Climate Change

& Refugees

2

Editors’ Note

In creating this issue, we aimed to explore the emerg-ing issue of climate change induced migration through an accessible and artistic medium. Over the next few decades, hundreds of millions of individuals are expect-ed to lose their homes and livelihoods as a result of the enroaching threats of natural disasters and rising sea levels. Clearly, this is an ongoing is-sue that needs to be effectivle addressed, yet widespread public awareness has yet to be achieved.

In this magazine, we have colloated a collection of arti-cles, infographics and origini-al pieces of artwork, condens-ing and simplifying research to create a more accessible overview of the complications concerning climate migra-tion. We investigate various approaches to, and factors of, the topic at hand- from governmental policies and aid efforts to human rights concerns- in the hopes of shedding light onto this often overlooked concern.

It is our hope that this publi-cation serves as a source for individuals to better inform themselves on the global chal-lenges that lie ahead, bereft of the denseness of scientific resources.

-Kristine Mar +

Katrina Lee

2

3

Table of Contents‘Future in Action’ by Kristine Mar..................................................................................page 4-5

‘Global Sea Level Rise’ ......................................................................................................page 6

‘The Pacific Ocean’ by Katrina Lee..................................................................................page 7

‘Global Land and Ocean Temperatures’ ..............................................................................page 8

‘The Sahara Desert’ by Kristine Mar...............................................................................page 9

‘Global Natural Disasters’..................................................................................................page 10

‘The Gulf Coast’ by Kristine Mar....................................................................................page 11

‘Human Rights’ by Kristine Mar.....................................................................................page 12

‘Implications on States’ by Katrina Lee............................................................................page 13

‘International response’ by Katrina Lee............................................................................page 14-15

China: A Photo Essay.....................................................................................................page 16-17

‘The Characterization of the term ‘climate refugee’ by Katrina Lee.....................................page 18

Further Reading..............................................................................................................page 19

4

5

Graph SourceNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2014). Global Mean Sea Level, TOPEX, Ja-son-1, and Jason-2, Seasonal signals removed [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/sod/lsa/SeaLevelRise/LSA_SLR_timeseries.global.

Article Sources1 Connell, J. (2003). Losing ground? Tuvalu, the greenhouse effect and the garbage can. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 44(2), 89-107. doi: 10.1111/1467-8373.001872 Myers, N. (1993). Environmental refugees in a globally warmed world. BioScience, 43(11), 752- 761. doi: 10.2307/13123193 Department of Defense. (2014). 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. Retrieved from http:// www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint.pdf.4 Farbotko, C. & Lazrus, H. (2012). The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 382-390. doi: 10.1016/j. gloenvcha.2011.11.0145 Mortreux, C. & Barnett, J. (2009). Climate Change, Migration And Adaptation In Funafu- ti, Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 19(1), 105-112. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenv cha.2008.09.006

Global Sea level RiSe

ThePacific Ocean

6

4

Tuvalu, with its seemingly boundless cor-al atolls and crystal clear waters, hardly seems like a place one would opt to leave voluntarily. Yet, in recent years, more than one tenth of the local population has em-igrated to neighboring countries. Rising sea levels threaten to engulf the coasts of the archipelago; by 2050, scientists expect the fourth smallest nation to become fully submerged due to glob-al warming.1 The effects of climate change are already taking effect; on June 4th, the Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand granted a family residency on the basis of climate change pressures en-dangering their livelihoods, marking the first case of international recog-nition on the issue. However, this only signifies the beginning of what is predicted to be a rapidly increasing phenomenon; across the Caribbean alone as many as 46 out of the 50 million inhabitants may find their live-lihoods critically effected by 2030.2

Although climate change induced migration is forecasted to af-fect nations globally, the burden is anticipated to lie most heavily on de-veloping nations. With low lying terrain and a high population density, Tuvalu, along with other small island states in the Pacific region, is es-pecially vulnerable to devastation from natural disasters, notably coastal flooding and typhoons. Currently, residents of Tuvalu heavily rely on the agriculture industry as their primary source of income but the in-creasing volatility of weather patterns, coastal erosion, coral bleaching, and saline contamination linked with climate change currently pose great threat to the already unstable livelihoods of many.3 Political-ly, the displacement of populations in developed nations already serves as a great challenge to stable governments; however, the consequence on developing nations like Tuvalu could be potentially devastating, destabilizing already delicate systems in such countries that lack the infrastructure to address the issue effectively.

