1 IPL Digest Compilation (PART I) Pearl and Dean Inc. v Shoemart (2003) Facts: Pearl and Dean (Phil.), Inc. (P&D) isengaged in the manufacture of advertisingdisplayunitssimplyreferredtoaslightboxes.,which utilizespeciallyprintedposterssandwichedbetweenplasticsheets and illuminated with back lights. 1981P&DsecuredaCertificateofCopyrightRegistrationover theseilluminateddisplayunits. Theadvertisinglightboxeswere marketed under the trademark Poster Ads. 1988Theapplicationforregistrationofthetrademarkwas approved. 1981-1988 P&D employed the services of Metro Industrial Services to manufacture its advertising displays. P&Dnegotiatedwith,Inc.(SMI)fortheleaseandinstallationofthe lightboxes.OnlythecontractforSMMakatibutwaslateron rescinded after SMI insisted that SM Cubao is also covered. Twoyearslater,MetroIndustrialServices,thecompanyformerly contracted by P&D to fabricate its display units, engaged in contract toconstructlightboxesforSMIschainofstores. Afterthiswas terminated,SMIengagedtheservicesofEYDRainbowAdvertising Corporation to make the light boxes. 1989P&Dfoundoutthatexactcopiesofitslightboxeswere installedatSMCityand2moreSMbranches.Itfurtherdiscovered thatEdsaMarketingInc.(NEMI)wassetupprimarilytosell advertisingspaceinlighteddisplayunitslocatedinSMIsdifferent branches. 1991P&DsentlettertobothSMIandNEMIenjoiningthemto ceaseusingthesubjectlightboxesandtoremovethesamefrom SMIs establishments.It also demanded the discontinued use of the trademarkPosterAds,andthepaymenttoPearlandDeanof compensatory damages (P20M). ClaimingthatbothSMIandNEMIfailedtomeetallitsdemands, P&Dfiledthisinstantcaseforinfringementoftrademarkand copyright, unfair competition and damages. Answer: SMImaintainedthatitindependentlydevelopeditsposterpanels using commonly known techniques and available technology, without notice of or reference to P&D copyright. TheregistrationofthemarkPosterAdswasonlyforstationeries such as letterheads, envelopes, and the like. WordPosterAdsisagenerictermwhichcannotbeappropriated as a trademark Pearl and Dean is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its complaint since its advertising display units contained no copyright notice Prayedforthedismissalofthecaseandcounterclaimedformoral, actual and exemplary damages and for the cancellation of Pearl and Deans Certification of Copyright Registration NEMI repleaded SMIs averments. Court Ruling: RTC: In favor of P&D. CA:ReversedRTC.InfavorofSMI.Sincethelightboxescannotbe consideredaseitherprints,pictorialillustrations,advertisingcopies, labels, tags or box wraps, to be properly classified as a copyrightable classOwork,whatwascopyrightedwerethetechnicaldrawings only, and not the light boxes themselves. Issues: WON SMI should be held liable. (No) Held/Ratio: ON THE ISSUE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT P&DsapplicationaswellasCopyrightCertificateissuedbythe National Library clearly stated that it was for a class O work under Section 2 (O) of PD 49 (The Intellectual Property Decree) which was the statute then prevailing.Said Section 2 expressly enumerated the works subject to copyright: SEC.2.TherightsgrantedbythisDecree shall,fromthemomentofcreation,subsist with respect to any of the following works: x x x x x x x x x (O)Prints,pictorialillustrations,advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps; x x x x x x x x x Copyright,inthestrictsenseoftheterm,ispurelyastatutory right.Accordingly,itcancoveronlytheworksfallingwithinthe statutory enumeration or description. P&Dsecureditscopyrightundertheclassification classO work.Thisbeingso,petitionerscopyrightprotectionextendedonly tothetechnicaldrawingsandnottothelightboxitselfbecausethe 2 latterwasnotatallinthecategoryofprints,pictorialillustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps. In fine, if SMI and NEMI reprinted P & Ds technical drawings for sale tothepublicwithoutlicensefromP&D,thennodoubttheywould havebeenguiltyofcopyrightinfringement.Butthiswasnotthe case. Courtremindsagainthatcopyrights,patentsandtrademarksare completely distinct and separate from one another, citing Kho case. ON THE ISSUE OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT P&D never secured a patent for the light boxes.It therefore acquired no patent rightswhich could have protectedits invention, if in fact it really was.And because it had no patent, petitioner could not legally preventanyonefrommanufacturingorcommerciallyusingthe contraption It is onlyafter anexhaustive examinationbythe patent office that a patent is issued.Such an in-depth investigation is required because inrewardingausefulinvention,therightsandwelfareofthe community must be fairly dealt with and effectively guarded. Such scrutiny is not present in the case of copyrights nor any notice publishedbeforeitsgranttotheeffectthatapersonisclaimingthe creation of a work. Therefore,nothavinggonethroughthearduousexaminationfor patents,thepetitionercannotexcludeothersfromthemanufacture, saleorcommercialuseofthelightboxesonthesolebasisofits copyright certificate over the technical drawings. ON THE ISSUE OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ThisissueconcernstheusebyrespondentsofthemarkPoster Adswhichpetitionerspresidentsaidwasacontractionofposter advertising. P& Dwas able to securea trademark certificate for it, butonewherethegoodsspecifiedwerestationeriessuchas letterheads,envelopes,callingcardsandnewsletters.Petitioner admitteditdidnotcommerciallyengageinormarketthesegoods. Onthecontrary,itdealtinelectricallyoperatedbacklitadvertising unitsandthesaleofadvertisingspacesthereon,which,however, were not at all specified in the trademark certificate. One who has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not preventtheadoptionanduseofthesametrademarkbyothersfor products which are of a different description. Assuming arguendo thatPosterAdscouldvalidlyqualifyasa trademark, the failure of P & D to secure a trademark registration for specific use on the light boxes meant that there could not have been anytrademarkinfringementsinceregistrationwasanessential element thereof. ON THE ISSUE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION Thetrialcourtdidnotfindprivaterespondentsliabletherefor. Petitioner did not appealButevendisregardingproceduralissues,weneverthelesscannot hold respondents guilty of unfair competition. TherewasnoevidencethatP&DsuseofPosterAdswas distinctiveorwell-known. Thecrucialadmissionbyitsownexpert witness that Poster Ads could not be associated with P & D showed that,inthemindofthepublic,thegoodsandservicescarryingthe trademarkPosterAdscouldnotbedistinguishedfromthegoods and services of other entities. This fact also prevented the application of the doctrine of secondary meaning.Secondarymeaningmeansthatawordorphraseoriginally incapableofexclusiveappropriationwithreferencetoanarticlein themarket(becauseitisgeographicallyorotherwisedescriptive) might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in the trade and to that branchofthepurchasingpublic,thewordorphrasehascometo mean that the article was his property.PosterAdswithpetitionerP&Dbecauseitwastoogeneric definitely precluded the application of this exception. PETITION DENIED. Mirpuri v CA [GR No. 114508 | 19 November 1999 | Puno | Nature of Case] Petitioner: Pribhdas Mirpuri Respondent:CA;DirectorofPatents;BarbizonCorporation(corporation organized and doing business under the laws of New York, U.S.A.) Quick Summary FactsLolitaEscobarhadearlierfiledanapplicationforregistration opposed by Barbizon Corporation before the Bureau of Patents for the use of BARBIZONinbrassieres&ladiesundergarments.Theoppositionof BarbizonCorpwasbasedonconfusingsimilarity,damageinbusiness,and violationoftheTrademarkLaw.TheDirectorofPatentsdismissedthe 3 oppositionandgaveduecoursetothepetition.Thisregistrationwaslater cancelled due to failure to file an Affidavit of Use of Trademark. Mirpuri, assignee of the trademark, filed his own application for registration of BARBIZON, opposed by Barbizon Corp alleging prior use and registration in the US and in different countries, prior international recognition & reputation ofthetrademarkthroughuseandads,withheavyrelianceontheParis ConventionanditsimplementingMemorandainthePhils(theVillafuerte Memo & the Ongpin Memo) and Art 189 RPC. Mirpuri raised the defense of res judicata. The Dir of Patents declared the opposition barred and thus gave due course to Mirpuris application. The CA reversed the Director of Patents decision & ordered a remand. MR was denied. HeldBarbizonCorpsoppositionisbarredbyresjudicata.The2cases didnt involve the same causes of action and the same laws. The rest of the case dealt with the ff: Trademarks & Trademark Law (purpose & history), The Paris Convention, and Intellectual Property Rights in the Phils in general. Facts: FIRSTREGISTRATIONCASE:On15June1970,LolitaEscobarfiled anapplication(InterPartesCaseNo.686orIPCNo.686)withthe BureauofPatentsfortheregistrationofthetrademarkBARBIZONfor useinbrassieresandladiesundergarments.Sheallegedthatshehad been manufacturing and selling these products under the firm name "L & BM Commercial" since March 3, 1970. Barbizon Corp opposed this application claiming that: oEscobarsmarkBARBIZONisconfusinglysimilartothetrademark BARBIZON w/c the Corporation owns & hasnt abandoned. oThe corp. will be damaged, and its business reputation and goodwill willsuffergreat&irreparableinjurybytheregistrationofthesaid mark. oTheuseofthesaidmarkbyEscobarconstitutesanunlawful appropriationofamarkpreviouslyusedinthePhilsandnot abandonedandthusastatutoryviolationofSection4dofRA166 (Trademark Law), as amended. Afterfilingpleadings,thepartiessubmittedthecasefordecision.The DirectorofPatentsdismissedtheopposition&gaveduecourseto Escobars application on 18 June 1974. The decision became final on 11 Sept 1974 when Lolita Escobar was issued a certificate of registration. She assigned all her rights & interest over the trademark to MirpurI under his then firm name Bonito Enterprises. Shefailedtofilew/theBureauofPatentstheAffidavitofUseofthe TrademarkrequiredunderSection12ofRA166.Thus,theBureauof Patentscancelledthecertificateofregistration.Sheappliedfor registration of the cancelled mark. SECONDREGISTRATIONCASE:Mirpurifiledhisownapplicationfor registration of Escobars trademark. Escobar assigned her application to Mirpuri&thiswasopposedbyBarbizonCorporation(IPCNO.2049) where the latter alleged that: oThecorporationadoptedandregisteredthetrademarkBARBIZON, Barbizon & its Bee design, and then Barbizon & a representation of a womanin1933,1934,1949,1977,1983.Theseregistrationsare subsisting & in force, and their use hasnt been abandoned. oTheCorp.,throughawholly-ownedPhilsubsidiary,hasbeen manufacturing the goods covered herein and selling them to various countries..Thetrademarkhasbeenusedincountriessuchas Australia, France, Greece, HK, Norway, Sweden, etc. oThe trademark was fraudulently registered by Escobar and the rights to the said mark was assigned to Mirpuri thus Mirpuris title is vitiated by fraud & crime.oBarbizon,Barbizon andBee Design, andBarbizon&representation ofawomantrademarksarewell-knowntrademarkswellentitledto protectionunderArticle6bis1oftheParisConvention,further amplifiedbytheMemorandaoftheMinistersofTradetotheDirof Patents (Villafuerte & Ongpin Memoranda). oThe trademark applied for by Mirpuri is identical to the corporations trademarkandconstitutesthedominantpartofthecorporations2 othermarks.ThecontdusebyMirpuriofthetrademarkongoods belongingtoClass25constitutesaclearcaseofcommercial& 1 Article 6bis (1)ThecountriesoftheUnionundertake,eitheradministrativelyiftheirlegislation sopermits,orattherequestofaninterestedparty,torefuseortocancelthe registrationandtoprohibittheuse,ofatrademarkwhichconstitutesa reproduction,animitation,oratranslation,liabletocreateconfusion,ofamark consideredbythecompetentauthorityofthecountryofregistrationorusetobe well-knowninthatcountryasbeingalreadythemarkofapersonentitledtothe benefitsofthisConventionandusedforidenticalorsimilargoods.These provisionsshallalsoapplywhentheessentialpartofthemarkconstitutesa reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith. (2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed for seeking the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be sought. (3) No time limit shall be fixed for seeking the cancellation or the prohibitionof the use of marks registered or used in bad faith. 4 criminalpiracy.ItsregistrationwillviolatetheTrademarkLawand also Art 189 RPC. Mirpuri raised the defense of res judicata. TheDirectorrenderedadecisiondeclaredBarbizonCorpsopposition barredbyresjudicataandgivingduecoursetoMirpurisapplicationfor registration.ThecorporationappealedbeforetheCA.TheCAreversed the findings of the Director of Patents regarding res judicata and ordered a remand of the case. CA denied MR. EscobarassignedtoMirpuritheuseofthebusinessnameBarbizon International.HeregisteredthenamewiththeDTIforwhichhewas issued a certificate of registration in 1987. Barbizon Corp filed a petition forcancellationofMirpurisbusinessnamebeforetheOfficeofLegal Affairs.TheDTIOfficeofLegalAffairscancelledMirpuriscertificateof registration&declaredBarbizonCorptheownerandprioruserofthe business name Barbizon International. Issues: WON Barbizon Corps opposition is barred by res judicata in the 1st registration case [YES] Ratio: Trademarks & Trademark Law AtrademarkisdefinedunderR.A.166,theTrademarkLaw,as including"anyword,name,symbol,emblem,signordeviceorany combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured, sold or dealtinbyothers."TheIntellectualPropertyCodedefineditas"any visible sign capable of distinguishing goods." InPhil.Jurisprudence,thefunctionofatrademarkistopointout distinctlytheoriginorownershipofthegoodstowhichitisaffixed;to securetohim,whohasbeeninstrumentalinbringingintothemarketa superiorarticleofmerchandise,thefruitofhisindustryandskill;to assurethepublicthattheyareprocuringthegenuinearticle;toprevent fraud and imposition; and to protect the manufacturer against substitution and sale of an inferior and different article as his product. Modern authorities on trademark law say that 3 distinct functions: a)indicate origin or ownership of the articles to w/c they are attached b)guarantee that those articles come up to a certain standard of quality c)advertise the articles they symbolize Asearlyas5,000BCmarkingsonpotteryhavebeenfoundby archaeologists.CavedrawingsofbisonsinEuropeshowsymbolson theirflanks.Greek&Romaninscriptionsonworksrevealfeatures thought to be marks or symbols. These were affixed by the makers or by public authorities to indicate payment of tax, to disclose state monopoly, ordevicestosettleaccountsbetweentheentrepreneurandhis workmen. IntheMiddleAges,marksongoodswascommon.InEngland, identifyingmarkswereusedincertaintradesbyeveryguildsothatthe public would know that the goods were not foreign goods smuggled into anareawhereaguildhasamonopoly.Merchantsalsousedmarksso they could identify & reclaim their goods after recovery from shipwreck or piracy. Duringtheindustrialrevolution,trademarksidentifiedgoods,indicated goodquality,andthusstimulatedfurtherpurchasesbytheconsuming public.Theycametosymbolizegoodwill&businessreputationofthe ownerandthusbecamepropertyrightprotectedbylaw.Thecommon law developed the doctrine of trademarks & tradenames. England & US createdlawsontrademarkstoregulateunfairtrade.Trademarkowners can now exclude others from using his mark or using confusingly similar markswhereconfusionresultedindiversionoftrade.Italsowarned against fake products. Today, trademark is a symbol of origin & goodwill, and also an agent for theactualcreation&protectionofgoodwill.Itcreatesanimpersonal guarantyofsatisfaction,creatingadesireforfurthersatisfaction.Thus, themarkbecamethesilentsalesman.Now,goodwillisnolonger confinedtotheterritoryofactualmarketpenetrationbutalsowherethe marked article has been fixed in the public mind thru advertising. Paris Convention ParisConvention,isamultilateraltreatythatseekstoprotectindustrial propertyconsistingofpatents,utilitymodels,industrialdesigns, trademarks,servicemarks,tradenamesandindicationsofsourceor appellationsoforigin,andatthesametimeaimstorepressunfair competition. It is a compact by the members of the Union w/c pledged to accordtocitizensofotherUnionmemberstrademarkandotherrights comparable to those accorded their own citizens by their domestic laws. Nationalsofthevariousmembernationsarethusassuredofacertain minimum of international protection of their industrial property. ItwassignedinParison20March1883,underwentseveralrevisions. TheUSaccededon30May1997whilethePhilsconcurredon10May 1965 becoming effective 27 Sept 1965. Art 6bis of the conventiongoverns protection ofwell-known trademarks. Under paragraph 1, each country of the Union bound itself to undertake torefuseorcanceltheregistration,andprohibittheuseofatrademark whichisareproduction,imitationortranslation,oranyessentialpartof which trademark constitutes a reproduction, liable to create confusion, of amarkconsideredbythecompetentauthorityofthecountrywhere protection is sought, to be well-known in the country as being already the 5 mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the Convention, and used for identicalorsimilargoods.ThisArticlewasintroducedinHaguein1925 andamendedinLisbonin1952.ITisaself-executingprovision.The requirementisthatthetrademarkiswellknowninthecountrywhere protectionissought.ThedeterminationofWONitiswell-knownliesin the competent authority of the countryof registrationor use either the registering authority or the courts. TheMemorandum(VillafuerteMemo)implementingtheConvention required the Director of Patents to reject pending applications for Phil reg ofsignature&world-famoustrademarksbyapplicantsotherthanits originalownersorusers,andifwarranted,Philregistrantsshouldbe askedtosurrendertheircertofregtoavoidsuitsfordamages&other legalactions.TheMemoenumeratedseveralinternationally-known trademarks.AnotherMemorandum(OngpinMemo)wasissuedwhichrequiredthe DirectorofPatentstohonorthePhilscommitmentunder6bisofthe ParisConvention.TheMinisterofTrade&Industryenumerated guidelinestoobserveindeterminingWONatrademarkisentitledto protection. The Phil Patent Office was ordered to refuse or cancel reg of trademarksw/carereproductions,translationsorimitationsof trademarksownedbyapersonwhoisacitizenofaUnion-member. Pendingapplicationsbyotherpersonsotherthantheoriginalowners were rejected. BothMemosweresustainedbytheSCin1984intheLaChemise Lacoste,S.A.vFernandezcasewhereitwasruledthattheMinisterof Trade&IndustrywasthecompetentauthoritytodetermineWONa trademark is well-known in the Phils. TheVillafuerteMemowasissued15yrsaftertheadoptionoftheParis Convention. The 1st registration case involving Barbizon was filed before the Villafuerte Memo but 5 yrs after the effectivity of the Convention. The ParisConventionwasnevermentionedatallbythecorporation.Itwas onlyinthe2ndregistrationcasewherethecorporationinvokedthe Convention & the Memos. Intellectual property rights Intellectualandindustrialpropertyrightscasesarenotsimpleproperty cases.Trademarksdealwiththepsychologicalfunctionofsymbolsand theeffectofthesesymbolsonthepublicatlarge.Trademarksplaya significantroleincommunication,commerceandtrade,andserve valuableandinterrelatedbusinessfunctions,bothnationallyand internationally.Thusagreementsconcerningindustrialpropertyare intimatelyconnectedwitheconomicdevelopment.Industrialproperty encouragesinvestmentsinnewideasandinventionsandstimulates creativeeffortsforthesatisfactionofhumanneeds.Theyspeedup transferoftechnologyandindustrialization,andtherebybringabout social and economic progress. TheWTOisacommoninstitutionalframeworkfortheconductoftrade relationsamongitsmembersinmattersrelatedtothemultilateraland plurilateraltradeagreementsannexedtotheWTOAgreement.Among thoseannexedistheAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsof Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPs. Members to this Agreement "desire toreducedistortionsandimpedimentstointernationaltrade,takinginto accounttheneedtopromoteeffectiveandadequateprotectionof intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade." To fulfill these objectives, the members have agreed toadheretominimumstandardsofprotectionsetbyseveral Conventions(BerneConvention,RomeConvention,reatyon IntellectualyPropertyinRespectofIntegratedCircuits,andtheParis Convention as revised). Amajorproportionofinternationaltradedependsontheprotectionof intellectual property rights On res judicata The decision in the 1st registration case (IPC No. 686, wherein Barbizon CorpsoppositionwasdismissedandtheapplicationofEscobarfor BARBIZONwasgivenduecourse)wasajudgmentonthemerits,asit determine the right of theparties based on disclosed facts. Although no hearingwasconducted,thepartiesfiledrespectivepleadingsandhad therighttopresentevidencebuttheywaivedtheirrighttodoso& submittedthecasefordecisionbasedonpleadings.Thelackof evidencedidntdetertheDirectorofPatentsfromrulingontheissueof prior use which is the main issue. The decision also involves the same parties (the corporation and Mirpuri asassigneeofEscobar),thesamesubjectmatter(BARBIZON trademark), and the same causes of action. On similarity of cause of action: The corporation however alleges that the cause of action in the 2nd registration case (IPC 2049) involved prior use and registration in foreign countries, prior use in the Phil, and fraudulent registration of mark in violation of Art 189 RPC. The corporation cited the Paris convention and the implementing Memorandum. 