy, while

suffCringr one-fifth the casualties as those who did not consider

this source of professional assistance.

As a compromise between command authority and the best,

overall utilization of troops trained for specific missions, it is

recormendced that such units be made an organic part of major com-

mands, preferably at regimental or divisional level.

6. Self-propelled uVeapon Superior 'to Towed Gun

TD organizations equipped with the armored, self-propelled,

antitank gun attained greater success in combat than those equipped

with the towed antitank gun. Using organizations considered the

superiority of the mobile mount so apparent that written remarks on

the difference are scarce. It was so obvious it could be taken for

granted.

In countless operations, mobile guns with armor protection

used these characteristics to their decided advantage. They could

mrove in or out of position freely; in combat, towed weapons waited

for nightfall (except in extreme emergency) before moving, and once

coimitted had little opportunity for their thin-skinned prime-movers

to change them to another position. Towed guns had :a limited tra-

verse, compared to the vehicular weapon, and their prime-movers were

of little assistance in altering their traverse. The vehicular

130

weapon could follow the advance of infantry or armor, or become a

part of the forward elements of the assault, all well beyond the

capability of the tcwed gun.

The self-propelled weapon is recommended as the best type

for use by TD units or organizations charged with a similar mission.

7. iobile Gun MvountsShould Have Overhead As Well As Side Armor

Several author-users wrote that TD self-propelled vehicles

would have attained greater combat efficiency had they carried

overhead as well as side armor. They also wrote that because it

had not been provided, most units improviscd their own. The impro-

visation ranged from a canvas spread, to deflect grenades, to metallic

sheeting providing protection against overhead artillery bursts.

In constructing vehicles with characteristics and capabilities

sir:.ilar to those of the TD vehicle, it is recomrmended that overhead

cover be provided for gun crews.

131

APPENDL I

628TH TANK DESTROYERBATTALION

Training

On 10 July 1941, the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion was

organized as a provisional antitank battalion at Indiantown Gap

iilitary Reservation. It owes its conception to Lieutenant General

Hugh Drum, who then commanded the First U. S. Army, and decided that

his divisions should test antitank battalions in the Carolina Maneu-

vers of 1941. This battalion was a divisional unit formed from the

artillery, infantry, engineers, and medical troops of the 28th In-

fantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, Keystone Division.

Initially the battalion was commanded by Major Carl L. Peterson and

consisted of a Headquarters Battery, six lettered batteries, and a

medical detach±ment. Attached was a company of the division engineers.

The battalion's first tactical field training was in July

1941 at A, P. Hill. Military Reservation, Virginia, as a part of the

28th Infantry Division. At this time the main armament consisted

of towed mock guns made of miscellaneous pieces of pipe, wood, etc.,

towed by 2-ton weapons carriers.

Early in November, while participating in the Carolina

Maneuvers, Majcr villiam Mi, Hernandez assumed command. On 15 Decem-

ber 1941, shortly after its return to the Indiantown Gap Military

Reservation, the battalion was recrganized into a permanent organi-

zation, absorbing D and E batteries, redesignating the remaining

132

batteries as companies, and redesignating the unit as the 628th Tank

Destroyer Battalion.

In January 1942 an additional company originally known as

the Pioneer Ccmpaniy, but ultimately to become the Reconnaissance

Company, was added. Also during this month the battalion was moved

to Camp Livingston, Louisiana, where training continued until Sep-

t: tber. Again it moved, this time to the newly formed Tank Destroyer

Center at Camp hood, Texas. Here, after fifteen months of training

with dummy guns, the Battalion first fired live ammunition, using

bcrrowed 75mm guns on half-tracks, the original TD vehicle and

weapon.

Early in December 1942 at Camp Bowie, Texas, the Battalion

successfully completed its first Army Ground Force tests.

In January 1942 the Battalion entrined for Camp Carabelle,

Florida, (later designated Camp Gordon Johnston) where it rejoined

the 28th Infantry Division for intensive amphibious training.

After receiving its first combat vehicles, 36 10 tank

destroyers, the Battalion moved to Camp Rucker, Alabana, where driver

training was stressed prior to participaticn in the 1943 Tennessee

a ne uve r s.

Periods of armphibicus training at Camp Bradford, near Nor-

folk, Virginia, kand Army Ground Force Firing Tests in the West

Virginia kaneuver Area were completed before the Battalion departed

for Camp Dix and the Port of Embarkation in December 1943.

After leaving the U. S. by way of Camp Shanks on 28 January

133

1944, the Battali.n arrived at Greenock, ScotlAnd, on 6 February

1944 and from there entrained for Packingham, England, (located

between Birmingham and Coventry).

After extensive range firing in iales, the Battalion was

moved to Dorchester, England, to run Marshalling Camps for the

Ncrrandy Invasion troops,

Relieved of its Marshalling Area assignment, the Battalion

embarked on Navy LSTs on 28 July for France and the combat zone.

134

APFENDIX II

628TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Combat History

The 628th TD Battalion left from PUDDLET1OWN, England, on

26 July 1944 and loaded on Navy LSTs for France on 28 July 1944.

They landed on Utah Beach on 30 July, and within a few days were

assigned to the 5th Armored Division, XV Corps, Third Army.

The normal procedure in combat was to attach one platoon

of the Reconnaissance Company to each of the gun companies of the

battalion, which in turn were attached to each of the combat commands

and to the reserve command of the Division. The remainder of the

628th was attached to Headquarters, 5th Armored Division Artillery.

Falaise-Argentan Gap

on 10 August 1944, still assigned to the Third Army, XV

Corps, and 5th Armored Division, the Battalion moved out of the

bivouac area in the vicinity of LE 1MANS, France, to participate in

the attempt to close the Falaise-Argentan Gap. Route of column

passed through BRIOSNE and 1E LELSE, arriving in the vicinity of

SEES, France, at 2145 hours, 12 August 1944. During the march on

11 August 1944, 2d Platoon, Company A, was acting as rear guard to

CCA's column. Sometime during the night an unidentified column

approached the route of march of CCA's column from the west. .S/Sgt.

Koczan, Company A, challenged the leading vehicle; and when it

failed to stop, Sergeant Koczan fired his .45 caliber pistol and

135

killed the driver. He then destroyed the next two vehicle. gi',

hand grenades and brought .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine gun

fire on the remaining five vehicles, while the M10's opened fire on

the rear of the column with three-inch H.-E. to prevent a with-

drawal. In all, eight enemy vehicles and 240 enemy troops were

destroyed.

Battle of the Seine River

The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel vtilliam Hernandez,

wont out to contact Company A on 29 August 1944; and while directing

fire on enemy tanks, was killed at 1630 hours near DOUAINS, France.

Major William J. Gallagher, Battalion Executive Officer, assumed

command of the Battalion at 1700 hours, same date. In the same

action in which Lieutenant Colonel Hernandez was killed, Corporals

O'Brien and Tartaglia, 3d Platoon, Company A, each destroyed a Mark V

tank at 1700 yards range just west of DOUAIJS, while the platoon had

one 110 Tank Destroyer knocked out.

Drive to the Belgian Border

On 27 August 1944, the 5th Armored Division with the 628th

Tank Destroyer Battalion attached was relieved of assignment to

Third Army and XV Corps. On 30 August 1944, the 5th Armored Division

was given the mission of marching direct to the Belgian border with

the least possible delay. The Battalion left bivouac near GUERVILLE,

France, at 0730 hours on 30 August 1944, with CCB. It passed through

the outskirts of PARIS and continued on through SENLIS, COIPEIGNE

136

Forest, NOYEN, GUISCARD, VILIENEUVE, and VALENCIENNES, arriving at

CONDE, France, on the Belgium border at 2330 hours on 2 September 1944.

