atlantic voices - one year after the iran nuclear deal
TRANSCRIPT
YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 1
- Flora Pidoux
In July 2015, a much expected nuclear
deal was finally reached between Iran and
the P5+1 (Permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council and
Germany), announcing the lifting of
international sanctions against Tehran in
exchange for the country’s agreement to
limit its nuclear activity to energy purposes.
This issue focuses on the impact the deal
has had on world security. The lifting of
sanctions against Iran has acted as a game
changer for the country which is now able to
openly trade with world powers as well as
have a voice on the international scene.
Iran is now able to export its large oil
resources across the globe, notably to China
and Europe, which has had negative impacts
for the price of crude oil and thus for other
oil exporting countries like Saudi Arabia and
Russia. On top of traditionally tense
relations with Riyadh, Tehran’s disregard for
OPEC’s guidelines and increased influence
in Syria can be expected to further
contribute to the region’s instability.
Despite the deal, the nuclear threat has
not disappeared and remains a concern for
NATO which is in a dire need to redefine its
nuclear strategy in face of Russia’s assertive
attitude and other actors’ threatening
attitude.
One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal
Volume 6 - Issue 06 June 2016
Contents:
One Year On: Iran and the World
Mr. Neil Thompson examines the state of Iran's relations with the major
world and regional powers in the year since its nuclear deal was signed with the
international community, and how the lifting of sanctions has affected regional
security after Iran’s return to the international scene.
Ms. Flora Pidoux analyses how short term security priorities are forcing
NATO to revise its nuclear strategy despite the West’s support for
denuclearization, arms reduction and non-proliferation.
The Iranian flag next to a ballistic missile (Photo: Center for Security Policy )
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 2
By Neil Thompson
W hen an Iranian opposition group
released information showing
secret activity, including the
construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a
heavy-water reactor which could theoretically both be
used to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, it
sparked a thirteen-year standoff between the West and
the Islamic Republic. After the allegations about Iran's
previously undeclared nuclear activities became
public, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) launched an investigation that concluded in
2003 that Iran had systematically failed to meet its
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
to report those activities to the organisation.
However, while the IAEA said that Iran had
violated the NPT’s
safeguards agreement, it
neither reported evidence
of links to a nuclear
weapons program nor did Tehran withdraw from the
NPT like North Korea had done in an earlier
confrontation over illicit nuclear programmes. Instead,
the Iranian leadership insisted that Iran had discovered
and extracted uranium domestically in pursuit of its
legitimate right under the treaty to obtain nuclear
energy for peaceful aims. The United Nations Security
Council did not find this a convincing explanation and
sanctions were imposed on Iran, which were extended
in 2010. These had a crippling effect on the Iranian
economy though they did not end the standoff.
The sanctions did lead to further talks which, after
a change in administrations in Iran, eventually led to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to
ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be
exclusively peaceful during the period the agreement
would be in force. By signing the deal, Iran “reaffirms
that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek,
develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.”
The IAEA has been put in charge of the monitoring
and reporting of Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA.
The deal, among other elements, demanded that Iran
restricted its sensitive nuclear activities to two nuclear
plants and to civilian energy production levels, defined
at 3.67% (before the JCPOA, Iran’s enrichment was on
average 20%). The JCPOA additionally stipulated that
nuclear research and development would take place
only at Natanz and be limited for eight years, and that
no enrichment
would be permitted
at Fordo for 15
years. Since January
2016, Iran has drastically reduced the number of
centrifuges which can enrich fuel, and shipped tonnes of
low-enriched uranium to Russia.
The deal struck a year ago has since realigned actors
inside and out of the Middle Eastern region; this article
examines the trends amongst both NATO members’
partners and rivals which might destabilize further the
regional balance in the future.
Renewed Saudi-Iranian Energy Rivalry
Despite the scepticism and hostility with which the
JCPOA agreement was greeted in both Western
countries and inside Iran, it has so far held firm. Since
this agreement reduces the chances of war between the
One Year On: Iran and the World
The deal struck a year ago has since realigned actors
inside and out of the Middle Eastern region
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 3
Western powers and Tehran, its arrival was certainly
applauded by NATO. But the agreement has also had an
immediate impact on Iran’s standing in the Middle East
and the wider international community, in ways which
have not been as positive for international peace and
security. This has played out particularly in the field of
energy politics.
