ann kite yo pale - best practice in communication haiti 2010

8/2/2019 Ann Kite Yo Pale - Best Practice in Communication Haiti 2010

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INTERNEWS EUROPE

Best Practice ad Lessos Leared iCommuicatio with Disaster AectedCommuities: Haiti 2010

let themspeak

Ann KiteYo Pale

By Imogen Wall WIth yves gerald Chry


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a Ki y P ( pk) 2 Best PraCtICe and lessons learned In CommunICatIonWIth dIsaster aeCted CommunItIes: haItI 2010

aCKnoWledgements

ti c jc w v i wi y . Ig W wi cwg wig iivi: Suranga Mallawa, Jacb Quintanilla, Philippe

Alluard, Stephanie Armand, Sabina Carlsn, Jn Bugge, Ben Nble, Sharn Reader, Karen Prudlck, Jennier

Mandel, Anita Shah, Carle Chapelier, Lizz Frst Ycum, Lisa Rbinsn, Rachel Hughtn, Mark Turner,

Guillaume Michel, Carel Pedre, Sabine Wilke, Lenard Dyle, PAW Cmmunicatins, Julie Breen, Mildrede

Beliarde.

Yv G Cy i gi wig : Ben Nble, Frantz Duval, Mari Viau, JcelynePierre-Luis, Jean Rmel Pierre, Jacques Desrsiers, Sny Estus, the whle Internews team/ENDK, Carel Pedre,

Jean Lesly Hilaire.

T cntact the authr, please email Imgen Wall at [email protected].

Cv :A man listens t a radi at a reugee camp in Prt-au-Prince, Haiti, Friday, January 22nd 2010.AP PHoTo/JAE C. HoNG

VIsIt: oChaonlIne.un.orG/haItI and WWW.relIeWeb.Int

Baie deMancenille

Baie dela Tortue

Baie deGrand-Pierre

Baie de

Jacmel

Canal deSaint-Marc

Canal dela Gonve

Canal de la Tortue

Golfe de la Gonve

Baiede Henne

LagoEnriquillo

EtangSaumtre

PORT-AU-PRINCE

Cap-Hatien

Gonaves

Hinche

Jacmel

Jrmie

Les Cayes

Miragone

Port-de-Paix

Fort Liberte

Les AnglaisTiburon

Chantal

Arniquet

Camp Perrin

Maniche

Cavaillon

St Louisdu Sud

Aquin

GrandGoave

PetitGoave

Bainet

Pestel

Roseau

BonbonAbricot

Dame Marie

Les Irois

Moron

Ansed'Hainault Beaumont

CorailPetit Trou de Nippes

Baraderes

Anse-a-Veau

Petite Riviere de Nippes

L'Asile

La vallee de Jacmel

CayesJacmel

Marigot

ErnneryMont

Organise

CercaCarvajal

Vallieres

TerrierRougeTrou

du Nord

CercaLa Source

Thomassique

Belladere

Jimani

LascahobasSaut D'eau

Thomonde

Maissade

Pignon

LaVictoire Mombin

Crochu

Bahon

Milot

Limonade

QuartierMorin

Dondon

SaintRaphael

Marmelade

Saint Michelde l'Attatalaye

Dessalines

Petite Rivierede l'Artibonite

Verrettes

LaChapelle

Mirebalais

Grande SalineDesdunes

L'Estere

AnseRouge

MoleSt Nicolas

Bombardopolis

Baie de Henne

Jean RabelBassin Bleu

Chansolme Anse-a-Foleur

Saint Louis du Nord

Le Borgne

Port MargotLimbe

PilateGros Morne

La Branle

Plaisance

Anse a pitres

Grand Gosier

FondVerrettes

Ganthier

Croix desBouquets

Thomazeau

CabaretArchaie

LeoganeChambellan

Perches

Ferrier

Carice

Bas Limbe

Acul du Nord

Terre Neuve

Boucancarre

Kenscoff

Carrefour Petion Ville

Gressier

Cornillon

Ile a Vache

Anse-a-Galets

Pointe-a-Raquette

La Tortue

Caracol

Belle Anse

Torbeck

St Jeandu Sud

Port-Salut

CoteauxPort-a-Piment

Chardonnieres

Thiote

Roche A Bateau

Ouanaminte

MonteCriste

Dajabn

Saint Marc

C U B A D O M I N I C A N

R E P U B L I C

H A I T I

S U D E S T

NOR D EST

AR TIB ONITE

C E N T R E

S U D

G R A N D EA N S E

NOR D OUEST

NIPPES

NORD

O U E S T

LE DE LA TORTUE

LE DELA GONVE

PRESQU'LEDESBARADRES

LES CAYMITES

LE VACHE

720'W7230'W730'W7330'W740'W7430'W

200'N

1930'N

19

0'N

1830'N

180'N

0 10 20 30 40 50

Km

Legend

Capital city

First admin capital

Towns

International boundary

Port

First admin boundary

Main roads

Minor roads

Disclaimer:The designations employed and the presentation of material on this mapdo not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariatof the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory,city or areaor of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.Reference System:UTM 18N, WGS84. Map datasource: United NationsCartographic Section,ESRI, Natural Earth, SRTM.

Caribbean Sea

Atlantic Ocean

200 - 400

400 - 600

600 - 800

800 - 1,000

1,000 - 1,500

1,500 - 2,000

2,000 - 2,500

2,500 - 3,000

0 - 200

Elevation (meters)

H A I T I

BarahonaJacmel

Jimani

Saint-MarcHinche

PORT-AU-PRINCE

SANTODOMINGO

Jrmie

Les Cayes

Miragone

Gonaves

Cap-Hatien

Port-de-Paix Monte Criste

Dajabn

0 80

Km

D O M I N I C A N

R E P U B L I C
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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The 7.0 magnitude earthquake

sc so of h o Jy 12 2010

ls spos

sc i Oc ts of 2004.

hs of ol cs lc cy

sposs, locl osos, h spo,

pv sco y oss of vls

also poured energy, money and time into nding ways tolp.

The earthquake was unfortunately not the only

sos cy o s h 2010. t ob

of cholera in the town of St Marc on October 18 2010

brought a new, highly infectious and deadly disease

to a country with weak sanitation and health systems,

and no knowledge or understanding of this illness. The

response of communication actors from the rst hours

was essential to the survival of potentially thousands of

people, whose ability to recognise symptoms and take

prompt action was literally the difference between life

.

ts pp ps o cp so of communication work implemented by a whole range

of partners, and to identify what was delivered from

the perspectives of those affected by these two major

b vy ff cs. t ppos of s

xcs s o fo co spos h

o pov pccl cs ss lyss of bs

practice models that may be useful elsewhere.

While much was done in Haiti, more remains to be

o s sco, bo h lobl lvl.

i s oc ss spos coc

coco-c b vo sol b

widely criticised from the earliest days for being soscoc fo locl cox. t css

sopsco of so spcs of locl

spos s o y obsvo fo h.

This generated models outside the framework of the

ol spos, s sy

s pcl ffo o l lssos fo locl

sposs.

W

l pi bicb i ii. W c c k ic 12. W i ppi, wiibi ki pc, w i i ii p. W ii.elmont pIerre, dIreCtor, Cool m,leoGane

the demand orCommunICatIon

Bo col sposs

cl fo foo fo ffc

cos s , fo vy ls ss of

cy. Fo svvos os o

stations to the overwhelming response to projects that

facilitated communication, it was clear that disaster-

ffc hs foo s ccl.

Executie summaryA Kite Yo Pale:Let Them Speak


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ti cici [Bhn/saKs Ci as] i i ippic ic w ciic k.WIllY petIt-homme, CommunIt Yleader, leoGane

CommunICatIonWorK Is PossIBle andImPortant rom theearlIest stage o aresPonse

t locl coco spos o

began within minutes as survivors began using phones

to nd out if friends and family were alive or dead, to

broadcast their location (especially those who were

pp) o o s fo lp. dv by svvo ,

cy bocs by locl o, cl oc

family reunication systems, were running within days.

While international agencies were slower to address

foo s, xpc of vloporganisation Internews and the World Food Programme

(WFP) shows not only that effective communication

work can be launched within days, but that it can have

pc o ffcvss of opol lvy.

a i i pp i cc wi WP c icpi i hii i wkwi k, c

WP iii c-p pib pc, c i , b ib i wk.Wp senIor sta member

lIstenIng andCommunICatIng are

vItal

Two of the most important ndings of this report

closly coc: poc of ls fo

ol spos, poc of

process of coco fo ss svvos. Wl

syss fo s foo, slly ccs

by o-o-y ol sb

foo, pclly sss, soo

polf, ols fcl lo

fcl ls o pspcvs cocs of

locl poplos f y c o ffcvo lpl lvls (cl pov opol

s lvy, losp bl, lv

o ccobly spcy cos

vlop s). acs sll s coco

s ply pocss of lv o xc

foo.