Ironically, it is these small island nations that tend to contribute least to carbon emissions, yet face the brunt

of the consequences. Already, various ENGOs are honing in their efforts on Tuvalu; one such organization, Alofa Tuva-

lu, aims to convert the island to a fully functioning community completely powered by renewable energy. However, this brings to

question the ethics behind forcing Tuvaluans to completely alter their way of life in the unrealistic hopes of offsetting the consequences largely attributed to Western industrialization. Furthermore, critics have taken issue with the use of the country as a ‘living laboratory’, likening the situation to that of the canary in a coal mine: “the idea that the canary – the Tuvalu islands – is not valuable in and of itself but rather is in service to a larger (global) environmental purpose”.4 As a society, we are prone to romanticizing the image of refugees, utilizing these individuals as tangible ‘faces’ to the seemingly abstract issue. However, in doing so, we are discounting the identity of im-mensely rich cultures, reducing them to symbols of the costs of the environmental crisis we face.

The case of Tuvalu is not unique in its standing. Already, var-ious countries, including the United States, have come to recognize

the onslaught of environmental migration in our future.5 With sea levels rising and weather patterns shifting dramatically, govern-

ments are slowly beginning to cognize the gravity of the is-sue- a realization that couldn’t come any sooner. For now,

the 10,000 residents of Tuvalu lie in wait, watching as sea levels continue to encroach their coastlines.

The Sahara Desert

Graph SourceNational Climatic Data Center. (2014). Climate at a Glance Time Series. [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/time-series/global.

Article Sources1 Sally Ride Science (2014). Introduction to Lake Chad. Retrieved from http://www.earthkam. ucsd.edu/ek-images/investigating_images/chad.2 Musa, Jibril. (2012). An assessment of the effects of desertification in Yobe State, Nigeria. Confluence Journal of Environmental Studies, 7, 72-87. Retrieved from http://works.bep ress.com/cjes_kogistateuniversity/19/.3 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. (2014). Desertification: The invisible front line. Retrieved from http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/ Desertification_The%20invisible_frontline.pdf.4 Odiogor, Hugo. (2010, May 3). Special report on desertification in Nigeria: The sun eats our land. Vanguard. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/05/special-report- on-desertification-in-nigeria-the-sun-eats-our-land/.5 United Nations Environment Programme. (2008). Desertification, drought, and climate change. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/trends_africa2008/deserti fication.pdf.6 Sayne, Aaron. (2011, June). Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Climate_ Change_Nigeria.pdf.7 Collectif, Argos. (2010). Climate refugees. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

8

Global land and ocean TempeRaTuReS

The Lake

For centuries, millions of people in what is now known as the countries of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have fished, irrigated, and simply lived along the 15,000 square miles of Lake Chad, part of the Conventional Basin in Africa. These days, though, maps must be redrawn, as Lake Chad has shrunk ten times smaller in the last thirty-five years.1 It no longer reaches into the borders of Niger and Nigeria. Instead it is being subsumed by the southward-encroaching tide of the Sahara Desert. The tide of desertification has dried up the lake’s shores, leaving fish and hu-mans alike stuck in the shallows, lacking their primary source of life.

The DeserT

Desertification is a consequence of over-cultivation, over-grazing, deforestation, and poor irrigation, coupled with changing global weather patterns that have disrupted the rainfall levels and created extended periods of drought. This is exemplified in the North African rainy season, which has dropped from 150 to 120 days in the past thirty years, drastically shortening the window of time allotted for farmers to grow crops.2 The erosion and loss of nu-trients caused by the poor land use and management of the modern, globalized agricultural system that favors cash crops and quick results over the sustainability of tra-ditional subsistence farming, compounds the resultant loss of productivity and yield. Higher global temperatures, as well as soil carbon sequestration that takes in increased quantities of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, fur-ther degrades the properties and, thus, the agricultural ca-pabilities of, soil.

The NaTioN

12 million hectares of productive land, the equivalent of 20 million tons of grain production, become too dry to farm each year.3 In Africa, the Sahara is advancing at a rate of 0.6 km per year. Currently, approximately 75 million hectares of land are under threat.4 The UN has evaluated agricultural impacts to be felt the most strongly in Africa, a region of the world that still has a large farming population.5 As circum-scribed growing seasons give way a shortage in resources, people’s decreasing economic ability can push them to choose to migrate, either to cities for non-agricultural jobs, or to more productive areas to compete with existing agricultur-al communities. This can have a far-reaching, chained reac-tion, as the often financially and politically unstable nations affected are unequipped to adequately handle such problems of population displacement, low economic opportunity, and food insecurity. Dissatisfaction with ineffective governmental structures may manifest itself in conflict that can destabilize already-weak governments.6

The PeoPLe

Around Lake Chad, fishermen have turned to farming, but the same forces that chased them there have followed their escape to another domain.7 The permanent transformation of land and water into empty miles of sand could be mirrored by the permanent transforma-tion of lives and livelihoods. 400 million people living in the African drylands could soon be facing the choice between staying where they are and staying alive.

9

The Gulf Coast

Graph SourceCentre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. (2014). EM-DAT The International Disaster Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.emdat.be/database.

Article Sources1 CNN Library (2014, August 22). Hurricane Katrina statistics fast facts. CNN.com. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fasts/.2 Collectif, Argos. (2010). Climate refugees. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.3 Marshall, B., The Lens, Jacobs, B., Shaw, A., & ProPublica (2014, August 28). Losing ground. Propublica & The Lens. Retrieved from http://projects.propublica.org/louisiana/#.4 Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (2008, February 6). Louisiana coastal facts. Re trieved from http://www.restoreorretreat.org/pdf/LA%20DNR%20Coastal%20Facts. pdf.5 Hammer, D. (2010, July 18). Louisiana has always welcomed offshore oil industry, despite dangers. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil- spill/2010/07/louisiana_has_always_welcomed.html.6 Dagg, M. & Shaw, R (2001). Climate change: What it will mean for Louisiana’s coastal fisher ies. Retrieved from http://seagrantfish.lsu.edu/pdfs/coast&sea/ClimateChange/pdf.7 Tilove, J. (2010, August 3). Five years after Hurricane Katrina, 100,000 New Orleanians have yet to return. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from http://nola.com/katrina/index. ssf/2010/08/five_years_after_hurricane_kat.html.8 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2014). Mean Sea Level Trend: 8761724 Grand Isle, Louisiana [Data file]. Retrieved from http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/ sltrends/sltrends_station.shtml?stnid=8761724.

Global naTuRal diSaSTeRS

10

The CiTy

In 2005, in the wake of broken levees and heavy floodwaters, more than one million New Orleanians were displaced by the costliest hurricane in American history.1 After the levees designed to control the flow of the Mississippi River failed in the face of Category 5 Hurricane Katrina, 80% of the city flooded, and it has never fully recovered. Now, ten years on, New Orleans’ population is only 85% of its pre-Katrina levels. Many of the storm’s evacuees have returned, but others, especially lower-income resi-dents, have settled more permanently in other Southern cities like Houston and Dallas, places that were sup-posed to only be temporary refuge.3

The sea

The destruction of New Orleans had three environmental factors: rising sea levels (regionally on track to be the highest rates on the planet), sink-ing coastlands, and extreme weather patterns. All are consequences of the past century’s climate change. Since the 1930s, Louisiana has lost about a quarter of its coastline, the result of the pairing of sea rise and land sink.3 Sea level rise, due to thermal ex-pansion of seawater and melting ice from increasing global temperatures, plus steep rates of erosion caused by human engineering that blocks or disrupts natural water flow, is a le-thal combination known as relative sea-level rise, that has led to the loss of 24 square miles of coastline every year in the past decade.4 And high-er, warmer water can change atmo-spheric conditions, exacerbating the effects of storms.

The river

The oil and gas industry has been welcomed with open arms into Lou-isiana, creating jobs and becoming an integral part of the state econo-my, and speeding up the coastline’s rapid decline.5 The Mississippi Riv-er, already corralled by a system of levees attempting to control its nat-ural flood cycles, has been further restricted by thousands of miles of canals and pipelines for the activities of drillers, laid out with no regard to the natural landscape. The sum total of these human actions have trapped the river, cutting sources of freshwater off from the delta and blocking natural flooding that would help build up sediment. The saltwa-ter intrusion that merges what was once a complex network of bayous and waterways into the Gulf of Mex-ico, eliminating eight million acres of wetland, has been a slow process, un-noticed until it is too late.6

The CoasT

As of 2010, nearly 100,000 displaced New Orleans residents had not re-turned.7 Beyond the city, communi-ties that have traditionally depended on the marshlands have seen their cultures and livelihoods submerge as well. By 2100, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospher-ic Administration, Louisiana should expect to see an approximately four-foot relative sea level rise, a devas-tating statistic for a coastline with an average elevation of only three feet.8 Its only recourse lies in the state’s Master Plan for the Coast, an ambi-tious project to reconnect the Missis-sippi and rebuild the land, requires billions more than it has to spend, and may not be able to outpace the ongoing effects of existing damage. In the meantime, there seems to be little that the remaining population can do but wait out the next storm.

11

Hum

an R

ights

Climate change has and will continue to cause massive upheavals in existing natural and social orders. Its effects on human populations will be large and far-reaching, as flooding, drought, extreme weather, heat stress, food insecurity and exposure to illness and disease exacerbate.1 Advocates of mitigation and adaptation typically promote the need for response to climate change using an economic, security-based, or ecological rationale. Howev-er, the addition of a human rights framework may be able to fulfill this need more substan-tially, especially in regards to the growing issue of population migration. The definition of human rights is subject to considerable interpretation, but can be loosely defined as the representation of moral stan-dards that individuals are entitled to, paired with the obligation of other individuals and societal structures to respect these standards. Population response to climate change includes consideration of the rights to life and self-de-termination, food, water, health, and housing. Because climate change is anthropogenic and overwhelmingly sourced to industrial actions of states, the loss of these rights could equate to states’ failure to uphold their obligations, and constitute violations under the jurisdiction of international law.2 In recent years, efforts to tie human rights to climate change legislation have grown. Tra-ditionally underrepresented groups, such as indigenous peoples and small nations, who are disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change, have successfully called attention to the rights framework. Work from groups such as the Maldives Association of Small Island States —evidence that the rights framework can contribute to resolving pow-er imbalances in governance—has led to the adoption of United Nations resolutions stating that the exercise of human rights requires in-ternational cooperation on climate change. Un-der the tenants of international law, states have

obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill access to rights by working to not cause harm to the environment, regulate the activities of third parties, and create equality of both outcome and opportunity. Following this, they should also have an obligation to repair any damage to the environments of other states that results from their own activities. However, human rights law is structured to address entitlements and violations with a direct source and a clear, causal impact. They work to protect and uphold rights, and to com-pensate individuals when their rights cannot be protected or upheld. Yet this is nearly impos-sible to trace when it comes to climate change, because its sources are diffuse and its impacts are collective. As a result, rights protections have limited applicability in existing legal systems. Furthermore, this diffusion of re-sponsibility has implications for accountability among international actors.3 Larger, more industrially developed countries contribute a larger share of global green-house gas emissions. By the simplest form of measurement, this should indicate that large contributors consequently shoulder a larger share of the responsibility for climate change’s effects. Yet the situation is complicated by the status of developing countries, which often lack the economic power to provide full coverage of many rights that should be afforded to their populations. Following the developmental models of industrial countries is a proven method of increasing their financial means to build infrastructure, construct social programs, and foster economic innovation, but these models have historically hinged on industry practices involving land degradation, resource exploitation, and high levels of emis-sions.4 Thus, it becomes difficult to reconcile the opposing threats to human rights: one from poverty that can theoretically be remedied by patterns of industrial development, and one from the environmental effects of development.

