PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. 

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident. 

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun

and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car. 

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. Thesearch is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of asearch incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before

a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizureshould precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’sbusiness in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. 

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and

consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. 

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted. 

2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL., 482 SCRA 660

Carpio-Morales, J.The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.

In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was opening the Union Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Once inside  the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of  a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents.

After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the  Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is valid.

Held:The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search warrant.

The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti, a criminal case, the issue was whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of one’s constitutional rights may be invoked against the State. In other words, the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State, is admissible.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT

1989]Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in thePhilippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by theconstitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the rightto return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any

country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. 

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

M I R A N D A v . A R I Z O N A

Facts of the Case The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.

Question Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?

Decision: 5 votes for Miranda, 4 vote(s) against

Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.

PEOPLE V AMPARADO

G.R. No. L-48656FERNAN; December 21, 1987

NATURE

Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Zamboangadel Norte, Br. 1.

FACTS

- Amparado was found guilty by the CFI for themurder of Manuel Magnahoy and was sentenced tosuffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua

and to paythe heirs of the victim the sum of P12k. On appeal,this Court affirmed said judgment but increased thecivil liability to P30k.- He now seeks a new trial, citing as grounds: [1] thediscovery of new and material evidence [2] errors of law or irregularities committed during the trialprejudicial to his substantive rights as an accused;and, [3] interest of substantial justice and avoidanceof a failure of justice.- The newly-discovered evidence relied upon byaccused-appellant consists of the testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr., Manuel Henry Auza and VioletaAmparado.- As contended by the SolGen, the testimony of Violeta Amparado could not be considered as newly-discovered nor could it materially affect the judgment, said testimony being merely cumulative incharacter.- The proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr., andManuel Henry Auza are explained in the accused-appellant’s affidavit attached to the motion underconsideration.- The evidence on record shows that Amparadostabbed Maghanoy by means of treachery, while thelatter was walking in the road. Amparado claimed itwas self-defense and it happened in the house wherehe was staying as a boarder. He explained that evenwith the use of reasonable diligence, he and hislawyer were not able to present as witness anyperson who first rendered assistance to the victim,nor any person who was in the road because he didnot know that there were such other people. Hesimply went inside the house after the incident andwas apprehended by the police there. He could notgo back to the scene of the crime because the familyand relatives of the victim were hunting him. He firstdiscovered that the two witnesses were present inthe road in front of the house after he received acopy of the decision of the Supreme Court, when hewent to Dipolog to look for a lawyer for an advice. There he met Roseller Ladera, a prosecution witness.Amparado told Ladera that he was convictedbecause of the testimony of another prosecutionwitness, Rogelio Patangan. Ladera told him thatbased on what he knew Patangan was not presentduring the incident, it was a certain Antonio Cachin Jr. and his companion who were present. Thereafter,he exerted earnest

effort to contact Antonio Cachin Jr, who related to him everything about the incidentand told him farther that he and Manuel Henry Auzawere there present and they were the first personswho were able to render assistance to Maghanoy andthat Patangan was not there present.

ISSUE

WON the evidence presented is newly-discovered

HELD

YES

Reasoning

- The evidence sought to be presented by accused-appellant conforms to the requisites laid down bySection 2[b] of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. Thetestimonies are newly-discovered and of sufficientweight and character as to alter the outcome of thecase.- The proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr. andManuel Henry Auza, who aver to be the first personsto render assistance to the victim immediately afterthe stabbing incident, if admitted, would tend toshow that the alleged eyewitness Rogelio Patangan,whose version of the crime was given full faith andcredence by the trial court and sustained by thisCourt, was not present at the scene of the crime.

If this is true, then, the version of the prosecutionmight perforce fail and that of the defense prevail.Consequently, the judgment of conviction could bereversed, or at the very least, modified.

Disposition

Motion for new trial granted. Theevidence already taken shall stand and thetestimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel HenryAuza and such other evidence of both prosecutionand defense as the trial court may in the interest of justice allow to be introduced, shall be taken andconsidered with the evidence already in the record,and a new judgment thereafter rendered by thelower court.

People vs. Estoista

•

The constitutionality of an act of legislature is not to be judged in the lightof exceptional cases.

•

It takes more than being merely harsh, excessive, out of proportion andsevere for a penalty to be obnoxious to the constitution. The punishmentthat is to be avoided is one that is

flagrantly and plainly oppressive

Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:

No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and

untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In

this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

Cariño v. CHR

– striking of teachers - CHR has adjudicative power (it may investigate i.e. receive evidence and make findings of facts as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights; cannot be likened to a judicial function; CHR has merely the power to investigate; it cannot try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate)

EPZA v. CHR

– CHR is a creation of the Constitution although it is not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions. In essence, its power is only investigative.

Simon Jr. v. CHR

– human rights; civil rights; political rights – Human rights – generic term; civil rights – those rights that

belong to every citizen or inhabitant of the state or country [by virtue of his citizenship in the country] and are not connected with the organization or administration of government (marriage, equal protection, freedom of contract etc.); Political rights – right to participate, directly or indirectly in the establishment or administration of government (suffrage, run for public office); CHR – focus on SEVERE cases of human rights violations (right of political detainees, treatment of prisoners, fair and public trials etc.); CHR can cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt but not order them to desist