YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05

- Flora Pidoux

How can NATO address new and potent

security challenges with limited financial

means? This is the puzzle the European Allies

have been trying to solve since the

resurgence of direct security threats.

The answer is simple: cooperation.

Cooperative security is a key component of

NATO which has been replaced by crisis

management since the end of the Cold War.

Today, cooperation must be brought back to

the surface, a task which is difficult to

achieve.

NATO members collectively have the

capacity to protect the continent; however,

they are reluctant to share their military

capabilities with their neighbors via a

supranational body, such as the UN or the

EU, which could coordinate the

international effort to fight off terrorism and

other current dangers. The first article will

analyze the efforts of each organization in

regards to cooperative security.

Some cooperative programs have been

put in place, notably through NATO’s Smart

Defence program. The German-Netherlands

cooperation, which will be discussed in the

second article, is proof that international

cooperation can work. There is still a long

way to go before all 28 Allies follow this

example.

Cooperative Security & Smart Defense

Volume 6 - Issue 05 May 2016

Contents:

The Future of the EU’s Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s

Smart Defence

Ms. Christine Andreeva compares the European Union’s and NATO’s

cooperative defense strategies. Each system presents advantages and both share

many similarities, however, it seems counterproductive for both to exist.

Germany and the Netherlands: Leading the Way in

Defence Cooperation

Ms. Marianne Copier details the cooperative efforts implemented by the

Netherlands and Germany, namely the 1 (Germany/Netherlands) Corps, in

order to merge their forces and thus cut down the costs of securing Europe.

Military jackets of soldiers coing from various NATO member states hanging side by side (Photo: 1GNC)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 2

By Christine Andreeva

C ollaborative defence engagement,

albeit not a new idea in itself, appeared

in the frameworks of the European

Union (EU) and NATO between 2010-2012, during

the height of the financial crisis. Austerity politics

projected dire budget and investment cuts in the field

of security and defence, making both organisations

realise the necessity to put in place multilateral

collaboration projects and collective capability-

building. These efforts aim to emulate economies of

scale effect and therefore achieve their perceived

benefit of heightened efficiency at lower costs and

streamlined efforts.

What this paper aims to examine is how pooling

and sharing initiatives have performed so far, if there is

an added value to them, and whether these strategic

programmes have managed to impact the political

mind set of perceived national supremacy and

sovereignty in defence matters. Is there a future for at

least one of these initiatives, or do they simply exist to

convey the message of cooperation and convergence?

The European Union’s Pooling & Sharing

The “Ghent Initiative”, instigated by EU member

states, was kicked off in September 2010; the idea of

pooling and sharing (P&S) was already embedded in

the 2003 European Security Strategy, emphasising the

importance of capability development through

avoidance of duplication and better interoperability.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) took upon the

first projects in November 2011 and subsequently set

up a Code of Conduct (CoC), indicating pooling and

sharing procedures, expectations, and stipulating that

the EDA shall report to national authorities once per

year on progress and implementation.

The P&S’s short-term objectives, which set it apart

from simple best practices exchange, include capability-

sharing, interoperability and streamlining of

standardisation, common training exercises, purchase

of expensive large-scale equipment, and better

preparedness and inclusiveness of common operations.

The most ambitious goal of P&S is the mainstreaming of

convergence into national defence planning and

encouragement of common capability development

plans in order to achieve greater conjunction of

capabilities in their full life-cycle. That would,

however, involve convergence of political attitudes,

military perceptions, and national interests too.

The terminology behind the concept indeed implies

a similar shift: pooling refers to setting up multinational

structures where member states contribute capabilities

proportionally to their abilities, focus, and relevant

allocation; sharing refers more to the security tasks at

stake, whereupon it is implied that European threats

and geopolitical issues are shared and should thus be

tackled together, and not just by the members who are

closest geographically.

The added value of P&S in terms of capability

development is that projects pertaining to the initiative

are meant to be largely shielded from budget cuts on

national and EU levels, which would imply some level

of priority of multilateral projects over national ones

(although member states could not be expected to

undermine their priority projects).

The agreement’s major loophole, however, is that it

The Future of the EU’s Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s Smart Defence

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 3

is only politically biding and not legally binding which, as

a general rule, precludes progress.