Critics of this theory of development argue that current ecologically-damaging practices are not necessary to economic growth. The discourse of ecological modernization, for one, posits that a sustainable and environmental-ly-conscious restructuring of global capitalism could marry the positives of both sides of the dilemma. Even if this becomes true and re-solves the problem, however, accountability would still face another hurdle. Analysis of responsibility for climate change falls under international jurisdiction, which, since the doctrine of sovereign immunity states that a governing body must have a state’s consent to have legitimate authority over it, would require participation of a plurality of states. In addi-tion, it quantifiable measurements would be needed to specify the requirements of such law, including determining the boundary between permissible conduct and human rights viola-tion, and determining the appropriate redress in the case of violation. Climate change will undoubtedly bring with it massive upheavals, not only on the level of overarching natural and social orders, but also among individual lives. The loss of habitable land is gradual, but especially devastating to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. A human rights framework, partially spurred by the increasingly visible mobility of affected populations, can provide a more urgent incentive for global action.5 It is more encompassing than a security-based rationale, which is only activated by the potential for in-tra- and interstate conflict, increases the duties of mitigation and adaptation in comparison to economic arguments, and can be a more con-crete motivator to the general public than an ecological justification. Ultimately, if all these are combined, perhaps the current internation-al stalemate on climate change will finally be overcome.

1 Brown, L. R. (2011). World on the edge: How to prevent environmental and economic collapse. New York: W. W. Norton.2 McInerney-Lankford, Siobhan. (2013). Human rights and climate change: Reflections on international legal issues and potential policy relevance. In M. B. Gerrard & G. E. Wannier (Eds.), Threatened island nations: Legal implications of rising seas and a changing climate (195-242). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.3 Werksman, J. B. (2013). Could a small island successfully sue a big emitter: Pursuing a legal theory and a venue for climate justice. In M. B. Gerrard & G. E. Wannier (Eds.), Threatened island nations: Legal implications of rising seas and a changing climate (409-432). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.4 Anderson, J. W. (2005, November). How climate change developed: A short history. Retrieved from www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-BCK-ClimateChangePolicy.pdf.5 Caney, S. (2010). Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds. In S. M. Gardiner (Ed.), Climate ethics (163-177). Oxford: Oxford University Press.12

Implications on StatesLegal issues

Whilst many low-lying island states are threat-ened by rising sea levels, the impacts of climate change are forecasted to render the land unin-

habitable long before the land physically becomes submerged. With many of these nations heavily reliant on coastal resources, the extreme weath-

er shifts and salinization threaten to damage agro-forestry resources and create food and water

insecurity that will force early migration. Legal-ly, there has been much ambiguity in how thes

residents of nations whose territories have been lost will be addressed, whether they will be con-sidered stateless persons or landless residents of a state that now ceases to exist2. Here arises the notion of creating ‘ex-situ nationhood’, a status

that enables ‘the continued existence of a sover-eign state, afforded all of the rights and benefits

of sovereignty amongst the family of states, in perpetuity’3 . The creation of such a status hopes to ensure that the identity of those forced out of

their original nations is protected, conserving the political entity as residents relocate to other

states. Nonetheless, this would require major reforms in international law and the creation of

entirely new government frameworks to accom-modate the recognition of stateless individuals, both of which involve lengthy reviews that are likely to encapsulate more extensive periods of

time than these nations have.