Battle of the Hurtgen Forest

On 23 October 1944, the Battalion moved to the vicinity of

KALTERERBERG, Germany, where for the first time since entering

combat civilian homes were utilized for billets, a policy which was

continued from that date until the end of hostilities. On 1 Novem-

ber 1944, the new Ni36 Tank Destroyers equipped with the 90mm guns

arrived to replace the 0l's with the three-inch guns in the three

firing companies.

On 3 December, CCA with Company A attached, was further

attached to the 4th Infantry Division in their attack on STRAUSS,

Germany, while Company B was attached to CCOB on indirect fire mis-

sions. The battle of the UJRTGEN Forest in Germany was by far the

most intense period of combat experienced by any unit in this Bat-

talion, and full credit can be paid to CCR and Company C for their

outstanding combat record in this engagement. This was the area

that the enemy had been able to strongly fortify and were determined

to protect, as it controlled the approaches to the vitally important

network of dams which fed into the ROER River area. To the north,

British and American units were approachiing the west bank of the

ROER but could not cross until the network of dams in the hills

above their positions were held by our forces, It was known that

the German plan of defense was based on their ability to hold these

dams to the last possible minute, and then release this vast supply

137

of water to flood the entire ROER River area.

Enermy artillery employment in the HURTGEN-BERGSTEIN area was

the heaviest encountered. The artillery fire was such as to confine

tank crews oto their tanks for hours at a time, and air bursts and

shrapnel caused many casualties to the men in the open M36 turrets.

One 036 of Company C hit a mine in the vicinity of BERGSTEIN on 6

December 1944, and the crew climbed into another 1136 for protection.

Shortly afterwards, however, this other i36 with both crews aboard

received a direct hit in the open turret with a white phosphorous

shell. As the result of this experience, plans were immediately

started to build an armored turret top for all tank destroyer

vehicles. This modification for all M36 Tank Destroyer vehicles

was finally completed in January 1945 and proved invaluable in

combat on a number of subsequent occasions.

Battle of the Ardennes

Upon the arrival of all units in the new area around 1400

hours on 24 December 1944, Company A took up a defensive position

in SOY, Belgium; Company B was attached to the 83d Reconnaissance

Battalion, 3d Armored Division, and took up defensive positions in

the vicinity of GI{ANDv NIL, Belgium; Company C, Reconnaissance

Company, and the Battalion Forward CF were established in EREZEE,

Belgium; and Headquarters Company and the Battalion rear echelon

elements moved into BOM L, Belgium. No one knew just how near the

enemy had approached, but it did not take long to find out. Company

A's position in SOY, Belgium, came under artillery fire shortly after

138

their arrival, and the enemy launched a small infantry counterattack

which approached to within 200 yards of Company A's position before

withdrawing. At 0130 hours., 25 December 1944, the 2d Platoon,

Company B, had a road block established in GiRANDINIL, Belgium,

when an enemy armored column was heard approaching the concealed

position. Sergeant Moser, Tank Destroyer Gun Commander, permitted

the leading enemy vehicles to come up to 25 yards of his position

before opening fire, and then in quick succession knocked out the

first two tanks at almost pointblank range, both of which were later

identified as Mark V's. This caused the other vehicles in the enemy

column to withdraw, and no further attempt was made by the enemy to

utilize this GRAiNDENIL-EREZEE-SOY road network which they needed

to properly protect their northriern flank. Later in the same day,

members of Company B3 found two hark V tanks abandoned by the German

crows because they were out of gas; and these two enemy tanks were

also destroyed.

The Roer to the Rhine River

Company B attached to CCB was the first unit of the Bat-

talion to cross the ROER at LINNICH, Germany, on 25 February 1945,

and the remainder of the Battalion followed the next day with Com-

pany A attached to CCA, Company C to CCR, and Battalion Headquarters,

Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance Company, headquarters the Pioneer

Flatoon, and Medical Detachment moving with Division Artillery Head-

quarters. The initial assembly area east of the ROER River was in

the vicinity of KOFFERN-HOTTORF, Germany. All elements of the 5th

139

Armored Division then swung to the north, capturing RATH, ERKELENZ,

HARDT, RHEINDALEN,. RBEYDT, bypassing UNCHEN-GLADI CH and continuing

through VIERSON, ANRATH, HULS, TONISBURG, AND .VLUYNHEIDE where the

Battalion CP was established on 4 March 1945. Company A in the

meantime had proceeded with CCA in the attack against KREFALD, while

Company C continued with. CCR in the attack on REPELEN and ORSOY on

7 March 1945.

140

APPENDIX III

704TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Training

The 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion was probably better known

to the Germans than it was to the people within the United States.

The nucleus of the 704th was formed on 15 December 1941 from

Battery D, 22d ±ield Artillery Battalion of the 4th Armored Division

at Pine Camp, New York, where it was attached to the 4th Armored

Division for training.

The first commander of the 704th was Lieutenant Colonel

Storck who relinquished the command to his executive officer, iajor

Oden, who soon received nis promotion and commanded the battalion

until Orleans, France.

After receiving its basic training with the 4th Armored

Division at line Camp, New York, the 704th packed its equipment in

early September 1942 and proceeded to the Tank Destroyer Center at

Camp Hood, Texas, for a three months training period where a fuller

knowledge of tactics and the use of equipment could be gained.

During this three months period, the battalion put emphasis

on gunnery, camouflage, cover and concealment, and the employment

of tank destroyer companies and platoons with armored units.

Specifically, great emphasis was put on fire and maneuver

and individual tank destroyer versus tank tactics. These tactics

involved agile maneuvering by a tank destroyer so as to place it in

141

a position to fire at enemy tanks in.their most vulnerable areas--

their sides, suspension systems, or their rear..

From January to August 1943,. the 704th ianeuvered with the

4th Armored Division in the California Desert. During these maneu-

vers, it was found that in the majority of problems the battalion

could be better utilized if the companies were attached to the major

~ia~! elements, such as a combat command. In many instances, platoons

were attached to reinforced tank battalions.

It was thought that by using the tank destroyer companies

or platoons decentralized from battalion control, a better dispersion

of the tank destroyers would be brought about, thus giving the tank

destroyers a better opportunity to be used in their primary role--

that is, antitank.

In late August 1943,. the 704th moved with the 4th Armored

Division to Camp Bowie, Texas,. where it underwent physical condition-

ing training and the Army Ground Force combat tests.. The latter

consisted of small unit problems where a platoon leader would be

given a situation such as that of a German tank attack against a

defended position. The tankcdstroyer' platoon leader and his platoon

would then be graded on the following techniques used in deployment:

setting up firing positions; maneuvering to the enemy flanks; and

the degree of chance taken in a simulated tank destroyer versus tank

action.

A considerable amount of attention was given the tank des-

troyer versus tank technique,. inasmuch as the tank destroyers were

142

simply 76mm guns mounted on a medium tank chassis with only three-

eighths inch armor plate for protection against small arms fire.

Since the gun crews had no armor or a turret for protection, this

mea:t that tiey would be completely ,t the mercy of any enemy weapon

of .50 caliber or larger. Also, the crews would be exposed to any

type of overhead fire in their opon vehicles.

On 18 February 1944, the 704th left the States and arrived

15 days later at Liverpool, England. From there the battalion en-

trained for Trowbridge, England, where the next four months were

spent in final preparation for the job ahead.

This preparation consisted mainly of review training of

everything learned in the States. From time to time., the tank des-

troyer companies maneuvered with the 4th Armored Division which was

unarby. These maneuvers consisted mainly of small unit problems

similar to those in the California Desert.

143

APPENDIX IV

8:23D TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Training

The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion was activated 25 July 1942

at Camp Carson, Colorado. Major (now Colonel) Charles B. McClelland

was tho battalion commanding officer; Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel)

Robert W. Rayburn was the battalion executive officer. A small

officer cadre and a 77 enlisted men cadre was furnished by the 804th

Tank Destroyer Battalion. Fifteen new officer graduates of the

Cavalry School were assigned from Fort Riley, Kansas.

