HEIRS OF DOLLETON V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC.

FACTS: Petitioners Heirs filed for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and p ossession with preliminary injunction/restraining order and damages against resp ondents Fil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed that they have been in open, exc lusive, and notorious possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years until Fil-Estate forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate contended that that have in their p ossession numerous certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be att acked collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The respondents also filed a motion to d ismiss on the grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of action the RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient cause of action.

HELD: The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the suffic iency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. T his Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficie ntly stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the o wners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. The petitioners are in open, co ntinuous and notorious possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 90 years. The rule of civil procedure provides the elements of a cause of action ; 1) a right in favor of a plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the defend ant to violate such right. 3) an act or omission on the part of defendant of the right of the plaintiff which constitutes such right.

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. MIGUEL V. CAMPOS,G.R. No. 138814 , April 16, 2009FACTS:Respondent Miguel V. Campos filed a petition with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing Department(SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE)The petition sought: (1) to nullify the Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors, whichallegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered with MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived of, for which hewould pay IPO prices;.SICD granted the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing orenforcing the resolution of the MKSE. they also issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation orenforcement of the MKSE Board Resolution in question.On March 11,1994, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Petition becamemoot due to the cancellation of the license of the MKSE (2) The SICD had no jurisdiction over the petition and (3)the petition failed to state a cause of action. However, the SICD denied petitioner s motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition failed to state a cause of action.HELD:The petition filed by respondent Miguel Campos should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.It contains three essential elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff 2) the correlative obligation of thedefendant and 3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent,the complaint will be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Furthermore, the petition filedby respondent failed to lay down the source or basis of respondent s right and/or  petitioner s obligation.Article 1157 of the Civil Code, provides that Obligations arise from: law, Contracts, Quasi Contracts, Actsor omissions punished by law and quasi delicts. Therefore an obligation imposed on a person and thecorresponding right granted to another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources.The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint orPetition, without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A pleading shouldstate the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as

distinguished from mereconclusions of fact or conclusions of law.The Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed sometime in 1989,granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However, there is nothing in the said Petitionfrom which the Court can deduce that respondent, by virtue of his position as Chairman Emeritus of MKSE, wasgranted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in thestock market at their offering prices.

 ContractsINTERNATIONAL FREEPORT TRADERS, INC., v.ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. DANZAS INTERCONTINENTAL,G.R. No. 181833 January 26, 2011FACTS:In March 1997 petitioner International Freeport Traders, Inc. (IFTI) ordereda shipment of Toblerone chocolates and assorted confectioneries from Jacobs SuchardTobler Ltd. of Switzerland (Jacobs) through its Philippine agent, Colombo MerchantsPhils., Inc., under the delivery term ―F.O.B. Ex-Works.‖ To ship the goods, Jacobs dealt with Danmar Lines of Switzerland (Danmar)which issued to Jacobs negotiable house bills of lading[1] signed by its agent,respondent Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. (Danzas). The bills of lading stated that theterms were ―F.O.B.‖ and ―freight payable at destination,‖ with Jacobs as the shipper,China Banking Corporation as the consignee, and IFTI as the party to be notified of theshipment. The shipment was to be delivered at the Clark Special Economic Zone withManila as the port of discharge. The goods were also covered by Letters of Credit MK-97/0467 and MK-97/0468 under a ―freight collect‖ arrangement. Since Danmar did not have its own vessel, it contracted Orient OverseasContainer Line (OOCL) to ship the goods from Switzerland. OOCL issued a non-negotiable master bill of lading,[2] stating that the freight was prepaid with Danmar asthe shipper and Danzas as the consignee and party to be notified. The shipment was tobe delivered at Angeles City in Pampanga. Danmar paid OOCL an arbitrary fee ofUS$425.00 to process the release of the goods from the port and ship the same to

 ContractsClark in Angeles City. The fee was to cover brokerage, trucking, wharfage, arrastre,and processing expenses.The goods were loaded on board the OOCL vessel on April 20, 1997 and arrivedat the port of Manila on May 14, 1997. Upon learning from Danmar that the goods hadbeen shipped, Danzas immediately informed IFTI of its arrival. IFTI prepared the importpermit needed for the clearing and release of the goods from the Bureau of Customsand advised Danzas on May 20, 1997 to pick up the document. Danzas got the importpermit on May 26, 1997. At the same time, it asked IFTI to 1) surrender the original billsof lading to secure the release of the goods, and 2) submit a bank guarantee inasmuchas the shipment was consigned to China Banking Corporation to assure Danzas that itwill be compensated for freight and other charges.But IFTI did not provide Danzas a bank guarantee, claiming that letters of creditalready covered the shipment. IFTI insisted that Danzas should already endorse theimport permit and bills of lading to OOCL since the latter had been paid an arbitrary fee.But Danzas did not do this. Because IFTI did not provide Danzas with the original billsof lading and the bank guarantee, the latter withheld the processing of the release of thegoods. Danzas reiterated to IFTI that it could secure the release of the goods only ifIFTI submitted a bank guarantee. Ultimately, IFTI yielded to the request and applied fora bank guarantee which was approved on May 23, 1997. It claimed to have advisedDanzas on even date of its availability for pick up but Danzas secured it only on June 6,1997.ISSUE:

