annual runway safety report 2010

Upload: alessandro-ravaschio

Post on 05-Apr-2018

223 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    1/92

    Annual RunwaySafety Report 2010

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    2/92

    Message from the Administrator

    Dear Colleague:

    When serious runway incursions drop by 50 percent over the

    previous year, you know youre doing something right.

    The good news here is every corner o the aviation community

    is sharing the success. From the airlines to the business

    aviation community to the pilots, controllers, surace vehicle

    operators and the GA enthusiasts who just y or pleasure,

    everyone has taken a step up.

    The numbers alone tell the story. With almost 53 million

    operations in FY 2009, we had 12 serious runway incursions, down rom 25 the previous

    year; two serious incursions involved commercial aircrat. Those are encouraging

    numbers.

    When we issued a Call to Action or runway saety almost two years ago, we as a

    community recognized the need to do a better job o keeping things sae on the airport

    surace. Even though the number o mistakes is infnitesimally small, given the number

    o successul operations per day, we nevertheless need to take every opportunity to

    continue to enhance surace saety.

    As youll clearly see in the runway saety report, thats what is happening. The

    emergence o a just culture between regulator and regulated has played a huge part.

    Because we have so ew data points, we need or the people in the system to be able to

    say, Heres a problem without ear o penalty. As a result, were learning about the sot

    spots, the places, and procedures that need to change.

    Although weve been successul, we still need to do more. Given these results, Imconfdent that we will.

    J. Randolph Babbitt

    FAA Administrator

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    3/92

    Table o Contents

    FAA Initiatives to Improve Runway Saety .....................3

    The FAA Measures and EvaluatesRunway Saety ...............................................................5

    Updates and Progress onRunway Saety Activities ................................................9

    NextGen and Runway Saety ...................................... 21Human Factors in Aviation .........................................27

    International Leadership inRunway Saety ............................................................ 35

    Appendix ..................................................................A-1

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    4/92

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    5/92

    32010 Runway Safety Report

    FAA Initiatives to ImproveRunway Saety

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible or the

    oversight and regulation o the worlds most advanced and saest

    aviation system. Strong partnerships within the aviation community,continued collaboration with stakeholders, and a clear vision o the

    uture have resulted in a strong oundation rom which the FAA

    continues to build a uture air transportation system and improve

    saety.

    The FAA is responsible or the largest and most complex National

    Airspace System (NAS) in the world (Figure 1), which includes more

    than 500 towered and roughly 18,500 non-towered airports. This

    complex airport environment operates saely and eciently primarily

    due to the collaboration and diligence o more than 14,500 air trac

    controllers, more than 624,000 FAA certicated pilots, ground crews,

    and a large number o airport vehicle operators. Their combined dili-

    gence has served to reduce the number and severity o runway incur-

    sions, and the impact o their role will become more evident as the

    FAA continues to engage in Next Generation (NextGen) initiatives.

    With NextGen tech-

    nologies, procedures, and

    operations, the FAA will

    be able to accommodate

    the projected growth

    in air transportation

    demand and provide

    better reliability while

    improving runway saety

    in a more complex

    environment. NextGen

    technologies will promote

    greater situational awareness or pilots, ground vehicle operators,

    and air trac controllers through real-time system-wide distribution

    o inormation. Slated or continous implementation, the FAA is

    constructing the NextGen air transportation system through near-,

    mid-, and ar-term planning initiatives. The FAA is well under way to

    accomplishing many near-term runway saety initiatives and will soon

    begin work on mid-term activities.

    The creation o the uture air transportation system requiresharmonization and collaboration between the FAA, oreign agencies,

    aircrat and component manuacturers, and airlines. To urther inter-

    national involvement, the FAA hosted the rst International Runway

    Saety Summit to not only bring a global ocus on saety issues but

    also advocate or increased awareness o the importance o runway

    saety domestically and internationally.

    Figure 1

    NAS With Air Trafc

    52,928,316Surface operations

    in FY 2009

    58,562,343Surface operations

    in FY 2008

    951Runway incursions

    in FY 2009

    1,009Runway incursions

    in FY 2008

    12Serious runway incursions

    in FY 2009

    25Serious runway incursions

    in FY 2008

    By the Numbers

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    6/92

    4 FAA Initiatives to Improve Runway Safety

    1 20092013 FAA Flight Plan Objective 3, Reduce the Risk of Runway Incursions.

    Table 1

    FY 2010 Runway Saety Report

    FAA Measures andEvaluates Runway Saety

    FY 2009 data and its comparison to FY 2008 data

    Updates and Progress onRunway Saety Activities

    Meetings Multimedia Training Other initiatives More runway saety improvements Improvements or inrastructure and technology

    NextGen and RunwaySaety

    What is NextGen? How will NextGen impact runway saety? NextGen and runway saety technologies available today NextGen and runway saety in the near term NextGen and runway saety in the mid-term (20122018) NextGen and runway saety beyond the mid-term (2018+)

    The Human Factor inAviation

    What is the human actor discipline? Why is the study o human actors so important? How human actors research reduces human errors Designing with the human actor in mind Anatomy o an incursion

    International Leadershipin Runway Saety

    International leadership in runway saety FAA is a key participant in ICAO Adopting international phraseology FAA collaborates on runway saety with international aviation stakeholders FAA and Eurocontrols collaboration in runway saety International saety data sharing FAA and CAST FAA and Chinese aviation authorities FAAs uture leadership role

    The FAAs Oce o Runway Saety publishes this

    annual report to inorm aviation stakeholders o

    the ongoing eorts to improve runway saety. The

    2010 FAA Annual Runway Saety Report presents

    the FAAs progress toward the Flight Plan[1] goals

    and perormance targets or runway saety. The

    report also describes the NextGen initiatives thatpertain to runway saety, the role o human actors

    in runway saety, and FAAs international leader-

    ship responsibility, all contributing to improving

    the uture o runway saety (Table 1).

    To learn more about the FAAs current initiatives

    and uture plans or runway saety, please visit

    www.aa.gov/go/runwaysaety. The ollowing FAA

    publications are available at www.aa.gov:

    National Runway Saety Plan,

    FY 2009 through FY 2011 FAA Flight Plan, 20092013

    FAA Port olio o Goals, 2009

    FAA Ofce o Saety,

    Saety Blueprint, 2009

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    7/92

    52010 Runway Safety Report

    The FAA Measures and EvaluatesRunway Saety

    The FAA depends on the support o strong partnerships in the airport

    environment to collectively improve runway saety (Figure 2). These

    partnerships have provided the ramework necessary or buildingthe uture o air travel, one that

    increases saety awareness or

    all involved and will allow us to

    travel rom where we are today

    to the projected increased capac-

    ity requirements o tomorrow.

    Leveraging NextGen technologies,

    improved training materials and

    rened communication techniques

    will aid in decreasing the number

    o serious incursions and continue

    to improve runway saety.

    Runway saety is measured by the

    occurrence o runway incursions,

    which are dened as ollows:

    Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence

    o an aircrat, vehicle, or person on the protected area o a surace

    designated or the landing and takeo o aircrat. The FAA uses this

    denition to identiy runway incursions, and then categorizes each

    based on the severity o the incident (Table 2 and Figure 3). Category

    A and B events are considered to be serious incursions.

    Airpo

    rtOp

    erations

    Tower

    Operati

    ons

    Airc

    raftOperations

    Drivers

    and

    Pedestrians

    Controllers

    Pilots

    Figure 2:

    Runway Saety Is a Shared

    Responsibility.

    Table 2:

    Runway Incursion Severity Classifcation

    Category Description

    AA serious incident in which a collision was narrowly

    avoided.

    B

    An incident in which separation decreases and a

    signicant potential or collision exists, which may

    result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response

    to avoid a collision.

    C An incident characterized by ample time and/ordistance to avoid a collision.

    D

    An incident that meets the denition o runway

    incursion such as incorrect presence o a single

    vehicle/person/aircrat on the protected area o a

    surace designated or the landing and take-o o

    aircrat but with no immediate saety consequences.

    1%The FAAs goal for reduction

    of total runway incursions

    for FY 2009

    6%The actual reduction of runway

    incursions in FY 2009

    52%The decrease in

    serious runway incursions

    from FY 2008

    By the Numbers

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    8/92

    6 The FAA Measures and Evaluates Runway Safety

    Table 3:

    Types o Runway Incursions

    Operational Errors Pilot Deviations Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations

    Action o an air trac controller

    that results in less than required

    minimum separation between

    two or more aircrat or betweenan aircrat and obstacles (e.g.,

    vehicles, equipment, personnel

    on runways) or clearing an

    aircrat to take o or land on a

    closed runway.

    Action o a pilot that violates

    any Federal Aviation Regulation

    (e.g., a pilot crosses a runway

    without a clearance while enroute to an airport gate).

    Pedestrians or vehicles entering

    any portion o the airport move-

    ment areas (runways/taxiways)

    without authorization rom airtrac control.

