2015 NDI 6WS Biometrics Aff AddendumBiometrics Addendum1AC Cards/ImpactsUniqueness -- Biometrics Increasing

Biometrics attempt to enforce the normalization of bodily identities Clarkson 14 [Nicholas L. Clarkson (PhD candidate in Gender Studies @ Indiana University), Biometrics, Duke University Press, TSQ Volume 1, Numbers 12, May 2014, http://tsq.dukejournals.org/content/1/1-2/35.full]The events of September 11, 2001, offered a rationale for expanding and legitimizing surveillance practices already in use or under development in the United States. Biometricstechnologies that measure the body, often with the intent of identifying individuals1featured significantly in that expansion. While full-body scanners at airport security checkpoints have been the most prominent face of this expansion for many US residents, other biometric technologies, such as fingerprint scans, iris and retinal scans, facial and hand geometry analyzers, and gait signature analysis, among others, also feature in security discussions and practices. Proponents of these technologies often argue that objective computer analyses provide better security than human agents while avoiding the liability of racial profiling. However, cultural critics of biometrics have argued that these machines are infrastructurally encoded with assumptions about race, gender, and ability and thereby continue to enforce bodily norms consistent with profiling practices (Pugliese 2007, 2010). The analog antecedents of contemporary digitized biometrics highlight the legacy of biometrics as techniques of subjugation.2 For example, British colonists used fingerprinting to distinguish Indian subjects, whom British officers could not otherwise tell apart (Pugliese 2007: 120). Furthermore, practices of measuring the body arose from the racist science of anthropometry, a branch of physical anthropology that sought to determine intelligence, for example, through a system of cranial measurements. These cranial measurements were used to support arguments that white men were more intelligent and civilized than women and the other races (Pugliese 2007; Amoore and Hall 2009; Magnet 2011). Though anthropometry is widely discredited, biometrics researchers continue to cite anthropometric methods (Magnet 2011: 39). Sir Francis Galton's use of the term biometry additionally highlights the connection between anthropometry and contemporary biometrics. In 1910, Galton used this term to describe the process of collecting measurements in service of anthropometric hypotheses.3 Though practices of measuring the body have a long history, the contemporary meaning of biometrics appeared in the early 1980s. The Oxford English Dictionary's first noted use of the term appeared in American Banker in 1981, in which authors hoped that biometrics would prove useful for unspecified banking operations.4 This is consistent with Kelly Gates's (2011) claim that biometric surveillance systems proliferated in tandem with neoliberal reforms before their exponential expansion under the rubric of homeland security. In the midst of the continuing proliferation of biometric technologies, transgender theory and trans bodies provide a unique vantage point from which to critique such developments. In particular, when trans bodies confound body scanners and individuals with dark skin tones reveal the racialized calibrations of facial geometry analysis, we are reminded that gender and race remain central to contemporary identity projects in spite of claims to the contrary by the biometrics industry.5 Gates argues that biometric systems respond to the need to bind identities to bodies while our identity information supposedly circulates untethered through computer networks. Because our vocabularies of gender and race have such limited ability to provide useful information about an individual, one might think that attempts to secure identities to bodies would be minimally invested in gender or race. Nevertheless, manufacturers persistently encode normative assumptions about gender and race into biometric systems even as they claim to produce objective technologies. Beyond the utility of trans bodies for highlighting the gendered and raced assumptions of biometrics, it is also crucial for the lives of transpeople that we continue to investigate and theorize these developments. As Dean Spade emphasizes in Normal Life (2011), the most vulnerable transpeople are the ones most exposed to mechanisms of surveillance. Biometrics are not only deployed to protect expensive, privatized resources (such as banking assets); these techniques are frequently imposed upon the most vulnerable populations in the most coercive relationships. This includes mandated fingerprint scanning for welfare recipients, retinal and fingerprint scanning for prisoners, and fingerprint scanning for migrants to the United States through the Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT program (Magnet 2011; Department of Homeland Security 2013). For trans theory, then, biometrics are a focal point for examining the biopolitical nexus of gendered, raced, and sexualized concerns. Exploring the connections between our experiences of biometrics and those of other, similarly targeted groups reveals the bodily norms encoded into and enforced by these technologies.