Whether or not a contract of lease of service exists between IFTI and Danzas.HELD:What is clear to the Court is that, by acceding to all the documentaryrequirements that Danzas imposed on it, IFTI voluntarily accepted its services. Thebank guarantee IFTI gave Danzas assured the latter that it would eventually be paid allfreight and other charges arising from the release and delivery of the goods to it. Another indication that IFTI recognized its contract with Danzas is when IFTI requestedDanzas to have the goods released pending payment of whatever expenses the latterwould incur in obtaining the release and delivery of the goods at Clark. It also admittedthat it initially settled with Danzas‘ General Manager and OOCL‘s Mabazza the issueregarding the charges on the goods after Danzas agreed to bill IFTI for the electriccharges and storage fees totaling P56,000.00. Certainly, this concession indicated thattheir earlier agreement did not push through.

 ContractsEvery contract has the elements of (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2)object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligationwhich is established. A contract is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested bythe meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are toconstitute the contract.Generally, contracts undergo three distinct stages: (1) preparation or negotiation;(2) perfection; and (3) consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospectivecontracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment ofagreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract takes place when theparties agree upon the essential elements of the contract. The last stage is theconsummation of the contract where the parties fulfill or perform the terms they agreedon, culminating in its extinguishment. Here, there is no other conclusion than that theparties entered into a contract of lease of service for the clearing and delivery of theimported goods.

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. JOHN TANSIPEKPosted on March 28, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard[G.R. No. 181235. July 22, 2009.]

FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as actual construction went on, progress billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI but instead, Tansipek deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the deposit to payee’s account only, and despite the alleged lack of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check despite demands made by the latter.PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIB’s Motion to Dismiss.PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied. Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time.ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct remedy

HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.It is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case – is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order

St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati CityG.R. No. 174290January 20, 2009

FACTS:  The private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Sales and Cancellation of TCTS registered in the name of Oro Development Corporation (ODC) and SMWSI. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that Tomas Soriano and Josefina Soriano, parents of the private respondent, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Soriano’s subscription of stocks in the said corporation.  Tomas Q. Soriano then diedintestate.By virtue of the said Deed of Assignment, the ownership and title over the subject properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter, ODC executed in favor of petitioner SMWSI a Deed of Saleover one of the subject property. Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Soriano’s death, he discovered that the latter’s signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery.A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on TCTs of the property owned by ODC and SMWSI. Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.RTC issued an Order dismissing the private respondent’s Complaint. Aggrieved by the RTC Order, private respondent moved for its reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same.Petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendensannotated on the titles, which Motion was opposed by the private respondent. Private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal stating his intention to elevate the RTC Orders to the Court of Appeals. RTC issued its Ordergranting the Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendens.  The private respondent, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order.RTC denied for lack of merit private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of LisPendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been duly appealed.  Petitioners opposed the aforesaid Motion of private respondent.Petitionersfiled a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on the ground that “the issues in the appeal are and can only be questions of law, the appellate jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, thus the dismissal of private respondent’s appeal is mandatory pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 and Section 2,

Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure.”The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting private respondent’s Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of LisPendens. The Court of Appeals also issued a Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal of private respondent.  According to the appellate court, private respondent raised both questions of fact and law in his appeal. The petitioners instituted two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. In G.R. No. 174290, the petitioner, seek to annul and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which granted herein private respondent Hilario P. Soriano’s Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate the Notice of LisPendens over TCT. In G.R. No. 176116, the petitioner also seek to annul and set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the three Resolutions similarly rendered by the Court of Appeals to wit: (1) Resolutiodenying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal of herein private respondent Hilario P. Soriano; (2) Resolutiondenying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and (3) Resolution requiring the Register of Deeds of Makati City to submit to the appellate court the original copies of the documents involvedso that they can be presented to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for comparative analysis of the signatures of Tomas Q. Soriano.

G.R. No. 174290

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner may file the instant Petition without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed resolution.

RULING:No. A Motion for Reconsideration of the order or resolution is a condition precedent for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari challenging the issuance of the same.The general rule that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. This rule, however, is subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the order or a resolution, is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower court;  (3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for Reconsideration would be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings were ex parte or were such that the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.  Petitioners’ averment of sense of urgency in that private respondent was already taking steps and other measures to have the Notice of LisPendens re-annotated by presenting the Resolution of the Court of Appeals to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City deserves scant consideration.  Petitioners never described with particularity, much less, presented proof of the steps purportedly taken by the private respondent that would justify their immediate resort to this Court on certiorari without seeking reconsideration of the Resolution in question from the Court of Appeals.  Petitioners simply made a sweeping allegation that absolutely has no basis.  The records themselves are bare of any proof that would convince this Court that the private respondent indeed, took steps to have the challenged Resolution implemented.  In fact, petitioners themselves, in their letterdated 8 September 2006 addressed to the Office of the

Registry of Deeds of Makati City, pointed out that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals did not yet order the said Office to re-annotate the Notice of LisPendens. More importantly, petitioners explicitly revealed in their letter that they intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, as its Resolution dated 18 August 2006 had not yet acquired finality.  Why then did petitioners not proceed with filing their motion for reconsideration, and opted to immediately file the present Petition for Certiorari?Similarly baseless is petitioners’ bare assertion, without even an attempt at explaining, that the issues subject of the Petition at bar involve public interest sufficient to excuse them from filing a Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 176116

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves purely questions of law, in which case, the proper mode of appeal would be a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; or questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, in which case, the proper mode would be by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41? RULING:Rule 41. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or questions both of law and of fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals. Among the grounds raised by petitioners in seeking the dismissal by the RTC of private respondent’s Complaint are: (1) the Complaint stated no cause of action;(2) the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; and (3) a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

In a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,” simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place.  What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true.  It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts."    It must be remembered, however, that the basis of the RTC Order dismissing private respondent’s Complaint was not only its failure to state a cause of action, but also the fact that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, and that the condition precedent for filing a claim had not been complied with. According to the RTC, the Complaint was dismissible on the ground that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished.  Private respondent, in accepting a certain parcel of land as his share in the estate of his late father Tomas Q. Soriano, was now deemed to have been paid or compensated because his share in the estate of the deceased had been delivered to him.  In arriving at such a finding, the RTC necessarily made a preliminary determination of the facts in order to verify that, indeed, private respondent’s claim or demand had been paid.  When the private respondent assigned as error in his appeal such finding of the RTC, he raised not only a question of law, but also a question of fact.   It must be stressed that in its 17 January 2005 Order, the trial court expressed a finding that “in the beholder of untrained eyes, the signatures in the Deed of Assignment and in the Second Amendment of Credit Agreement are the same.”  Considering that the trial court made a finding of fact as regards the issue of forgery and such issue was properly raised in the private respondent’s appeal with the appellate court, it certainly behooves the appellate court to review the said findings.  Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals has the power to inquire into the

allegations of forgery made in the private respondent’s Complaint, it can validly require the submission of the original copies of the documents involved to enable the NBI to perform a comparative analysis of Tomas Q. Soriano’s signatures therein.

GENARO SANTIAGO III v. JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR.579 SCRA 1 (2009)

Under the principle of “judicial immunity”, judges cannot be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

The complainant Genaro Santiago III filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/ Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas Fajardo. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court asking for its reversal.

The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, Justice Vicente Veloso and herein respondent Justice Juan Enriquez. Justice Gonzales-Sison was the one who made the Report as the basis for the Division’s consultation and deliberation which upholds the decision made by the RTC of Quezon City. Justice Veloso concurred in the Report made. On the other hand, Justice Enriquez dissented to the Report and made his own Dissenting Opinion. Justice Enriquez requested for another two (2) Justices to form a Special Division, Justice Edgardo Cruz and Justice Lucas Bersamin were then included. After the deliberations, the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Enriquez became the majority opinion. The decision of the RTC of Quezon City was reversed by the decision made by the Special Division.

Complainant Santiago then filed an administrative complaint against Justice Enriquez on the ground of gross ignorance of the law, and gross incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in the case of Santiago. Justice Enriquez contends that it was a mere nuisance and that it was filed prematurely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid ground for the filing of an administrative case against Justice Enriquez

HELD:

The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable.

The principle of ―judicial immunity‖ insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith. To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.

It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by respondent in

his individual capacity. It was a product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special Division of five.