Fo svvos, by cos, pocss of

coco of ss o s c s

foo slf. t bly o coc

than just source information to ask a question, share

a story, discuss an issue was often brought up by

Haitians as vital. This was widely recognised by localradio stations, many of whom ran open mikes for days

after the quake, allowing people to come in and talk on

air about what happened. It is also clear in projects such

s iol Fo of r Coss

Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) helpline in Annexe de la

Mairie camp in Port au Prince, where callers surveyed

by oso xpss f ssfco

levels with the call service than with the information

received about IFRCs shelter project.

O of osos ss s so,

os pl ffcv fbc/lo

ols fo s vy posv xpc. to

cocps of fbc, cl ools sc s cll cs copl css, lo of po,

with local and international staff worrying about being

overwhelmed with the volume of calls or having to

deal with angry people, it was interesting to note that

these fears were usually expressed by those who had no

direct experience of such systems. Those who overcame

cocs fo y o fs pcc

those who implemented effective dialogue systems

los vslly scb s o of os

important aspects of their work.


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W w p c c, w i b p ppi bc w kw w , k w wpp i ic? B i c i 100 wc pp. m c i p cc kb i ii.kurt Jean Charles,ounder o noula

t x sp s pocss h s o cl

feedback and voices from the eld into policy and project

development work on an ongoing basis. This is, however,

cll. t ls p s lc of y

of sysc ppoc o s foo

o o ls, fbc o collc

spo o copls.

dedICated CaPaCIty

There is an important and growing recognition

that communication with affected communities is

a completely separate area of work and a different

technical skill compared to conventional external

relations or international media liaison. To work

operationally, however, organisations need to decide

what this work looks like in practice. Different agencies

in Haiti tried different approaches with the most

sccssfl ol h vlop by iFrC. ts

consisted of a dedicated technical specialist with

socs (pclly locl cpcy), bo sp

from conventional communication and crucially

tasked with providing technical support to all otherbranches of work, including operations, transparency

ccobly oo vlo

(m&e).

the CoordInatIonChallenge

t cll of cooo cy lvl s vy

ff fo fc sys. t

fo foo o b coss coss ff

outlets and agencies, the question of how to share andcollect feedback regarding the response as a whole,

poc of s osos

are not duplicating each others work and are working

o psp s cooo. t

increasing number of agencies investing in this work

s s so v o c, ss

ol sos bo cooo cls lvl,

and increasingly at geographical level in the eld. The

xpc h lso ls po sos,

which need further consideration, about the role of the

ov coco cooo.

The solution piloted in Haiti the coordination and

coss-cls svc pov by ploy

dedicated stafng of the Communications with Disaster

Affected Communities (CDAC) Haiti mechanism

delivered far beyond original expectations. By lling in

this gap, it highlighted the extent to which there was noprovision for coordination of communication work, or

for the provision of common services for those working

in this sector. In particular, interviewees felt that CDAC

h, s coss-cls svc, pov sfl

and important service. This gap will need to be lled at

eld level in future responses.

At global level, adding communication (both projects

and coordination systems) to the range of work that can

be legitimately funded by the humanitarian nancing

system would do a great deal to open up potential for

growth in this sector during the early days of a response.

ts s o o pov sby f foemergency communication work within individual

cs.

eeCtIveCommunICatIon IsClosely lInKed tooPeratIonal suCCess

ao cl lsso fo h s poc

of the relationship between communication and

operations. Several operations staff commented

that it would actually not have been possible toachieve operational success without support from

coco, cl os volv cp

poplo so ssss of -

bls. also vl o opol sccss

s ol ply by fc-o-fc cocos

(coy oblss), poc of

understanding the different ways in which different

ols of coco vl, o b

familiar with the communication environment in the

rst place.


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I w ii [ i cp] w b ipib wi pp cici .CCCm Cluster CoordInator

teChnology hasthe PotentIal torevolutIonIseCommunICatIon

Large-scale ownership of mobile phones and use of

social media in Haiti, as well as the emergence of thevol c coy obl po cops

s cos, ll s coy

continues to be a watershed response in the use of

technology and communication. However, in-depth

understanding of how local communities used these

tools was found mainly in responses launched by localosos. Locl , pv lcos

copy pcl, scc vlop

multi-platform models meshing mobile phones, SMS,

Facebook, Twitter and conventional media such as

radio within days of the response. These are showcased

Cp 6. W cos o coco

ss spos, colocl cocos

xps s o b fo o ffc cos

locl cos. iol plys v c

to learn from local actors, and systematic ways to

identify and connect with local expertise and to build

psps .

Gi w iig

q.


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the dIICulty oKnoWIng the ImPaCt

O of bs ps coco

response in Haiti was the lack of capture and M&E.

Wl s y b sbl v lpl

cs fc 2010, s b cll. no

oly s o vl fl pc of

many projects but they are also unable to evolve as they

sol o l pocss. ts s pcl

problem involving models new to the humanitarian

response such as SMS, mobile phones and web platforms

for which no M&E models have yet been developed.

Discussions with operational staff in particular indicate c os of lys pc of

communication work may be inadequate, as they do not

capture how such work positively impacts operational

lvy poc of coco

pocss (spclly psycosocl s) o ss

svvos.

O of os po sccss sos h

was the production of consistent research into the

communication environment, primarily by Internews,

who for the rst time invested in a research unit as part

of their early emergency response. Their data, which was

lso vlbl sysclly o sfor the rst time through CDAC Haiti, helped agencies

o pov po pov

col b s by cy sff o sll coco

projects to donors.

usIng the haItIexPerIenCe

ts sc lso sss spos o vy

specic situations in a very specic country. It seeks

only to capture and present what worked within Haiti,

s oo cl s bo earthquake and cholera were highly unusual events

pop sl sposs. i s op f

responses will be able to draw on some of the ideas,

ols ppocs plo h. Wl s

research does identify some major gaps and challenges,

it is also clear that this sector is growing exponentially

as is the understanding of how communication can

cob pccl opol s o

ly, sccss, llc ppopss

of spos. ts s o of os

important and encouraging ndings of this report.

Mai fdigsemergenCy resPonse:ChaPters 1 and 2

ts cps loo s ffcvss of

communication in the early days and weeks of a disaster

spos. Cp 1 covs cy spos

o ; Cp 2 loos sbs

col cy b Ocob 2010.

Communication can make a profoundfdifference to operational effectiveness.

Operational staff interviewed for this research who

had worked alongside professional communication

support in Haiti were overwhelmingly positive

about the impact on their work. They saw the

benets of communication primarily as improving

trust, helping to mitigate conict, developing

losps s o coy

pcpos sss.

Provision of support to thef

communications sector as part of theemergency response is essential. Locl

o ps, cl obl po

cops, o b sppo

f of ss. i h, pccl

sppo sc s fl fo o so

os soo of i ccss (s

is increasingly prioritised by local journalists), as

well as food and shelter for reporters, would have

made a considerable difference. Specialist media

vlop osos lbl sby

f bly o ccss cy

f css. rsoo of obl

phone network in particular should be regarded asa lifesaving humanitarian priority. Partnerships

ahead of time would facilitate this.

The local communication response in Haitif

was both rich and innovative. W os of

, locl o b s bocs

o s foo xpcs, fy

needs, nd assistance, reunite families and help

popl svv. i so css y s p sos

s o vs, op los ly

without support from the international response.

Local communicators, including those working c sco, pov pclly p

using SMS, the Internet (including social media),


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obl po plfos o s collc

foo, f o so

cos.

CommunICatIon atorganIsatIonal level:ChaPter 3

This chapter focuses on communication work

by osos o o spcls s ,

several of whom developed projects and units, building

communication work into technical projects and

working on practical application of communicationpcpls o opos. ts cp lso

looks at camp-based communication a particularly

po ol h cox.

The most effective organisational modelf

for implementing effective communication

in Haiti was a standalone unit. This was

l by ccl coco spcls,

provided with a budget and tasked with providing

technical support to the whole organisation,

particularly operations. Operations staff working

in agencies where they had direct technicalsppo coco fo spcls sff

were very positive, frequently saying that project

delivery would have been impossible without

sppo of coco colls.

Organisations that viewed communication as

ply fco of ccobly o

b o l pspcv, lss cl

o c coco psol,

develop standalone communication projects or

pov ccl sppo o o ps of

oso.

A multi-channel approach tofcommunication was the most successful. i

s s os sccssfl coco

work in Haiti from the nationwide cholera

spos o cp-bs ols sc s os

vlop by iFrC Jenkins/Penn Haiti

rlf Oso (JPHRO) all used multiple

cls o s foo ls

different but reinforcing and complementary ways.

t bs ppocs cos pofo

differences, benets and limitations of different

coco cls s o

bs v.