1st registration case2nd registration case Theissueofownership oftrademarkBARBIZON wasntraisedinthe1st registrationcasebutit wasanchoredon Theissuesraisedwereownershipofthe trademark,1st registrationanduseof thetrademarkintheUS 6 confusingsimilarity, probabledamage,and unlawfulappropriationof amarkpreviouslyused inthePhilswhichis penalizedunderSec4d of the Trademark Law andothercountries,and internationalrecognition andreputationofthe trademarkestablished byextensiveuse&ads ofthecorporations productsforover40 years Based on the Trademark Law ParisConvention,EO 913,andthe2Memos; Art 189 of the RPC Causesofactionwhicharedistinctandindependentfromeachother, althougharisingoutofthesamecontract,transaction,orstateoffacts, may be sued on separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on other. PETITION DENIED. CA DECISION & RESOLUTION AFFIRMED. Ching v Salinas [GR No. 161295 | 29 June 2005 | Callejo, Sr | PetRev R45] Petitioner: Jessie G. Ching (owner of Jeshicris Manufacturing Co) Respondent:WilliamM.SalinasSr;WilliamMSalinasJr;JosephineL Salinas; Jennifer Y Salinas; Alonto Solaiman Salle; John Eric I Salinas; Noel M Yabut (Board of Directors & Oficers of Wilaware Product Corporation) Quick Summary Facts Ching & Joseph Yu held Copyright Registration over Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and Vehicle Bearing Cushions. Ching requested aid fromtheNBIforpoliceassistancetoapprehend&prosecuteillegal manufacturers,producers,and/ordistributorsoftheaboveworks.TheNBI filedapplicationsforsearchwarrantsinManilaRTCagainstrespondents. TheRTCgrantedthesame.AninventorywassubmittedbytheNBI.The respondentsfiledamotiontoquash,allegingthattheworkscoveredinthe certificatesofregistrationarenotartisticinnaturethusnotsubjectofa copyright. The Trial Court quashed the search warrant.MR was denied. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and the MR. Thus this petition. HeldTheRTChasjurisdictiontodetermineWONtheworksare copyrightableand WONChingownsacopyright.FortheRTCtodetermine whetherthecrimeforinfringementundertheIPCodeasallegedinan applicationiscommitted,Chingwasburdenedtoprovethat(a)Chingand Joseph Yu were the owners of copyrighted material; and (b) the copyrighted materialwasbeingcopiedanddistributedbytherespondents.Thus,the ownership of a valid copyright is essential. The Bushing and the Bearing Cushions are merely utility models. These are not literary or artistic works. These are useful articles w/o artistic value since they must conform to the shape & design of the materials which they intend toreplace(becausetheitemsareautomobilespareparts).Nocopyright grantedbylawcanariseinfavorofChingdespitetheissuanceofthe certificates.Beingastatutorygrant,therightsareonlysuchasthestatute confers.Itcancoveronlyworksfallingw/inthestatutoryenumerationor description. Facts: Jeshicrisisthemaker&manufacturerofaUtilityModel,describedas LeafSpringEyeBushingforAutomobilemadeupofplastic.Ching& JosephYuwereissuedbytheNationalLibraryCertificatesof Copyright Registration and Deposit of the said work described therein as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile on 4 Sept 2001. ChingrequestedtheNBIforpolice/investigativeassistancefor apprehension&prosecutionofillegalmanufacturers,producersand/or distributors of the works. The NBI filed applications for search warrants2 in Manila RTC against William Salinas Sr and the officers and Directors ofWilaware,allegingthattheyreproduced&distributedthemodels penalized under Sec 177.1 & 177.3 of the IP Code.The RTC granted the application. An inventory was submitted by the NBI agents.Therespondentsfiledamotiontoquashthesearch warrantsbecausetheworkscoveredinthecertificatesissuedby theNationalLibraryarenotartisticinnaturebutareautomotive sparepartswhichpertaintotechnology.Thus,themodelsarenot originalandnotpropersubjectsofapatent,notcopyright.Ching saysthattheissuingCourtisnottheproperforumbeforewhichto articulatetheissueofthevalidityoftheargumentsandthatuntilthe copyrightisnullified,heenjoysrightsofaregisteredowner/holder thereof. 2TheapplicationssoughtseizureofLeafspringeyebusingmadeofpolyvinylchloride plasticandplasticpolypropylene,vehiclebearingcushionmadeupofpolyvinylchloride plastic, items used to manufacture or fabricate the items above, and evidences of sale of the items above 7 The trial courtquashed the searchwarranton findingthattherewasno probablecauseforitsissuanceandadoptingtheargumentofthe respondents.TheMRofChingwasdenied.TheCAdismissedthe petition for certiorari since there can be no violation of the copyright since theobjectsarenotcopyrightableinthefirstplace.CAdeniedMRthus this petition. Chingcontendsthattherevocationofcopyrightcertificatesshouldbe raisedinadirectaction.Hefurtherarguesthatthelawgivesanon-inclusivedefinitionofworkandthusincludesornamentaldesignsor modelsforarticlesofmanufactureWONregistrableasanindustrial design and other works of applied art, as they are works w/c may have a bearing on the utility aspect to w/c Chings utility designs were classified. He also says that the fact that his utility designs or models for articles of manufacturehavebeenexpressedinthefieldofautomotiveparts,or based on something already in the public domain does not automatically remove them from the protectionof the Law on Copyright.He saysthat heenjoysthepresumptionthathiscopyrightisvalid.Theissueof probable cause, according to Ching, should be resolved w/o invalidating his copyright. RespondentsaverthattheworkofChingisatechnicalsolutiontothe problem of wear & tear in automobiles, the substitution of materials (from rubber to plastic matter of polyvinyl chloride,anoil resistant soft texture plasticmaterialstrongenoughtoendurepressurebroughtaboutbythe vibration of the counter bearing and thus brings bushings). They say that a technical solution in anyfield of human activitywhich is novel may be the subject of a patent, not of a copyright. The registration of copyrights over the items doesnt provide automatic protection. The registration and depositofworkisnotconclusiveastocopyrightoutlayorthetimeof copyright.Respondentssaythatcopyrightonlyexistswhentheworkis covered by the protection of the IP Code. Issues: 1.WONtheRTChasjurisdictiontoresolvetheissueofonwhetherthe utility models of Ching are copyrightable [Yes] 2.WONChingownscopyrightoverthemodels.[No,theitemsarenot copyrightable] Ratio: 1.RTChasjurisdictiontodetermineWONtheutilitymodelsare copyrightable InSolidTriangleSalesvSheriffofRTCQCBr93,inthe determination of probablecause, the court must necessarily resolve WON an offense exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant or the quashal of one already issued by the court. In Sec 3 Rule 126 of theCrimProRules,asearchwarrantmaybeissuedforsearch& seizure of property (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. FortheRTCtodeterminewhetherthecrimeforinfringementunder theIPCodeasallegedinanapplicationiscommitted,Chingwas burdened to prove that (a) Ching and Joseph Yu were the owners of copyrightedmaterial;and(b)thecopyrightedmaterialwasbeing copied and distributed by the respondents. Thus, the ownership of a valid copyright is essential. ByrequestingtheNBItoinvestigateandtofileanapplicationfor searchwarrantforIPCodeinfringementversustherepsondents, ChingauthorizedtheRTCtodelveinto&determinethevalidityof the copyright w/c he claims he had over the utility model. Ching cant seekreliefbasedonthisclaimandthenrepudiatethecourts jurisdictiontoascertainvalidityofhisclaimw/orunningafoultothe doctrine of estoppel. Todischargehisburdenofprobablecausefortheissuanceofa searchwarrantforviolationoftheIPCode,Chingsubmittedhis CertificateofCopyrightRegistrationissuedbytheNationalLibrary for the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and Vehicle Bearing CushionclassifiedunderSec172.1(h)3asLiteraryandArtistic Works. Sec 171.10 provides that a work of applied art is an artistic creationwithutilitarianfunctionsorincorporatedinausefularticle, whethermadebyhandorproducedonanindustrialscale.The BushingandtheBearingCushionsaremerelyutility models.These are not literary or artistic works. 2.Ownership of copyright Ownershipofcopyrightedmaterialisshownbyproofoforiginality and copyrightability. By originality is meant that the material was not copied,andevidencesatleastminimalcreativity;thatitwas independentlycreatedbytheauthorandthatitpossessesatleast sameminimaldegreeofcreativity.Copyingisshownbyproofof access to copyrighted material and substantial similarity between the two works.Acopyrightcertificateprovidesprimafacieevidenceoforiginality whichisoneelementofcopyrightvalidity.Itconstitutesprimafacie evidenceofbothvalidityandownershipandthevalidityofthefacts stated in the certificate. The presumption of validity to a certificate of copyrightregistrationmerelyorderstheburdenofproof.The applicantshouldnotordinarilybeforced,inthefirstinstance,to 3Originalornamentaldesignsormodelsforarticlesofmanufacture,whetherornot registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art. 8 prove all the multiple facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the validity of the respondent shifts the burden of doing so to theapplicant.Acertificateofregistrationcreatesnorebuttable presumption of copyright validity where other evidence in the record casts doubt on the question.4 TheBushingandtheBearingCushionsaremerelyutilitymodels. Thesearenotliteraryorartisticworks.Theseareusefularticles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is notmerelytoportraytheappearanceofthearticleortoconvey information. A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to theextentthatsuchdesignincorporatespictorial,graphic,or sculpturalfeaturesthatcanbeidentifiedseparatelyfrom,andare capableofexistingindependentlyoftheutilitarianaspectsofthe article. Anauthorsintellectualcreation,WONitisacreationw/utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article