atlantic voices, vol.4, no. 9
TRANSCRIPT
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 1
- Magda Kocianova & Maria Mundt
The growing imbalance between sup-
ply and demand in the energy market has
been confirmed by recent crises and will lead
to more instability in the supply chain by
developed economies.
This month’s edition of Atlantic Voices
will analyse NATO and the EU’s current
stance on future energy challenges and at-
tempt to identify the relevant energy issues
for transatlantic actors. Given the fact that
the majority of European states are depend-
ent on imports of energy supply from exter-
nal unstable suppliers, the energy policy has
recently dominated the political and security
debates.
The two articles will analyse the po-
tential risks that could affect the transatlantic
community’s energy security and contribute
to cumulative knowledge in a sphere of a
new but critical interests. This edition will
further analyse how transatlantic actors are
addressing the vulnerability of the world en-
ergy markets, whether these are disruptions
from geopolitical strives or natural disasters,
and how strategic energy policies should go
beyond the supply of oil, in order to prevent
disasters to affect multiple economies simul-
taneously.
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection:
The Role of NATO and the EU
Volume 4 - Issue 9 September 2014
Contents:
Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on Current Energy Situation
Julian Gajo explains the significance of the recent energy security debate within the European Union amid the increased tensions in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, analysing the vulnerability of the EU Member States depend-ent on energy imports.
NATO and the EU’s Potential Role in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
Alessandro Niglia focuses on different policies and approaches towards the Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection within the Euro-Atlantic sphere, spe-cifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, elab-orating on the prospects for future potential collaboration.
Solar panels and wind power plants are increasingly used by the European states to pro-mote renewable energy production.
(Photo: Institute of Energy for South-Eastern Europe)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 2
energy sources. Both of these basic assertions approve
of the assumption that the increasing importance of
energy security touches upon the idea of interdepend-
ence.
This interdependence presumes a more or less
balanced relationship between two or more political
entities, which both have their tools or means of
demonstrating leverage and power over the other
(besides traditional military strength, which in times of
increasing global interconnectedness has been reduced
to a mere last resort of power). Interdependence is
however a very fragile state of a relationship and can
easily turn into an asymmetrical interdependence that
is then rather considered as a one-sided dependence of
one entity to another. Especially when looking at ener-
gy relations, this notion seems to hold true in the vast
majority of cases. The implications this has on the EU
are just as profound, as they are complex. This article
intends to give a succinct insight into the EU’s energy
situation with regards to this theoretical notion.
Recent Trends
So far, the year 2014 has revealed two major
trends in transnational energy relations. Although those
trends were not unexpected in their basic nature, they
have marked a dramatic intensification of transnational
energy relations in recent months. One trend is the
By Mr. Julian Gajo
I n recent years, energy security has incrementally
moved into the focus of public debate and up on
the national and international political agendas.
Especially when looking at the EU, it has furthermore
become increasingly important in the field of foreign
policy, given the Union’s over-reliance on imports
from non-EU energy producers. This is not least due
to the acknowledgment of the increasing nexus be-
tween energy security and political freedom of action
as an element of independence and sovereignty.
There are many reasons for these causally determined
tendencies and any investigation on this matter can
only capture a limited part of the greater image.
Amidst the often times arbitrarily used range of multi-
faceted terms, such as competitiveness, sustainability,
and the term energy security itself, identification or
articulation of a coherent argument is the first chal-
lenge when approaching issues related to energy poli-
cy. One of the most adequate theories that reflect the
current international discussion on energy security is
the complex interdependence theory. This article will
approach the present theme in an attempt to identify
the relevance of energy issues in contemporary poli-
tics, how this affects the EU and how this in turn is
linked to the EU’s transatlantic relations. As an exem-
plary energy resource, this article will center on gas
trade to limit and hence sharpen its focus.
The complex interdependence theory argues
that in the context of transnational relations, political
agendas lack hierarchy and nation states are not only
connected through official political elites, but through
numerous official and unofficial ties – as it is the case
with the energy sector, which includes (amongst oth-
ers) international organizations, multinational compa-
nies and NGOs. At the same time, the energy sector
is of varying relevance to different nation states, de-
pending on whether they are demanding or supplying
Gazprom’s Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas field.