The EDA’s Capability Development Plan

The Capability Development Plan (CDP) was meant

as an overarching strategic tool for capability

development directions, pinpointing capability gaps, and

short/long-term goals of convergence. The major

shortfall that prevents it from promoting further

progress is its foundation on voluntary contributions

from member states, which are not necessarily indicative

of the actual gaps and necessities, but may be

symptomatic of selective information sharing. The CDP

is still based on the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, which

is outdated.

Progress

By 2015, 59 Pooling & Sharing projects had

commenced, whereupon four member states have been

involved the most (Germany, France, Italy and Sweden),

while several others have been interested in initiating

such ventures (Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Finland and

Austria). The main focuses of the projects can be divided

into two strands: Armament and Development, and

Operational Capability and Command. While this may

seem encouraging, in reality it means that member states

would rather engage on small-scale tasks in the initial

stages of capability provision and in the facilitation of

standardisation and interoperability. Member states seem

to prefer to help each other in terms of research and

mutual recognition, rather than share troops,

capabilities, and equipment. P&S tends to put a strong

emphasis on civil-military synergies, which are key for

the EU capability development, while Training and

Education is perceived both by the EDA and member

states to have potential for added value and integration.

The most successful project to date has been "air-to-air

refuelling”, while other notable achievements have been

Future Air Systems, GO GREEN (European Armed

Forces), European Air Transport Fleet (EATF),

LAVOSAR, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

(RPAS).

NATO’s Smart Defence

NATO’s Smart Defence was set up at the Chicago

Summit of May 2012, although it was first mentioned

by Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security

Conference and was aimed at achieving the goals of

Forces 2020: up-to-date capabilities that are closely

interconnected, homogeneously trained, and

purposefully led and therefore easily deployable for

international operations. In contrast to its EU

counterpart, Smart Defence (SD) aimed from the outset

to also converge future defence planning, by balancing

out national capabilities and aiming to oblige members

to incorporate targets in their national programmes and

coordinate defence budget cuts. In time, this was

expected to provide for the development and

acquisition of those resources that the Alliance needs

most, helping to close capability gaps, and ensuring a

fairer burden- and cost-sharing.

Smart Defence consists of three components:

Prioritisation (top-down alignment of national

capability development to NATO targets);

Cooperation (capability pooling to cut down costs and

enhance interoperability);

Specialisation (allocation of competences, with

narrow focus and direct effect on sovereignty).

Specialisation is a key concern for multilateral

collaborations and convergence as member states are

apprehensive of having to specialise their armies, which

would make them “capable” in a narrower field, with

possible implications on defence markets, competition,

military staff and preparedness. NATO incorporates this

concern in such a way that it is adequately addressed via

targeted initiatives. Specialisation is de facto already

taking place, while NATO's aim with Smart Defence is

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 4

to systemise and streamline it, focusing on national

strengths and targeting the deepest gaps.

The main issue for SD is once again the insufficient

political will of nations, who are encouraged to lead the

process and designate projects to be involved in.

The long-term vision of SD is the ambition to evolve

from small-scale modest projects to larger, even regional

initiatives, while gradually realigning capability

development to establish a common NATO doctrine.

The NATO Defence Planning Process

In contrast to the young EU counterpart initiative,

NATO’s oversight on strategic capability building is

significantly more mature and engaging. The NATO

Defence Planning Process (NDPP) sets specific national

targets, instead of simply spelling out capability goals;

those targetsare subsequently adapted to member states’

defence programmes and strategies. The NDPP’s main

drawback is considered to be the absence of a binding

linkage to the systematic recommendations of the Allied

Command Transformation (ACT), the body responsible

for setting goals and directions for future capability

development, causing its focus to be more on current or

short-term necessities.

Progress

There are currently 26 multinational SD projects with

six having been finalised. These have gained modest

success and general progress, mainly due to most of the

endeavours being of relatively small-scale and prudent

ambition, largely oriented towards maintenance of

equipment and joint training. Nevertheless, initiatives of

Smart Defence have provided new incentive for NATO’s

ongoing strategic programmes: Missile Defence, Alliance

Ground Surveillance, Air Policing and Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Furthermore, the topic

has become prominent at NATO Summits, which are

intended to prioritise the importance of SD and give

general direction for its further development. Similarly to

the P&S, most SD projects involve air capabilities such as

Jet aircraft upgrade, Multinational Aviation Training

Centre, pooling maritime patrol aircraft. There have

been, however, efforts to diversify projects with

Multinational cyber defence capability development and

Pooling Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

(CBRN) capabilities – both absent from P&S projects.

Comparison and Potential

Political Will and Preference

As per NATO’s primacy as a collective security

provider and guarantor, the Alliance is undeniably

perceived by member states as the more appropriate

channel of engagement, due to its mature and manifold

instruments of engagement.

Additionally, the EU’s meagre status as a security actor

does not inspire confidence in its abilities to guide

capability building. The Union needs a stronger security

policy with more effective institutional and legal

frameworks and mechanisms of cooperation, as well as a

firmer and convincing leadership to engage member

states. Alternatively, the EU would be better advised to

stay clear of defence matters, as it is thus far largely

unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with them.

Procedural Elements

The two frameworks are rather similar in structure,

objectives, procedures and implementation. The strategic

advantage of the SD is its binding nature, whereupon

specific national targets are determined and subsequently

implemented by member states. In the context of low

political will, a binding approach in security cooperation is

guaranteed to provide better results in terms of output

and even successful outcome.

Contrary to the EU, NATO has developed a

communication strategy for the initiative of Smart

Defence, which delivers a more convincing narrative.

Special Envoys, one of which is Deputy Secretary-General

Vershbow, have been designated to promote SD, making

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 5

the venture more attractive to member states and

industry alike, as well as non-members that NATO

occasionally engages with.

CDP vs NDPP

Both planning processes aim for the same end go: to

encourage members to converge capabilities in their

full life-cycle and in the long-term to adjust defence

planning processes to set rather ambitious targets,

which is necessary to achieve progress. CDP focuses

exclusively on European capabilities and gives a clear

idea on their gaps and availabilities. The main difference

between the two capability planning mechanisms is

their binding force: many member states adapt their

national programmes and strategies in accordance with

NATO’s NDPP targets and objectives but not

necessarily following the EU’s CDP. The linking up of

the two processes has been discussed as to avoid the risk

of duplication of capability programmes and excessive

administrative burden. The lack of consensus results in

the logical presumption that members would usually

choose NATO for such engagement.

Stalemates and Recommendations

European states who are members of both

organizations are expected to assume initiative of both

P&S and SD projects, with the argument that they

would intuitively identify gaps and potential for

cooperation. By renouncing exclusive initiative rights

with this bottom-up approach, the EDA risks inactive

tendencies and sluggish progress, as nations would

rarely choose the EU as the platform for security

cooperation, partly for reasons of resentment of EDA

budget scrutiny. Nevertheless, a top-down approach is

also often unproductive: there is bound to be resistance

to a supranational body dictating priorities and targets

in national capability building.

The lack of trust between member states is one of

the most severe issues stalling progress on collaborative

projects. The wide capability gaps and unwillingness of

certain member states to share with the “less capable”

nations cause the latter to dread mutual dependence

and the insecurity of the commitment. Members of

both organisations still do not fully trust each other on

sensitive issues and are apprehensive of the availability

of common resources in times of an operation or crisis,

a fundamental concern that has the potential of being a

constant stalemate if not properly addressed. This

could be institutionally tackled via more binding

commitments imposed by the two overarching

organisations.

Member states also tend to prefer bilateral and

regional constellations, such as the Visegrad Group and

the Weimar Triangle for instance, according to

geographical proximity and comparable size, shared

strategic culture and political interests, etc. This could

be a useful instrument for the EU and NATO, as their

engagement in pooling and sharing could be

encouraged and subsequently used to foster inter-

cluster coordination, to move towards greater

integration.

Bureaucratic burden can drive national authorities

away from cooperation. Strenuous implementation,

red tape, and duplicative administrative tasks are better

kept at a minimum, to avoid discouragement and

interruption of projects.

Financing issues could become counterproductive

in the context of defence budget cuts. The EU's Athena

mechanism and NATO's Framework Nation concept

both translate into "costs lie where they fall", which

means in practice that the member state(s) that

contributes the most troops and capabilities is left with

the bulk of the costs, which provides not only for

financial reluctance, but for risk-based disinclination to

deploying troops.

Some duplication and overlap are to be expected

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 6

with programmes of such content, involving 22 of the

same member states. Communication and

benchmarking between NATO and the EDA is

instrumental in this respect in order to avoid

duplications and gaps, in projects and capabilities, as

well as to achieve a general alignment of approaches

and objectives, a crucial component in the EU-NATO

Capability Group. Although there have been no

common P&S–SD projects to date they are

recommendable to configure duplication areas, and

might foreseeably be initiated as consequential effect

to an eventual TTIP adoption. Furthermore, each

organisation has six non-overlapping members—

twelve countries in total— who benefit from the

similar programs on two different organisational

levels.

Should the EU and NATO political leaderships

decide to delimitate their security tasks - for example,

the EU could specialise on small-scale crisis

management and post-conflict stabilisation, while

NATO handles the

larger operations - this

would effectively mean

that they could delineate divergent priorities in

capability development and training, thus precluding

duplication, ensuring complementarity and focusing

more on capacity-building.

In order to maximise progress on pooling and

sharing, both the EU and NATO need to establish

clear definitions of targets and successful outcomes, to

involve monitoring and follow-up mechanisms, and to

clarify what types of capabilities and resources could

be subject to cooperation. Such clarifying actions

would help iron out differences in perception and

approach.

Defence planning has largely become an

institutional, instead of a political task. For the EU to

gain a stronger security leverage, the stipulation of an

annual European Council meeting on defence is

recommended, so as to compel heads of state and

governments to regularly discuss security matters, thus

providing adequate leadership and aligning national

approaches. This would also effectively bind foreign and

defence ministers through means of the final declarations

adopted in this constellation.

The EU spends about €190bn on defence per year,

which is still insufficient for Europe to autonomously

defend itself, while the saving gains from P&S are

estimated at €300 million, which could be allocated to

further training or capability development projects. The

EU and NATO leaderships are advised to better present

potential and tangible gains and launch projects financed

through saving gains, in order to provide better

incentive for new initiatives. Regularly taking stock of

lessons learned and positive outcomes of multinational

operations could also inspire confidence and raise

ambition for

engagement.

Defence industry

implications, including

industry disenchantment, market fragmentation and

shrinkage, as well as stalled progress in research and

development, should be seriously addressed as they have

a detrimental effect on Europe's industrial and

technological base.

Potential for Future Development

The fact that there is no up-to-date literature and

assessment of either initiative is indicative of lost

impetus and low ambition. The two initiatives, although

commendable in their approach, have achieved modest

success, having large overlapping goals and similar

projects. This does not, however, mean to imply that

the two cancel each other out or that they deliver no

added value, but it is not surprising that the two

“"Cooperation in defence is still not a natural reflex."

- Jorge Domecq, EDA's Chief Executive

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 7

initiatives are not performing as well as expected;

nevertheless, this should not be construed as a

discouraging signal. European nations have taken decades

to integrate far simpler policies. One should not

underestimate the so-called “spillover” effect of European

integration; the consolidation of one policy often leads to

that of another.

The issue of perceived supremacy of national

sovereignty in defence remains a stalemate to

collaboration. While the negative economic implications

should intuitively bring states closer together in

integration, they have the opposite effect of making them

look inward and focus on national politics, budgets, and

short-sighted campaign-wining tactics. Channelling

security through multilateral cooperation entails

acknowledging that nations are no longer able to

autonomously guarantee their citizens' security, while a

multinational corps implies a lesser degree of political

recognition and credit. For national authorities this is

difficult to do and so is convincing the public that in times

of austerity and budget cuts military spending should be

increased.

Future opportunity lies within the strategic reviews in

development - the publishing of the EU's Global Strategy

on Foreign and Security Policy (June) and the upcoming

NATO Warsaw Summit (July). Both are occasions for

strategic oversight and recommendations, which could

provide new impetus and incentives for further

engagement in P&S and capability consolidation.

The change of approach in security since the Cold

War entails shifting from a threat-based model to a

capability-based one, implying the necessity of military

capacity-building. The progressively higher number of

terrorist attacks, failed states, regional and international

conflicts, and the high number of European victims they

are producing should point out to European policy-

makers that security is no longer an exclusively national

prerogative – today it affects the citizens of Europe and

the world across borders alike.

Christine Andreeva concluded a Master’s Degree in

European Integration and Development at the Institute

for European Studies (in cooperation with Vrije

Universiteit Brussel). Ms. Andreeva’s interests lie in the

field of the EU’s external relations, with a particular

focus on European defence policy and counter-

terrorism. Ms. Andreeva completed internships at the

European institutions and for the past one and a half

year has been working at the European Parliament, at

the office of Mr. Georgi Pirinski, MEP.

European Parliament Research Service, (June

2015), State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and

sharing initiatives and its impact on the European Defence Industry,

Brussels: European Parliament.

E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t R e s e a r c h

Service, (December 2013), The cost of Non-Europe in Common

Security and Defence Policy, Brussels: European Parliament.

Mölling, (June 2012), Pooling and Sharing in the EU and

N AT O, B er l in : S t i f t un g W is se n s ch a f t u nd

Politik; [online]; http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/

publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/

article/europas_verteidigung_pooling_sharing.html ;

(Accessed 1 May 2016)

Dempsey, J.; (June 2014), Why Defense Matters: A New

Narrative for NATO, Carnegie Europe; [online]; http://

carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=55979 (Accessed 2 May

2016)

Pintat, X., (11 April 2013), Smart Defence, Strategic

Defence: Pooling and Sharing from the Start, Report for the

Defence and Security Committee of the NATO PA;

[online]; www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=3124;

(Accessed 30 April 2016)

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Smart Defence

(general information page); [online]; http://www.nato.int/

cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm(Accessed 30 April 2016);

Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

European Defence Agency; Pooling and Sharing (general

information page); [online]; http://www.eda.europa.eu/

what-we-do/eda-priorities/pooling-and-sharing (Accessed

30 April 2016); Brussels: European Defence Agency

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 8

A Need to Grow Up

Geopolitics have again regained importance in

Europe over the past few years. In the words of NATO

Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg “we are facing new

threats, new challenges, coming both from the East and

from the South”. Not only is Europe dealing with a

very assertive Russia, the Old Continent also needs to

worry about threats coming from the south, the biggest

being the so-called Islamic State. The strategy for

dealing with the consequent refugee flow to Europe is

causing great divisions among members of the

European Union (EU) and NATO.

However, the realization has come among European

leaders that in today’s globalized world, conflict and

instability anywhere across the globe can directly and

indirectly influence peace and security in NATO and

EU member states. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Mali

are good examples of this. Whereas it used to be

possible to speak of “wars of choice” and “wars of

necessity”, the line between the two is becoming more

and more blurred. The interconnectedness of the

threats means that NATO and EU member states

cannot be selective in their efforts to export peace to

neighbouring areas. It also means that all three of

NATO’s core tasks; collective defence, crisis

management and cooperative security are of utmost

importance. The renewed focus on collective defence

and deterrence must represent a rebalance towards

collective defence and not a shift away from crisis

management and cooperative security.

To be capable of successfully executing these

three core tasks, NATO and the EU need to increase

Germany and the Netherlands: Leading the Way in Defence Cooperation

By Marianne Copier

E uropean security is under threat.

Challenges have arisen along the

Southern and Eastern borders, as well as

within the borders with home-grown terrorism.

Additionally, Europe is still recovering from a financial

and economic crisis, needs to deal with new challenges

such as cyber attacks, and is suffering the consequences

of climate change. European defence is in a deplorable

state after decades of defence budget cuts. Currently

not a single European state can afford to maintain the

full spectrum of defence capabilities needed to address

all of these challenges. It is also unrealistic to believe

that defence budgets will increase so much as to enable

this. Therefore, European countries find themselves

with no other options than to upscale their defence

cooperation. To regain a competitive edge, the money

that is now finally coming available must be spent

effectively, to avoid duplication and meet the

collective defence capability needs.

The threats and challenges are of an international

and interconnected nature and therefore require a

multinational and integrated response. Common sense

dictates that if your adversaries’ strategy is to “divide

and conquer”, your response needs to consist of unity

and solidarity. This makes European defence

cooperation not only a financial necessity, but also the

best strategic choice. Then the question arises how to

give shape to “Smart Defence”, NATO’s cooperative

strategy to enhance capabilities while cutting down the

costs. German-Dutch defence cooperation can serve as

an example.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 9

their defence capacities. More specifically, the European

members need to do so, as they are not carrying their

equal share of the burden, even though they are the ones

surrounded by conflict zones. Unfortunately, they have

much to achieve, especially after decades of declining

defence budgets. At the Wales Summit, steps in the

right direction were made but more needs to be done.

Simply increasing defence budgets is a good first step,

but will not suffice; the money needs to be spent wisely

to generate more force. This requires more effective

European defence cooperation. Or as Dutch Defence

Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert recently remarked:

“Europe has to grow up”.

History of German-Dutch Defence Cooperation

When in 1991 the Dutch and German defence

ministers, Relus ter Beek and Gerhard Stoltenberg, laid

the foundations for the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps

(1GNC), Europe was in a totally different

place. The Cold War had just ended and it

was time to cash in on the peace dividend.

Defence budgets started to decline, resulting

in troop reductions. It was this trend that

prompted the Dutch and German defence

ministers to merge some of their national

corps to establish a binational one. It was the

first time in European history that two

existing corps headquarters amalgamated.

On 30 August 1995 the 1GNC, was ready for action. Its

tasks included defending NATO territory as unit of the

NATO Main Defence Forces; conducting peace

operations, operations under the auspices of the United

Nations, as well as humanitarian missions; and carrying

out national tasks, such as disaster relief during floods.

The Commander of the Corps is alternatingly Dutch or

German, for two to three years. Other key positions,

such as the Deputy-Commander and the Chief of Staff,

change simultaneously. The Corps is based in the

German city of Münster, where the Peace of Westphalia

was concluded in 1648, and which played an important

role in the history of both states.

When set up, the joint initiative was heralded as

testifying to the “shared will to reinforce the European

pillar of the NATO alliance” and “the intertwined

destiny of two neighbors”. Yet, it was also met with

scepticism, as the following quote from The New York

Times (September 12th, 1995) demonstrates: “And, since

only national parliaments can decide to send troops

outside NATO's boundaries, it is unlikely that German

and Dutch troops will ever be sent into action together

in the localized conflicts that have supplanted the

Warsaw Pact as the foe.” In hindsight, Defence Ministers

Ter Beek and Stoltenberg were proven right by history.

First of all, since its inauguration, the 1GNC’s mission

included defending NATO territory as a unit of the

NATO Main Defence Forces. In 2002, the

Corps was certified to act as a High

Readiness Force Headquarters. And since

2014, the Corps is engaged in the

enhancement of the NATO Response Force

(NRF), for which it assumes the Land

Component Command for half a year every

three years. When the Netherlands,

Germany and Norway took the interim lead

of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

(VJTF) in 2015, the 1GNC was in the vanguard of the

land operation. The Corps is thus doing its share in

“reinforcing the European pillar of the NATO alliance”.

Second, regarding the doubt that the Corps would ever

be deployed outside NATO’s boundaries, it is worth

noting that it has taken part in the International Security

Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003, 2009,

and 2013. Last but not least, the pioneering work of the

1GNC is paying off now that only 25 years later

European defence cooperation has become an absolute

Emblem of the 1GNC Headquarters

(Image: 1GNC)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 10

necessity.

Enhancing European Defence Capabilities

Through Cooperation and Integration

For decades now, there has been talk of a

European army. It never came into existence, for

multiple reasons - states not wanting to loose

sovereignty over their armed forced being the

primary one. Although there is a clear need for more

European defence cooperation, now is not the time to

discuss a European army. In fact, with current levels

of anti-EU sentiment all across Europe, doing so

would be counterproductive. Europe is, however, in

dire need of

initiatives that

increase its overall

defence

capabilities.

Whereas a

European army is a

step too far,

regional defence

cooperation has a

better chance of

getting popular

support. Dutch-

German initiatives can again lead the way. Building on

the trust relationship that they have built up over 25

years, the Dutch and German armed forces have

initiated several new forms of cooperation recently.

Importantly, these have enabled both countries to

maintain or gain defence capabilities.

In June 2014, the Dutch Airmobile Brigade,

consisting of 2000 military personnel, became part of

the German Rapid Forces Divison (Division Schnelle

Kräfte). The unit was placed under German

command; a first in the history of the Dutch armed

forces. Even more important in terms of enhancing

capabilities, was the 2015 agreement that allowed the

Netherlands to regain some of its tank capabilities, that

were lost in 2011 due to cutbacks. In 2015, the Royal

Netherlands Army 43 Mechanized Brigade was

reinforced by the German 414 Panzer Battalion, before

it was integrated into the 1st Panzer Division. It is

thanks to this collaboration that the Dutch armed forces

can maintain the know-how in operating this weapon

system and even have tanks at its disposal once again.

Germany and the Netherlands are now also exploring

opportunities for strengthening ties in the area of ground

-based air and missile defence.

Even more recently, in

February 2016, Dutch

Defence Minister Hennis

-Plasschaert and her

German colleague Ursula

von der Leyen signed an

agreement that foresees

far-reaching naval

cooperation, including

the “full integration of

the German Naval Force

Protection Battalion into

the Royal Netherlands

Marine Corps”, which will be the first time that German

armed forces are placed under foreign command. The

deal also includes the joint use of the largest and newest

ship in the Royal Netherlands Navy, the logistical

support ship HNLMS Karel Doorman, which ‘can be

used as a supply vessel but also for transporting heavy

weapons and for the sea-based support of complex

landing operations with helicopters’. Due to financial

constraints, the Netherlands decided to use the ship only

as a supply vessel. Germany on the other hand was in

need of transport capability. Thus, collaborations such as

these allow both countries to ‘maintain, expand, and

Lieutenant General Volker Halbauer (DEU) is relieved of his duties as Commander 1

(German/Netherlands) Corps by Lieutenant General Michiel van der Laan (NL) on 17 April

2016 (Photo: Facebook/ German /Netherlands Corps )

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 11

rebuild their military capabilities and operational

knowledge’.

Concluding Remarks

Europe’s current security landscape faces many

threats. To be able to ensure the European and

Transatlantic security, the European member states of

NATO and the EU have to step up to strengthen their

defence capacities. This means increasing defence

budgets, as was pledged in Wales. That, however, will

not be enough. The best chance Europe has to reach the

necessary capabilities to face the security challenges of

the 21st century is through enhanced defence

cooperation. From the rhetoric of the European

leaders, it would appear that they are aware of the

necessity of defence cooperation. From their actions,

the same conclusion cannot always be drawn. Now is

the time to undertake serious efforts to strengthen

European defence capabilities, and thereby Alliance

capacities, because if not now, it could very well come

too late. Since establishing a European army is not a

viable option, other forms of cooperation need to be

found, be it regional, binational or multinational.

Defence cooperation initiatives already in place, such as

between the Dutch and the Germans, demonstrate the

potential for such collaborations to make Europe

stronger. However, whereas common threats and the

necessity to work together can develop almost

overnight, the level of trust required for effective

defence cooperation can take years to build. Europe

cannot afford to waste any more time.

Marianne Copier holds a MA in International

Relations from Utrecht University. She has worked for

the Netherlands Atlantic Association since 2013 and in

November 2015, she became YATA Vice-President for

Communication.

Coelmont, Jo. “Message to – and from – the European political leadership: Agreeing to disagree on strategy is a luxury the EU can no longer afford”, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief no.71, May 2015

Cowell, Alan. “After 50 Years, a German-Dutch Military Partnership”, The New York Times, 1995 (September 12)

Dutch Ministry of Defence. “Division Schnelle Kräfte”: https://www.defensie.nl/english/topics/international-cooperation/contents/other-countries/division-schnelle-krafte

Dutch Ministry of Defence. “Dutch tank history ends with a bang”, 2011 (May 26): https://www.defensie.nl/english/latest/news/2011/05/26/dutch-tank-history-ends-with-a-bang

European Parliament, Directorate-General for External policies, Policy Department. “State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and sharing initiatives and its impact on the European defence industry”, 2015

Fiorenze, Nicholas, “Dutch mechanized brigade to be integrated into German panzer division” in HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2015 (September 18)

Headquarters 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. “History”: http://1gnc.org/history/

Speech of Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert at the seminar “Europe’s security and Defence; what next?”, March 11, 2016 in Paris: https://w w w . r i j k s o v e r h e i d . n l / d o c u m e n t e n /toespraken/2016/03/11/toespraak-van-minister-hennis-plasschaert-bij-het-seminar-europe-s-security-and-defence-what-next-engels

Jans, Karlijn. “The Netherlands and Germany as European Defense Pioneers” in The Huffington Post, 2016 (February 20)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. “Fact Sheet NATO Response Force (NRF)”: https://www.shape.nato.int/page349011837

The White House. “Remarks by President Obama and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after Bilateral Meeting” on May 26, 2016: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/26/remarks-president-obama-and-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-afte

The Netherlands EU Presidency 2016. “Germany and the Netherlands step up their military cooperation”: http://english.eu2016.nl/latest/news/2016/02/04/germany-and-the-netherlands-step-up-their-military-cooperation

About the author

Bibliography

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ATA Programs On May 31st, representatives from national ATA chapters will attend

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The Bulgarian Euro-Atlantic Youth Club will welcome young people

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