VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the BOARD.” That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

G.R. No. 86695.

MARIA ELENA MALAGA,

Administrative Law; Government instrumentality, defined; Iloilo State College of Fisheries is a government instrumentality; Applicability of P.D. 188.—The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities

and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

The petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PREC1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of prequalified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.

The decree reads pertinently as follows:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

In their opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision.

In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its separate and distinct corporate personality.

It finds for the petitioners.

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR.,

Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. was appointed Terminal Supervisor.

On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet,, was filed against Beja by the PPA General manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable.

A decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case finding the petitioner guilty and rendered, among others that respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;

Beja challengesthe jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

Held: The Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner. Under the law creasting PPA, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other personnel.”

It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.

G.R. No. 115863. March 31, 1995.*

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution which streamline, reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”

The above resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, Resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments:

IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW,

ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,

SC held that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16 of administrative code of 1987. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous

entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Code, to wit:

“(3) Attachment.—a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.”

Not included anymore eBut, as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:

“SEC.16. Offices in the Commission.—The Commission shall have the following offices:

“(1) The Office of the Executive Director

“(2) The Merit System Protection Board

“(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

“(4) The Office of Planning and Management

“(5) The Central Administrative Office

“(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records.

“(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

“(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement.

“(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

“(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

“(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit

“(12) The Office of Personnel Relations

“(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs.

“(14) The Office of Retirement Administration.

“(15) The Regional and Field Offices.—

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

“Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement

On May 24, 1995, the Voluntary Arbitrator against the herein petitioner.

Issue: whether or not the CA has an appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of voluntary arbitrator which are final and executor?

Yes

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

“x x x x x x x x x (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, respondents.

Petitioner was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

Petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC , praying that it (ISA) be placed in possession of the property.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person.

Issue: whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government.. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines.

. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

MANUEL M. LEYSON, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills, respondents.

International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC); a domestic corporation engaged in the or shipping business, entered into a one (l)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF.

ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract—; (b) bad faith—; (c) manipulation—; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. (g) overpricing

On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.

On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that—

The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court.. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction.

Petitioner imputed that since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary, it follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily. petitioner asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that they are not public officers .

P.D. No. 1468 was passed amending PD No. 961 whch inserted a new provision authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition of “shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment and operation of industries . From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in what have come to be known as the “CIIF companies” were purchased.

The definition of “government owned or controlled corporation” in the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and EFREN L. ALAS, respondents.

The Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by a special law. It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission Under its Articles of Incorporation the purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for business.

Obviously, it is not involved in the performance of a particular function in the exercise of government power.

Issue: whether or not PPSB is a GOCC?

Yes., PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled corporation, and organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, “to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public, especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside x x x” and to facilitate postal service by “receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders.”

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. GENERAL FOODS (PHILS.), INC. respondent.

The respondent corporation, which is engaged in the manufacture of beverages such as “Tang,” “Calumet” and “Kool-Aid,” filed its income tax return for the fiscal year ending February 28, 1985. In said tax return, respondent corporation claimed as deduction, among other business expenses, the amount of P9,461,246 for media advertising for “Tang.”

On May 31, 1988, the Commissioner disallowed 50% or P4,730,623 of the deduction claimed by respondent corporation. Consequently, respondent corporation was assessed deficiency income taxes in the amount of P2,635,141.42. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

On September 29, 1989, respondent corporation appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but the appeal was dismissed.

Aggrieved, respondent corporation filed a petition for review at the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

Held: In reversing the decision of CA, SC believed among others, that It has been a long standing policy and practice of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems. It has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. We extend due consideration to its opinion unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Since there is none in the case at bar, the Court adheres to the findings of the CTA.

Nos. L-10123 and L-10355. April 26, 1957]

GENARO URSAL, as City Assessor of Cebu, petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and CONSUELO NOEL, respondents..

The Court of Tax Appeals as created by Republic Act No. 1125 is a part of the judicial system and was not made to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.

G.R. No. 129130. December 9, 2005.*

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and its resolution of dismissing petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company’s claim for refund of excess creditable withholding taxes in the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifteen Pesos (P755,715) allegedly paid and remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) sometime in 1990 and 1991.

Petitioner anchors its arguments among others that THE DECISION WHEREBY RESPONDENT CA DISMISSED PETITIONER’S APPEAL, AND RESPONDENT CTA’S DECISION AND RESOLUTION, ARE NOT BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

SC says that The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court, especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion.

EOPLE v MACEREN79 SCRA 450AQUINO; October 18, 1977FACTS-Section 11 of the Fisheries Lawprohibits " the use of any obnoxious orpoisonous substance" in fishing.- The Secretary of Agr icu l ture andN a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s , u p o n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r o f F i s h e r i e s , promulgated Fisheries AdministrativeO r d e r N o . 8 4 ( 6 2 O . G . 1 2 2 4 ) , p r o h i b i t i n g e l e c t r o f i s h i n g i n a l l Philippine waters.- J o s e B u e n a v e n t u r a , G o d o f r e d o R e y e s , B e n j a m i n R e y e s , N a z a r i o Aquino and Carlito del Rosario werec h a r g e d w i t h

h a v i n g v i o l a t e d Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that they engaged inelectro fishing.- Upon mot ion of the accused, themunicipal court dismissed the case.Administrative Law A2010Dean CarlotaCFI af f i rmed. The lower court held t h a t e l e c t r o f i s h i n g c a n n o t b e penalized because electric current isn o t a n o b n o x i o u s o r p o i s o n o u s substance as contemplated in sectionI I o f t h e F i s h e r i e s L a w . T h e l o w e r court further held that, since the lawd o e s n o t c l e a r l y p r o h i b i t e l e c t r o f ish ing, the execut ive and judic ia ld e p a r t m e n t s c a n n o t c o n s i d e r i t unlawful.ISSUE/S1. WON the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources exceeded hisa u t h o r i t y i n i s s u i n g F i s h e r i e s Administrative Order No. 84HELD1. YES.Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulatingthe mode or proceeding to carry intoeffect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended toamending or expanding the statutoryrequirements or to embrace mattersnot covered by the statuteReasoning

 The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine mollusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of “other violations” because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

Nowhere in the said law is electrofishing specifically punished. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, toanticipate and provide for themultifarious and complex situationsthat may be encountered in enforcingthe law. All that is required is that theregulation should be germane to the  defects and purposes of the law andthat it should conform to thestandards that the law prescribesDispositionMETROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT,

Private respondent, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked. He questioned the petitioner’s act that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal.

LOI 43 punished Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways, streets and sidewalks, shall immediately be removed by their owners/users; otherwise said vehicles shall be dealt with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder;

1. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked vehicle shall be removed, towed and impounded at the expense of the owner, user or claimant;

2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registry plates of the vehicles shall be confiscated and the owner’s certificate of registration cancelled. (Emphasis supplied).

Private respondent invoke that it did not empower the petitioner “to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways.” At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605.

The petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only. Moreover, The petitioner stresses that under the decree,

“the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation over such violations and punishment thereof are (hereby) transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission,” and one of such laws is LOI 43. The penalties prescribed by the LOI are therefore deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties therein specified.

Issue: whether or not LOI is a valid?

We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD 1605, whichever is considered the special law either because of its subject or its territorial application. The former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a no-parking area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles, the offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second. This explains why the sanctions are different. The purpose of the LOI is to discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break down while that of the decree is to penalize the driver for his defiance of the traffic laws.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid

LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION

Subsequent to the promulgation of P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy enunciated in said decree in the private sector. Under LOI private employers are urged to give allowances to their employees with the ff scales;A pertinent provision of said LOI reads:

For large-scale and medium-scale enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more, P50.00 or higher;

For small-scale enterprises capitalized at P 100,000 to P1 million, P30 or higher;

For enterprises lower than these categories, P15 or higher." (Italics supplied.)

On July 31, 1974, the President issued P.D. No. 525 making mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174.

then Secretary of Labor Blas F. Ople promulgated the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 with the following provisions:

"Section 7. Amount of Allowances.—Every covered employer shall give to each of his employees who is receiving less than P600.00 a month not less than the following monthly allowances:

(a) P50.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more;

(b) P30.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is at least P100,000.00 but less than P1 million; and

(c) P15.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is less than P 100,000.00.

The herein petitioner , a corporation with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2.7M as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance.

Held: It should be observed that this provision not only injects a new determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, but also provides a choice for the determinative factor; whichever is higher between the employer's authorized capital stock and its total assets

Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations, therefore, introduced a matter which is not germane to the provisions of P.D. No. 525 by considering total assets as a criterion. Moreover, it further complicated the law by the addition of the phrase "whichever is applicable and higher." In practice, the exercise of the option expressed in such phrase may lead to absurd situations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED

PB COM

According to the facts, herein petitioner had a tax credits amounting to P5M+ with the BIR.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes .

The CTA, denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit in the sum amount of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided for by law.

Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code

Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a position contrary to its declared circular if it would result to injustice to taxpayers. Petitioner claims that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have to retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to taxpayers.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner’s reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years?

When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.

Interpretation of Administrative body is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC

This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment

agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong” (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.

“In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.

On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:

1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;

2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and

There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.

“Art. 36. Regulatory Power.—The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to isssue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.” (Italics ours.)

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the growing complexity of the modern society” (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society’s ramified activities. “Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice” (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the “administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred” upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to “restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, issued Executive Order No. 1088 which increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.

However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order for some reasons.

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to fix pilotage rates.

Held: The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.

The SC cited the fixing of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act as similar to this case . It cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with

wage-fixing powers, by virtue of the former’s plenary power of legislation. When Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required.

Being a mere administrative agency, PPA cannot validly issue orders or regulations that would have the effect of rendering nugatory the provisions of the legislative issuance such as those of the executive order in question.

Legaspi vs Minister of Finance

In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time,  Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid.

. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”

  LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE24 July 1982Ponente:Aids in interpretationFacts:Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interimBatasang Pambansa, prayingthat the SC declare PD 1840 unconstitutional. The said PD was issued in accordancewith the legislative powers granted on

the President in Amendment No. 6 of theConstitution pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595. Petitioner claims that the saidamendment is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution asamended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981.Law:Amendment No. 6“Whenever in the judgment of the President, there exists a grave emergency or a threat orimminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular NationalAssembly fa i ls or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in h is  judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue thenecessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of theland.”Sec. 1, Art. 8“The Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa”Sec.11, Art. 7 The President may grant amnesty “with concurrence to the Batsang Pambansa”Sec. 16, Art. 7“All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and thelaws of the land which are not herein provided for on conferred upon any official shall bedeemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa providesotherwise.Issues:•Whether or not PD 1840 is unconstitutional?oWhether or not Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Const i tut ion isunaffected or repealed by the April 7, 1981 amendment?oWhether or not the term “incumbent President”, as seen in all otherAmendments and which only refers to Marcos, is the person referredto as President in Amendment No.6 ?oWhether or not the phrase “President (Prime Minister)” means thats ince the pos i t ion is no longer held by one person, nei ther thePresident nor the Prime Minister can have the power vested inAmendment No. 6?oWhether or not Amendment No. 2, which refers to the legislativeassembly simply as Batasang Pambansa, intends to convert orupgrade the present existing assembly (interimBatasang Pambansa)into the regular Batasang Pambansa?

  Decision:

H e l dR a t io1 . P D 1 8 4 0 2 . A m e n d m e n t N o . 6 i s unaffected3. The term “incumbent President”does not apply to Amendment No. 64. The phrase “President (PrimeMinister)” does not limit AmendmentNo. 65. Amendment No. 2 did not meanto convert or upgrade the presentassemblyConstitutional The 1981 plebiscite does not repealAmendment No. 6 by omission. Since itwas not voted on, it would be unfair to thepeople to repeal it just because it was notincluded as one of the questions in theplebiscite.A m e n d m e n t N o . 6 u s e s t h e t e r m “ P r e s i d e n t ” a n d n o t “ i n c u m b e n t President”. Therefore, it refers to all futurepresidents.When the two offices are separated andh e l d b y s e p a r a t e p e o p l e , t h e p o w e r o r i g i n a l l y f o r t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r i s transferred to the President. The power inA m e n d m e n t N o . 6 w a s m e a n t f o r t h e executive official, which in this case is thePresident. The only change made by the 1981amendment to Amendment No. 2 is then o n - i n c l u s i o n o f t h e “ i n c u m b e n t President” to the assembly. The referencet o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y a s B a t a s a n g P a m b a n s a ( a s o p p o s e d t ointerimBatasang Pambansa) is a non-essentialissue since the present existing assemblyis still theinterimBatasang Pambansa.

Maceda v ERB

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases

ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify the provisional increase as ERB did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a denial of due process

SC held that such a relaxed procedure is true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as

exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings

“What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex-parte and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.1 Specifically, they ask the f ollowing questions:

1. What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or " general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inf orm the public of the contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance

Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.

Republic vs. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.

Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA).

Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated December 19, 1993 stating there is no available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and hereby ordered the application ARCHIVED without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.

On March 23, 1999, Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 was issued by the NTC re-allocating an additional five (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service.

Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case,7 citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators, as provided for under Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99.

Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application.9 Extelcom argued that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost eight (8) years ago. Thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of respondent Bayantel in this application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service.

On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service.

Held: In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for.xxxx

Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.

In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect.

Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation.31 In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs

RUBLE RUBENECIA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

An administrative complain was filed before the MSPB against petitioner Rubenecia, for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules. After a preliminary inquiry, the MSPB formally charged Rubenecia and required him to file an answer with the CSC Regional Office.

Then the Regional Director submitted an investigation report to the Chairman, MSPB. Before the MSPB could render a decision, the Commission issued on Resolution No. 93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision.

The Commission, accordingly, took over the case against petitioner and finding petitioner guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, asserting lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Commission.

Petitioner Rubenecia claims that the Civil Service Commission itself (as distinguished from the MSPB) did not acquire jurisdiction over his case because he had not been notified by individual written notice sent by mail that his case had been elevated to the Civil Service Commission as required by Resolution No. 93-2387.

Held: We consider this objection unmeritorious. CSC Resolution No. 93-2387, quoted earlier, did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending before the MSPB. the fact that Resolution No. 93-2387 was published in a newspaper of general circulation the Commission may accordingly be deemed to have complied substantially with the requirement of written notice in its own Resolution.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION,

The PITC ,a government-owned and controlled corporation thru its board approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. 2 Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five (5) years. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle was purchased.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation such

as representation and transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate.

To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management) issued Corporate Compensation Circular 10 which discontinued discontinued effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not otherwise enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.

On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the above-mentioned expenses (50% of the yearly car registration and insurance premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car) made after November 1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor.

Issue 1: whether the disallowance is valid?

No, COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10 16 as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan benefits has been declared by this Court as of no force and effect due to the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The publication of which in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law.

Issue 2:Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit?

The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same.

Honasan II

An affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent. It reads in part:

2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan, II …

Then the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.

Petitioner is questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation. That since the jurisdiction of the DOJ is based on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001, it is ineffective because it was not published is not plausible.

Held: SC citing the case of People vs. Que Po Lay and tanada vs tuvera, that since OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty, publication is not necessary in order for the circular to take effect.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.14

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

The PPA has been paying its officials and employees COLA and amelioration %, pursuant to various legislative and administrative issuances. During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA discontinued the payment thereof in view of Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 prescribing the implementing rules and regulations of the Salary Standardization Law which integrated said allowances into the basic salary effective July 1, 1989. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023 dated August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to non-publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856 directing the payment of COLA and amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service during the period July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999, the date of publication of CCC No. 10.

But the COA held that only officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 were entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the additional compensation (COLA and amelioration allowance) mentioned.

Hence this petition.

Whether or not herein petitioners -- who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance

Petition is meritorious.

Pursuant to its authority under Section 23 of RA 6758, the DBM issued on October 2, 1989, DBM-CCC No. 10, Section 4.0 of which enumerated the various allowances that were deemed "integrated" into the standardized basic salary. Admittedly, among these allowances were the COLA and the amelioration allowance.

However, because of its lack of publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, DBM-CCC No. 10 was declared ineffective on August 12, 1998, in De Jesus v. COA,9 which we quote:

"In the present case under scrutiny, its is decisively clear that DDM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that.  At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of the subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines – to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the subject matter. In other words, during the period that DBM-CCC No. 10 was in legal limbo,11 the COLA and the amelioration allowance were not  effectively integrated into the standardized salaries.

TANADA VS. TUVERA

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Tañada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs).