produced on an industrial scale,isprotectedbycopyrightlaw.However,thelawreferstoa workofappliedartwhichisanartisticcreation.Thereisno copyrightprotectionforworksofappliedartorindustrialdesignw/c haveaestheticorartisticfeaturesthatcantbeidentifiedseparately from the utilitarian aspects of the article. Themodelshereinarenotworksofappliedart,norartisticworks. Theyareutilitymodels,usefularticlesbutw/oartisticdesignor value. A utility model is a technical solution to a problem in any field of human activity which is new and industrially applicable. It may be, or may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the aforesaid.Autilitymodelreferstoaninventioninthe mechanical field. A utility model varies from an invention, for which a patent for invention is, likewise, available, on at least 3 aspects: Utility ModelInvention Inventive step requiredNot required 7 yrs of protection20 yrs of protection Dispensesw/the substantive exam Needforasubstantive exam 4 218.2. In an action under this Chapter: (a)Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject matter to which theactionrelatesifthedefendantdoesnotputinissuethequestionwhethercopyright subsists in the work or other subject matter; and (b)Wherethesubsistenceofthecopyrightisestablished,theplaintiffshallbe presumedtobetheownerofthecopyrightifheclaimstobetheownerofthecopyright and the defendant does not put in issue the question of his ownership. Theautomotivesparepartshereconformtotheoriginalstructural design of the components w/c they seek to replace thus they are not ornamentallackingindecorativequalityorvaluecharacterizing authenticworksofappliedart.Theyaremechanicalworksofutility sansanyaestheticembellishment.Theydonotfallunderother literary,scholarly,scientificandartisticworksundertheapplication of ejusdem generis. No copyright granted by law can arise in favor of Ching despite theissuanceofthecertificates.Beingastatutorygrant,the rightsareonlysuchasthestatuteconfers.Itcancoveronly worksfallingw/inthestatutoryenumerationordescription (JoaquinJrvDrilon;Pearl&DeanvShoemart).Copyrightand patent rights are completelydistinct and separate from another thus theprotectionaffordedbyonecantbeusedinterchangeablyto coveritemsorworksthatexclusivelypertaintotheothers.(Khov CA). In the US case of Mazer v Stein (where statuettes of dancing male & femalefiguresmadeofsemi-vitreouschinawerecopyrightedas works of art but the items were intended for use as bases for table lamps,withelectricwiringetc),theUSSCdeclaredthatthe statuetteswerecopyrightableworksofartormodelsordesignsfor worksofartsincetheyareworksofartisticcraftsmanshipasfaras their form, not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects, are concerned. TheUSSCalsoheldthatthedichotomyofprotectionforthe aestheticisnotbeautyandutilitybutartforthecopyrightand theinventionoforiginalandornamentaldesignfordesign patentsthusifthesoleintrinsicfunctionofanarticleisits utility,thefactthattheworkisuniqueandattractivelyshaped will not qualify it as a work of art. The bushing& cushion are notworks of art. They are utility models w/c may be subject of a patent. Petitiondeniedforlackofmerit.CAdecision&resolutionaffirmed.Search Warrants annulled & set aside. Costs against Ching. Hoffman v. Le Traunik (Dec 8, 1913) Facts: ThisisasuitbroughtbyAaronHoffmanagainstSamLeTraunikfor infringement of copyright in the use of monologues. 9 Hoffman copyrighted his monologues entitled The German Senator and the GermanPolitician.Eachofthe14partsareseparateanddistinct.The moving papers describe it as gags or jokes. The monologues come under the head of light literature which is said to be books or writings such as can be understood and enjoyed without much mental exertion. Hoffman alleges that he is the author of all the expressions in the monologue. He claims that Le Traunik has substantially reproducedhis monologues bypublicly reciting the most valuable parts of the monologues. Le Traunik denies this and alleges that these expressions and ideas were old and well known when Hoffman made his monologues. He further asserts that they were originated from others and they were common property. Themonologuesofthepartiesarenotsimilarexceptforthefollowing expressions: HoffmanLe Traunik My dear friends and people workersMy dear friends and people workers Iamoverstewedwithpleasureto havethehonortostandhereand undress myself before you It gives me great pleasure and joy to stand and undress myself before this large aggravation It affords me pleasure to be disabled to stand up here and distress such a large congregated aggravation Icomebeforeyouasasterilized citizen A poor, honest, sterilized citizen TheywanttoelectanIndianto misrepresentthemintheHouseof Misrepresentatives Lookatthegreatmenwegotinthe House of Misrepresentatives Issue: WON Le Traunik infringed upon Hoffmans copyright. Held/Ratio:No, denied. To be entitled to copyright, the composition must be original, meritorious, and freefromillegalityorimmorality.Itmustbeoriginalinthattheauthorhas createditbyhisownskillandlaborwithoutdirectlycopyingorevasively imitatingtheworkofanother.Anewandoriginalplan,arrangement,or combination of materials will entitle the author with copyright. Le Traunik didnot copy substantially the plan, arrangement, or combination ofmaterialsfoundinHoffmansmonologue.Concedingartisticmeritin Hoffmans monologues, defendants do not infringe as they have not used the plan, arrangement, or combination unless they have abstracted so much of it as to authorize a finding of copying or taking. Copyingthewholeorsubstantialpartofacopyrightedworkisanessential elementofinfringement.Itisnotonlyliteralreproductionbutalsoincludes various modes in which the matter may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced with colorable alteration to disguise piracy. But on the principle of DeMinimisNonCuratLex,itisnecessarythatasubstantialpartofthe work be taken. If there is piracy, it constitutes in taking of isolated expressions. To constitute infringement, Hoffman must prove that they were original of him. Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc.(G.R. No. 172835 | December 13, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.) Facts: PetitionerAirPhilippinesCorporationisadomesticcorporation engagedinthebusinessofairtransportationservices.Respondent Pennswell,Inc.wasorganizedtoengageinthebusinessofmanufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. On various dates, respondent Pennswell delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioners total outstanding obligation amounted toP449,864.98withinterestat14%perannumuntiltheamountwouldbe fullypaid.ForfailureofthepetitionerAirPhilippinestocomplywithits obligationundersaidcontracts,respondentfiledaComplaintforaSumof Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

10 In its Answer, Air Philippines contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons, and alleged that it was defrauded in the amountofP592,000.00byrespondentforitsprevioussaleoffouritems, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626.Said items (Anti-friction Fluid, Contact Grease,TrixohtropicGrease,DryLubricant)weremisrepresentedby respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical withproductspetitionerhadpreviouslypurchasedfromrespondent.Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods.

AccordingtoAirPhilippines,respondentPennswellsproducts, namelyExcellentRustCorrosion,ConnectorGrease,ElectricStrength ProtectiveCoating,andAnti-SeizeCompound,areidenticalwithits Anti-FrictionFluid,ContactGrease,ThixohtropicGrease,andDry Lubricant,respectively.AirPhilippinesasseveratedthathadPennswell beenforthrightabouttheidenticalcharacteroftheproducts,itwouldnot havepurchasedtheitemscomplainedof.Moreover,petitionerallegedthat whenthepurportedfraudwasdiscovered,aconferencewasheldbetween petitioner and respondent whereby the parties agreed that respondent would returntopetitionertheamountitpreviouslypaid.However,petitionerwas surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment oftheamountofP449,864.94,whichlaterbecamethesubjectof respondents Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

Duringthependencyofthetrial,petitionerfiledaMotiontoCompel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-ElectricStrengthProtective Coating;and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound. Petitioner had earlier requested the PhilippineInstituteofPureandAppliedChemistry(PIPAC)forthelatterto conduct a comparison of respondents goods.

TheRTCgrantedtheMotion.Pennswell,Inc.sought reconsiderationoftheforegoingOrder,contendingthatitcannotbe compelledtodisclosethechemicalcomponentssoughtbecausethe matterisconfidential.Itarguedthatwhatpetitionerendeavoredto inquireuponconstitutedatradesecretwhichrespondentcannotbe forced to divulge.Respondent maintained that its products are specialized lubricants,andiftheircomponentswererevealed,itsbusinesscompetitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.

TheRTCgavecredencetoPennswellsreasoning,andstatedthat asidefromnationalsecuritymattersandintelligenceinformation,tradeor industrialsecrets(pursuanttotheIntellectualPropertyCodeandother relatedlaws)aswellasbankingtransactions(pursuanttotheSecrecyof BankDepositAct)arealsoexemptedfromcompulsorydisclosure.Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which denied the petition. TheCA,indenyingthepetitionandthesubsequentMR,ruledthat Pennswellhadaproprietaryoreconomicrightovertheingredientsor components of its lubricant products.The formulation thereof was not known tothegeneralpublicandwaspeculiaronlytoPennswell.Ithadarightto guarditstradesecrets,manufacturingformulas,marketingstrategiesand otherconfidentialprogramsandinformationagainstthepublic.Otherwise, suchinformationcouldbeillegallyandunfairlyutilizedbybusiness competitors who, through their access to Pennswells business secrets, may use the same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the latter. Issue: 1.WONthechemicalcomponentsoringredientsofPennswells productsaretradesecretsorindustrialsecretsthatarenot subject to compulsory disclosure. [YES] 2.WON Rule 27, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court is applicable to the case. [NO.] 3.WONpetitionercanrelyonR.A.7394(ConsumerActofthe Philippines),RA.8203(SpecialLawonCounterfeitDrugs),andthe Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990tocompeldisclosureofthecomponentsofPennswells products. [NO.]