Biometrics -- Violent

Abstraction from experience renders the body open to interpretation and discrimination.Haggerty & Ericson 2K [Kevin D. Haggerty (Professor of Criminology & Sociology @ University of Alberta), & Richard V. Ericson (Professor of Criminology and Sociology @ University of Toronto), The surveillant assemblage, British Journal of Sociology Vol. No. 51 Issue No. 4 (December 2000) pp. 605622, http://bigo.zgeist.org/students/readings/IPS2011/8/Haggerty%20ericson%202000.pdf]A great deal of surveillance is directed toward the human body. The observed body is of a distinctively hybrid composition. First it is broken down by being abstracted from its territorial setting. It is then reassembled in different settings through a series of data flows. The result is a decorporealized body, a data double of pure virtuality. The monitored body is increasingly a cyborg; a flesh-technology-information amalgam (Haraway 1991). Surveillance now involves an interface of technology and corporeality and is comprised of those surfaces of contact or interfaces between organic and non-organic orders, between life forms and webs of information, or between organs/body parts and entry/projection systems (e.g., keyboards, screens) (Bogard 1996: 33). These hybrids can involve something as direct as tagging the human body so that its movements through space can be recorded, to the more refined reconstruction of a persons habits, preferences, and lifestyle from the trails of information which have become the detritus of contemporary life. The surveillant assemblage is a visualizing device that brings into the visual register a host of heretofore opaque flows of auditory, scent, chemical, visual, ultraviolet and informational stimuli. Much of the visualization pertains to the human body, and exists beyond our normal range of perception. Rousseau opens The Social Contract with his famous proclamation that Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. To be more in keeping with the human/machine realities of the twenty-first century, his sentiment would better read: Humans are born free, and are immediately electronically monitored. If such a slogan seems unduly despairing, one might consider the new electronic ankle bracelet for infants, trademarked HUGS, which is being marketed to hospitals as a fully supervised and tamper-resistant protection system that automatically activates once secured around an infants ankle or wrist. Staff [are] immediately alerted at a computer console of the newly activated tag, and can enter pertinent information such as names and medical conditions. Password authorization is needed to move infants out of the designated protection area and if an infant is not readmitted within a predetermined time limit an alarm will sound. An alarm also sounds if an infant with a Hugs tag is brought near an open door at the perimeter of the protected area without a password being entered. The display console will then show the identification of the infant and the exit door on a facility map. Alternatively, doors may also be fitted with magnetic locks that are automatically activated. As well, Hugs can be configured to monitor the progress and direction of the abduction within the hospital. Weighing just 1/3 of an ounce, each ergonomically designed infant tag offers a number of other innovative features, including low-battery warning, the ability to easily interface with other devices such as CCTV cameras and paging systems and time and date stamping. (Canadian Security 1998) Professor Kevin Warwick of Reading University is the self-proclaimed first cyborg, having implanted a silicon chip transponder in his forearm (Bevan 1999). The surveillance potential of this technology has been rapidly embraced to monitor pets. A microchip in a pets skin can be read with an electronic device which connects a unique identifying number on the microchip to details of the pets history, ownership and medical record. Warwick has proposed that implanted microchips could be used to scrutinize the movement of employees, and to monitor money transfers, medical records and passport details. He also suggests that anyone who wanted access to a gun could do so only if they had one of these implants . . . Then if they actually try and enter a school or building that doesnt want them in there, the school computer would sound alarms and warn people inside or even prevent them having access. (Associated Press 1998) These examples indicate that the surveillant assemblage relies on machines to make and record discrete observations. As such, it can be contrasted with the early forms of disciplinary panopticism analysed by Foucault, which were largely accomplished by practitioners of the emergent social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On a machine/human continuum, surveillance at that time leaned more toward human observation. Today, surveillance is more in keeping with the technological future hinted at by Orwell, but augmented by technologies he could not have even had nightmares about. The surveillant assemblage does not approach the body in the first instance as a single entity to be molded, punished, or controlled. First it must be known, and to do so it is broken down into a series of discrete signifying flows. Surveillance commences with the creation of a space of comparison and the introduction of breaks in the flows that emanate from, or circulate within, the human body. For example, drug testing striates flows of chemicals, photography captures flows of reflected lightwaves, and lie detectors align and compare assorted flows of respiration, pulse and electricity. The body is itself, then, an assemblage comprised of myriad component parts and processes which are broken-down for purposes of observation. Patton (1994: 158) suggests that the concept of assemblage may be regarded as no more than an abstract conception of bodies of all kinds, one which does not discriminate between animate and inanimate bodies, individual or collective bodies, biological or social bodies. It has become a commonplace among cultural theorists to acknowledge the increasing fragmentation of the human body. Such an appreciation is evidenced in Groszs (1995: 108) schematic suggestion that we need to think about the relationship between cities and bodies as collections of parts, capable of crossing the thresholds between substances to form linkages, machines, provisional and often temporary sub- or micro-groupings . . . their interrelations involve a fundamentally disunified series of systems, a series of disparate flows, energies, events, or entities, bringing together or drawing apart their more or less temporary alignments. Likewise, the surveillant assemblage standardizes the capture of flesh/information flows of the human body. It is not so much immediately concerned with the direct physical relocation of the human body (although this may be an ultimate consequence), but with transforming the body into pure information, such that it can be rendered more mobile and comparable. Such processes are put into operation from a host of scattered centres of calculation (Latour 1987) where ruptures are co-ordinated and toward which the subsequent information is directed. Such centres of calculation can include forensic laboratories, statistical institutions, police stations, financial institutions, and corporate and military headquarters. In these sites the information derived from flows of the surveillant assemblage are reassembled and scrutinized in the hope of developing strategies of governance, commerce and control. In the figure of a body assembled from the parts of different corpses, Mary Shellys Frankenstein spoke to early-modern anxieties about the potential consequences of unrestrained science and technology. Contemporary fears about the implications of mass public surveillance continue to emphasize the dark side of science. Today, however, we are witnessing the formation and coalescence of a new type of body, a form of becoming which transcends human corporeality and reduces flesh to pure information. Culled from the tentacles of the surveillant assemblage, this new body is our data double, a double which involves the multiplication of the individual, the constitution of an additional self (Poster 1990: 97). Data doubles circulate in a host of different centres of calculation and serve as markers for access to resources, services and power in ways which are often unknown to its referent. They are also increasingly the objects toward which governmental and marketing practices are directed (Turow 1997). And while such doubles ostensibly refer back to particular individuals, they transcend a purely representational idiom. Rather than being accurate or inaccurate portrayals of real individuals, they are a form of pragmatics: differentiated according to how useful they are in allowing institutions to make discriminations among populations. Hence, while the surveillant assemblage is directed toward a particular cyborg flesh/technology amalgamation, it is productive of a new type of individual, one comprised of pure information.

Impact Framing

The ableist construction of biometric technologies functions as a normalizing technique to manage and exclude disabled bodies.Saltes 13 [Natasha Saltes (PhD Candidate in Department of Sociology @ Queens University, MA in Critical Disability Studies), Abnormal Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion: Biopolitics and the Paradox of Disability Surveillance, Surveillance & Society 11(1/2): 55-73, 2013, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/abnormal/]Writing in the context of racism and sexual oppression, McWhorter (2009) hones in on the concept of abnormality and provides a compelling appropriation of Foucault. In explaining how psychiatry became a technology of abnormality (Foucault 2003, quoted in McWhorter 2009: 30), she writes: [I]t identified persons who it supposed could not be assimilated into the life of the community, and then it went to work to capture those individuals, discipline them, and thereby defend society from the threat they posed. In the process, the public became sensitized to newly recognized dangers:eccentrics, and nonconformists of all kinds. Such peopleabnormal peoplewere not only problems for those whose intimate lives they shared but were threats to the general public and rightfully subject to surveillance and constraints imposed through psychiatry and other means by or on behalf of society as a whole. (McWhorter 2009: 30-31) In the same way that psychiatry became a technology of abnormality (Foucault 2003a: 163), so too did the biomedical definition of disability in that it identified and categorized people with impairments as unhealthy, defective and incapable, rendering them social burdens and therefore a threat to the normalizing society. For people with impairments, the path to a normalizing society is one marked by a sequence of dividing practices (Foucault 1982: 777) that begins by classifying abnormal bodies through the implementation of ableist policies and practices and the demarcation of spaces as those designated for normal (able) and abnormal (impaired) bodies (Hansen and Philo 2009). Kitchin (1998) recognizes the ways in which disability is spatially produced through power relations that work to organize people with impairments. He claims that the social relations that emerge through socio-spatial processes serve to isolate and marginalize people with impairments (1998: 343). In the context of the excessive demand clause, the political tactic of managing bodies through the use of medical data to categorize desirable immigrants from undesirable immigrants in accordance with perceived excessive demand on health and social services illustrates the operation of biopolitics (Wiebe 2008, 2009). The use of this data to determine who will be granted permanent residency also illustrates how socio-spatial processes work through power relations to exclude people with impairments. According to Wiebe (2008), biopolitical agendas that regulate health in order to optimize economic prosperity inevitably construct a narrow conception of citizenship extended only to those deemed healthy and productive. Wiebe adds that surveillance derives from a fear of the unknown, which translates into the states ambition to conduct risk management practices (2008: 337). Writing on the theme of surveillance as biopower, Ceyhan (2012) echoes Wiebes sentiment, remarking that surveillance operates as a technology of biopoliticalized security (2012: 39) as a means of mitigating uncertainty. Indeed, it is the Canadian states assumptions about impairment and its inclination toward managing economic risk and uncertainty that the purpose of conducting disability surveillance at the border becomes evident. Biopolitics at the Border: Social Sorting and Ableist Biometric Technologies The pervasiveness of surveillance and its inherent discriminatory characteristic of identifying and classifying certain individuals and groups as risky have given rise to the notion of surveillance as social sorting. According to Lyon, surveillance as social sorting centres on the social and economic categories and the computer codes by which personal data is organized with a view to influencing and managing people and populations (2003: 2). It is the process of predicting and preventing risk by classifying subgroups of society deemed to pose a threat (Lyon 2003). Lyon attributes social sorting and digital discrimination to the prevalent use of networked technology (2003: 8) and the rising attention paid to the body itself as a source of surveillance data (2007: 55). The concept of social sorting and the emphasis on the body as a source of data is especially relevant in the context of disability surveillance in that the collection and documentation of information about the body reduces people with impairments to impaired bodies and further still to impaired data. The data double therefore can become disabled in much the same way as the individual insofar as it is not perceived, viewed, monitored and treated equally as non-impaired data doubles. The data double itself may include biometric details or other forms and fragments of information that allude to or signify the embodiment of impairment. The implication of this is that the abnormality of the body is extended to the digital and what serves to mark, label and stigmatize the body in the physical environment now has the ability to mark, label and stigmatize the body digitally. Referring to electronic patient records (EPR) as an example of the digitalization of the body, van der Ploeg considers the data they contain to be extended forms of unique identifiers due to the personal information they contain, including biometric data (2003: 62). The increased use of biometric identifiers in EPRs (as well as in other contexts such as immigration) are superimposing traditional forms of identifiers such as name and birth date as they are considered a more reliable representation of identity (van der Ploeg 2003). In challenging the gendered neutrality of surveillance, Monahan argues that representations of data render a disembodied and highly abstract depiction of the world by removing social context (2009: 286). Monahan contends that surveillance systems artificially abstract bodies, identities and interactions from social contexts in ways that both obscure and aggravate gender and other social inequalities (2009: 286). He considers the embodied consequences that arise from surveillance practices that operate on a level of abstraction (2009: 286). Building from Monahans argument on the socially de-contextualized collection of data and applying it to disability surveillance provides a useful means with which to contextualize the consequences of conducting disability surveillance within a biomedical perspective. A useful starting point is to consider the ways in which certain surveillance strategies such as biometric technologies separate the social from the body. Biometric technologies operate by capturing physiological markers of bodies including fingerprints, face or voice recognition, iris and handwriting authentication. The data produced by the body is then used to verify identity (Maddern and Stewart 2010). However, biometric systems do not only verify identity, but they also play a significant role in assigning identities. This is worth considering in light of the governments reliance on biometric data, which stems from the belief that biometric technology is infallible (Maddern and Stewart 2010). The use of biometric technology at the Canadian border is being touted by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012b) as a highly reliable way to reduce identity fraud. In a public notice released online announcing the scheduled implementation of biometric technologies in 2013, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012b) states that biometrics would strengthen the integrity of Canadas immigration program by helping prevent known criminals, failed refugee claimants, and those previously deported from using a different identity to obtain a visa and that biometrics will strengthen and modernize Canadas immigration processes. In lauding the collection of biometric data as part of the immigration process, the Canadian government neglects to consider how the technology might have a discriminatory impact for certain groups. Pugliese (2010) questions the infallibility of technologies that filter bodies through a racialized lens. He looks in particular at the ways in which biometric technologies fail to accurately capture the data and images of bodies that do not conform to the features of whiteness, which biometric technologies were designed to accommodate. 7 Similarly, by virtue of their ableist design, biometric technologies also filter bodies through a normalized lens. Trials have shown that biometric systems are not designed to conform to disabled people, but that disabled people are expected to be able to conform to the systems design (Maddern and Stewart 2010). The ableist way in which they collect physiological data inherently carries out the function of social sorting by classifying and categorizing those who are not able to pass easily through the system. The passage below illustrates this point: For someone in a wheelchair if you cant perfectly adapt your position it could be difficult. For blind people it certainly can be difficult because they cant seeYou dont actually have to focus, but you do have to keep a constant relationship with the camerathats why we couldnt get acceptable enrolment (in a recent trial) for a quite a large selection of people with disabilities. (respondent and biometric technology user quoted in Maddern and Stewart 2010: 247) This quote reveals the challenges that biometric technologies present for some people with impairments. The inability to navigate through biometric systems not only impedes mobility, but reduces people with impairments to deviant bodies that do not conform to preconceived standards of ontological normality. According to Haggerty and Ericson, The observed body is of a distinctively hybrid composition. First it is broken down by being abstracted from its territorial setting. It is then reassembled in different settings through a series of data flows. The result is a decorporealized body, a data double of pure virtuality. (2000: 611) For some people with impairments, their bodies are in a sense already decorporealized before they are even reassembled, due to the biometric systems inability to accept and process their varied physiological traits. Similarly, Garfinkel suggests that biometric technologies are problematic in that they do not identify people, they identify bodies (2000: 65 emphasis in original). Here we can begin to see that the surveillance gaze is similar to that of the medical gaze in that it calls abnormal bodies into question. In examining biometrics through a governmentality perspective, Epstein observes that biometric databases operationalize two types of risky bodies: guilty bodies understood as transgressors of the law and immigration violators understood as destructive bodies (Epstein 2007: 160). For people with impairments, biometric technologies seem to operationalize a third type of risky body understood as nonnormative bodies. By failing to process the data from bodies that do not conform to the systems ableist design, biometric technologies also function as a technology of abnormality (Foucault 2003a: 163). In reinforcing corporeal norms, biometric technologies operate as part of a broader biopolitical project aimed at eliminating abnormality. Biometric technologies, especially when used in combination with provisions that emphasize ontological normality such as the excessive demand clause, do not account for the social construct of disability. Consequently, it is not ableist and discriminatory social structures, systems and attitudes that are deemed flawed, but the body. The flawed body is then evaluated against normative corporeal standards used to determine citizenship often resulting in an undignified, if not outright exclusionary, immigration process.

Root Cause

Ableism is foundational to all oppressionSiebers 9 [Tobin Siebers (Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan), The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification, 10/28/9, Lecture, http://disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/lecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc]Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves groups, and not individuals, means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferioritywhat some call in-built or biological inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aestheticsnot only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. Racism disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. Sexism disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. Classism disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. Ableism disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiorityand the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppressionthe prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

Interrogation Good

The affirmatives rhizomatic characterization of bodily surveillance is key to accurate diagnoses of modern power.Ball 5 [Kirstie Ball (Professor of Organization @ The Open University Business School, PhD in Organization Studies from Aston University), Organization, Surveillance and the Body: Towards a Politics of Resistance, Organization, January 2005 vol. 12 no. 1 89-108, http://org.sagepub.com/content/12/1/89.short]Recent theorizing about surveillance practices has turned to the centrality of the body, not least in those at the workplace. Although many acknowledge Foucaults nod towards the rehabilitated body of the incarcerated subject in the panopticon and the political technologies of the body identified in The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1976), the theoretical inclination is towards Latourian and Deleuzian ideas. These approaches highlight the disparate arrays of people, technologies and organizations that become connected to make surveillance assemblages, in contrast to the static, unidirectional panopticon metaphor. Indeed, Gandy (1998) asserts that it would be a mistake to assume that surveillance in practice is as complete and totalizing as the panoptic ideal type would have us believe. Similarly, Rule (1998: 68) observes that the panopticon alone offers little help in understanding new forms of electronic surveillance, particularly if the question is whether people are subject to more or more severe forms of control. Moreover, Boyne (2000) observes that disciplinary power, with its perfection through technology, and the resultant docile, accepting, self-disciplining population are the exception rather than the norm. It is, rather, how individuals, organizations, state bodies and the media connect to these technologies that influences whose data are collected, where they go and what happens as a result. Ball (2002) begins to address this point. In a paper entitled Elements of Surveillance, she describes four elements in a surveillance domain. Representation refers to the technological element, acknowledging how surveillance technologies can re-present data that are collected at source or gathered from another technological medium. Meaning refers to the potential of new surveillance technologies to enable different interpretations of life to be made, as well as interpretations of surveillance itself. At least three common meanings are attributed to surveillance practice: surveillance as knowledge; surveillance as information; and surveillance as protection from threat. Manipulation refers to the inevitability of power relations under surveillance, not least because surveillance practices capture and create different versions of life as lived by surveilled subjects. Power relations are evident in the way in which watching institutions or groups are able to regulate the flow of information and knowledge about the surveilled domain between various parties; resistance strategies concern breaking or disrupting those flows and creating spatio-temporal gaps between watcher and watched. Finally, Ball refers to actors within a surveilled domain as intermediaries where meaning is inscribed, where technologies re-present information, where power/resistance operates, and where networks are bound together. Each party, at each level of analysis, assumes a role in a surveillance network and becomes inscribed as such through embodied compliance, the exchange of money, the inscription of text and the use of artefacts (Michael, 1996). Ball argues that intermediation is an important socio-technical process in the perpetuation of surveillance practices. Using Deleuze and Guatarris (1987) concept of the assemblage, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) also describe the convergence and spread of data-gathering systems between different social domains and at multiple levels. Their argument centres on the notion that the target of the generic surveillance assemblage is the human body, which is broken into a series of data flows to the end of feeding the information categories on which the surveillance process is based (Hier, 2003). Thus, it is not the identity or subjectivity of individuals that is of interest, but rather the data individuals can yield and the categories to which they can contribute; these are then reapplied to the body as part of the influencing and managing process to which Lyon refers. Accordingly Haggerty and Ericson argue that surveillance has a rhizomatic character: it has many and diverse instances connected to an underlying, invisible infrastructure, which concerns interconnected technologies in multiple contexts. Haggerty and Ericson (2000) pose a new challenge, which concerns how resistance is to be conceptualized. Unlike organizational conceptions of resistance, which are built around some arboreal, centralizing dominant force, Haggerty and Ericson suggest that more widespread and decentred notions are to be employed. It is no longer sufcient to resist surveillance practices by restricting or controlling one technology; one must also consider the impulse to integrate, simulate and apply disparate information categories across a range of contexts that intersect at those surfaces of contact or interfaces between organic and non-organic borders, between life forms and webs of information, or between organs/ body parts and entry/projection systems (Bogard, 1996: 33). They characterize the human body as esh made information, drawing on arguments that emphasize hybridity and cyborgism (Haraway, 1991), positioning it as a marginality, a state of in-between-ness of technologies and the local (Leigh-Starr, 1991). This is a point to which I shall return. Although Haggerty and Ericson argue that rhizomatic surveillance opens more opportunities for scrutiny of surveillance practices, they privilege the breaking of the body into ows to feed the assemblage over the reconstitution of the body with such ows (Hier, 2003), and thus the question of resistance is not sufciently addressed in their analysis. The main advantage of Haggerty and Ericsons work is that they shatter the notion underlying many of the claims made by proponents of biodata that the body is a source of truth. This enables a critique of these practices as somehow denitive, absolute or nal to be established. However, Haggerty and Ericson do not venture far enough: the degree of tension and inbetween-ness characterizing the hybrid or cyborgian subject (Haraway, 1991) is underemphasized. In a manner similar to Ball (2002), the identication of the body is more akin to Callons (1991) intermediarya hybrid entity that points back to the network of which it is part and denes roles for other actors within it (Michael, 1996). A politicization of the constitutive instability of the body is needed to augment a practical and analytical understanding of how resistance to surveillance practices might be conceptualized. In order to address this argument, a brief review of developments concerning a sociology of the body will be reviewed, and its contribution to an understanding of resistance to surveillance will be considered.

Embodiment Good

Building a politics of difference centered on embodied experiences of disability is key to overcome the abstracting limitations of the social model and destabilize ableist discourse.Loja et al 13 [Ema Loja (Researcher Fellow @ University of Leeds Center for Disability Studies, PhD in Psychology from University of Porto), Maria Emlia Costa (Professor of Psychology @ University of Porto), Bill Hughes (Professor of Sociology @ Glasgow Caledonian University) & Isabel Menezes (Associate Professor in Education @ University of Porto), Disability, embodiment and ableism: stories of resistance, Disability & Society, Volume 28, Issue 2, 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09687599.2012.705057]What counts as a legitimate body' (Shilling 1993, 145) is a question that has been at the core of disability discourse. Disabled people have struggled with a corporeal identity that is predominately defined by a medical model that reduces it to abnormality (Zitzelsberger 2005), stressing the need for correction or normalization (Edwards and Imrie 2003). The medical gaze plays a crucial role in invalidating bodies that do not conform to the norm. Impaired bodies are regarded as abnormal, deviant, inferior and even sub-human (Campbell 2008). Furthermore, the prominence of bio-medical ideas in the public discourse on disability monopolizes not only physical capital but also political, symbolic and social capital, loosely corresponding to and operationalised on different social fields' (Gottfried 1998, 459). Subjects are produced and placed within a hierarchy of bodily traits that determines the distribution of privilege, status, and power' (Garland Thomson 1997, 6). As Braidotti (1996, 136, cited in Meekosha 1998) states, some bodies matter more than others: some are, quite frankly, disposable'. Disabled bodies epitomize the latter. The social model of disability makes a clear distinction between impairment and disability. It rejects medical categories focusing on the elimination of prejudice and discrimination and defends self-determination, social integration and the civil rights of disabled people. The body is the site of physical disability (Stoer, Magalhes, and Rodrigues 2005), but a number of academics have argued that the social model of disability has excluded it from disability discourse (Morris 1991; Hughes 2000; Patterson and Hughes 2000). In fact, the social model considers the impaired body untouched, unchallenged: a taken-for-granted fixed corporeality' (Meekosha 1998, 175) and within disability studies the term body tends to be used without much sense of bodiliness as if the body were little more than flesh and bones' (Paterson and Hughes 1999, 600). However, debate about the body and impairment is re-emerging within the disability movement (for example, Shakespeare 1992; French 1993). The movement has been recovering this lost corporeal space, and as Hughes and Paterson (2006, 101) emphasize: disability is experienced in, on and through the body, just as impairment is experienced in terms of the personal and cultural narratives that help to constitute its meaning'. To bring bodies back in' (Zola 1991, 1) or to recognize how corporeal practices produce and give a body its place in everyday life' (Turner 2001, 259) are questions fundamental to the disability project. In order to validate the impaired body within disability studies, Campbell (2001, 44) has defined ableism as: a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfecct, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human'. Ableism imposes a corporeal standard, the falling away from which represents the pathway to disability (Campbell 2009), which for disabled people produces two consequences: the distancing of disabled people from each other and the emulation by disabled people of ableist norms (Campbell 2008). The body politics of Critical Disability Studies that ableism envisages offers valuable ways to theorize disability and challenge disability oppression (for example, Corker 1999; Hughes 1999). Furthermore, the politics of difference can be an important lens for destabilizing ableism because it legitimates not sameness but human variation (Jones 2006). As Taylor (1994, 51) says, the politics of difference is about recognizing the equal value of different ways of being', and moving to a tradition concerned with rights to secure positive recognition, albeit symbolically, for minority identities (Galeotti 2002). The social struggle of disabled people understood as a struggle for recognition' (Honneth 1995a, 1995b) embodies the deconstruction of ableism and the celebration of difference.

Disability is Pervasive

Constant interrogation of ableism is critical the specter of the disabled body permeates our cultural imaginary and foundationally informs our epistemology.Snyder & Mitchell 1 [Sharon L. Snyder (assistant professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago), & David T. Mitchell (associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Ph.D. in Disability Studies Program at the University of Illinois at Chicago), Re-engaging the Body: Disability Studies and the Resistance to Embodiment, Public Culture 13(3): 367389, 2001, http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/13/3/367.full.pdf]Consequently, disability studies has formulated the problem of the medicalized body in a manner similar to that undertaken earlier in body studies, taking up medical institutions (and the ancillary administering of diagnosis, sequestration, and case study) as the primary locus of its critique. The pathologization of human differences is theorized as an imposition on the bodya regulatory effort to standardize inherent dynamism. But while body studies provided a foundation for a more general model of critique around the categories of illness, health, pathology, and even bioethics, disability studies moves beneath these terms to encounter disability directly in the experiences of human populations which were merely referenced euphemistically by those more general terms. Disability studies narrows the focus of its investigation to the social implications for bodies deemed excessively aberrant. In doing so, scholars have expanded the domain of cultural understandings about disability beyond the walls of its scientific management. For disability studies, the disabled body is neither a matter of individual malfunctionas cast by medicinenor an effect of the abstraction of the body within the health professions. Instead, disability translates into a common denominator of cultural fascination (if not downright obsession)one that infiltrates thinking across discursive registers as a shared reference point in deciding matters of human value and communal belonging. In this emergent field, the able body is no longer characterized as merely a false quantitative ideal, as it had been in body studies, but rather as an aesthetic product of cultural forces that oppress those categorized as disabled. This subtle shift in emphasis allows humanities scholars in disability studies to extend the discussion of bodily deviance from the context of rehabilitative institutions to that of wider ranging cultural locations. For instance, Lennard J. Davis (1995) analyzes the role of institutions for the Deaf in the historical development of disability activism and community in eighteenth-century Europe. Martin Pernick (1996) analyzes the influential role of public health films in the promotion of eugenics in Chicago prior to World War II. Through readings of nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S. literary texts and cultural spectacles such as the freak show, Rosemarie Garland Thomson (1997) argues that disabled peoples bodies have been represented as unassimilable within a normalizing biological ideology that marks the disabled body as the inferior contrast to an able-bodied, white, masculine citizenry. Paul K. Longmore (1997) assesses television genres, such as disease-of-the-week movies and telethons, to dissect mainstream representations of disability as tragedies in need of eradication or overcoming. In our own Narrative Prosthesis (Mitchell and Snyder 2000), we theorize the pervasive utility of disability to literature in Europe and the United States by discussing the longstanding artistic recourse to disability as a staple feature of characterization. Disability studies scholars have also analyzed the opportunistic use of corporeal metaphors to emblematize societal weaknesses in literary and philosophical figurations of disability. Ultimately, these analyses of the pervasive dependency upon textual and visual representations of disability in various cultural media have forced a reformulation of a theory of marginality itself within disability studies. This is one site at which disability studies diverges from the approach established by other civil rightsbased programs. While many minority movements have argued that their social devaluation occurs as a result of their marginal presence in representational media, disability studies has formulated an analysis of social depreciation targeting the perpetual recourse to images of disability in narrative and visual mediums. As a result, disability studies follows a figuration of marginality as the expression of an overheated symbolic organism that conveys potent meanings as a result of its palimpsest-like discursive history (cf. Stewart 1993). Theaters of Repression The work of disability studies scholars consolidated the argument that bodily and cognitive differences were integral to various registers of meaning-making within culture. While the earliest research in the field kept returning to a denunciation of three prominent literary figuresShakespeares Richard III, Melvilles Captain Ahab, and Dickenss Tiny Timthe growing body of historical research called for wider ranging methodologies. As with later developments in race and gender studies, disability studies outgrew its denunciations of stereotypes; instead, theorists began to argue that disability represented a deep-seated, yet uninterrogated, cultural conflict. If the able body proved a utopian fiction of abstract bodily norms, disabled bodies occupied the phantasmic recesses of the cultural imaginary. The different body was more than a site for public scapegoatingcognitive and physical aberrancies acted as reminders of Others in our midst who challenged beliefs in a homogeneous bodily order. Out of these efforts to elucidate the constructed nature of disabled bodies in history, disability studies set out to diagnose the investments of an ableist society in disabilitys various incarnations. Cultural efforts to medicalize or domesticate disability effectively repressed the power of aberrancy to unmoor notions of the body as a matter of norms, averages, and deviations. Locating disabled bodies as rare examples of extraordinary deviance essentially cordoned off disability from the differences that characterize typical biological diversity. For disability studies, the impersonal was the political. Such a sequestration evidenced the mainstream desire to reduce the different bodys (or minds) ability to destabilize normative models of health.

AT: Social Model

The social model is insufficient overly abstracted from experience.Terzi 4 (Lorella Terzi, School of Educational Foundations and Policy Studies, Institute of Education, University of London. Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2004)My questioning of the definition of impairment and disability provided by the social model certainly does not aim at simply reintroducing a linear causal link between impairment and disability and in all cases. If we accept that society discriminates against impaired people, then we can also understand the claim of the disablement structure of society. What I hold, ultimately, is that there certainly is a causal relation between oppression and disability, when society plays a strong role in excluding and marginalizing impaired people. But in maintaining that disability is squarely socially caused, the social model theorists are over-socialising their position. Their model, then, as we have seen, needs clarifications and extensions [56]. More specifically, the social model overlooks the impairment effects, in terms of their restriction of activities or the possible inabilities to perform different functions. In so doing, it downplays the importance of the relational nature of impairment, disability, and society. Moreover, in asserting the total separation between impairment and disability, it opens up the chance of a proliferation of terms other than disabilities, to denote inability or being unable to do things, which, if politically correct, appears less justified theoretically. One example to illustrate this position is related to some forms of congenital blindness, which, for instance, prevent people from performing certain actions, such as driving a car. This form of impairment, which can be considered a clear inability and a disability if referred to driving (at present society is structured to have sighted drivers only), is certainly not a cause of inability or disability in many other possible activities, like enjoying music or cooking or acting as a state minister. It is now clearer, therefore, why some disabled scholars have voiced the need to reconsider impairment, and why medical sociologists have pointed to the relational aspect of some impairment with illness and disability. These considerations highlight the need for a different framework, providing a more coherent basis for the understanding of impairment, disability, society and their reciprocal implications. I suggest that a philosophical perspective based on Amartya Sens capability approach could take these issues in fruitful directions. The discussion of the latter, however, is well beyond the aim of this article. A final critical point, on the relation between impairment, disability and society, concerns moral and social responsibility. In maintaining that disability is socially caused, the social model of disability attributes the responsibility of disablement completely to society. In his development of a social understanding of impairment, Abberley argues that impairment is socially caused; therefore asserting that society is responsible also for the impairment it produces. However, in light of the previous critical points and although the issue of responsibility is very complex, a few considerations emerge. First, if society causes discrimination, either politically or economically, and, therefore, restriction of activity or participation, then society is responsible for the disablement in an unacceptable way. The same applies when society causes impairment, as a con- sequence of war, for instance. But there are circumstances when impairment and its effects do not stem from social causes and many of the examples above have illustrated this claim. There are, consequently, different considerations related to responsibility with respect to impairment. How could a congenital impairment unrelated to any endemic condition be considered societys responsibility? Moreover, even if one fully endorsed the social model position, it would be quite problematical how society could be held responsible in the case of disablement connected to the activity of driving by a person visually impaired owing to congenital blindness. Finally, there are impairments that are a consequence of a persons agency, in other words of her particular actions or activities, some of which can well be highly risky activities, voluntarily undertaken. When impairment arises from a hang-gliding accident, to mention an extreme case, considerations of societys responsibility are difficult to sustain. In that case, in fact, when the sport has been voluntarily chosen with full awareness of its potential risks, when all that could have been done to prevent the accident has been done and when rescue has been provided, where should societys responsibility be placed? Here again, the social model of disability shows the element of over-socialisation and improper generalisation seen in the causal link established between society and disability, thus reconfirming the internal limitations highlighted so far.

Framework CardsT-Consent

Biometrics is TAbernathy et al 13 (William, S-American professor at the Harvard University Business School, 9-14-2003, "Biometrics: Who's Watching You?," Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/wp/biometrics-whos-watching-you) Among the many reactions to the September 11 tragedy has been a renewed attention to biometrics. The federal government has led the way with its new concern about border control. Other proposals include the use of biometrics with ID cards and in airports, e.g. video surveillance enhanced by facial-recognition technology. The purpose of this document is to sketch out EFF's concerns about biometrics. In today's public arena, biometric technologies are being marketed as a "silver bullet" for terrorism; however, very little independent, objective scientific testing of biometrics has been done. Deploying biometric systems without sufficient attention to their dangers makes them likely to be used in a way dangerous to civil liberties. This document is very much a work in progress and we welcome comments. Biometrics refers to the automatic identification or identity verification of living persons using their enduring physical or behavioral characteristics. Many body parts, personal characteristics and imaging methods have been suggested and used for biometric systems: fingers, hands, feet, faces, eyes, ears, teeth, veins, voices, signatures, typing styles, gaits and odors. Biometric technology is inherently individuating and interfaces easily to database technology, making privacy violations easier and more damaging. If we are to deploy such systems, privacy must be designed into them from the beginning, as it is hard to retrofit complex systems for privacy. Biometric systems are useless without a well-considered threat model. Before deploying any such system on the national stage, we must have a realistic threat model, specifying the categories of people such systems are supposed to target, and the threat they pose in light of their abilities, resources, motivations and goals. Any such system will also need to map out clearly in advance how the system is to work, in both in its successes and in its failures. Despite these concerns, political pressure for increasing use of biometrics appears to be informed and driven more by marketing from the biometrics industry than by scientists. Much federal attention is devoted to deploying biometrics for border security. This is an easy sell, because immigrants and foreigners are, politically speaking, easy targets. But once a system is created, new uses are usually found for it, and those uses will not likely stop at the border. With biometric ID systems, as with national ID systems, we must be wary of getting the worst of both worlds: a system that enables greater social surveillance of the population in general, but does not provide increased protection against terrorists. Sec. 403(c) of the USA-PATRIOT Act specifically requires the federal government to "develop and certify a technology standard that can be used to verify the identity of persons" applying for or seeking entry into the United States on a U.S. visa "for the purposes of conducting background checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa under a different name." The recently enacted Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Sec. 303(b)(1), requires that only "machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers" shall be issued to aliens by October 26, 2004. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department currently are evaluating biometrics for use in U.S. border control pursuant to EBSVERA. The chronic, longitudinal capture of biometric data is useful for surveillance purposes. Our Surveillance Monitor page highlights some of these issues. Biometric systems entail repeat surveillance, requiring an initial capture and then later captures. Another major issue relates to the "voluntariness" of capture. Some biometrics, like faces, voices, and fingerprints, are easily "grabbed." Other biometrics, at least under present technology, must be consciously "given." It is difficult, for instance, to capture a scan of a person's retina or to gather a hand geometry image without the subject's cooperation. Easily grabbed biometrics are a problem because people can't control when they're being put into the system or when they're being tracked. But even hard-to-grab biometrics involve a trust issue in the biometric capture device and the overall system architecture. To be effective, a biometric system must compare captured biometric data to a biometric database. Our National ID System page highlights issues surrounding database abuse, which has both static and dynamic dimensions. The static issues surrounding databases are mainly about safeguarding large and valuable collections of personally identifying information. If these databases are part of an important security system, then they (and the channels used to share PII) are natural targets for attack, theft, compromise, and malicious or fraudulent use. The dynamic issues surrounding databases mainly concern the need to maintain reliable, up-to-date information. Databases that seek to maintain accurate residence information must be updated whenever one moves. Databases that are used to establish eligibility for benefits must be updated so as to exclude persons no longer eligible. The broader the function of the system, the more and broader the updating that is required, increasing the role of general social surveillance in the system. By far the most significant negative aspect of biometric ID systems is their potential to locate and track people physically. While many surveillance systems seek to locate and track, biometric systems present the greatest danger precisely because they promise extremely high accuracy. Whether a specific biometric system actually poses a risk of such tracking depends on how it is designed. Why should we care about perfect tracking? EFF believes that perfect tracking is inimical to a free society. A society in which everyone's actions are tracked is not, in principle, free. It may be a livable society, but would not be our society. EFF believes that perfect surveillance, even without any deliberate abuse, would have an extraordinary chilling effect on artistic and scientific inventiveness and on political expression. This concern underlies constitutional protection for anonymity, both as an aspect of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, and as an aspect of Fourth Amendment privacy. Implemented improperly, biometric systems could: increase the visibility of individual behavior. This makes it easier for measures to be taken against individuals by agents of the government, by corporations, and by our peers. result in politically damaging and personally embarrassing disclosures, blackmail and extortion. This hurts democracy, because it reduces the willingness of competent people to participate in public life. All biometric technology systems have certain aspects in common. All are dependent upon an accurate reference or "registration" sample. If a biometric system is to identify a person, it first must have this sample, positively linked to the subject, to compare against. Modern biometric identification systems, based on digital technology, analyze personal physical attributes at the time of registration and distill them into a series of numbers. Once this reference sample is in the system, future attempts to identify a person are based on a comparison of a "live" sample and the reference sample or samples.

Counter-interpretation Surveillance is the collection of personal informationFernback 13 (Jan, 1/11/15, Culture Digitally, In Context: Digital Surveillance, Ethics, and Prism, http://culturedigitally.org/2013/06/in-context-digital-surveillance-ethics-and-prism/, 7/3/15, WG*)Nissenbaum advocates understanding privacy neither as a right to secrecy nor as a right to control but as a right to appropriate flow of personal information [p. 127]. I am interested in examining the notion of appropriate flow as it regards information gleaned from surveillance. Clearly, information assembled from Google searches, disassociated from the user, and then bundled with millions of other data subjects to be sold for predictive data modeling differs contextually from RFID chips implanted into a data subjects body.

Definitions

Resolved means to reduce by analysis (Merriam Webster Dictionary 2010)

Surveillance Is the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of data. Farlex Partner Medical Dictionary 12 ("surveillance."Farlex Partner Medical Dictionary. 2012. Farlex 25 Jun. 2015,http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/surveillance)Thecollection,collation,analysis,anddisseminationofdata

Surveillance isnt static and can manifest itself in any relationship.Shawki 9 (Sharif, Professor @ Illinois Western University "Surveillance and Foucault: Examining the Validity of Foucault's Notions Concerning Surveillance through a Study of the United States and the United Kingdom" (2009). Honors Projects. Paper 23. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/socanth_honproj/23)Before the application sections commence, Foucault's definition of surveillance will be given to provide a clear picture as to what the term encompasses. First of all, the French word that Foucault utilizes is surveiller. As the translator to Discipline and Punish notes, there is no proper English equivalent The English correspondent of surveiller, "surveillance," is too restricted and too technical.86 Thus, Foucault defines surveillance as a potentially aggressive action. It is clearly not neutral and can be used by one side to subjugate another. There are always motives behind surveillance and these motives are usually self-serving. Foucault defines surveillance as a watch kept over a person or a group. But one must realize that this simple definition contains several components. Foucault considers surveillance in both a personal and complex manner. Surveillance can take place between two people such as neighbors. This type of surveillance is very simple and usually involves insignificant issues. At the same time, surveillance can involve many people as well as institutions. Thus, commanders can surveille many soldiers because these commanders have been given the authority to do so. Therefore, surveillance is not considered as one static entity. This is a benefit because Foucault allows himself to consider personal self-surveillance as well as institutional surveillance.

Surveillance is a form of disciplinary power. Fuchs 10 (Christian, Department of Informatics and Media Studies, Uppsala University, The Internet & Surveillance - Research Paper Series, October 1, 2010, http://www.sns3.uti.at/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-Internet-Surveillance-Research-Paper-Series-1-Christian-Fuchs-How-Surveillance-Can-Be-Defined.pdf)For Foucault, surveillance is an instrument of disciplinary power. He has stressed that the term power designates relationships (Foucault 1994, 337), it brings into play relations between individuals (337). Surveillance is a social relationship between humans that involves disciplinary power and makes use of instruments for producing knowledge about these humans in order to coerce and dominate the. To reduce surveillance to the level of surveillance technologies not only robs it of its social dimension, it is a form of techno-deterministic reductionism and fetishism that reifies surveillance and thereby destroys the concepts critical potential.

AT: Policymaking

Policymaking BadMakau 96 (Josina., Ph.D. in Rhetoric at the University of California-Berkeley, Responsible Communication, Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils)Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction . Like the Nazi doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery of life to abstraction." Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned that people are not abstractions. Weisel urges educators to learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges, of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures, its own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful suasory skills but little understanding , students participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would have difficulty grasping or appreciating Christian's framework for an ethic of technology an approach that requires above all, openness, trust and care. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats. Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues. Trained to view problems in black and white terms and conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness. As Benhabib noted, 'Moral blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipaled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or her.' These traditional debaters, deprived of true dialogic encounter , fail to develop 'the capacity to represent' to themselves the 'multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging student to embrace the will to control and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situatedness,' the traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact, that the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the world's human made perils. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional argumentation of debate.

AT: Cede Political

Politics has already been ceded by the elites. Rancire14 (Jaques, The Hatred of Democracy , pg 72-74 , Jaques Rancire is a Professor of Philosophy at European Graduate School in Saas-Fee and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris) We can now return to the initial terms of our problem: we live in societies and States known as 'democracies', a term by which they are distinguished from societies governed by States without law or with religious law. How are we to understand that, at the heart of these 'democracies', a dominant intelli-gentsia, whose situation is not obviously desperate and who hardly aspire to live under different laws, day in day out blame all of humanity's misfortunes on a single evil they call democracy? Let's take things in order. What is meant when it is said that we live in democracies? Strictly speaking, democracy is not a form of State. It is always beneath and beyond these forms. Beneath, insofar as it is the necessarily egalitarian, and ne-cessarily forgotten, foundation of the oligarchic state. Beyond, insofar as it is the public activity that counteracts the tendency of every State to monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere. Every State is oligarchic. One of the theoreticians of the opposition between democracy and totalitarianism quite happily acknowledges it: 'It is impossible to conceive of a regime which in one sense is not oligarchic."7 But oligarchy can give democracy more or less room; it is encroached upon by democratic activity to a greater or lesser extent. In this precise sense, the constitutional forms and practices of oligarchic governments can be said to be more or less democratic. Usually the mere existence of a representative system is re-garded as the crucial criterion for defining democracy. But this system itself is an unstable compromise, the result of opposing forces. It tends toward democracy only to the extent that it moves nearer to the power of anyone and everyone. With this in mind, we can specify the rules that lay down the minimal conditions under which a representative system can be declared democratic: short and non-renewable electoral mandates that cannot be held concurrently; a monopoly of people's representatives over the formulation of laws; a ban on State functionaries becoming the representatives of the people; a bare minimum of campaigns and campaign costs; and the monitoring of possible interference by economic powers in the electoral process. Such rules have nothing extravagant about them and in the past many thinkers and legislators, hardly moved by a rash love of the people, have carefully considered them as potential means to maintain a balance of powers, to dissociate the representation of the general will from that of particular interests, and to avoid what they considered as the worst of governments: the governments of those who love power and are skilled at seizing it. All one has to do today to provoke hilarity is list them. With good reason for what we call democracy is a statist and governmental functioning that is exactly the contrary: eternally elected members holding coministerial functions and whose essential link to the people is that of the representation of regional interests; governments which make laws themselves; representatives of the people that largely come from one administrative schoo1;48 ministers or their collaborators who are also given posts in public or semipublic companies; fraudulent financing of parties through public works contracts; businesspeople who invest colossal sums in trying to win electoral mandates; owners of private media empires that use their public functions to monopolize the empire of the public media. In a word: the monopolizing of la chose publique by a solid alliance of State oligarchy and economic oligarchy. We see why those who despise 'democratic individualism' do not reproach this system of predation of the public interest and public goods for anything. In fact, these forms of over-consumption of public functions do not come within the province of democracy. The evils of which .our 'democracies' suffer are primarily evils related to the insatiable appetite of oligarchs.

AT: Predictability

Everything is chaosDer Derian 98 [James, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, in On Security ed. Ronnie Lipschutz. http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbess and Marxs interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical other of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien otherswho are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsches idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results.34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsches view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and effective force of becoming, from which values and meanings including self-preservation are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages.35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war.36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isnt our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The why? shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of causea cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanationthat which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostilityrecycling the desire for security. The influence of timidity, as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the necessities of security: they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences.39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. Trust, the good, and other common values come to rely upon an artificial strength: the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god.40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes.41 Nietzsches interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to ones ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe existsand that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.42 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for the ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god. 43 As the ancestors debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an artificial strength: the feeling one lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the man without peace, is exposed since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the love of the neighbor quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: My rights are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsches critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation.46 Nietzsches worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsches lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsches lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of new philosophers (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals, he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their rhathymia a term that incorporates the notion of indifference to and contempt for security.48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsches message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

AT: SSD

Only affirmation empowers resistance every instance is key it multiplies solvencyJohnson 97 (James, Rochester, Political Theory 25(4), JSTOR)Resistance trades upon a number of affirmative possibilities. Foucault locates these possibilities within a quite specific understanding of the rela- tions that obtain between intellectuals and political movements.27 As he explains: If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a newform of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty. (Foucault 1980, 108; emphasis added) The essential political problem for the intellectual is ... that of ascertaining the possibil- ity of constituting a new politics of truth. (Foucault 1980, 133; emphasis added) Political analysis and criticism have in large measure still to be invented-so too have the strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed in reality. That is to say, the problem is ... to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicization. (Foucault 1980, 190; emphasis added)

AT: Roleplaying

They vacate individual agency to politics proper, weakening politics and overdefining the value in lifeInfluxus 7 (Major contributor, Foucault blog, http://foucaultblog.wordpress.com/2007/05/13/dividing-the-individual/)When you say that the individual is not un-political are you agreeing with Craigs point that liberal political theory, cannot recognise the political, because it vacates all dividing practices from the domain of politics proper? Taking the individual as object, as base unit, is precisely not the disciplinary pole of anatomo-politics. Disciplinary power, as Foucault articulates it in HoSv1, is about dividing and sharing the body through a series of drives, impulses etc. The relationship between liberal political theories, that take the individual as base point, and a management of the body, that divides the anatomy into a series of potentials, should be antagonistic to say the least. Which might be why disciplinary techniques often come as challenges to liberal rights to privacy and bodily integrity. The standard move of declaring someone pathological or deviant, in serious need of help, is to exclude them from the liberal body, from being a candidate for ordinary ethical relations between citizens. In other words if politics is taken to appropriately be concerned with the individual person, then it can only be a form of biopolitics. It is a way of organising the mass-population as though it were a collection of atomic particles. As you point out through Hacking the person is an entity that is generated and categorised through many forms of auto-management. However, if politics takes the relevant aspects of personhood to be attributes that all persons (supposedly) share-alike, such as reason, autonomy and universal rights then the only division that matters is the original division of the population into individual persons. Hence, once liberal political theory is taken up, all relevant decisions of division are already made for it.

AT: Dialogue

Dialogueisintersubjective Kent et al 2 (Michael L. Kent, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Strategic Communication, Maureen Taylor, Ph.D., is Gaylord Family Chair of Strategic Communication, Sheila M. McAllister-Spooner, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Communication, Monmouth University, Research in dialogic theory and public relations)Since dialogue is intersubjective, it necessitates interpretation and understanding by all parties involved. Dialogue necessitates that all participants are willing to exert themselves on the part of others in a dialogue to understand often- diverse positions. Commitment to interpretation also means that efforts are made to grasp the positions, beliefs, and values of others before their positions can be equitably evaluated (Gadamer, 1994; Ellul, 1985; Makay & Brown, 1972).

AT: Agonism

A politics of agonism presupposes an essentialist categorization of antagonism versus agonism which systematically brackets out ideological challengesOksala 12 (Johanna, Academy of Finland Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki, 2012 Foucault, Politics, and Violence p. 63-66) It is my contention that we do not have to accept Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy to argue that democracy necessarily implies exclusion, Ma moment of closure." As Mouffe effectively argues through a post-structuralist framework, like- any other regime, modern pluralist democracy constitutes a system of relations of power. Consensus in a liberal-democratic society isand always will bethe expression of hegemony and the crystallizatio