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat”. Publication is indispensable.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary

G.R. No. 108524. November 10, 1994.*

Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code.

The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under §103(b) of the NIRC.

Petitioner complains that it was denied due process because it was not heard before the ruling was made.

Held: There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. The circular in question is a mere interpretative rule.

The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a

newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. 4

In addition such rule must be published. 

ERMITA

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing .

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, which requires all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication:

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.

E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

People vs. Veridiano IINo. L-62243. October 12, 1984.*

Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 .The information reads: That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo xxxx

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.

Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979

Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.

We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private respondent

It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation

The respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which requires phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, which states that taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities

Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry

Held: The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.  In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural land, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank

After trial, the court rendered decision ordering respondents to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands.

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

Held: SC cited Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,19 in which they declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands

under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.20

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

vs. Lubrica

G.R. No. 159145. April 29, 2005

Federico Suntay, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines ("Land Bank").3  the case was filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ("RARAD")

Respondent said that the land valuation made by the DAR and LBP was unconscionably low.

After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of Suntay’s properties

Then, on May 22, 2001, RARAD declared this Decision as final and executor.

Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction16 before the DARAB against Suntay and RARAD.

Respondent’s successor said that the law which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari.

Issue: THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252 WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND

SC held that DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Bank’s petition for certiorari.

Other the Eos created that creadted DARAB, it was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases before it. 

In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank’s petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.31 The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.

The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.

Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Peña

No. L-77663. April 12,1988.*

The Commission issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms

The Commission designated of the OICs, the private respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.. However, in a memorandum addressed to depository banks of the said two corporations, Ms. Saludo revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing .The said memorandum was approved by then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista of the Commission.

The OIC withdrew from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the staff, employees and laborers of the same .Becuase of this, respondent, instituted an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, the Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the OIC, Saludoin the Regional Trial Court.

The C; ommission filed a motion to dismiss praying for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case .

IssueOn the issue of jurisdiction squarely raised, as above indicated, the Court sustains petitioner's stand and holds that regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals for that matter have no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its powers

In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other." 12 The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

(((But as already indicated hereinabove, the Court of Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.))

Carino v CHR

On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: HELD:The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it

may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

JOSEPH C. CEREZO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE AFULUGENCIA, respondents.

petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against herein respondents .

Finding probable cause to indict respondents,6 the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them but the same prosecutor reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.9 Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC. During the intervening period, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a “not guilty” plea.10

In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed.

Then the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel.

Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: whether or not the court is correct in relying solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.

No.

In this case, in dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge should make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold

respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case..

The same holds true when the court reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary.

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio

Herein respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner in the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, which dismissed it for insufficiency of evidence.

On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.

Then respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision set aside the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of “courts of justice;”12 that, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,13 the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ

In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,15 as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals

Held: A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since “the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.”

A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.20

In Balangauan v. Court of Appeals21 in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.” Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary

((((Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly

and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be

refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. )))

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.

The PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-852 which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.

Subsequently, PPA issued AO whose avowed policywhich provides therein that “all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that “all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby

“relevant government agencies” and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views

Held: SC held that the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Mendoza v COMELEC

Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. On 1 June 2007, respondent filed the Election Protest which the COMELEC Second Division rendered Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioner’s proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc, however, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, affirming the decision of COMELEC second division

On 11 February 2010, petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the said Resolution on the following ground, among others that there was lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

On the scheduled re-hearing, it turned out, the deliberations which ensued again failed to muster the required majority vote.

On 4 March 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the issuance of a Writ of Execution directing the implementation of the 1 December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.

Held:

SC held that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC because it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned Resolution ,annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor

The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest. Section 6, Rule 18 od the comeleec rules of proccedure, pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution categorically provides that when the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.”

The provision is not violative of the Constitution.

The Rule, in fact, was promulgated obviously pursuant to the Constitutional mandate in the first sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C).

Cruz de Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Work

Private respondents filed complaints with respondent Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board.

Respondent board disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas such as the elevator and the servants' quarters

The petitioner said that this was a contractual obligation of the tenants over which respondent regulatory board had no jurisdiction,

Issue: Has the board lack of jurisdiction,

Held: Under the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 458 jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act 1 were transferred to respondent board.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged not by the respondent regulatory

board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals

Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric Company .CCM Gas was billed P272,684.81 for electric consumption of which 213,696 corresponds to purchased power.