(Gazprom)
Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on
Current Energy Situation
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 3
reaffirmation of the assertion that the EU’s energy sector
does not only heavily rely on non-EU energy providers,
but also that this asymmetrical interdependence creates a
gap between relying on energy imports and the ability to
demonstrate leverage towards non-EU actors in foreign
affairs, as the EU cannot afford the risk to lose key energy
providers. This holds especially true when looking at fos-
sil energy sources such as gas. The other trend is the one
of intensified efforts in minimizing possible dependence
on external or non-EU energy providers. Besides more
common strategies, which include measures such as di-
versification of providers or diversification of energy
sources, a more recent tool is what is commonly known
as hydraulic fracturing, or short ‘fracking’, which has the
potential of exploiting yet unexplored gas reserves. This
method is however highly controversial due to its un-
charted impacts on the environment. The new technology
represents one of the biggest differences between the US
and the EU in their approach of minimizing energy de-
pendence, as elaborated on below, and potentially repre-
sents a turn of the tides in transatlantic energy policies.
The intensified awareness of dependence on exter-
nal energy providers has not sprung from nowhere. With
a lagging, yet increasingly determined energy strategy of
approaching a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector,
which also includes a long-term phase-out of nuclear en-
ergy, the EU is especially dependent on the fossil re-
source gas, which is commonly considered to be a ‘bridge
-fuel’ – a necessary energy source that is to provide ener-
gy security in the transformation process of the EU’s en-
ergy sector. While simultaneously expanding ‘smart-
grids’ and promoting the development of renewable en-
ergies, it is undeniable that the EU’s energy sector is yet
characterized by a strong reliance on fossil fuels. Latest
figures from 2012 indicate that the EU-28 consumes
some 392.8 mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent), while
only producing around 133.4 mtoe. The EU’s net import
of gas is hence 258.6 mtoe, which roughly accounts for
66% of its gas consumption. This is mainly due to the
fact that fossils are extremely scarce within the EU, which
is why imports and hence import dependency rates re-
main high and in some cases even increase. Especially
with regards to gas imports (import dependency rate
2012: 65.8%), this dependency is treacherous. Not
only are the vast majority of gas resources in the hands
of only a few producing states world-wide, it is also
hard to transport – commonly through pipelines or
more expensively in form of LNG tankers. All of these
developments and characteristics, which determine the
EU’s current energy situation, provide ideal circum-
stances for dependence or interdependence to develop.
Recent dramatic political events in the European
neighborhood have shown how significant it is to deal
with this interdependence.
The Impact of the Arab Spring on the EU’s En-
ergy Sector
One of those events was the Arab Spring in early
2011, still overshadowing current situations in affected
countries. A popular uprising overthrew thitherto au-
tocratic or quasi-autocratic regimes and – for the sake
of democratic development – turned stable economic
partners into unstable neighboring countries with in-
terim governments. Whereas some countries, such as
Tunisia, were able to manage this drastic political
switch rather successfully, other countries, such as Lib-
ya, are still dealing with the aftermath, being strongly
characterized by armed conflict and domestic unrest.
To the EU’s energy sector, this is especially disadvanta-
geous, as Libya, rich in oil resources, represented one
of the most important energy partners in the region.
Although Europe’s most valuable gas trade partner in
the region, namely Algeria, managed to suppress a full-
scale national uprising, the EU did face a serious threat
to the stability of its gas imports, potentially being ex-
posed to an era of uncertainty in energy relations to-
FRACKING: Hydraulic fracturing is a high-tech method of retrieving natural gas or petroleum
from deep rock formations comprising unexplored fossil energy resources by injecting high-pressure fluids (usually consisting of water, chemicals and
sand). Although this technique is ecologically highly questionable, it does offer the advantage of increasing domestic gas production temporarily.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 4
wards the region. A recent terrorist attack on an
Algerian oil field in January 2013 is only one con-
crete example of the fragile security state the EU’s
foreign fossil sources are in. Despite the fear of
disrupted supply of fossil resources, the Arab
Spring also represented a major challenge to large-
scale international projects in the field of renewa-
ble energies. Bilateral and multilateral agreements
and contracts concluded – e.g. – within the con-
text of the Mediterranean Solar Plan had to be re-
assured of validity, while at the same time major
investors backed out of financial commitment due
to the regional political instability. Especially in
the early stages of the Arab Spring, the EU found
itself in a position in which both supply of tradi-
tional energy sources and future potential supply
of alternative energy sources were endangered,
revealing the EU’s strong vulnerability towards
energy partner countries, as the EU’s policy
framework cannot, or at best, can only slowly,
adapt to drastic external changes.
