april 44 intelligence

8/6/2019 April 44 Intelligence

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Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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i**F *&"[} SUFREI'.^E lIKJ^UARTERSr-.-^/r -.- / iXLISD EXPEDITION^Y FORCEOffice of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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6for"15,000 wagons" read"1500 \7agons".for "Flak wagons" read"flat wagons".

q^-iU t*^G.A. RO tAN-ROBINSONMajor, GSfor Major-Gene raliX! of S, G-2

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERSALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORGEOffice of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 2 For i/eek EndingIst. April, 1944CONTENTS.-PARTILAND

A. Enemy Operations1 Russia2. Italy

B. Enemy Dispositions1. German Divisions in the 1. OS i>2f2 f Balkans,

CV Enemy CapabilitiesD. Enemy Supplies and Transportation

1.Railways(a) Germany(b) Prance(c) Attacks on Railway Centres

2. German />rmy Fuel Distribution in France3 , Note on German Strategic O il Storage System

E , Economic Notes1. Germany

(a) Fears of Food Shortage(b) The Value of Hunga.ry(c) The Bombing of Essen-2, France Underground Aircraft Factories-3. Belgium Production Loss through RaidsF. Political Notes-PARTII AIRA, Enemy Air Attacks on the United KingdomB# Reconnaissance ActivityC, Disposition of GAFD. GAF Operations in the Mediterranean

PART 111 - SEA *% ** ,eA* The ChannelB , The Adriatic " W pl^C* The TirpitzD Gods v. Mortals


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=-^ SUPREME HEADQUARTERSWgWesK&* * '" ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORGEOffice of Assistant Chief of Staff, G

WEEKIY INTELLIGENCE SlkliAY No. 2 For Week Ending- 1 April 1944PART I LANDENEMY OPERATIONS1. RUSSIA

The German Front in the SOUTH continues to disintegrate with everincreasing thoroughness. As a result of the week's fighting their forcesEAST of the DNIESTER have now only the rail and road crossing at TIGEENAleft open to them in addition to the rail ferry at ODESSA,, though theymay have constructed some pontoon "bridges over the river.The German reluctance to evacuate TRANSNISTRIA has probably been dueprimarily to their unwillingness to allow the Russians the use of the mainlateral BALTI-VOZNSSENSK railway. It appears now, however, that theGermans have been forced off their last hold on this line. This wil l

'ease the Russian supply and reinforcement problems very considerably andshould enable them to increase their speed of advance. ?:

The other important result of the recent fighting is. the fact thatwith KOLOMYJA and CERNAUTI in Russian hands the Germans are now forcedto . supply all their Southern forces either through or SOUTH of the CARPATHIANS from advanced bases in RUMANIA and IJUNGARY. Moreover it wouldseem that the Russians have got the Germans on the run and they may beable to force the JABLONICA pass before the Germans have time to organiseits defence. The situation would appear to be somewhat similar to thatwhich developed at the end of the Tunisian campaign a when the British6 Armoured Division rushed the German bottleneck at HAMLIAN-UP and brokeinto the CAPE BON Peninsula. The Russians are likely to receive strongsupport from the local inhabitants who are mostly pro -Russian. Thisadvance would probably have to be made in conjunction with a drive tothe NORTH on LWOW in order to secure their right flank.

The main range of the CARPATHIANS SOUTH of CERNAUTI is easy to defend.Of the four main passes only one is open all the year round and all arenarrow and easily obstructed. The Southern flank is not so easy to defendbut the length of front that has to be defended, i.e. from the Southernfoothills of the CARPATHIANS to the DANUBE Delta at GALATZ, is only aboutsixty miles. It is probable that the German defensive SCHWERPUNKT wil lbe in this area, firstly,, "because the bulk of the German forces in theSOUTH wil lbe forced back this way,, and secondly because the enemy islikely to make every endeavour to defend the approach to the oil wells atPLOESTI.-In view of the proximity of LVOV to the scene of operations^ it isinteresting to hear on the German Home Service programme that plans arein preparation for the performance of German operas in LVOV and that ".manywell known artistes of prominent opera casts in the Reich wil l cooperatein the new enterprise^ the most easteiAJteyyMfaiymywMjgage in theReich".

2.

UNCUSSIfIBn the ADRIATIC flank tne ".fflSmJrhas been showing signs of increasedliveliness, especially in the coastal sector s where he is probablypreparing to launch a local attack. Further SOUTH he has evacuatedlIONTENSRO and ALFADENA. This has probably been forced on him by the threat'..i. jV j?'


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pf# apriiag 3^-wheif conditions wil l a~!flow the possibility of Allied infil-' *frgj^jjxxy.-in -ft*? mountains and wil l compel him to make several readjustmentsmiiin-ir-** in his forward positions.In the CASSINO area, having successfully forced a stalemate s theenemy has decided to postpone indefinitely his withdrawal to the ADOLFHITLER line and he has not yet found it necessary even to reinforce theparachutists at CASSINO. 15 pG- Division is now partly behind 1 Parachute

Division and partly flanking it to the NORTH, while 90 FG- Division, whichwas brought up to man the FONTE CQRVO-PIEDIMONTE sector of the ADOLF KETLSRline in the event of a withdrawal, is stillwaiting there in general reserve.In'the ANZIO bridgehead the enemy's attitude is still defensive. Hisartillery, though remaining strong on the flanks, has decreased considerably in the centre. This is due to a series of events starting with thewithdrawal of 29 PG - Division and then 26 Panaer Division into reserve andto the departure of HERLIANH G-03RING- Division and 114 Light. The forcesaround the perimeter may be even further reduced., as prisoners report that

4- Parachute Division is also due for withdrawal, which is quite possible,as it has not yet completed its training- Assuming, though, that it isstill in the lir^ this leaves five divisions around the perimeter, ofwhich 3 PG- Division is the only first class formation.

The number of divisions, then, in the SOUTH remains the same (i7i)as last week, With the withdrawal of 11 4 Light from the bridgehead, however, the number of divisions. in reserve has increased by one to four.There are no indications yet as to how these wil lbe employed, but it isprobable that his success at CASSINO may encourage him to adopt a moreoffensive attitude, on the main front, both locally -.on the ADRIATIC Coastand in . the CASSINO area.What exactly is going on in Northern ITALY is not yet clear. Butthe G-erman occupation of HUNG-ARY is certain to have had some effect onthe internal reshuffling mentioned in Summary No. 1, and KESSELRING- maywell be forced to part with a portion of his fox'ces, even if only tempor

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b. enemy disposit ions' "


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*"** now so vitK to German forces^retreating from SOUTH HJSSSittOIn view ofthe lack of opposition to the occupation it seems likely that the fixstline elements wil l be relived "by inferior troops and security personnelfor more active use.

The relief afforded to TlTo*s PARTISANS wil lbe considerable, butprobably only temporary. Troop movements in GREECE and ALBANIA probablyinvolve the move Northwards of at least one division.

C. Enemy Capabilities-Since Weekly Summary No 1, the enemy situation in EUROPE hasdeteriorated still further and there can be no doubt that the Germansare seriously perturbed at the turn of events on the Eastern front.The battle SOUTH of TARNOPOL is now largely fluid and even the enemyspokesmen complain that, there is no true front. This is 'tantamount toan admittance by the enemy. that he has, for the time "being at all events,lost control of the situation. Furthermore, the position in HUNGARYhas necessitated the provision of forces in order to "encourage" thatcountry to continue the fight with the remaining partners of the Axis.

It seems evident that these divisions have had to-be found mainly fromYUGOSLAVIA where GERMANY can ill,fford to .give TITO more 'scope forhis guerrilla activities, and that, in effect, is what itmeans.In Southern RUSSIA the enemy must now "endeavour, firstly, toextricate his forces new E4SE/of the ENIESTKR'(no longer can he affordthe extravagance of a STALINGRAD) and-, secondly, to stablise his lineto prevent a deep penetration by the Russians towards the PLOESTI oil-fields. It looks as though the CRiriA-, is to be held for the time being.Further NORTH he must at all costs hold theline of the CARPATHIANS.To what extend, this wil lbe achieved. depends partly on the Russianability to maintain pressure, but, for the moment, it seems that theline of the R. PRUTH ds the best that the enemy can hope for and thatthey may, well be .driven back further and "forced to attempt to establish

a ;line from the Southern tip of the CARPATHIANS to GAJLATZ and the' "DAjfeE' basin, . .In ITALY there has been little change in the enemy situation.KESSELRING is evidently intent on dinging to the political prize of

ROME and unless he is forced out of his xoresent strong defensive linesor is filched of divisions to provide stop gaps on other fronts, onemay expect to see a continuation of the German strategy to defend a lineSOUTH of ROME.In the Yi/EST, the enemy continues to put the finishing touches tohis plan for the defence of FRANCE. There are indications that internal

moves of troops are taking place, the portent of which" is not yet clear,but one fact stands .out * There is as yet no evidence -that the desperatesituation on the Eastern front ha 3 led to the withdrawal of divisionsfrom FRANCE. information still points to a German determination tomanage somehow in RUSSIA so that she can present a firm- defence in theWEST to the Allies. 'It might not be out of place to quote from Marshal- FOCH s memorandum Of 24 July 1918, designed "to induce the conviction that ourconcerted efforts v/ould bring decisive results".

He wro.te: "Moreover, all available information is in agreement-as' to the enemy being reduced to the state of being compelled to have

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D. El^fi:SUPPLIES -lffi>TRANSPORTATION |i^ff^l'tt^Ql^l r f 1 . Railways(a) GERMANY

The policy of combing out German railways staffs to provide moreG-erman railway personnel in the V/EST, thereby increasing Germancontrol of railways in the occupied territories, is naturallyhaving repercussions on the German railways themselves. This isshown in a report that trains may now be worked with one guardor "brake-man. In addition to supplying railway personnel for theoccupied territories the Reichsbahn is having to meet furtherdemands for the release of men for service in special Army rail way units and even for combatant service, '/ithdrawals of railwayworkers from the EA.ST is insufficient to balance these commitments and the Reichsbahn is trying to meet the staff shortage bymaking greater use of women.

(b) FRANCEFrench railways are receiving a great derl of attention at thepresent time; from ourselves, the enemy, and French saboteurs;and it is quite clear that the growing tide of sabotage forcedthe G-ermans to go to lengths which must be a serious embarrassmentto them. The decision to increase control of the French railwaysappears to have been taken quite suddenly towards the end of 1943,as a direct result of increasing sabotage. According to an officialreport stated to have "oeen made to LAVAL last December, 350 loco motives and 15,000 wagons were put out of action each month in the-period 1 July 30 Nov. Damage by air attack was apparently included in these figures but there is no doubt that by far themajority of the damage was done by sabotage. Since then thescale of sabotage has probably been even higher. In January,MDNZER, head of the German Railway Traffic Directorate in FR^TCE,threatened the Directors of the French Railways and other highofficials with imprisonment on the grounds that the na.ture ofthe railway sabotage in FRANCS showed cles.rly that it was beingcommitted by expert railwayman. MUNZER added that if necessarythe Germans would take over complete control of the French rail ways with 65,000 of their own personnel. It seems not unlikelythat the Germans are coming near to carrying out this threat asthe total of German .personnel in FRANCE is now reported to beabout 50,000.Another difficulty besetting the Germans in FRANCE is the lowstate of maintenance which now prevails throughout the Frenchsystem, A report on the locomotive failures on the SNCF inSeptember 1943 shows that failures occurred in no less than 541steam locomotives and 95 electric locomotives. In addition,failures occurred to 4,722 wagons due to hot axle boxes. Thesefigures reflect strikingly the poor condition of the stock andthe inadequacy of maintenance arising from the shortage and poorquality of lubricants, and probably indicate a shortage of staffand materials in the running sheds and workshops.Probably to relieve this state of affairs, locomotives arereported to be returning to the French railways from GERMANY.In November las^Jj-t was reported that 200 locomotives had been

Yreturned and* %Hat |550 wore due to be returned. It is nowreported that

>l-v450 German locomotives have arrived at NAMJR.This would seem to be direct evidence of an acute shortage oflocomotives in' the iTEST, This is not actually thought to be the


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case, * There ui#y, however, be a short a^^j^saWali^Typc :s or* locomotives, and serviceability is certainly low. Consequently ,the Germans may "be preparing to operate some of their own locomotives for essential military traffic.Some fairly recent figures are now available to illustrate further the- serious general state of affairs pertaining on theFrench railways. The total number of wagons loaded by the SNCFin October 1943 (excluding purely non-military traffic) as compared with October 1942 was 59^*722 wagons against 825,955 or adrop of about 255 j. c actual number of SNCF wagons available fo]non-military traffic inside FRANCE was approximately the same inOctober 19^3 as 1942, and the big drop in loadings is a directreflection on the deterioration of the railway position in-FRANCE, arising from all causes sabotage, air attacks, badmaintenance, etc.The following details, however, are even more illuminating incase there should be any doubt as to who are the sufferers fromthis -present state of affairs.A study of figures available (for tho &JD-SST Region only) ofthe nurober of wagons supplied as against those ordered, revealsthe following: In NcT-einbcr and December 1943? the percentageof covered, open and Flak wagons supplied for military trafficand goods traffic on German account as against those actuallyordered varied between 97 and 72^>, However, wagons ordered '!for French commerical traffic varied between 1 and 18^S. Thesefigures speak for themselves.That the Germans intend, if necessary, to squeeze the Frenchcommercial traffic right off the railways is yet further illustrated by a warning addressed by the Vichy Ministry ofIndustrial Production and Communications to the SNCF at the endof January 1944. The warning set out at great length the chaoticstate of affairs prevailing and which showed no signs of abating.The warning concluded, however, by.stating that the Germans hadjust notified the Ministry in most categorical terms that unlessthere was a material improvement within the next few days, they(the Germans) would be forced to take action against thoseresponsible and in order to ensure their own vital requirementsbeing met, they would haze to reduce very materially Frenchtraffic. The warning reminded the SNCF that French traffic wasalready restricted to the barest minimum for supplying the Frenchpopulation with coal and food, and that any further reductionwould have extremely grave consequences for the French population,Clearer evidence could hardly be as Iced for to show that in acrisis, be it now or "./hen the battle is on, the Germans will, ifnecessary, devote the railways entirely to..their own use, andthe French wil l have to manage as best they can whatever theconsequences.

(c ) Af'C-cks on R:i3 Iv/ay Csiitr. ,s(i) FRANCE

Attacks on important fuel centres have continued withattacks on AULNOIE, HIRSON and TREIL, LaON and VAIEES.-AULNOYE In an attack of 26 March severe damage was doneto the locomotive shed and the carriage and wagon repairshop, both of which were about half demolished. Trackswere heavil^oratered.iINPI iicoirirh *^^^^^ iUIUJLinMOiritJJ im.ii


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' - 8 HIRSQN Attacked on 25 March, . There again considerablydamage was done to installations. The engine shed was completely demolished and the main wagon shop, damaged in theattack of 6 March, was further damaged. Sidings do notappear to have been heavily crate red.-LAON Attacked night 23/^k March. Sidings were heavilycratered, and servicing shops received. 2o-30 direct hits.Cover of 26 March revealed that repair work was already inprogress.VAJRES - Heavy damage to rolling stock; locomotive shedhalf destroyed. /The most outstanding result of these attacks has clearly beenthe destruction of installations such as engine sheds, repair- shops, etc.Meanwhile repair work ha-s been progressing at AMIENS, TRAPPES,and LE MANS. By 23 March (12 days after the raid) repairswere still not far advanced at AMIENS. Clearance for repairsto be made was being carried out; but apart from throughtracks, extensive track repair has not been carried out.On the same date at LS MAN'S (2 weeks after last attack)marshalling yard tracks were sufficiently repaired for partialworking; clearance- work was continuing. The undamaged sectionof the locomotive depot was in use.Cover of TRaPPES on 26 March revealed that about half theyard was unserviceable and that temporary electric standards'had been erected. This latter repair work is of some interestsince it reveals that the enemy is apparently seriously concerned with keeping electric traction going.In general, it appears that once through tracks have beenrestored, repairs continue at a rather leisurely pace; despitethis, however, it.must be admitted that even large yards likeTRAPPES are fairly quickly restored to adequate operatingcarjacity. Little or no attempt appears to be made to repairlocomotive sheds etc.

(ii)BELGIUMThe rail centres of H/JNE ST PIERRE and COURTRAI in BELGIUMwere also attacked.-KAINE ST PIERRE- Locomotive shed was partly demolished andwhilst there was severe damage to track and rolling stock inthe yard; through lines escaped serious damage.-COURTRAI The marshalling yard sidings and main lines wereheavily cratered and an engine shed received three direct hits,A turntable also received a direct hit. Two days after the raidno repairs had been started.As in the case of the French centres, engine sheds appear tohave suffered most.There has as yet been little evidence, apart from re-routing ofcertain expresses, of the effect of these attacks on the enemy.Since this form of attack is definitely one of attrition againstthe enemy's transport system, it is as yet too early to expectresults. ?, igg-g^-g^^^-g^^

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~^" *v*UNCLASSIFIED, German Army Fuel Distribution inNorthern FRABWE

?The German Army system of fuel distribution inNorthern FRANCS isrelatively simple with few unusual features and is "based on the directand indirect method of supply.The principal GHQ bulk storage transit depot and bulk breaking depotis at GENNEVILLIERS, a suburb of PARIS. This depot was receiving byrail (at the end of 1943) an estimated minimum of 8,500 tons of MFfuel per month. Although the GENNEVILLIERS depot appears to handlemost of the German MT Fuel requirements for FRANCE, it is estimatedhowever, that a further 3 9QQO tons a month (not 'known if MT or A/cfuel) arrives in PARIS by water up the MARNS-RHINE Canal. The importance- of GEIMEVILLIERS centers not so much on the s tocks it holdsbut that.it is the main transit and bulk breaking depot, v/hence supplies are forwarded by road or rail to Army POL depots. Stocks atGENNEVILLIERS are estimated at about 15000 tons (or sufficient , say,for 10 motorized divisions for a month).In addition to the bulk breaking depots in PARIS, smaller amounts offuel are routed direct by rail to such places as ROUEN, LE IL2JS, SENS,RHEIMSj other small depots, and even directly to Array depots. Deliveries at ROUEN and LB MANS are estimated at some 1500 tons at eachplace.Army depots fall into three distinct categories: firstly, dumpssituated in forest areas; secondly, those using existing civilianstorage facilities, e.g. storage tanks at REMMES, BORDEAUX, etc;thirdly, those using buried storage installations of which there area number linked to the German strategic storage system, as explainedin the succeeding paragraph. Some of the civilian storage and buriedstorage installations may, however, be under GHQ control.About eleven major forest dumps have been located NORTH of the LOIREbetween the BISCAY Coast and the- Belgian frontier. The followingfeatures appear to be common to most of them:(a.) They are more than 50 miles from the Coast.(b) They are associated with Army ammunition dumps (AldL's) sitedin another part of the forest.(c) The average quantity held is estimated at about 1000 tons.These dumps have perhaps >eon more accurately described as convoy refillingpoints and arc sor'-cc*lLy road and rail* Fuel is stored incontainers.Divisional dumps are served by rail and road from Army dumps and Army(or forward GHQ) tankage, Fuel in tanker wagons is also available fordivisions at railway fillingstations; c.g n, the divisions under 81Corps in the DIEPPE' raid U3oC. NLYSRS, " VaLOC-UES, CERIDE SUR VIES andCERENCES. Army apparently -bakes "charge of these dumps to facilitatethe supply tasks of divisions.From this it appears that there is a definite tendency (quite in keeping with German regulations) for divisions to keep all their stocks ofPOL supplies mobile in divisional transport and to avoid takingresponsibility in setting up dumps. Dumps are conveniently sited forthe various divisions. Jav_ Armv.mmmm-mm.w*to*J*'s2^'.*-;.JB -js 2**..:,i i *.'::*'^-. .^^^m^f .^Tija


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:. ECONOIHC "NOTES


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Apart fPOBte-ifca starategiG. valuers a transport centre 5 HUNQ^RY'seconomic importance to GERMANY lies in its annual production ofabout 1 ,000 3 000 tons of "bauxite, its exportable Wheat surplus and-its oil production of over A,000, 000 tons a year. : ,

IIt is probable that the Germans "will also 'try to make use & the*Hungarian engineering industry. tt %In addition to the few arms work's., Hungary had even before the wara useful steel pro_ducing and engineering capacitor which was* capable

of conversion to war production. Considerable expansion is indeedreported to have been achieved in small arms and machine gun manufacture as well as in ammunition of most calibres. At the sametime artillery production, which was in 1938 limited to l ight BoforsA.A.. guns.j now includes medium field artillery. There is3 however,some doubt whether heavy A.A. artillery or adequate anti-tank weapons are' inproduction in HUNGARY.In the past two or three years tank or other armoured vehicle production has apparently begun in small numbers. These advanceshave no doubt been assisted by German, technical aid but were apparently executed independently by the Hungarian Government,Hungary can probably be organised tb supply most of her ow n military requirements with the exception of heavy armaments, There havebeen instances both of HUNGARY'S ability to export arms (e.g. Boforsguns and certain types of ammunition) and also of b^r desire toimport particular- weapons (e.g. 20*-mm. Swiss cannon),. It is probable that her capacity is stronger in certain direction than others.As far as is known there are only two items in which GERMANY atpresent benefits from Hungarian production of military equipment.Though their use by the German Army may be on a relatively smallseale 3 there is nevertheless some evidence that both Gamma range-finders and predictors and Junghans time-fuses (made by Suss) arebeing .made available by HUNGARY.HUNGARY'S aircraft industry is very largely under German influence.A large new factory built according to plans provided by Messerschmitt's was completed in 1943 and is now in production on twinengined fighters. Output is still well below designed capacity(rated at 120 per month) and is believed to be P at the moment,shared between HUNGARY and GERMANY.

(c.) Bombing of ESSENESSEN 3 home of the .^reat Krupp works, was heavily bombed byBomber Command on liarch 26/27- The town had not been heavilyraided since July 25 \ the last of .six heavy attacks which destroyednearly three-quarters of the Krupp plant.Formerly employing 35 3 000 workers on armament work alone ,Kruppspecialized in the heaviest calibre guns for naval 5 coastal defenceand siege purposes. In this particular field they were the mostimportant firm in GERMANY. They also produced A.A.:guns, airbornerecoilless guns- flame-throwers., gun carriages,, mountings, turretsand many other forms. of armaments.The destruction of the greater part of the ESSSN works was achievedin the course of the attacks between March and July 1943. Manyof the forges, machine and armament assembly shops were demolishedand it is thought that at the end of 1943 output of all Krupp products was not running at more than one-third of capacity.

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'? fc I.*. BIt is known that many of Krupp's multifarious activities have"been transferred elsewhere but there is no specific evidence ofwhat types of ar tade in Essen or in alter native premises. 'difficulty of findingsuitable plant fflrnbhe 'prbctuation of the heavier forgings, cast ings and machined parts it is unlikely that any such transferhas been made oh^any large scale and the x^roblem of bridging thegap in the production of heavy guns has probably been solved bycontinuing as far as possible to produce at ESSEN and by usingunemployed v/orkers from ESSEN to help to increase production atSKODA, WITKOT7ITZ and RHEIMtETALL-BORSIG, This is likely to haveproved only a partial solution.

2, FRANCEUnderground Aircraft FactoriesFollowing reports of the re-opening of the underground aircraftworks at CRAVANT near AUXERRE (XONNS) it is now reported that,at a conference inPARIS between representatives of the G-.A.F.and interested French ministers, it was decided that undergroundaircraft works should be installed on French territory.Extensive disused quarries covering some 75 acres at CROG-NAC, ahamlet just NORTH of ST. ASTI3R (DORDOGNE) are being prepared..Some equipment from the bombed works of the 3.N.C.A. dv S.O. atBORDEAUX BACALAN has already been installed and, according tothe report, it was intended between January and March 1944 totransfer the aircraft works from BEGLES and MERIGNAG.. As fromMarch, works from ROCHEFORT, NANTES, ST. NAZAIES, BAYONNE andothers are to be transferred and the labor force wil lnumber8,000.Five hundred v/orkers are to be housed in hutments at ST. ASTISR,while others wil l be billeted inbarracks at JPERIGSUX. Specialrail facilities wil l be afforded between ST. ASTISR and PERIGEUXfor the transport of workers.

3. BELGIUM.Production Loss through RaidsFigures have been received which illustrate the interference towork occasioned by air raid warnings although it must be borne inmind that the Belgian v/orkers wil l seize every opportunity to"go slow".It has been officially stated that during the month of November1943, 9,500 tons of crude steel and 9*ooo tons of semi-finishedand finished products were lost owing to the cessation of workduring alerts. These figures correspond to ' about' ~J% of themonth's output. Coke production is not affected to the sameextent, the loss of 3,000 tons during the month constituting lessthan V/j of the output.It is of interest to note that losses in production due to airraid alerts have been such that works are obliged to furnishmonthly statements to the authorities.

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HsuiUa nvn&a MB "S'n|{P. POLITICAL NOTES

' '"FIfILAXD ..,. .1. . a..-A . > ' ;'.1b|-Li i,Hopes of the Finnish public are rising somewhat as the result fno incidents having occurred since the publication of the reoe^tSoviet, and Finnish official statements the peace_ on negotiation^_-i-S\ I * /--! !__!*' ' _~1 .Tl H ? .If.an armistice or successful geace negotiations are concluded, *the'is considerable chance of civil disorder in FINLAND and the pos^ibi1lity of the Germans attempting to seize HELSINKI and set up a;pi|ppegovernment. The possibility of German success along these lineswould be materially lessened if such an event did not take placeuntil Soviet troops had reached the BALTIC and TALLINN. Soviet-"Finnish discussions ajjpear to be continuing inMOSCOW.

2. SWEDENThe Swedish Government is watching the Soviet-Finnish situation withgreat care, as a German move into HELSINKI, as the result of a Soviet-Finnish accord, might seriously affect Swedish-German relations. FullSwedish mobilization would probably deter any direct German attackbut to take such a step is difficult for the Swedish Government atpresent as there is slated to be an election during the current year.

3. HUNGARYThe Germans have Had a comparatively easy task so far in theiroccupation of HUNGARY. There has been no sign of any real resistance,'and the airports and railways have fallen plump into German hands.On the political side a puppet government is in the saddle and theopposition parties consisting of the Social Democratic Party, theSmall Holders'' Party and the Peasa.nt Union are to be suppressed.HORTHY, the Regent, is being "rigged up by the NAZIS as the St.GEORGE who wil l lead the fight against the Bolshevik dragon.

The Hungarian Ministers in BERNE, STOCKHOLM, LISBON and MADRID, whoare reported to have broken with the puppet German government inBUDAPEST, seem to be desirous of establishing a resistance movementoutside of HUNGARY.

4. ITALYThe -Italian Government, with the full support of the Alliedauthorities, is proceeding energetically, according to recentreports, with the clearing out of FASCISTS from public office.The Soviet action in establishing relations with ITALYmay bringthe Italian Communists around to : serving under BADOGLtO. The arrival in ITALY of ERCOLI, Secretary-General of the undergroundItalian Communists during the Fascist regime, on March 28th fromMOSCO.f may clarify Italian Communist policy further.

5. FRANCE!DEAT, who has been appointed Vichy Minister of Labor, has nailedhis colors to the Nazi mast by patch of Frenchworkers to GERIvL^NY wil lbe hisJjS

The Germans on their side are demanding a considerable speed-up ofthe transfer of workers in FRANCE to c-s sent Tal Indus trio s. and have


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v .%M t also ordered VIOHT to take energetic meate-^-^fo-rtJUilff UfT^orEerswho have been allowed to return to FRANCE on leave and who have defaulted. H3NPJOT states that these amount to 65,000.

6. FRANCE NORTH AFRICAThe Provisional Consultative Assembly at iiG-lERS has, after considerable debate, approved an ordinance for establishing a government in liberated FRANCS. The full text is not yet available but theprinciple features are that the people of FR/JTCE will be afforded an;X i Opportunity to vote at latest within one year, for: (1) JL Provisional Assembly and (2) a Constituent Assembly. In addition localelections arc to be held at the earliest possible moment, and atlatest within 3 months after the liberation of the metropolitan ter ri tory.No members of the French Committee took part in the debate exceptde GAULLE who made a shox-t speech in which he made two points:

(a) To lea.ye new consitution to decision of a properlyelected assemply^(b) To hold elections at earliest possible moment.

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"**""Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 k '***

T/EBKLY nTTSLLIG^TCE SIMIAJ^T NOy.2.

For Veek Ending2 April 1944.NCLASSIFIH*-PART TV/O AIR (Prepared by Air Intelligence Section, SHAEF)

A i_.A!i^..i:ii_ j-h-e UNITED KDTGIOI,During .the, v;eek ending tc 30, 3*44. the G.A.F. has made two air attackson the UNITED JCDIGDOII.. On the first attack the enemy operated 170 aircraftagainst Southern El-TGL/'JID, of which 110 attacked land targets. Attacks v/erescattered over the v/hole of Southern EJIGIiAIID from ".rSSTOTT-SUPSH-II'':RE toHASTINGS. No where was there any concentration of. effort.. Aircraftoperated in two phases. The first force of 110 Long Range Bombers crossedthe Coast between FAIi-IOUTH and PORTLATTD BILL. The second force consisting

of fighter/bombers operated over the coastal area between FOLKESTONE andHASTINGS. On the night 30/31 Ilarch, 12 enemy aircraft operated over SvE.BNGM^ID and the LOI-TDON area. These came in over SUSSEX and SURREY undercover of our returning bombers z.ncl. operated at heights from 25,000 to 8,000feet with a minor concentration along the -"toast between BEA^HY HEAD andDUNG3NESS. 3 enemy aircraft reached the Greater LONDON area, and minorincidents have been reported on . -.VOOL5. -ICK, ESIiER and E^SISOIMTE. A further6 enemy aircraft operating from HOLL.JID appeared off the East Ooast, 3 ofthem making landfall over NORFOLK and LIlTOOLir. These aircraft are believedto have been lie.4los engaged on intruder operations. No interceptions byAllied night fighters were made.B. Reconnaissance ActivityThe scale of effort of enemy reconnaissance sorties for the last weekhas been from 15 to 20 during the day and up to 10 at night. The majorityof these have been carried out hy long range twin-engine aircraft and TV*'.2oosover Northern waters. No enemy reconnaissance aircraft have been reportedover the Coast of this country during the last week.. The North Sea and South-Vestern approaches have been well covered.C. Disposit ion of GAF.It is probable that the fighter units defending GERILJTY, representingover 70^J of the total operational fighter strength of the G.A.F., have duringFebruary undergone the heaviest cumulative strain ever imposed on them in thecourse of one month's operations. Since, however, the rising crescendo ofthe Allied day and night offensive against German industrial targets only-reached its peak in the period 20 25 February-, the full effects on thefighting value of the G.A.F. fighter forces have not yet made themselves felt.In particular, the result of the destruction of vital factories producing andassembling fighter aircraft wil l only become fully apparent during the nextmonth or two, when a substantial reduction in fighter strength may beanticipated, provided that wastage is maintained at the February level.

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' SUPREME HEADQUARTERSfiAr%^ ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE- Office of Assistant Chi^f of Staff, G-2.WEEKLY INTEyjJg^Cj^aiLMigr No. 2

For Week Ending2 April 1944-PART 111 SEAA. THE CHANNEL

There have been several actions "by coastal craft during the week, noneof them very conclusive. In an action on the night of the 28/29 thMarch, 6 of our M.T.B, scored many hits on an enemy group betweenDIEPPE AND ETAFLES, but there was heavy opposition including firefrom shore batteries and 5 of our M.T.B, were damaged with fairlyheavy casualties.B. THE ADRIATIC

Allied raids have been made on SOLTA ISLAND off SPLIT, where the wholeGerman garrison was eliminated and on HVAR where Royal Marine Cnnmandcswith the help of the partisans cleared the enemy from practically thewhole of the Island. The enemy wil l now be unable to send supplies tihis forces on the mainland South of SPLIT.

C. THE TIRPITZ:The TIKPITZ, continues to undergo daily trials and the repair ship whichwas in attendance has now left. It is not thought, however, that animmediate move is likely.

D, GODS v MORTALSFlag Officer, Western Italy reported on 24th March that whereas theNaples Group of ports is now discharging at the rate of 12,000,000 tonsper year, was estimated to be doing 30,000,000 a day fe oughtESUVIUS " irto admire,"' he said "this gesture of the Gods,

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