    Runway incursions can be urther classied by type

    as Operational Errors, Pilot Deviations, or Vehicle/

    Pedestrian Deviations (Table 3). Pilot deviations

    accounted or 63 percent o runway incursions,

    with operational errors and vehicle/pedestrian

    deviations accounting or 37 percent (Figure 4).

    In FY 2009, 270 o more than 500 towered

    airports reported runway incursions. A total o

    951 incursions occurred at these 270 airports.

    Flight operations dropped rom 58.6 million in FY

    2008 to 52.9 million in FY 2009 a 10-percent

    decrease. As a result, the rate o runway incursions

    per million operations increased slightly (Figure 5).

    Although the rate o incursions increased, the

    number o serious incursions decreased signi-

    cantly (25 to 12). More than 98 percent o the 951

    runway incursions were recorded as Category C

    and D or non serious. The FY 2009 perormancetarget or total incursions was set at a 1-percent

    decrease rom FY 2008; however, the actual

    decrease was 6 percent.[2]

    During FY 2008, the FAA recorded 25 serious

    incursion incidents out o 58.6 million operations

    (0.43 incursions per million). In FY 2009, the FAA

    recorded 12 serious incursion incidents out o 52.9

    million operations (0.23 incursions per million).

    These numbers represent a reduction o serious

    runway incursions by 52% in one year, and surpass

    the FAA FY 2009 Portolio o Goals perormancetarget o not more than 0.47 incursions per million

    operations (Figure 6).

    OE/D

    16%

    PD

    63%

    V/PD

    21%

    Figure 4:

    Distribution Across Runway

    Incursion Type (FY 2009)

    Category A1%

    Category B0.32%

    Category C36%

    Category D63%

    Figure 3:

    Distribution Across Runway

    Incursion Severity (FY 2009)

    2 FAA FY 2009 Portfolio of Goals

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    9/92

    72010 Runway Safety Report

    Figure 6:

    Number and Rate o Serious Runway Incursions, Categories A and B (FY 2006FY 2009)

    Figure 5:

    Number and Rate o Runway Incursions (FY 2006FY 2009)

    0

    10

    5

    15

    20

    25

    30

    0

    0.1

    0.2

    0.3

    0.4

    0.5

    0.6

    Rate of Incursionsper Million Operations

    FY 2009PerformanceTarget = 0.47Serious Incursionsper MillionOperations

    Number ofRunway Incursions

    7Category B

    24Category A

    FY 2009FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

    0.51

    7

    17

    0.39

    13

    12

    0.43

    9

    3

    0.23

    FY 2009 ActualPerformanceRate = 0.23Serious Incursionsper MillionOperations

    Rate of SeriousRunway Incursions perMillion Operations

    0

    400

    200

    600

    800

    1000

    1200

    0

    2

    4

    6

    8

    10

    12

    14

    16

    18

    20Rate of Incursions per Million Operations

    Number of Runway Incursions

    816Total RunwayIncursions 892 1009 951

    Rate of Runway Incursionsper Million Operations 13.36 14.59 17.23 17.97

    FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    10/92

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    11/92

    92010 Runway Safety Report

    500,000the number of

    runway safety DVDs

    distributed in FY 2009

    240the number of

    runway safety briefings

    conducted in FY 2009

    77%the percentage of

    pilot deviations that involved

    general aviation aircraft

    By the Numbers

    Updates and Progress on RunwaySaety Activities

    The FAA Oce o Runway Saety has made progress in continuing

    to build a proactive saety culture across the aviation community.

    An important part o a robust saety culture is the awareness andidentication o hazards. The FAA has achieved increased community

    awareness o the hazards that contribute to runway saety by using

    specic targeted outreach and training activities.

    The FAA continually inorms the aviation community about runway

    saety updates and best practices through various ormats ranging

    rom traditional fyers, multimedia DVDs, interactive websites, and

    aviation events. This multi-pronged approach enables the FAA to

    reach a ar broader aviation audience.

    Saety in the runway environment is largely dependent on eective

    communications among pilots, controllers, ground crews, and vehicle

    operators to ensure airport operations are conducted in the saemanner in which they were intended. Eective communication has

    proven to be a critical actor in decreasing operational risk resulting

    rom misinterpreted or misunderstood instructions and inormation.

    Thereore, human actors infuences are given greater consideration

    in discussions about phraseology changes, pilot situational awareness

    improvements, and technology implementation.

    Human error is known to contribute to almost every runway incur-

    sion; the largest proportion o those incursions involved general avia-

    tion pilots. In act, general aviation pilots were involved in 77 percent

    o all runway incursions that were categorized as pilot deviations in

    FY 2009 (Figure 7). In FY 2009, general aviation pilots were involvedin 11 o the 12 serious runway incursions. Consequently the FAA

    and the general aviation community have joined together to identiy

    and address specic runway saety issues. By developing training and

    outreach activities targeting runway saety, hundreds o thousands

    o pilots, air trac controllers, and

    airport vehicle drivers have the

    opportunity to increase operational

    awareness and help decrease the

    number o runway incursions. In

    support o this eort, or example,

    the FAA teamed with the Aircrat

    Owners and Pilots Association(AOPA) to distribute runway saety

    DVDs. This one initiative reached

    more than 400,000 or about two-

    thirds o all registered pilots. General Aviation77%

    CommercialAviation

    23%

    Figure 7:

    FY 2009 Pilot Deviations by

    Operating Type

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    12/92

    10 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    The Oce o Runway Saetys strategic communi-

    cation, community outreach, and training activities

    encompass our ocus areas: meetings, multimedia,

    training, and other initiatives (Table 4). Since the

    initiation o these activities, occurrence o serious

    The frst-ever FAA International Runway Saety

    Summit was held December 13, 2009, in

    Washington, DC. Focusing on runway saety

    rom an international perspective, the 3-day event

    attracted more than 500 airport managers and

    planners, air trac controllers, pilots, engineers,

    airline ocials, aviation association executives,

    human actors specialists, and saety experts rom

    17 countries worldwide.

    By bringing these individuals together, we

    will not only be able to evaluate our progress

    to improve runway safety to date, but will

    also set a course for the future of runway

    safety worldwide.

    Wes Timmons

    Director of Runway Safety

    runway incursions has decreased. The program

    has achieved success in promoting the message

    o runway saety to the aviation community. The

    ollowing subsections explain these activities in

    greater detail.

    meetings

    multimedia

    training

    otherinitiat

    ives

    InternationalRunway Safety

    Summit Runway Safety

    Action Team(RSAT) Meetings

    Runway SafetyBriengs

    Flight InstructorRefresher Clinics

    IndustryConferences

    Trade Shows Runway Safety

    Council

    DVD Pilots Guideto Safe Surface

    Operations National

    Association ofFlight Instructors(NAFI) DVD

    Pilot SafetyAnnouncementFilms on RunwaySafety

    Online RunwaySafety Course

    Runway SafetyWebsite

    Airport Recurrent Crew Resource

    Management(CRM)

    National Air TrafcProfessionalism

    Tower Refresher Prevention of

    Operational Errors

    Signs and MarkingsQuizzes

    Postcards, Posters,and E-mails

    Safety SummerFlying Brieng

    Taxi ClearancePost-it Notes

    Vehicle SafetyStickers

    UniversityCompetitions

    Table 4:

    Ofce o Runway Saety Communications Strategy

    Meetings

    Special keynote talks by U.S. Deputy Secretary

    o Transportation John D. Porcari, FAA

    Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt, National

    Transportation Saety Board Chairperson Deborah

    A. P. Hersman, and FAA Air Trac Organization

    Chie Operating Ocer Hank Krakowski empha-

    sized the importance that the United States and

    its aviation partners worldwide place on runway

    saety.

    Recognized saety and human actors experts

    rom industry groups Air Line Pilots Association

    (ALPA), National Air Trac Controllers

    Association (NATCA), Civil Air Navigation

    Services Organization (CANSO), International

    Air Transport Association (IATA), and

    EUROCONTROLled presentations, panels, and

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    13/92

    112010 Runway Safety Report

    runway safety progress, and future plans also were

    included in the agenda.

    The Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT) is

    chartered to address existing and potential runway

    safety issues and offer recommendations for improve-

    ment of local airports. The nine regional RunwaySafety Program Ofces held 129 meetings combined

    at nationwide airports reporting frequent or severe

    runway incursions. RSAT meeting attendees included

    airport management, air trafc controllers, airport

    tenants, airlines and charter companies, xed base

    operators, general aviation pilots, airport certication

    inspectors, and other stakeholder entities (Table 5).

    Runway safety briengs, presentations, and Flight

    Instructor Refresher Clinics (FIRC) were presented

    to ight instructors to help them stay current with

    Table 5:

    Runway Safety Activities (FY 2009)

    Runway Safety Activities (FY 2009) Total

    Runway Safety Program Meetings 116

    Local RSATs 81

    Follow up RSATs 48

    Pilot Meetings 106

    FIRCs 71

    Designated Pilot Examiner Meetings 3

    Flight Schools Part 91/141 24

    Mechanic Schools Part 143 6

    National Association of State Aviation

    Organizations Events

    14

    Fly-ins AOPA EAA Local 20

    Safety Assessments/FCT Site Visits 26

    Incident and Other Investigations 150

    Speaking Engagements 84

    Other Customer Meetings 288

    Meetings With Aircraft Manufacturers 2

    Total Major Activities 1039

    general aviation ight training guidance. The FAA

    conducted 71 clinics nationwide, reaching thousands

    of ight instructors. FIRCs are an important conduit

    for the FAA, starting at the source with student pilots.

    The FAA is bringing the importance of runway safety

    directly to each ight instructor so that each of them

    can teach proper runway safety awareness and incur-sion avoidance to each general aviation pilot through

    improved training, printed materials, and electronic

    media (e.g., runway safety DVDs).

    The Runway Safety Council (RSC) is a joint effort

    between the FAA and the aviation industry. A work-

    ing sub-group, called the Root Cause Analysis Team

    Table 6:

    Runway Safety Conferences

    Runway Safety Conferences Date

    NBAA Annual Meeting and

    Convention (Orlando)

    10/2008

    AOPA Expo (San Jose) 11/2008

    Ohio Regional Business Aviation

    Association Safety Day (Columbus)

    01/2009

    Women in Aviation Conference

    (Atlanta)

    02/2009

    Aviation Human Factors Conference

    (Dallas)

    03/2009

    ICAO Runway Safety Seminar

    (Bangkok)

    04/2009

    NBAA Regional Forum (Dallas) 04/2009

    Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar

    (Orlando)

    04/2009

    EAA Sun n Fun (Lakeland, FL) 04/2009

    Regional Airline Association Annual

    Convention (Salt Lake City)

    05/2009

    AAAE Annual Meeting (Philadelphia) 06/2009NBAA Regional Forum (St. Paul)

    EAA AirVenture (Oshkosh, WI)

    07/2009

    NBAA Regional Forum (Las Vegas) 09/2009

    NASAO Annual Meeting (Tucson) 09/2009

    Bombardier Safety Standdown

    (Wichita)

    09/2009

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    14/92

    12 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    The Runway Saety Council (RSC) is a joint

    eort between the FAA and the aviation industry.

    A working sub-group, called the Root Cause

    Analysis Team (RCAT), conducts root cause

    analysis o most serious runway incursions, which

    are then presented to the RSC along with recom-

    mendations to improve runway saety.

    Industry conerences, trade shows, and events are

    all places at which the FAAs Oce o Runway

    Saety showed a strong presence (Table 6). These

    platorms enable the FAA to engage and interact

    with industry leaders, airport managers, air trac

    controllers, pilots, aircrat operators, and industry

    groups. This interaction enables the FAA to receive

    comments and suggestions regarding runway saety

    issues, concerns, and progress. The events listed inTable 6 signiy the FAAs sustained communica-

    tions and collaboration eorts.

    Multimedia

    A runway saety DVD containing our videos,

    co-produced by the Oce o Runway Saety, was

    included in the April 2009 issue oAOPA maga-

    zine, reaching approximately two-thirds o the

    nations airmen. The our short lms were entitledFace to Face, Eye to Eye; Heads up, Hold Short,

    Fly Right; Listen Up, Read Back, Fly Right; and

    Was That for Us? The short lms ocused on good

    communication, situational awareness, and proper

    planning procedures beore a fight (Table 7). All

    lms were accompanied with examples o real-lie

    situations and problems that have historically

    Table 7:

    Runway Saety DVD Films

    Title Overview

    Face to Face, Eye

    to Eye

    The lm highlights human actors elements o runway saety, detailing the impor-

    tance o situational awareness, phraseology, and communication between pilots and

    controllers. The key message throughout this short lm was to educate the viewer

    about the importance o continual education o runway saety.

    Heads up, Hold

    Short, Fly Right

    The lm underscores paying attention to detail, keeping a sharp sense o situational

    awareness, and i unsure, asking someone who knows. Best practices included keep-

    ing a sterile, sae, and observant cockpit. The video message reminded viewers that

    reducing distractions in the cockpit, being aware o surroundings, and clariying

    any unclear instructions are critical or maintaining a sae runway environment.

    Listen Up, ReadBack, Fly Right

    The script ocused on pilots who fy to or rom non-towered airports and theprocedures that should be used to maintain saety while emphasizing a sterile

    cockpit, planning or readiness o fight, and phraseology in an area that relies on

    the communication skills o pilots when no air trac services are provided.

    Was That For

    Us?

    The script emphasized the importance or good prefight planning by fight crews,

    ocusing on taxiing procedures, understanding lighting and signage, and good

    communication.

    occurred. An FAA-published brochure, A Pilots

    Guide to Safe Surface Operations, designed to

    augment the videos was also included.

    The FAAs Ofce o Runway Saety ofcial website

    was launched in October 2009 (Figure 8). Thiswebsite contains valuable inormation or everyone

    involved and interested in runway saety. The

    website also oers resources, best practices, and

    statistics ocused on runway saety. For more inor-

    mation, visit www.aa.gov/go/runwaysaety.

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    15/92

    132010 Runway Safety Report

    The FAA published 63 Hot Spot charts (Figure 9).

    A Hot Spot is an area on an airport that has had

    a history o problems, either rom congestion

    or runway incursions. The FAA has added Hot

    Spots to its AERONAV Services airport diagrams.

    to airport diagrams, which are available ree

    o charge. Visual displays o Hot Spots are an

    eective way or a pilot or vehicle driver to be

    orewarned o existing areas o concern and to plan

    or contingencies. Last year, the FAA identied 23

    airports as potential candidates or Hot Spot mark-

    ings. To date, the FAA has published 63 airport

    diagrams, complete with Hot Spot markings. Some

    o these charts also have been made into oldout

    pamphlets that illustrate more detail.

    Runway Saety DVD and Pilots Guide brochures

    were mailed in April 2009 to National Association

    o Flight Instructors (NAFI) members (more than

    5,000 members, or about 90% o all active fight

    instructors) to spread awareness or runway saety.

    The NAFI mailing included an introductory

    message about runway saety and was co-signed by

    NAFIs Executive Director and FAAs Director o

    Runway Saety.

    Figure 8:

    Ofce o Runway Saetys Ofcial WebsiteFigure 9:

    Hot Spot Chart

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    16/92

    14 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    Training

    Crew resource management (CRM) training,

    initially designed or fight crew personnel, was

    enhanced in 2009 and tailored to meet the air

    trac controllers specic needs. Continuing to

    promote an operational saety culture, the FAAs

    CRM human actors training is geared toward

    addressing the operational aspects o the air

    trac control team environment and is relevant

    to daily operations. The training includes three

    major sections: Improving Teamwork, Improving

    Individual Perormance, and Threat and Error

    Management (TEM). A DVD highlighting the

    basic concepts o CRM also was distributed to all

    air trac acilities. The FAAs Oce o Saety has

    conducted training at many o the nations largest

    airports and terminal acilities, and 2,914 control-lers have been trained in CRM. For FY 2010,

    CRM workshops are scheduled to be held at

    another 21 acilities.

    National Air Trafc Proessionalism (NATPRO)

    training is ocused on visual sensory perception

    to enhance cognitive skills, situational awareness,

    memory, and reaction time or controllers in radar

    and tower acilities, and was completed by all

    terminal acilities in 20082009. NATPRO II is the

    complementary part o the training or controllers

    in radar and tower acilities, and targets auditory

    sensory training. It is also intended to improve

    cognitive skills, situational awareness, memory,

    and reaction time, with an emphasis on improving

    hearback/readback skills. It was completed in radar

    acilities in January 2010, and tower acilities will

    complete it by December 31, 2010.

    Tower Reresher Training is a comprehensive

    reresher training class or air trac control-

    lers specically ocusing on tower procedures,

    best operating practices, and runway incursion

    prevention. This training, which was conducted

    at all FAA and contract towers nationwide and

    completed in September 2009, consisted o

    briengs on risk management techniques, actual

    surace events, and a review o unique local airport

    characteristics and procedures.

    A Prevention o Operational Errors When

    Conducting On-the-Job Training Program was

    developed in response to numerous operational

    errors that have occurred during new air trac

    controller training sessions. To address this issue,

    training presentations were given to all terminal

    acilities. These presentations addressed the poten-

    tial risks when on-the-job training is occurring.

    Terminal acilities are encouraged to utilize this

    training on an ongoing basis or all newly ormed

    training teams consisting o the controller receiv-

    ing training, the on-the-job training instructors

    and the ront line manager.

    Back to Basics DVDs or Airport Trafc Control

    Tower Controllers. From 20062010, two series

    o Back to Basics DVDs were deployed and

    training completed. Subjects o the DVDs included:

    Be Sure the Runway is Open; Aircrat Position is

    Veried; Scan the Runway; Issue Clearance UsingCorrect Phraseology; Close the Loop by Getting

    an Accurate Readback, Thunderstorm Hazards,

    Infight Icing, and Clear Communications.

    Hearback/Readback Joint Initiative. A signicant

    number o operational errors that occur in terminal

    acilities are a result o hearback/readback errors;

    thereore Terminal Quality Control developed a

    multimedia presentation to mitigate hearback/

    readback errors by educating and inorming

    the controller workorce on dierent types o

    hearback/readback errors, how they occur, andexamples (both radar and audio) o TRACON,

    Tower and Enroute operational errors triggered by

    hearback/readback mistakes. This presentation was

    completed September 30, 2009.

    Air Trafc Initiatives. All air trac controllers are

    being trained on two changes to air trac proce-

    dures that are scheduled or implementation. The

    rst was Taxi and Ground Movement Procedures,

    encompassing multiple runway crossing procedures

    and explicit runway crossing instructions. The

    second is Line Up and Wait, a phraseology changethat substitutes line up and wait, or position

    and hold is scheduled or implementation end o

    September 2010.

    Airport Recurrent Training or all certicated

    airports in the nation was conducted. This train-

    ing included initial and recurrent instruction or

    airport employees (e.g., airport police and airport

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    17/92

    152010 Runway Safety Report

    maintenance workers). As a result o the 2008

    FAAs Call to Action, all certicated airports now

    require recurrent training or non-airport employ-

    ees (e.g., Fixed Base Operator [FBO] personnel and

    airline mechanics). The airport conducted initial

    and recurrent training, and the training curriculum

    must include at least one o the ollowing:

    Airport amiliarization, including airport mark-

    ings, lighting, and signs

    Procedures or sae and orderly access to, and

    operations in, movement areas and saety areas

    by pedestrians and ground vehicles, including

    provisions identiying the consequences o

    noncompliance with the procedures

    Airport communications, including radio

    communication between the air trac control

    tower and personnel, and procedures or report-ing unsae airport conditions

    Duties required under the airports certication

    manual

    Additional subject areas such as aircrat rescue

    and reghting, handling and storing o

    hazardous substances and materials, airport sel

    inspections, wildlie hazard management, or

    eld condition reporting, as appropriate

    An Airport Certication Inspector must approve

    all training, and each airport must provide a sylla-bus in its Airport Certication Manual.

    Runway saety was emphasized in airline pilot

    training. Many airlines incorporated real-world

    runway incursions into their pilot curriculums.

    Working with the FAA, the airlines constructed

    scenarios rom actual runway incursions to

    emphasize the importance o runway saety.

    Importance was placed on numerous issues such as

    the ollowing:

    Display and use o airport ground navigation

    charts.

    Contemporary human actors associated with

    the introduction o new technologies (e.g.,

    aircrat equipped with advanced avionics

    displays and electronic fight bags [EFB]).

    Understanding pilot-controller ground

    instructions and the potential or error during

    read-back.

    Proper timing or the use o checklists and fightdeck briengs during taxi.

    Last minute avionics and fight management

    system (FMS) input.

    Controllers were trained on runway saety rom

    the pilots viewpoint; several U.S. air carriers, in

    collaboration with the FAA, have oered a one-day

    air trac amiliarization course or controllers.

    The controllers spent the day in ground school

    learning about the responsibilities and pitalls o

    working in the cockpit o a transport category

    aircrat. They also observed a simulator sessiondemonstrating pilot-controller interaction during

    ground operations.

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    18/92

    A summer pilot initiative was developed by the

    FAAs Oce o Runway Saety in partnership with

    the FAA Saety Team (FAAST). This initiative

    reminded pilots who had not fown during the

    winter months about the importance o runwaysaety. The summer awareness initiative, composed

    o postcards, posters, and e-mails, all emphasized

    runway saety and targeted roughly 40,000 airmen

    in the Great Lakes and Northwest Mountain

    regions.

    A runway saety campaign aimed at general avia-

    tion pilots using placemats to depict airport signs

    and provide an airport markings quiz was tested

    at airport restaurants in the Southwestern Region

    o the United States. The test campaign distributed

    more than 10,000 placemats. Response to theplacemats has been positive and expansion o the

    campaign to other regions is expected in FY 2010

    (Figure 10).

    The Ofce o Runway Saetys signs and mark-

    ings vehicle sticker was updated or the 2009

    Experimental Aircrat Association (EAA)

    AirVenture fy-in. The stickers, intended to be

    axed to airport vehicle dashboards, provided a

    handy airport signage and marker reerence or

    vehicle drivers. Thousands o these stickers were

    distributed to each o the FAAs nine regionalrunway saety oces or ongoing disbursement.

    FAAs taxi clearance notesin the style o

    Post-it Noteswere updated during summer

    2009. These notes are used to jot down taxi

    inormation (e.g., clearances, requencies, and

    Other Initiatives

    Figure 10:

    FAA Saety Handouts

    Figure 11:

    FAA/AOPA Online

    taxi routes). The taxi clearance post-it became a

    hit with all pilots and a sell-out at FAA pilot

    briengs, FIRCs, and saety presentations. Eachregional runway saety oce has been issued extra

    supplies o the notes or distribution.

    An update to the AOPA on-line runway saety

    course was completed and produced with the

    support o the FAA Oce o Runway Saety and

    developed with the latest multimedia technology

    (Figure 11). The comprehensive training and

    examination are available to AOPA members and

    non-members. The course includes the ollowing:

    An in-depth guide to airport signs, pavementmarkings, and lighting

    Re-creations o several real-lie runway incidents

    and accidents

    Valuable real-world insights rom air trac

    controllers

    Best practices or communication at towered and

    non-towered airports.

    The course presents a multitude o interactive

    exercises to help pilots hone their skills. It provides

    airmen with a thorough review o every aspect orunway saety. To date, almost 83,000 pilots have

    completed the course, and the numbers continue to

    increase each month.

    The FAA has sponsored its third annual Design

    Competition or Universities, which engages

    undergraduate and graduate students in airport

    16 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    19/92

    172010 Runway Safety Report

    More Runway Saety Improvements

    Figure 12:

    FAA Design Competitiondesign related issues. Students work individually

    or in teams choosing one o our Technical Design

    Challenge categories:

    Airport operation and maintenance

    Runway saety/runway incursions

    Airport environmental interactions

    Airport management and planning.

    The competition provides an opportunity or

    students to address pertinent technical challenges

    regarding the management, saety, capacity, and

    eciency presented to our nations airports and to

    recommend innovative solutions. The FAA selects

    winning designs, and the ourth annual competi-

    tion is under way.

    Inrastructure

    Runway Saety Areas (RSA) are unobstructed

    zones around the perimeter o the runway to

    enhance saety in the event o a runway incursion

    or excursion. An FAA team determined appropriate

    improvements or each runway. The FAA expects

    to improve 82 percent o the saety areas identied

    by the end o 2010.

    Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS)is a sot-ground arrestor system constructed to

    quickly and saely stop aircrat rom overrunning a

    runway. The FAA developed EMAS in partnership

    with industry and airport operators. An EMAS

    bed provides a saety enhancement on runway

    ends where not enough level, cleared land exists

    or a standard runway saety area. EMAS has

    been installed at more than 41 runway ends at

    28 airports, with plans to install 15 more EMAS

    systems at 9 additional airports across the nation.

    EMAS has proven its value at least six times

    over, most recently at Charleston, WV, where aregional jet carrying 30 passengers and 3 crew

    members aborted its takeo. The aircrat overran

    the runway and was stopped saely by a recently

    installed EMAS. The aircrat came to a stop with

    its wheels buried in the EMAS material, allowing

    the passengers to exit without injury.

    If it hadnt been for the EMAS, Im convinced

    a catastrophic accident would have occurred.

    West Virginia County Commissioner

    January 19, 2010.

    Technology

    Runway Incursion Prevention Device (RIPD) is

    an electronic device developed as a memory aid

    or controllers to help prevent runway incursions.Housed in the tower cab at the ground controller

    position, RIPD equipment helps enhance runway

    movement procedures and is coupled with a visual

    and an audio warning message. The FAA has

    nalized the operational design and will start

    implementation. The implementation plan will be

    a reverse waterallthat is, starting with smaller

    airports (without ASDE-X) and moving to the

    larger acilities. Prototype testing o the RIPD will

    begin in late 2010.

    Airport Movement Area Saety System (AMASS)visually and aurally prompts tower controllers

    to respond to situations that could potentially

    compromise saety. AMASS, which is an add-on

    enhancement to the already existing ASDE-3

    radar, provides automated alerts and warnings o

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    20/92

    18 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    potential runway incursions and other hazards

    (Figure 13). The system operates with ground andapproach sensor systems to ascertain aircrat loca-

    tions in approaching and ground movement situa-

    tions. It uses airport radars, state-o-the-art signal

    processing, and advanced computer technology to

    improve airport saety. The value o AMASS was

    demonstrated in the near-collision o two aircrat

    at San Francisco in 2007, when the system alerted

    the air trac controller 15 seconds beore the

    estimated collision. The FAA installed AMASS

    at the nations busiest airports, and the system

    continues to be an important runway saety tool

    or controllers.

    Runway Status Lights (RWSL)

    Runway Status Lights provide pilots with

    inormation about current or immediately

    anticipated runway occupancy by other aircrat

    (Figure 14). A RWSL system (Figure 15) derives

    Figure 13:

    AMASS System Display

    Figure 14:

    Runway Status Lights

    Figure 15:

    Runway Status Lights Concept

    trac inormation rom surace and approach

    surveillance systems and illuminates red in-pave-

    ment lights that alert the pilot to potentially unsae

    situations. Two RWSL componentsRunwayEntrance Lights (REL) and Takeo Hold Lights

    (THL)are undergoing operational evaluation

    at Dallas/Ft. Worth International, Los Angeles

    International, and San Diego International

    Airports (Table 8). RELs are deployed at a taxiway/

    runway crossing and illuminate red, signaling to

    the pilot or driver it is unsae to enter because

    trac is on or approaching the runway. THLs

    are deployed in the runway by the departure hold

    zone and illuminate red when an aircrat is in

    position or departure and the runway is occupied

    by another aircrat or vehicle. Another RWSLcomponent, Runway Intersection Lights (RIL)

    or intersecting runways, will be tested at Boston

    Logan International Airport starting in Summer

    2010. RILs are deployed at runway intersections

    and illuminate red when the runway intersection is

    or will soon be occupied by an aircrat or vehicle

    and a confict exists. RWSL is under consideration

    by the International Civil Aviation Organization

    (ICAO) as an international standard.

    Final Approach Runway Occupancy

    Signal (FAROS)

    Pilots landing on runways at night or in poor

    visibility are oten unable to visually determine

    whether the runway is ree o obstructions. This

    issue can lead to the type o runway incursion

    called a land over, in which one aircrat lands

    on the runway over the top o another aircrat or a

    vehicle occupying the runway. Like RWSL, FAROS

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    21/92

    192010 Runway Safety Report

    Table 8:

    Runway Status Lights Deployment Status

    Runway Status Lights (RWSL) Deployment Sites Status/Schedule

    Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport (Dallas, TX) Test System Installed

    San Diego International Airport (San Diego, CA) Test System Installed

    Los Angeles International Airport (Los Angeles, CA) Test System Installed

    Boston Logan International Airport (Boston, MA) Test System Installed

    Orlando International Airport (Orlando, FL) August 2011

    Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (Phoenix, AZ) December 2011

    George Bush Intercontinental Airport (Houston, TX) January 2012

    Baltimore-Washington Intl Thurgood Marshall Airport (Baltimore, MD) March 2012

    Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (Las Vegas, NV) March 2012

    Charlotte Douglas International Airport (Charlotte, NC) May 2012

    Hartseld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (Atlanta, GA) September 2012Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Seattle, WA) April 2013

    Chicago OHare International Airport (Chicago, IL) May2013

    Washington Dulles International Airport (Chantilly, VA) May 2013

    LaGuardia Airport, (New York, NY) June 2013

    John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York, NY) April 2014

    Denver International Airport (Denver, CO) May 2014

    Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport (Minneapolis, MN) May 2014

    Newark International Airport (Newark, NJ) June 2014

    Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport (Detroit, MI) August 2014Philadelphia International Airport (Philadelphia, PA) October 2014

    Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood Airport (Ft. Lauderdale, FL) March 2015

    San Francisco International Airport (San Francisco, CA) December 2015

    is designed to provide a visual alert o runway

    status to pilots approaching a runway or landing

    (Figure 16). Pilots are provided runway occupancy

    status by the fashing Precision Approach Path

    Indicator (PAPI) lights. As with RWSL, the system

    derives trac inormation rom approach and

    surace surveillance systems and uses active datato eed the alerting signal (fashing the PAPI) when

    appropriate. The FAA completed operational

    testing o active FAROS at Dallas/Ft. Worth

    Airport and is conducting operational evaluation

    o low-cost FAROS at Long Beach/Daugherty Field

    Airport in Caliornia (Table 9). Currently, the FAA

    is determining key FAROS sites where the new

    designs can be installed or operational testing.

    Figure 16:

    FAROS System PAPI Lights

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    22/92

    20 Measuring Runway Safety and Strategies for Continuous Improvement

    awarded our contracts or pilot test sites using

    SMRs (Table 10). LCGS will be evaluated at the

    pilot site locations beore a ull-scale investment

    and deployment decision. Test and evaluation is

    expected to last at least one year.

    Upon completion o the pilot site evaluations and

    additional investment analysis activities, one or

    more LCGS vendors may be selected to provide

    NAS-wide deployment or 30 airport locations.

    Additional airport saety related technologies will

    also be implemented as part o the NextGen plan.

    These technologies will allow the air trac system

    as a whole to move into the next generation o air

    trac management with increased saety abilities.

    Low Cost Ground Surveillance Systems

    (LCGS)

    LCGS will close surveillance technology gaps that

    exist between large airports that have Airport

    Surace Detection Equipment (ASDE) systems

    and small-to-medium size airports that do not. By

    improving the surace situational awareness o air

    trac controllers, LCGS systems will help reduce

    the risk o ground trac accidents, incidents, and

    runway incursions.

    Prototype evaluations o two dierent candidate

    systems at Spokane International Airport revealed

    that surace movement radar (SMR) provided

    the most cost-eective LCGS solution. The FAA

    Table 10:

    LCGS Installation Status

    LCGS Pilot Evaluation Site Planned Installation Date

    Manchester Boston Regional Airport (Manchester, NH) 4Q 2010San Jose International Airport (San Jose, CA) 4Q 2010

    Long Beach International Airport (Long Beach, CA) 3Q 2011

    Reno/Tahoe International Airport (Reno, NV) 4Q 2011

    Table 9:

    FAROS Deployment Status

    FAROS Deployment Sites Status

    Dallas-FT. Worth International Airport (Dallas, TX) Operational Evaluation Concluded

    Long Beach Daugherty Field Airport (Long Beach, CA) Operational Evaluation Ongoing

    FAA photo by Jon Ross

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    23/92

    212010 Runway Safety Report

    Table 11:

    Transormation o the U.S. Air Transportation System

    NextGen and Runway Saety

    What Is NextGen?

    NextGen is a comprehensive overhaul o our National Airspace

    System to provide increased capacity and better operational peror-mance that reduces congestion, meets projected demand, and is

    environmentally sound. In a continuous rollout o improvements and

    upgrades, the FAA is building the capability to saely guide and track

    air trac more precisely and eciently, in turn providing multiple

    benets to passengers and operators.

    NextGen is a necessary evolution in the air transportation system in

    the United States (Table 11). Trac is orecast to increase steadily

    over the coming decades, making it imperative that NextGen develop-

    ment take place now.

    NextGen will make travel more predictable and ecient. For passen-

    gers, this will translate to dependable, sae, and secure air travel.For operators, this will translate to more optimized fight operations

    with improved predictability, reduced carbon ootprint, ewer delays,

    and lower cost. In addition to these gains in operational ecien-

    cies, NextGen will help prevent accidents because advanced saety

    Todays National Airspace System

    Ground-based navigationand surveillance

    NextGen

    Air trafc controlcommunications by voice

    Disconnected information systems

    Cognitive-based air trafccontrol

    Fragmented weather forecasting

    Airport operations limited byvisibility conditions

    Forensic safety systems

    Focus on major airports

    Inefcient routes andfuel consumption

    Satellite-based navigationand surveillance

    Routine information sent digitally

    Information more readily accessible

    Decision support tools

    Forecasts embedded into decisions

    Operations continue into lowvisibility conditions

    Prognostic safety systems

    Focus on metropolitan areas

    Short ight paths, fuel savingprocedures, alternative fuels,reduced noise and emissions

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    24/92

    22 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    management eatures will enable the FAA, with

    other government agencies and aviation partners,

    to better predict and identiy risks and resolve

    hazards.

    How Will NextGen Impact RunwaySaety?

    Sae runway operations are related directly to the

    level o situational awareness maintained by pilots,

    controllers, and airport operators. Everyone, in

    turn, relies on a combination o communication,

    navigation, and surveillance inormation to

    conduct sae runway operations. The introduc-

    tion o NextGen technologies provides increased

    accuracy, expanded inormation, and clearer

    communication among pilots, controllers, and

    airport operators, and will signicantly contributeto increased levels o situational awareness, which

    will positively impact runway saety.

    Advanced technologies can help mitigate some

    o the contributing actors in runway incursions,

    such as a breakdown in communications between

    controllers and pilots, ailure o a controller to

    veriy the correct readback o instructions rom

    the pilot, or blocked transmissions. NextGen

    data communication systems will mitigate these

    contributing actors by reducing the requency

    congestion and removing the potential or

    miscommunications.

    Another actor in runway incursions occurs when

    pilots misperceive their location on the airport

    surace. With NextGen, moving maps will be avail-able in the cockpit to improve the pilots situational

    awareness during taxi operations. These maps will

    indicate the aircrats own position as well as the

    position o other aircrat and ground vehicles. All

    o the relevant surace aircrat and vehicle move-

    ments also will be shared between controllers and

    airline fight operations, enabling greater eciency

    and saer operations.

    Many NextGen Operational Improvements are

    directly related to runway saety (Figure 17).

    The FAA developed transormational programs,which include Automatic Dependent Surveillance

    Broadcast (ADS-B), System-Wide Inormation

    Management (SWIM), Data Communications

    (Data Comm), NextGen Network Enabled

    Weather, NAS Voice Switch, and Collaborative

    Air Trac Management Technologies (CATMT).

    These transormational programs and other activi-

    ties will enable the FAA to achieve the necessary

    operational improvements.

    Figure 17:NextGen and Runway Saety Related Operational Improvements

    Operational Improvement 104207

    Enhanced Surface Traffic Operations

    Operational Improvements 103208 and 107202

    Improved Runway Situational Awareness for Controllers and Pilots

    ADS-B, SWIM, Data Comm, Nex tGen Network Enabled Weather, NAS Voice Switch, CATMT

    Transformational Programs

    Operational Improvement 104209

    Initial Surface TrafficManagement

    Operational Improvement 104117

    Improved Management ofArrival/Surface/Departures Flow Ops

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    25/92

    232010 Runway Safety Report

    NextGen and Runway Saety

    Technologies Available Today

    To increase situational awareness during surace

    operations, the FAA is currently integrating

    several runway saety-related technologies, as

    described below. Although ASDE-X and ElectronicFlight Bags with moving maps are not considered

    NextGen capabilities they are included in this

    section to help describe the operational space that

    will evolve into NextGen.

    Airport Surace Detection Equipment

    Model X (ASDE-X)

    ASDE-X is a tool that provides the position o

    aircrat and vehicles on the surace, providing

    alerting unctions or air trac controllers

    and enhancing their situational awareness(Figure 18). The technology integrates data

    rom various sources (e.g., radars, transponder

    multilateration systems, and ADS-B) to deliver

    accurate positioning and identiy inormation

    to controllers or an improved view o airport

    surace operations. Tower controllers receive

    visual and audible alerts o potential conficts

    ASDE-X is being deployed at 35 o the busiest

    airports in the nation (Table 12).Table 12:

    ASDE-X Deployment Status

    ASDE-XDeployment Site

    ImplementationDate

    MKE (Milwaukee, WI) 10/30/03

    MCO (Orlando, FL) 09/30/04

    PVD (Providence, RI) 05/16/05

    HOU (Houston, TX) 08/31/05

    SEA (Seattle, WA) 02/24/06

    STL (St. Louis, MO) 05/24/06

    ATL (Atlanta, GA) 06/07/06

    BDL (Hartord, CT) 06/21/06

    SDF (Louisville, KY) 07/19/07

    ORD (Chicago, IL) 08/29/07

    CLT (Charlotte, NC) 08/30/07

    IAD (Chantilly, VA) 04/01/08

    DTW (Detroit, MI) 08/13/08

    FLL (Ft. Lauderdale, FL) 09/09/08

    PHX (Phoenix, AZ) 09/18/08

    JFK (New York, NY) 10/09/08

    LAX (Los Angeles, CA) 01/29/09

    EWR Newark, NJ) 07/15/09

    ASDE-XDeployment Site

    ImplementationDate

    BOS (Boston, MA) 07/23/09

    MIA (Miami, FL) 08/26/09

    DEN (Denver, CO) 10/08/09

    IAH (Houston, TX) 10/19/09

    MSP (Minneapolis, MN) 12/11/09

    PHL (Philadelphia, PA) 12/18/09

    SLC (Salt Lake City, UT) 01/20/10

    SNA (Orange County, CA) 02/23/10

    DFW (Dallas, TX) 02/26/10

    DCA (Arlington, VA) 06/01/10

    MDW (Chicago, IL) 08/01/10

    SAN (San Diego, CA) 08/01/10

    BWI (Baltimore, MD) 09/01/10

    HNL (Honolulu, HI) 09/01/10

    LGA (New York, NY) 10/01/10

    LAS (Las Vegas, NV) 04/01/11

    MEM (Memphis, TN) 04/01/11

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    26/92

    24 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) With Moving

    Map Displays

    Although not a NextGen technology, but rather a

    technology enabled by NextGen, EFBs with visual

    maps that update as the aircrat moves provide thepilot with greater situational awareness (Figure 19).

    The FAA reached agreements with several U.S.

    airlines to provide unding to help EFB installation

    programs. Through these agreements, the airlines

    will provide critical operational data to help the

    FAA evaluate the saety impact o the technology.

    This data will be used to make inormed deci-

    sions on key saety capabilities necessary or the

    transition to NextGen. The FAA will provide up

    to $600,000 to each airline to invest in EFBs and

    surace moving maps or fights to or rom test bed

    airports (Table 13). Each agreement will remain ineect through September 2011.

    NextGen and Runway Saety in the

    Mid-Term (20122018)

    To achieve mid-term NextGen capabilities, the

    FAA and its partners continue to conduct research

    in several areas relevant to runway saety and

    runway operations. Some o these areas include

    runway conguration management, arrival and

    departure metering, low-visibility surace opera-

    tions, and simultaneous runway occupancy.

    The ollowing descriptions o NextGen capa-

    bilities were extracted rom current FAA NAS

    architecture documents and the FAAs NextGen

    Implementation Plan, March 2010. These descrip-

    tions were selected based on their relevance to

    runway saety operations.

    Figure 18:

    ASDE-X Site

    Figure 19:

    EFB with Moving Map Display

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    27/92

    252010 Runway Safety Report

    Expand Low Visibility Operations to

    Achieve Low Visibility Surace Operations

    (Approach, Landing, and Takeo[3])

    Pilots are oten aced with reduced visibility

    conditions in the air and on the ground, making it

    dicult to accurately determine location. NextGen

    initiatives will improve situational awareness

    during these conditions using a combination o

    technologies.

    Pilots and drivers o ground vehicles will

    determine their position on an airport using

    Global Positioning System (GPS), Wide Area

    Augmentation System (WAAS), and Local Area

    Augmentation System (LAAS) via ADS-B and

    Ground-Based Transceiver (GBT) systems with

    or without surace based surveillance. Location

    inormation o aircrat and vehicles on the airport

    surace will be displayed on moving maps using

    Cockpit Display o Trac Inormation (CDTI) or

    aided by Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS),

    Enhanced Vision Systems (EVS), Synthetic Visions

    Systems (SVS), or other types o advanced vision or

    virtual vision technology.

    Table 13:

    Airports With Available Moving Map Database

    Airports

    Los Angeles International Airport (Los Angeles, CA)

    Boston Logan International Airport (Boston, MA)Chicago OHare International Airport (Chicago, IL)

    Newark International Airport (Newark, NJ)

    Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (Cleveland, OH)

    Fort Lauderdale International Airport (Fort Lauderdale, FL)

    George Bush Intercontinental Airport (Houston, TX)

    Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (Anchorage, AK)

    San Francisco International Airport (San Francisco, CA)

    Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (Las Vegas, NV)

    Miami International Airport (Miami, FL)

    Philadelphia International Airport (Philadelphia, PA)

    Albuquerque International Sunport (Albuquerque, NM)

    Daytona Beach International Airport (Daytona, FL)

    Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (Phoenix, AZ)

    Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport (Dallas, TX)

    John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York, NY)

    Hartseld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (Atlanta, GA)

    LaGuardia Airport, (New York, NY)

    Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Seattle, WA)

    [3] Operational Improvement 107202

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    28/92

    26 Updates and Progress on Runway Safety Activities

    Improved Runway Saety Situational

    Awareness or Pilots and Controllers[4]

    Enhanced surace displays, which will alert

    controllers when a runway incursion could result,

    and provide pilots greater awareness o their loca-

    tion on the airport surace, will be developed toimprove runway saety. Both ground-based (e.g.,

    RWSL) and cockpit-based runway incursion alert-

    ing capabilities (e.g., EFB) also will be available to

    alert pilots when it is unsae to enter the runway.

    Initial Surace Trafc Management [5]

    FAA automated decision support tools will use

    departure-scheduling algorithms to manage the

    fow o surace trac at high-density airports.

    These tools will integrate surveillance data that

    will include weather, departure queues, aircratfight plan inormation, runway conguration,

    expected departure times, and gate assignments.

    The tools also will provide controllers with surace

    sequencing and staging lists or departures,

    along with average departure delays (current and

    predicted).

    Enhanced Surace Trafc Operations [6]

    Data communication between aircrat and control-

    lers will be used to transmit automated airport

    inormation, exchange clearances, and instructions,including hold-short instructions. At specied

    airports, the use o data communications will

    provide the augmented means o communication

    between controllers and equipped aircrat. Data

    communication unctions will reduce requency

    congestion on the radio, ensuring the successul

    transmission o more important communications

    that can provide a sae runway environment.

    NextGen and Runway Saety,

    Beyond the Mid-Term (2018+)

    Long-term NextGen capabilities require continued

    research into surace situational awareness, taxi

    route generation and assignment, conormance

    monitoring, confict detection, and confict resolu-

    tion. Because o the complexity o the NextGen

    program and the required interdependencies o

    various technologies, research has already started

    on many o the improvements that will not mature

    until ater the mid-term time rame.

    The ollowing descriptions o NextGen capabili-

    ties were extracted rom the current FAA NAS

    architecture and have been selected based on their

    relevance to runway saety.

    Full Surace Trafc Management With

    Conormance Monitoring[7]

    By using improved surveillance, communication,

    and automation, saety and eciency o surace

    trac management will be increased. Properly

    equipped aircrat and ground vehicles will be

    provided with surace trac inormation in real

    time. Airports and air trac control centers will

    be able to view trac fows and project demand;

    predict, plan, and manage surace movements; andbalance runway assignments. Automated systems

    will monitor surace operations and update esti-

    mated departure clearance times. Surace optimiza-

    tion automation includes activities such as runway

    conguration and runway snow removal.

    Full Surace Situation Inormation (SSI)[8]

    Automated broadcasting o aircrat and vehicle

    position to ground and aircrat sensors/receivers

    will provide a digital display o the airport envi-

    ronment and trac to pilots, controllers, vehicleoperators, and fight operations centers. SSI will

    complement visual observations o the airport

    surace by alerting pilots, controllers, and vehicle

    operators o a possible runway incursion beore it

    happens.

    NextGen represents the uture state o our national

    air transportation system. Through a sustained

    eort, diligent implementation plan, and continued

    industry partnerships, these enhanced technologies

    will signicantly improve runway saety or the

    next generation o air traveler.

    [4] Operational Improvement 103207

    [5] Operational Improvement 104209

    [6] Operational Improvement 104207

    [7] Operational Improvement 104206

    [8] Operational Improvement 102406

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    29/92

    272010 Runway Safety Report

    Human Factors in Aviation

    What Is the Human Factors Discipline?

    The FAA and its air trac control system, along with pilots, ground

    crews, and vehicle operators, unction together every day to ensurethat sae aircrat movement occurs on the runways and airport

    surace. This eort requires that everyone be able to transmit and

    receive accurate and complete inormation to maintain procedures,

    have appropriate judgment to make the right decision, and then take

    action upon that decisionliterally hundreds o times every day. Sae

    runway operations are the objective or every aircrat every time there

    is a decision process. There is a constant reminder that the vulner-

    abilities o human error are injected into each decision made.

    In the aviation environment, reliable and accurate human peror-

    mance is equated with achieving high levels o operational saety.

    With technology evolving at a rapid pace, and saety being our high-

    est priority, the FAA can no longer rely solely on a persons experi-

    ence, insight, and training to accurately predict human perormance.

    Human Factors, as an engineering and psychology discipline, has

    been proven to scientically identiy and assess human perormance

    characteristics required to increase perormance within the control

    tower, cockpit, and runway environments.

    Pilots, controllers, and airport operations personnel wake up and

    start every day ully aware o their responsibility o ensuring sae

    fight. So, what happens between the time they wake up and the time

    they realize that a runway incursion has just occurred? The answer

    might be as simple as, they are human.

    The goal o the Human Factors discipline is to improve operational

    perormance and saety via the study o human strengths and limita-

    tions in relation to how people interact with equipment, the environ-

    ment, and other people.

    Why Is the Study o Human Factors So

    Important?

    It is the gap between humans and systems, when studied, analyzed,

    and tested that allows human actors specialists to help design

    systems and procedures that promote maximum human perormance

    by capitalizing on human ability while counterbalancing human

    limitation. This is the basis or NextGen, a saer uture. Increasingly

    crowded skies mean not only more departures and arrivals but also

    more decisions by pilots, ground crews, and controllers. This magni-

    es the opportunity or human error and potentially results in runway

    incursions.

    Aviation saety experts have documented that human perormance

    is a major causal actor in a majority o runway incursions. Nearly

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    30/92

    28 Human Factors in Aviation

    all air trac control operational errors are either

    caused by human actors or have some contribu-

    tory human actors element. In todays complex

    aviation environment, any mistake can lead to a

    serious accident. Accurate human processing skills

    not only are necessary but also need to be continu-ally maintained and sharpened. I the number o

    runway incursions are to continue to decrease,

    human actors must be better understood and

    knowledge more broadly applied.

    A recent General Accountability Oce (GAO)

    report conrmed that, according to experts

    surveyed and some airport ocials, the primary

    causes o runway incursions are human actors

    issues. These issues may include miscommunication

    between air trac controllers and pilots, pilots

    lack o situational awareness on the aireld, andair trac controller/pilot judgment error.

    One way to attack these human actors issues is to

    understand specic human contributions to errors

    and identiy ways to eliminate or minimize their

    eect on runway incursions. An enormous number

    o people are involved in daily airport operations

    ranging rom piloting the aircrat, controlling

    airspace, and ground crew maintenance to vehicle

    operations, snow removal, and surace repair. To

    successully continue to decrease all runway incur-

    sions, we need to understand and evaluate each

    and every role in the guidance, maintenance, and

    control or takeo, landing, and taxiing to identiy

    gaps in process, procedure, equipment, or limita-tions in the human condition.

    How Human Factors Research

    Reduces Human Error

    Human Factors experts, working alongside system

    designers and developers, examine the people,

    equipment, and processes involved in airport

    operations to gain an in-depth understanding o

    how each piece o the system works, the inter-

    relationship among various systems, and the inter-relationship o each piece with the environment.

    When designing and building new technology

    and processes, upgrading existing systems, or

    developing training materials, a comprehensive

    understanding o the aviation environment and all

    available resources is essential or targeting the best

    solution.

    The human has a relationship with everything

    around him or hersotware, hardware, other

    humans, and the environment. This constitutes

    the basis or human system error as a result o the

    inherent inconsistencies and limitations o our

    human condition. Evaluating human strengths and

    weaknesses plays an important role in the design o

    systems and procedures to determine which unc-

    tions are best perormed by a human and which are

    best suited or a machine.

    The ultimate goal o Human Factors in aviation

    design is to maximize the strengths o both

    the human and machine or optimum system

    perormance and to avoid the limitations o each

    (Figure 20). Although this eort sounds easy,

    designing products or a general population should

    take into account the varying characteristics o

    the user population. Unlike a machine that can

    be almost identically produced, modied, and

    redesigned to achieve a specic perormance

    metric, humans are born with innate variants (e.g.,

    physical size and shape, strength, reaction time,

    logical thought and reasoning, color and sound

    machines

    humans

    Continuousalertness (repetitive,routine work)

    Quick responsetime andapplication ofprecise force

    Ability to multi-task Ability to store

    information anderase it completely

    Complexcomputationalcapability

    Sensory functions Perceptual abilities

    (abstract concepts)

    Flexibility (theability to improvise)

    Judgment Selective recall Inductive reasoning

    Figure 20:

    Strengths o Machines and Humans

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    31/92

    292010 Runway Safety Report

    perception, and even a sense o smell). It is precisely

    these human dierences that Human Factors engi-

    neers measure and analyze to optimize the human

    contribution to system perormance.

    Human-Hardware Interaction

    Throughout the aviation system, humans interact

    extensively with hardware, including tools

    (interpreting gauges and inormation) (Figure 21),

    aircrat controls and displays (fight management

    systems in the cockpit), computers and even vehi-

    cles and buildings. The potential or human error

    is easy to see when asking simple questions: Is the

    outside equipment used or a particular operation

    as usable in the winter with a gloved hand? Are all

    the control switches accessible or all heights and

    sizes o pilots? Does being tall skew what a pilot

    sees on a display?

    Designing visual displays requires in-depth under-

    standing o how humans see and, subsequently,

    how we process that inormation. The human eye

    receives and processes electromagnetic energy in

    the orm o light waves, which are transormed into

    electrical impulses and sent to the brains vision

    center or processing. Capabilities such as detecting

    speed, direction, color, contrast, and even patterns

    are processed in the brain. With the aid o our past

    learning experiences, the brain osters our recogni-

    tion and recall. The complex digital instrumentpanel (Figure 22) demonstrates that the placement

    o control panels is as important as the colors

    chosen and the movements within the display (e.g.,

    blinking, graduating color, moving color blocks).

    The HumanInormation Interace

    Human Factors experts are heavily involved with

    ensuring that all the inormation pertaining to

    how the aviation system operates and how it is

    organized, including all the regulations, saety

    procedures, operating manuals, and procedural

    checklists, is presented in an understandable

    manner in the appropriate ormat. Although not a

    device (Figure 23), the inormation that the pilots

    are obtaining rom a navigational chart is impor-

    tant. Is the inormation complete, understandable,and accurate? The device itsel would be considered

    hardware.

    Figure 21:

    Using Hardware on an Aircrat Wheel Base

    Figure 22:

    Using Hardware in the Cockpit

    Figure 23:

    The HumanInormation Interace

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    32/92

    30 Human Factors in Aviation

    The HumanEnvironment Interace

    Humans are also taxed with interacting with their

    environment, including being sheltered inside

    buildings or airrames or perorming duties outside

    exposed to the elements. The indoor environment

    can be impacted by such actors as temperature,noise, level o light, urniture, etc. The controller

    in Figure 24 is working in a low light internal

    environment at a comortable temperature with

    little distraction. The outside environment can be

    impacted by such elements as weather, airspace,

    and airport inrastructure and suraces. The

    airrame environment can be aected by additional

    actors such as equipment usage and communica-

    tion requirements (Figure 25). Usually humans

    interact with these interaces in harmony to

    produce a working system.

    Designing With the Human Factor

    in Mind

    As technological advances continue to provide

    ever-increasing amounts o complex inormation,

    identiying ways to incorporate this inormation

    into existing procedures and systems and designingnew ones while improving human perormance

    presents a challenge. Improving saety in the

    runway environment, involving a large number

    o people, aircrat, and equipment, will require

    employing Human Factors concepts into the design

    process to provide or all these moving parts to

    individually unction and interace saely with each

    other, ensuring the ollowing:

    Runway signage is easily readable

    Taxiways and runways are clearly discernible

    Mechanisms exist or controllers and pilots

    to clearly communicate and check that each

    communication was heard correctly

    Ground crews coordinate with controllers and

    pilots

    Displays relate the inormation needed in a

    ormat easily and quickly understandable by the

    user

    Equipment controls are clearly labeled with

    appropriate understandable instructions.

    Building systems via a human-centered design

    principle that takes actual human perormance

    into consideration by maximizing user strengths,

    minimizing recognized humanmachine interace

    weaknesses, and increasing saety is a unction

    o system usability. Human actors specialists

    determine the usability criteria throughout the

    design, development, and prototyping phases to

    assess the upgraded or new system beore bringing

    it into the eld. Usability is a measure o how

    well a system supports the users needs, in addi-tion to meeting system goals. Taking this a step

    urther, designing the system around the user is a

    methodology proven with great success because

    the design ocuses on the unction and response o

    maximizing user capabilities. It eliminates the need

    to t the user and the users limitations around

    the system and signicantly reduces the amount o

    Figure 24:

    Controller Working in a Low Light Environment

    Figure 25:

    Lights, Controls, Displays, and Communication

    Helps Pilots Overcome Adverse Environments

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    33/92

    312010 Runway Safety Report

    modication at the end o product development,

    not to mention the addition o cost and time.

    A highly usable human-centered design should

    reduce the amount o training required, ease the

    complexity o maintenance, and provide increased

    saety.

    Particularly helpul in raising awareness o the

    importance o human actors in aviation, especially

    runway incursions, has been a change in saety

    culture, where people are increasingly willing to

    report incidents that might not otherwise have

    been known. This culture change helps establish

    how circumstances may have transpired to create

    a chain o errors that led to an incident so that an

    eective response can be developed. The willing-

    ness o organizations to openly share inormation

    about saety incidents and targeted solutions alsohas begun to help improve the aviation commu-

    nitys understanding o just how important a role

    human actors plays.

    The ollowing anatomy o a runway incursion

    highlights the signicance o the human eect:

    humans are the greatest single contributing actor

    in runway incursions.

    Anatomy o a Runway Incursion

    This analysis reviews the sequence o events

    and contributing actors that ultimately led to a

    Category A runway incursion.

    Scene:

    Time: 21:00 Local

    Weather: Clear

    Air trac complexity: Low

    Controller time on position: 18 minutes

    Controller time on duty: 7 hours out o an

    8-hour shit

    Airport Construction: Taxiway B6 closed or

    maintenance, Runway 29L also closed.

    Event Description:

    9:00 p.m. The pilot o a six-seat Piper Malibu

    contacts the control tower and is cleared to land

    on runway 29R. Behind the Malibu is a 50-seat

    Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ).

    9:019:04 p.m. The CRJ pilot checks in with the

    controller and is cleared to land on runway 29R.

    The controller advises the pilot that he is ollowing

    a Malibu ahead on a 2-mile nal or the runway.

    The CRJ pilot acknowledges the landing clearance

    and inorms the controller that he has the Malibu

    in sight.

    9:049:07 p.m. The controller instructs the Malibu

    to exit the runway at taxiway B3. The Malibu pilot

    misses B3 and is instructed to exit at taxiway B5.

    At this time, the CRJ is on a mile nal. The Malibu

    pilot inorms the controller that B5 taxiway is

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    34/92

    32 Human Factors in Aviation

    dicult to locate. However, the controller believes

    he sees the Malibu turning let at taxiway B5.

    9:07 p.m. CRJ lands on runway 29R and, on

    rollout, swerves to avoid the Malibu, which is still

    on the runway (Figure 26). The CRJ pilot inorms

    the controller that they, had just passed anotheraircrat still on the runway. The two aircrat came

    within 15 eet o each other.

    Event Analysis:

    What Went Wrong?

    To ully understand what happened, each partici-

    pants role was analyzed. FAA-detailed records

    were used to construct a timeline. Focusing on the

    most critical 3 minutes, rom 9:04 p.m. to 9:07

    p.m., provides additional insight and inormation.The controllers intention was to provide the

    best air trac service to both inbound aircrat.

    However, poor communication, inrastructure, and

    other issues all exacerbated the situation.

    Analysis o Time Period 9:049:05 p.m.

    Human Error: Malibu pilot missing taxiway B3

    The Malibu pilot was unable to make the

    turn onto taxiway B3. He might have been

    unamiliar with the airport and might not haveplanned ahead and reduced speed in time or

    the exit. General aviation pilots oten fy alone;

    consequently, it is extremely important or the

    single pilot to not only thoroughly review airport

    charts and diagrams but also establish runway

    exit and taxi plans.

    Human Error: Poor communications between the

    controller and Malibu pilot

    The Malibu pilot did not advise the controller

    that he missed taxiway B3. The controller took

    the initiative and instructed the Malibu to exitat taxiway B5, which did not connect directly to

    the runway.

    29R

    29L

    B5

    B6 B3

    B4Closed Taxiwayor Runway

    Figure 26:

    Airport Layout Showing the Two Aircrat and Runway Lights

    Figure 27:

    Aerial View o Runway as It Was at the Time o the Runway Incursion

    Taxiway B5

    Taxiway B4

    Taxiway B3

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    35/92

    332010 Runway Safety Report

    Analysis o Time Period 9:059:06 p.m.

    Human Error: Malibu pilot unable to locate

    taxiway B5

    The Malibu pilot could not locate B5 because

    he might have been unamiliar with the airport,

    might not have had an airport diagram, and the

    taxiway was not lighted.

    Human Error: Loss o situational awareness Although not an error, specically assigning B3

    and B5 as runway exits caused the unamiliar

    Malibu pilot to spend more time and energy

    trying to comply with Air Trac Control (ATC)

    instructions than maintaining situational aware-

    ness. Just as a driver o a car slows to look or

    a street sign in an unamiliar area, the Malibu

    pilot spent more time on the runway looking or

    the correct exit. The controller planned or the

    Malibu to spend as little time on the runway as

    possible because o the CRJ being on short nal.I the controller had issued an instruction to exit

    at the rst available taxiway, this event might

    never have happened.

    The controller assumes the issue is resolved

    when he thinks he sees the Malibu turning onto

    taxiway B5. Neither the pilot nor the controller

    communicates or conrms that the Malibu was

    clear o the runway.

    Inrastructure: Taxiway B5 not intersecting with

    runway 29R, nonstandard markings, and B6 closed

    or construction.

    Taxiway B5 did not intersect with the runway

    (Figure 27). Also, taxiway B6 was closed or

    construction at the time, this let only taxiways

    B4 or B5 available or exiting the runway.

    Furthermore, B5 did not have any taxiway

    lights; instead, it had refectors that were a

    dierent color than the anticipated taxiway

    lights. Unless a plane is directly acing refectors

    with its lights on, refectors are not visible.

    Taxiway B5 is narrower than a normal taxiway

    and could be conused with a service road.

    Analysis o Time Period 9:06-9:07 p.m.

    Human Error: Loss o situational awareness

    The Malibu pilot and controller were unaware

    that the aircrat was still on the runway. The

    controller did not conrm that the runway wasclear beore the CRJ landed. I the controller had

    known the Malibu was still on the runway, he

    would have issued go-around instructions to the

    CRJ. Only on landing did the CRJ pilot conrm

    that the Malibu was still on the runway.

  • 8/2/2019 Annual Runway Safety Report 2010

    36/92

    34 Human Factors in Aviation

    Taxiway B3

    Taxiway B4

    RemovedTaxiway B5

    Runway 29R

    New Taxiway Signage

    Figure 28:

    Aerial View o Runway Showing Improvements to the Runway Layout

    What Has the Airport Done Since

    the Serious Incursion?

    As a result o this runway incursion, the FAA

    tasked RSAT teams, certied inspectors, pilot

    representatives, and FAAST team members to

    provide a list o improvements that could help

    prevent a similar incident rom recurring. This list

    includes the ollowing:

    Demolition o taxiway B5 (Figure 28)

    New runway signs and markings

    Pilot presentations, which include the ollowing:

    l The importance o being amiliar with the

    airport layout. Having a current airport

    diagram in the cockpit, being aware and

    understanding the Airport Trac Inormation

    System (ATIS)/Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)

    inormation relating to the current condition

    o the airport, and having a plan or yourrunway/taxiway routing on the airport

    l Emphasis on the importance o taxiing clear

    o any movement areas and requesting air

    trac assistance when conused on an airport

    surace

    l The i