The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on the
EU’s Energy Sector
Besides the Southern neighborhood, the
Eastern one is at least of equal importance to the
EU’s energy sector and in terms of fossil energy
sources even more important, with Russia still being
the biggest gas supplier to the EU, providing 32% of
all extra-EU natural gas imports. While in recent
years post-Cold-War tensions have been very low,
increasing hopes for long-term stability in EU-Russian
relations, 2014 with the newly revived Ukraine Crisis
has proved these hopes wrong. Using gas supply as a
political tool to counter political sanctions put forth
by the EU, Russia uses the presumably asymmetrical
interdependent relationship to make leeway for its
foreign policy. This rather unforeseen supra-regional
conflict seriously compromises EU’s foreign policy
with its domestic needs for energy. The spiral of sanc-
tions that developed in the aftermath of the Ukraine
Crisis of 2014 was of an economic, financial and dip-
lomatic nature. Russia’s response, however, focused
on the energy sector, as it represents its most valuable
asset.
Both the EU’s sanctions and Russia’s energy
supply threat were not related to the original conflict
that emanated from Ukraine’s revolution and the
EU’s and Russia’s roles in it. In fact, it had nothing to
do with it except for fulfilling the purpose of demon-
strating leverage towards the respective other party.
At first sight, this scenario seems like the revival of a
state last experienced in the times of the Cold War,
which was until recently unthinkable. In reality, how-
ever, what this situation displays is an exemplary cross
-sectoral, reciprocal influence of transnational issues
due to a well-developed and distinct complex interde-
pendence in international relations. The EU is subject
to this interdependence. This fact has been reaffirmed
clearer than ever in recent history. Although the US
takes part in tightening sanctions towards Russia, it
suffers less from Russia’s counter-sanctions than the
EU. Yet again, an extra-EU conflict turned out to
reveal EU’s high vulnerability and sensitivity when it
comes to energy-related issues. The EU has to be-
come aware of its unique position in geopolitical en-
ergy disputes and cannot rely on third parties to re-
solve the conflict that it is by proxy involved in, but
has to take immediate action itself.
German nuclear power plant Isar 2. On its way to a se-cure, sustainable and competitive energy sector, the EU will eventually engage in a nuclear phase-out, increasing natural gas’ relevance as a ‘bridge-fuel’ in the Union’s energy mix.
(E.ON Kernkraft GmbH)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 5
Aggregated Energy and Foreign Policy Crisis
for the EU
Both conflicts rest upon the fact that the EU,
from the early beginnings of modern energy markets
on, has pursued a strongly integrative energy policy,
linking it directly to its neighbourhood and foreign
policy. This was not least due to the fact that virtually
all conventional energy sources were characterized by
scarcity within the EU. Tough nuclear energy did
seem to promise a loophole in the later half of the 20th
century, as it guaranteed domestic electricity genera-
tion; incidents such as Chernobyl and more recently
Fukushima have triggered an intense public debate
about serious security issues with the nowadays rela-
tively unpopular energy source. Many national gov-
ernments, above all the German one, have agreed on
nuclear phase-out, which bolstered the relevance of
fossil fuels, once again making the EU depend strong-
er on external energy providers. This most profound
substructure of the EU’s energy sector does not only
explain why a foreign policy issue can easily turn into
an energy issue and vice-versa, but already presuppos-
es the Union’s entanglement in complex interdepend-
ent relations.
