capacity development and institutional change jaap voeten and saeed parto seminar ‘scrutinizing...
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Capacity Development
and Institutional Change
Jaap Voeten and Saeed Parto
Seminar ‘Scrutinizing Success and Failure in Development’
Wageningen International, 3 Dec. 2007
Objective
To promote understanding of institutions and institutional change in capacity development …
By introducing several concepts from new economic theory.
Contents
1. Problem exploration ‘capacity development and institutional change’ (JV)
2. Review institutional theories economics (JV, SP)
3. Analytical framework institutional assessment (SP)
4. Case illustrations (SP, JV)
Seminar problem statement
‘A significant cause of failure of many well intended capacity development interventions is a
limited understanding of institutions and falseassumptions about processes of social change’.
More often then not, CD interventions do not meet expectations. There is something missingin the existing CD approaches, methods, plans
Why would understanding institutions be critical in CD?
Capacity Development
What is it? Many definitions…
Two essential elements: various approaches, strategies and methodologies seek to improve performance at different levels
Still quite vague, what is meant by the term ‘capacity’?
Capacity
Abilities, skills, understandings (explicitly addressed in CD)
Attitudes, values, relationships, behaviors, motivations (implicitly, indirectly addressed)
(Resources and conditions)
What is missing/implicit?
Issues of attitudes, mentalities,values, motivations, culture, norms all concern:
Human interaction
There is something missing in our understanding of human interaction in CD
Emerging questions
How could we better understand the human interaction in capacity development?
What theories on human interaction exist
and could be of help?
What about institutional theories?
Theoretical concepts
New economic theories address human interaction in their analysis:
Transaction Cost Theory
New Institutional Economics
Evolutionary Economic Theory
Transaction costs theory
What makes some markets
more imperfect than others?
Transforming Transacting
Costs of measuring, enforcement, (dis)trust
Transaction costs
Costs implied in economic transacting due tohuman interaction issues. Transaction costs need to be taken intoaccount in the analysis.
Assuming that measurement, enforcementand trust are costly and context related, explains why some economies/marketsdevelop better than others.
New Institutional Economics
What determines the transaction costs?
In economic transaction, rules of the game areframed (contract, enforcement, trust). If the framework is clear -> low transaction costs
Rules of the game = ‘Institutions’
Institutions are the rules of the game in asociety, they are the humanly devisedconstraints that shape human interaction.
Examples of institutions
Formal rules: constitution, law, policy, regulations, tax, contracts on paper
Informal rules: conventions, norms ofbehavior, values, attitude, (self imposed)codes of conduct, routines, personalstandards of honesty
Institutions (rules) <-> Organizations (players)
Functions of institutions
provide stability and predictability facilitate behavior in recurrent interaction codify accumulated knowledge in routines
and traditions communicate values by containing social
prescriptions for behavior Institutions are regulated
power relations
Evolutionary Economic Theory
Sees the economy as always in the process of change
The economic context is not completely understood by the actors; they can not make optimal choices.
Institutions help cope with incomplete information and uncertainty providing guidance and stability
An always changing economy implies changing institutions.
Implications Institutional change
The more complex a society, more formal rules Institutions serve the ones in power, not
necessary (socially) efficient Formal rules can change overnight, informal
rules usually do not Path dependency perpetuates the existing
institutions Institutional changes imply internalization Institutions will never reach a steady state
SP: Reconstruction of Afghanistan
Started in earnest in late 2001 A number of international conferences held on
how to reconstruct Numerous infrastructure and service provision
programmes were introduced including: Microfinance (2003) Community Development Councils (2004) Water User Associations (2005)
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Policy Process Dynamics
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)
Policy Process Dynamics
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)
Decision making analysis(March and Olsen)
Policy Process Dynamics
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)Network AnalysisColeman; Burt
Decision making analysis(March and Olsen)
Policy Process Dynamics
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)
Implementation AnalysisMazmanian and Sabatier
Network AnalysisColeman; Burt
Decision making analysis(March and Olsen)
Policy Process Dynamics
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
InstitutionalContext
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)
Implementation AnalysisMazmanian and Sabatier
Network AnalysisColeman; Burt
Decision making analysis(March and Olsen)
Policy Process Dynamics
? ?
• A way of thought or action of some prevalence or permanence, embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people (Hamilton 1932)
• Conventions, rules of action, embedded in social structure, locally specific (Krätke 1999)• Settled habits of thought common to the generality of men (Veblen 1919)• Collective action exercised by different types of organization (family, corporation, trade
union, state in control of individual action (Commons 1924)• Convenient term for the more important among the widely prevalent, highly standardized
social habits (Mitchell 1950)• Sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct defining social practices (Young 1994)• Formal organizations, patterns of behaviour, negative norms and constraints (Coriat and
Dosi 1998)• Mental constructs (Neale 1987)• Rules of the game (North 1990) / How the game is played (Nelson and Sampat 2001)• A set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour (Bush 1986)• Prescribed or proscribed patterns of correlated behaviour (Tool 1993)• Constitutional rule systems for society, collective choice rules governing different kinds of
organization, operational rules of organizations• Norms that regulate relations among individuals (Parsons 1990)
What are “Institutions”?
Typology of Institutions
Constitutive Regulative Associative Cognitive Behavioural
Formal / Societal
Informal / Social
Introducing Microcredit Organizations in Afghanistan
Rationale for Microcredit: High “unmet demand” for credit in
rural areas Lack of access to credit in rural areas Microcredit as a means to improve
economic and social wellbeing in rural areas
Introducing Microcredit Organizations in Afghanistan
Research Objectives: Investigate role of Microcredit in rural
communities Assess impact of Microcredit on rural
livelihoods Take stock of changes in rural socio-
economic conditions due to introduction of Microcredit
Introducing Microcredit Organizations in Afghanistan
Methodology: 32 households in 4 provinces “chit chats” Focus Group Meetings Key Informant interviews
(shopkeepers, farmers, teachers, mullahs, eldermen, widows, MFI staff)
A lot of time and sweat
Introducing Microcredit Organizations in Afghanistan
Findings (1): Significant amount used for consumption smoothing,
but also some for increased economic activity Used for weddings, funerals, medical expenses,
repaying loans from traditional sources and vice versa Borrowed for others (wives for their husbands, kin,
friends) Overly strict repayment schedules Amounts too small, lent over too short a period, to
make a difference in livelihood of borrowers
Introducing Microcredit Organizations in Afghanistan
Findings (2): Selling assets (land, livestock) to make payments Contravention of Islamic notion of credit MC is a new “product” on the highly structured and
evolved rural credit market Statistics on high uptake of MC in rural areas is
misleading because the novelty factor is not taken into account
Statistics on the high percentage (68%) of women taking MC loans is misleading because they mostly borrow for their husbands – there are some exceptions
Associative InstitutionsCognitive Institutions
Behavioural Institutions
Source: Parto and Regmi (2007)
Regulative InstitutionsAssociative InstitutionsCognitive Institutions
Behavioural Institutions
Source: Parto and Regmi (2007)
Constitutive InstitutionsRegulative InstitutionsAssociative InstitutionsCognitive Institutions
Behavioural Institutions
Source: Parto and Regmi (2007)
Some institutions are slow to catch up with and adjust to new knowledge (learning)
The question is seldom whether to intervene, but how to do so effectively and with the least negative impact
Work through, or with, current institutions Catalyze complementary institutionalization
processes
To Summarize….
The core responsibility of those who deal in public policy – elected officials, administrators, policy analysts, [and academics] – is not simply to discover as objectively as possible what people want for themselves and then to determine and implement the best means of satisfying these wants. It is also to provide the public with alternative visions of what is desirable and possible, to stimulate deliberation about them, provoke a reexamination of premises and values, and thus to broaden the range of potential responses and deepen society's understanding of itself.
Robert Reich, The Power of Public Ideas (1988)
“Good” Development Policymaking?
Physical / Material Conditions
Attributes of Community
Policy Decisions
Institutions:
BehaviouralCognitive
AssociativeRegulativeConstitutive
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Problem(s)
Policy Process Dynamics
Practical application (JV)
Institutional mapping of 3 Nuffic NPT CD Cases (Vietnam, Yemen, Uganda) to identifyconstructive and ‘undesirable’ institutions
Institutions: within the Southern organization between Dutch and Southern organization
Behavioral institutions
Human interaction is structured by standardized (recognizable), habits social norms, routines, ways of doing things. Examples in NPT projects: Routines and norms in education and research Attitude towards authority Ways of doing things in management Initiative taking, proactive/reactive Habit to work from a structured approach written
down in plans, logframes, schedules, reports
Cognitive institutions
Mental models and scripts how the world aroundperceived understood and interpreted by constructs,definitions and also wishful thinking. Examples in NPTprojects: A CD project is a bag of money Everything from abroad is ‘best’ or ‘no-good’ Everything new and innovative is ‘best’ or ‘no-good’ Emerging problems are to be solved by directors Interpretation and ambition of education and research
position Values: education = good and invest a lot in education
Associative institutions
Group identification rules: culture, attitude, mentalitywithin organizations networks, classes, associations).Examples in NPT projects: Culture and attitudes within education research
teams, project team Resistance-to-change mentality by groups opposed to
change New formal/informal teams emerge setting new
organizational culture Formally or informally organized external networks
Regulative institutions
Formal policies, regulations of government and organizations). Examples in NPT projects: National policies and regulations Nuffic rules and regulations NPT project also help to develop new national
policies
Constitutive institutions
Constitutions, contracts, agreements and property rights structures. Examples in NPT projects: The project contract and its negotiation Internal contracts and arrangements Agreements with third parties (auditor, co-funding,
consultancy).
Concluding remarks
So what’s new? ….. sounds like old wine in new bottles
It is about the new bottles; Institutions should be addressed explicitly, better explain process
Mapping institutional context helps to plan and anticipate change
No tool boxes or cooking book; only analytical framework.
Institutions matter!