CommunICatIon atsystem level:ChaPter 4

This chapter looks at the question of how

communication with affected communities should be

os lvl of

sys vl cs.

As the communication sector expands,f

the need for coordination is growing.

Haiti piloted some important models with

o ss s so, o

them the rst eld deployment of the CDACnetwork. The Shelter Cluster hired a dedicated

communication delegate for the rst time, and

so osos b ss so

of coo locls foo plcs

where multiple agencies were providing services.

The importance and operational benet of

v c coco cooo

capacity was articulated by a very wide range of

cos, cl locl ov bos,

h Cooo, cls ls os

working within the sector, particularly during the

col cy.

Project models that enhance access tof

information about a response exist and

can be nurtured. Internews, for example,

launched a daily radio show providing information

about the humanitarian situation as a whole that

s sll poc bocs ly o ov 30

o sos.Enformasyon Nou Dwe Knonnen

(ENDK) or News You Can Use built on models

developed elsewhere, but in Haiti beneted from

a much closer working relationship with the

international community. However, much more

c b o o pov ccss o foo.

The donor role is key.f doos h

interviewed for this research actually

os s of

interest in the communication sector than was

cooly ss by cs. t

sys os o cos

importance of communication was a serious

hindrance, however, particularly in terms of

f.


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standaloneCommunICatIonProjeCts: ChaPter 5

The projects covered in this chapter focus exclusively

o foo s coco s

project output. They include those launched to provide

support to local media as well as communication

vs vlop by ol osos o

improve communication with affected communities

lly.

All best practice projects identied by thisf

research involved support from a technical

communication specialist.

The best communication strategies,f

whether highly localised or nationwide,were those that meshed a number of

different communication channels.

Research and understanding of thef

communication environment was

essential. While it was clear from the start

that radio was by far the most signicant mass

medium, with over 250 stations nationwide,

television is also now appearing in surveys1 s

more signicant than assumed. Also, low literacy

did not mean that print work was automatically

without value. The best projects were those thatworked closely with their audiences and explored

multiple ways of using available media.

Face-to-face communication wasf

particularly important,both for localised

communication work and national

campaigns such as the response to cholera.

Osos vs coy

mobilisers found their work to be extremely

vlbl coy losps,

s foo o sly covy o

ss collc foo fo

eld. Haitians in turn appreciated the ability to covsos, o s sos lv

o ccscs.

Localised information is also importantf

for communities. Participants in focus groups

conducted for the infoasaid project commented

that while they appreciated generalised

information, what they most wanted was to know

what was going on in their area, and what plans

were being developed for their future. More

localised information work, in particular with

local radio, is needed within Haiti, and this is also lsso fo f sposs.

1 J, m l, . aic rc I a ti o C: c G svy o hii i, Iw, Jy 2011.

CommunICatIon andteChnology:ChaPter 6

Haiti was a landmark response when it came to

s of poc of

coco coloy ss spos. ts

cp loos pcl locl colocl

spos povs lssos fo ol

spos. i lso lyss svvos pspcvs o

coloy, pv lcos scos pspcv

on working with NGOs and models pioneered

by ol osos cox of

communication with affected communities.

The inuence and importance of modernf

technology is profoundand has the

potential to revolutionise the way aidagencies and affected communities

communicate with each other. i pcl,

s s possbl fo svvos o coc

directly to responders for the rst time, facilitating

volv of spos s bo ffc

cos po cos spos.

Communications technology, however, is at

ps s s cc-ll bs (socl

media and new media are also used) for what are

pcc of vy ff ols

ools. t o cs ps of s

of ff ools soo, b chance of working with them successfully.

Those who made best use of such systems,f

however, were local responders and

specialists, not international aid agencies.

In Haiti as elsewhere, innovation in use of

coloy s b v ply by locl

populations and by the private sector. Some of the

os ffcv coco ols vlop

after the earthquake came from local journalists

c xps. t h xpc lso

llss s of coloy by svvos s

pofoly sp by cll socl os,not just access to services (such as Internet access),

literacy or nancial status.

Many exciting and groundbreakingf

projects were launched in Haiti. However,

several experienced aid workers commented

s of coloy sol o co

expense of face-to-face communication, which

s vl fo bl

losps psps.

There is almost complete lack offmethodology around monitoring and

evaluating projects using communication

technology, in particular capturing the

end user experience. d o vl


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and impact of SMS, for example, is unclear and in

so css cocoy. ts s bcs

s sco s sll ly s of volo,

and effective capture and analysis of projects

in countries like Haiti, where so much has been

plo, s po fo vlop of

sco fo voccy. t fc y

organisations have experimented with this work

h s s pol fo s

spos o plo l o vlop of m&e

cp ols.

monItorIng,evaluatIon, CaPture

and researCh:ChaPter 7

ts cp loos pocss of oo

evaluating communication projects, the importance and

fco of sc so of oc

projects. Research work in Haiti was strong, but M&E

in communication projects was weak almost across the

bo.

The availability of quality research intof

the communication environment in Haiti

made a signicant difference to the ability

of all actors to develop and deliver good

communication projects.

The operational perspective of the impactf

and value added of communication work

was often profoundly different compared

to the models applied by communication

professionals. In addition, few projects

had ways of capturing the value of the process

of coco o ffc cos,

focss s o sf bsopo of

foo o sss. t s pol

here for development of more holistic ways of

capturing the impact of communication work.

M&E and capture exercises were oftenf

regarded as low priority, formulated in

terms of baseline and endline models and

were seen as requiring additional capacity

and resources. In practice, models that were

fully integrated into the project and generated

constant data were more effective and useful as the

y col lso b f cly bc

into operations and project development.

Methodologyad termiology

methodologyThe bjective this study was t identiy best

practice mdels in cmmunicatin with aected

ppulatins as implemented by humanitarians

wrking in Haiti in 2010. The study des nt aim t

be a cmprehensive verview all cmmunicatin

prjects launched in Haiti since January 2010.

The bjective is rather t identiy, present and

analyse sme prjects that had prven eective,

particularly thse which had emplyed innvative

techniques r mdels r which were new t

the rganisatins in questin. A key prblem incarrying ut the research was the verall lack

capture and M&E that has been cnducted t

date. In determining eectiveness, therere, the

researchers drew n what material was available.

They used bservatin in the eld, cnducted

cus grups, and gauged perceptins agency

sta, and where pssible, survivrs, as t the

value cmmunicatin wrk.

Particular erts were made t identiy and

capture activities that ccurred utside the

sphere the internatinal humanitarian respnse,

including initiatives launched independentlyby lcal media, technlgy actrs and lcal

authrities. Frm amng these, the bjective was

t identiy the mst successul slutins and

mdels and prvide sme insight int why they

may have been eective, and what ideas they

may be able t prvide r uture respnses. The

research cvers cmmunicatin as part the

respnse t bth the earthquake and chlera

emergencies, and t a lesser extent the hurricane.

This study was researched thrugh a prcess

in-depth interviews with a wide range actrs

invlved with the multiple emergency respnseslaunched in Haiti in 2010 (including survivrs),

a series site/eld visits t nging prjects,

a review all existing literature and a series

cus grups in Haiti cmmissined by inasaid.

The apprach was almst entirely qualitative and

cussed as much as pssible n the experiences

Haitians, including lcal authrities, media, civil

sciety partners and aid agency beneciaries.

Fieldwrk was carried ut between February and

May 2011 with subsequent peer review chapters

and case studies taking place between May and

July 2011.

Mst interviews were cnducted inrmally and

cnsisted an initial preliminary discussin

llwed where necessary by llw-up


12/88


interviews t lk in-depth at a particular prject.

Mst interviews were taped t ensure accuracy,

althugh interviewees were all given the ptin

nt being recrded (nly ne made this request) and

mst spke n the understanding that they wuld

nt be quted by name. Fr mst case studies

several sta members were interviewed, with a

particular emphasis n the experiences lcal

sta. Cnversatins with disaster survivrs were

held, wherever pssible, withut the presence

anyne rm any the rganisatins wrking in their

cmmunities.The cus grup discussins were cnducted by

a lcal Haitian grup n behal inasaid, and

cnsisted 15 grups held in rural and urban areas,

specically Prt au Prince, Legane and St Marc.

The rural grups were split between earthquake and

nn-earthquake aected areas. Cmments cited in

this paper rm Haitian surces are, unless therwise

surced, taken rm these discussins.

Amng ther imprtant data surces r this study

were the audience research reprts prduced

rtnightly by Internews, which analysed inrmatin

needs and access, initially in earthquake-aectedareas but subsequently in ther parts Haiti.

termInology

Thrughut this study the term cmmunicatin

relates, unless therwise specied, t cmmunicatin

between prviders and cmmunities aected by

disasters in Haiti in 2010. This is regarded as distinct

rm cmmunicatin with internatinal media,

external relatins and public inrmatin.

As ar as pssible, this paper als avids use the cncept the beneciary, n the basis that

this term rames disaster survivrs primarily as

recipients assistances r surces data, rather

than practive agents and architects their wn

recvery. It is als generally used t designate ne

specic grup in disaster respnse thse wh havebeen physically r materially impacted and thus is

hard t use t encmpass ther grups essential t

eective cmmunicatin such as the diaspra, r

Haitians ptentially aected by a disaster such as

chlera. Mre imprtantly, given that cmmunicatin

with aected cmmunities is abut equal dialgue

and empwerment, the extent t which lcal

actrs are essential t eective cmmunicatin

and the leadership prvided by lcal specialists in

cmmunicatin, the cncept beneciary was elt

t be bth limiting and at dds with the philsphy

behind this area wrk. The terms survivr, and

aected cmmunity have been preerred wherever

pssible.

ii i dd jc i igi y w i vgii, bbC W t Iw. I c ii y iiig cc iy ii vi

ii ci g iv iicg i ciic w y w gci. Ii jciv g cciy i gci ii cici ci. I vi i c gci i i wi igci i i w-wycici wi c i.

Yv G Cy ii ic c fi wi w i .


13/88


AT 4.53PM LOCAL TIME o Jy 12 2010,

ly bs of so hthat includes Leogane, Jacmel, Petit Goave

and the capital, Port au Prince, was struck

by a shallow 7.0 earthquake lasting approximately 35

scos. t ol spos s ss

, o ls os coplx of

o, ps ls scl ploy of

scs, pclly

cluster system, and the largest surge of private nancial

sppo fo cy sc 2004.

This chapter will analyse the most important

elements of communication work in the early days and

weeks of the response to the earthquake, drawing oninterviews with actors at the time and where possible

on surviving reports and data (of which there is very

little). It will look particularly at local media initiatives

pspcv, opol pc of

communication work, and the response of specialist

media NGOs and international aid agencies. It will

fy ovos vlops, pov

coos o bl o copsv

coco spos of x ss.

Chapter 1Respodigto the earthquake

Key IndIngs

dic cciy f cici,icig c ggi, i i i y .

eciv cicif

c icic iivy i, w ig viv ii.

a cicif i gcy c igiig y.

mi vfgii iv i gcy

y ii y,icig , i.

tw-wy cicify, wic ig w ii ii, vi iy i i

i .c y f ig y c c c i icy cii-ig v , w i .

pviig c f iic i i

ycci ci i i.

c--c icifi y civ cici,wic iycci c viv.

mg iif cici i y.

a iv i i c

gw, cii igig c v i.

Cici f c ii ig civ,icy i c Cegcy r (Cer) egcy

r ri (err) w i i cyy v i.


14/88


Iormatio adcommuicatio aterthe earthquake

desPerate to KnoW

t fo foo of

survivors to communicate was overwhelming from the

rst hours after the disaster. It manifested in various

different ways, from hundreds of people arriving atlocal radio stations looking for assistance with family

reunication to those trapped under the rubble using

mobile phones to call for help. Most of this early trafc

happened outside the international aid framework,

as people used tools and systems they already knew:

fs, fly, locl coy ls o

stations, who quickly organised themselves into

information hubs for whole communities.

Anecdotally, use of communications technology was

lso pos. mobl po c bc vbl

business for anyone with an electricity connection while

po copy dcl, op f csvc s p of s spos1 ( o po o

rate for 15 minutes of charge time was 40 gourde,

roughly one dollar equivalent to a days income for

many Haitians). The instant popularity of the Internews

emergency humanitarian radio show, ENDK, which

b bocs ly ys f

was played by some stations up to six times a day (the

show is still carried for free by more than 30 stations),

the overwhelming demand at radio distributions, and

spos o fbc syss, ll clly spo

to a desperate need to know what was going on, where

aid was available and how to access assistance.

destroyed In a tIme ogreatest need

as o cs, s fo foo

o coc c xcly po

the communications infrastructure was itself seriously

damaged by the earthquake. At least 31 local journalists

died and many others were injured.2 Several radio

stations collapsed completely, while those whose staff

and buildings survived lost income and were unable

1 lg, t. C p ri h sv liv a hii Q,Reuters,Jy 24 2010.

2 Ims i ic

o py sls, ply bcs vs

bs collps.Le Nouvelliste, hs py ly

newspaper, lost its printing press and began publishing

online. Digicel and Voila, the two major phone

cops, lso sff fo s of psol

and damage to towers and other infrastructure.

o cci b c i w iw b k. I wi i w b p b

i b b i w wb.hrold Jean-ranCoIs,dIreCtor o radIo Ibo3

Haitis few landlines appear to have been less

ffc. i cocos so ps of

ffc lso pp o v svv b

mobile phone networks anecdotally, some people

managed to make contact with those outside the

country on Skype and social media in the earliest hours,

although based on the records of systems such as Twitterthis only applied to a few.

hoW the loCal medIaresPonded

Despite the devastation and their own personal

suffering, many local journalists and radio stations in

particular went to extraordinary lengths to stay on air,

and to use the radio medium as a way to help people.

Stations that suffered minimal destruction, such as

Radio 1 and Signal FM, began special broadcasts within

24 hours of the earthquake. Stations that were badlyhit, such as Radio Caraibes whose building collapsed,

salvaged what equipment they could and constructed

sf sos pblc spcs o s:

Caraibes FM was back on air three days later. In

Petit Goave, where all stations were badly damaged,

journalists saved what equipment they could and used

o bl copos so bc of c

worked together to get a shared broadcast on air with no

sppo fo ol spos.

rspo o fo lss, y sos

b fco los ly s foo

hubs. Radio 1, which broadcasts nationwide and has

3 Q i ri si sgg t sy o ai, Ims wi, mc 31 2010.


15/88


an international phone line, was the focus for anyone

wanting to connect with loved ones outside Port au

Prince and in the diaspora. Many survivors had no

specic message but just wanted to talk about what

had happened to them. Even radio stations that were

o bly s p copos s

for those who were too scared to go into buildings

because of the aftershocks. Several Haitian journalists

were keen to stress the psychosocial importance of

communication, both in interviews for this research andelsewhere.

t ppi p, w i.patrICk moussIGnaC,radIo CaraIbes statIon dIreCtor4

From the earliest days there was also a spontaneous

effort, led by the big broadcasters in Port au Prince, to

work together. Members of the media associations met

to debate their response. All were struggling to handle

4 Cy, J.r. hii ri t Ci l I oc, n I mii, g t Ci pci Ji, Jy 28 2010.

reporting: moving around the city was hard, and few

had fuel for transport. Many journalists were also

looking after their families, and were spending days in

lo s fo sssc.

The role of local media (and the work of the Volunteer

tcoloy Cos) lso l

c of spo s y foo ply

spos. as foo ss, hs bo

were desperately looking for news of loved ones and

trying to nd ways to provide assistance. They werebl o sppo spos cly by pov locl

knowledge, translation support and technical expertise.

acol vc lso sss hs

living in other countries were important information

gatekeepers: English speaking, with access to the

Internet (and thus the web platforms of international

cs), bl o sc pocvly fo foo.

t po ol spo ply o

spcs of h spos (voccy fs

fo cy sssc, pss o ol

political gures, and direct nancial support to

svvos o cs) s o ssl odiaspora responses elsewhere, notably in Burma after

hc ns. ts sss cos

sIgnal m andemergenCy medIa viv q, c i ic i viv i y q. y, y w y wy w w gig . ty w c i, c ciy ig i viv w .

sig m i i w ii i p pic, w w c y q ( i viv). Wii w q, iv g c wy .

t i qicy i i ii cg c, wi

q i wig c q , iig j ii. sig m wy w c. dc, gi,igi cgy w i. ty w wi i, w i w , w y c c ici , wic i w , i c iv. ty yc iv. Ww i cy, y i Ceo,mi Vi.

o w, eci dy, c sig m i y q iig , J ci, w w y i q.li , w c, g i iv.1

sig m y i iiy. ti i c wi y y hii v; igi gv sig m ii wi ciiz i hii cc ; y i i i i us, C c c sig m c.2 hiii q i sig m c q ii ihii ig iv i c .

tg i i, y icsig m civ w gv ivy

g w i . a wiy i, sig m w i i iy hiii y i. li g w ji ciwig.

sic q, sig m c g- i hii ig gci.

1 Wii, t. sig m pvi lii i hii, la ti, y 1 2010.

2 Ii.


16/88


s cpcs of spos f sposs

could bear considerable fruit for those working on

coco.

alos ll locl opos po

their emergency broadcasting services with little or no

sssc fo yo o coy. ts

was partly because few specialist media NGOs are at

present well prepared to handle emergencies. Measures

sc s sby f, socpl bsc p,

agreements with humanitarian responders to ensure

journalists can access supplies such as food and tents,

cs s fo fl o ssl sppls

in-country, would make a dramatic difference.

t h xpc lso l pocof xing existing communications networks as quickly

s possbl. mc s b , fo xpl, of

fact that survivors in Haiti could SMS and call from

under the rubble. With an overloaded Urban Search and

Rescue (USAR) system, this information was mostly

important to local friends and family who identied

o y svvos. By s o,

most effective communication work in the crucial few

days after the quake was carried out by local media:

journalists embedded with civil society networks,

who knew and were trusted by their audience and

were profoundly committed to serving their listeners.Mapping, engaging with and supporting such efforts

s b poy f sss.

hoW loCal teleComsComPanIes resPonded

In the early days after the earthquake, Voila (who

was operational within two days of the earthquake)

dcl spo posvly o lpl ss

from NGOs to send out information via SMS to their

sbscb bs -ffc .

The information from NGOs, however, quickly andunintentionally became perceived as spamming by

sbscbs.5 There was little consistency in content and

ccl lcs l o ovlo sys, lvy

of the same SMS multiple times and long delays in

ss ssso.

For commercial as well as humanitarian reasons,

both companies ceased working with free-for-all

systems within weeks to protect their customer base.

ioclly, cocl pv s

ffc of foc cooo css. dcls

insistence that they would not work on the cholera

response with organisations and content not fully

5 tc ci i hii iic -ii g i i y.

sanctioned by the Ministry of Public Health, the World

Health Organisation (WHO) or the Red Cross was

bs o o poc po s

that their customers associated Digicel with reliable

information, as well as the need to limit partnerships

for the sake of their own internal capacity. Telecoms

cops h lso pp o v b c o

ssv o s s ngO sco. as

David Sharpe, Head of Products at Digicel, puts it, We

listen to our end stakeholders the customer.

t spos o lso pcp

arrival of a number of new international actors from

coloy coy. us, Csspps,

toso rs Foo (trF) b ofos ll lc ffos o pov sssc, svl

of them explicitly in the context of improving two-way

communication between international responders and

survivors. The efcacy of such systems has been widely

debated elsewhere and this paper does not propose to go

ov s o.6

hoW sPeCIalIstmedIa organIsatIonsresPonded

Media organisations already present in Haiti were

also badly hit by the disaster but when they recovered,

their response was one of the swiftest ever launched.7

Using existing funding, Internews were able to

scale up in days and launch the ENDK radio show.

Organisations like International Media Support (IMS),

amarC (Wol assoco of Coy ro

Broadcasters), Internews and Reporters sans Frontires

(RSF) collaborated to produce emergency assessments

of impact on local media. They launched their own

responses, which included provision of a centre for

ssocos pp c, s

well as trauma counselling and support for staff.Initial assessments of journalists killed, injured

and traumatised were made by the Association of

Haitian Journalists (AJH) supported by IMS, who

also worked with AJH and the Ministry of Culture and

Communication to ensure that journalists received basic

humanitarian assistance such as tents. Some support

was given to replace equipment, but much of it came late

so v ll.

6 s kcic, n, mc, n, mw, n, pic. a. I evi uii hii pjc, p pic, ai 2011, dv Iisy Ii digic C, J Cwy, J.Disaster Relief 2.0:the future of information sharing in emergencies, g .

7 i yi mi, Ii sy Cii:l hii i y kig i, Jy 2011.


17/88


hoW InternatIonal aIdagenCIes resPonded

Humanitarian agencies overwhelmed by the scale

of the disaster and and for many the impact on

their own staff and ofces mostly did not prioritise

communication with affected communities. Surprisingly

few of those with a long-term presence had localKreyol

sp spospopl, los ll focss o

ol los.The result of this was also a marginalisation of the

locl . as un cs os sbls

operations at the airport, so press conferences were held

at the UN base outside the centre of town, a facility that

local journalists had difculty accessing for months

after the earthquake. Press releases, situation reports

and press conferences were all in English with few

osos pov Fc slos. gv

the lack of dedicated local communication staff, few

organisations were prepared to spend any time going to

local radio studios and giving interviews or explaining

their work.Those that did, however, found that communicating

did not just help ll the information vacuum among

ffc poplo, lv cosbl

operational benets. After the rst food distributions

proved chaotic, WFP decided that one of the best

ways to improve their system was to make sure people

understood how it worked (see case study above).

ao oso p cosbl

rewards for prioritising local communication was the

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The agency

sourced a Haitian American spokesperson with uent

Kreyolas a matter of urgency. Explicitly tasked withsppo locl coco, o o l

international media, he worked with the gender-based

volc o co bocs ss of pblc

service announcements (PSAs) with advice for victims.

Based on anecdotal feedback, UNFPA say the response

to the PSAs helped convince thePolice Nationale dHaiti

o sp p pols cps.

the storyo mr rICeI i c hii q gcy,giig g-c iii ii viv w gcg iii iiiw cic. rcii ivc iii w i yiy g , w y v g ic.t iv iii, Wpic vc y cii, i c, iq pi,

c Kreyolic iicig.

iq w iw Wp i w c i. tgCdaC hii, Wp ccwi endk, mInustah m c i i. I i , gv 150iviw, qicy c iviw w ic m ric

y c i. W yw i w iq i w vy y.h w ig icwi y g igi iig w

c y w w, y Jc Qii,Iw iici i.

t ic iiw y c iq w civ vyi i. I c cy, g ig i

g c i. dig w , civ 127 sms. p wyig I i d, w c. t c I ciy , I i v bcy i Iiv c y y c cig sms. Ici y z. I wvy i cig. I wgig sms i, c

2 I w wy w.

mc pi, Wp h Cici, i c c i i cii-ig c, ig Wp

qicy y .ti i w Wp w ig vc i w icv yw ig c . t gcy i i gig i vc w ig w ig.

a c gcy jc, m&e w ci i

w. iq pi jg iw cc iviw ci i, c sms g cii. Wi cwgig c i ,mc pi iv cici w w vi iiiig ii ip pic i ic.


18/88


t b i I I i i c p w picip i c i iii ii c i i i ii i.dImItrY leGer, unpa spokesperson

engagIng WIthhumanItarIans

Aside from projects such as ENDK, local media

reported that they found it difcult and frustrating

to engage with humanitarian organisations. From

pobls o scy un bs o

pss cofcs o l bs, y of

found humanitarian organisations hard to access when

y foo.

L o spclly col cy,

local radio in particular was sometimes unappreciative

of osos xpc o pov

for free. Having said that, two key humanitarian radio

shows ENDK and the IOM project Chimen Lakay(Kreyolfor The Way Home) are currently broadcast

fo f by p sos. a spos v vy

v opos of py fo , b o sos

were very clear that international organisations needed

o s y cocl s fo

whom air and production time are commodities.

Journalists would have welcomed further

engagement with humanitarian agencies. However,

lack of strategic working relationships between

cs locl s v, v ov

y f , spclly fo os poo

dialogue and discussion rather than just disseminating

foo.

t ii p i ciciwi bcii, wi sms cci. t i b cpip wi c i, w i b cicic.JaCQues desrosIer,General seCretarY, aJh

Cross-cuttigad system-leelcommuicatiomodels

eedBaCK and

tWo-WayCommunICatIon

O of os obl coco po

of the Haiti response was the dramatically increased

ability of survivors to interact with aid agencies

cop o ps spos. t lvls of obl

phone ownership and use (8090 percent) among

survivors was a key factor, as was the clear desire of

populations to engage with aid agencies.8 Fo xpl,

when Internews established an SMS contact number

for listeners to their ENDK radio show they received

800 messages in 24 hours. Community mobilisers also

po svvos xpc o s ponumbers, and then expected to be able to call when they

sos.

Of the agencies interviewed for this paper, few

established feedback systems within the earliest phase

of the response (with the exception of Internews).

Oxfam and World Vision International (WVI) were

among the rst, establishing feedback and community-

bs syss s p of spcy

accountability work about a month after the disaster.

Internews developed an SMS-based system with a

8 ti g vi ccig i i cc i iig -q i. Iw c cc i y2011 i g vyig i q-c wi v 85 c i c 90 c i.


19/88


sl obl po b cll co

messages through a software programme, which then

cp clo . ty locl

sff b o oo lys co. WVisbls fbc sys bs o coy

scssos (fo o o s s Cp 3). Oxf

Care lso sbls lpls fo svvos, bo

sff by sl ol sff b.

isly, y cs o s p

fbc syss xpss sos svos bo

such systems which led them to discount the idea.

