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2014 NDI 6WS – Fitzmier, Lundberg, Abelkop

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2014 NDI 6WS – Fitzmier, Lundberg, Abelkop

STATES COUNTERPLAN

***Solvency – States ***

GenericStates can coordinate over ocean policy – they’ve been doing it for 40 yearsCSO 14 (Coastal State Organization, an organization that represents and coordinates the interests of the coastal governors and their states, “FY 2015 Coastal Zone Management Program,” Coastal State Organization, http://www.coastalstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CSO_CZM_FY15_Appropriations_FS.pdf)National issues—Local solutions For more than 40 years, the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZM) has offered an effective mechanism for federal and state managers to address important national coastal objectives. This innovative partnership has resulted in the establishment of coastal management programs in 34 states and territories, including the Great Lakes. CZM Programs in the Iower 48 states Programs not shown include: American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, N. Mariana lsland, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands These programs have: • Reduced environmental impacts of coastal development • Resolved significant conflicts between competing coastal uses Provided critical assistance to local governments in coastal planning & resource protection The success of the CZM Program is a result of states working with communities to design coastal management programs that address specific issues and priorities affecting local areas.

States solves – they at least three miles of exclusive jurisdiction and CZMA allows states to shape federal watersOCRM ’11 (Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, “STATE JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL WATERS STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, OCEAN MANAGEMENT AND COASTAL AND MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING, April 18, 2011. http://static2.docstoccdn.com/docs/156149733/state_fed-waters-ag)HOW THE CZMA ENABLES STATES TO ADDRESS ACTIVITES IN FEDERAL WATERS THROUGH STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLANS a. Brief Summary of the CZMA: Congress enacted the CZMA in 1972 to protect, restore, and enhance natural coastal resources of the United States. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466. The CZMA authorizes NOAA-approved state coastal management programs and the state National Estuarine Research Reserve System (NERRS) (the NERRS is a network of 28 protected estuarine areas managed by the states which promote coastal stewardship, education and research). There are 34 federally approved state coastal management programs (the one remaining state, Illinois, is developing a coastal management program). State coastal management programs manage the uses and resources of a state’s coastal zone, including a state’s marine waters, energy facilities, development , public access, coastal hazard mitigation, fishing , etc . The program is voluntary and incentives are CZMA implementation funding and “federal consistency.” State coastal zones include state marine waters, bays, estuaries, rivers, etc., and state inland coastal zone boundaries vary from a few hundred feet to entire coastal counties or even the whole state. b. State CZMA Enforceable Policies: State CZMA enforceable policies are applied to federal actions that have effects on state coastal uses or resources through the CZMA federal consistency provision. An enforceable policy is a state policy that is legally binding under state law (e.g., through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions), by which a state exerts control over private and public coastal uses and resources, and that is incorporated in a state’s NOAA-approved coastal management program. See 16 U.S.C. § 1453(6a) and 15 C.F.R. § 930.11(h); see also OCRM’s Federal Consistency Overview, pages 5-7: http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/consistency/media/FC_overview_022009.pdf. OCRM has informed

states that enforceable policies are given legal effect by state law and that the CZMA does not authorize states to establish regulatory standards/enforceable policies for federal agencies or federal waters. A state policy that would establish standards for federal agencies or federal lands or waters would not meet the CZMA’s definition of “enforceable policy” (i.e., legally binding under state law). States apply their federally approved enforceable policies to federal actions in federal waters through CZMA federal consistency reviews. Enforceable policies must also contain standards of sufficient specificity to guide public and private uses. 15 C.F.R. § 930.11(h). c. The CZMA Federal Consistency Provision: The Federal consistency provision (16 U.S.C. § 1456 and NOAA’s regulations at 15 C.F.R. part 930) requires that federal actions that have reasonably foreseeable effects on any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone (also referred to as coastal uses or resources, or coastal effects) be consistent with the enforceable policies of a state’s federally approved coastal management program. Federal consistency provides states with an important tool to manage coastal uses and resources and to facilitate cooperation and coordination with Federal agencies . Under the CZMA Federal agency activities that have coastal effects must be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of a state’s federally approved coastal management program. In addition, the statute requires non-federal applicants for federal authorizations and funding to be consistent with enforceable policies of state coastal management programs. There are four types of federal actions under

the CZMA: 1. Federal agency activities — activities and development projects performed by a Federal agency, or a contractor for the benefit of a Federal agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) – (2) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart C. 2. Federal license or permit activities — activities performed by a non-Federal entity requiring federal permits, licenses or other form of federal authorization. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart D. 3. OCS plans — Department of the Interior/Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement approvals for OCS plans, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart E. 4. Federal assistance to state and local governments. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart F.

AquacultureStates solve aquaculture – they have jurisdictionBuck 12 (Lisa E, internally citing David Fluharty, Associate Professor [WOT] at the School of Marine and Environmental Affairs at University of Washington, Beth Bryant, chair professor at the School of marine and Environmental Affairs at U of W, Thomas Leschine, professor at same place, “U.S. Development of Offshore Aquaculture: Regulatory, Economic, and Political Factors,” student thesis for School of Marine and Environmental Affairs, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/21752/Buck_washington_0250O_10741.pdf.txt?sequence=2)While this project focused on federal regulation, many interviewees stressed the importance of state governments in the development of offshore aquaculture. At the state level, government attitudes toward the development of offshore aquaculture tend to reflect the priorities of the state?s elected officials and their constituencies, and will be reflected in the state?s CZM Plan. These priorities reflect in turn the economic, social and political situation of the state.

States can develop their own aquaculture policies , which may outline specific goals and objectives unique to the priorities of their residents. As regulations currently stand, it is wise for any action taken by a party interested in developing an offshore aquaculture project to not only be consistent with federal laws and regulations, but also with the policy of the state whose coast they will be developing. As is discussed in Section 5.1.3 of this thesis, states can invoke the Federal Consistency clause of the CZMA and appeal any federally permitted action that will have an impact on their state?s coastal zone. In this way, the coastal states of the United States have a distinct political stake in the development of a domestic offshore aquaculture industry.

ConservationCongress should establish a national ocean management regime – allows state offshore management and avoids the link to politics Fitzgerald 02 [Edward A., Professor at Wright State University, Ph.D. from Boston University, M.A. from Northeastern University, J.D. from Boston College Law School, and B.A. from Holy Cross College, “THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FLORIDA’S EXPERIENCE WITH OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT,” Florida State University Law Review, Fall 2002, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/vol18_1/fitzgerald.pdf, 07/14/14]Florida, like the other coastal states in the Seaweed Rebellion,¶ was not successful in its litigation. The courts narrowly interpreted¶ the statutes and deferred to the Secretary of the Interior's decisions,¶ which were contrary to the coastal states’ concerns. Florida, like the¶ other coastal states, was more successful in Congress preventing energy development off its coast through the establishment of OCS moratoria. Much of Florida's success can be attributed to consistent bipartisan opposition by governors and the entire congressional delegation. Florida’s continued importance in presidential politics¶ also guarantees that the state’s OCS concerns will be seriously ¶

considered. Congress should take steps to strengthen the role of coastal states in the OCS process. Florida's proposal to strengthen the role¶ of state governors in the development of the five-year OCS leasing ¶

program pursuant to section 18 of the OCSLA and regarding OCS¶ lease sales pursuant to section 19 of the OCSLA should be¶ enacted .591 Coastal state decisions regarding consistency¶ determinations under the CZMA should be given greater weight.¶ Many of these changes can be accomplished by shifting the burden¶ of proof regarding state determinations.592 After a state makes a¶ decision, the burden should shift to the Secretary of the Interior or¶ Secretary of Commerce to demonstrate why the state's position is¶ incorrect . In addition, the OCS revenue sharing program should be¶ institutionalized .593 ¶ Congress should establish a national ocean management regime, which encourages state offshore management. This is¶ particularly important in light of the establishment of the 200-mile¶ Exclusive Economic Zone595 and extension of the United States¶ territorial sea to twelve miles.596 Florida has been actively engaged¶ in managing its coastal and ocean resources,597 which are important¶ components of its economy. Florida believes that OCS energy¶ development poses too great a risk. 598 The establishment of an¶

ocean management program and enactment of the suggested¶ statutory changes will help Florida protect its coast.

Deficit SpendingStates should be able to deficit spend – creates state uniformity and promotes economic growthAttewells 09 [Steve, Graduate Student with a B.A. from Columbia University and a M.A in History from UCSB, “Fifty-State Keynesianism - Part Deux,” 07/31/09, http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/fifty-state-keynesianism-part-deux, 07/14/14]Background: Why is it the case that America's state governments have become so strongly pro-cyclical? The basic reason is that all but one state in the Union (Vermont being the exception) have some form of a balanced budget or debt limitation requirement, which makes it impossible to deficit spend during recessions. Many of these requirements date back over a hundred years, following the Panic of 1837, which caused nine states to default on their "internal improvement" (i.e, transportation infrastructure) related debts in 1842, which prompted a wave of anti-debt measures. The state of New York, for example, adopted a new constitution in 1846, which required a 2/3rds vote for appropriations bills and a 3/5ths vote for any bill that would raise taxes or incur debts. Illinois' 1848 constitution required a 2/3 vote for appropriations, a balanced budget requirement, and a $50,000 cap on state debts. Similar waves of constitutional redrafting tended to follow other major recessions in which states suddenly were unable to finance their debts, such as the Panics of 1857 and 1873 (triggered by the failure of banks that had over-speculated on railroads). The question is why we allow a "hobgoblin of little minds" over a hundred and seventy years old to continue to rule over us? Why, when even a total economics amateur like myself can pick up Keynes and learn about the "paradox of thrift," do we continue to allow the political cliche that "well, families have to balance their budgets, so the government should too" to be the conventional wisdom of the stump speech? (Incidentally, given the fact that most American families are horribly in debt and are relying on their credit cards to make ends meet, this couldn't be less accurate). A 50-State Solution: One of the things that's often puzzled me about the progressive movement is our lack of willingness to use the initiative process to our advantage in both achieving policy ends and mobilizing the electorate - consider the way in which the Republican Party used anti-gay marriage propositions in 2002 and 2004 to gin up their right-wing base, change the political debate from economic issues to their wedge issues, and attack the civil rights and civil liberties of queer Americans. In 2006, we saw a little bit of this strategy on the progressive side, using minimum wage initiatives to increase working class turnout in states like Ohio, but to the best of my knowledge it hasn't become a standard part of the Democratic Party political toolkit. Hence, the first step in establishing "50-state Keynesianism" is to promote, state-by-state an " Anti-Recession Budget Reform Initiative ." (if anyone has a better name for it, I'm

open to suggestions). This initiative should amend the state constitution's balanced budget requirement to allow the state, when the economy is in recession (i.e, two quarters of negative economic growth) to run a limited deficit (two years maximum) for the purposes of funding counter-cyclical stimulus programs (limited to say, 5-10% of state GDP). We should begin our push in those areas which are deep blue states and which tend to have weaker balanced budget requirements - New England would be a good starting place, especially with Vermont as the lone non-balanced budget state sitting there as a model for how deficit spending won't destroy western civilization. The Rust Belt states that have been especially hit hard, like Michigan or Ohio, would probably be receptive to a message that it's better to spend money to create jobs than to balance a budget by throwing teachers and other state workers out of their jobs. As usual, the major prizes would be New York and California, given their size and political weight. Second, in order to build state capacity for Keynesian economic policy, we

should also push for the creation of State Reserve Banks. Here, I really have to credit Ellen Brown over at the Huffington Post for promoting this idea and bringing it to my attention. This amazingly simple yet powerful idea takes its example from, of all places, the state of North Dakota, which has operated the Bank of North Dakota since 1919. It works like this - the state charters a public bank, and instead of placing its reserves, tax revenues, deeds for public lands, and so forth in a variety of state banks (as most states do), it puts all of them in the public bank to act as the bank's capital base. (Note: as long as the bank only circulates U.S dollars, it's perfectly constitutional , avoiding the Article I, Section 10 bar against states issuing coin or bills of credit) The bank then acts like a reserve bank, using the power of "fractional reserve lending" (i.e, that a bank can generate much more money in loans than it keeps in its vaults, thus multiplying many times over its actual reserves, as long as it keeps back a portion to redeem deposits) to generate loans, act as a local "lender of last resort" (thus buttressing the work of the Federal Reserve and FDIC during credit crises), and (this is the key bit) allowing the State to borrow money in order to deficit spend in a recession without relying on the ideologically-biased bond market and the credit agencies who've taken a hammer to state bond ratings while maintaining A ratings for AIG and Lehman Brothers. The State could then use these loans (which would be much cheaper than ordinary bonds, given that its essentially paying interest to itself) to maintain public services and fund public works and other stimulus measures in a recession.

Drilling – Natural GasCongress should empower state governments to control permitting and environmental review – solves inefficiency and delay – consultation with the FERC solves tech Loris 13 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports: Lift Restrictions and Empower the States,” The Heritage Foundation, 02/11/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states, 07/14/14]Reforms Needed to Increase Access to Markets¶ The current system is too onerous to allow American LNG exports to reach the market in a timely manner. The DOE's role in permit authorization is completely unnecessary and U.S.

producers should be allowed to export LNG to any country they see fit. Further, Congress should return jurisdiction to the state governors by allocating authority to state regulators to conduct the environmental review and provide the permit to construct an LNG facility . Given the large volume of

LNG export applications, not only could this take some of the burden off FERC, it could also spawn an efficient review process that allows these projects to come online more efficiently. In that vein, Congress should:¶ Lift restrictions on LNG-recipient countries. The distinction that exports to FTA countries are in the "public interest" while others are not is on the whole an arbitrary one. There are numerous non-FTA nations with which the U.S. trades regularly. Natural gas should be no different and should be treated as any other good traded around the world.¶ Remove all decision rights from the Department of Energy and prohibit any federal agency from determining natural gas exports based on public interest. It should not be up to the Department of Energy, FERC, or any federal agency, to determine what amount of natural gas to export is in the public's interest. Energy producers should be able to capture economic opportunities from LNG-recipient nations if they believe it is in their interest. If the DOE was sincere in its role to protect the public interest, it would have accepted its own analysis that exporting as much LNG as possible is an overall benefit to economic welfare. The DOE's authorization requirement is a pointless obstacle and should be removed immediately.¶ Empower state regulators to manage the environmental review and permitting process of the export facility while allowing FERC to stay involved. States already have the authority to veto LNG terminals. Rather than take an advisory role to FERC, states should play a more predominant role in authorizing the construction of the terminal. A state's environmental review and permit approval would satisfy the federal permits necessary to build an LNG terminal.[30] The state permit approval would satisfy all other necessary approvals required under the National Environmental Policy Act. A state regulator can pull in FERC technical or safety expertise as necessary. Export applicants would also need to meet Coast Guard security standards and the requirements under the MTSA, as well as the Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety requirements.[31]¶ However, if the state in which the facility is built deems it in the state's and the facility's best interest to move forward with the FERC review because it is already in process, or even start the FERC review, the state should be permitted to grant that authority to FERC. All new LNG export applicants would fall under the state's jurisdiction.

States regulations solve offshore drilling and the environment – and fed fails – problems with status quo drilling are a result of the federal governmentLoris 13 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports: Lift Restrictions and Empower the States,” The Heritage Foundation, 02/11/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-the-states, 07/14/14]Onerous Regulations, Not Exports, Are the Problem¶ A much more realistic threat to affordable domestic natural gas is the federal government's intervention in natural gas extraction, specifically the hydraulic fracturing process. One of the reasons why hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. has been successful in promoting oil and gas development for decades, while maintaining a strong environmental record, is the state regulatory regime. States in which fracturing takes place each

have comprehensive regulation that ensures that oil and gas companies operate safely and in an environmentally responsible manner , and administer fines and implement punitive measures to correct wrongdoing.¶ In November 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Lisa Jackson

acknowledged the states' role: " States are stepping up and doing a good job . It doesn't have to be EPA that regulates the 10,000 wells that might go in."[11] But states are not just now stepping up-states have effectively regulated oil and gas production and hydraulic fracturing for decades. In Pennsylvania, fracking has been taking place since the 1960s, with nearly 100,000 oil and gas wells fracked and no instances of contamination of groundwater. The same clean record is true for Ohio, where over 70,000 oil and gas wells have been fracked since the 1960s. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission has compiled statistics for all 50 states, each of which has a flawless record when it comes to fracking and groundwater protection.[12]¶ Despite the states' regulatory effectiveness, the federal government is pursuing costly and duplicative regulations. In April 2012, the EPA announced its first air-emission rules for hydraulic fracturing. The EPA contends that the regulations are necessary to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds and hazardous air pollutants. However, the EPA quantifies only environmental benefits from regulating methane, clearly indicating this rule was more about regulating a greenhouse gas. The EPA's rule miserably fails the cost-benefit test-the agency's own analysis projects $745 million in annual costs and just $11 million to $19 million in environmental benefits. Moreover, the EPA has grossly overestimated methane emissions from the wells.[13]¶ Further, the Department of the Interior released a draft rule on public disclosure of chemicals on federal lands despite the fact that states have successfully managed chemical disclosure.[14] Congress has also introduced legislation that would regulate fracking fluids under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) despite the fact that the 2005 Energy Policy Act codified that Congress never intended to regulate fracking (except when using diesel oil in the fracking process under SDWA).[15] Hydraulic fracturing had been safely regulated for a quarter century before Congress enacted SDWA in 1974.¶ The EPA is conducting a study on the effect of fracking on drinking water and groundwater; the agency expects to release a draft report in 2014.[16] While the study itself does not pose a threat, the EPA's guilty-until-proven innocent approach is cause for concern. The EPA accused companies of contaminating water supplies in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming, and thus far the EPA has found no evidence of drinking water contamination; in the case of Wyoming, however, the EPA published faulty data with speculative and heavily contested conclusions. A legitimate fear is that the 2014 report will do the same.[17]¶ The facts and history of hydraulic fracturing indicate that many of the fears associated with the process are exaggerated or unsubstantiated.

Entrepreneurs created an energy boom and state regulators have been ensuring that energy production occurs in an environmentally sensible way. In this manner, responsibility is allocated to land managers who have local knowledge and the most to gain from proper management and the most to lose from mismanagement.[18] Congress should keep it that way. [19]

Drilling – OilCongress should devolve energy production decisions to the state – federal government fails to solve the environment and the economyLoris 14 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, “Federal Regulations and Federal Ownership Limit Oil and Production Potential,” The Heritage Foundation, 05/07/14, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/federal-regulations-and-federal-ownership-limit-oil-production-potential, 07/13/14]Production of crude oil in the United States is up to 8.36 million barrels per day—the highest since January 1988.[1] The increased supply of oil has widespread economic benefits, but a new Congressional Research Service report shows that when the numbers are broken down by ownership it becomes clear that the situation could be even better. Although oil production overall has almost doubled in less than six years, production continues to fall on federally owned land areas.[2]¶ A more streamlined and efficient environmental review and permitting process would be welcome, but the best solution would be for Congress to devolve energy production decisions regarding federal lands to the states. ¶ Offshore Drilling Discouraged¶ After oil production reached a peak in barrels produced offshore per day in 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in a blanket moratorium on all new offshore projects and the cancellations of several existing leases. There may no longer be a literal ban on offshore drilling, but government policies still in effect have the same consequences.¶ It can take anywhere from five to 10 years for a company to move from approval to production, with no guarantee that the permit obtained will lead to successful crude oil production. Much of this is due to copious amounts of regulation and red tape.[3] The time and labor needed to see this process through dwarfs the amount of time it takes other businesses to expand and grow in almost any other industry. On top of the inefficient and onerous regulatory process, the oil industry has access to just 15 percent of available offshore areas.[4]¶ Inaccessibility and unnecessary regulations inhibit economic growth in various parts of the country off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. A study recently published by the American Petroleum Institute and the National Ocean Industries Association shows that opening up offshore areas for drilling in the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf—just one region where offshore drilling is possible but not permitted—would create 280,000 jobs in that region alone.[5]¶ Drilling on Federal Lands Faces Bureaucratic Hurdles¶ In addition to a continued decline in offshore drilling, onshore drilling on federal land has increased at only a fraction of the rate as on non-federal lands. Almost all of the benefits from fracking thus far have occurred on non-federal land.¶ While production on state and private lands has grown by almost 65 percent in the past seven years, production on federal lands has increased by about 27 percent, less than half the rate.[6] In total, federal lands now account for only 5 percent of oil production.[7] Daily federal onshore oil production is equal to about one-third of what is produced every day at the Bakken formation alone.[8]¶ Part of the discrepancy is that many of the big oil shale reserves lie on non-federal lands; however, a major reason that production on federal land has lagged behind is not a matter of economic viability or location but rather inefficiencies on the part of the federal government . ¶ As with offshore

drilling, long processes resulting from government inefficiencies create an unnecessary burden on industry. In some cases, waiting for a federal permit can take 10 times longer than it does at the state level . In 2013, the average wait for the federal government to approve a request was 194 days,[9] compared to 27 days in North Dakota, 11

days in Texas, and 45 in Pennsylvania.[10]¶ Federal ownership disincentivizes production on non-federal lands located adjacent to or interspersed with federal lands. Since production on federal lands is much more difficult, drilling may make economic sense only if a company has access to both the federal land and the non-federal land.¶ Open Access and Grant States Control¶ Excessive regulations and bureaucratic inefficiencies have stymied oil production and prevented the full effects of the energy boom. Opening up the rest of the Outer Continental Shelf to exploration and oil production would allow this to occur.¶ As the experience with federal lands that are technically open to exploration and drilling has indicated, having access is only one of the changes that must be made. Another step the federal government needs to take to allow for growth is to reduce time-consuming and costly regulations by streamlining the process. The efficiency that has been demonstrated at the state level shows that it is possible to quickly process a high volume of requests.¶ In fact, one of the primary reasons shale oil and shale gas production has been so successful both economically and environmentally is state management. State regulators and private land owners have decentralized knowledge and the proper incentives to promote economic growth while protecting their environment. They are the ones who have the most to gain when the management of natural resources and economic activity is handled properly, and they also have the most to lose if those are mismanaged.¶ The federal government owns nearly one-third of U.S. territory. Congress should consider privatizing some of that land, but in the meantime, transferring the management of federal lands to state regulators would encourage energy resource development on the federal estate while maintaining strong environmental protections. The Federal Land Freedom Act of 2013 (S. 1233 and H.R. 2511), introduced by Senator James Inhofe (R–OK) and Representative Diane Black (R–TN), would do just that by allocating more authority to the states to control their energy future.[11]¶ Increasing Energy Opportunities¶ Due to a lack of access and excessive federal regulation, the full effects and potential of America’s energy boom have yet to be felt. Streamlining and simplifying the approval process by devolving decisions to the states, along with opening up more regions for development, would allow the U.S. to harness its full energy potential.

States solve the aff best – better at managing the economy and the environment – federal government fails Spakovsky and Loris 12 [Hans A. and Nicolas D., Hans is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, Nicolas is the Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “Offshore Drilling: Increase Access, Reduce the Risk, and Stop Hurting American Companies”, The Heritage Foundation, 08/13/12, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/offshore-drilling-increase-access-reduce-the-risk-and-stop-hurting-american-companies, 07/14/14]Congress should require the Department of the Interior to honor the permit deadlines (as required by law) unless the Interior finds specific and significant faults with the application. If Interior concludes that the permit application is not complete, it should outline specific steps the applicant could take to complete it. If Interior does not find fault with the application before the deadline expires, the permit application should be considered accepted upon expiration of the deadline so that companies can proceed with exploration and drilling.¶ Congress should reform liability caps for oil spills. Given the fact that uncapped tort liability yields frivolous lawsuits, removing the cap entirely without implementing a new system would subject covered industries to artificially high costs. Congress should reform liability caps in a way that accurately assigns risk and liability to those companies engaged in covered activities.[10]¶ Congress should ultimately transition the permitting process to state regulators, who are best able to balance economic growth and

environmental protection. The permitting process needs to be taken out of the hands of Washington bureaucrats who report to a President hostile to oil and gas production—a Chief Executive who can arbitrarily stop such energy development across the nation by executive fiat.

OCS DevelopmentDevolution of OCS authority solves best – local expertise and less bureaucracyDunlop 08 (Becky Norton, Heritage’s vp for external relations, served under Ronald “The Gipper” Reagan in the Department of Justice, and Department of the Interior and under George “The Dubya” Bush, “Offshore Drilling: An Alternative to Funding Terrorism,” Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/about/speeches/offshore-drilling-an-alternative-to-funding-terrorism)Conservatives believe that policy and politics work best at the local level. We believe that individuals know what is best for them and they should be allowed to pursue their interest with limited constraints from the government. In the realm of environmental policy, conservatives believe that individuals, local communities and states are best equipped to handle the environmental issues that affect them. Conservatives believe that big government and environmental stewardship are not one-in-the same. People in the coastal regions of our country, where offshore drilling is now a hot topic should make the decision whether to progress forward based on sound scientific argument with the most

up to date data on potential oil reserves and the technology to remove it. It should not be the decision of those in other states miles away, and especially not those in Washington, D.C. What this issue comes down to is Constitutional federalism. It needs to be

accepted that the states can responsibly control and maintain their own waters instead of being micromanaged from above. Increasing energy supply is a necessary step that the United States must take to be ensured of continued and new economic growth. It is ridiculous to think that with America’s current mobile workforce infrastructure we can simply turn off all the gas pumps overnight and wake up the next morning on a renewable energy source. We are working on renewable energy. And certainly even more needs to be done. But in the interim, that transition can be made easier with the production of our own fuels to ease the burden on the average American at the pump. In addition, producing more of our own energy means that we will not have to depend on imports from country’s that do not have our interests in mind. It is a very serious matter the possibility that taxpayers and consumers are putting dollars into the hands of those who support terrorism and seek to undermine the United States. These include of course, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Becoming a nation in which America can be much more self reliant for its energy needs prevents the potential funding of those who wish to destroy us. We can and should have trading relationships for energy with other nations but they should be ones we deem to be friends and allies in the quest for greater human liberty. When I worked with Governor George Allen in Virginia we realized early with the EPA that a one-size-fits-all blanket policy does not work. How could it? When you look over the landscape of our nation, it should be apparent that what works for the beaches of Florida is most likely not going to be appropriate for the Black Hills of South Dakota. The states should decide what policies best work for their

citizens and their environment. Under the policy I advocate, states would have option of choosing how to deal with their Outer Continental Shelf lands, and the benefits of permitting drilling would go to the states . In a state like Florida, where there are objections to energy development, there would be the option of not drilling but I would argue that by delegating these decisions to the local level, Florida’s citizens would have more of a voice in how the drilling was conducted and how the revenues would be spent. By letting the state decide how to go about developing OCS, citizens can hold their elected legislators accountable. If Floridians disapprove of how a legislator stands on OCS development, they can vote him out in the next election. Or conversely, if the drilling produces more revenue it can be used for something like the Everglades Restoration of improving the stewardship of other state resources, or even reducing the tax burden on Floridians. Santa Barbara County in California recently reversed their stand on offshore drilling and passed resolution supporting more drilling. Even with the federal moratoria lifted on Oct 1st, current Washington policy dictates that a federal regulator knows better. More importantly is the matter of revenue. Currently, the federal government receives the revenue derived from OCS energy

production. Bills like H.R.6899 would continue this trend. In addition, it would strip the oil companies of $18 billion in tax breaks leaving both the states and oil companies with little incentive to allow or explore drilling, respectively. I purpose that the federal government would no longer receive a cut of the money until the resources were developed and then its “cut” would come in the form of tax revenue generated by increased economic activity. The simple fact would be that if OCS has been removed from federal jurisdiction, each state would receive 80 percent of the revenues generated from production off its shore. It would share the remaining 20 percent with other states. Obviously, a revenue-sharing structure of this sort would find critics in the federal government, which would lose roughly $5 billion each year. Many big government environmentalists would object because the federal government uses some of these funds for environmental purposes, like the Land and Water Conservation Fund and the National Historic Preservation Fund. Without OCS revenues, they would argue, these programs would lose important income. My response to these critics would be that I would rather have these revenues in the hands of the states and not the federal government. When the states control the money, they would be free to use it for the purposes they see fit. In many cases, this money could be used to fund environmental initiatives that are made to fit the specific needs of the states as determined by their governors and state legislatures. And, if citizens are not pleased with the way these revenues are being spent, they can simply elect new officials. It’s a much better system than when the policy is centered in Washington, D.C. with bureaucrats who neither knew nor frankly care what states, localities and citizens want or need.

Current OCS policy is dictated by Washington and is a complex maze of bureaucratic regulations even without the moratorium. In the case of OCS,

a simple policy is the best policy. The federal government should cede its authority to the states. Let’s allow the states to decide what to do with their lands. Let’s stop the micromanagement, and understand that those at the state level will without a shadow of a doubt responsibly take care of their environment, their home. Let states use new tax revenues from drilling to reduce taxes on entrepreneurs, so they can fund and develop all matter of energy sources and infrastructure and increase the invention of new and better technologies. Let’s take the opportunity to lower current fuel costs to bridge the gap. Let’s finally increase development of our resources – grow our economy and trade with allies of human liberty rather than funding those that support terrorism and deny freedom to their own people.

OTECThe states can operate and adopt OTEC technology – Hawaii provesLiu 07 [Theodore E., Director of the Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, “Ocean Thermal Energy,” 3/20/07, http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/energy/renewable/otec, 07/14/14]Almost all of the major U.S. OTEC experiments have taken place in Hawaii. The Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority (NELHA) has been recognized as the world's foremost laboratory and test facility for OTEC and OTEC-related research. The facility has been funded by the State of Hawaii with significant USDOE and private sector participation. On June 2, 2006, plans for a 1-MW OTEC facility at NELHA were announced. Article: Star-Bulletin, June 3, 2006. Updates and additional information may be available from the NELHA website and the OCEES website. There is no OTEC facility currently producing electricity at Keahole Point. However, cold seawater is being used directly to air condition (cool) the administration and laboratory buildings. The seawater provides about 50 tons of air conditioning, offsetting the equivalent of 200 kW of peak electrical demand. Using the cold seawater for air conditioning saves NELHA nearly $4000 per month in electricity cost - and the system requires much less maintenance than traditional compressor system

State governments solve – they have the tech and can provide companies access to federal watersWebber 08 [Michael E., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Associate Director of the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Texas at Austin, B.A. in Liberal Arts, B.S. in Aerospace Engineering, M.S. in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University, 05/04/08, “OTEC and wave energy technologies in Hawaii,” http://webberenergyblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/otec-and-wave-energy-technologies-in.html, 07/14/14]Considering the extremely high wave heights around the Hawaiian Islands, wave energy technologies are very suitable. Since the state of Hawaii is an island, it has large coastline perimeter, allowing for vast wave energy technology potential. The following is are the concluding remarks from my paper: From environmental and economically standpoints, the feasibility of OTEC systems and wave energy technologies is still unclear. As with any new technology that must be implemented on a large scale, this is to be expected. Producing tens or hundreds of megawatts of power in the oceans is a daunting task that requires years of experimentation and cost-benefit analysis. Yet, from a technical standpoint, OTEC systems and the discussed wave energy technologies present themselves as technically feasible alternatives for applications in the state of Hawaii. Hawaii’s large wave heights and underwater temperature differences allow the state of Hawaii to utilize OTEC and wave energies at their advantage, if state government so chooses. As large and overwhelming as the ocean is, so too is the economic and engineering task of designing large offshore and onshore ocean energy power plants. In order for Hawaii to meet its goals of 20% renewable fuels by 2020 and 70% of its energy mix from renewable by 2030, the state government should first provide for access to federal waters where companies like Finavera Renewables and CETO can test their products year round. This is the first and most crucial step towards launching any large scale ocean energy system within the Hawaiian Islands.

State incentives to producers solve barriers to OTEC development in the status quoWebber 08 [Michael E., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Associate Director of the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Texas at Austin, B.A. in Liberal Arts, B.S. in Aerospace Engineering, M.S. in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Mechanical

Engineering from Stanford University, 05/04/08, “OTEC and wave energy technologies in Hawaii,” http://webberenergyblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/otec-and-wave-energy-technologies-in.html, 07/14/14]Finally, the state of Hawaii should cut down , not punish its producers , on its electricity generation from petroleum in order to create market incentives for other alternative technologies. The truth of the matter is that ocean energy technologies are at least five to ten years away from being cost effective, therefore, it is imperative to allow these technologies to mature and then blossom when the time is apt. In the meantime, more cost-effective technologies like solar and geothermal should be given incentives to grow. Heavy incentives and tax rebates should be given for installed solar capacity on homes and buildings so that Hawaii can reduce its dependency on fossil fuels. By allowing different parts of the alternative energy industry to grow with the newly revived OTEC and wave industries, the state of Hawaii can economically make its way towards 70% renewable energy by 2030 and 100% renewable in the future .

States solve—Hawaii provesFriedman 14 [Becca, writer for the Harvard Political Review, “Examining the future of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion: An Alternative Source Heats Up,” 03/26/14, http://www.oceanenergycouncil.com/examining-future-ocean-thermal-energy-conversion/, 07/14/14]OTEC is not completely off the government’s radar, however. This past year, for the first time in a decade, Congress debated reviving the oceanic energy program in the energy bill, although the proposal was ultimately defeated. OTEC even enjoys some support on a state level. Hawaii ’s National Energy Laboratory, for example, conducts OTEC research around the islands. For now, though, American interests in OTEC promise to remain largely academic. The Naval Research Academy and Oregon State University are conducting research programs off the coasts of Oahu and Oregon, respectively.

Hawaii solves the aff – limited alternative energy sources Greenwire 04 [Greenwire, “Oceans: Pacific Islands Tap Seas for Water, Power,” 04/04/04, “Oceans: Pacific Islands Tap Seas for Water, Power,” Lexis Nexis, 07/14/14] Honolulu is among a number of Pacific island municipalities considering technology that exploits the temperature difference between the ocean's warm surface water and the cold water found 2,000 feet below to generate both electricity and drinking water. Faced with potential water shortages in as little as 20 years, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply is considering among its options for long-term water supply a deep-water ocean facility that would use ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) for desalination and power generation. The water board is spending $2.5 million on a feasibility study for an OTEC plant off Kalaeloa. The study is expected to be completed by April 2004, said Barry Usagawa, the board's water resources principal executive. Usagawa said Honolulu has taken special interest in the technology because the island of Oahu has limited natural water supply combined with a growing demand for energy. Both problems could be solved through the island's abundant ocean resources. "We import so much oil and our economy is so tied in with outside factors that we need to develop sustainable energy, water, these kinds of resources," Usagawa said.

Rare Earth MetalsAlaska already funds rare earth metal research – the counterplan just increases explorationHandwerger 13 (Jeb, Bachelor Degree in mathematics and a Masters in Education, “State Of Alaska Takes Active Role In Developing Heavy Rare Earths In The U.S.,”http://www.selfdirectedinvestor.com/article/201203/state-of-alaska-takes-active-role-in-developing-heavy-rare-earths-in-the-u-s-stateofalaskata.htm/)The CEO of Ucore (UCU.V or UURAF), Jim Mckenzie, recently released significant news of the progress on Bokan Mountain as Ucore moves ahead in its development as the sole United States heavy rare earth provider. Alaskan Governor Parnell has placed Ucore on the proposed budget for 2013. He proposes to allocate $8.1 million into expediting Ucore's development as a viable corporate entity. This is meat and potatoes stuff. The state government of Alaska is sponsoring explicit support for Ucore's Bokan Mountain which contains the strategically important heavy rare earth metals of dysprosium and terbium. These metals have been highlighted by the U.S. Department of Energy as being at risk of a supply shortfall in the near term. Jim McKenzie, President and CEO of Ucore states, “The State of Alaska continues to take an active role in the development of its enormous rare earth and critical minerals potential…The allocation of substantial funding specifically targeting rare earth and strategic resource development at Bokan Mountain and across the state is a tremendous advantage for a very young industry with immense upside potential for employing Alaskans and adding to the state’s export revenue. We applaud Governor Parnell’s initiatives and look forward to working with the state to advance its critical metals revenue base.”

Resource ManagementStates can manage ocean resources – Hawaii provesState of Hawaii Office of Planning 14 (“Ocean Resource Management Plan,” http://planning.hawaii.gov/czm/ocean-resources-management-plan-ormp/)The Hawaiʻi Ocean Resources Management Plan (ORMP) is a statewide plan that sets forth the State’s ocean and coastal resource management priorities. The ORMP supports effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the state’s coastal zone, which includes all lands of the state and the area extending seaward from the shoreline to the limit of the State’s police power and management authority, including the U.S. territorial sea. The ORMP is a requirement under Hawaii Revised Statutes §205A-3 and is a major component of the State’s Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Program. A partnership of State and county agencies has been collaborating since 1985 to improve the management of Hawaii’s ocean and coastal resources. Today, through the Hawaii Ocean Council, Directors of State and County agencies, with unanimous support of federal and community partners, coordinate and implement the State’s shared ocean and coastal resource management priorities. The ORMP was updated in July of 2013, and continues a place-based approach to management of ocean resources in the islands, based on recognition of the ecological connections between the land and sea, the link between human activities and its impacts on the environment, and the need for improved collaboration and stewardship in natural resources governance. The ORMP works by identifying eleven Management Priorities for the next five-year planning period, by identifying responsible agencies and resources, and by providing a method for performance measures and reporting.

States solve resource management – Massachusetts, California, Hawaii, New York, Florida proveState of California 07 (“Joint Ocean Commission Initiative: U.S. Ocean Policy Report Card,” State of California Ocean Protection Council, http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/docs/Documents_Page/Reports/2007_reportcard.pdf)Why is regional and state ocean governance reform important? Regional governance mechanisms are needed to achieve a more coordinated, ecosystem-based management approach for improving ocean and coastal health. Such mechanisms enable governments at all levels to work together to identify regional goals and priorities, improve responses to regional needs, and develop and disseminate regionally significant research and information. While the problems facing marine ecosystems must be addressed at the local level, additional tools and support that the federal government can provide are also needed to truly resolve the most pressing issues. Multi-state initiatives and efforts at the state level can strengthen the voice of local stakeholders in communicating those needs to the federal government. What was done in 2007 to address regional and state ocean governance reform? Over the last few years, ocean governance efforts have emerged in a number of regions and states. The Joint Initiative applauds these efforts and urges further state commitment and federal support for sustain their progress. State ocean legislation: • Massachusetts - The State Senate and House have both passed various versions of the Massachusetts Ocean Act, a landmark bill that would create an integrated system for managing the state's coastal waters. The Joint Initiative encourages the state's legislative bodies to maintain the bill's core

strengths for more comprehensive planning and authorize the Ocean Act in 2008. Similar leadership in the Northeast Regional Ocean Council is encouraged. • New Jersey - The New Jersey Coastal and Ocean Protection Council was established by state legislation and signed by the Governor in early 2008 to promote ecosystem-based management of the state's ocean and coastal resources. The Joint Initiative urges the expeditious appointment of Council members and state funding for Council activities. • New York - The New York Ocean and Great Lakes Ecosystem Conservation Council, which was established by law in 2006, is using ecosystem-based management as the new approach for managing the state's ocean and coastal resources. The Council moved forward on ecosystem-based management demonstration projects, an ocean and coastal atlas, and agency guidelines for implementing an ecosystem-based approach. The Joint Initiative encourages the state legislature and Governor to support and embrace the Council's groundbreaking work. State ocean governance efforts: • California - The California Fish and Game Commission approved a network of 29 marine protected areas off the state's central coast in 2007. The network covers 204 square miles of ocean, roughly 18 percent of state waters, with a portion set aside as no-take zones. The second phase of the process to develop the nation's first statewide network of marine protected areas also began in the north central coast region of the state. • Florida - The Governor's Action Team on Energy and Climate Change is showing strong leadership by moving to address the impacts of climate change on the state, including adaptation strategies to protect coastal resources and communities. • Washington - The 2007 Washington State legislature approved substantial funding for Puget Sound restoration and recovery, including formation of a new agency, the Puget Sound Partnership. The Partnership works with communities, agencies, and organizations to create an Action Agenda to identify priorities and serve as a roadmap for restoration and protection efforts. The Joint Initiative applauds Washington's governor and legislature for embracing the Puget Sound Partnership. • Other state initiatives that address important ocean issues include the Alaska Ocean Policy Cabinet; Hawaii Ocean and Coastal Council; Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority; and Oregon Ocean Policy Advisory Council. Regional ocean governance initiatives: • Gulf of Mexico - During 2007, the Gulf of Mexico Alliance continued making significant strides on implementing the commitments of the 2006 Governors' Action Plan. The five Gulf state governors also reaffirmed their commitment to the Gulf of Mexico Alliance and its work to protect the waters and coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. The Joint Initiative commends the Gulf states' leadership and achievements in regional ocean governance reform, as well as the active engagement by federal agencies to support progress in the region. • West Coast - The West Coast Governors' Agreement on Ocean Health released its Draft Action Plan in 2007 for public comment; the final version is scheduled for release in 2008. The Action Plan will set forth priority actions for Washington, Oregon, and California in addressing shared challenges to ocean health and advancing an ecosystem-based approach to ocean management. Momentum for ecosystem-based management continued to grow in the region as six local ecosystem-based pilot projects that had progressed independently for years started to explore ways to coordinate and share lessons learned on implementing ecosystem-based approaches. • Other multi-state initiatives that are actively addressing regional ocean issues include: Chesapeake Bay Program; Great Lakes Regional Collaboration; Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment; Long Island Sound Study; and Northeast Regional Ocean Council.

AT: No TechCalifornia has tech and can manage its ocean resourcesState of California 10 (“ROV-based Deep Water Monitoring of the Northern Channel Islands Marine Protected Areas,” Ocean Protection Council of State of Calinfornia, http://www.opc.ca.gov/2010/07/rov-based-deep-water-monitoring-of-the-northern-channel-islands-marine-protected-areas/)In 1998, California passed the Marine Life Management Act (MLMA), which calls for an ecosystem approach to achieving sustainable fisheries and identifies the acquisition of essential fishery information (EFI) as a critical component in management decisions. EFI includes, among other things, fish population status and trends, impacts of fishing, ecological relationships, habitat information, and other environmental information. In 1999, the State went further, passing the Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA), which mandated a redesign of the state’s system of MPAs “to increase its coherence and its effectiveness at protecting the state’s marine life, habitat, and ecosystems.” The Channel Islands MPAs became the first of the new MPA networks to be implemented. Established in 2003, the network includes eleven State Marine Reserves (SMRs) where no take of living, geological or cultural resources is allowed and two State Marine Conservation Areas (SMCAs) where limited commercial and/or recreational take is allowed. CIMPA_Figure_new Working together, the California Department of Fish and Game and Marine Applied Research and Exploration (MARE) developed an ROV program designed to collect data in the deepwater (20 to 100 meter) habitats in the newly established Channel Islands MPAs—habitats beyond the reach of most SCUBA divers. The overarching goal of the program was to provide fishery-independent data required by the MLMA and MLPA—data to provide information on relative abundance, species interactions and associations, habitat preference, fishing effects on habitat, distribution, size composition of stocks, and human interactions with the marine environment. When tracked over time, this kind of information may provide managers with an indication of whether stocks are increasing or decreasing, and whether current management measures are achieving their intended conservation objectives. These data are also are needed to improve understanding of marine ecosystems and to enable adaptive management. CIMPA2009_HC_small Key Findings and Successes A full report on the ROV program results to date is contained in “ROV-based Deep Water Monitoring of the Northern Channel Islands Marine Protected Areas Annual Report – 2009,” Marine Region Administrative Report No. 10-02, which will be posted on the California Department of Fish and Game web page: http://www.dfg.ca.gov. The ROV data show that fish densities inside the MPAs have been consistently higher than densities in sites with similar habitats outside the MPAs. These differences were also detected by SCUBA based surveys in the shallow water areas adjacent to ROV study sites. While the causes for these differences are unknown, the fact that two independent methods showed similar results validates the use of ROV-based surveys for fishery-independent data collection. The data have shown only slight changes in density within the MPAs since 2005. Given that most species of rockfish need very specific ocean conditions for successful reproduction, population changes are not expected to occur at a steady pace, but rather as large recruitment events that occur every five to ten years. Accordingly, it is not surprising that we have not yet seen large changes in MPA fish populations. In 2009, however, the team observed huge clouds of young of the year rockfish. Scientists working with MARE do not yet know if this is a huge recruitment class, or simply that the research cruise was conducted a month earlier than normal. The time series data collected over the last five years has provided a cost effective baseline assessment of finfish and invertebrate abundance inside the MPAs and in unprotected comparison areas. Further, no animals were harmed by this video sampling. Detailed analysis of data collected during this baseline sampling period is ongoing. The wealth of information contained within the archival video

record collected will provide marine scientists the opportunity to expand our understanding of these highly productive marine ecosystems.

***Alaska Drilling CP***

1NCAlaska solves the aff – amending the Alaska Coastal Management Program increases Alaskan influence over drilling – solves the environment Kurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,” University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]The availability of consistency review provides Alaska with a unique opportunity to exercise real influence over the development of the natural resources off its shoreline . Although the state can never fully control these

resources, it can ensure that oil and gas production on the OCS does not run afoul of the standards which [*402] it has set for other offshore activities by revising the ACMP. State control in this area is especially important to Alaska because of the scope of potential problems and opportunities that could arise as a result of OCS petroleum development. Only the states can fully understand the implications of offshore activities to local environments and economies. Alaska, with its unique environment and natural wealth, is in a position to steer OCS development toward a controlled growth that can help meet the energy needs of the nation as a whole without undue risk to one of the nation's treasures--the Alaskan landscape.¶ Alaska can accomplish this by taking a few necessary steps. First and foremost, it must revise the ACMP to ensure that it applies to all stages of OCS development, particularly the lease sale stage. An ACMP that does not apply at the critical early stages is ineffective in light of considerations such as the inertia behind taking a leased area through to production. If any given standard within the ACMP does not apply to the lease sale stage (such as transportation), it must be revised so that it does. Furthermore, the phasing system n146 should be revised in order to make it clear that it is not intended to allow phases of OCS activities to proceed without examining the consequences of the activity as a whole. Phasing should grant flexibility to an agency by allowing it to focus on a smaller time frame, not hamstring it by forcing it to look only at presently available facts. This could easily be accomplished by amending the ACMP regulatory definitions to include MMS projections and other possible outcomes of the activity among the "reasonably foreseeable, significant effects" under Alaska Statutes section 46.40.094(b)(2)(C). A detailed ACMP that applies to the early phases of offshore development can be used either to challenge a federal consistency determination directly or as a negotiating tool, as was the case with the review of Sale

124. The ACMP must become the primary means for Alaska to exert power over OCS development.¶ Alaska should also continue to use some of the less reliable means of influencing the process, such as the gubernatorial comment power under the OCSLA and its power to issue consistency determinations. As previously discussed, these methods should not be relied upon to produce desired results, as the Secretary of the Interior's determinations are subject to a very high [*403] level of deference. However, these methods have been successful in the past as a means of incorporating limited concerns into a given lease, and they should continue to be used as a kind of testing ground for future ACMP regulations.¶ There is enormous wealth off Alaska's coast. This wealth includes not only petroleum, but also resources such as fish, tourism and natural beauty. The development of any offshore resource also has substantial effects on the land. Regardless of whether these effects are negative (such as oil spills or interference with subsistence lifestyles) or positive (such as more jobs and increased wealth), Alaska should have a say in whether these effects will be allowed. It does. Consistency review under the CZMA gives the state the means to play a role in regulating federal activities off its shore. Alaska must grasp this opportunity to

the greatest degree possible. Using the ACMP through CZMA consistency review is Alaska's key to shaping its own future.

2NC SolvencyThe CP solves the aff – increasing state influence at the OCS lease sale stage is keyKurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,” University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]IV. ALASKA'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OCS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS¶ A. Significance of the Lease Sale Stage¶ If Alaska wishes to exert any real influence over the OCS development process , it should do so as early as possible, preferably at the lease sale stage . However, courts have attempted to weaken the role of the states at this early stage, relying on five main propositions to achieve this goal:¶ (1) No physical impacts of importance can follow the sale without first being approved by the Secretary of the Interior;¶ (2) The successful lessees do not acquire any right to proceed to exploration and development but only a priority for submitting plans of exploration and development and production plans;¶ (3) At the exploration, development, and production stages, all environmental statutes apply, including [the National Environmental Policy Act];¶ (4) At the exploration, development, and production stages, the Secretary retains the authority to suspend or cancel leases if the environmental impacts of development are too great; and¶ (5) At exploration and development stages, the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act allow states a substantial voice in what activities will occur. n132¶ However, the logic of the various courts that have attempted to minimize the importance of the lease sale stage is fundamentally flawed. The lease sale stage is absolutely critical to OCS development. In Trustees II, the Alaska Supreme Court

noted the importance of the lease sale:¶ Environmentally protective purposes require that at the time [the Department of Natural Resources] reviews any . . . permit application it consider the probable cumulative impact of all anticipated activities which will be a part of [the project in question], whether or not the activities are part of the permit under review. If [the Department of Natural Resources] determines that the cumulative impact is problematic, the problems must be resolved before the initial permit is approved. n133¶ [*398] Moreover, the states are no longer powerless to have an early effect on the process. When the 1990 Amendments to the CZMA were passed, the states' power at the lease sale stage increased substantially because it became clear that the lease sales are subject to state consistency review.¶ The paramount importance of the lease sale stage emanates from the fact that it is the only opportunity to review the entire lease sale area as a whole. Review at the exploration or development stages is limited to those individual lease sites within the lease area which are part of the current exploration or development plan. Deferring consideration of environmental issues until only individual lease sites are reviewed "may tend to mask appreciation of any cumulative environmental threat that would otherwise be apparent if [the Department of Natural Resources] began with a detailed and comprehensive identification of those hazards." n134 Thus, individualized site review cannot effectively protect the Alaskan coastal region as a whole. ¶ Furthermore, the Secretary of Interior's power to suspend or cancel a lease does not provide any real safeguards to the state's interests. Once an OCS area has been leased, a certain amount of inertia tends to drive the area toward development. First, the Department of the Interior has a financial interest in not cancelling a lease--the OCSLA provides that in the event of a cancellation, a lessee is entitled to compensation equal to the lesser of anticipated profits or the difference between the lessee's revenues to date and his expenditures. n135 More importantly the Department of the Interior has never cancelled any lease for any reason. As one commentator points out, "for Interior the benefits associated with

protecting the environment have never been valuable enough to justify incurring the high cost of cancelling a lease agreement." n136¶ Overall, the courts' reliance on the later stages of review is unwarranted. In addition to the fact that issues such as cumulative effects cannot be adequately addressed beyond the lease sale stage, the regulations applicable to the post-lease sale phases of OCS development only address the question of what form exploration and production should take, as opposed to whether they should occur at all. n137 Also, state consistency review at later stages is [*399] severely limited by the Department of the Interior's position that environmental impact statements are not required for exploration plans. n138 This has the effect of denying the state the chance to examine all possible environmental effects. Finally, state denials of exploration or development plans will not be upheld unless the state provides to the lessee a "reasonable alternative." n139 This prevents a state from completely blocking undesirable exploration or development. Therefore, if a state wishes to exercise any real control over the OCS development process, it must do so at the lease sale stage.

2NC Fed FailsFederal government fails – state control key to the environment, protection of Native cultures, and the fishing industryKurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,” University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]Preventing oil spills, however, is not the only reason Alaska has an interest in regulating OCS development. Resource production off the Alaska coast will put significant pressure on the state's infrastructure as remote areas such as the North Slope Borough develop. Additionally, drilling and oil transportation could pose other environmental problems. For example, construction of undersea pipelines may disturb the migratory patterns of endangered bowhead whales, while increased traffic near land-based facilities could alter the migration of other animals such as caribou. Either of these possibilities would further disturb the subsistence lifestyles of many Native Alaskan communities. Finally, oil drilling on the OCS would interfere with the productivity of other offshore resources. For example, the fishing industry could be affected by hazards resulting from sustained drilling activity, such as gear loss n12 and seabed degradation.¶ The Alaska state government is better able to address these state-related issues than the federal government. The state legislature is likely to be better informed about the multitude of local issues that will inevitably arise, and is better equipped to protect the rights of Alaskans against intrusions by the federal government. Congress recognized as much with its inclusion of the state consistency doctrine in the Coastal Zone Management Act. n13

***EBSCoR CP***

1NCDOE EPSCoR program empirically funds fusion research at national labs, including STEM students – states can contribute fundsApril 05 [Gary C., PhD and Associate Director Alabama DOE EPSCoR, “Alabama DOE EPSCoR,” http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/05/EPSCoR/pdf/abstracts/powell-abstract.pdf, 07/14/14]The Alabama DOE EPSCoR Program is made up of three integrated components including Program Coordination, Human Resources Development, and Energy Research Clusters. All programmatic elements are coordinated through a statewide steering committee. The first Implementation Award for the Alabama DOE EPSCoR

Program (1994-2000) had three energy research clusters: Fusion Energy ,

Novel Organic Semiconducting Materials, and Petroleum Reservoir Characterization. Alabama’s second Implementation Award (2001- 2007) builds on the success of these clusters and expands the interest and focus of energy related research through Fuel Cell technology and manufacturing. Collectively, the success of the first three energy research clusters can be measured against the record that they established during the six-year tenure of their work. For an investment of $3.4 MM from DOE

and $4.4MM from institutional/ state matching , these programs supported the research of: a) 21 research professors, b) 32 post-doc toral associates , c) 40 doctoral-level graduate students , and d) 41 undergraduate research students. Their research also brought in an additional $18MM in non- DOE EPSCoR funding . Add to these numbers the $1.5MM from DOE, state and institutional sources for Human Resources Development activities elevating energy awareness among K – post doctoral participants, an additional $1.2MM from DOE Traineeship Awards and success in the DOE State Laboratory Partnership Awards by six investigators at a total of nearly $2.1MM and the true impact of the support base for energy -related programs in Alabama is quite evident . The Fuel Cell energy research cluster is located at the University of Alabama and Alabama A&M University (HBCU). The program is in its fourth year of the second Implementation Award. DOE awarded the Fuel Cell group a total of $1.2MM for four years with matching support from institutional/state matching. To date, the program has supported: a) 13 research faculty, b) 10 undergraduates, c) 15 graduates, and d) three post-doctoral associates. Their research has thus far produced an additional $5MM in non-DOE EPSCoR funding. The Human Resources Development Travel and Enhancement Grant Programs are intended to help cover the costs incurred by young Alabama researchers seeking an opportunity to visit a Federal Laboratory for the purpose of on-site research or developing collaborative research between institutions. Since the programs were initiated, 12 research faculty from four EPSCoR institutions, including one HBCU, one visiting scholar, one undergraduate student, 10 graduate students, and one post-doctoral associate have participated in research efforts at Argonne, Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and the Pacific Northwest

National Laboratories .

2NC Solvency – STEMEPSCoR allows state collaboration with national labs on energy research – solves STEMDOE 11 [Department of Energy, “Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research,” EPSCoR, 03/16/11, http://science.energy.gov/bes/epscor/about/, 07/14/14]Overview: DOE EPSCoR is located in the Office of Science and assists the Office by supporting basic and applied research and development across a wide range of interdisciplinary program areas including but not limited to: Advanced Scientific Computing Research, Basic Energy Sciences, Biological and Environmental Research, Fusion Energy Sciences, High Energy Physics and Nuclear Physics. It also supports research that is relevant to other DOE Program Offices, including but not limited to: the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management; the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; the Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy; the Office of Environmental Management; the Office of Fossil Energy; the Office of Legacy Management; and, the Office of Nuclear Energy. The participation of these other programs is critical to the success of EPSCoR applications and developing understanding of these programs should be long-term objective of all EPSCoR applicants.¶ Goals of DOE EPSCoR: a) improve the capability of designated states and territories to conduct sustainable and nationally competitive energy-related research ; b ) jumpstart infrastructure development in designated states and territories through increased human and technical resources, training scientists and engineers in energy-related areas;

and c) build beneficial relationships between scientists and engineers in the designated states and territories with the 10 world-class laboratories managed by the Office of Science, leverage DOE national user facilities, and take advantage of opportunities for intellectual collaboration across the DOE system. Through broadened participation DOE EPSCoR seeks to provide the most comprehensive network of energy-related research across the nation. DOE EPSCoR requests an annual budget of approximately $8 million per year and posts Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) every one to two years.¶ Program Priorities: DOE EPSCoR is a science-driven, merit-based program that supports basic and applied research activities spanning the broad range of science and technology programs within DOE. In addition, the program places high priority on increasing the number of scientists and engineers in energy-related areas. The program places particular emphasis and importance of collaboration with young faculty, postdoctoral associates, graduate and undergraduate students with scientists from the DOE national laboratories where unique scientific and technical capabilities are present. The program supports the most meritorious proposals based on merit and peer review. To maximize the effectiveness of the program, the development of the science and engineering resources component is closely coupled with the research part of the program.

EPSCoR solves R&D and STEMLawson 12 [Christopher, Physics Professor at the University of Alabama and Executive Director of Alabama EPSCoR, CQ Testimony, 03/22/12, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]

EPSCoR provides a mechanism to address those geographical

imbalances. The program has been a huge success , investments have generated growth in state economies, attracted students into STEM

fields, and created a broader base of high tech research expertise. NSF EPSCoR provides co planning meritorious proposed research and EPSCoR states and by infrastructure improvement awards to support academic research infrastructure and cyber infrastructure improvements in areas critical to the states' high tech economic development. NSF EPSCoR infrastructure funding matched by the states to leverage the federal investments. In

my home state of Alabama, NSF EPSCoR funding is generated revolutionary advancements in science and engineering that have led to new business growth and high-paying jobs. NSF EPSCoR funding has been vital for advancing students to STEM ideas and research and introduce more than 2,000 students across Alabama to these science and technology and engineering concepts in one year alone. In a time when the President and Congress are working to engage students in STEM fields, it only makes sense to build on this success and continue to fund the NSF EPSCoR program at the Administration's budget request of $158 million. This will ensure that states such as Alabama continue to develop a robust research infrastructure so that they can compete for Federal research grants and continue to prepare a skilled, high tech workforce capable of delivering innovation in the future. Congress designed NASA EPSCoR to increase the research capacity of states with limited NASA R&D funding in areas related to NASA's mission. NASA EPSCoR funds both grants for Research Infrastructure Development and to seed research in critical research areas. Together, they attract students into STEM fields, allow more states to participate in NASA research enterprise, and provide opportunities for high tech economic growth in local communities nationwide. Like the NSF EPSCoR program, states help increase the Federal benefit by matching funds. Funding the NASA EPSCoR at the congressionally authorized level of $25 million is truly a win-win program for the states and our nation. At a time of economic challenges and tight budgets, programs like EPSCoR that seek a broader distribution in research funding makes solid fiscal sense. Limiting these resources to a few states and institutions is self defeating for our nation in the long run. NSF and NASA EPSCoR help all states to benefit from taxpayer investments and federal research and development, and they generate long term growth and a skilled workforce for the future. NSF and NASA EPSCoR stretch limited federal dollars further through state matching. Not only do states benefit from increased research capacity and growth, but our nation benefits from the rich and diverse pool of talent that our entire country can provide. In a time that 33 percent of all bachelors degree in China are in engineering, compared to 4.5 percent in the US, if we are going to remain globally competitive, instead of restricting ourselves to a few states and institutions, we need to be training and harnessing all of our nation's brainpower, and EPSCoR is working to achieve this goal.

DOE EPSCoR boosts US leadership and STEM workersNew Mexico EPSCoR 09 [New Mexico EPSCoR, “DOE EPSCoR State and National Laboratory Partnership Program,” 2009, http://nmepscor.org/content/doe-epscor-state-and-national-laboratory-partnership-program, 07/14/14]The Department of Energy's Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DOE EPSCoR) is a federal-state partnership program designed to help the Department lead the world in meeting today's and tomorrow's energy needs through increased competition in energy-related r esearch and d evelopment across the entire nation. The mission of DOE EPSCoR is

to support basic research activities spanning the broad range of science and technology programs within DOE, and to increase the number of scientists and engineers in energy-related areas.

2NC Solvency – DOE LabsStates can empirically fund energy research at national labs – New York provesCorditz 10 [Kay, “State Grant to Fund Advanced Battery Materials Partnership,” Brookhaven National Lab, 03/15/10, http://www.bnl.gov/newsroom/news.php?a=21663, 07/14/14]Funded by a $550,000 grant from the New York State Energy Research and

Development Authority (NYSERDA), Brookhaven National Lab oratory will partner with battery materials researchers from leading New York State universities to explore new chemistries and synthesize new materials for long-lasting batteries. The Laboratory will partner with SUNY’s University at Buffalo and Binghamton University on three projects to develop improved batteries for use in stationary grid-scale energy storage applications, including lithium-air, lithium-ion, and lithium-titanate batteries. The Brookhaven effort, led by Brookhaven materials scientist Jason Graetz, will focus on the development and synthesis of new materials, and application of advanced experimental techniques to characterize these materials using Brookhaven’s National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS). The SUNY-Buffalo lead is Esther S. Takeuchi, and the Binghamton University lead is M. Stanley Whittingham. “This partnership among Brookhaven and two leading SUNY schools will capitalize on the research strengths of each, and our materials characterization capabilities will be a key element of the project,” said James Misewich, Brookhaven’s Associate Laboratory Director for Basic Energy Sciences. The collaboration grew out of a workshop sponsored by Brookhaven and Stony Brook University’s Joint Photon Sciences Institute (JPSI) last spring. Chi-Chang Kao, NSLS Chair and Founding Director of JPSI, coordinated the collaboration’s successful proposal. “It is an excellent example of how universities, industries, and national laboratories can work together to address an important scientific challenge with major societal impact,” said Kao. Said Graetz: “NYSERDA’s funding of this program will give us the opportunity to expand our energy storage research to large-scale stationary energy storage systems, which are crucial for integrating intermittent renewable generation sources such as wind and solar. In the past, the vast majority of battery research investment has focused on the important problem of electrical energy storage for transportation. However, a different set of criteria exist for stationary systems, and this project will allow us to explore new electrode materials, like lithium titanate, that meet those criteria.”

DOE EPSCoR allows states to work with national labsFitzsimmons 12 [Timothy, PhD, “Department of Energy,” EPSCoR/IDEA Foundation, 2012, http://www.epscorideafoundation.org/about/agency/doe/, 07/14/14]The Department of Energy’s Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DOE EPSCoR) was established by Section 2203 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). DOE EPSCoR enhances the capability of 25 eligible states and Puerto Rico to conduct sustainable and nationally competitive energy-related research, increase the number of competitive scientists and engineers in energy-related areas, and build beneficial relationships between designated states and territories and the 10 world-class laboratories managed by the Office of Science, leveraging DOE national user facilities and intellectual collaboration. The DOE EPSCoR effort to develop science and engineering research infrastructure and human resources enables the states to contribute to the current and future energy-related needs.

State grants can fund national lab projectsBrandon 12 [John, “Could EV car batteries be made from salt water?” Fox News, 10/05/12, http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2012/10/05/could-ev-car-batteries-be-made-from-salt-water/, 07/14/14]A California company is hoping to supply 20% of the world’s lithium by 2020 with an ingenious plan to produce this material used in the batteries that power most electric cars. Simbol Materials says it wants to build a plant in the Salton Sea near Imperial Valley, California, to extract lithium from the salt water

brine that flows up from geo-thermal power generators. The salt water extraction process was originally conceived at California’s Lawrence Livermore National Lab oratory (LLNL) with funds from a state grant , while Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago adapted it to be used with geothermal fluids.

States can fund national labsYubaNet 12 [YubaNet, “Local Water Suppliers collaborate with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,” 02/03/12, http://yubanet.com/regional/Local-Water-Suppliers-collaborate-with-Lawrence-Livermore-National-Laboratory-on-Martis-Valley-Groundwater-Model-and-Management-Plan-Effort.php#.UG-N4U0xByQ, 07/14/14]The Truckee Donner Public Utility District (TDPUD), Northstar Community Services District (NSCSD) and Placer County Water Agency (PCWA) continue its partnership in developing a groundwater management plan and groundwater model for the Martis Valley basin. This effort recently gained further technical resources with the addition of a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) study of climate change impacts to recharge and groundwater quality in the Martis Valley. Previous studies have indicated that some water in the Martis Valley groundwater basin may be in excess of 1,000 years old. And in the case of groundwater, older seems better as the age of water indicates how fast it is moving, how it is being replenished in the basin, and the outlook for long-term sustainable supplies. The LLNL water aging study will help further the ongoing efforts to determine how the aquifer functions. The LLNL study is being funded by the State of California Groundwater Ambient Monitoring & Assessment Special Studies Program. The results of the study will supplement and validate the Martis Valley groundwater model being prepared under a separate grant to the Desert Research Institute (DRI) by the Bureau of Reclamation.

National labs work in partnership with states on energy research – ORNL provesWikipedia 14 [Wikipedia, “Oak Ridge National Laboratory,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory, 07/14/14]Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a multiprogram science and technology national laboratory managed for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) by UT-Battelle. ORNL is the largest science and energy national lab oratory in the Department of Energy system.[1] ORNL is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, near Knoxville. ORNL's scientific programs focus on materials, neutron science, energy, high-performance computing, systems biology and national security. ORNL partners with the state of Tennessee, universities and industries to solve challenges in energy, advanced materials, manufacturing, security and physics.

***Federalism NB***

Ocean Policy KeyCZMA fosters cooperative federalism – most efficient way to regulateKalen 10 (Sam, Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “Lingering Relevance of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Energy Development in our Nation's Coastal Waters?”, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=139128&sr=AUTHOR(Kalen)%2BAND%2BTITLE(Lingering+relevance+of+the+Coastal+Zone+Management+Act+to+energy+development+in+our+nation%27s+coastal+waters%3F)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2010)In statutes such as the CZMA, Congress intended that states, not federal agencies, would play the primary management role with regard to coastal resources. The CZMA is one of the cornerstone examples of, at least theoretically, how the concept of cooperative federalism is to be played out in the regulation of environmental protection. Cooperative federalism, a partnership between the state and federal governments, has become the model approach to environmental regulation. n50 The cooperation between the federal government and the governments of the several states is often necessary as a consequence of the size and diversity of our nation, the variation of environmental concerns among the many localities, and the policy considerations involved in environmental decision-making. Further, the federal government is without adequate resources to address all of our nation's environmental regulatory programs and problems without help from state and local authorities. n51 Quite often environmental programs are more [*83] successful when the policies are tailored to local conditions, a process that also mandates the involvement of the states. Finally, because environmental programs often affect landuse, lifestyles, and local economic activity, federal officials often solicit local support through cooperation in order to alleviate local concerns about federal intrusion into local matters. n52 Cooperative federalism also fosters diversity in federal regulatory programs, because "it promotes competition within a federal regulatory framework" and permits "experimentation with different approaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy." n53 The ability of states to tailor environmental regulation to fit the specific needs of the community and the local landscape demonstrates one of the main benefits of cooperative federalism. Indeed, Justice Brandeis illustrated this ability of federalism to allow for adaptation to the local environment in this famous observation in 1932: To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory. n54

Giving more authority to states restores cooperative federalism and prevents ecological disastersKalen 10 (Sam, Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “Lingering Relevance of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Energy Development in our Nation's Coastal Waters?”, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=139128&sr=AUTHOR(Kalen)%2BAND%2BTITLE(Lingering+relevance+of+the+Coastal+Zone+Management+Act+to+energy+development+in+our+nation%27s+coastal+waters%3F)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2010)For the CZMA to be more than a law of lingering relevance, overhaul is needed. The CZMA has failed to provide a meaningful opportunity to states to voice their concerns with federal permitting, as evidenced through Louisiana's problems with OCS activities and other states' problems with LNG activities. It is evident that either a substan-tial rewrite of the CZMA is in order such that the air of cooperative federalism under which the Act was crafted may be realized or a new law is needed to revitalize the intent of the CZMA in a manner in which occurrences such as the

DEEPWATER HORIZON disaster can be minimized. We recommend amendment of the CZMA as the easiest route to resolve its current inadequacies through legislative means. Amendments must be accomplished in the vein of restoring the cooperative federalism of the law by giving more authority to the affected coastal states. As it currently exists, the CZMA provides no authority for the states to undertake reviews of safety documents. This reality became an acute problem with the DEEPWATER HORIZON disaster, as, under the current law, Louisiana and other affected coastal states simply had to take the MMS's word that the technology used was adequate to protect against the blowout. In fact, as testimony has since shown, even the MMS did not completely discharge its legal duties in this regard. n178 Because of these shortcomings, assurances from the MMS as to the safety of the blowout preventer were empty. However, simply providing the authority to make these reviews is not enough. The states, on the other hand, must be capable of undertaking meaningful, critical reviews of federal permitting documents. As it stands, at least in Louisiana, the agency charged with reviewing leasing and exploration and development plans for consistency is not staffed with engineers and safety experts. Rather, that agency, the Office of Coastal Management at the LDNR, is staffed with biologists and other scientists whose tasks are to ensure compliance with environmental protection laws and guidelines. Accordingly, in addition to amending the CZMA to require state concurrence on safety plans and documents, we recommend that these amendments also [*110] include a provision for the immediate diversion of a portion of federal OCS royalties to each coastal state. This would ensure sufficient funds for a safety review division within each affected state's relevant consistency review agency.

States are left out of the process – federalism and environment Kalen 12 (Sam, Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “ARTICLE: CRUISE CONTROL AND SPEED BUMPS: ENERGY POLICY AND LIMITS FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASING”, Environmental & Energy Law & Policy Journal, The University of Houston Law Center, lexis nexis)Coastal states have an acute and unique interest in being involved in the OCS leasing process. After all, their coastal resources, human capital, and onshore infrastructure necessary to support OCS development significantly affect their coastal communities. When describing the legislative discussion that shaped the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA, the late U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson observed that the "secondary impacts onshore are far greater than the direct impact from oil spills and the activity on the OCS lease site itself." n50 The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy observed that "[p]hysical damage to coastal wetlands and other fragile areas by OCS-related onshore infrastructure and pipelines" remains one of the foremost environmental issues associated with OCS activity. n51 Affected coastal wetlands, for instance, provide a variety of ecosystem services, including absorbing and protecting a state's populated areas from storm surges, affording essential habitat for fish and [*168] wildlife populations, and functioning as protected environs for a portion of the nation's wintering waterfowl. n52 Along with the direct impacts to coastal wetlands from onshore support activities that occur from the construction of canals, pipelines, and shipyards, there are the many indirect effects on vital public resources and services, such as roads, levees, utilities, water supply, garbage disposal, and even increased educational resources for the families of OCS-related activities. n53 These negative effects are all part of the oftentimes subtle socioeconomic effects that adversely impact communities. Professor Robert Gramling has written about this phenomenon for OCS activity, n54 and in this symposium, Professor Fershee describes its quite dramatic effect in the context of increased onshore oil and gas shale activity in North Dakota. n55 Both the OCSLA and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) purportedly afford coastal states the opportunity to shape whether, when, and how leasing might occur off their [*169] coasts. n56 The CZMA, to begin with, represents "a unique federal-state collaboration," n57 designed "to encourage and assist States in developing and implementing

management programs to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of our nation's coast by the exercise of planning and control with respect to activities occurring in their coastal zones." n58 Congress induced states to develop coastal management plans by offering federal funding and guaranteeing, in part, that federal activities would be consistent with the enforceable policies of any such plans, unless otherwise precluded under the law or exempted by the President. n59 The CZMA "offers the unprecedented inducement to coastal states that upon federal approval of their coastal zone management programs, federal actions within or affecting their coastal zones will be conducted in a manner 'consistent' with the states' programs." n60 A state with a coastal zone management (CZM) plan approved by the Department of Commerce, therefore, can review a proposed five-year leasing program or an individual lease sale and assess whether BOEM's proposed action is consistent with that state's enforceable policies contained in the CZM plan. To the extent practicable--that is, to the extent not otherwise prohibited--BOEM must ensure that its actions are consistent with those enforceable polices. Any dispute between the state and federal government over consistency effectively favors the federal government . n61 Also, once a lessee seeks to engage in exploration [*170] or production and development activities, the lessee must ensure that its proposed activities are consistent with the state's approved CZM plan, with any state objection subject to a Department of Commerce override. n62 Of course, the theory of the CZMA does not necessarily translate into anything meaningful during the OCS process. As I have chronicled elsewhere, n63 the Interior Department historically has been reluctant to embrace the CZMA's application to OCS activities. n64 Dr. Dubner aptly captures much of this history when [*171] he observes the program is marked by "that of state/federal jurisdictional conflict which was supposedly settled years ago, but has been going on in part for years." n65 Congress also designed a second mechanism, § 19 of the OCSLA to afford states a significant role in the OCS leasing program. A principal objective of the 1978 OCSLA amendments was to strengthen the role of coastal states in federal OCS oil and gas leasing decisions. n66 Congress intended that affected coastal states could influence pre-lease decisions regarding the size, timing, and location of a lease sale. Section 19(a) of the OCSLA, therefore, provides the governor of an affected state the right to submit recommendations "regarding the size, timing, or location of a proposed lease sale" to the Secretary of the Interior. n67 Congress described this right as affording the states a "leading role" in the process. n68 Section 19(c) of the Act instructs that Secretary "shall" accept these recommendations "if he determines, after having provided the opportunity for consultation, that they provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State." n69 The "Secretary" is further directed to respond to the state in writing, with the "reasons for his determination to accept or reject such Governor's recommendations, or to implement any alternative means identified in consultation with the Governor to provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State." n70 [*172] But this promise, too, has proven illusory . The Interior Department apparently disagrees that this provision serves as a mandate, but instead treats the directive as a mere requirement to explain itself--no different than any general administrative law requirement. In Blanco v. Burton, when Louisiana sought to delay the issuance of a lease sale until after further review in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the government argued that this provision merely served as a formal opportunity for the state to provide input, not an ability to "veto"--apparently conflating an objection or recommendation as to the size, timing or location as a "veto." n71 The government also argued that "[s]o long as the Secretary's decision to reject the Governor's recommendation 'was based on a consideration of the relevant factors' and there has not been a 'clear error of judgment' the Court should defer to the Secretary's determination." n72 The

government further explained that any delay in the lease sale would cost the United States government revenue, affect jobs, and not be consistent with the OCSLA's goal of expeditious oil and gas development. n73 And, the government added, it would ignore the structure of the OCSLA leasing program, because actual environmental impacts occur later on, during the exploration and development phases, n74 at a time, however, when a state lacks the statutory right to affect, the size, timing or location of the sale.

War ImpactFederalism solves global war and promotes economic growthCalabresi 95 [Steven G, Associate Professor at the Northwestern University School of Law, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review, December 1995, 07/14/14]The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigor ously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

Democracy ImpactFederalism solves democracy Stepan 99 [Alfred, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, founding Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy, Toleration and Religion, founding President of Central European University in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw, former Director on Concilium on International and Area Studies at Yale University, Dean of School of International Affairs at Columbia University, author on comparative politics, federalism, and democratic transition, field researcher in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Israel, Palestine, and Brazil, "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model," Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4, https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/6_7_Stepan_1999_Federalism_J_of_Dem.pdf, 07/15/14]Yet in spite of these potential problems, federal rather than unitary states are the form most often associated with multinational democracies. Federal states are also associated with large populations, extensive territories, and democracies with territorially based linguistic fragmentation. In fact, every single longstanding democracy in a territorially based multilingual and multinational polity is a federal state. Although there are many multinational polities in the world, few of them are democracies. Those multinational democracies that do exist, however (Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India), are all federal. Although all these democracies, except for Switzerland, have had problems managing their multinational polities (and even Switzerland had the Sonderbund War, the secession of the Catholic cantons in 1848), they remain reasonably stable. By contrast, Sri Lanka, a territorially based multilingual and multinational unitary state that feared the "slippery slope" of federalism, could not cope with its ethnic divisions and plunged headlong into a bloody civil war that has lasted more than 15 years. In addition to the strong association between multinational democracies and federalism, the six longstanding democracies that score highest on an index of linguistic and ethnic diversity--India, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and the United States--are all federal states. The fact that these nations chose to adopt a federal system does not prove anything; it does, however, suggest that federalism may help these countries manage the problems that come with ethnic and linguistic diversity. In fact, in my judgment, if countries such as Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, China, and Burma are ever to become stable democracies, they will have to craft workable federal systems that allow cultural diversity, a robust capacity for socioeconomic development, and a general standard of equality among their citizens.

Democracy solves extinctionDiamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 95 (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own

populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Economy ImpactFederalism is key to the economy – innovation and policy creativity Katz 12 [Bruce, Vice President and Director, Metropolitan Policy Program, Global Cities Initiative, “Will the Next President Remake Federalism?” Brookings, 03/18/12, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/03/18-federalism-katz, 07/15/14]With the national and global economy in a period of disruptive change, now is a good time to challenge states and metropolitan areas to invent the next growth model. Several states and metro areas might, for example, pioneer a new way of supporting advanced manufacturing. Others might do the same with exports and attracting investment from foreign firms or with upgrading the skills of key advanced-industry workers. With federal direction, this could be a golden era of state and metropolitan innovation.¶ Federalism is not a gift that Washington bestows on statehouses and city halls. Rather, it is a special, often dormant vehicle for galvanizing and unleashing the talents and energies of an entrepreneurial nation. The next president has a historic opportunity to usher in a new era of

pragmatic, collaborative federalism that capitalizes on the economic power of metropolitan areas and the policy creativity of state and local leaders. Remaking federalism is the path toward an economy that is productive, sustainable and inclusive. More broadly, it can be a vehicle for economic prosperity, fiscal solvency and political comity - if the next president is willing to take it.

***Theory***

AT: 50 State FIAT50 State FIAT is good – our interpretation is that the judge is a policy analyst deciding to the plan –

1) Means it’s a logical opportunity cost – a policy analyst has the jurisdiction to chose between state and federal action – net benefits check abuse

2) Neg flex – The aff gets to parametricize the resolution by picking one example – its an inherent advantage because they know way more about their one aff than the neg who has to be prepared for every aff – the only check is to allow the neg flexible fiat options

3) The aff is too utopian by fiating multiple entities – no one would do the plan in the real world

4) Increases Ground – Aff gets all their State-based DAs

5) Key to topic education – states actively participate in ocean policy CSO No Date [Coastal States Organization, “About CSO,” http://www.coastalstates.org/about-cso/, 07/15/14]Serving the States Helping states to maintain their leadership role in the development and implementation of national coastal and ocean policy is among CSO’s most important functions. CSO works with Congress to shape legislation and arrange for state testimony and works with Federal Agencies to comment on proposed regulations. CSO advocates for increased federal funding and support for state-based coastal and ocean programs, as well as responsiveness of federal agency program administration and policies to state concerns. CSO provides information, updates and alerts that keep states attuned to developments in Washington, DC to enable states to respond to legislative, regulatory and policy developments as they occur. CSO serves as an important professional network for state coastal and ocean managers. CSO Work Groups focus on coastal water quality, coastal hazards, coastal zone management, ocean policy and island affairs. CSO also supports a state Legal Council which provides legal background and analysis when needed.

6) Built in the Resolution – the Aff must defend the Federal Government over states – key to topic education

At worst, reject the argument, not the team.

AFF ANSWERS

States Fail

JurisdictionThe Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to research in the EEZ- states would have to ask for permission- links to politicsUS Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_primer.pdf)The exclusive economic Zone (12 to 200 Nautical Miles) The LOS Convention allows each coastal nation to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) adjacent to its territorial sea, extending a maximum of 200 miles seaward from the baseline. Within its EEZ, the coastal nation has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and nonliving resources, whether found in ocean waters, the seabed, or subsoil. It also has jurisdiction over artificial islands or other structures with economic purposes. In 1983, President Reagan proclaimed the U.S. EEZ. which currently occupies the area between 12 miles (the seaward limit of the territorial sea) and 200 miles offshore for international purposes. It also includes areas contiguous to its commonwealths, territories, and possessions. Consistent with international law and traditional high-seas freedoms, the U.S. does not generally assert control over surface or submarine vessel transit, aircraft overflight, or the laying of cables and pipelines on the ocean floor, nor does it assert juris- diction over marine scientific research in the U.S. EEZ to the same extent that most coastal nations do. The United States requires advance consent for marine research, if and only if, any portion of the research is conducted within the U.S. territorial sea, involves the study of marine mammals, requires taking commercial quantities of marine resources, or involves contact with the U.S. continental shelf.

They only have jurisdiction over the Territorial Sea and Contiguous ZoneUS Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_primer.pdf)The Territorial Sea (0 to 12 Nautical Miles) Under international law, every coastal nation has sovereignty over the air space, water col- umn, seabed, and subsoil of its territorial sea, subject to certain rights of passage for foreign vessels and, in more limited circumstances, foreign aircraft. For almost two hundred years, beginning with an assertion by Secretary of Slate Thomas Jefferson in 1793, the United States claimed a territorial sea out to 3 miles. In 1988, President Reagan proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea for the United States, consistent with provisions in the LOS Convention. The proclamation extended the territorial sea only for purposes of international law, explicitly stating that there was no intention to alter domestic law. The Contiguous Zone (12 to 24 Nautical Miles) International law recognizes a contiguous zone outside the territorial sea of each coastal nation. Within its contiguous zone, a nation can assert limited authority related to cus- toms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws. In 1999, President Clinton proclaimed a U.S. contiguous zone from 12 to 24 miles offshore enhancing the U.S. Coast Guard's authority to take enforcement actions against foreign flag vessels throughout this larger area.

States only have jurisdiction for 3 miles out and 9 miles for Texas and FloridaUS Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_primer.pdf)The Baseline (0 Miles) For purposes of both international and domestic law, the boundary line dividing the land from the ocean is called the baseline. The baseline is determined according to principles described in the 1938 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), and is normally the low water line along the coast, as marked on charts officially recog- nized by the coastal nation. In the United States, the definition has been further refined based on federal court decisions; the U.S. baseline is the mean lower low water line along the coast, as shown on official U.S. nautical charts. The baseline is drawn across river mouths, the opening of bays, and along the outer points of complex coastlines. Water bodies inland of the baseline——such as bays, estuaries, rivers, and lakes—are considered "internal waters" subject to national sovereignty. State Seaward Boundaries in the United States (0 to 3 Nautical Miles; 0 to 9 Nautical Miles for Texas, Florida's Gulf Coast, and Puerto Rico) In the 1940s, several states claimed jurisdiction over mineral and other resources off their coasts. This was overturned in 1947, when the Supreme Court determined that states had no title to, or property interest in, these resources. In response, the Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 1953 giving coastal states jurisdiction over a region extending 3 nautical miles seaward from the baseline, commonly referred to as state waters. For historical rea- sons, Texas and the Gulf Coast of Florida are an exception, with state waters extending to 9 nautical miles offshore. (Note: A nautical mile is approximately 6,076 feet. All references hereafter in this Primer to miles are to nautical miles.) Subsequent legislation granted the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa jurisdiction out to 3 miles, while Puerto Rico has a 9-mile jurisdictional boundary.

Ecosystem ManagementStates fail at ecosystem management – differences in capabilityKarkkainen 02 [Bradley C., Associate Professor at Columbia Law School, “COLLABORATIVE ECOSYSTEM GOVERNANCE: SCALE, COMPLEXITY, AND DYNAMISM,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 2001/2002, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]iii. States. States, on the other hand, may be both too big and too small to serve as effective coordinating units in ecosystem management. Their territorial boundaries, which generally define the limits of their jurisdictional reach, tend to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. California, for example, is very large and extremely diverse - by its own calculation spanning ten distinctive "bioregions," each made up of multiple subsystems. n58 Even if a state like [*215] California is motivated to try to engage in ecosystem management, it must effectively find a way to subdivide itself into smaller-scale units in order to manage even these very large regional systems. But some of California's bioregions, such as the Sierra, in the east, or the Klamath, in the north, spill over the state's territorial boundaries, and to that extent, too, the state's territorial boundaries are mismatched to ecological realities.¶ Maryland, on the other hand, is too small. Most of Maryland is in the Chesapeake Bay basin, and the Bay is the dominant and defining feature of its ecology. But the state of Maryland shares the Bay with Virginia and the Chesapeake Bay's watershed - the source of much of the nutrient pollution that plagues the main stem of the Bay - encompasses an even larger multistate region, severely constraining Maryland's ability to manage ecological conditions in the Bay without some significant degree of interstate coordination. n59 States, then, will tend to be either under-inclusive or over-inclusive or both simultaneously, their boundaries poorly matched to the demands of ecosystem stewardship.¶ Again compounding the difficulty is the question of capacity and institutional competence. For all the categories mentioned so far - landowners, local governments, and states -

knowledge and money are likely to be critical limiting factors . States, in general, may be expected to have greater in-house expertise, greater capacity to acquire and process the relevant scientific and technical information, greater financial resources should they choose to deploy them, and a more robust and well-rounded set of regulatory powers (again, subject to a political decision to deploy them) than either individual landowners or local governments. But states' capacities are highly variable. Some are relatively well endowed with the relevant financial, managerial, and information resources, others less so. On the other hand, because of their very size, states may lack what is possessed in great abundance by more localized parties, that is, the capacity to generate fine-grained, high-resolution information at more localized scales. Critically, this includes specific information as to the localized costs of ecosystem management, as well as the opportunity costs of foregoing or constraining [*216] real estate development in a particular community or on a particular parcel.¶ Although a state like California may possess relatively high-quality information on the life cycle of the California Gnatcatcher and the stresses on its coastal sage scrub habitat, it may have less precise and locally detailed information on the costs and consequences of a rule curbing development in the coastal sage scrub than is held or could be acquired by the largest local landowners or the city and county governments, who are likely to be acutely sensitive to these questions.¶ For all of these reasons, I shall argue that the shift toward ecosystem management, although it devolves substantial authority toward regional

scales, should not be equated with the more familiar forms of federalist devolution of authority to the states . n60 Undoubtedly, the states will

have a prominent role to play, n61 and they have emerged as major players in all the collaborative ecosystem governance arrangements I have cited. But a high degree of state autonomy could actually turn out to be antithetical to effective ecosystem management if, for example, it impedes interstate coordination where needed, or if authority becomes lodged at a tier of government that is neither particularly well-informed about regional ecosystems, nor places a high priority on managing them, nor has the informational, technical, administrative, financial, or political resources at its disposal to manage them effectively. This is not to say that all states would do a poor job at it. But there is a good deal more to effective ecosystem management than for the federal government simply to stand down from the leading role it has played in environmental stewardship in the past three decades, and devolve authority to the states in the hope that they will do the job well and wisely, because the states are not ideally matched to the task either territorially or in terms of institutional capacities. n62

Perm

GenericPerm solves and shields the link – states fail on their ownOPC 13 [State of California Ocean Protection Council, “CALL FOR ACTION: PROECT THE NATION’S OCEANS & COSTS, 11/27/13, http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/project_pages/WCGA/0805COPC_02_Attachment.pdf, 07/15/14]CLEAR PRIORITIES ¶ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coastal States Organization, and other partners have ¶ held public discussions around the country centered on four priorities to direct the nation’s future coastal efforts: ¶ • Support healthy coastal communities and coastal-dependent economies; ¶ • Protect and restore coastal ecosystems, habitats, and unique resources; ¶ • Prepare for impacts of climate change; and, ¶ • Make sure that local, state, regional, and federal coastal programs work together at all appropriate scales. ¶ ¶ States will use these priorities and scientific and technical assessments of state and local coastal conditions and ¶ need to prepare multi-year strategic approaches to implement them. States will be accountable through measures ¶ of performance in meeting priorities. State efforts will be evaluated periodically. ¶ ¶ STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIP AND ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ¶ State and local government land use decisions and public infrastructure investments are key to the future of ¶ protecting coastal resources and creating healthy communities. But state and local governments need technical, ¶ planning, and financial assistance to improve decision-making and management. National investments are critical ¶ to enabling local governments to be strong partners in developing and carrying out programs to meet coastal management objectives.

Perm solves efficiency, coordination and integration of state and federal policiesJOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June 2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)Action 3: Support state and regional ocean and coastal priorities Coastal states and regions play an essential role in fostering durable ocean policy solutions that lead to both healthier ocean ecosystems and stronger coastal economies. In fact, states and regions often play a leadership role, developing and implementing innovative approaches that can serve as models for national efforts. It is widely understood that decision-making approaches led by states and regions, with strong federal support in the form of technical resources and engaged commitment, are more effective and durable than those driven exclusively from the federal level. The fact is that decades of insufficiently coordinated, sector-based management of ocean and coastal resources at the federal level have taken their toll on the health of our ocean and coastal ecosystems. Fortunately, federal agencies are now working to create a more efficient , integrated approach to management by setting up mechanisms to increase coordination and reduce duplication of federal agency policies and activities. This should lead to increased transparency, support predictable and efficient decision making, and be undertaken in close collaboration with regional, state, and tribal entities.

Such a coordinated approach will help to reduce conflicts, redundancies, and inefficiencies that waste time and money, and will also result in better resource management. Federal agencies must also make efforts to think beyond their specific missions and collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries to address the priorities of each region in which they operate in ways that are appropriate for states in the region.

Perm solves lack of state funding for ecosystem managementJOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June 2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)support multi-state regional ocean partnerships For many years, multi-state regional ocean partnerships in the Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, South Atlantic, West Coast, Caribbean, and Pacific Island regions have worked to address ocean issues across state boundaries, with some focusing on planning for the expansion and development of new and traditional ocean activities. These regional partnerships often work closely with federal agencies and tribal governments to improve communication and coordination, leading to enhanced scientific understanding and improved resource management. In short, multi-state, regional efforts are essential to successful ocean management, because ocean ecosystems—including the marine species and ocean currents that help define their boundaries—span jurisdictional lines. At the same time, these state and regional efforts are under-resourced. For them to continue to succeed, additional federal funding and technical assistance are necessary. In addition, federal support of state and regional efforts should include high-level participation by all relevant agencies, a willingness to think creatively to leverage resources, and a dedication to improving the way decisions are made.

Perm do both solves best – key to coordinationJOCI 09 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Regional and State Ocean Leadership,” http://oceanleadership.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Regional_and_State_Ocean_Leadership.pdf)Due to the physical and ecological characteristics of oceans, coasts, and watersheds, marine resources are difficult to delineate along traditional geopolitical borders, which confirms the need for regional cooperation in the protection and management of the oceans. The current patchwork of federal, state, and local ocean policies is inherently incapable of effectively and coherently addressing such complex challenges as ocean dead zones, overfishing, habitat loss, and the impacts of and possible adaptations to climate change along our densely populated coasts. It also constrains our ability to explore and take advantage of promising new opportunities such as ocean-based forms of alternative energy production, environmentally and economically sustainable offshore aquaculture, and marine bioprospecting. Regional collaborations among states can facilitate effective management across jurisdictional boundaries and are necessary for implementing ecosystem-based management and the presence of such entities encourages region-specific science and management. Moreover, multi-state and other regional governance mechanisms can strengthen the voice of local stakeholders in communicating their needs to the federal government States have been forging ahead, working to incorporate new alliances; these efforts should be further supported by coordination with federal agencies. Guiding Principles for Effective Regional Collaboration Regional ocean governance mechanisms can facilitate more coordinated and collaborative approaches to realizing opportunities and addressing concerns in the region. By developing compatible and coordinated plans and processes, governments at all levels can work together to develop regional goals and priorities, improve responses to regional needs, and develop and disseminate regionally significant research and information. Efforts to enhance regional and state ocean governance initiatives should

observe the following principles: ■ Regional Research and Information. Decision makers at all levels, but particularly at the local level, need accurate and timely information about ocean and coastal ecosystems, including how human activities impact those ecosystems. ■ Regional Ecosystem Assessments. Assessments of the natural, cultural, social, and economic attributes in a region would help guide management decisions and improve the process mandated under the National Environmental Policy Act by providing a single science-based regional assessment that can be the basis for individual environmental impact statements. ■ Enhance Regional Governance Capacity by Improving Federal Coordination in Regions. Our governmental institutions need to be recalibrated to enable government at all levels to work together more effectively at the regional level. One step toward improved regional coordination is for federal agencies to identify opportunities and further coordinate existing programs and activities to assist and support more effective response to regional priorities.

Federal coordination is keyJOCI 12 (“U.S. Ocean Policy Report card 2012,” Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, http://www.jointoceancommission.org/resource-center/2-Report-Cards/2012-06-06_2012_JOCI_report_card.pdf)What remains to be done to improve the grade? The Joint Initiative is encouraged that the federal ocean agencies are improving communication and coordination among themselves and with the states, but recognizes that there is still a great deal of room for further improvement. The National Ocean Council should work more closely with regions, states, and local communities to identify priority needs and issues that could benefit from the National Ocean Policy. In those areas, the Council should support and help assist with the development of collaborative strategies to achieve locally driven goals, while advancing the implementation of the National Ocean Policy. As the National Ocean Council works on improved engagement with stakeholders and citizens, an effective communication and outreach effort is needed to clearly articulate the intent of the National Ocean Policy and clarify how it will lead to improved management of ocean resources, more efficient regulatory processes, and greater coordination among levels of government. A major misstep in the rollout and initial implementation of the National Ocean Policy was unclear communication about why a new approach to management is needed, how the policy will be coordinated with existing federal and state laws and regulations, and what the short and long term outcomes of the policy will be. Concerns about regional ocean planning specifically need to be addressed, and the National Ocean Council should reach out directly to stakeholders and citizens to clarify the role of regional ocean planning, how it may impact existing ocean uses, and the extent to which it will affect inland activities. It has become urgent that these questions be answered clearly and explicitly. The Joint Initiative continues to emphasize the importance of strong stakeholder engagement as the National Ocean Council works with the states and regions to implement the National Ocean Policy. We urge the National Ocean Council to address the concerns being raised and provide increased opportunities for stakeholders to ask questions and give input directly to members of the Council. To this end, the National Ocean Council should establish routine opportunities in all regions for stakeholders to engage with the Council members, through in- person forums or workshops, in order to gather input on the implementation process, listen to concerns, and discuss specific examples and opportunities of how the region may benefit from the more comprehensive and coordinated approach of the National Ocean Policy. The National Ocean Council should also reach out specifically to ocean industries to work with them to better understand their ideas and seek their increased engagement on how to best implement the policy so that it leads to more efficient regulatory processes, reduces conflicts between uses, and provides other benefits that achieve economic growth while protecting the health of the ecosystems on which the industries depend. As a part of this communication effort, the Joint Initiative urges the National Ocean Council to better utilize the Governance Coordinating

Committee by engaging them more in advising and providing feedback on Council activities and documents.

ArcticFederal-state coop key for Arctic Research and Oil Spill ManagementJOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June 2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)In order to effectively manage the rapidly changing Arctic, we must enhance our scientific understanding of Arctic marine ecosystems, including how fish stocks are migrating and trends in weather and climate patterns that could have significant economic, environmental, and human health impacts. We must also gather the critical baseline information needed to evaluate and guide economic development in the region and allow us to prepare for contingencies. This will require significant investment in research infrastructure and monitoring programs. At present, many public, private, and nonprofit entities are funding and conducting Arctic oil spill research. Given declining federal budgets, more needs to be done to avoid duplication, coordinate research, and pursue public/private partnerships and joint funding opportunities. For instance, the Administration should further partner with the oil and gas industry, other commercial interests, nongovernmental organizations, state governments, local and tribal communities, and other interested stakeholders to assess challenges, identify research priorities, and develop coordinated solutions. The engagement of local communities and Alaska Natives is especially critical to ensure that traditional knowledge is integrated into research programs and decision making. The Administration should also engage in international agreements with other Arctic nations to share data, information, and research platforms. The recently released Interagency Arctic Research Plan: FY2013-2017 provides a strong foundation to guide public and private investment in Arctic science. However, greater support must be provided to implement the Arctic observation network so that we can take advantage of the opportunity to properly manage human activities in this sensitive ecosystem before it is too late.

Offshore WindCooperative federalism solves offshore wind best – states prevents regulatory uncertainty and shields the link to politics Maxwell 12 [Veery, third year law student at UC Hasting with an interest in cleantech, “Wind Energy Development: Can Wind Power Overcome Substantial Hurdles to Reach the Grid?,” West Northwest Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Summer 2012, LexisNexis, 07/13/14]Currently, the wind turbine siting process lies largely in the hands of local and state governments. As a result, the regulatory process is inconsistent and often unpredictable . Given the national interest in supporting renewable energy production,

the public at large and the wind energy industry specifically stand to benefit from a cooperative federalism framework for the regulatory process.¶ Several federal agencies , including the Bureau of Land Management, are in the process of developing and issuing guidelines for siting wind turbines on federal land. n157 Most historical wind energy development, however, has taken place on private land, thus the proposed Bureau of Land Management guidelines would not even apply. States have adopted a variety of regulatory approaches for wind developers; some states grant [*347] authority for siting decisions to special siting boards, while others use general utility commissions. n158 It is common for state regulatory authority over wind developments to be spread among state environmental, natural resource, parks, historical preservation, and transportation agencies. Additionally, developers must comply with state laws relating to environmental impact reports, water quality, endangered species, wetlands, and storm water runoff regulatory requirements. n159¶ Instituting a cooperative federalism framework for the wind energy industry could reform the current inconsistent and convoluted regulatory process. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA") serves as a successful role model for such a framework. n160 The TCA was enacted to support the deployment of a national telecommunications network, and includes a cell tower siting policy as a part of the overall strategy. n161 The TCA siting policy largely leaves siting decisions in local hands, but constrains certain local decisions in order to balance local concerns with the national interest in developing a communications network. n162 Prior to the passage of the TCA, local NIMBY-driven opposition to cell towers often prevented siting approval of projects, or made them prohibitively expensive. n163¶ Cooperative federalism, when applied to wind regulatory processes, could increase regulatory uniformity while continuing to encourage local tailoring and experimentation . n164 According to the

Department of Energy, deployment of wind projects would be greatly facilitated by increased uniformity of regulatory requirements across regions. n165 Local control of wind siting has resulted in increased application and compliance costs, and provided local opponents with the opportunity to revise local ordinances to prevent turbine construction. n166 However, this desire for increased efficiency should be balanced against the fact that experience in environmental regulation has shown the need to tailor land use policies to local circumstances. n167¶ [*348] The diversity of siting options for wind turbines has been one of the impediments to promulgating uniform federal siting guidelines, since the best practices for siting vary greatly depending on the specific location. n168 For this reason, a federal wind-siting framework should provide suggested guidelines that allow localities to experiment and surpass the base level established at the federal level. Additionally, a cooperative federalism model is preferable to a complete

preemption by federal authority in terms of political feasibility . Any proposition that devolves authority from local and state officials to a federal agency is likely to be met with staunch opposition.¶ The framework that must be established by the federal action should be mostly fluid, but must contain a couple of key preventative measures. These requirements include prohibiting local governments from banning wind developments, siting decisions must be made within a reasonable time window, and decisions must be made in writing and supported by substantial evidence. n169 Such requirements would alleviate many of the issues raised by local control over siting. These explicit federal constraints strike the appropriate balance between local autonomy and the national interest in encouraging wind as a clean domestic energy source.

Federalism Bad

EconomyFederalism is bad – only centralization can solve the economy and competitivenessMeyerson 09 [Harold, editor at large at The American Prospect and a columnist for The Washington Post, “Fed Up With Federalism,” The American Prospect, 11/19/09, http://prospect.org/article/fed-federalism-0, 07/15/14]By accident of its birth -- a collection of separate colonies that slowly came together to form an independent union and revolted against the remote power of the British government -- the United States has an enduring bias toward localism, an aversion to centralized government that is part of its DNA. For some on the left, this has been seen as a positive. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country," Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote.¶ Even though progressives such as Brandeis have celebrated our federalism, it's important to remember that Brandeis lived and worked at a time when the federal government was icebound in conservative orthodoxy and the cause of social justice could be advanced only in a small number of states and cities. Segregationists like George Wallace and Richard Russell have celebrated our federalism, too, arguing for states' rights at a time when the national government was moving to abolish the Jim Crow laws throughout the South.¶ Conversely, liberals have argued for the right of the nation to move beyond its federalist constraints during those periods when they controlled the national government (the 1930s and, especially, the 1960s). And during the late, lamentable Bush presidency, conservative justices on the Supreme Court frequently forbade the states from enacting stricter regulations on business than those that Bush's administration had put in place.¶ The love of federalism is a sometime thing; its critics and champions switch places depending on who is in power at which level of government. But the problem with our allegedly ingenious federal system is not simply that half the time, if not more, it is an effective way to protect all that is biased and unfair in the American nation. The problem is also that federalism inherently subverts a coherent national response to many

fundamental challenges the United States faces, at a time when other major nations -- our competitors in an increasingly global economy -- face no such structural impediment. ¶ Given the sheer size of America and the distinct cultural identity of its many regions, federalism has always made a certain amount of sense. The abolition of the slave trade and the legalization of gay marriage had to begin somewhere. As the rise of national government, transportation, and media have eroded regional identities, traditions, and isolation, however, more conservatives than liberals have found a refuge in federalism.¶ But even though federalism is more often the refuge of reactionaries than of visionaries, it has an even deeper flaw: setting the nation at cross-purposes with itself, and never more so than during a recession.¶ ***¶ There is a classic algebra problem in which water pours into a bathtub from the tap at a specified rate but also exits the tub at a different rate because someone has neglected to stop the drain. If you know the rates, you should be able to figure when the water will rise to a certain level. During a recession, the United States becomes a version of that bathtub. The federal government is the tap. The state and local governments are the drain.¶ That's no way to fight a recession. When investment, production, and consumption are all in decline, the only way to keep the economy from shrinking is for the federal government to deficit spend and create a stimulus. But while the federal government pours money in, the state and local governments, which cannot deficit spend, see their tax revenue shrinking, so they cut spending, raise taxes, or both – taking money out of the economy. America's distinct brand of federalism inherently impedes an economic recovery. ¶ Consider the state with the biggest tap and the biggest drain: California. The sum total of the federal tax cuts for Californians included in last year's Bush administration stimulus legislation and this year's Obama administration stimulus came to $15.5 billion for the years 2008 to 2010 -- money desperately needed to boost consumer spending in the midst of the worst downturn since the Depression, says Jean Ross, executive director of the California Budget Project. But the sum total of state tax increases enacted by the California Legislature and signed into law by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2008 and 2009, Ross says, came to $12.5 billion for the years 2008 to 2010 -- money desperately needed to keep public services in California from grinding to a halt in the midst of the worst downturn since the Depression. "The state negated 80 percent of the feds' tax cut,"

Ross says. "And the cuts and the increases pretty much targeted the same lower-income groups."¶ Nor were the negations limited to tax cuts. Ross calculates the federal government's direct aid to education, its block-grant programs and other education-related expenditures for California total $9.5 billion from 2008 to 2010. The state government's cuts to K-12 schools, community colleges, the California State University, and the University of California add up to $17.4 billion for the same years.¶ California leads the fiscal--disaster pack, but it is anything but alone. A September paper from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports that since the recession began, at least 41 states and the District of Columbia have slashed their budgets for a wide range of services -- 27 for health care, 25 for aid to the elderly and disabled, 26 for K-12 education, 34 for higher education, and some states for all of these. Forty-two states have reduced wages to state workers through layoffs, furloughs, and salary cuts. At least 30 states have raised taxes during the same period. "All of these steps remove demand from the economy," the center concludes. They "reduce the purchasing power of workers' families, which in turn affects local businesses."¶ Without the Obama stimulus, which appropriated roughly $140 billion to the states to reduce their budgetary shortfalls during 2009 and 2010, these numbers would be even worse -- though keep in mind that $140 billion in federal funds isn't engendering growth; it's merely offsetting state cutbacks. The center estimates that the federal bailout enabled states to reduce their budget gaps by 40 percent. But with state financial shortfalls in those two years coming to a whopping $350 billion, that leaves $210 billion in unrecompensed state budget shortfalls, which the states have to make up by cutbacks or tax hikes or financial gimmicks. Dean Baker and Rivka Deutsch of the Center for Economic and Policy Research estimate that the cutbacks and tax hikes of cities, counties, and school districts in 2009 and 2010 will come to an additional $15 billion.¶ So how much does the government's stimulus come to when we subtract the amount the states and localities are taking out of the economy from the amount the feds are putting in? The two-year Obama stimulus amounted to $787 billion, of which $70 billion was really just the usual taxpayers' annual exemption from the alternative minimum tax, and $146 billion was actually appropriated for the years 2011 to 2019. That leaves $571 billion that the federal government is pumping into the economy during 2009 and 2010. Subtract the amount that state and local governments are withdrawing from the economy (they have a combined shortfall of around $365 billion, but let's say they do enough fiscal finagling so that the total of their cutbacks and tax hikes is just $325 billion), and we're left with $246 billion.¶ At $787 billion, the stimulus came to 2.6 percent of the nation's gross domestic product for 2009 and 2010 -- not big enough, but a respectable figure. At $246 billion -- the net of the federal stimulus minus the state and local anti-stimulus -- it comes to just 0.8 percent of GDP, a level lower than those of many of the nations that the U.S. chastised for failing to stimulate their economies sufficiently.¶ But other major nations don't have federal systems that turn them into unstopped bathtubs in times of recession. They have states and municipalities, to be sure, but either the responsibility for funding most functions of government resides with the national government, or, as in Japan, state and local governments are not required to run annual balanced budgets. In China, which probably has had the most robust recovery of any major nation, taxes and spending for everything are set in Beijing (including the lower tax rates for provinces in which manufacturing for export is the main economic activity). In France, taxing and spending has been controlled by the national government at least as far back as Louis XIV. In Britain, funding for local government also comes from the national government; "local taxation," says Thomas Barry, first secretary for economic affairs in the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., "is a very small fraction of the total tax burden in the U.K."¶ Such is obviously not the case in the U.S. The national government alone funds defense and the two great social programs, Social Security and Medicare, created at moments (1935 and 1965) when liberals controlled both Congress and the White House. But state and local governments, which can't run deficits, remain the primary funders of education, transportation, local infrastructure, and public safety and split the cost of health care for the poor with the feds. What this means is that the governmental impediments the United States encounters during a recession are far greater than those encountered by the other major nations with which we compete in the ever more global economy. What this means is that our federal system is, in this very significant particular, massively dysfunctional.¶ ***¶ This September, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the agency that runs LA's growing subway system and its far-flung bus lines, struck a novel deal with an Italian rail manufacturer. In return for its purchase of 100 light-rail cars from the company, the MTA got the company to agree to locate a unionized factory in Los Angeles. Problems with the manufacturer caused the deal to collapse, though, and the MTA is now searching for another company that will build the trains in Los Angeles. The agency's attempt to bolster local industry with a Buy-LA policy has encountered opposition, however, from the Los Angeles Times, which noted in an editorial that federal funds available for buying clean, green rail transport are denied to states and cities that insist on making the product locally. To be sure, the Obama administration has allotted billions of dollars to incubate an electric-car industry. But it is not insisting on domestic content, nor has it cut a deal with a foreign manufacturer to locate a factory here, as Los Angeles is trying to do with rails and as Southern states have done for years with foreign automakers.¶ The federal government doesn't do that. Well, our federal government doesn't do that. Foreign federal governments do that all the time. China has spared no expense to attract foreign manufacturers,

routinely abating their taxes, holding wages in check, offering help to construct new facilities. In the U.S., states and cities woo foreign and domestic investors with an array of tax and zoning incentives; right-to-work states promise to hold down wages, too. But the kinds of sweeping guarantees that national governments can offer are beyond the capacity of states and localities to promise, much less deliver.¶ China, for instance, is halfway through a stunningly ambitious project to build 100 university science parks roughly modeled on North Carolina's fabled Research Triangle. On average, the parks, according to the testimony of attorney Alan Wolff to the U.S.?China Commission, are 150 percent the size of North Carolina's triangle. "China has taken our model and expanded dramatically on it," Rick Weddle, CEO of the Research Triangle Foundation, testified to the commission. "We toured a research park in Suzhou that is a joint venture between the Chinese government and Singapore. We wouldn't even think about that."¶ The industrial policies of American states are dwarfed by those of foreign nations, while the one entity with the resources to compete with foreign nations -- the federal government -- stays out of the game. States seek new factories while the federal government shuns domestic content requirements. As with stimulus policy during recessions, state and federal industrial policies seem totally at cross-purposes.¶ Federalism also enables federal and state governments to punt the responsibility for funding politically contentious programs to each other -- a pretty good way of ensuring that the programs will end up underfunded. A quick way to grasp the contrasting levels of political power wielded by the elderly (considerable) and the poor (negligible), for instance, is to look at how the government funds their health care. Medicare, for seniors, is entirely federally funded. Medicaid, for the poor, has the responsibility for its funding split between the federal government and the states. Despite the fact that Medicaid is nominally a national program, the levels of financial support that states allot it vary considerably. During the current recession, many states have opted to slash Medicaid benefits, even as federal Medicare benefits have largely stayed intact.¶ The perverse consequences of this hybrid funding have seldom been clearer than during the health-care reform battle, in which the Senate Finance Committee's bill to open Medicaid rolls to more Americans without pledging full federal funding for the program has presented recession-wracked states with a problem they could do without. After Gov. Schwarzenegger stated that the increased cost to his state could amount to $8 billion annually, Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, who backs the health-reform efforts, announced that she couldn't support a bill that increased the state's costs. (In the House bill, the federal government picks up almost all of the states' increased Medicaid costs.) Federal mandates on states that must balance their budgets during recessions are problematic policy, and they illustrate the buck-passing that is inherent in the federal system. Historically, the price for this feature of federalism has been paid neither by the federal nor state governments but by the poor.¶ In regulatory matters, the gap between federal and state standards can work as Brandeis thought it should, but it can also enable businesses to comparison shop for the lowest level of regulations. While federalism is an effective way to create multiple governmental power centers in a nation, it creates a system that powerful private players can game. The diffusion of power inherent in federalism works best when power in the private economy and civil society is also diffused, so that, for instance, business will get push-back from labor when it attempts to arbitrage the gaps between state and federal law.¶ The boundary between federal and state functions in the United States has always been a flexible one, and one that has moved slowly and haltingly toward the federal level throughout most of the nation's history. By the standards of nearly every other major nation, however, and increasingly by the standard of common sense, the United States retains a system of government that frequently subverts its own policies and enables federal and state governments to negate each other's endeavors. Federalism has its points, but in a growing number of ways, and especially during a recession, it makes no damn sense at all.

Federalism wrecks stimulus and economic recovery – prevents growthSurowiecki 09 [Surowiecki, staff writer at The New Yorker, “Fifty Ways to Kill Recovery,” The New Yorker, 07/27/09, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2009/07/27/090727ta_talk_surowiecki, 07/15/14]If you came up with a list of obstacles to economic recovery in this country, it would include all the usual suspects—our still weak banking system, falling house prices, overindebted consumers, cautious companies. But here are fifty culprits you might not have thought of: the states. Federalism, often

described as one of the great strengths of the American system, has become a serious

impediment to reversing the downturn. ¶ It’s easy enough, of course, to mock state governments nowadays, what with California issuing I.O.U.s to pay its bills and New York’s statehouse becoming the site of palace coups and senatorial sit-ins. But the real problem isn’t the fecklessness of local politicians. It’s the ordinary way in which state governments go about their business. Think about the $787-billion federal stimulus package. It’s built on the idea that during serious economic downturns the government can use spending increases and tax cuts to counteract the effects of consumers who are cutting back on spending and businesses that are cutting back on investment. So fiscal policy at the national level is countercyclical: as the economy shrinks, government expands. At the state level, though, the opposite is happening. Nearly every state government is required to balance its budget. When times are bad, jobs vanish, sales plummet, investment declines, and tax revenues fall precipitously—in New York, for instance, state revenues in April and May were down thirty-six per cent from a year earlier. So states have to raise taxes or cut spending, or both, and that’s precisely what they’re doing: states from New Jersey to Oregon have raised taxes in the past year, while significant budget cuts have become routine and are likely to get only deeper in the year ahead. The states’ fiscal policy, then, is procyclical: it’s amplifying the effects of the downturn, instead of mitigating them. Even as the federal government is pouring money into the economy, state governments are effectively taking it out. It’s a push-me, pull-you approach to fighting the recession.¶ Now, state cutbacks have not been as severe as they might have been, thanks to the stimulus plan, which includes roughly $140 billion in aid to local governments. That aid, according to a recent study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, has covered thirty to forty per cent of the states’ budget shortfalls. Money for the states translates directly into jobs not lost and services not cut—which is why you can make a good case that more of the stimulus should have gone to state aid. Yet there’s no sign that those budget gaps are getting smaller, and, as the federal money runs out, state tax increases and spending cutbacks are only going to become more common. In the midst of this downturn, some of the biggest players in the economy—state and local governments together account for about thirteen per cent of G.D.P.—will be doing precisely the wrong thing.¶ Fiscal federalism also makes it harder to spend the stimulus money efficiently. Much of the tens of billions of dollars that will be spent on

roads, for instance, will be funnelled through the states. As a result, a disproportionate amount of the money will be spent in rural areas

(which exert disproportionate influence on state governments), leaving cities—which happen to have most of the people and most of the traffic—shortchanged. The top eighty-five metropolitan areas in the country are responsible for about three-quarters of the country’s G.D.P. Yet less than half of the road money will be invested there. The billions in stimulus money that’s going to high-speed rail will likely be spent more sensibly, since the Obama Administration has placed a premium on interstate cooperation in building the network. Still, whether we end up with true regional, let alone national, rapid-transit networks will depend largely on decisions made at the state, rather than the national, level. In other words, you may be able to get from Miami to Orlando quickly, but it could be a slow train (at best) to the rest of the country.