Social and Security ChallengesAs a consequence of increased population density due to migration, as well as changes in the distri-

bution and quality of natural resources, climate change is speculated to threaten the peace and

security of states, both on the national and inter-national scale. Past occurrences have established a strong link between resource competition and armed conflict, and with mass migration placing pressure on food and water security- a predicted 600 million more individuals at risk of hunger by

20804 - the likelihood of conflict is forecasted to increase, challenging the societal stability of such

nations. Furthermore, there is fear that in offering asylum to refugees, governments may be endan-

gering political relations, encouraging mass entry and disrupting the racial, religious and ethnic bal-

ance. Alongside this, the rise in population con-centrations as a result of climate change induced migration raises concern over increased risks of

health epidemics, with the spread of infectious diseases potentially destabilizing already fragile nations. In countries where the most productive

individuals are afflicted by infectious disease, the stagnation of economic development often

causes social upheaval and destroys the ability for government institutions to effectively provide for their citizens. With the World Health Organiza-

tion already reporting upwards of 160,000 annual deaths attributed to subsidiary effects of global

warming, the additional pressures of climate change migration on nations is only expected to

worsen the situation, with a projected twofold increase in the death rate by 20305. Undoubtedly,

climate change will dramatically impact nations and international relations globally, highlighting the

importance for governments to openly address the issue of climate change migration, if only for their

country’s best interest.

1 Burkett, M. (2011). The Nation Ex-Situ: On climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era. Climate Law 2, 345–374 2 Shalit, A., & Sugden, S. (2011). Climate Change Refugees, Compensation, and Rectification. Monist, 94(3), 310-328. 3 Burkett, M. (2011). The Nation Ex-Situ: On climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era. Climate Law 2, 345–374 4 Panda, A. (2010). Climate Refugees: Implications for India. Economic & Political Weekly,45(20), 76-79. 5 Purvis, N (2004). The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System (Policy brief). Retrieved from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ ecspr10_unf-purbus.pdf.

The geopolitical consequences of climate change are antici-

pated to be vast and unprece-dented1 . With the potential for environmental shifts to render various nation-states uninhab-

itable in the near future, the impending loss of land holds

great implications for interna-tional law. Ideally, sufficient international dedication and

collaboration in mitigation efforts would ensure that

all states remain habitable. Unfortunately, there has been

little indication of progress in this realm and thus many

nations find themselves strug-gling to find feasible solutions

to assuage the encroaching legal, security, and social im-

plications that lie ahead.

13

“Do we have to migrate in order to lose our culture? Because we could lose our culture by just remaining where we are. Given time, we could lose it, either totally or we could change it … culture is an evolving thing. It is changing. So wherever we go or wherever we stay, culture is still evolving and changing” -Audience member 1, USP Tuvalu Campus Public Seminar, Funa-futi, 12 August 2005

Sichuan, China

Researchers in China have estimated that air pollution contributed to 1.2 million deaths in 2010 alone, accounting for almost 40% of global figures. High pollution levels are heavily linked to decreased quality of life, placing the health of residents at risk and raising concerns that continually increasing figures may render some areas unlivable in the near future.

14

Langmusi Village, China

Beijing, China

Researchers in China have estimated that air pollution contributed to 1.2 million deaths in 2010 alone, accounting for almost 40% of global figures. High pollution levels are heavily linked to decreased quality of life, placing the health of residents at risk and raising concerns that continually increasing figures may render some areas unlivable in the near future.

Shifts in weather patterns are expected to internally displace rural communities across the country, placing additional migration pressures on the already overpopulated major cities. With high population densities associated with increases in the spread of disease, worsened sanitation issues and resource shortage, China faces the challenge of accommodating the regional move-ments of populations.

15

International Response

Whilst awareness on the implications of climate change has become increasingly pervasive over the past decade, debate still exists over the most equitable and effective solution to address the issue. Unfortunately, this has resulted in little progress in the development of legal protection of individuals displaced as a result of climate change. However, a shift in towards international involve-ment may be advancing as na-tions begin to recognize that mass migration is not solely an environ-mental issue, but also a matter of national security.

Issues with Legal Recognition

The discourse surrounding the term ‘environ-mental refugee’ in itself has only served to im-pede the recognition of such individuals and the development of international policies to address the issue. The Refugee Convention strictly limits the classification of refugee status to those with ‘well –founded fear of being prosecuted’ due to ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-ticular social group or political opinion’1 . Cur-rently, the legal system lacks clear recognition of environmental pressures as a valid justification for residency, with critics arguing that the as-sumption that migration stems from a unilateral cause flawed, as environmental change often cannot be isolated from political and econom-ic factors given the complexity of many global issues. Whilst New Zealand’s recent granting of residency of a Tuvaluan family is being lauded as a milestone in the plight towards international recognition, the case in itself is unique in that the ruling was based on various factors, not solely climate change, but also the strong familial ties they had to the country2 . Unfortunately, many of those at risk of displacement are unlikely to have similarly strong connections to such nations and whether or not these countries will similar-ly open their borders to displaced individuals is uncertain; just a few months prior, a man from Kiribati was denied environmental refugee status by the same government.

1 Williams, A. (2008). Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law. Law & Policy, 30(4), 502-529.

2 Aulakh, R. (2014). New Zealand case hints at future climate refugee crisis. Toronto Star. Retrieved No-vember 25, 2014.

3 Grubb, M. (1995). Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 71(3), 463-493.

4 Rio Declaration. (1992). Retrieved November 25, 2014, from http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilin-gual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163

5 Jerneck, M. (2009, January 1). Policy Responses to Climate Refugees: What Are Governments Doing? Retrieved November 25, 2014, from http://www.climate.org/topics/environmental-security/climate-ref-ugee-policy.html

6 Purvis, N (2004). The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System (Policy brief). Retrieved from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/de-fault/files/ecspr10_unf-purbus.pdf. 7 Murray, S. (2010). Environmental migrants and Canada’s refugee policy. Refuge, 27(1).

16

The UN

Whilst international policy responses such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been established in the past, wherein various small-island na-tions agreed to rely on traditional law to ad-dress climate change induced damage, have been established, it has since been recognized that upholding such laws would be legally complicated3 . Some progress has been made in the recognition of the issue itself, with the 1992 Rio Declaration binding states to ‘coop-erate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage’4 , however, there has been little progress made in actually implementing the principle. Argu-ably, the most headway prior to the mid 21st century has been taken on by the Global En-vironmental Facility, which aids developing countries in acquiring funding to implement adaptation measures. However, an equitable, long-term solution has yet to be established. In order to address the issue of equity in burden, there have been preliminary sugges-tions in both the Beijing Declaration and the Toronto Conference for the development of a ‘climate fund’ to help fund protection mea-sures in developing nations to minimize the impacts of climate change, but minor prog-ress has followed.

The EU

Within the European Union, evidence of expected increased migratory pres-sure from the European Commission have brought forward concerns and prompted the EU to address the issue in their own self-interest. Due to the EU’s geographical relationship with many affected countries, they are expected to see a large influx of en-vironmental migration in the coming years and will arguably have one of the largest influences on developing inter-national policy. Notably, the German Advisory Council on Global Change’s (WBGU) report has prompted policy makers to address preemptive mea-sures to moderate migration flows through treaties between Europe and affected countries. In 2008, the Eu-ropean Parliament declared to “orga-nize legal protection for the victims of climate events”5 , but as of 2011 only Sweden and Finland have set up mea-sures to allocate permanent resident status for migrants who are both al-ready resident in the countries and are unable to return to their home coun-tries due to environmental disaster.

North America

Although policy regarding environmen-tal refugees in North America has been negligible to date, the recent release of the United States Department of Defense’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Road-map6 clearly identifies climate migration as a key issue facing the nation. However, largely, the concerns identified focused on an increased demand for disaster relief and military capabilities, with the pro-posed actions concentrating on military preparations to support relief efforts in the aftermath of climate change induced events rather than the preemptive measures the EU declarations discuss. Similarly, Canada has made little headway in laying down concrete policies in response to climate change migration, with the government’s temporary adjustments in policy towards those affected by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti regarded as the nation’s most notable effort7 . However, due to Canada’s strong ties to the United States, it is expected that the country will likely to take a similar ap-proach when US policy regarding the issue is established.

17

The characterization of the term ‘Climate Refugee’

In 1985, Essam El-Hinnawi, a researcher for the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) coined the term ‘environmental refugee’, defining such individuals as “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habi-tat, temporarily or permanetly, because of a marked environmental disruption that jeopar-dized their existance”1. Since then, the phrase, alongside it’s counterpart ‘climate refugee’, has become increasingly ubiquitous in addressing individuals displaced due to climate change.

However, legally, the term holds little weight, and environmental forces do not currently fall under the constraints that enable the rec-ognition of ‘refugees’2. Skeptics criticize the definition for it’s vagueness, arguing that the decision to migrate falls on a continuum rather than a binary system3. Whilst some environ-mental factors, such as natural disasters or loss of land, may force relocation, others may simply prompt migration due to damaged local opportunities. By generalizing these through the use of the umbrella term, there is a failure to distinguish between these levels of severity.

Additionally, the connotations of the word ‘refugee’ risk stripping community pride and resilience. The term removes the individual identities of residents, reducing the population to a group of victims reliant on food handouts and humanitarian aid. Following campaigns to ‘save climate refugees’ in 2008, President Tong of Kiribati, a Pacific island under the risk of rising sea levels, stated that he does not wish residents do not wish to leave their home labelled ‘environmental refugees’ but rather as skilled migrants that are able to effective-ly adapt to the challenges they face ahead4. Rather than empowering those afflicted by climate change and encouraging self-reliance, the utlisiation of the phrase ‘climate refugees’ may actually serve to discourage individuals and damage the identities of communities.

Furthermore, the classification of citizens as ‘environmental refugees’ often discounts other challenges the nation may be facing aside from climate change. Often, coastal atolls, such as Kiribati, are not only confronted with the impending rise in sea levels, but also lack of

effective infrastructure and sanitation issues amongst several others5. Moreover, media at-tention that circulates the topic tends to focus heavily on the prospect of border control in developed nations rather than bringing aware-ness to the plight of individuals in the affected countries6.

Whilst there are evident issues in classify-ing individuals as environmental or ‘climate refugees’, the reality of the situation is that an alternative term does not currently exist. The use of the word ‘migrants’ has previously been suggested, however, this is often consid-ered too light of a term, failing to address the often involuntary nature of the movements of communities. At the moment, no clear devel-opments have been made in adapting the ter-minology utilised. Whilst the phrase ‘climate refugees’ may be commonly adopted in the realm of environmentalism, it is of importance to note that, in the words of President Tong, the issue is ‘not just about moving people to a safer place. But it’s about equity, identity and human rights’7.

1Bates, D. (2002). Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change. Population and Environment, 22(5), 465-477.2Myers, N. (1993a). Environmental refugees in a globally warmed world. Bioscience 43, 752–761.3Farbotko, C., & Lazrus, H. (2012). The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 382-390. 4ABC, 2008. Kiribati President in Australia for Climate Change Talks. Radio Australia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pro-gramguide/stories/200806/s2283088.htm5Lazrus, H., 2009. Perspectives on Vulnerability to Climate Change and Migration in Tuvalu. Source: Studies of the University: Research, Counsel, Education. Bonn, UNU Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS).6Kiribati National Assessment Report. (2010, January 1). Retrieved November 27, 2014, from http://sidsnet.org/msi_5/docs/nars/Pacific/Kiribati-MSI-NAR2009.pdfABC, 2008. 7Kiribati President in Australia for Climate Change Talks. Radio Australia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/programguide/sto-ries/200806/s2283088.htm

18

Further Reading

Gerrard, M. B., & Wannier, G. E. (Eds.). (2013). Threatened island nations: Legal implica-tions of rising seas and a changing climate. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Nash, M. P. (2010). Climate refugees [Motion picture]. United States.

UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. (n.d.). <http://www.unhcr.org/>

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. (n.d.). <http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change>

Brown, L. (2011). World on the edge: How to prevent environmental and economic collapse. New York: W.W. Norton.

Image sources:

Front Cover...........................................................................................................................................................................Kristine MarPages 2-3...............................................................................................................................................................................Katrina LeePages 6-11.............................................................................................................................................................................Kristine MarPages 11-14...........................................................................................................................................................................Katrina LeePage 17..................................................................................................................................................................................Katrina LeeBack Cover............................................................................................................................................................................Kristine Mar

19

Special Thanks To:Professor M. Dawn King

Brown University