The EU’s Policy Response
To manage this (asymmetrical) interdepend-
ence, the EU has engaged in several methods. To
minimize dependence on single gas providers, the EU
has started diversifying its gas suppliers, which de-
creases the exclusiveness of energy relations to major
gas providers, such as Russia, as the EU is now able to
consume gas from a range of different countries. Oth-
er extra-EU gas suppliers are mainly Norway (31% of
gas imports) and Algeria (13%), but more recently
also smaller ones, such as (among others) Qatar (8%)
and Nigeria (4%). The EU has also increased its ef-
forts in promoting renewable energy with large-scale
projects within and outside the EU, which ultimately
diversifies the EU’s energy mix eventually decreasing
the gas share in said mix. Other ways of directly and
indirectly managing asymmetrical interdependence
also include (among others) the promotion of energy
efficiency and the domestic gas production. In the
context of the latter tool, hydraulic fracturing has be-
come a very attractive concept, as it could potentially,
but also only temporarily, increase domestic gas pro-
duction, in turn making the EU’s energy sector less
dependent on extra-EU gas supply. Since ’fracking’ is,
however, highly disputable in terms of its impacts on
the environment, its use within the EU remains rather
unclear. At this point, shale gas production seems to
directly disagree with the EU’s dictum of developing
a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector. The EU
itself has not managed to implement a binding agree-
ment on it and hence left the responsibility of shale
gas production up to national governments. Whereas
some EU member states have decided to start shale
gas exploration, such as Great Britain and Poland,
other countries are more inclined to prohibiting
‘fracking’, as is the case in Germany. This in turn
leads to an asymmetrical ‘energy exposure’ among
EU member states, causing policy-making on EU lev-
el to become yet more difficult than it already is in the
energy sector.
Projecting this situation onto the transatlantic
relations, there appear to be two main paradigms that
differentiate the EU’s approach to the one of the US.
Whereas the EU has made sustainability its basic and
most desirable long-term aim, the US has implied
independence as its main goal. Engaging in large-scale
‘fracking’ operations, the US has recently declared
Carrier ships are the only alternative to conventional gas pipe-lines to trade gas. Although the transport is very costly, it offers the potential of receiving gas from geographically distant loca-
tions. (QatarGas)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 6
this independence in the gas sector. Although con-
crete predictions of future gas production do differ
in volume and time span, the US could indeed be
independent of gas imports for about the next dec-
ade and could in fact become a gas exporter to oth-
er countries. As some academics have suggested,
this current situation of contradicting paradigms
pursued by the EU and the US could turn out to be
a major parting of their ways. Whereas in the past,
global energy politics have often been influenced
under the same fundamental idea – namely of se-
curing world fossil resources and ensuring access
to them within a global energy market – the EU
could now find itself alone in this endeavor, as the
US is a self-providing gas producer. Although this
idea is nothing but mere speculation at this point,
the near future’s developments in this regard need
to be closely observed.
The EU has to become aware of the gravity
of this change in world energy politics. It also
needs to decide whether it wants to pursue energy
politics of ‘Eurogaullism’ or ‘Euroatlanticism’. In
times of supply uncertainty, an EU solo attempt in
global energy politics is highly risky. Especially
when considering newly arising tension in the
Eastern neighborhood, a more than fragile Near
and Middle East, and a Southern neighborhood
undergoing major political transformation, old
alliances need to be maintained, if not intensified.
The transatlantic relations need to be inclusive of
the energetic dimension. Diverging paths on a
transatlantic level could very well be of short-term
interest, but might turn out to be counter-
productive in the long-run. Equally, the US has to
become more aware of its global role in energy
politics. It cannot withdraw from international
disputes over fossil resources, as it is now more
than ever in recent history independent of gas im-
ports. Unless the US decides to offer its newly
found gas production for transatlantic trade oppor-
tunities – which will be costly and difficult due to
the rather elaborate transport-efforts for gas –
transatlantic energy relations and interests might
be at the turn of the tides. In light of recent efforts in
promoting transatlantic economic agreements, in
form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP), it remains to be seen if and to what
extent energy politics will play a role in transatlantic
relations.
About the author
Julian Gajo studied Communication and Cultural
Management (BA) at Zeppelin University, focusing on
the understanding and communication of the concept
of sustainability by German energy companies. As an
external consultant to different German Ministries, he
engaged in several projects in the field of renewable
energy politics. Mr. Gajo specialized in Political Strat-
egy and Communication at the University of Kent’s
Brussels School of International Studies, investigating
on the interdependence between the EU and non-EU
energy providers by analyzing and identifying ways of
managing and minimizing the Union’s possible de-
pendence on foreign gas supplies.
Bibliography
Eurostat – European Commission (2014), EU Energy in
Figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2014, Luxembourg: Publica-
tions Office of the European Union.
Goldthau, A (2012), The Politics of Natural Gas Develop-
ment in the European Union. [Online], Available from:
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MO-CES-
pub-GeoGasEU-102513.pdf>.
Kaveshnikov, N (2010), “The issue of energy security
in relations between Russia and the European Union.” Eu-
ropean Security, vol.19, no.4, pp.585-605.
Keohane, R and J Nye Jr. (2012), Power and Interdepend-
ence, 4th edition, Cambridge: Pearson Publishing.
Youngs, R (2009), Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign
Policy Challenge, New York: Routledge.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 7
NATO and the EU’s Potential Role
in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
By Mr. Alessandro Niglia
E nergy resources are of crucial and vital im-
portance for any country to work properly
(e.g. to generate the electricity needed for
households, schools, businesses and factories). The
developing economies in particular demand a strong
increase in energy supply according to recent studies
released by the International Energy Agency (IEA). As
a result, a growing imbalance between supply and
demand in the energy market might lead to more in-
stability in the supply chain by developed economies.
This offers the foundation to review the policies and
strategies on future energy challenges. On one hand,
drawing more attention and investment towards re-
newable energy sources might easily solve such a re-
view. On the other hand, Critical Energy Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CEIP) now becomes an issue of in-
ternational concern, as most countries in the transat-
lantic area are not fully energy independent; e.g. Lith-
uania (100%), Germany (38%), Italy (31%), Hungary
(31%) are strongly dependent on the gas supply com-
ing from Russia.
Due to the call for a strong diversification of
energy supplies, most NATO countries still have to
rely on oil and gas (from Russia) to provide basic ser-
vices (from transportation to communication, to se-
curity and health infrastructure). In addition, in the
last ten years, terrorist attacks, maritime piracy,
cyber-attacks, and political sabotage against interde-
pendent energy infrastructures have resulted in mak-
ing production and transportation of energy more
complicated, causing instability in the financial energy
market. This means that the vulnerability of the ener-
gy supply system must be viewed as a global question.
NATO’s progression in energy security is not
entirely based on the strategic concept, which is an
official document that outlines NATO’s enduring
purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks.
It also identifies the central features of the new securi-
ty environment, specifies the elements of the Alli-
ance’s approach to security and provides guidelines
for the adaptation of its military forces.
The NATO Strategic Concept in 1999 stressed
that “Alliance security can be affected by […] the dis-
ruption of the flow of vital resources.” Since the 2008
NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, CEIP has been
one of the top subjects for discussion and the Alliance
is considered a relevant player for the defense of criti-
cal energy infrastructures at large. As outlined by Mr.
Michael Rühle, the Head of Energy Security Section
in NATO HQ, “NATO has a legitimate role to play in
energy security” and “assuring energy supply may not
be a straightforward military challenge, yet it clearly
has a security dimension.” The new Strategic Concept
(November 2010) affirms NATO’s commitment to
"develop the capacity to contribute to energy securi-
ty, including protection of critical infrastructure and
transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and
consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic
assessments and contingency planning.” Despite this
Protecting the CEIP is essential to guarantee political stability and security.
(Intelligent Security Systems)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 8
innovative impetus, NATO hesitates to approach
the energy security subject for two main following
reasons:
First, the diverging national interests on the
matter justify this hesitation. Before the Bucharest
Summit took place in 2008, a very heated discus-
sion on NATO’s role in energy security was car-
ried out. On the one hand, Poland and Baltic states
called for NATO’s active role in defending vital
energy infrastructures such as pipeline and marine
oil terminals, in order to be more independent
from Russia. On the other hand, many NATO
Member States were afraid of an overlap between
NATO and the EU policies as the latter is already
committed to protecting energy infrastructure in
the framework of the Common Security and De-
fense Policy. Basically, these States wanted NATO
to have a more limited role on the control of mari-
time security.
Second, there are already a high number of
players involved in the energy security arena, such
as the EU itself, IEA, Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the private sector.
Therefore, diverging national political and eco-
nomic interests and NATO’s structural limitations
obstruct the clarity and importance of NATO’s
added value in the energy security debate. Thus,
many European states are reluctant to discuss this
delicate issue in international forums. This re-
quires NATO to put more effort in addressing the
challenges in the following 5 key areas where rele-
vant added value could be provided: 1. Intelligence
and information sharing; 2. Projecting stability; 3.
Advancing international and regional stability; 4.
Supporting consequence management; and 5. Sup-
porting the critical protection of infrastructure.
With specific regard to the Critical Energy
Infrastructure , NATO outlines the importance to
carry out a particular policy to protect energy in-
frastructure, as it is a critical part of global energy
security, which is a subject to a number of threats.
According to recent statistics (Word Oil Transit
Chokepoints Report, U.S Energy Information Admin-
istration), almost half of the total global oil produc-
tion is transferred by oil tankers on permanent mari-
time routes with a high number of critical choke
points. This means that port facilities are being more
critical and difficult to be managed than before. The
current situation is extremely complicated as the
cyber systems (meaning the intense link between the
computational and physical elements) are essential to
make some critical energy infrastructure work
properly. This requires the preparedness and readi-
ness to face potential cyber-attacks.
Furthermore, hundreds of terrorists attacks,
such as bombing of gas and oil pipelines, attacks on
fuel trucks, killing and kidnapping associated person-
nel, disrupting of electrical power systems, occur
every year on energy-related targets. West Africa is
the area where the most of these attacks are carried
out. Nonetheless, one of the most critical problems to
be addressed is the consequence of an attack on ener-
gy infrastructure, which can reverberate far beyond
the point of origin. The attack can result in the inter-
ruption of the flow of energy, which might lead to
ripple effects. As a consequence, energy markets are
not immune and prices are strongly influenced even
from the result coming from one single attack if the
duration and extent of the attack itself are significant.
The rise in the energy prices is just one of the several
features that make the energy security a global issue
that no Ally can ignore.
At the latest NATO Summit, energy security
has been one of the prominent topics discussed. Once
again NATO has affirmed its role in the energy securi-
ty area in the Wales Summit Declaration (Article
109): “A stable and reliable energy supply, the diver-
sification of routes, suppliers and energy resources,
and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain
of critical importance(…)we will enhance our aware-
ness of energy developments with security implica-
tions for Allies and the Alliance; further develop
NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of
critical energy infrastructure; (…)We will also en-
hance training and education efforts, continue to en-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 9
gage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis,
and consult with relevant international organizations,
including the EU, as appropriate”.
With the aim to provide the Allies with the
most appropriate support in the scope of energy sec-
tor, the NATO’s Center of Excellence for Energy
Security (ENSEC COE) was inaugurated in Vilnius,
Lithuania, in October 2013. This NATO ENSEC
COE, supported by Lithuania, Estonia, France, Italy,
Latvia and Turkey, has been tasked to provide both
NATO HQ and Members with analyses on energy
developments. At this Center of Excellence, other
relevant activities such as education, training, strate-
gic planning and technical and academic research are
conducted. As outlined by NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen over the inauguration of the
Center on 6 September 2013: “Energy security is not
a call to arms. But when it comes to understanding
the security implications of global resource develop-
ments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.” This Cen-
ter of Excellence has an important mission, which is
to assist Strategic Commands, nations, partners, and
other civil and military bodies by supporting NATO’s
capability development process, mission effectiveness,
and interoperability in the near, mid and long term by
providing comprehensive and timely subject matter
expertise on all aspects of energy security. The mis-
sion includes cost effective solutions to support mili-
tary requirements, energy efficiency in the operation-
al field and interaction with academia and industry.
EU’s Role in Energy Security
Recalling the Article 109 in the NATO Summit
Declaration just mentioned above, the cooperation
between NATO and the EU and the role of the latter
in the energy security field is a strategic asset. The
Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon is considered the
legal basis for a new energy policy at the EU level. In
particular, four objectives are affirmed: 1. Ensure the
functioning of the energy market; 2. Ensure security
of energy supply in the Union; 3. Promote energy
efficiency and energy saving and the development of
new and renewable forms of energy; and 4. Promote
the interconnection of energy networks.
In order to achieve objectives number 1 and 2,
the European Commission established strict priorities
to make the energy infrastructure stable and secure
for the years to come; the most relevant being the
identification of European Critical Infrastructures
(ECI) in different energy sub-sectors: electricity, oil
and gas. Directive 2008/114/EC is the first legal in-
strument of an EU dimension on the subject of critical
infrastructure protection and is focused on the energy
and transport sectors. In particular, this directive con-
siders the role that EU Member States and owners/
operators of European Critical Infrastructures have in
identifying whether or not a particular ECI is a likely
target for an attack. Key criteria for identification in-
clude: casualties, economic impact and public opin-
ion. Once an ECI is identified through the criteria
mentioned above, each EU Member State will have
the duty to inform the others that might be signifi-
cantly affected by a potential attack, its identity, point
of origin and the reasons for designating it as a poten-
tial ECI target.
Moreover, an Operator Security Plan (OSP) has
been created in order to provide and implement solu-
tions for the protection of the ECI identified. In addi-
tion, each EU Member State will possess a Security
Liaison Officer or equivalent as the point of contact
for security related issues between the owners/
operators and the Member State authority. Through a
proper collaborative mechanism the relevant Member
State and the Security Liaison Officer identify the
NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 10
risks and threats in relation to the ECI concerned.
Last but not least, the European Commission will
also play a relevant role by providing the Member
State authority and the owner/operators of a des-
ignated ECI all the technologies and best practices
related to critical infrastructure protection.
The Directive 2008/114 is now under revi-
sion and a heated discussion is taking place
amongst European governments. The Thematic
Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protec-
tion (TNCEIP), made up of the European owners
and operators of energy infrastructure in the elec-
tricity, gas and oil sectors, are contributing to the
debate on the revision of the Directive with the
aim of raising awareness and sharing the best prac-
tices for improving the protection system of the
designated ECI. Resulting from the debate of this
revision of the Directive, TNCEIP has moved to
strengthening private-public partnership between
the European Commission, Member States and
relevant stakeholders, reinforcing contingency
plans, setting a common methodology for assessing
risks and threats and improving the technology on
information security.
Private Sector Role in Securing Energy
Besides the regulatory role played by the
EU, the private sector is supposed to play a more
relevant role in the CEIP. In particular, many en-
ergy companies, which own and operate energy as-
sets, should take under their consideration the finan-
cial impacts caused by a potential threat, be it either a
terrorist attack or vandalism. Moreover, other rele-
vant threats such as natural hazards, accidental haz-
ards, and consequential hazards might have a wide
financial impact on the energy company’s functioning.
Often a specific analysis of the security risk is not car-
ried out by the private sector. In doing so, the safety
of energy infrastructure and the well-being of all citi-
zens are more vulnerable. In order to analyze, miti-
gate, and minimize the security risks associated with
energy infrastructure, a set of guidelines has been pre-
pared by the Harnser Group for the European Com-
mission. These guidelines serve as an innovative tool
at the disposal of private companies, in which a de-
tailed analysis of the potential damaging effects result-
ing from a lack of experience and poor consideration
of the issues are provided. The vital importance of a
methodology for assessing risks and threats is affirmed
by two strategic documents prepared by the Harnser
Group. The first, published in summer 2010, titled:
“A Reference Security Management Plan for Energy
Infrastructure” considers the owners/operators ener-
gy perspective, giving them a useful blueprint to com-
ply with the national and/or international legal and
technical background. This document is intended to
provide an overall strategy for making an effective
Operator Security Plan under the Directive 2008/114
provisions. The second, published in autumn 2012,
titled: “The Financial Aspects of the Security of Assets
and Infrastructures in the Energy Sector” is a set of
guidelines for owners/operators of energy infrastruc-
tures aiming to solicit them to take into major consid-
eration the financial consequences of managing the
security risks on energy assets. This innovative docu-
ment contributes to raising awareness about the high
financial value resulting from the protection of critical
energy infrastructure.
CEIP: What’s Next?
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is a
joint issue for the EU and NATO since many coun-
Energy security has been on the agenda of NATO and the Allies for several years
(NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 11
tries involved are members to both organizations. With
the Directive 2008/114, now under revision, the EU has
a certain role in securing the flow of vital energy sources.
However, due to a lack of coordinated European energy
policies, the preeminent role of the European states re-
mains untouched, ignoring an important component for
an EU energy-related body that would specialize in the
foreign relations component of providing CEIP for the
Euro-Atlantic region. This has unfortunately resulted in a
weak European cooperation, allowing further complica-
tions between NATO-EU relations to arise.
Despite this complicated collaboration, some steps
forward are being taken by NATO. Since 2008, after the
NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, the Alliance has
effectively provided its contribution through strategic
agreements such as the Partnership for Peace and the Is-
tanbul Cooperation Initiative within the framework of
Science for Peace and Security Programme. However,
NATO’s leading role in energy security is difficult to car-
ry out for three reasons. First, many countries refuse the
potential overstretching to which NATO might be ex-
posed. Second, other international organizations exist
that are better designed and mandated to address issues of
energy security. Third, several threats in diverse fields are
considered more relevant for the Alliance. Thus, NATO
should consider the energy security area as a potential
field, in which a specific added value might be provided in
mitigating risks to energy critical infrastructure. NATO
has wide access to the best available systems of surveil-
lance including satellite feeds, electronic intercepts and
on-the-ground representation, allowing NATO to con-
tribute securing attractive and vulnerable energy infra-
structure with a very high-level of support. For example,
information and intelligence sharing might represent a
further strategic way to contribute effectively to global
energy security.
Therefore, a comprehensive new approach could
look as followed: NATO should support the Member
States by giving access to the best practices for managing
both risks and threats to CEIP worldwide. This is the spe-
cific added value that might be extremely relevant for
securing energy supply from countries facing political
instability and a lack of security. On the EU side, first of
all, the problems in the designation of the European
Critical Infrastructure on each EU country should be
overcome by reinforcing the role of the EU Commis-
sion, which is only informed annually of the number of
ECI by sector, among which is also the energy sector.
Therefore, the Commission should play a stronger role
of guidance even if the Member States remain primari-
ly responsible for implementing and assessing the need
to enhance protection of critical infrastructure.
In order to implement the CEIP policies, the
dialogue with the private sector should be facilitated by
both NATO and the EU. This will lead to the involve-
ment of companies in the evaluation of the threats and
challenges facing the CEIP as well as a contribution to
the reduction of the likelihood of potential attacks.
This would create a sustainable long-term approach
that would increase security, lower expenses, and for-
mally develop an integrated system between the inter-
national organization and the private sector.
About the author
Alessandro Niglia is Program Manager at the Atlan-
tic Treaty Association focusing on the NATO-EU rela-
tions in the field of energy security. He is a Co-
Director of the NATO Advanced Research Work-
shop on the protection of critical energy infrastruc-
tures, contributing to an enhanced cooperation be-
tween both the public and private sectors. He
has graduated cum laude in Political Science and Euro-
pean Studies and holds a Post-Graduate Master in Geo-
politics and Global Security.
Bibliography
Cornell, P (2012), “Regional and International Energy Security Dynamics: Consequences for NATO’s Search for an Energy Security Role.” GCSP Geneva Paper, Research Se-ries no.5.
NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2008), Energy Security: Co-Operating to Enhance the Protection of Critical Energy Infra-structures.
North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, NATO’s Role in Energy Security. [Online] Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm.
Rapisarda, A (2007), “Risk Assessment in the Private Sector.” Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security.
This publication is coThis publication is coThis publication is co---sponsored by the sponsored by the sponsored by the
North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable
contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of
importance to the NATO Alliance. For details on how to submit your
work, please, see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to
the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.
Editors: Magda Kocianova and Maria Mundt
ATA Programs
The Atlantic Council of Hungary is co-organizing with the support of
the NATO Public Diplomacy Division the annual NATO Partnership
Running Festival on 3-5 October 2014 at the occasion of the 20th anniver-
sary of the NATO Partnership for Peace. The Running Festival uses the
popular street running to draw the public attention to the importance of
collective security and cooperative defence that is best guaranteed by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation through the cohesion of its member
and partner states.
The Atlantic Treaty Association is organizing a NATO-sponsored
Advanced Research Workshop on 'The protection of Critical Energy In-
frastructure against Emerging Security Challenges' in Tbilisi, Georgia, on
25-28 November 2014. The main objective is to investigate the security
risks to critical energy infrastructure, namely cyber and terrorist attacks,
as well as to identify opportunities for public-private stakeholders to meet
these risks. Using the case study of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the work-
shop will provide an excellent forum for experts, government stakehold-
ers and academia to exchange information and practices.
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic
Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and
security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially
include to the successor generation in our work.
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern
European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
security issues.
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for
its members.
the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in
Northern Africa and Asia.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of
international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with
NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.