The battalion remained at Camp Carson for about six weeks,

conducting cadre training and orientation of newly commissioned

officer personnel. The unit participated in a good amount of

nountain-climbing during this period for the purpose of physical

conditioning. The battalion climbed Pikes Peak in August 1942 and

claims to be the first military unit to accomplish this, in formation.

On 9 September 1942 the 823d moved to Camp Livingston,

Louisiana. At this time it was still in a cadre status, with only

the minimum essential items of TO&E equipment. On or about 1 October

it received 250 fillers from Camp Robinson, Arkansas, plus its general

purpose vehicles. Basic training was then conducted until about

1 January 1943, when it received 400 newly inducted men from Texas

and California. On 5 January the battalion was transferred to the

Basic Unit Training Center, Camp Bowie, Texas. This center was a

144

subordinate command of the Tank Destrtoyer Center at Camp Hood,

Texas.

Individual training, basic and advanced, .was completed at

Camp Bowie, and on 13 April the battalion moved to Camp Hood, coming

under control of the Advanced Unit Training Center, the Tank Des-

troyer Center, At this time, the outfit was converted to a towed

t-nk dostroyer battalion (3-inch gun) and received its first major

items of equipment, a few 3-inch guns and halftracks. At this

time, a strenuous 3-month training program, including weapons and

tactical training, was undertaken. During May, McClelland was

transferred to command the 101st Cavalry Group, and Lieutenant

Colonel Paul B. Bell, FA, assumed command of the battalion.

The battalion completed its proficiency firing tests with

the highest score then recorded for a towed tank destroyer unit.

Other proficiency tests culminating the end of the training period

at Camp Hood were accomplished in an excellent manner, and on 31

July 1943, the battalion moved to Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

At Camp Claiborne, the battalion was given additional train-

ing tests by Headquarters, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade. Then came

the series of 6, 12, 18, and 25-mile road marches. In September the

battalion left for Third Army maneuvers in the Louisiana Maneuver Area

where it was attached to ,the 84th, 99th, 102d, and 103d Infantry

Divisions, respectively. The battalion completed maneuvers around

the 15th of November with an overall rating of Excellent, the only

tank destroyer battalion to receive this rating during this particular

145

phase of r:aneuvers.

Upon return to Camp Claiborne, it was given the mission of

preparing for AGF tests - tactical, physical, equipment, etc., and

getting every individual qualified for POM. About this time,. Bell

was transferred, and the battalion executive, Major Edward A. Cos-

toriris, assumed command. In January 1944 the battalion took its

various AGF tests, which it passed with high scores, particularly

the AGF physical tests. Around the 1st of February, Major (later

Lieutenant Celcnel) Stanley Dettmer assumed command. During February

Major General Frank v. Milburn, Commanding General, XXI Corps, with

representatives of the Inspector General, U. S.- Army, inspected the

unit.

Late in February the battalion received its alert orders

from the War Department. All equipment other than that prescribed

as minimrnu ossential by POM instructions was turned in, last-minute

personnel changes were effected, and on or about 8 March it moved

by rail to Camp Miles Standish, near Taunton, Massachusetts. The

advance detail consisting of two officers had departed for England

in late February. The battalion was scheduled to sail during the

latter part of March, but the ship earmarked for it developed

mechanical trouble, It did sail from Boston aboard the "SS Sea

Porpoise" on 6 April 1944.

146

APPEDIX V

MAPS

1. Gernvriny,. 1:x100,000 G4SGS 4416, Sheet No, S.1 -~Bonn omi~tted.

2. Germany (Cenitral Section), 1:25,000 GSGS 4414, Sheet No. 5503 --

Else nborn .. omitted.

147

DOTD-2745-M-Army-Knox-Jan 85-30