Many thought that they were expensive and difcult to

manage, that agencies would be overwhelmed with calls,

that most callers would be angry and frustrated and that

it would be impossible to answer the many questions

s, l o f fso .Those who did set up feedback systems, however,

fo sc po o fs

or were more manageable than expected. While the

volume of inquiries was considerable at the start, it

was not unmanageable. Noula (see p 66 fo cs

sy) po of vy 100 clls, o were angry. As Fedrique Pierre noted in his experience

with WFP, most were happy to have made contact,

appreciative that someone was making the effort to

ls o , os of sos y s

were basic and relatively easy to log and answer. All also

found that the feedback was invaluable in assisting them

o l- foo o svvos s,

cocs pcpos.

acs o sbls fbc syss,

meanwhile, often found that like F their

community mobilisers were compensating for this

by v psol po bs o svvos, l o psol sss

fco sys fo l s

endKand theeedBaCKsystem

Vy y i jc Iw wig endki i y ic c i qiw i, ciy i vi w vig c c w ic. Ji gig c endk w ig viv w qi ic,

qi wic ji w. t ci i c sms (w ci cciy c). t y iiiy i w g y ccicig c, c sImc.

Iigy, v icii cicii w ci iig c y.

my cc i i wc, i w v, c w w w y i

c w wy i.a iiiy i i vw cciy ci i g. W w wy iig yy w ici, i

Jc Qii, Iwii ci i.

I 24 endki civ 800sms g. I w c yic cw cy. W i ok,w w w ig wi iii? i Iw . l c i c

qi w wc i. sms wc icy i wy c icy gg i c .

t cc i iw c ii qi cy cc i, jic w wi v

ii gvi c w. I w gy .I c c g y w -i j, ciy

yi w i v v jg. I i w iiiy -i .

t cc i

y w i endkv c gy iggig ic ii cc iendk gig. a i c -cigg ( w c y sms) i i iv ic c ici w y

. I wv v y i giig ig ii cii,ciy i y y wendk ig . tyi wiy i iiciy.

t i i w i i c.ev w, v y , wciv v 150 g

i y. pvyw, v hii ivig, y wi i sms qi w g ic,y c endk i.


20/88


col o b poply sppo, o s o

vl fo opos polcy .

t endk cs sy llss clly lpl

uses of a single feedback system, how important such a

system can be to the programmes audience, and how

c c sp ol ll

issues. In particular, it is worth noting that because the

ENDK feedback system was not limited to the provision

of international aid, and the system was open (people

could raise whatever issues they liked) it also provided

cl fo sos o o fos of sssc.In particular, the system was instrumental in letting

survivors know the importance of replacing personal

documents, such as birth certicates, and how to

register deaths. These were not captured as important

o sl s sssss.

A nal gap that needs to be lled is the capacity to

oo ly ys of spos. ts

point was raised by WFP, who had no capacity to track

their own campaigns, and by other CDAC staff members

who said they would have found summaries of local

news broadcasts extremely helpful. The United Nations

Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) carriedo ly oo Fc b v s

capacity was unusual and the monitoring was never

geared towards humanitarian responders. Good media

monitoring would be another very effective way of real

cp of cocs sss o svvos.

aCe-to-aCeCommunICatIon InemergenCy resPonse

The need to work fast and to reach as many

popl s possbl s cloc of s

coco cy spos fls oa question of how to work with media. Investing in

c s, sc s coy oblss, o

handle face-to-face interaction is seen as expensive, slow

ffcv.

Aid agencies who did establish teams of community

mobilisers or community liaison staff, or who were

fo o o v sc s fo bfo

the earthquake (such as Concern), however, found

s vs p off. Fsly, fc-o-fc

exchange is often the only way to share certain kinds of

information, such as practical advice on hand washing

or demonstrating how to secure a tent. Secondly, itis very much valued by survivors who often want the

cc o l v fsos. t iol

Oso fo mo (iOm) coy

unoPs and earlyuse o CommunItymoBIlIserst unops jc miiy pic

W i ig g iig ip pic g y q,wi ciy ii iiiiv. t w cig vi iviy

y i jc (c cici, cigy ycgy) i ci w.

iy ii w ci g gig cii q. ty w

cc wi ii c w j c .

i w i y wgig gv i , w w i gv, i sg mw, pgmg. W w gig qi v cvy. W w, w w c g ii.

bc unops w cig v wi c qi, i y c

ii i wi iic. t v y, jc w i iw c i c ii i.

W g ci c i w j vwig. W w ig2,000 y! I g givig ig CCCm [C Cii C mg] c ig, j yig w w wig, i mw.

Ciy ii v y v yig ycci , y j w . W v y ycci i w i i w i i , i .

l i , ciy iii c v gic unops i, viig ii ci w i c y iig ig iigi, cic ic f vi y wigy. ty c g-c cii cici cig iic w c.


21/88


mobilisation team, for example, frequently went to

cps o fcl scsso xpl pco

initiatives before they were launched as a way of keeping

sos cl coy losps soo.

For organisations without the capacity to recruit

dedicated community mobilisers, it is worth noting

that the most common need identied by mobilisers

interviewed for this research was for basic training coco. Osos col sol

provide this to any national project staff member who

interacts with communities on a regular basis, especially

to new recruits.

the role o CdaC haItI

The Haiti response saw the rst effort to tackle

coco sys lvl fo of

eld-level coordination and support mechanism

for communication with communities called CDACHaiti. It was initiated by the CDAC global network,

founded in 2009 by a group of agencies to improve

communication with disaster-affected people. CDAC

cosss of vlop osos cl

Internews, the BBC World Service Trust and IMS as well

as humanitarian aid agencies such as Save the Children

and the United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of

h affs (OCha).

Because this was CDACs rst operation, there was

no template for what CDAC Haiti should be. CDAC

ps o o fo b by p o

coordinate communication work between those global

partners who had deployed mostly specialist media

organisations and by reaching out to aid agencies.Following a request by OCHA, Internews took the role of

l cy os v.

Fo s y pc CdaC s coss-cls

service that provided access to newly-established

coco cls sc s endk, ecy

Information Service (EIS), BBC broadcasts and

MINUSTAH FM. By March, however, 1520 agencies

were participating regularly and nding the service

sfl.

CdaC h lso oo o ss sc s coo

coco cos by os s;

c coc lss; poc so pos ococo cvs; sppo pplcos

fo f; coo s sssss of locl

; poo bocs s fcs fo

CdaC hii ig, nv 2011.


22/88


Recommedatios

emergency radio programming via SMS; and developing

coc lss of locl fo s by cs.

Within a few weeks, CDAC built partnerships

with key clusters, the Ministry of Culture and

Communication and MINUSTAH, and was functioning

as an information-sharing focal point for all working

in this eld, helping to minimise duplication, ensuring

information was consistent and accurate, and

voc coosly o blf of ll cos fo b

communication with earthquake survivors.

a i w CdaC

p b iip wic i b ii p bi w p. B ip i w w wki w t c i w - cii ciw pi iw b pic.undaC CommunICatIon sta, port

au prInCe, marCh 2010

There is also no question, however, that the lack of

s of fc o cly o xc ol of

CdaC h c cofso o so ps

those with whom they sought to interact. Managing the

system also placed a considerable burden on Internews

s l cy.

Despite initial attempts, CDAC was also not

successful at connecting with the local communications

sector, including telecoms companies. However given

the experimental nature of CDAC, the fact that few

participants had any prior knowledge of Haiti and

the extreme environment in which the responsewas launched, this is understandable. The Haiti

experience does however underscore the need to

bo coco s psps

s p of cy spos pl ss

risk reduction work at country level, to ensure the

cocvy c pp s soo s possbl (fo o o

CdaC s Cp 4).

I ii i, igf

cici w ii iiy. ti icig -i icci ig c i vic. ti iiy v vig w c,ciy y gii wi iig c c i-cy / i civii y w w.

t ii y f

ii gci cgi ic cici c i c cc i ivy ii ic. I cic,i:

Reorming humanitarian unding criteria to

include communication work as a legitimate

orm o humanitarian assistance (both in

terms o standalone projects and as an

integrated part o technical operations),

particularly CERF and ERRF.

Prioritising the provision o inormation to

aected communities at cluster level during a

response.

Implementing key recommendations below

or individual agencies, including providing

technical support and resources or

communication rom the very earliest days o

a response.

Developing ways o listening to and analysing

eedback rom survivors

a cii cif cici i i i i i gci vi ici, vi ci cc ii, ii y ivciv cici wi ccii.


23/88


or medIadeveloPmentorganIsatIons

dv .f mi vgii v i c ic i ci, c iiy iigiiiiv y w y c v.

egcy ig.f t cici

c w gy yig gcy , cc gcy ig cic Cer. a i c i , i civiiiy i i c wi .

s c i.f egcy i ccic c ci :

Replacing basic technical equipment and

providing technical capacity to repair what is

difcult to replace (such as transmitters).

Providing basic humanitarian assistance to

sta (tents, ood, water, psychosocial support).

Supporting agencies should work with

humanitarian agencies to source such supplies

rather than seek to procure or manage them

themselves.

Access to supplies such as uel or generators

(either through cash grants or closer workingrelations with the Logistics Cluster).

Providing support services to acilitate

production, including Internet access, mobile

phone credit, support with transport etc.

G ig ic.f e

cici c i ciw cig yigw vivig i wi cic, j g ic i. cii giv c. pi i, , w qy ii ihii i c w icy i w i icw y ifi, viig i y i w i.

or humanItarIanorganIsatIons

pvi cic fcici wi c cii . ei ci i icii/ i w, ci c cici iiy cicywi ig i-cy cici.

lc gg.f m cici i c ic gg vi i.

ei w-wy cicifci .e i sms/w- g i, ivc g c c c.

p g cici wf ig jc ig.

Iv i ciy ii c--fc cici cciy .

Ic wi- i i iii f- i. l ic c, usb , cg c., ig i i ic cic ci g c w.


24/88


THIS CHAPTER WILL LOOK

coco spos o col

outbreak in October 2010. Starting with an

analysis of key tools, the chapter will then look

at how the cholera information campaign played out

at eld level and outline the lessons learnt for greater

impact and for future responses. In particular, it will

focus on the importance of listening, of work that

exposed the gulf between Haitian and international

pcpos of col, opol pc of

ffcv coco.

As well as describing the cholera response, this

chapter will lay out some of the key aspects of the

communication work around cholera, identifying

strengths and weaknesses in approach. It will also

note the value of investment not just in communication

capacity but also in research, as a way of capturing

perceptions, allowing campaigns to evolve, and of

pc.

Chapter 2Respodig tothe choleraemergecy

Key IndIngs

t iig cicifcciy i cy, iic jcv q,w i i cig wi ii cig.

C y v fw i i hii, iw i g c ivicig ig,i ic ic iicc.

pic ii fgig w cic icc iic, i y c i ci i.

c--cf

cici, ig iig w ciicyi c iciv ic ciw c.

t civf icw w qicy c yi gii c

ig iv ii.

eciv c yfiv y v:gig c iici ci iig cc, c c iy, c c im&e.

Wi c icfci cig cvi icvi , iiv yw iv cc cii c c .


25/88


Cholera ad thehumaitariarespose

hs col ob b o of

St Marc, a small town in Artibonite in late October

2010 and was ofcially conrmed four days into the

pc o Ocob 21s. By apl 2010, of

a million people had developed symptoms, an ofcial

gure certain to be lower than the real number due to

difculties of accurate data collection in rural areas.The outbreak was unexpected as Haiti had no history

of col s sssss c o by

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention after the

earthquake had identied the chances of a cholera

outbreak as low.

From an operational point of view, the

communication response to cholera is the story of how

so y of syss socs s p f

bc cclly po. Osos

that had invested in communication work such as IFRC

iOm cpcy ools sposl

could be mobilised within hours and which becamecentral to the response. Several organisations had teams

of experienced community mobilisers who were able to

begin mass face-to-face cholera prevention work within

ys.

Radio projects such as ENDK, Chimen Lakay

the IFRC broadcasts on Radio 1 were well established,

with experienced staff and audiences that trusted them

as information sources. The Hygiene Promotion Sub

Cls b cps fo svl os,

s os fo c popl

in basic hygiene. And while Haiti had not experienced

col ob bfo, fc ss s

well understood, easy to prevent and easy to treat meanty sss col b cly vlop s p-

existing global consensus on how to handle the disease.

i o, spos ly

dedicated communication coordination mechanism

CdaC h.

Advocacy for communication work was also made

f s by fc col s cos by

s s pblc foo cy.

The dramatic difference in the speed with which

communication projects were developed, resources

obls sol co o

communication work compared to the earthquakeresponse was marked.

t s co of msy of

Public Health was also a factor, particularly in ensuring

cosscy of y sss by sbls c

Co fo dvlop L mls,

and leveraging many existing relationships with

ps.

nvlss, col spos l

how, despite considerable efforts and groundbreaking

work within the sector, the public information capacity

available to humanitarian response was still inadequate.

CDAC Haiti, still an experimental initiative, with only

three staff and no formal status yet, was expected to play

ol of fll-scl cls. t hl Cls l cpcy xps cls lvl.

Cholera ad mediatechology

The cholera outbreak also came at a time when many

of colocl foo-s ovos

sbls h f , bco flly-

edged partnerships.iFrC iOm b os foo blss

with the key messages, developed by the Ministry of

Public Health and partners. IFRC also uploaded cholera

foo o o *733 l. a s

, msy of Cl Coco

established a call centre in partnership with Digicel.

dcl lso sbls b of ls s

of ov, cl b o cll fo

collco of bos o fo blc

services. Digicel also developed a system whereby

subscribers who travelled through cholera hotspots

were automatically sent an SMS with a warning andvc.

It is difcult to compare the experiences of the two

call centre systems one automated (IFRC), one with

C cig i. CopYrIGht Who


26/88


ls sff by ploys (msy of Cl

Communication) as neither carried out any kind of

vlo sys. acol vc sss

msy of Cl Cocos *300 b

was hard to get through on, given that only four people

were taking calls at the beginning. Call centre staff

were oriented on cholera prevention and response

during Ministry of Public Health press conferences

while questions asked on the helpline were fed directly

bc o pss cofcs so y col b pblcly

ss by xps.1

Once again, however, the technology experience

col focs poc of ls

vlop cpcy o l sos. iFrC po130,000 clls ol o icv Voc rspos

system, promoted via SMS, although there is no way

at present to gauge how many of those people felt the

information on the system reected their needs. Digicel

reported that their SMS blasts, in partnership with the

Ministry of Public Health, resulted in large numbers of

people calling the Digicel customer call centre, which

overwhelmed staff not trained on cholera. The Noula

system had a similar experience, with call centre

operations staff put in the position of having to answer

questions on a disease with no technical background or

sppo.

W w c c c. Pp c k, w i c? W I w f?...Pp i i .daVId sharpe, head o produCts atdIGICel

Choleraad local media

As with the earthquake, the local media response

was swift. Radio 1 broadcast a special two-hour

po, s foo fo lobl WhO

website, the day before the ofcial conrmation of

cholera. The Ministry of Public Health was also quick

o p o o spos sb o locl

1 Iviw wi Ji si, usaId cic miiy C Cici, mc 3 2011.

journalists, and from the start held daily press briengs

with experts present to answer questions. Many radio

sos bocs pss cofc lv

every day. Stations like Radio 1 also acted on their

own initiative, commissioning local artists to record

messages and PSAs about cholera prevention and cure.

On other stations, especially local broadcasters who

lss ccss o cc foo, ly

of information was in some cases much lower, with

rumours and misunderstandings nding their way onto

the airwaves.

Local media could, however, be resistant to requests

fo f , fo po o

spots. This was partly because the cholera epidemicstruck just before the election, and many stations had

ly p-sol o cs,

valuable revenue (this was particularly an issue in

Artibonite). Other stations were happy to broadcast

Ministry of Public Health spots, although there were

logistical challenges in delivering PSAs to stations.

Training in cholera and reporting was also made

vlbl o locl vy cly o

initiative by the United Nations Educational, Scientic

and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and AJH. Both

organisations found medical staff in all major Haitian

cities that could brief local media. This was mostlyos o psol cocs losps

bl o CdaC h. aJh lso co

previous disaster risk reduction training for media was

useful for cholera, as journalists were able to leverage

ov cocs vlop .2

Radio was of primary value to the cholera response.

O ps t nv l govs, fo

example, described how he had rst heard about

cholera from listening to his radio the only one in

vll. rcos cy of so,

cl col foo s sos. ul

IOM community mobilisers reached the town in early

December, the priests sermons were the only source offoo fo popl.

The iewrom the feld

In line with classic public health education

ooloy, col cp h focss

o fy y sss bo pvo

2 Jcq di, G scy aJh, iviw mc 23 2011.


27/88


spos o s y popl s

possbl v s y cls s possbl. t

foo ss oo cl ccl

foo, pclly o psol cos (

washing, water purication, symptom identication)

and packaged it in a way intended to make it easy to

understand and implement. Posters, radio, TV, SMS and

community mobilisers were the primary channels for

sso of foo.

i pcc, s ppoc los. t

fc h v xpc col bfo

led many organisations to think they were starting

from a zero sum of knowledge of cholera. In practice,hs s xs cll, los socl

beliefs to interpret the disease. While cholera was

medically new, Haitis narratives of disease (especially

hiV), fc coy by oss

sppo cy spos ll sp

ly pcpos of col s cos

o . ts fs lly s fsl o blv

cholera was a disease and that it was a deliberate

p by oss o ll hs.

The practical consequences of this were considerable.

Fo xpl, 200-b col c

St Marc, which was built to relieve the overcrowdedlocal hospital, was burnt to the ground by the local

community two days after it was completed. This

pattern was quickly repeated elsewhere, with

communities preventing construction, taking down or

c xs fcls. t sspo col

was not an illness led to the belief that it was a voodoo

curse. By December, 45 male and female voodoo priests

b lyc f b bl fo sp

cholera deliberately, most of them in the South.3

Such incidents, especially the rejection of the

col cs, c

coy by sps. t cy of so

o sbls cs s cly

s possbl, y osos

assumed that communities would understand that these

facilities were intended to help, and had not explainedor discussed them with surrounding communities.

The nature and function of the centres were also not

ss y of ly ss, lo s

changed after the incident in St Marc.

Oc col popl obsv los

all patients who went for treatment recovered, their

s sf. ts llss fo

communication work to evolve and adapt according

o ccscs, o l fo ps of

response. Evidence from the eld suggests that those

osos oo o lo-bs ppoc

o coco, sc s h r Coss

3 hii g c i-v ycig,Reuters, dc 23 2010.

hrC andPerCePtIons oCholera

a w w i c hrC

ycci ci ici cwi i i c i q-c w y w y wig.

ag i civiy w cc c, hrC i vii w cig ici cig i i g.o ic i w c ici ci c w y wi ciic iy c, wy i w ig i icii cig.

t hrC ici v iiv c w cy i. ty g y iv i cii y c v i , i i i cig ci. ty qy hiiKreyolyig mi y yiy(ic i hii).

hii w cicci, i ig

ic i i c. pici ii i iigii wig q c y wi ivig i c y y i.

ycci civ, hrC ii ivig c i ci j c, y ciii ig wy v c i. ti vy cqc: c c w jc, w w ic, cv w w g i ccwi i, w igi, civ w c. t y i ig g i w iig ciiiy ig

gii cyig ii cig.t y cc nGo iiy c civ i c wig ii, i c iy, y cci ci i. a , hrC ycci w cicyi wi i. hrC v iciy c cici, wic ivv ig cci g civ iig c.


28/88


(HRC), were better placed to understand and respond to

reactions to cholera. It was also clear that treating these

misperceptions as just simple misinformation was also

o spos, s s fl o cos

the validity of the Haitian worldview. To miss this

crucial point was to misunderstand the nature of the

coco cll ly.

Osos oo ls ppoc

were able to improve the impact of their response

pos. to cob sso pv

-fco, C r Coss (CrC)

col c Cfo

introduced a phone follow-up system for discharged

patients, to ensure they continued to follow advice aboutpv -fco. as sl, y v cv

cvs lvl of lss 2 pc.4

How eectiewas the choleracommuicatio

campaig?evl ovll coco ffo ocholera is extremely difcult, and isolating the impact of

any specic intervention almost impossible: too many

organisations were involved and too many techniques

used. This holistic approach, however, was at least part

of the reason the campaign was judged effective by

almost all interviewees. Community mobilisers also said

the fact that the same information was available from so

many sources and was thus repeated to communities in

so many different ways was extremely helpful.

t ii w ik i i pp w.InterVIeWee

In Haiti, two particular models of measuring impact

: u nos Cls F (uniCeF),

who carried out a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices

(KAP) study in January/February 2011, and CDAC

Haiti, which coordinated a multi-agency study of cholera

knowledge levels in November 2010. Internews also

carried out research that was published in June 2011.

4 evi Ci r C c c i C yi c, i, ai 2011.

an IntegratedaPProaCh toCommunICatIon:Cholera and themInIstry o PuBlIChealtht miiy pic h i hii g icici c i w c. t cc w y c ii i

aii wii w y ,wi ii .

C miiy pic h w i q iy ig.evy y, iiy c iy iii g, i g i gv vi . ty ivi un nGo , i icig c w c wcic qi i. I ic,y ic y qi y hiiig c gv *300 ci y c w i ic y .

t cc w iyc iv c y i w vii ci i nv 14.t miiy pic h gi v- i g c, y pi pv, wic w cc y w.

by nv 10 miiy pic h v w v 12i , wi iii g gComatel c ji.1 t iiy w wi digic sms ci ci , wi gig y IrC i i sms jc wi Vi.

ty ii i ii wi miiy C Cici, ig c ci. ti w i iiiy y w vi c, w w c cii.

ai qi ig c i cc, i vi ic i cici.

1 t , wv, w wi : i ic wc ci v wy ii c w, v ci yi y. ti i c ig i wi i ic, i c c i g cii gci.


29/88


alos foly, ppoc o

impact was a classic baseline/endline methodology,

which looked for retention and action on the key

sss poo by col foo

cp. t vc pov by hrC pp

and discussions with medical staff and communitymobilisers suggest that this was not adequate as an

approach, with little scope for identifying key barriers to

bvo c fo h pspcv.

The ways in which operational staff commented on

pc of foo cp, fo xpl,

were very different from those benchmarks used by

coco xps. Coy oblss s

they knew the campaign was working when families

b vs col ps ospl (f y

ovc l f of ss). mcl sff,

meanwhile, judged effectiveness in terms of drops in the

number of patients with advanced symptoms arrivingat treatment centres: those who recognised symptoms

and knew what to do came earlier and thus were easier

o o lly o svv, cl

work easier. While anecdotal, such information clearly

s vl s co of cp ffcvss

it would be useful to nd a way to use such systems in

evaluations of communication projects.

This given, the data available does show that thecoco cp scc ly y

basic ideas. The ndings of UNICEFs KAP survey, for

example, show that the vast majority of people now

know the basics of cholera. The CDAC Haiti survey

lso fo 76 pc of spos fl

information available on cholera was satisfactory.5

However, both studies found that more detailed

knowledge of prevention and cure of cholera was patchy.6

5 CdaC i vy ic cici cig c, hii, nv/dc 2010.

6 CdaC hii wi 63 c i y w w yi , y 40 c w cc ci unICey (cc igy ) i g c 18 c.

hii c gi, mc 2011.


30/88


t ic ig- c.Even in a public inrmatin emergency such as

chlera, a dialgue-based apprach that priritises

understanding lcal perceptins the disease,

cllects eedback and is able t respnd quickly t

changing levels understanding is mre eective

than a ne-way, ne-t-many public inrmatin

campaign. The apprach needs t be systematic and

clearly articulated, with channels r eedback t fw

back int decisin making and prject design.

u c c. Mre ertneeds t be made early n in such campaigns t

iterate lcal perceptins int the cmmunicatinrespnse. Peple act n what they perceive t be

true, and attempts t infuence behaviur withut

understanding the wider cntext will therere be

limited. Studies such as the HRC paper are essential,

and strng cluster leadership t make sure that such

ndings are shwcased and acted upn culd als

make a dierence.

m y g cy i. Thecase r develping cnsensus at glbal level

arund key messages n issues such as chlera is

clear, and the imprtance cnsistent messaging

at eld level is vital. But it is als imprtant t

remember that all inrmatin needs t be culturally

cntextualised: a prcess nt just designing lcally

apprpriate materials, but als understanding

lcal perceptins and cncerns that d s much

t determine the extent t which peple react t

inrmatin.

rii. Even the mst basic inrmatinneeded t be repeated ver and ver again, and this

need cntinues tday. Even six mnths ater the

utbreak, the IFRC radi shw was still receiving

basic questins n chlera, and many cmmunitymbilisers identied the time bere the 2011 rainy

seasn as a key perid t reinrce messages.

mgig c fi. Whilebasic inrmatin regarding chlera may appear

simple, in practice prductin key messages was

dicult. General inrmatin had t cver several

areas: preventin, identicatin symptms, and

treatment. Subsequent t this, urther messaging

was develped in respnse t emerging prblems,

particularly arund the issue chlera treatment

centres and stigmatisatin survivrs. Inrmatin

als had t be lcally specic. Systems rdevelping messaging need t be fexible t ensure

new messages and guidance can be generated and

shared quickly this is essential in an emergency

envirnment.

t i. Hwever urgent the situatin, it isclear that ailing t test print materials adequately

bere ging int prductin is a mistake as it is s

dicult t rectiy errrs nce materials are prduced.

As demnstrated in the case ther cmmunicatin

materials in Haiti, testing materials, especially in

emergency situatins, des nt necessarily require

ull cus grup methdlgy. Simply asking r

inrmal eedback rm lcal sta, drivers and

cmmunity mbilisers can be sucient t identiy

basic prblems.

miig vi. M&E shuld be clselycnnected t the issue eedback. While thestandard apprach t measuring impact is thrugh

cnventinal evaluatin methdlgies, these have

sme imprtant limitatins in the cntext chlera.

Firstly, baseline data in an emergency is extremely

hard t cllect and is rarely an peratinal pririty.

Secndly, the ndings tend t be static, resulting in

snapsht studies published at the beginning and

end prjects, rather than the cnstantly updated

inrmatin systems needed t guide a ast mving

respnse acrss a wide gegraphical area. There

is als the add

ann kite yo pale - best practice in communication haiti 2010

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