In May, Iran’s Tasnim news agency, which has strong
links with the notorious Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), reported Iranian Oil Minister Bijan
Namdar Zanganeh claiming that, thanks to the lasting
implementation of the nuclear deal, Iran’s capacity to
produce and export crude and oil products has doubled
in comparison with the pre-sanctions era. The agency
also quoted a recent report by the International Energy
Agency as saying Iran’s oil production had returned to
the level of pre-sanctions era, reaching 3.56 million
barrels a day in April, and added that Iran’s crude
exports had increased to 2 million barrels a day, close to
the pre-sanction level. The result has been a dramatic
increase of Iranian oil available on the international
market at a time when oil prices remain at rock bottom,
which energy importers like Europe and China largely
benefit from.
But the return of Iran to the oil market has also had
negative consequences, sparking tensions with traditional
Western allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. When
ministers from the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) including Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Venezuela, together with other non-member
oil producers such as Russia, met in Doha in April it had
been expected that the first agreement to freeze
production in fifteen years would soon drive up oil
prices. But when Riyadh suddenly demanded that Tehran
limit its oil production, Iran proved unwilling to
squander the opportunity that returning to world
markets afforded. As a result, the expected agreement
stalled and any agreement was pushed back to June.
Saudi Arabia’s continued rift with its rival in both OPEC
and the Middle East in general has played a large role in
torpedoing the old effectiveness of the producers’
cartel.
This is good economic news for Western energy
importers, but it signals a renewed regional hostility
between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran which should
concern NATO. The two powers are on opposing sides
in two hot Middle Eastern proxy wars - in Yemen and in
Syria. The civil war in Yemen is between a Saudi-led
coalition and Zaidi Shia rebels known as Houthis, who
overthrew the Yemeni government in cooperation with
forces loyal to Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah
Saleh. The Saudis allege that the Houthis are Iranian
pawns, saying that Tehran has supplied weapons, money
and training to the Shia militia as part of a wider pattern
of interference in the region via Shia proxies. There are
longstanding fears in Saudi and NATO that Iran has
exploited turmoil between Sunni and Shia Muslims in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and now Yemen to
expand its regional influence. Now, with the expansion
of Iranian capabilities following the ending of sanctions,
there is some danger that a rattled Saudi Arabia will use
its influence to nudge the United States and NATO
towards intervention of one of these quarrels despite the
relative improvement in relations between Tehran and
the West.
Negative Implications for Syria
While Saudi Arabia is not a NATO member and US-
Saudi relations have been cool under the administration
of outgoing US president Barack Obama, there is one
particular area of overlap between the concerns of the
Alliance and those of the leading Sunni Gulf power. In
Syria, Iran is backing an array of pro-regime militias and
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 4
has encouraged its Lebanese ally Hezbollah to join in the
fighting as well. A major objection to the JCPOA
agreement from Riyadh (and Tel Aviv) was that the lifting
of sanctions and unfreezing of Iranian assets would act as a
boost for Iranian funding of overseas armed groups,
especially in Syria. The United Nations Special Envoy for
Syria, Staffan de Mistura, estimates the Islamic Republic
spends $6 billion annually on backing Damascus.
NATO has become concerned about the situation in
Syria due to the joint Iranian and Russian intervention.
Late last year, Major General Qassem Soleimani, the
commander of the Quds Force, the elite extra-territorial
Special Forces arm of the IRGC, travelled to Moscow to
solicit greater Russian involvement in the Syrian war. In
September 2015, at a
time of heightened
Russian-NATO
tensions in Europe and
the Middle East, a
Russian military
intervention on behalf
of the regime began to
turn the tide in favour
of Damascus. Iran and
Moscow are now
cooperating in Syria to
restore the Assad regime’s control over the western parts
of the country where most of the population lives.
NATO now faces a challenging situation whereby a
resurgent Russia flexes its muscles in Eastern Europe and
has drawn closer to Tehran over Syria, despite the friction
this has caused with neighbouring NATO member
Turkey. This is not, however, a case of an Iranian-Russian
bloc emerging to confront the West and its Arab allies.
While Iran and Turkey have disagreed over their views on
regional political developments in the last five years
Turkish-Iranian relations are nowhere near as bitter as
Saudi-Iranian ones. Since the January 16 "Implementation
Day" of the JCPOA, Ankara has agreed to expand
bilateral trade with Iran to $50bn a year. It is
manoeuvring to become Iran's first trading partner as a
way to compensate for Russian sanctions.
Moscow-Tehran Relations and NATO
The signs are that Iran continues to see Moscow as a
great power in the Middle East, and one which it can
cooperate with on occasions to foil Western moves it
deems anti-Iranian. Likewise, Moscow will work with
Tehran on occasion. Despite participating in the sanctions
regime, Moscow has continued to honour a nuclear deal
struck with the Islamic Republic of Iran to construct a
series of nuclear power
plants at Bushehr in the
south of the country.
Moscow and Tehran both
remain committed to
rolling back Western
influence in the Middle
East and will work
together on an ad hoc
basis when it suits them
both.
But despite their shared suspicions of the United States
and NATO, Russia and Iran have had a long and
contentious relationship. Just as the United States and
European members of NATO have remained aloof of
Turkish and Saudi policy in Syria, Moscow has allowed the
Western powers to enlist its help in curbing Iranian
nuclear ambitions. Together with China, Russia was one
of the nations which agreed to impose tough sanctions on
Tehran to force it to the negotiating table. It has also
helped ease the passage of the JCPOA by agreeing to
recycle Iranian nuclear fuel in Russia, removing any
Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan (center) meets with his Russian
and Syrian counterparts, Sergei Shoigu (left) and Fahd Jassem al-Freij (right), in Tehran, on
June 9, 2016. (Photo: RNA)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 5
justification for enrichment inside Iran. Moscow does
not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons while fearing
that a nuclear agreement will lead to improved ties
between Iran and the United States.
The return of Iran to the oil market has also
disrupted Russian hopes for a price floor to be
coordinated with OPEC producers thanks to Saudi-
Iranian rivalry. Iran is pushing to find new ways to
extract and export its vast natural-gas reserves, and has
entered into preliminary talks with NATO-member
Greece to provide a gateway for the Islamic Republic to
supply fuel to European markets. Since the dispute
between Russia and Ukraine disrupted gas supplies and
sped up the EU’s bringing an antitrust case against the
Russian gas giant, Russian energy exports to Europe
have lost ground of which Iran is hoping to be a
beneficiary. Tehran is also competing with Saudi Arabia
and Russia in its energy exports to China; Beijing is the
largest importer of crude
from both Saudi Arabia
and Iran.
Therefore, although
the pair are happy to
cooperate over Syria,
whose regime was a
longstanding ally of Iran’s
dating back to the Iraq-
Iran war and whose port
of Tartus was the site of
the only Russian military
facility outside of the former Soviet Union, this was a
coincidence of overlapping interests rather than a sign
that Moscow and Tehran will draw closer together as
Iran emerges from under the shadow of over a decade
of crushing economic isolation from the global
economy. Moscow does not want to be seen as
affiliated with Iran by the mainly Sunni Arab world
amidst the escalating Sunni-Shia conflict. Iran is wary
of Moscow’s strong ties with Israel and its continued
efforts to court anti-Iranian Arab states and
longstanding disputes over the Caspian Sea continue to
impede Russian-Iranian economic cooperation.
Relations between Russia and Iran will continue to
be seen through a lens of shifting interests and
alliances, in which they are neither quite friends nor
enemies, but rivals. Moscow fears friendlier relations
between Iran and the West following the JCPOA
could, one day, allow former Soviet states in the
Caucasus and Central Asia to export their petroleum to
and through Iran, lessening their economic dependence
on Russia. The possibility of improving Western-
Iranian ties is therefore an alarming one to Russia at a
time of deteriorating relations between itself and the
West. It is therefore anxiously watching the progress
towards reform of Tehran’s
more liberal factions as these
actors favour greater
openness towards the West.
China and Iran
China is now Iran’s number
one trading partner as a
direct result of the sanctions
regime imposed over Iranian
nuclear activities, and this
closer relationship has
continued following the
implementation of the JCPOA. In January, Chinese
President Xi Jinping visited Iran and signed a long
series of agreements on economic and technological
cooperation with his Iranian counterpart Hassan
Rouhani. Iran’s leaders have also announced they will
cooperate with Beijing on its One Belt One Road
President Xi Jinping (right) meets his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rowhani in
Jakarta on 23 April 2015 to discuss the construction of a pipeline between Iran
and China as part of Beijing’s ”One Belt, One Road Initiative”. (Photo: Xinhua )
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 6
initiative.
China and Iran do not share the history of mutual
suspicion that divides Iran from Russia, which both
have clashed with in the past. Moreover, the drawing
together of Tehran and Beijing could ultimately
threaten Russia’s economic interests in both China's
hydrocarbon market and Iran's nuclear energy sector.
China has agreed to construct two nuclear power
plants in Iran and import Iranian oil on a long-term
basis. Russia's place in the Chinese oil market, which
it turned to as an alternative following the Ukrainian
crisis, could now be threatened while its monopoly
position as the Islamic Republic’s nuclear supplier has
been broken. Russian self-interest makes it very
unlikely that a Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis will
emerge as a united front against the NATO powers,
though all three will continue to cooperate together
on an ad hoc basis, as Russia and Iran have in Syria.
Iran also acts as an
important transport hub
between China and
Europe, part of a trading
relationship dating back to
the Iran-Iraq war, when a
combination of the Islamic Revolution and the Cold
War led Iran to purchase weapons from China instead
of Russia or the reviled US. But with the end of
sanctions and the tentative return of European states
to rebuild their interrupted political and economic
relations with Tehran, Chinese firms may find
themselves facing increasing competition from
outsiders, disturbing a cosy status quo which has been
built up during the past decade or more. The visit of
China’s president and the inducements he offers may
be in part a gambit to pre-empt this, and one which
Iran’s leadership seem to have accepted as a continued
hedge against overdependence on the West. For now,
Beijing is looking to deepen rather than limit its
involvement in Iran, whose political elite seem happy to
accept the Chinese overtures.
Conclusion
So far the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has
been a surprising success for Euro-Atlantic diplomacy
against all odds. A year on, the tensions with Iran are
lower and progress towards an Iranian nuclear weapon,
however obliquely pursued, has been halted for now,
while trade and transparency have given the two sides a
chance to recalibrate their relationship. However, the
agreement should not be seen as a panacea for everything
which ails Iranian-Western relations. Iran remains
aligned with a threatening Russia in Syria, which has put
sanctions on NATO member Turkey amidst a plunge in
relations with other Alliance member states. Tehran has
also stepped up its proxy conflicts and economic warfare
with Saudi Arabia, a major
US and NATO ally in the
region. It is moving closer
into the orbit of a more
assertive China which has
its own territorial disputes
with key NATO member America and is looking to
gather allies into its own competing institutions. One
year after the nuclear deal was signed, it is clear that
much remains to be done before relations between the
Alliance and the Islamic Republic can truly be said to
have been reset; what prevails now is more of an
armistice.
One year after the nuclear deal was signed, it is
clear that much remains to be done before rela-
tions between the Alliance and the Islamic Repub-
lic can truly be said to have been reset; what pre-
vails now is more of an armistice.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 7
Neil Thompson is a Contributing Analyst at
geostrategic analysis and business consultancy Wikistrat
and a blogger at the Foreign Policy Association. His work
has appeared in the Diplomat, the International Security
Network, the Independent, the Financial Times, and
various other publications. He holds an MA in the
international relations of East Asia and is presently based
in London.
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About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 8
the different security priorities of the Allies, the Euro-
Atlantic Alliance is split into two groups, some wishing
to see the nuclear component more present in the
confrontation with Russia, others rejecting the idea. In
both cases, the effectiveness of the chosen response will
be challenged by Moscow’s increased assertiveness and
other global threats.
A New Nuclear Age
When trying to define NATO’s best possible
approach to today’s nuclear threats, it is crucial to
analyse the current nuclear paradigm, which has been
referred to by scholars as the Third Nuclear Age.
The First Nuclear Age refers to that of the Cold
War which rested on the NATO-Warsaw Pact bipolar
confrontation; the second corresponds to the post-Cold
War era when the threats were no longer states but
rather unchecked non-state actors; the Third Nuclear
Age is a system where the nuclear threat is used by
irrational actors (be it state or non-state actors) to
assert political power on the international scene when
they do not otherwise have the resources to do so. It is
generally accepted that the Third Nuclear Age started
in 2014 with the illegal annexation of Crimea by
Russia. By doing so, Russia unsettled the European
security order by putting an end to its partnership with
NATO and using its nuclear arsenal to assert itself as an
influential world power again, thus making up for its
conventional power inferiority.
The Third Nuclear Age opposes a political or
economic ‘midget’, i.e. an actor which is insignificant
on the international scene such as North Korea, a rising
Incompatible Goals: Denuclearization vs. Nuclear Deterrence
By Flora Pidoux
O n May 27th, 2016, United States (US)
President Barack Obama used his
visit to Hiroshima, Japan, to refocus
the world’s attention on denuclearization, a project
which has been Obama’s concentration since he took
office, and which awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize
in 2009.
The speech was deemed hypocritical as the US is
currently heavily investing into the modernization of
its nuclear arsenal, instead of reducing it, as the
denuclearization guidelines would suggest.
Washington has also supported the deployment of
more nuclear weapons to NATO’s eastern front in
response to Russia’s threatening attitude. Of course,
some efforts have been made towards nuclear arsenal
reduction, notably through the signing of the New
START Treaty signed by the United States and Russia,
but overall, Obama’s project has been stalling since it
was first announced.
The discrepancy between discourse and action is
not only visible in the US; NATO seems to be
following the same route as nuclear deterrence has
regained importance over the past few years. North
Korea’s nuclear tests, Iran’s controversial recent
ballistic missile tests, and Russia’s annexation of
Crimea are pushing NATO to redesign its nuclear
strategy and increase its deterrence capacity.
At the upcoming NATO Warsaw Summit, the
Allies will have to define how to use nuclear weapons
in order to reassure the member states whilst not
provoking a security dilemma elsewhere. Because of
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 9
power like China, a declining power like Russia, or a
non-state actor, to an established power through the use
of nuclear weapons and whereby the former tries to
impose its will on the latter. This confrontation is also
used by political leaders as a means to boost their
popularity; Kim-Jong Il proudly announced on May 7th
“that his nuclear-weapons and missile programmes had
brought the country ‘dignity and national power’”.
The current nuclear age is also tainted with
ideological antagonism between legal models: on one
hand, the Western principles of rule of law,
international rules and regulations, arm reduction and
denuclearization are sought after; on the other hand,
counterparts use hybrid methods as means of power.
The latter model seems to rest on irrationality, which
raises the issue of containment if a crisis were to erupt;
indeed, the traditional nuclear concepts of first strike,
escalation and even deterrence are not respected by all,
thus creating further uncertainty and increasing the
chances of security dilemma and as a consequence of a
nuclear response.
The challenge is therefore to deter irrational actors
who depend on their nuclear weapons to make their
voices heard and make themselves look more important
than they really are.
Deterring Russia: Reviewing NATO’s Strategy
In face of Russia’s renewed threatening attitude, the
Alliance must modernize its nuclear strategy, a publicly
recognized need, though NATO officials assert that no
drastic turn will be made. In any case, NATO must
ensure that “there is no doubt in the Russians’ mind that
this idea of using nuclear weapons to "de-escalate a
crisis" isn’t going to work.”
In Warsaw, NATO will thus work on refreshing its
nuclear stance, which has not changed since NATO’s
“Deterrence and Defense Posture Review” developed at
the 2012 Chicago Summit. The Alliance is indeed in dire
need to review this document as most principles it is
based on, namely NATO-Russia good relations and
cooperation, are no longer reflecting today’s reality.
What will be closely monitored by the general public
is whether the Allies will modify the 1997 Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between
NATO and Russia, which asserted that NATO had “no
intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear
weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need
to change any aspect of [its] nuclear posture or nuclear
policy”. If NATO did so – Poland, Latvia, the United
Kingdom and the United States support the idea of an
increased nuclear deployment towards the East - it
would add a nuclear component to the Alliance’s
sovereignty reinforcement measures already in place
which will most certainly not be well received by
Moscow.
A report from the Center for Non-proliferation
Studies (CNS) studied the Allies’ take on reinforcing the
nuclear presence closer to the frontline. The results lean
towards a nuclear status quo where the atomic
capabilities would remain in Western Europe as the
frontline states see hosting nuclear weapons on their soil
as “heightening their risk of being involved in a nuclear
conflict with little positive payoff.”
It appears that border states believe that much can be
done to deter Russia by implementing small changes in
the Alliance’s conventional (and not nuclear) strategy. In
addition, investing more resources into nuclear
deterrence is regarded as a non-credible military and
political choice which would take away crucial resources
from conventional forces. What NATO can do is
encourage the three nuclear Allies to cooperate to offer
the rest of the Alliance a credible nuclear stance which
will not demand further nuclear efforts.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 10
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
When revising its nuclear strategy, the Alliance
must keep the big picture in mind in order to send a
coherent message to the world. NATO has never
taken part in the denuclearization movement, only in
the arm reduction and anti-proliferation ones, as
illustrated by the annual NATO Conference on
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation. The
Alliance believes, however, that nuclear weapons
must be controlled and used for deterrence and not
for intimidation. NATO must therefore continue to
count on its nuclear capability while not increasing it,
and expand its conventional capabilities to match that
of Russia while not making Moscow feel insecure to
the point where it will require to flex its nuclear
muscles.
Placing nuclear weapons in NATO’s most eastern
Allies, like Poland was suggesting, can be regarded as
nuclear proliferation, as supported by
denuclearization advocates. One can argue that
nuclear weapons posted in NATO’s nuclear sharing
program beneficiaries, that is Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey, do not make
those nations nuclear because the missiles belong to
the US and are controlled by Washington; but this is
subject to criticism as the host countries are seen as
violating the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a
result of which NATO has been accused of double-
standards by contributing to the proliferation of the
nuclear technology. In that regards, expanding the
scope of NATO’s nuclear sharing program, and
especially to include Poland and the Baltic states,
would send the wrong message regarding
disarmament and non-proliferation, a goal the West
has been supporting since the end of the Cold War.
Prevailing Short Term Security Goals
Obama stated on 30 March 2016 that, “as the only
nation ever to use nuclear weapons, the United States
has a moral obligation to continue to lead the way in
eliminating them. Still, no one nation can realize this
vision alone. It must be the work of the world.” So far,
the US has not led the way to this goal other than in
discourse.
Needless to say that unilaterally diminishing the
number of nuclear warheads is no easy task, especially
when confronted with irrational actors such as North
Korea, Russia and China who do not see eye to eye with
the West on denuclearization. China sees this project as
counterintuitive; after all, why destroy what one has
spent so much money to build?
Regional crises have multiplied in recent years,
notably because of the nuclear threat: China is currently
expanding its arsenal without announcing to what extent
and what for, which has repercussions for India, Pakistan
and Asia-Pacific at large and for relations with the West
and Russia; Israel’s undercover nuclear program impacts
Iran, Saudi Arabia and other regional actors; Russia’s
nuclear exercises and tests, notably close to Sweden, and
direct declarations that they would not hesitate to use
the nuclear bomb if provoked are all signs of renewed
tension; and North Korea’s tests and unruliness threaten
South Korea and Japan, both NATO Partners Around
the Globe.
The lack of transparency and accountability that some
nuclear actors display to international organisations is
worrisome as their disrespect of international laws
increase uncertainty and cause a potential security
dilemma, like Iran’s nuclear plans did before the 2003
sanctions. Russia renounced to participating in the
annual Russian-American summits on nuclear safety, and
withdrew from “the bilateral cooperation program
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 11
designed to increase nuclear safety under the so-called
Nunn-Lugar Act” which increases the risk of Russia’s
“radioactive substances, nuclear weapon elements and
nuclear expertise from falling into the wrong hands.”
Some countries are no longer willing to play by the
West’s rules, thus making denuclearization extremely
unlikely.
Killing the Bird in the Nest
Today, denuclearization is not a priority for
countries, preferring disarmament and non-
proliferation as they are more realistic goals in
threatening times. Disarmament is working to a certain
extent, notably thanks to the New START Treaty. Non
-proliferation has proven effective in the case of Iran:
the sanctions aimed to kill Teheran’s nuclear ambitions
in the nest before it was too late. This strategy has,
however, proved unsuccessful in North Korea due in
part to China’s support to the country, limited impact
of the Six Party Talks, and Pyongyang’s disregard for
international sanctions.
The risk of nuclear confrontation today is real. The
increasing number of nuclear actors and their declared
willingness to use their nuclear technology makes it
necessary for the West to reassert its defensive
strategy. Deterrence seems the best route to take in an
effort to avoid provoking the irrational actors as well as
support the denuclearization project.
While the West is officially trying to limit its
armament, the rest of the world does not seem to be
willing to follow suit. Denuclearization is an ambitious
goal that most ultimately supports for the security of
the world. Unfortunately, one cannot win a game
where the others do not play by the rules, so for now,
short-term security priorities will have to prevail.
Flora Pidoux currently works at Transparency
International Belgium and previously worked at the
Atlantic Treaty Association. She holds a Master’s Degree
in International Relations from Université Catholique de
Louvain. Her interests include power relations,
territorial conflicts and overseas territories. She blogs at
florafranca.com
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About the author
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