Held/Ratio: 1.YES.ThecomponentsofPennswellsproductsareconsidered trade secrets and are not subject to compulsory disclosure. Atradesecretisdefinedasaplanorprocess,tool,mechanismor compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessarytoconfideit.Thedefinitionalsoextendstoasecretformulaor processnotpatented,butknownonlytocertainindividualsusingitin compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. Atradesecretmayconsistofanyformula,pattern,device,or compilationofinformationthat:(1)isusedinone'sbusiness;and(2)gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information.Generally, a trade secret is a process or device 11 intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machineorformula,butcanbeapricelistorcatalogueorspecialized customer list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights.The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights thereinwhich may be treated as property, andordinarily an injunction willbegrantedtopreventthedisclosureofthetradesecretbyonewho obtainedtheinformation"inconfidence"orthrougha"confidential relationship."Americanjurisprudencehasutilizedthefollowingfactorsto determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

(1)theextenttowhichtheinformationisknownoutsideofthe employer's business; (2)theextenttowhichtheinformationisknownbyemployees and others involved in the business; (3)theextentofmeasurestakenbytheemployertoguardthe secrecy of the information; (4)thevalueoftheinformationtotheemployerandto competitors; (5)the amount of effort or moneyexpendedbythe company in developing the information; and (6)the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source. Thechemicalcomposition,formulation,andingredientsof respondentsspeciallubricantsaretradesecretswithinthe contemplationofthelaw.Respondentwasestablishedtoengageinthe businessofgeneralmanufacturingandsellingof,andtodealin,distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods,wares, merchandise, products, including butnotlimitedtoindustrialchemicals,solvents,lubricants,acids,alkalies, salts,paints,oils,varnishes,colors,pigmentsandsimilarpreparations, amongothers.Itisunmistakabletoourmindsthatthemanufactureand productionofrespondentsproductsproceedfromaformulationofasecret list of ingredients. Inthecreationofitslubricants,respondentexpendedefforts,skills, research,andresources.Whatithadachievedbyvirtueofitsinvestments may not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary forpetitionersdefenseagainstacollectionforasumofmoney.Byand large,thevalueoftheinformationtorespondentiscrystalclear.The ingredientsconstitutetheveryfabricofrespondentsproductionand business. Nodoubt,theinformationisalsovaluabletorespondents competitors.Tocompelitsdisclosureistocripplerespondentsbusiness, andtoplaceitatanunduedisadvantage.Ifthechemicalcompositionof respondentslubricantsisopenedtopublicscrutiny,itwillstandtolosethe backbone on which its business is founded.This would result in nothing less thantheprobabledemiseofrespondentsbusiness.Respondents proprietaryinterestovertheingredientswhichithaddevelopedand expended money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailedingredientssoughttoberevealedhaveacommercialvalueto respondent.Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants itacompetitiveadvantage;wealsofindthatthereisclearlyaglaringintent onthepartofrespondenttokeeptheinformationconfidentialandnot available to the prying public.

2.NO.Rule27,Sec.1appliesonlytodocuments,papers,books, things, etc. that are not privileged. Rule27oftheROCstates:SECTION1.Motionforproduction orinspectionorder.Uponmotionofanypartyshowinggoodcause therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produceandpermittheinspectionandcopyingorphotographing,byoron behalfofthemovingparty,ofanydesignateddocuments,papers,books, accounts,letters,photographs,objectsortangiblethings,notprivileged, whichconstituteorcontainevidencematerialtoanymatterinvolvedinthe actionandwhichareinhispossession,custodyorcontrol;or(b)orderany partytopermitentryupondesignatedlandorotherpropertyinhis possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographingthepropertyoranydesignatedrelevantobjectoroperation thereon.Theordershallspecifythetime,placeandmannerof makingthe inspectionandtakingcopiesandphotographs,andmayprescribesuch terms and conditions as are just.

Rule27setsanunequivocalprovisothatthedocuments, papers,books,accounts,letters,photographs,objectsortangible thingsthatmaybeproducedandinspectedshouldnotbeprivileged.The documents must not be privileged against disclosure.On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for productionandinspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is,booksandpaperswhich,becauseoftheirconfidentialandprivileged 12 character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition totherequisitethattheitemsbespecificallydescribed,andmustconstitute orcontainevidencematerialtoanymatterinvolvedintheactionandwhich are in the partys possession, custody or control.

3.NO.NoneoftheprovisionsoftheActsinvokedbythepetitioner are applicable to the case at bar. PetitionercannotrelyonSection77ofRepublicAct7394,orthe Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemicalcomponentsofitsproducts.Whileitistruethatallconsumer productsdomesticallysold,whethermanufacturedlocallyorimported,shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent.Respondents specialized lubricants--namely,ContactGrease,ConnectorGrease,Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound--arenotconsumerproducts.Consumerproducts,asitis definedinArticle4(q),referstogoods,servicesandcredits,debtsor obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes,whichshallinclude,butnotbelimitedto,food,drugs,cosmetics, anddevices.Thisisnotthenatureofrespondentsproducts.Itsproducts arenotintendedforpersonal,family,householdoragriculturalpurposes.Rather,theyareforindustrialuse,specificallyfortheuseofaircraft propellers and engines. Petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law onCounterfeitDrugs,requiresthedisclosureoftheactiveingredientsofa drugisalsoonfaultyground.Respondentsproductsareoutsidethescope of the cited law, as they are not drugs. Wedonotfindmeritorapplicabilityinpetitionersinvocationof Section12oftheToxicSubstancesandHazardousandNuclearWastes ControlActof1990,whichgrantsthepublicaccesstorecords,reportsor informationconcerningchemicalsubstancesandmixtures,includingsafety data submitted, and data on emission or discharge into the environment.To reiterate,Section12[50]ofsaidActdeemsasconfidentialmatters,which maynotbemadepublic,thosethatwoulddivulgetradesecrets,including productionorsalesfiguresormethods;productionorprocessesuniqueto such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect adverselythecompetitivepositionofsuchmanufacturer,processoror distributor.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.CA affirmed. ELIDAD KHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Elidad Kho, doing business under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory,istheregisteredownerofthecopyrights ChinChun Su and OvalFacialCreamContainer/Case.Shealsohaspatentrights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office on February 7, 1980. KhoallegedthatSummervilleadvertisedandsoldpetitioner'scream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioneruses,therebymisleadingthepublic,andresultinginthe declineinthepetitioner'sbusinesssalesandincome;and,thatthe respondentsshouldbeenjoinedfromallegedlyinfringingonthe copyrights and patents of the petitioner. Summerville alleged as their defense that: oSummervilleistheexclusiveandauthorizedimporter,re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan;oThesaidTaiwanesemanufacturingcompanyauthorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream withthePhilippinePatentOfficeandotherappropriate governmental agencies;oKECCosmeticsLaboratoryofthepetitionerobtainedthe copyrightsthroughmisrepresentationandfalsification;and,that theauthorityofQuintinCheng,assigneeofthepatent registrationcertificate,todistributeandmarket ChinChun Su productsinthePhilippineshadalreadybeenterminatedby the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company. Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer fortheissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunctionagainstSummerville which the Trial Court granted. OnappealviaPetitionforCertiorari,theCAreversedtheOrderofthe Trial Court. In granting the Petition, the CA ruled: Theregistrationofthetrademarkorbrandname"ChinChunSu"by KECwiththesupplementalregisteroftheBureauofPatents, TrademarksandTechnologyTransfercannotbeequatedwith registrationintheprincipalregister,whichisdulyprotectedbythe Trademark Law. La Chemise Lacoste, S.S. vs. Fernandez: "RegistrationintheSupplementalRegister,therefore,servesas notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the trademark. 13 Bytheveryfactthatthetrademarkcannotasyetbeonguardand therearecertaindefects,someobstacleswhichtheusemuststill overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the mark or ask the courtstovindicatehisclaimsofanexclusiverighttotheuseofthe same.Itwouldbedeceptiveforapartywithnothingmorethana registration in the Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice as if the registration is in the Principal Register. After hearing on the final injunction and damages, the trial court rendered a decision barring the petitioner from using the trademark Chin Chun Su andupholdingtherightoftherespondentstousethesame,but recognizing the copyright of the petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream. Issue:whetherthecopyrightandpatentoverthenameandcontainerofa beautycreamproductwouldentitletheKhoasregistranttotheuseand ownership over the same to the exclusion of others. Held: NO Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto. Atradenamemeansthenameordesignationidentifyingor distinguishing an enterprise.Meanwhile,thescopeofacopyrightisconfinedtoliteraryandartistic workswhichareoriginalintellectualcreationsintheliteraryandartistic domain protected from the moment of their creation.Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution ofaprobleminanyfieldofhumanactivitywhichisnew,involvesan inventive step and is industrially applicable. Petitionerhasnorighttosupportherclaimfortheexclusiveuseofthe subjecttradenameanditscontainer.Thenameandcontainerofa beautycreamproductarepropersubjectsofatrademarkinasmuchas the same falls squarely within its definition.Inordertobeentitledtoexclusivelyusethesameinthesaleofthe beautycreamproduct,theusermustsufficientlyprovethatshe registered or used it before anybody else did.Thepetitioner'scopyrightandpatentregistrationofthenameand containerwouldnotguaranteehertherighttotheexclusiveuseofthe sameforthereasonthattheyarenotappropriatesubjectsofthesaid intellectual rights.Consequently,apreliminaryinjunctionordercannotbeissuedforthe reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over thesaidnameandcontainertotheexclusionofothers,nothaving proventhatshehasregisteredatrademarktheretoorusedthesame before anyone did. The dispositiveportionof saiddecisionheld that thepetitioner does not havetrademarkrightsonthenameandcontainerofthebeautycream product.Thesaiddecisiononthemeritsofthetrialcourtrenderedthe issuanceofthewritofapreliminaryinjunctionmootandacademic notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court of Appeals. 9. Berris Agricultural Company Inc., v Norvy Abyadang Facts:RespondentAbyadang,proprietorofNSNorthernOrganicFertilizer, filedwiththeIPOatrademarkapplicationforthemarkNSD-10PLUSfor useinconnectionwithFungicidewithactiveingredient80%Mancozeb. PetitionerBerrisAgriculturalCo.,Incopposedtheapplication,becauseNS D-10 PLUS is similar or confusingly similar to its registered trademark D-10 80 WP, which is also a fungicide with the same active ingredient, and used for the same group of crops, ornamental plants, fruits and vegetables, in the same dosage and same manner of application. TheIPOBureauofLegalAffairs(IPO-BLA)heldthatthemarkwas confusinglysimilartoBerrisandrejectedtheapplication.Abyadang appealed,firstwiththeOfficeoftheDirectorGeneral,IntellectualProperty Philippines(IPPDG),andthentotheCA.TheCAreversedtheIPPDGs decision and held that 1.NS D-10 PLUS was not confusingly similar to D-10 80 WP; 2.Berris failed to establish its ownership of the mark D-10 80 WP; 3.AndthatBerristrademarkD-10WPmaybecancelledtoavoid multiplicity of suits. Issue:Whetherornottherewasaconfusingsimilaritybetweenthetwo marks Held: YES. CA decision reversed. Ratio:R.A.No.8293definesa"mark"asanyvisiblesigncapableof distinguishingthegoods(trademark)orservices(servicemark)ofan enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods.14 R.A.No.166definesa"trademark"asanydistinctiveword,name,symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and distinguish them from those manufactured, sold, or dealt by another.A trademark, being a special property,isaffordedprotectionbylaw.Butforonetoenjoythislegal protection,legalprotectionownershipofthetrademarkshouldrightlybe established. Theownershipofatrademarkisacquiredbyitsregistrationanditsactual usebythemanufacturerordistributorofthegoodsmadeavailabletothe purchasing public. Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293 provides that the rights in a markshallbeacquiredbymeansofitsvalidregistrationwiththeIPO.A certificateofregistrationofamark,onceissued,constitutesprimafacie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant's ownership of the mark,andoftheregistrant'sexclusiverighttousethesameinconnection with the goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate.R.A.No.8293,however,requirestheapplicantforregistrationorthe registrant to file a declaration of actual use (DAU) of the mark, with evidence tothateffect,withinthree(3)yearsfromthefilingoftheapplicationfor registration;otherwise,theapplicationshallberefusedorthemarkshallbe removedfromtheregister.Inotherwords,theprimafaciepresumption broughtaboutbytheregistrationofamarkmaybechallengedand overcome, inanappropriate action,byproof of thenullity of the registration or of non-use of the mark, except when excused. Moreover, the presumption may likewise be defeated by evidence of prior use by another person, i.e., it willcontrovertaclaimoflegalappropriationorofownershipbasedon registration by a subsequent user. This is because a trademark is a creation of use and belongs to one who first used it in trade or commerce. The determination of priority of use of a mark is a question of fact. Adoption ofthemarkalonedoesnotsuffice.Onemaymakeadvertisements,issue circulars, distribute price lists on certain goods, but these alone will not inure totheclaimofownershipofthemarkuntilthegoodsbearingthemarkare soldtothepublicinthemarket.Accordingly,receipts,salesinvoices,and testimoniesofwitnessesascustomers,orordersofbuyers,bestprovethe actual use of a mark in trade and commerce during a certain period of time. BerrispresenteditstrademarkapplicationdatedNov29,2002;itsIPO certificateofregistrationdatedOct25,2004;itsphotocopiesofpackaging, salesinvoicesandofficialreceiptsusingthemark;anditsnotarized declarationofactualuse(DAU)datedApr23,2003,statingthatthemark was first used on June 20, 2002. Abdayang presented a photocopy of the packaging for his fungicide bearing themarkNSD-10PLUS;anaffidavitstatingthatthemarkwashisown creation, derived from his and his wifes name, his birth month and the month of his business name registration, and that he did not know of the existence ofBerrisoranyofhisproducts;acertificationissuedbytheFertilizer PesticideAuthority (FPA) that NS D-10 PLUShadbeen in the market since July 30, 2003; whereas, as of Oct 2005, based on monitoring by the FPA, the RegionalOfficerhadnotencounteredD-1080WPinthemarket,nordid FPAprovincialofficersreceiveanyreportastothepresenceorsaleof Berris fungicide in the market; a certification dated March 2006 issued by the FPA,certifyingthatallpesticidesmustberegisteredwiththesaidoffice pursuant to PD 1144, and Section 1, Article II of FPA Rules and Regulations No.1,Seriesof1977;andaCertificationdatedMarch2006,issuedbythe FPA,certifyingthatpesticideD-1080WPwasregisteredbyBerrisonlyin November 2004. BerriswasabletoestablishthatithasbeenusingthemarkD-1080WP sinceJune2002,evenbeforeitfiledforitsregistrationwiththeIPOin November 2002.The DAU, being a notarized document, is evidence of the facts it stated and has the presumption of regularity, entitled to full faith and credituponitsface.ItisbuttressedbytheCertificationdatedApril2006, issuedbytheBureauofTrademarksthatBerrismarkisstillvalidand existing. WecannotsubscribetothecontentionofAbyadangthatBerrisDauis fraudulent,based on his assumption that Berris could not havelegallyused themarkinthesaleofitsgoodsinJune2002becausetheproductwas registered with the FPA only in November 2004. As held by the IPPDG in its decisiononAbyadangsappeal,thequestionofwhetherornotBerris violatedPD1144,becauseitsolditsproductwithoutpriorregistrationwith the FPA, is a distinct and separate matter from the jurisdiction and concern of theIPO.EvenadeterminationofviolationbyBerrisofPD1144wouldnot controvert the fact that it did submit evidence that it had used the mark D-10 80 WP earlier than its FPA registration in 2004. NeithercouldtheFPAcertificationthattheofficehadneitherencountered norreceivedreportsaboutthesaleofthefungicideinRegionIandthe CordilleraAdministrativeRegionnegatethefactthatBerriswassellingthe productusingthemarkin2002,especiallyconsideringthatitfirsttradedits 15 goods in Calauan, Laguna, where its business office is located. According to Section 123.1(d) of R.A. No. 8293, a mark cannot be registered if it is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different proprietor with anearlierfilingorprioritydate,withrespectto:(1)thesamegoodsor services;(2)closelyrelatedgoodsorservices;or(3)nearresemblanceof such mark as to likely deceive or cause confusion. Indeterminingsimilarityandlikelihoodofconfusion,jurisprudencehas developed tests the Dominancy Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The DominancyTestfocusesonthesimilarityoftheprevalentordominant featuresofthecompetingtrademarksthatmightcauseconfusion,mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is notnecessary;neitherisitrequiredthatthemarksoughttoberegistered suggestsanefforttoimitate.Givenmoreconsiderationaretheauraland visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments.Incontrast,theHolisticorTotalityTestnecessitatesaconsiderationofthe entiretyofthemarksasappliedtotheproducts,includingthelabelsand packaging,indeterminingconfusingsimilarity.Thediscerningeyeofthe observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other.Berris'andAbyadang'smarkbothhaveacommoncomponent,"D-10."On Berris' package, the "D-10" is the dominant feature of the mark. Applying the DominancyTest,itcannotbegainsaidthatAbyadang's"NSD-10PLUS"is similartoBerris'"D-1080WP,"thatconfusionormistakeismorelikelyto occur. Both marks pertain to the same type of goods and belong to the same classificationofgoodsunderR.A.No.8293.Bothdepictionsof"D-10,"as found in both marks, are similar in size, such that this portion is what catches the eye of the purchaser. The likelihood of confusion is present. Thislikelihoodofconfusionandmistakeismademoremanifestwhenthe Holistic Test is applied, taking into consideration the packaging, for both use thesametypeofmaterial(foiltype)andhaveidenticalcolorschemes(red, green,andwhite);andthemarksarebothpredominantlyredincolor,with the same phrase "BROAD SPECTRUM FUNGICIDE" written underneath.Consideringthesestrikingsimilarities,predominantlythe"D-10,"thebuyers of both products, mainly farmers, may be misled into thinking that "NS D-10 PLUS" could be an upgraded formulation of the "D-10 80 WP." Moreover,notwithstandingthefindingoftheIPPDGthatthe"D-10"isa fancifulcomponentofthetrademark,createdforthesolepurposeof functioningasatrademark,anddoesnotgivethename,quality,or description of the product for which it is used, nor does it describe the place of origin, such that the degree of exclusiveness given to the mark is closely restricted,andconsideringitschallengebyAbyadangwithrespecttothe meaning he has given to it, what remains is the fact that Berris is the owner ofthemark"D-1080WP,"inclusiveofitsdominantfeature"D-10,"as establishedbyitsprioruse,andpriorregistrationwiththeIPO.Therefore, BerrisproperlyopposedandtheIPOcorrectlyrejectedAbyadang's application for registration of the mark "NS D-10 PLUS." ANGELITAMANZANOv.CA,andMELECIAMADOLARIA,asAssignor to NEW UNITED FOUNDRY MANUFACTURING CORP. (G.R. No. 113388 | Date: September 5, 1997 | Ponente: Bellosillo) Facts: LettersPatent(LP)No.UM-4609pertainingtoanLPGgasburnerwas issuedtoMeleciaMadolaria(Melecia).Later,sheassignedtheLPtoNew UnitedFoundryManufacturingCorp.(NewUnited).OnFebruary19,1982, AngelitaManzano(Angelita)filedwiththePhilippinePatentOffice,filedan action for cancellation of the said LP. Allegations of Angelita: a.the utility model covered by the LP was not inventive, new or useful;b.thespecificationoftheLPdidnotcomplywiththerequirementsof Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended;c.Meleciawasnottheoriginal,trueandactualinventornordidshe deriveherrightsfromtheoriginal,trueandactualinventorofthe utility model, andd.the LP was secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation. According to Angelita, the utility model covered by the LP had been known or usedbyothersinthePhilippinesformorethan1yearbeforeshefiledher 16 application for letters patent in December 1979 and the products which were producedwiththeutilitymodelhadbeeninpublicuseoronsaleinthe Philippines for more than 1 year before the filing of application for patent. Evidence of Angelita: a.Angelitas affidavit alleging the existence of prior art b.brochuredistributedbyManilaGasCorporation(ManilaGas) disclosingapictorialrepresentationofRansomeBurnermadeby Ransome Torch and Burner Company, USA,c.brochuredistributedbyEssoGasulorEssoStandardEastern,Inc., showingapictureofanothersimilarburnerwithtopelevationview and another perspective view of the same burner d.Angelitas testimony, claiming the following: i.her husband Ong Bun Tua (Ong) worked as a helper in New United where Melecia was affiliated with from 1965-1970 ii.OnghelpedinthecastingofanLPGburnerwhichwasthe same utility model as LP iii.AfterOngleftNewUnited,AngelitaorganizedBescoMetal Manufacturing(Besco)forthecastingofLPGburners,one ofwhichhadtheconfiguration,formandcomponentparts similar to those manufactured by New United. iv.Angelitapresentedinevidencethatin1982,oneofher customersshowedheranallegedmodelofanLPGburner fromNewUnitedcoveredbytheLP.Next,shepresented her own model of an LPG burner called Ransome allegedly manufactured in 1974 or 1975 and sold in the regular course of Bescos business operation. Angelita claimed that the Ransome burner had the sameconfigurationandmechanismaswiththe model patented by Melecia. e.OngstestimonycorroboratingAngelitastestimonyofhis employment f.FidelFranciscos(Fidel)testimonystatingthathewasemployedby ManilaGasfrom1930-1941andfrom1952-1969andthatManila GasimportedRansomeburnerswaybackin1965whichwere advertised through brochures. Evidence of Melecia: a.Testimony of Rolando Madolaria (Rolando) stating the following: thathewastheGeneralSupervisorofNewUnitedinthe foundry, machine and buffing section;in his early years with the company, New United engaged in the manufactureofdifferentkindsofgasstovesaswellasburners basedonsketchesandspecificationsfurnishedbycustomers earlymodelsofsingle-piecetypesofburnerswherethemouth and throat were not detachable;in1978Meleciatoldhimthattherewerecomplaintswiththe earlymodelsbeingmanufactured.Then,Meleciainstructedhim to make several experimental models based on revised sketches andspecifications,inwhichMeleciamadesomeinnovations. Afterafewmonths,Meleciadiscoveredthatthesolutiontoall thedefectsoftheearliermodels,henceRolandowasableto makeseveralmodelsincorporatingthefinding.Melecialater decided to file for application in December 1979. DirectorofPatents:PetitionforcancellationDISMISSEDforfailureto establishconvincinglythatthepatentedutilitymodelofwasanticipated,nor was there any indication that the LP was acquired through fraud. CA: Affirmed Director of Patents Issue: WON LP should be cancelled on the ground that the utility model on which it was based already existed prior to its application. Held: No. Petition dismissed. Ratio:TheissuanceoftheLPcreatesapresumptionthatthepatenteewasthe originalandfirstinventor.Theburdenofprovingwantofnoveltyisonthe person disclaiming it. The burden is met only by clear and satisfactory proof which overcomes every reasonable doubt. Hence, a utility model shall not be considered"new"ifbeforetheapplicationforapatentithasbeenpublicly knownorpubliclyusedinthiscountryorhasbeendescribedinaprinted publication or publications circulated within the country, or if it is substantially similartoanyotherutilitymodelsoknown,usedordescribedwithinthe country. The standard of evidence was not met by Angelita. As found by the Director of Patents: 17 a.Thepictorialrepresentationsofburnersdidnotclearlyand convincinglyshowthatthedeviceshownthereinisidenticalor substantiallyidenticalinconstructionwiththeutilitymodel.In determiningwhethernoveltyornewnessisnegativedbyany priorart,onlyoneitemofthepriorartmaybeusedatatime. Foranticipationtooccur,thepriorartmustshowthateach elementisfoundeitherexpresslyordescribedorunder principles of inherency in a single prior art reference or that the claimedinventionwasprobablyknowninasinglepriorart device or practice. b.Evenifthebrochuresdepictclearlythateachandeveryelementof thepatentedgasburnerdeviceandthepriorartareidentical,they cannotserveasanticipatorybarsforthereasonthattheyare undated. The dates when they were distributed to the public were not indicated and, therefore, they are useless prior art references. c.AcarefulexaminationoftheLPGburnerallegedlymanufacturedin 1974or1975(seeAngelitastestimony)showedthatitdidnotbear the word Ransome, without any indication of the time or date it was manufactured. d.As to the imported Ransome burner from Esso, there was no date indicatedthereinastowhenitwasmanufacturedand/orimported beforethefilingoftheapplicationforissuanceofpatentofthe subjectutilitymodel.Also,somepartsaremissing,asonlythecup was presented so that the same could not be compared to the utility model(subjectmatterofthiscase)whichconsistsofseveralother detachable parts in combination to form the complete LPG burner. ThevalidityofthepatentissuedbythePhilippinePatentOfficeinfavor ofprivaterespondentandthequestionovertheinventiveness,novelty andusefulnessoftheimprovedmodeloftheLPGburnerarematters whicharebetterdeterminedbythePatentOffice.Thetechnicalstaffof the Philippine Patent Office composed of experts in their field has by the issuanceofthepatentinquestionacceptedprivaterespondent'smodel of gas burner as a discovery. There is a presumption that the Office has correctlydeterminedthepatentabilityofthemodel8andsuchaction must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary. TheruleissettledthatthefindingsoffactoftheDirectorofPatents, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Courtwhensupportedbysubstantialevidence.Angelitahasfailedto showcompellinggroundsforareversalofthefindingsandconclusions of the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals. Pursuanttotherequirementofclearandconvincingevidenceto overthrowthepresumptionofvalidityofapatent,theoraltestimonyto showanticipationisopentosuspicionandifuncorroboratedbycogent evidence, as what occurred in this case, it may be held insufficient.RUBBERTIREWHEELCOMPANY,andConsolidatedRubberTire Company, Petitioners, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY. (Decided February 24, 1914 | Mr. Justice Hughes) Doctrine: Theimmunitygivenbyaprovisioninadecreetoaspecifiedparty manufacturingandsellinganarticleasapatentablecombinationproducing newresultsisnottransferable,andsuchparty,althoughimmunehimself, cannot enjoin the prosecution of suit against another as an infringer because the latter purchases from him one of the elements used in manufacturing the article. Facts: ThepetitionersRubberTireWheelCompanyandConsolidated RubberTireCompanyaretheownersoftheGrantpatent(No.554,675) issuedFebruary18,1896,foranimprovementinrubber-tiredwheels.Ina suit for infringement brought by the petitioners against the Goodyear Tire & RubberCompany(therespondent)itwasheldbythecircuitcourtof appeals for the 6th circuit that the patent was void for want of novelty. Uponthebasisofthedecreeentereduponthatdecision,the respondentGoodyearinstitutedthepresentsuitinthesoutherndistrictof Ohio,torestrainthepetitionersfromprosecutingsuitsforinfringement againstGoodyear'scustomers.Thecircuitcourtgrantedapreliminary injunction.Uponappeal,thecircuitcourtofappealsforthe6thcircuit sustained the injunction so far as it applied to the prosecution of a suit which thepetitionershadbroughtagainstJohnDohertyinthecircuitcourtforthe southern district of New York. This writ of certiorari was then granted. TheGranttireiscomposedofthreeelements:(1)achannelor groovewithtaperedorinclinedsides,(2)arubbertirewithadescribed shape,adapted to fit into the channel, and (3)a fastening device consisting 18 ofindependentretainingwires,whichpassthroughtherubbertireandare placedinaparticularposition.Itwasheldinthe6thcircuitthatboththe elementsandtheresultswereold,andhencepatentabilitywasdenied.In the 2nd circuit, and in the circuit court for the northern district of Georgia, the patent was sustained. Thecontroversycametothiscourtuponcertioraritoreviewthe decisionofthecircuitcourtofappealsforthe2ndcircuitinthecaselast mentioned,anditwasfinallydeterminedthatthepatentwasvalid.The patented structure was held to be not a mere aggregation of elements, but a newcombinationofparts,co-actingsoastoproduceanewanduseful result. It was found that the Grant tire possessed a distinctive characteristic; thatis,a'tippingandreseatingpower.'Therewasthusapatentable combination, the patentability of which did not depend on the novelty of any of the elements entering into it, whether rubber, iron, or wires. Doherty,againstwhomsuitwasenjoined,hadashopinNewYork city,wherehewasengagedinthebusinessofapplyingrubbertiresto vehiclewheels.Itappearedthathavingpurchasedtherubberfromthe respondentGoodyear,andthewireandchannelfromotherparties,he combinedtheseelementsandfittedthemtoacarriagewheel,thus constructing a complete tire. Issue:1.WONthedecreeinfavorofGoodyearCompanyaffordsDohertya defenseagainstthechargeofinfringementinmakingthepatented structure. [NO] 2.WONGoodyearcanenjointheprosecutionofthesuit/chargeof infringementagainstDoherty,becauseDohertypurchased(from Goodyear) one of the elements used in manufacturing the tire. [NO] Held/Ratio: ItisatonceapparentthatthedecreeinfavoroftheGoodyear Company in the former suit does not work an estoppel in favor of Doherty, so as to afford him a defense against the charge of infringement in making the patentedstructure.Dohertywasnotapartytothesuitinwhichthatdecree wasrendered;nor,atleastwithrespecttotiresmadebyhim,canhebe regarded as a privy to that decree. We may lay on one side the question as totherightsofonepurchasingfromtherespondentthecompletedarticle. Dohertydidnotpurchaseit;hemadeithimself,assemblingitsvarious elementsforthatpurposeandeffectingthecombination.Onnopossible theorycanitbesaidthat,ifthetirethusconstructedwascoveredbythe patent,Dohertywasentitledtoimmunitysimplybecauseheboughtone element of the time from the Goodyear Company. TherespondentGoodyear,however,isassertingitsownright,and notthatofDoherty.Itinsiststhat,byvirtueofthedecreeinitsfavorinthe infringement suit, it should have the injunction in order to protect its trade. It contendsthatithasanequitablerighttothisprotectionbyrestrainingsuits notonlyagainstthosewhobuyfromitthestructurewhichisthesubjectof the patent, butalsoagainst thosewhobuyits rubberand themselves make thepatentedtire.Inurgingthiscontentiontherespondentreliesuponthe doctrine of Kessler v. Eldred. There, Kessler andEldredwere rival manufacturers of electric cigar lighters. Eldred, being the owner of the Chambers patent, sued Kessler in the northerndistirictofIndianaforinfringement.Thecircuitcourt,finding noninfringement,dismissedthebill;andthisdecreewasaffirmedbythe circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit. Subsequently, Eldred brought suit on the same patent in the northern district of New York against Kirkland, who was selling a similar cigar lighter, but not of Kessler's make. The circuit courtofappealsforthesecondcircuitheldtheKirklandlightertobean infringement. Eldred then began a suit for infringement in the western district ofNewYorkagainstBreitwieser,auserofKessler'slighters.ThusKessler filedhisbillinthecircuitcourtforthenortherndistrictofIllinoistoenjoin Eldredfromprosecutingsuitagainstanyoneforallegedinfringementofthe Chamberspatentbypurchase,use,orsaleofanyelectriccigarlighter manufactured by Kessler, and identical with the lighter before the court in the suitofEldredv.Kessler.Kessler,beingdefeatedinthecircuitcourt, appealedtothecircuitcourtofappealsfortheseventhcircuit.Answering questions certified by that court, this court held that the decree in the suit of Eldred v. Kessler had the effect of entitling Kessler to continue the business ofmanufacturingandsellingthroughouttheUnitedStates,thesamelighter hehadtheretoforebeenmanufacturingandselling,withoutmolestationby Eldredthroughthepatentwhichheheld;andthatthedecreealsohadthe effectofmakingasuitbyEldredagainstanycustomerofKesslerforthe allegedinfringementofthepatentbyuseorsaleofKessler'slightersa wrongfulinterferencewithKessler'sbusiness,withrespecttowhichhewas without adequate remedy at law. Itwillbeobservedthattheequitythussustainedsprangfromthe decree in the former suit between the parties, and that the decision went no further than to hold it to be a wrongful interference with Kessler's business to suehiscustomers forusingandsellingthelighterwhichKesslerhadmade and sold to them, and which was the same as that passed upon by the court intheprevioussuit.Hisrighttomakeandselltheparticulararticle,the makingofwhichEldredhadunsuccessfullychallengedasaninfringement, was deemed to include the right to have others secure in buying that article, 19 and in its use and resale. But the present question was in no way involved. It wasnotheldthatKesslerwouldhavebeenentitledtorestrainEldredfrom suingothermanufacturersoflighterswhomightbuyfromKesslersomeof the materials used in such manufacture. The distinction is controlling. Under the doctrine of Kessler v. Eldred, therespondentGoodyearbyreasonofthefinaladjudicationinitsfavorwasentitledtomakeandselltheGrantstructure,andtohavethosewho boughtthatstructurefromitunmolestedintakingtitleandinenjoyingthe rightsofownership.Itmayalsobeassumedthattherespondenthadthe right to make and sell its rubber without hindrance by the petitioners claiming underthepatent.Thetraderightoftherespondent,however,whetherwith respect to the complete structure or its separate parts, is merely the right to havethatwhichitlawfullyproducesfreelyboughtandsoldwithoutrestraint orinterference.Itisarightwhichattachestoitsproducttoaparticular thingas an article of lawful commerce, and it continues only so long as the commodity to which the right applies retains its separate identity. If that commodity is combined with other things in the process of the manufactureofanewcommodity,thetraderightintheoriginalpartasan article of commerce is necessarily gone. So that when other persons become manufacturersontheirownbehalf,assemblingthevariouselementsand unitingthemsoastoproducethepatenteddevice,anewarticle,itis manifestthattherespondentGoodyearcannotinsistupontheirbeing protected from suit for infringement by reason merely of its right to make and sell,and the fact of its having made and sold, some component partof that article. It must be able to go beyond a mere trade right in that element, and to showitselftobeentitledtohaveitscustomersmanufacturethepatented structure. Thus the fallacy in the respondent's contention becomes apparent. The decree gave the respondent no right to have others make Grant tires. It couldmakeandsellthem,anditcouldmakeandsellrubber;itcould demandprotectionforitstraderightsinthecommoditiesitproduced.Butit had no transferable immunity in manufacture. The decree gave it no privilege todemandthatothersshouldbeallowedtomakeandsellthepatented structure in order that it might have a market for its rubber. The suit against Doherty was based upon his conduct in constructing Grant tires. The fact that the respondent could not be charged with liability as aparticipantintheinfringementthusallegeddidnotexcusehim;andthe petitioners, in bringing the suit, did not violate any right of the respondent. Gorham v. Company v. White, 81 U.S. 14 Wall. 511 511 (1871) Facts: The Patent Act of August 29, 1842, enacts: "That any citizen or citizens &c., who by his, her, or their own industry, genius, efforts, and expense may have inventedorproducedany newandoriginaldesignforamanufacture, whetherofmetal orothermaterialormaterials,oranynewandoriginal design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief, or composition in alto or basso relievo, or anynew and originalimpression or ornament,or tobe placed on anyarticleofmanufacture,thesamebeingformedinmarbleorother material,oranynewandusefulpattern,orprint,orpicturetobeeither workedintoorworkedon,orprinted,orpainted,orcast,orotherwisefixed on any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others before his, her, or their invention or production thereof and prior to the time of his, her, or their application for a patent therefor, and who shall desire to obtain an exclusive property or right therein to make, use, and sell, and vend the same or copies of the same to others. Gorham&Co.,inJuly,1861,obtainedapatentforanewdesignforthe handlesoftablespoonsandforks,whichunderthenameofthe"cottage pattern"becameextremelypopular--themostsuccessfulplainpattern, indeed,thathadbeeninthemarketformanyyears.Gorham&Co. subsequentlytransferredtheirpatenttotheGorhamManufacturing Company. In1867,oneWhiteobtainedapatentforadesignwhichheallegedtobe originalwith him forthesamethings--thehandles,namely,offorksand spoons--andin1868apatentforstillanotherdesign.Bothofhisdesigns are shown on thepagealready mentioned, alongside of the cottagepattern and to its right hand on the page. Manufacturingandsellingquantitiesofspoonsandforksoftheselasttwo patterns,WhiteinterferedlargelywiththeinterestsoftheGorham ManufacturingCompany,andthatcompanyaccordinglyfiledabillinthe court below to enjoin his making and selling spoons and forks under either of his patents. The validity of the patent held by the Gorham Company was not denied, nor was it controverted that the defendant had sold spoons and forks whichhaduponthemdesignsbearingsomeresemblancetothedesign described in the patent held by the company.20 Gorthams Contention: The designwas substantiallypreservedbecause the mainfeaturesofthefigurewereunalteredandtheminorportionwere changed (examples: as the substitution of a ring of flowers for a ring of stars, or quatrefoil for a trefoil ornament). Ordinary observer is misled. Whitescontention:Noneofthedesignsonthesearticlesthussoldwas substantiallythesameasthedesigncoveredbythepatentheldbythe company. Lower Court: No infringement. Issue: WON there was infringement. (YES) Held: 1.TheactsofCongresswhichauthorizethegrantofapatentfordesigns contemplatenotsomuchutilityasappearance,andthethinginventedor producedforwhichapatentisgivenisthatwhichgivesapeculiaror distinctive appearance to the manufacture or article to which it is applied. 2.Itistheappearancetotheeyethatconstitutesmainly,ifnotentirely,the contributiontothepublicwhichthelawdeemsworthyofrecompense,and identity of appearance or sameness of effect upon the eye is the main test of substantial identity of design. 3.Itisnotessentialtoidentityofdesignthattheappearanceshouldbethe sametotheeyeofanexpert.If,intheeyeofanordinaryobserver,giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same--iftheresemblanceissuchastodeceivesuchanobserverand sufficienttoinducehimtopurchaseonesupposingittobetheother--the one first patented is infringed by the other. Jessie Ching v. William Salinas G.R. 161295, June 29, 2005 Facts:JessieG.ChingistheownerandgeneralmanagerofJeshicris Manufacturing Co., the maker and manufacturer of a Utility Model, described as "Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile" made up of plastic. OnSeptember4,2001,ChingandJosephYuwereissuedbytheNational LibraryCertificatesofCopyrightRegistrationandDepositofthesaid work described therein as "Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile. OnSeptember20,2001,ChingrequestedtheNBI)forpolice/investigative assistancefortheapprehensionandprosecutionofillegalmanufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the works. Afterdueinvestigation,theNBIfiledapplicationsforsearchwarrantsinthe RTC, which the RTC granted.The respondents filed a motion to quash the search warrants on the following grounds: 2. The copyright registrations wereissued in violation of the Intellectual Property Code on the ground that: a)thesubjectmatteroftheregistrationsarenotartisticor literary; b)thesubjectmatteroftheregistrationsaresparepartsof automobiles meaning there (sic) are original parts that they are designed to replace. Hence, they are not original. The respondents averred that the works covered by the certificates issued by the National Library are not artistic in nature; they are considered automotive sparepartsandpertaintotechnology.Theyaverthatthemodelsarenot original, and as such are the proper subject of a patent, not copyright. RTC: granted the motion and quashed the search warrant on its finding that therewas no probable cause for its issuance. The court ruled that thework coveredbythecertificatesissuedtothepetitionerpertainedtosolutionsto technicalproblems,notliteraryandartisticasprovidedinArticle172ofthe Intellectual Property Code. CA:RTCdidnotcommitanygraveabuseofitsdiscretioninissuingthe assailed order. It is worthy to state that the works protected under the Law on Copyright are: literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173).TheLeafSpringEyeBushingandVehicleBearingCushionfallon neither classification. Accordingly, if, in the first place, the item subject of the petition is not entitled to be protected by the law on copyright, how can there be any violation? 21 Issue/Held: WhetherSpringEyeBushingandVehicleBearingCushionare protected by copyrights.-NO Ratio: The petitioner cannot seek relief from the RTC based on his claim that hewasthecopyrightownerovertheutilitymodelsand,atthesametime, repudiate the courts jurisdictiontoascertain thevalidityof his claim without running afoul to the doctrine of estoppel. Todischargehisburden,theapplicantmaypresentthecertificateof registration covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A copyright certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one element of copyrightvalidity.Itconstitutes primafacie evidenceofbothvalidityand ownership andthevalidityofthefactsstatedinthecertificate. The presumption of validity to a certificate of copyright registration merely orders the burden of proof. The applicant should not ordinarily be forced, in the first instance,toproveallthemultiplefactsthatunderlinethevalidityofthe copyrightunlesstherespondent,effectivelychallengingthem,shiftsthe burden of doing so to the applicant. Indeed, Section 218.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides: 218.2. In an action under this Chapter: (a)Copyrightshallbepresumedtosubsistintheworkor othersubjectmattertowhichtheactionrelatesifthe defendantdoesnotputinissuethequestionwhether copyright subsists in the work or other subject matter; and (b)Wherethesubsistenceofthecopyrightisestablished, theplaintiffshallbepresumedtobetheownerofthe copyrightifheclaimstobetheownerofthecopyrightand thedefendantdoesnotputinissuethequestionofhis ownership. Acertificateofregistrationcreatesnorebuttablepresumptionofcopyright validitywhereotherevidenceintherecordcastsdoubtonthequestion.In such a case, validity will not be presumed. Todischargehisburdenofprobablecausefortheissuanceofasearch warrantforviolationofR.A.No.8293,thepetitioner-applicantsubmittedto theRTCCertificateofCopyrightRegistrationNos.2001-197and2001-204 datedSeptember3,2001andSeptember4,2001,respectively,issuedby the National Library covering work identified as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for AutomobileandVehicleBearingCushionbothclassifiedunderSection 172.1(h) of R.A. No. 8293, to wit: SEC.172. LiteraryandArtisticWorks. 172.1.Literaryand artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works," are original intellectualcreationsintheliteraryandartisticdomain protected from the moment of their creation and shall include in particular: ... (h)Originalornamentaldesignsormodelsforarticlesof manufacture,whetherornotregistrableasanindustrial design, and other works of applied art. RelatedtotheprovisionisSection171.10,whichprovidesthata"workof applied art" is an artistic creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article, whether made by hand or produced on an industrial scale. Itbearsstressingthatthefocusofcopyrightistheusefulnessoftheartistic design, and not its marketability. The central inquiry is whether the article is a work of art. Works for applied art include all original pict