CCM demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213,696.00 had been arrived at.

As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the Regional Trial Court.

The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the Board of Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was "arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing.

Issue: Whether or not Trial court had jurisdiction?

It is clear that what CCM Gas is questioning is not the power of MERALCO to collect the amount but the manner in which the amount was arrived at — in short, the manner the power was exercised. CCM Gas' predicament concerns its inability to understand why, for its consumption worth P51,383.98, it is being billed P213,696.00 for purchased power adjustment. Hence, its demand for the details of this item in its electric bill.

Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies, but what CCM Gas demanded from Meralco was only the basis upon which the latter had computed the purchased power adjustment of P213,696.98.

Ergo, it is clear that the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way pertains to BOE's supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates. . . The question CCM Gas raised before the trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of the BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and adjudication. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain a civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein.

RCPI VS BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS

These two petitions which have been Consolidated as they involve the same issue as to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.

In the first petition, respeondent is asking for damages because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses.

In the second petition, Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.

After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200.

Issue: whether Board has jurisdiction of the case?

We agree with petitioner RCPI. the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".

The complaint of respondents in the two case constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission

A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable

and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.

After being informed that the message sought to be sent to the addressee had not been delivered, private respondent, sent to then Public Service Commissioner an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident against the herein petitioner.

PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended.

Issue: Was the then PSC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint?

Held: Verily, the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the

terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

((((Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.))))

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd.

In a contract denominated as “Tampakan Option Agreement” the respondent herein acquired the mining claims of Tampakan Companies.

The “Tampakan Option Agreement” was amended by subsequent agreements under which the Tampakan Companies were given preferential option to acquire the shares of respondnet in WMCP and Hillcrest Inc. in the event it (WMC) decided to sell them.

The Republic of the Philippines, entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)[3] with WMCP for the large scale exploration, development and commercial exploitation of mineral resources in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao Del Sur and North Kotabato.

Then respondent sold to herein petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. The sale was subject to certain conditions including the Tampakan Companies’ failure to accept WMCP’s offer to sell the same shares, under the companies’ right of first refusal provided for in the “Tampakan Option Agreement” and its amendments.

Later, also respondent sold to the Tampakan Companies its shares of stock in it (WMCP) and Hillcrest, Inc.

Petitioner, getting wind of the Sale and Purchase Agreement between WMC and Tampakan Companies, wrote letter to the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares.  

But in the end, Tampakan Companies successfully acquired the disputed shares of stock through Sagittarius Mines, Inc.  

Petitioner filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three corporations comprising the Tampakan Companies, for specific performance, annulment of contracts, contractual interference and injunction.

Therein defendants-herein respondents filed before the Makati RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss[14] petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

Issue: Whether or not DENR have jurisdiction on the case?

 It is clear from the proceedings before the DENR, specifically before the MGB, that the issue of which –– between petitioner and respondent Tampakan Companies –– possesses the better right to acquire the mining rights, claims and interests held by WMC through its local subsidiary WMCP, especially with respect to the 1995 FTAA.  The DENR or the MGB cannot just assess the qualifications of petitioner

and of the Tampakan Companies as potential transferee or assignee of the rights and obligations of WMCP under the FTAA without also resolving the issue of which has priority of right to become one.

True, the questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity to another.  But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in mining agreements.  Hence, the power of the DENR or the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law.  

BOISER VS CA

The petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement.

Without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT terminated the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross

violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting Agreement." . So, petitioner instituted Civil Case with the Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages.

On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties.

The private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing for certiorari.

TThe ground alleged in the petition was:

That RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR COURTS. THE REGULAR COURTS

The order which cut off the Tagbilaran-Mandaue phone connections is an internal transaction and business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely technical matter pertaining basically to the operation of the communications network of a public utility corporation. According to PLDT, the CFI of Cebu has arrogated upon itself the authority of supervising or overseeing the operations of PLDT at its Cebu relay station.

Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance.

Held: The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of exemplary and moral damages in addition to attorney's fees.

There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages.

Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated

The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. SC cited RCPI v. Board of Communications, "that if an injury is suffered due to the breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications."