ICAO NAM/CAR/SAMRunway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference

John Pallante, ARI-2

October 2002

U.S. Runway Safety BriefingU.S. Runway Safety Briefing

Global Airspace CharacteristicsGlobal Airspace Characteristics

Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety

Millions of operations a year

Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft

Thousands of airports

Thousands of air trafficcontrollers

Growing demand for air travel and system capacity

Runway Safety Realities Runway Safety Realities

Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to

Operations

Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are

Significant Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and

Individual Ownership

Types of Runway IncursionsTypes of Runway Incursions

Pilot DeviationsPilot Deviations

A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.

A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.

Vehicle/Pedestrian DeviationsVehicle/Pedestrian Deviations

A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.

A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.

A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land.

The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types.

Operational ErrorsOperational Errors

An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:

An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:

Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways)

An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft

Runway Incursions (All Categories)Runway Incursions (All Categories)

DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

304

329

405407

338

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY0266.21 68.67 67.68 65.47

Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02

est. 64.85

Distribution by Type of Runway Distribution by Type of Runway IncursionsIncursions

DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)

OE/D22%

PD56%

V/PD22%

OE/D24%

PD57%

V/PD19%

Runway Incursion Severity CategoriesRunway Incursion Severity Categories

Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity

Category DCategory D Category CCategory C Category BCategory B Category A

Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion

Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision

Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision

Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision

Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results in a collision

Increasing Severity

Available Reaction

Time

Available Reaction

Time

Evasive or Corrective

Action

Evasive or Corrective

Action

Environmental Conditions

Environmental Conditions

Speed of Aircraft and/or

Vehicle

Speed of Aircraft and/or

Vehicle

Proximity of Aircraft and/or

Vehicle

Proximity of Aircraft and/or

Vehicle

Increasing Severity

An incursion that resulted in a runway collision

CollisionSeparation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision

Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision

Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion

Category A

Category A&B Runway IncursionsCategory A&B Runway Incursions

DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

59

69 67

53

37

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY0266.21 68.67 67.68 65.47

Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02

53 = FY02 Perf Limit

est. 64.85

Severity Distribution of Runway Severity Distribution of Runway IncursionsIncursions

DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)

D61%

C28%

B8%

A3%

D47% C

36%

B11%

A6%

Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal).

Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL).

Category A and B Runway Incursions Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001) (CY 2000 and 2001)

Traffic Flow

2001 A Events

2000 A Events

2001 B Events

2000 B Events

66% or2/3 of runway

Location of Collisions at ToweredAirports (1990 – 2001)

Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001)- 2001)

NIGHT VMC

DAY IMC

NIGHT IMC

DAY VMC

2 1

5 0

TOTAL OPERATIONS

4 Year Total = 268 Million

Annual Average = 67 Million

TOTAL OPERATIONS

4 Year Total = 268 Million

Annual Average = 67 Million

TOTAL INCURSIONS

Total Incursions = 1460

Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years

TOTAL INCURSIONS

Total Incursions = 1460

Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years

INCURSION RATE

Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations

INCURSION RATE

Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations

Frequency and Rate of Runway Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)

LAX STL IAD

34 Incursions 30 Incursions 3 Incursions

Airport complexity influences the number and Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)

Severity Distribution at the 32 Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)

The Benchmark Airports accounted for– 18% of all operations (approx. 61

Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period

– 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied

The Benchmark Airports accounted for– 18% of all operations (approx. 61

Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period

– 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied

The Benchmark Airports accounted for – 38% (38/87) A events,

– 36% (59/163) B events,

– 35% (178/509) C events,

– 16% (113/694) D events

The Benchmark Airports accounted for – 38% (38/87) A events,

– 36% (59/163) B events,

– 35% (178/509) C events,

– 16% (113/694) D events

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Current Situation

Runway Safety Goals

What the FAA is DoingWhat the FAA is Doing

Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions

Primary Performance Factors of Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001)Runway Incursions (1997-2001)

Pilot Deviations – Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short

instructions– Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position

and hold instructions

Operational Errors

– Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways

– Runway crossing separation errors

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations

– Crosses a runway without communication or authorization

– Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions

Runway Safety BlueprintRunway Safety Blueprint

8 Goals– 39 Objectives

1. Education and Training – Safety Seminars

2. Surface Safety Awareness – Mass Mailings

3. Procedures – Modeling and Simulation

– Advisory Circulars

4. Data Collection – Surface Incidents

– ASRS

8 Goals– 39 Objectives

5. Communications – Phraseology Workgroup

6. Situational Awareness – Paint Study

7. Local Solutions – Special Emphasis Program

8. Technology – Flashing PAPI– Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X)– Moving Map– LED Lights

Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)

TechnologiesTechnologies

ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential

– AMASS 18 Commissioned 6 Operational Suitability Demo 13 Remaining

– LED lighting Enhances hold position

markings at runway/taxiway intersection

Omaha system activation July 2002

SummarySummary

Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach.

People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes.

Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions.

Backup SlidesBackup Slides

ApproachApproach

Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks– What are the types and relative frequencies of

different types of error?

Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error– Procedures– Technologies

Where do we go wrong?Where do we go wrong?

Controllers– Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that

they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land)

– Get distracted– Fail to coordinate (teamwork)– Don’t catch all readback errors– Act human

Where do we go wrong?Where do we go wrong?

Pilots– Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line

up on the runway)– Takeoff without a clearance– Get lost (with and without poor visibility)– Misunderstand the clearance– Act human

Resulting in:Resulting in:

Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing

Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position

and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway

Other scenarios

What Controllers Can DoWhat Controllers Can Do

Optimize teamwork Recognize limitations of human memory and

attention Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you

plan on it being there for more than a minute Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that

the runway is clear Good communication techniques

What Pilots Can DoWhat Pilots Can Do

DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation– LISTEN UP– LOOK OUT– Airport diagram “out and in use”– Is there a runway between you and the gate?– Is there an aircraft on final?

What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)

Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off

When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK

SOPs and Recommended Practices– Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is

received (signal that aircraft is rolling)

– Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds

TechnologiesTechnologies

BAA ActivitiesBAA Activities

Background– Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement

(BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions

– Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology– Proceed to technology/solution development phase based

on operational transition potential

Status– Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001

(summary on next slide)– Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002

System demo - November 2002

BAA Activities (cont’d)BAA Activities (cont’d)

Technology/Product Contractor Site Status

Multilateration/IR Sensor Fusion

Sensis and Tri-Space

Memphis, TNDemonstration conducted in August and October 2001.

Magnetic Sensors HoneywellMinneapolis, MN

Demonstration conducted in October 2001.

GPS/RF Data Link Vehicle Tracking

Veridian Engineering

Warminster, PA

Demonstration conducted in December 2001.

Ground Marker Airspec WJHTCDemonstration conducted in November 2001.

Addressable Signs/SmartBoard

Technology Planning Inc.

College Park Maryland Airport

Demonstration conducted in October 2001.

Radar guns and Runway Status Lights

Architecture Technology Corporation

Long Beach, CA

Demonstration conducted in April 2002.

Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)

Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights– Three phases testing at Omaha

LED stand alone LED with motion sensors Special scenarios - TBD

– Operational Assessment complete Jan 2003

Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)

VHF audio alert with motion sensors for non-controlled airports– Two months data collection at Millard Airport

completed in May 2002– Detection rate and false alert rate need

enhancement

Other Projects (cont’d)Other Projects (cont’d)

Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)– Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an

aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway

– System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach

– Article 7 Brief August 12, 2002

– Field Demo September 10-12, 2002

Technologies DeploymentTechnologies Deployment

Short Term– Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and

Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators

North Vegas Long Beach

– Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness

Technologies Deployment Technologies Deployment (cont’d)(cont’d)

Mid Term– Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to

improve runway safety Addressable Sign – TYS LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA 75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center

Long Term– Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports– Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic

Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking

– Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators