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SpecialIssue
TheManyFatesofLegalPositivism
IsPostPositivismPossible?
ByKarenPetroski*
A. Introduction
In some of his last publishedworks,NeilMacCormick began to refer to his theoretical
positionaspostpositivist.1 Inlightofthewidelyperceivedlimitationsofthepositivist
label, this selfidentification might seem prudent.2 Was it anything more? Was
MacCormickspositionreallypostpositivist? Inthispaper,Iarguethatitwasnot,butthat
thisneednotbeviewedasafailingofMacCormickswork,sincethereisasenseinwhich
modern jurisprudence cannot and need not hope to become generally postpositivist.
More specifically, given the institutional context inwhich legal scholarship isproduced,
positivism is likely to be an inevitable (if not necessarily dominant)mode of theorizing
aboutlaw. Yetmuchinformativeworkremainstobedoneunderthepositivistrubricnot
justalongthelinessuggestedbyMacCormick,butalongothersaswell.
My ultimate point concerns the institutional possibility and desirability of a shift to a
theoreticalpositioncalledpostpositivism. Addressingthispointrequiresmetotakea
positionnotonlyonwhatthatphrasemeans,butalsoonwhatlegalpositivismitselfis. As
aresult,inthispaper,Irecapitulateaspectsofthedebatesregardingthenatureoridentity
oflegalpositivism,butIalsoaddresstopicsbeyondthetraditionalscopeofthosedebates.
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Andrs Jakab, Jrgen Busch, Otto
Pfersmann,andThomasBustamanteforvaluableinput. Email:kpetrosk@slu.edu
1SeeNEILMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONSOFLAW:ANESSAYINLEGALTHEORY(2007)[hereinafterMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS];
NEILMACCORMICK,H.L.A.HART(2007)[hereinafterMACCORMICK,HART].
2See,e.g.,KentGreenawalt,TooThinandTooRich: DistinguishingFeaturesofLegalPositivism,inTHEAUTONOMY
OFLAW: ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM1,8(RobertP.Georgeed.,1996)(notinguseofpositivismlabelforsummary
condemnation);FrederickSchauer,PositivismasPariah, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM31,
35;Wilfrid J.Waluchow, TheMany Faces of Legal Positivism, 48U. TORONTO L.J. 387, 390 (1998) (discussing
meaningless[ness]
of
debates
within
legal
positivism).
Much
of
twentieth
century
positivist
legal
theory
has
soughttoredeemthetermfromitsuseasanepithet. See,e.g.,H.L.A.Hart,PositivismandtheSeparationofLaw
andMorals, 71HARV. L. REV.593, 61521 (1957) (discussingpostWorldWar II critique of legalpositivismby
Radbruch, among others); ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2, 23 (1998) (discussing
derogatoryuseofpositivistlabel).
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[Vol.12No.02664 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lMydiscussionhas important limitations. First, sinceMacCormickswork ismypointof
departure,IfocusontheAngloAmericanlegalpositivisttraditionwithinwhichhewrote.3
ThecontinentaltraditionoflegalpositivismassociatedinthetwentiethcenturywithHans
Kelsen lies largely beyond the scope of my argument. Second, my focus is on the
institutionalconditionsofproductionoflegaltheories,ratherthanonassessmentoftheir
content. Thisessay isnotacontributiontopositivist jurisprudence,although itarguably
buildsona tradition that ispositivist inamoregeneral sense. Finally,my thesis is the
modest one that, as long as the current institutional conditions of legal and academic
endeavors persist, some form of legal positivism is also likely to persist,making post
positivismdifficult toattain. Idonotargue thatall,orevenmost, legal theorymustbe
positivist.
Mydiscussionhasthreemainsections. SectionBseekstoclarifythenatureofthe legal
positivism
beyond
which
MacCormick
sought
to
move
and
the
reasons
for
his
desire
to
movebeyondit. Iamhardlythefirstpersontoconsiderthequestionofthenatureoflegal
positivism; in SectionB.I, I describe some previous efforts to address it, identifying the
principal areas of overlap of these efforts. (I call these prior attempts to identify the
natureof legalpositivismsecondorderaccounts,becausetheyarenotaccountsofthe
natureoflawassuch,butrathertheoreticalaccountsofotherfirstorderaccountsofthe
natureof law.) Thesecondorderaccounts IconsiderinSectionB.Isuggestthatapplying
thepositivistlabeltoatheoryoflawhasbeenconsideredappropriatewhenthetheory
characterizesitssubjectmatterinaparticularway. IconcludeSectionBbyexaminingwhy
themovebeyondpositivismmight seemattractive toa legal theorist,given thecontext
withinwhich such theoristsproduce their theories, and the relatedquestionofwhat it
mightmeantobepostpositivist.
SomeofthesecondorderaccountsIconsidernotethatthefirstorderlegaltheoriesthey
discuss seem to share important features with the subject matter, law, for which the
theoriesseektoaccount. InSectionC,Iconsiderthisparallelfromadifferentperspective.
I argue that given the modern institutional setting of scholarly activity, something
resembling thepositivistmodeof inquiry,anddebatesover itsproprietyanddetailswill
alwaysbepartoflegaltheory. Indeed,theexistenceofpositivistlegaltheoryappearsto
be a product of social and institutional forces very similar to those engendering the
features identifiedby legalpositivistsascharacteristicof legalsystems. Inthissection, I
alsobrieflyexplorehow thisargument clarifies theworkofmajor figures in theAnglo
American positivist tradition. I conclude Section C by considering some potential
objectionstomyargument;SectionDaddressesanotherpotentialobjectionthat if it is
notpossibletomovebeyondpositivism,legaltheoristswillrunoutofinterestingquestions
to
investigate.
In
fact,
legal
positivism
has
important
contributions
to
make
to
other
areas
of legal scholarship. In SectionD, I examine two areas inwhich a positivistinfluenced
3 SeeNEILMACCORMICK&OTAWEINBERGER,AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORYOF LAW: NEWAPPROACHES TO LEGALPOSITIVISM
(1986)(identifyingMacCormickswork,incontrasttoWeinbergers,asintheBritishtraditionoflegalpositivism).
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vocabularycouldenrichdebatesproceeding,andperhapsstalling,withoutthebenefitof
thatvocabulary.
B. DefiningPositivismandPostPositivism
Attemptstoclarifythenatureoflegalpositivismhavemultipliedinrecentdecades. Inthis
section I examine the general landscapeof these attempts at clarification and some of
theirlimitations.
Assuggestedabove,accountsoflegalpositivismmaybeconsideredexamplesofsecond
order legal theory, since they theorize about the nature of firstorder theories, those
concernedwith thenatureof law itself. SectionB.Ioffers something like a thirdorder
accountof these secondorder theories,describing first theirgeneralcharacteristicsand
then
their
main
points
of
agreement
on
the
nature
of
legal
positivism.
From
this
agreement,Idrawasetofconsensusattributesoflegalpositivismmyownsecondorder
accountof legal positivism. In SectionB.II, Idistinguishmy account from a fewof the
accounts towhich itmay seem to bear some superficial similarities. In Section B.III, I
consider thepossible reasons for seeking to avoid the positivist label, asMacCormick
appearstohavedone.
I. ExistingAccountsofLegalPositivism
1. TypesofSecondOrderAccount
Sincetheearly1980s,thevolumeofAngloAmericancommentaryonthenatureof legal
positivismitselfhasincreasedsignificantly.4 Individualexamplesofthiscommentaryhave
variedaimsandcharacteristics. Some,forexample,appearaspreamblestoneworrevised
theoriesofthenatureoflaw,whichneednotthemselvesbepositivist. Inthesecondhalf
ofthetwentiethcentury,thistypeofworkhasbeendonebyH.L.A.Hart,RonaldDworkin,
JosephRaz,andMacCormick,tonameonlysomeofthemostnotablefigures. Whilethese
accounts of legal positivism have a critical, normative component, others are more
descriptive, aiming mainly to clarify the landscape of theories of law or to correct
misapprehensionsaboutsuchtheories.
4 These decadesweremarked, for example, by thepublicationofmonographson legalpositivism andmany
symposiaandanthologieson the topic. See,e.g.,TOMCAMPBELL,THE LEGALTHEORYOFETHICALPOSITIVISM (1996);
HARTSPOSTSCRIPT: ESSAYSONTHEPOSTSCRIPTTOTHECONCEPTOFLAW (JulesColemaned.,2001) [hereinafterHARTS
POSTSCRIPT]; RUTH GAVISON, ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART (1987) [hereinafter ISSUES IN
JURISPRUDENCE];THEAUTONOMYOF LAW: ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM (RobertP.Georgeed.,1996) [hereinafterTHE
AUTONOMY
OF
LAW];
POSITIVISM
TODAY
(Stephen
Guest
ed.,
1996);
MATTHEW
KRAMER,
IN
DEFENSE
OF
LEGAL
POSITIVISM:
LAWWITHOUTTRIMMINGS (1999);GERALD J.POSTEMA,BENTHAMANDTHECOMMONLAWTRADITION(1986);SEBOK,supra
note 2;WILFRIDWALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994); Symposium: TheHartFullerDebateAt Fifty, 83
N.Y.U.L.REV.993(2008). Manyotherinstancesofsecondorderaccountsoflegalpositivismbytheseauthorsand
othersappearedasstandalonearticlesandarecitedinthefootnotestothisSection.
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[Vol.12No.02666 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l
Oneapproachcommoninthisworkusestheidiomsofanalyticphilosophy,explaininglegal
positivismasamatterofconceptualcommitmenttoparticulartheses. IfHartinitiatedthe
twentiethcenturylinkbetweenanalyticphilosophyandlegaltheory,5Dworkinappearsto
haveinitiatedthisthesisbasedapproachinhisearlycritiquesofHart.6 Theobjectivesof
this kind ofwork are consistentwith the conventions of philosophicalwriting, but still
diverse; indeed, the heterogeneity of the debates in this area is often cited as a good
reason to try tomovebeyondpositivism.7 Thus, someworkof this kinddrawson the
thesespurportedlyunderlying the legalpositivistposition inorder todemonstrate their
incoherence,8 their identitywithnatural law theses,
9or, froma lesscriticalperspective,
their logicalentailments.10
Otherworkstresseseitherthesuperiordescriptivepowerof
thetheses11
ortheirabsenceofdescriptivepower.12
5 SeeNicola Lacey,Analytical JurisprudenceVersusDescriptive SociologyRevisited,84TEX. L.REV.945,94750
(2006).
6SeeRonaldM.Dworkin,TheModelofRules,35U.CHI.L.REV.14,1718(1967)describingastheskeletonof
legalpositivismasthreecentralandorganizingpropositions.
7Seeinfranotes4445andaccompanyingtext.
8 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HARTS
POSTSCRIPT,supranote4,at99;DavidDyzenhaus,PositivismsStagnantResearchProgramme,20OXFORDJ.LEGAL
STUD.703(2000);JohnFinnis,Onthe IncoherenceofLegalPositivism,75NOTREDAMEL.REV.1597(2000);Klaus
Fueer,FarewelltoLegalPositivism: TheSeparationThesisUnravelling,inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,
at119,152;Gerald J.Postema,CoordinationandConventionat theFoundationsofLaw,11 J.LEGALSTUD.165
(1982).
9See,e.g.,BrianBix,OntheDividingLineBetweenNaturalLawandLegalPositivism,75NOTREDAMEL.REV.1613,
1624 (2000) (suggesting that positivists differ from one another as much as they differ from naturallaw
theorists); TimothyA.O.Endicott,HerbertHart and the Semantic Sting, 4 LEGAL THEORY283 (1998) (describing
overlapofassumptionsbetweenHartandDworkin);PhilipSoper,SearchingforPositivism,94MICH.L.REV.1739
(1996) (review of WALUCHOW, supra note 4); Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HARTS
POSTSCRIPT,supranote4,410.
10See,e.g.,MatthewD.Adler,ConstitutionalFidelity, theRuleofRecognition,and theCommunitarianTurn in
ContemporaryPositivism,75FORDHAML.REV.1671(2006)(exploringnatureoftheconventionsregardingaruleof
recognitionthatmustexistintheU.S.constitutionalorder);JulesColeman,NegativeandPositivePositivism,11J.
LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); KRAMER, supra note 4; Andrei Marmor, The Separation Thesis and the Limits of
Interpretation,12CAN.J.L.&JURIS.135(1999).
11See,e.g.,FrederickSchauer&VirginiaJ.Wise,LegalPositivismasLegal Information,82CORNELLL.REV.1080,
108788,1092(1997);FrederickSchauer,TheLimitedDomainoftheLaw,90VA.L.REV.1909,195154(2004).
12
See,
e.g.,
David
Dyzenhaus,
The
Demise
of
Legal
Positivism?,
119
HARV.
L.
REV.
F.
112
(2006);
Robert
P.
George,
NaturalLawandPositiveLaw, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at321; JeffreyD.Goldsworthy,TheSelf
DestructionofLegalPositivism,10OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.449(1990);LeslieGreen,PositivismandConventionalism,
12CAN. J.L.&JURISPRUDENCE35(1999);GeraldJ.Postema,JurisprudenceasPracticalPhilosophy,4LEGALTHEORY
329(1998);PhilipSoper,LawsNormativeClaims,inTheAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at215.
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Theothersetofprominentacademicconventions followedbyaccountsofthenatureof
legalpositivismare thoseassociatedwith theworkof legaland socialhistorians. Some
genealogicalaccountsofthiskinddescribeacoherentlegalpositivisttradition,restingon
anessentialcontinuityofattitude,method,vocabulary,orconceptualcommitmentamong
thoseselfidentifiedordescribedaslegalpositivists.13
Otherspointtotheincoherenceof
the positions espoused by the same figureseither to deny the absence of any such
tradition,awayofconfirmingclaimsaboutthemeaninglessnessofthepositivistlabel,14
or topointoutparticular theoristsmisinterpretationsof theirpredecessorspositions,a
wayofredescribingthetradition.15
Whilesomeoftheseaccountsfocusonaspectsofthe
institutionalsettingwithinwhichparticularlegaltheoristshavewritten,16
nonerelatesthat
contexttothedebatesaboutlegalpositivismitselfinanysustainedway.
2.
Where
Second
Order
Accounts
Agree
Astheabovediscussionsuggests,theoreticalaccountsoflegalpositivismdisagreeonmany
points. Theydonotonlydisagree about the academic conventions according towhich
legaltheoryshouldbedone,ortheotherdisciplinaryresources itshoulddrawon. They
disagree about the nature of legal theory itself, and about whether positivism is a
13 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and theNature of Jurisprudential
Debate, 12 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 17 (1999) (tracing legal positivism to Hobbes); Owen M. Fiss, The Varieties of
Positivism,90YALEL.J.1007(1981);JohnGardner,LegalPositivism: 51/2Myths,46AM.J.JURIS.199(2001);Neil
MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for AMoralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Stephen Perry, Harts
Methodological Positivism, inHARTS POSTSCRIPT, supra note 4, at 311; Kevin Toh,Harts Expressivism and His
Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL THEORY 75 (2005);William Twining,General and Particular JurisprudenceThree
ChaptersinaStory,inPOSITIVISMTODAY,supranote4,at119;JeremyWaldron,AllWeLikeSheep,12CAN.J.L.&
JURIS.169(1999).
14 See,e.g.,DeryckBeyleveld&RogerBrownsword,NormativePositivism: TheMirageof theMiddleWay, 9
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.462,462 (1989) (concluding thatmodern normativepositivism is incoherent);David
Dyzenhaus, The Genealogy of Legal Positivism, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2004); Andrew Halpin, The
MethodologyofJurisprudence: ThirtyYearsoffthePoint,19CAN.J.LAW&JURIS.67(2006).
15 See, e.g., James Allan, AModest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003); Brian Leiter, Beyond the
Hart/DworkinDebate: TheMethodologyProbleminJurisprudence,48AM.J.JURIS.17(2003);DavidLyons,Review,
Principles,Positivism, and Legal Theory,87 YALE L.J.415, 42425 (1977);Michael S.Moore,HartsConcluding
Scientific Postscript, 4 LEGAL THEORY 301 (1998); Schauer, supra note 2, at 31; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The
ContemporaryRelevanceofLegalPositivism,32AUST.J.LEG.PHIL.1(2007).
16See,e.g.,MartinKrygier,TheConceptofLawandSocialTheory,2OXFORD J.LEGALSTUD.155,15567 (1982);
Lacey,supranote5,at94749;AndrewLewis,LegalPositivismSomeLessonsfromLegalHistory, inPOSITIVISM
TODAY, supra note 4, at 65, 6773; Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and NineteenthCentury English
Jurisprudence,12J.LEGALHIST.58,6175(1991);Twining,supranote13,at119,12331.
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[Vol.12No.02668 Ge rman L aw J ou rna ldescriptiveornormativetheory.
17 Theyalsodisagreeonthepreciseboundariesof legal
positivism (such aswhetherRonaldDworkinmaybe consideredapositivist).18 And,of
course, theydisagreeonwhether legalpositivism,howeverunderstood, isdescriptively
true or theoretically coherentor useful. Despite all of this disagreement, there is also
implicitagreementamongtheseaccountsaboutcertainfeaturesoflegalpositivism. These
areasofoverlapare,however,differentfromthose,suchastheseparabilitythesis19
or
thesourcesthesis,oftenassociatedwithlegalpositivism.20
First, all seem to agree that to the legal positivist (and perhaps to any legal theorist,
positivist or not), law can be differentiated from other things that exist.21
(Of course,
certainlegaltheoristsnearlyuniversallyunderstoodnottobepositivistsalsosubscribeto
this view.22
I return to thequestionofwhether thesepointsuniquelydistinguish legal
positivistsbelow.) Second,positivistsaredescribedasagreeingthatanimportantaspect
of
law
is
its
character
as
a
social
phenomenon
made
up
of
interrelated
communicative
acts
involving the identificationandprovisionof reasons foraction. Inotherwords, law isa
discursiveandnormativesystem.23
Third,asaresultofthesefirsttwopremises,second
orderaccountsseem toagree thattothe legalpositivist,thesystemof lawhas limits; it
doesnotcoincidewiththeuniverseofexperienceorthe full rangeoforderedbehavior.
Different accounts put this point in different ways. Some focus on the phenomenon
17 See,e.g.,DeryckBeyleveld&RogerBrownsword,ThePracticalDifferenceBetweenNaturalLawTheoryand
LegalPositivism,5OXFORD J.LEGALSTUD.1,31 (1985) (arguing thattheultimate reason forchoosingbetween
naturallawtheoryandpositivismisnotthemoralreasonbutthereasonoftheoreticalsuperiority).
18Dworkincharacterizedhis theoryasageneralattackonpositivism.Dworkin,supranote6,at20;seealso
Dyzenhaus, supranote8,at712, 716 (noting thataDworkinian judgewouldnotbea legalpositivist). But
othershavearguedthatDworkinisneverthelessalegalpositivistinsomesense. See,e.g.,Leiter,supranote15,
at27;Perry,supranote13,at317;StephenPerry,TheVarietiesofLegalPositivism,9CAN.J.L.&JURIS.361,361
(1996).
19See,e.g.,LeslieGreen,Positivismand the InseparabilityofLawandMorals,83N.Y.U.L.REV.1035,103536
(2008);GeraldPostema,LawsAutonomyandPublicPracticalReason, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at
79,80.
20See,e.g.,Coleman,supranote10,at140;Gardner,supranote13,at199.
21 This point is related to but distinct from the socalled separability thesis. Voluminous citationswould be
requiredtosupportthisassertionfullyandspecifically;inidentifyingthesepointsofagreement,Ihavedrawnon
thesourcesinsurroundingfootnotes.
22SeeJOHNFINNIS,NATURALLAWANDNATURALRIGHTS14(1980)(describinglawasasignificantlydifferentiatedtype
ofsocialorder).
23Commitmenttothispositiondoesnotimplyanormativeordescriptiveaim,aparticularmodeofargumentor
description,oranyparticularcharacterizationof theacts inquestion. SinceHart, thisaspectof thepositivist
positionhasprobablymostoftenbeendiscussedintermsofthefollowingofrules,butworkonrulefollowingis
bestunderstoodasaparticularwayofdiscussingthereasonseekingfunctionoflaw.
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identifiedbyHartinhis1957essayontheseparationoflawandmorals.24
Othersfocuson
thedistinctionbetweennorms thatare intentionallygeneratedandothers thatarenot.
Stillothersfocusontheexclusionary25
orlimited26
natureof legalreasonsforaction.
Allofthesearedifferentwaysofmakingthesamepoint. Finally,secondorderaccountsof
legal positivism in the AngloAmerican tradition agree that for the positivist, law
necessarily involvessome formofhigherorderdiscourse thatbothconcernsandcarries
out the acts of delimitation constitutive of legal systems, what Hart called secondary
rules.27
(Thisposition iscommonlyassociatedwithHart;below, IdiscusshowpreHart
theoristsalsodescribedlawasnecessarilyinvolvingsomesuchhigherordercontent.)28
In addition, a point increasingly common to these accounts of legal theory is the
observation that all positivist theories of law are necessarily partial accounts of their
subjectmatter,sothatanygiventheoristcanonlyhopetocaptureoneorafewaspectsof
the
nature
of
law.
Both
theorists
of
the
nature
of
law
and
accounts
of
these
theories
have,
moreandmore,cometoacknowledgethispointexplicitly.29
II.WhatThisAccountAdds
Myaccount isconsistentwithbutextendsboth theaccountssurveyedaboveandother
morespecificpositionstakenbyparticularlegaltheorists. InthissectionIclarifyhowmy
perspectiveisrelatedtotheseotherpositions.
Torecapitulate,thepointsofagreementamongtheaccountsoflegalpositivismdiscussed
aboveare (1)to thepositivist, law isanactuallyexisting socialphenomenonnecessarily
includingadiscursivesystemincludingpracticesofidentifyingandprovidingreasons,and
it isusefullyconsideredassuch;(2)tothepositivist,thissystem islimited;and(3)tothe
24Hart,supranote2,at599,601n.25.
25See,e.g.,JOSEPHRAZ,PRACTICALREASONANDNORMS3548(1990).
26SeeSchauer,supranote11,at191516.
27H.L.A.HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW94(1994).
28Seeinfranotes99107andaccompanyingtext.
29 See H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 35, 39; but see Stephen R. Perry,
InterpretationandMethodology inLegalTheory, inLAWAND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGALPHILOSOPHY97,120
(AndreiMarmored.,1995)(arguingthatHartsawhistheoryof lawastheonlypossibleconceptualanalysisof
law).
Joseph
Raz
makes
this
point
often.
See,
e.g.,
The
Problem
About
the
Nature
of
Law,
21
U.
W.
ONTARIO
L.
REV. 203, 218 (1982); On the Nature of Law [hereinafter Raz, On the Nature], in BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND
INTERPRETATION:ONTHETHEORYOFLAWANDPRACTICALREASON[hereinafterRAZ,BETWEEN]91,9798(2009)(Whilethe
lawhasmanyessentialfeatureswearenotawareofallofthem....Thestudyofjurisprudenceisneverending,
forthelistoftheessentialpropertiesoflaw isindefinite.). SeealsoFINNIS,supranote22,at17;KRAMER,supra
note4,at21627.
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[Vol.12No.02670 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lpositivist, legal systems include mechanisms for sustaining their own boundaries, or
effectuating these limitson the system, in the formof communications referring to the
system and the reasons it offers. Further, although this point is not universally
acknowledged,notheoristhascapturedallofthefeaturesoflawinasingleaccount.
Iwilltakethesepointstoconstitutethecoreoflegalpositivismas it isunderstoodby
contemporary AngloAmerican legal theorists. It is possible that none of these points
distinguish legalpositivistsfrom legaltheorists ingeneral,aquestiontowhich Ireturn in
SectionC.II.3below. Inaddition, theunderstandingof legalpositivismproposedhere is
notentirelyderivedfromtheseearlieraccounts,whichsharetworelatedblindspots. With
a fewexceptions,thesetheoriesof legal theoryhavenotexploredthesocialcontexts in
whichpositivist legal theoryhasbeenproduced; theexceptionshaveexploredonly the
contextswithinwhichspecifictheoristshaveworked.30
Thesesecondorderaccountshave
also
largely
failed
to
explore
the
curious
parallel
between
the
characteristics
of
law,
on
the
positivist account, and the characteristics of theoretical discourse about law.31
The
discussion inSectionCsuggeststhatconsideringthese issuesoneapositivisticconcern,
theotheraformaloneindicatesthatpostpositivismisnotnecessarilyarealisticgoal.
Featuresof theaccountpresentedherealso closely resemble,butdepart from, specific
positions taken by particular legal theorists. Mydistinction between first and second
order theories, for instance, recalls StephenPerrysdistinctionbetweenmethodological
andsubstantivepositivism,althoughmyconclusionsdiffer fromhis.32
Perrypointedout
that the term positivism has been used to refer to two types of position, one a
substantivepositionaboutthenatureof law(thepositionthatthere isnonecessary link
betweenmoral normativity and legal normativity), the other amethodological position
about the nature of legal theory (the position that legal theory should be purely
descriptive,ratherthannormative).33 Thisdistinctionismorespecificthanmydistinction
between first and secondorder theory. Perrys main point in making it is that it is
conceptually inconsistent to defend a substantively positivist position using
methodologicalpositivism,sincethisamountstotreatinganormativesubjectinawaythat
cannotaccountforitsnormativity.34
IncontrasttoPerry,Iarguebelowthattheconditions
30Seesupranote16.
31Somesecondorderaccountsofpositivismhaveexplored the relationshipbetweenexternalandinternal
legaltheory,andtherelationshipbetweenthisdistinctionandthenecessarilypartialnatureoflegaltheory. See,
e.g.,Perry,supranote29. Othershaveexploredthecontextsinwhichlegaltheoryisproduced. See,e.g.,Lacey,
supranote5,at94748;Schofield,supranote16,at6970,82,85. Butthe linkbetweenthesetwotopicshas
been
much
less
scrutinized.
32SeePerry,supranote13;Perry,supranote18;Perry,supranote29.
33Perry,supranote13,at311.
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encouraging the production of what he calls methodological positivism may actually
encourage(withoutrequiring)substantivelypositivistpositions.
Finally,mypositionmayalsoattimesseemreminiscentoftheclaim,oftenattributedto
Hart, thata satisfactory accountof the conceptof lawmustproceed froman internal
pointofview.35
Ononeaccount, this is theclaim that, togivea fullaccountof law,a
theoristmustgrasptheway law isexperiencedby legalprofessionals. Thisrequirement
arguablyleadslegaltheorytodevelopformalorsystematiccharacteristicsmirroringthose
ofitssubjectmatter,althoughitneednotdoso.36
Iseektomaketherelatedbutdistinct
pointthatbecauselawandacademiclegaltheoryarepracticesthathistoricallydeveloped
inparallel,weshouldnotbesurprisedtofindthattheysharecertaincharacteristics(rather
thanthatlegaltheorymustaccountforaparticularsubsetofthesecharacteristicsinorder
togiveaninformativeaccountoflaw).
Incomingtothisconclusion,Iamindebtedontheonehandtoworksthathavelookedat
the institutionalcontextwithinwhich legalpositivist theoryhasbeenproduced37
andat
theconnectionbetweenthiscontextandthesocialandinstitutionalhistoryoflawitself,38
andon theother toa literatureon thesociologyofacademicand legalexpertise that is
seldomlinkedtometatheoreticaldebatesinjurisprudence.39
Thisworkindicatesthatthe
partialityoflegaltheory,andsomeofitsspecificcharacteristics,areusefullyconsideredas
functionsofthesocialandinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichitiscreated.
34Id.at347,354.
35SeePerry,supranote29;HART,supranote27,at91(opiningthatallourcriticismsofthepredictiontheoryof
obligationmaybebestsummarizedasthecriticismthattheydefine...outofexistencetheinternalaspectof
obligatoryrules).
36SeePerry,supranote29. SeealsoHART,supranote27,at91,24344.
37SeeKrygier,supranote16;Lacey,supranote5;FrederickSchauer,(Re)TakingHart,119HARV.L.REV.852(2006)
(reviewingNICOLALACEY,ALIFEOFH.L.A.HART: THENIGHTMAREANDTHENOBLEDREAM(2004));Schofield,supranote
16.
38See,e.g.,HaroldJ.Berman,TheOriginsofWesternLegalScience,90HARV.L.REV.894(1977);Lewis,supranote
16;DavidSugarman,LegalTheory, theCommonLawMindand theMakingof theTextbookTradition, inLEGAL
THEORYANDCOMMONLAW26(WilliamTwininged.,1986).
39
See,
e.g.,
ANDREW
ABBOTT,
THE
SYSTEM
OF
PROFESSIONS:
AN
ESSAY
ON
THE
DIVISION
OF
EXPERT
LABOR
(1988)
[hereinafter
ABBOTT, SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS]; ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES (2001) [hereinafter ABBOTT, CHAOS]; TONY
BECHER,ACADEMICTRIBESANDTERRITORIES: INTELLECTUALENQUIRYANDTHECULTURESOFDISCIPLINES(1989);HARRYCOLLINS&
ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007); RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: AGLOBAL THEORY OF
INTELLECTUALCHANGE(1989).
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[Vol.12No.02672 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lIII.WhySeekPostPositivism?
HavingclarifiedwhatItaketobethecoreoflegalpositivismasitisunderstoodbyAnglo
American legal theorists,and thescopeofmyobjectives, I turn in this section toa final
backgroundquestion: thereasonsalegaltheoristmightseektomovebeyondpositivism,
tobecomeapostpositivist. So far,NeilMacCormick ismostvisibleAnglophone legal
theorist tohaveapplied this label tohimself repeatedlyand tohaveexplained indetail
why he considers himself a postpositivist. In this section, I briefly identify several
possiblereasonsfortheimpulsetolabeloneselfpostpositivist,notallofthemcitedby
MacCormick. A number of these reasons are intimately linked to the phenomenon
describedabovethestaggeringproliferationoffirst andsecondorderlegaltheoriesover
thepastseveraldecades,thepreciseperiodwithinwhichMacCormickwrote. Thissection
providesa foundation formyexamination, inSectionC,ofhow, if atall,MacCormicks
position
differs
from
the
legal
positivist
commitments
discussed
above.
Asithasbeenusedfromthemidtwentiethcenturyon,firstinliterarycriticismandthenin
many other areas, the post label signifies the desire for a fresh start, based on
disillusionmentwithexistingtradition.40
Useoftheprefiximpliesthattheroottraditionis
no longer viable in itsoriginal form. This ishowMacCormickuses the term.41
A legal
theoristmightconclude that the root traditionlegalpositivismisno longerviable for
eitherconceptualorprudentialreasons. Conceptualreasonsforseekingtomovebeyond
legal positivism could include (1) dissatisfactionwith the increasingly narrow questions
addressed by positivists and their apparently increasingly trivial conclusions42
or (2) a
conclusion thatoneormoreof thepremisesormethodsof legalpositivismhavebeen
discredited or are irreconcilable. (Note that this second reason, while it is a common
criticalapproach inlegaltheory,43
cannotbeasoundreasonforrejectinglegalpositivism
unlessthetheoristhasexhaustivelyidentifiedthepremisesormethodsoflegalpositivism.)
Prudentialreasonsforidentifyingapositionaspostpositivismmightinclude(3)adesireto
free the theorists work from the pejorative connotations associated with the legal
40SeeMalcolmBradbury,WhatWasPostModernism? TheArts inandaftertheColdWar,71INTLAFFAIRS763,
76774(1995)(discussing IrvingHowes initialuseoftheprefix in1959and itssubsequentshifts inmeaning in
differentcontextsandperiods).
41SeeMACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supranote1,atv (explainingabandonmentofpositivist labelasa resultof
debatesovertheissue).
42See,e.g.,Twining,supranote13,at12325(suggestingthatJohnAustinsworkinitiatedthisnarrowingofthe
issuesaddressedbylegaltheory);R.GeorgeWright,DoesPositivismMatter?,inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote
4,
at
57,
57,
68
(arguing
that
legal
positivist
positions
are
trivial).
43Manylegaltheoristshavetakenthisposition,butpriortoMacCormicktheydescribedthemselves,andwould
most likelyhavebeendescribedas,antipositivist rather thanpostpositivist. See,e.g.,WILLIAME.CONKLIN,THE
INVISIBLEORIGINSOFLEGALPOSITIVISM: AREREADINGOFATRADITION3,68,304(2002);Fueer,supranote8,at119,
120;George,supranote12,at321,330;Tamanaha,supranote15,at3536.
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positivism label;44
(4)exhaustion with the volume of material produced under the
positivist rubric; and/or (5)a desire tomark the theoristswork as original rather than
derivative,thatis,astrategyofreputationalortheoreticalbranding.45
The distinctionbetween conceptual andprudential reasons for using the postpositivist
label is important because the theory in question ismore likely to be genuinely post
positivisttranscending or fundamentally departing from the core positions outlined
aboveif theuseof postpositivist label is supportedby conceptual, rather than just
prudential, reasons. As I suggest below, it seems thatMacCormicks chief reasons for
applying the label to himself were probably, in fact, prudential, and that powerful
incentiveswill continue to deter anywidespread rejection or denunciation of the core
preoccupationsoflegalpositivism.
C.
The
Possibility
of
Post
Positivism
Inthissection,Iarguethatlegalpositivismisbothadefensiblemodeoftheorizingabout
lawandaninescapableone. Wecannothopetoeliminateitentirelyfromthelandscapeof
legaltheories,aslongasthattheorizingproceedswithinaninstitutionalcontextsimilarto
itspresentone. This isbecausemodern legal theorists,positivistandnonpositivist,are
always simultaneously concernedwith twodomains: (1)that of law, aboutwhich they
theorize, and (2)that of academic theoretical inquiry,withinwhich they produce their
work. Bothofthesedomainsaffectthescopeofwhat it ispossiblefor legaltheoriststo
thinkandwrite. All legal theoristswrite fromwithin theseconddomain; legalpositivist
theoristshappentoproducetheoreticalaccountsfromthatseconddomainthatbearsome
of the same characteristics they also ascribe to the first domain, law. This parallel is
sometimes represented as a deliberate theoretical choice, but deliberate or not, it is
encouraged by the parallels between the social and institutional histories of the two
domains,parallels that in turngenerateparallel incentives for theproductionofhigher
ordercommentary.
My discussion in this section has three parts. In Section C.I, I argue that the reasons
suggestedbyMacCormick formovingbeyond legalpositivismarenotcompelling. Ialso
argue thatMacCormickdidnot succeed in thisgoal. SectionC.IIexamines someof the
factors thatmakepostpositivismaquixoticgoal, througha reviewof thehistoryof the
44See,e.g.,Greenawalt,supranote2,at19(notingthatthe labellegalpositivismmaybemainlyamatterof
rhetorical
force,
now
usually
negative);
SEBOK,
supra
note
2,
at
2
(noting
that
the
positivist
term
has
in
recent
years...becomeapejorative inmodernAmerican legalcircles);Schauer, supranote2,at3235 (discussing
pejorativeusesofpositivistlabel).
45Cf.BECHER,supranote39,at70.
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[Vol.12No.02674 Ge rman L aw J ou rna llegalpositivistnegotiationofthetwodomainsidentifiedjustabove. InSectionC.III,Ibegin
toaddresspossibleobjectionstomyargument,aprojectcontinuedinSectionD.
I. MacCormicksPostPositivism
Asnoted, it seems that forMacCormick,prudentialmotivations for resort to the post
positivist labelmighthavebeenparamount.46
Hedoesnot take theposition that the
premisesoflegalpositivismhavebeendiscredited;47
indeed,heconsistentlyidentifiedhis
workasinthesametraditionasthatofHart.48
Nordoesheseemtroubledbythenit
pickingdetailsoflegalpositivistcontroversies,sinceheengagesinandacknowledgesthe
relevanceofmanyofthosequarrels.49
MacCormickinfactadmitsthatthejustificationshe
provides forhis selflabelingaspostpositivistdonot reallydistinguishhisposition from
legalpositivism. Hewritesthatheidentifieshimselfaspostpositivistbecausehebelieves
that
law
is
necessarily
geared
to
some
conception
of
justice,
a
moral
concern.
50
But
he
concedes that it isonly the more austere and rigorous formsof legal positivism that
absolutelyexcludethepossibilitythatthereisanymoralminimumthatisnecessarytothe
46MacCormicksuseofthe labelmayalsoberelatedtoterminologicalbleedingfromonespecialtytoanother.
Thetermpostpositivistisnotuncommoninworkoninternationallawandinternationalrelations,anotherfield
inwhichMacCormickwrote. See,e.g., INTERNATIONALTHEORY: POSITIVISMANDBEYOND (SteveSmith,KenBooth&
MarysiaZalewskieds.,1996);ThomasBiersteker,CriticalReflectionsonPostPositivisminInternationalRelations,
33INTLSTUD.Q.263(1989);StanGontarek,InternationalLegalTheory:Positivist,Naturalist,andMuchMore,1
INTLLEGALTHEORY5(1995). Inthissubfield,thetermisusednottorefertoapositionbeyondorfollowinglegal
positivismbutinamannerborrowedfromitsmeaninginthephilosophyofscience,whereitreferstopostlogical
positivist theoretical positions. See, e.g., RUTH GROFF, CRITICAL REALISM, POSTPOSITIVISM, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
KNOWLEDGE(2004);JOHNH.ZAMMITO,ANICEDERANGEMENTOFEPISTEMES:POSTPOSITIVISMINTHESTUDYOFSCIENCEFROM
QUINE TO LATOUR (2004). Larry Laudan is known forhavingargued that these postpositivistpositions share
importantassumptionswiththepositivismtheyclaimtomovebeyondandarelargelyanextensionofpositivism
rather thana truedeparture from it. SeeLARRYLAUDAN,BEYONDPOSITIVISMANDRELATIVISM:THEORY,METHOD,AND
EVIDENCE(1996).
47Forexample,hemaintainsthatlawandmoralityareconceptuallydistinct. MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS,supra
note1,at261,264.
48 MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 27879. See alsoMACCORMICK, HART, supra note 1, at 16, 167;
MACCORMICK&WEINBERGER,supranote3,at7.
49See,e.g.,MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at2530 (discussingvariousaspectsof theoreticaldebates
over rules,norms, exclusionary reasons,discretion,and standards); id.at 5657 (offering critiqueof received
understanding of Harts Rule of Recognition concept); id. at 6273 (clarifying distinction between rules and
habits);id.at16165(discussingvalidityanddefeasibilityoflegalnorms).
50
MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS,
supra
note
1,
at
264.
See
also
id.
at
4
(writing
that
he
believes
that
some
minimum
ofjusticeisessentialtolegalvalidity). MacCormickalsopointstohisincorporationofpositionsassociatedwith
legal theorists identifiedasnatural law theoristsaswellas legalpositivists. Id.at279. Butashasoftenbeen
discussed,manylegalpositivistshavemoderatedtheirpositiontoaccommodatecriticismsofferedbynaturallaw
theoristsornonpositivists,withoutrelinquishingtheircommitmenttothepositionsdescribedabove inSection
B.I.2. See,e.g.,RobinBradleyKar,HartsResponsetoExclusiveLegalPositivism,95GEO.L.J.393(2007).
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existence of law as such.51
(I am not the first to note that the theory articulated in
InstitutionsofLaw,whichisarestatementoftheoriesMacCormickbegandevelopingmuch
earlier, is best understood as an extension of legal positivism, one that draws on
theoretical sources outside the mainstream tradition of legal positivism, rather than a
movementbeyonditsbasicperspective.)52
ButnoneofthedetailsofMacCormickspositioninInstitutionsofLaw,hisfinalsummation
of his theoretical commitments, distinguishes those commitments from the core legal
positivist commitments described above. MacCormick identifies the heart of his
institutional theory of law as the proposition that law is an institutional normative
order53
that isheteronymous [i.e.,providing reasons foractionexternal toagents],as
well as authoritative and institutional, in contrast to morality, which is autonomous,
discursive,andcontroversial.54
Thus,MacCormickdescribeslawasasocialphenomenon,
systemic
in
character,
involving
the
communication
and
suspension
of
particular
(autonomous or moral) reasons for action.
He also understands legal systems and
institutions as necessarily containing selfreferential components; in this aspect of his
account,hedrawsonthesocialsystemstheory
ofNiklasLuhmannandGuntherTeubner.55
Indeed,oneoftheprimarywaysinwhichMacCormickmovesbeyondlegalpositivismin
this finalwork isbyconsidering theworkof theoristsoutside the legalpositivistcanon,
suchasLuhmann,Teubner,KarlPopper,MichelFoucault,andSundramSoosay.56
Butthe
useofavocabularythatispartlynoveldoesnotcauseMacCormickstheorytodiffermore
fromadmittedlypositivistpositionsthanthosepositionsalreadydifferfromoneanother.57
51MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at278.
52SeeHuibM.DeJong&WouterG.Werner,ContinuityandChangeinLegalPositivism,17L.&PHIL.233,240,249
(1998). To be sure, there are some ways in which MacCormick moves beyond the concerns of prior legal
positivists, as outlined above. He suggests, for example, that lawmight not be reducible to discourse. See
MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at6273. Healsosuggeststhatjudgmentsregardingthelegalvalidityof
normsoccuronacontinuumratherthanbeingbinaryjudgments. Id.at16165,25758. Andasnotedbelow,
hedrawsonawiderrangeoftheoreticalmaterialthanthetraditionallegalpositivistdoes. Seeinfranote56and
accompanyingtext.
53MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at1,60.
54 Id.at255. SeealsoNeilMacCormick,TheConceptofLawandTheConceptofLaw, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,
supranote4,at163,16471. MacCormickusesthetermdiscursiveinanarrowersensethanIdo,torefertoa
disputationalsettingratherthantopracticesofverbalarticulation.
55
MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS,
supra
note
1,
at
24,
17778,
184,
289,
30203.
MacCormick
claims
that
his
theory
is
notderivedfromor
entailedbyLuhmannssystemstheory,butthatthetwoarestrikinglymutuallycompatible. Id.at302.
56MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at65,154,29293.
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[Vol.12No.02676 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lItseems,then,thatMacCormickcanonlybeusingthepostpositivistlabelforoneofthe
prudential purposes I identified above: as a device for avoiding unwanted negative
connotationsor forasserting thathis intellectualposition isdistinguishable fromothers.
As suggested above, these reasons for using the label cannot themselves establish the
conceptual or functional difference of a particular theoretical position from legal
positivism.
Still,evenifMacCormickdidnotdistinguishhispositionsufficientlyfromlegalpositivismto
justifylabelinghispositionpostpositivist,itispossiblethatadifferentlyformulatedfirst
order theory might achieve this distinction so conclusively as to make positiviststyle
commitmentsseemtrulyobsolete. Below Iconsiderwhetheritisfeasibletoexpectthat
legaltheorywillpassbeyondpositivisminthissense.
II.
The
Possibility
of
Post
Positivism
Within legaltheory,perhapsespecially includingthetraditionof legalpositivism,there is
anestablishedpracticeofdrawingonsociologicalconcepts to fleshoutaccountsof law,
even where the primary conceptual vocabulary comes from other analytical or
philosophicalwork.58
Asnotedabove,thereisalsoalimitedtraditionofreflectiononthe
relationship between the discourse of legal theory, including legal positivism, and the
discourseof law itself.59
Butmostof thework reflectingon thisparallel isdescriptive,
57MacCormickcomesclosetoacknowledgingthiswhenheacknowledgesthatscholarshipcanonlyeverhopeto
provideapartialaccountofitssubjectmatter. MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at30102(assertingthat
scholarshipcannotclaimtohavefoundsomeArchimedeanpointoutside,perhapsabove,thepracticalactivity
fromwhichitlooksdownontheactivityandseesthatitrepresentsnothingreal. Rather,asLuhmannpointsout,
it involvesa kindof selfobservationof the legal system fromwithin it,butanobservation that isnotaimed
directlyatthesolutionofparticularcurrentpracticalproblemsarisingwithinit).
58See,e.g.,Lacey,supranote5,at95057;Perry,supranote29,at97(Asadisciplinejurisprudenceclaims...to
bebothabranchofpracticalphilosophy...andasocialscienceofacertainkind.). ButseeRogerCotterrell,
WhyMustLegalIdeasBeInterpretedSociologically?,25J.L.&SOCY171(1998). MacCormicks incorporationof
Luhmanniansystems theory intohisaccountof lawcanbeviewedasa logicalextensionof thistradition. See
MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote55andaccompanyingtext.
59 See, e.g., Krygier, supra note 16, at 164, 167 (noting howdifferent disciplinary commitmentsof analytical
theoristsandsocialscientistsstudyinglawleadthemtoidentifydifferentcharacteristicsoflegalsystems);Lacey,
supranote 5, at 95057 (providing critique ofH.L.A.Harts respect for anddisciplinary allegiance to analytic
philosophy);Lewis,supranote16,at65,7071(presentingdescriptiveaccountofparallelhistoriesofvalorization
of autonomy in legal practice and legal theory); Schauer, supra note 37, at 85869 (discussing disciplinary
commitmentsanddimensionsoftwentiethcenturypositivism in thewakeofHart);Twining,supranote13,at
12930(describinghistoryofparticularizingconclusionsofpostBentham legaltheorists,andparallelsbetween
particularization
in
legal
practice
and
in
jurisprudence).
Some
work,
to
be
sure,
has
rejected
the
thesis
that
the
legaldomaininvolvesthekindofpartialityorsuspensionidentifiedbylegalpositivism,whileacknowledgingthat
legaltheory isnecessarilypartial,anddrawsfromthesepremisestheconclusionthat legalpositivism inoneor
moreof itsvarieties is intellectually incoherent. But thisworkargues that thepositivistdescriptionof law is
inaccurate; itdoesnotseek to refute the idea that legalpositivism isan inevitable formof legal theory inthe
worldweinhabit. See,e.g.,Goldsworthy,supranote12,at45152(arguingthattheonlyplausiblelegalposition
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simplyidentifyinganalogiesbetweenlegalpracticeandlegaltheory. Inthissection,Iuse
the firstof these techniques toextend theanalysisbegunby thesecond, lookingat the
social and institutional context within which legal theory is produced and the factors
encouragingproducersoftheorytogivetheirworkpositivisttraits.
1. TwoDomains
In a1981article,OwenFissexplored aquestion related tomy concernhere: whether
commitment to theenterpriseof generating a theoretical accountof law (or cognitive
positivism, identifiedbyFisswithpuredescription) logicallyentailscommitmentto legal
positivistconclusions,chiefly the socalledseparation thesis (orethicalpositivism).60
Fissconcluded (asothershavesince61) thatnosuch relation isnecessary,butsuggested
that the lackof awelldeveloped critical literatureon the practicesof legal scholarship
made
it
impossible
for
him
to
venture
any
firm
conclusions
about
the
necessary
shape
of
legaltheory.62
IntheyearssinceFisswrote,theliteratureonpracticesoflegalscholarshipandacademic
expertisemoregenerallyhavegrownsignificantly.63
(Theconsensusemerging from this
literature is reflected in the increasingly common position, noted above, regarding the
necessarypartialityorincompletenessoflegaltheory.64
Butthatobservationisjustoneof
alargersetofcommonobservationsabouttheWesternacademicdomain.) Thisliterature
agreesthat,startingintheearlymodernperiod,theacademicdomainhasbeenmoreand
more characterized by the policing of membership through extensive discursive
indoctrination65
and the evaluation of various forms of discursive performance.66
from the internal point of view is a natural law position); Perry, supra note 13, at 347 (arguing that
methodologicalpositivismisinconsistentwiththenormativityofitsdescriptiveobject,law);Postema,supranote
8,at16566(arguingthathistoryof legalphilosophy isahistoryofattempts toreconcile irreconcilabletheses
regarding legal normativity and social existence of legal institutions);Waldron, supranote 9, at 426, 43233
(discussing asymmetrybetween legal theoryasgraspedbyactorswithin the legal system from the internal
pointofviewandasgraspedbyacademictheorists).
60Fiss,supranote13,at1008.
61 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 13, at 31214 (discussing Harts mixture of methodological and substantive
positivism);Waldron,supranote9,at43233.
62Fiss,supranote13,at1016.
63See,e.g.,sourcescitedsupranote39;Sugarman,supranote38;ChristopherTomlins,FramingtheFieldofLaws
Disciplinary
Encounters:
A
Historical
Narrative,
34
L.
&
SOCY
REV.
911
(2000).
64Seesupranote29andaccompanyingtext.
65SeeBECHER,supranote39,at3244;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at14,24;CatherineKemp,TheUsesof
Abstraction: Remarkson the InterdisciplinaryEfforts inLawandPhilosophy,74DENVERU. L.REV.877,87985
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[Vol.12No.02678 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lAccording to this literature, the modern university, one of the institutions that has
emergedfromthisdynamic,hasdistinctivematerialandconceptualfeatures. Materially,
thoseactingwithinthe institutiondependtosomeextentonexternalsupportandmust
thereforejustifytheiractivitiestosocialactorsoutsidetheinstitution.67
Atthesametime,
theinstitutionalstructureislargelyselfreproducing,bothmateriallyandconceptually,and
its selfreproduction occurs primarily through discourse.68
These features make the
structure a competitive arena, and the resulting competition encourages academics to
draw distinctions between their positions and those of their forebears and
contemporaries.69
Sociologist Andrew Abbott calls this characteristic of academic
discourse thedrawingoffractaldistinctions.70
AlthoughAbbott focuseson the fractal
conceptualstructureofthesocialsciences,othershavemadesimilarobservationsabout
academicphilosophy71
andtheacademicstudyoflaw.72
Thenatureofthesedistinctionsis
suchastoencouragetheuseofarhetoricofinnovation,evenwhenatheoristisnottruly
making
a
novel
point.
73
And
these
features
also
encourage
an
implicit
normative
hierarchy
of intellectualpositions,one inwhichabstract,conceptual,orhigherorderaccountsofa
subject matter attain higher prestige, both within each specialty and across fields,74
despite the acknowledged impossibility of attaining a theory of everything. For the
academic, a high measure of selfawareness and facility with abstract selfreferential
discourseisaprizedandrewardedtrait.
(1997);WALTERJ.ONG,RAMUS,METHOD,ANDTHEDECAYOFDIALOGUE: FROMTHEARTOFDIALOGUETOTHEARTOFREASON
306(2nded.,2004).
66SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at13031,13738,14042;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at4576;COLLINS,
supranote39,at2536.
67ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at141;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at9.
68SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at130,140,14749;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at7,2427,3031,39,
86;COLLINS,supranote39,at2536.
69ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at137(noting that[k]knowledgeexpertscompetewithoneanotherthrough
redefinitionofeachotherswork);COLLINS,supranote39,at31,71,80.
70ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at1113,138,148.
71See,e.g.,COLLINS, supranote39,at31,76,8081;HANSJOHANNGLOCK,WHAT ISANALYTICPHILOSOPHY?24546
(2008).
72FIONACOWNIE,LEGALACADEMICS: CULTURESANDIDENTITIES134,198(2004);Sugarman,supranote38,at26,29,34;
Tomlins,supranote63,at92664.
73
ABBOTT,
CHAOS,
supra
note
39,
at
14042,
148;
BECHER,
supra
note
39,
at
70.
74See,e.g.,ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at14547;ABBOTT,SYSTEMOFPROFESSIONS,supranote39,at5257,79
85,102104,11011,11821(discussingphenomenonofprofessionalregression intohighstatuspositionsof
pure reflectionon abstract knowledge linkedwithprofessional group);BECHER, supranote 39, at 57;COWNIE,
supranote72,at198.
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Similar features characterize the modern legal domain as a set of social institutions.
Attainingexpertise inthisdomain involvesindoctrinationintodiscursivepractices.75
Like
theacademy,thissetofinstitutionsisbothmateriallyandconceptuallyselfperpetuating.
Materially,lawyersexpertiseinthediscourseusedtonavigatetheinstitutionsregulating
statepowerensurestheircontinuedsupportbynonlawyers. AndrewLewishasargued,
alongtheselines,thatlawyershaveaninherentinterestintakingatheoreticalperspective
on their activities, since such a perspective allows them to exclude the practical
consequencesof their judgment fromconsiderationand thus insulate themselves from
criticismbyoutsidersandwithdrawalofsupport. 76
Intheseways,lawyersmaintenance
of their discursive expertise shapes legal discourse, ensuring not only that it requires
certainreasonsforactiontobesetaside,77
butalsothatitcontainshigherorderdiscourse
aboutlawitself.78
Asintheacademicdomain,legaldiscoursethustakesafractalform,
even
at
the
level
of
what
Hart
called
primary
rules.
79
And
as
in
the
academic
domain,
the
proliferationofhigherorderdiscoursereflectsandcreatesastatushierarchy. Thosewho
workwithsuchhigherorderlegaldiscoursesuchasappellateandconstitutionallawyers
and judgesarewidelyaccordedahigher status than theirprimaryrulecounterparts.80
Atthesametime,legaldiscoursecontainsasignificantelementofwhatHarryCollinsand
RobertEvanscallinteractionalexpertise,thatis,fluencyinthediscursiveconventionsof
otherspecialties.81
Indeed, legalpracticeseemstobeoneofthetypesofexpertisethat
CollinsandEvansdescribeasalmostentirelydevotedtogaininginteractionalexpertisein
other specialisms, since it borrows its content and meaning from responses to and
discourseaboutothersocialphenomena.82
75COWNIE, supranote 72, at 12829; ELIZABETHMERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A
LAWYER1230,20723(2007).
76Lewis,supranote16,at66.
77Id.
78HART,supranote27,at94.
79 See J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). Using a different
vocabulary,NiklasLuhmannhasexploredthisphenomenonextensively. See,e.g.,NIKLASLUHMANN,ASOCIOLOGICAL
THEORYOFLAW4148,7383(1972).
80Angela P.Harris&MarjorieM. Schultz, A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal
Education,45STAN.L.REV.1773,1777n.14(1993)(notingprestigeofappellatejudgescomparedtotrialjudgesin
America,
and
of
certain
substantive
fields
of
law
involving
more
secondary
rule
content
and
valuing
rationality
over emotion); Deborah Jones Merritt,Who Teaches Constitutional Law?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 145 (1994)
(concludingthatconstitutionallawishighprestigespecialtyamongAmericanlegalacademics).
81COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at3539.
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LegaltheorygenerallyandlegalpositivisttheoryinparticularthesubjectofSectionB.Iaregeneratedfromwithinthefirstofthesedomains,theacademic,andseektodescribe
or account for the second, the legal. Thus, legal theory is both amanifestation and a
description ofwhat Andrew Abbott calls the fractal fecundity of certain cultural and
intellectualphenomena.83
Thecharacteristicassumptionsof legalpositivism,outlined in
SectionB.I.2,observethesefactsaboutlaw,buttheyusuallydosowithoutturningthose
observations back upon the theoretical enterprise itself. If we engage in such self
reflection,wecanseethat legalpositivisttheoryfixatesonqualitiesof itssubjectmatter
that have analogues in the institutions within which the theorists themselves are
operatinga preoccupation with reasongiving, the systematic suspension of certain
considerations,communicativeselfreference. Mypointisnotthatlegaltheoryinevitably
adoptsthesefeaturesbecauseitisimpelledtotakeonthefeaturesofthesubjectmatterit
is
explaining
(either
because
this
is
necessary
for
a
complete
explanation
or
because
it
is
a
kindofirresistibletemptation).84
Itis,rather,thatbecauseoftheparallelsocialfunctions
andhistoricalpathsofthesetwopracticeslegalpracticeandtheoreticalinquirytheyin
fact share certain features,at leastwhen theyare regarded froma certainperspective.
Moreover, the institutionalandconceptualdynamicswithineachdomainprovidestrong
incentivesforthoseworking ineachtofixateonjustthesefeatures. Theassumptionsof
legal positivism are therefore over determined; those assumptions are demonstrably
accurate, if partial, descriptions of legal reality, and they are also types of descriptions
encouragedbythenatureoftheinstitutionwithinwhichtheyareformed.85
In the next section, I further explore, from a more historical point of view, how the
positions associated with legal positivism started to circulate just as both the modern
enterprise of theoretical inquiry andWestern legal systemswere starting to take their
modernform.86 Beforeproceeding,however,IwouldliketoclarifythatIamnotarguing
82COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at38. SeealsoDouglasW.Vick,InterdisciplinarityandtheDisciplineofLaw,31
J.L.& SOCY 163, 18990 (2004) (noting thatmost interdisciplinary legal scholarship is theoretical rather than
empirical,probablybecauseofstructuralandconceptualsimilaritiesbetweentheoryanddoctrinalwork).
83ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at5355.
84Cf.ThediscussionofHartsargumentforthenecessityofadoptinganinternalpointofviewinPerry,supranote
29,at97,99100.
85 Thus, theory mirrors practice not because to study metaphors, one must do so metaphorically, the
assumptioncriticizedbyMichaelMooreinInterpretingInterpretation,inLAWANDINTERPRETATION,supranote29,at
1,26,butbecause,infact,lawdoeshavethesefeatures(alongwithothers),andacademictheorizingalsodoes,in
fact,
have
these
features
(along
with
others).
86Myposition isnot inconsistentwithGeraldPostemasargumentthat jurisprudence isan inherentlypractical
inquiry,sincehissenseofpracticalhavingtodowithnormativityandwithreasonsforactionoverlapswith
my senseof theoretical,which refersonly to the abstractaccounting foror explainingofa subjectmatter,
regardlessofwhethertheaccountorexplanationisnormativeordescriptive. Postema,supranote12.
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eitherthatthediscourseidentifiableaslegalpositivismcanbegeneratedonlybyacademic
theoreticiansorthatallacademiclegaltheoryisnecessarilypositivist. Onthefirstofthese
points, Ibelievethat thedescriptionof judgesaspositivist isbothmeaningfulandmore
interestingthan isusuallyrealized; Ireturntothis issue inSectionD.I. Iexplainhowmy
argumentdiffersfromthepositionthatalllegaltheoryisnecessarilypositivisticinSection
C.IIIbelow.
2. TheLegalPositivistBridge
In this section, I briefly survey how five key figures in the development of the Anglo
American traditionof legalpositivismHobbes,Bentham,Austin,Hart,andRazfit into
theanalysispresentedabove.87
(BecauseIhavealreadydiscussedMacCormicksposition,
Idonotrepeatthatsummaryinthissection.) Inaddition,thisdiscussionhelpstoconfirm
the
features
of
legal
positivism
outlined
in
Section
B.I.
Eachofthefivefiguresinthislistwrotewithinthetypeofcompetitiveintellectualcontext
described in the previous section, even though that contextwas still in the process of
formation fortheearlier figures intheseries. Collectively,theworkofthese figureshas
supplied much of the basic conceptual vocabulary available in the domains of both
academic inquiryand law. For instance,whileHobbesdidnotwrite from theacademic
domainasweknowittoday,hewasoneofthearchitectsofthediscoursethathasshaped
thatdomain,aswellastheAngloAmericanlegalone.88
Bentham,too,wasakeyfigurein
thedevelopmentofthemodernacademicand legaldomains.89
Austindevotedmuchof
hiscareertotheestablishmentofthestudyofpositive lawasanautonomousscientific
disciplinewithintheacademy.90
Allofthemostinfluentialtwentiethcenturyproponents
of firstorder positivist legal theoryHart, Raz, andMacCormickhave benefited from
Austinsefforts inthis regardandhavebeen, firstand foremost,successfulacademics in
themoderncompetitivemold.91
87Althoughsomeaccountsof legalpositivismtraceitsoriginstopremodernEurope,see,forexample,CONKLIN,
supranote43,at1432(discussingGreekdistinctionbetweennomosandphysisasanalogoustopositive law
natural law dichotomy),most accounts of legal positivism identify Thomas Hobbes as the firstmodern legal
positivist. See,e.g.,Bix,supranote13,at18;Dyzenhaus,supranote8,at708;5860;Gardner,supranote13,
20405;Waldron,supranote13,at171.
88SeeSTEVENSHAPIN&SIMONSCHAFFER,LEVIATHANANDTHEAIRPUMP:HOBBES,BOYLE,ANDTHEEXPERIMENTALLIFE10002
(1985);SteveFuller,DisciplinaryBoundariesand theRhetoricof theSocialSciences,12POETICSTODAY301,320
(1991).
89
See
NEGLEY
HARTE
&
JOHN
NORTH,
THE
WORLD
OF
UCL
18282004
(2004).
90Twining,supranote13,at123.
91OnHart,seeLACEY,supranote37,at112208. SeealsoSchauer,supranote11,at195153(classingAustin
withBenthamandKelsenasbeingconcernedprimarilywiththedemarcationoflawfromitsneighbors).
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[Vol.12No.02682 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l
Allofthesefigureswroteinparttowinauthorityfortheirsubjectmatter,agoalnotfully
distinguishablefromwinningpersonalandinstitutionalsecurityforthewritersthemselves.
Describing ones subjectmatter as differentiable from other subjectmatters reflects
positivelyonthedescribersauthoritytomakethedescription.92
Atthesametime,that
differentiationcannotbetoofinegrained;thedifferentiatorhasaninterestinclaimingas
muchintellectualterritoryaspossible.93
Theincentivestokeepdifferentiationsofsubject
matter(afocuson law)generalare intensionwith incentivestodifferentiatetheoretical
positions (a focuson theattributesof lawassociatedwith legalpositivism,andoneach
writersdifferencesfromhispredecessors). Thistensionhasbeencontinuouslymodulated
by these writers consistent description of law as basically discursive, normative, and
systemic. Hobbesexplainedlawasnecessitatedbythetransitionintoapostnaturalstate
oflanguageandasexistingonlytotheextentthesovereignscommandsarearticulated.94
Bentham,
similarly,
defined
a
law
as
an
assemblage
of
signs
declarative
of
a
volition
conceivedoradoptedbythesovereign.95
Austinreferredtothequestionofthenatureof
law as a question of identifying the principles, notions, and distinctions which are
commontosystemsoflaw.96
Hart,ofcourse,differentiatedhisaccountfromAustinsin
partbypointingout thatAustins accountpaid insufficientattention to the variety and
nuances of legal discourse.97
And Raz,while critical of aspects of Harts account, has
similarlydescribedlawastheauthoritativevoiceofapoliticalcommunity.98
Allof these figureshave alsodescribed law as a system of aparticular kind: one that
suspendstheoperationofcertainreasonsforactionandthathasselfreferentialfeatures.
ForHobbes,theLeviathanscommandsforbidcertainactionsand justificationsasasocial
even though (or because) they are natural;99
these commands contribute to the
maintenanceofanartificialbodycreatedthroughlanguagereferringtothatartificialbody
92SeeCOLLINS,supranote39,at31.
93SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at147;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at7076.
94SeeCONKLIN,supranote43,at73,8191,9888.
95JEREMYBENTHAM,OFLAWS INGENERAL1(1782). Indeed,Benthamhasbeendescribedasanticipat[ing]various
trendsintwentiethcenturyphilosophyoflanguage(includingFregesandWittgensteinscontextprinciple,some
views of logical positivists, and the development of speech act theory). See Timothy Endicott, Law and
Language,StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,availableathttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawlanguage/.
96JOHNAUSTIN,THEUSESOFTHESTUDYOFJURISPRUDENCE365,367(1863).
97HART,supranote27,at8294.
98Raz,OntheNature,supranote29,at99.
99SeeCONKLIN,supranote43,at96.
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and its operations.100
Benthams expository jurisprudencewhich anticipated in some
respectswhatPerrycallsmethodologicalpositivismsoughttodescribelawasasystemof
specific reasons, including higherorder reasons relating to the generation of those
reasons.101
Austin,too,thoughfaultedbyHartforinadequateattentiontothestructureof
secondary rules,102
did consider the constraint of legal systems by the higherorder
discourseofconstitutionallaw,103
andsuggestedthatlawisinherentlyselfreferentialinits
inability to represent the sovereigns pure will.104
Hart described his claim that legal
reasons must be distinguishable from moral reasons as entailed by the practices of
referring to something called law105
and, of course, identified the inclusion of self
referringnormsasadefiningfeatureofa legalsystem.106
AndRazhasfurtheradvanced
Hartsdiscussionsofthenormativeandexclusionaryfunctionsoflegaldiscourse.107
Eachofthesetheorists(amongmanyothersnotdiscussedhere)builtonandmodifiedhis
predecessors
ideas,
while
continuing
to
attribute
certain
consistent
characteristics
to
the
subjectmatterheaddressed. Thepatternofmodificationofpredecessors ideashasas
muchtodowiththegraduallysolidifyingacademicinstitutionalsystemwithinwhichthese
theorists functionedas itdoeswith the (inherent) incompletenessof theirpredecessors
explanations. Indeed, we could see this pattern of attributing a consistent set of
characteristicstothesubjectmatterasakindofconfirmationthatthisconceptualization
meaningfullycorrespondstoan identifiableaspectofexperience. Thisperspectiveoffers
100Id.at8286.
101IntheFragmentonGovernment,forexample,Benthamstressestheneedtoacknowledgehigherordernorms
orreasonswhenhecriticizesBlackstoneforexcessivefocusonthe lawmakingpowerofthegovernment(the
rightofGovernmenttomakeLaws)totheneglectoftherulesgoverningandrestrictingthatpower(thedutyof
theGovernmenttomakeLawsandtheBritishConstitution). SeeJEREMYBENTHAM,AFRAGMENTONGOVERNMENT
67(1776); id.at5355(discussingsovereignssubjectionto law). SeealsoSchofield,supranote16,at5960;
Twining,supranote13,at121.
102HART,supranote27,at1825,9199.
103JOHNAUSTIN,THEPROVINCEOFJURISPRUDENCEDETERMINED25758 (1863)(discussingconstitutionalprinciplesor
maximswhichthesovereignhabituallyobserves,which itisboundorconstrainedtoobserve,andwhichare
knowntothosewhomightapply(nonlegal)sanctionstothesovereignintheeventofitsfailuretoobservethese
principles).
104CONKLIN,supranote43,at14344.
105SeeHart,supranote2,at61415,620.
106HART,supranote27,at79.
107See,e.g.,Raz,supranote25,at3548,14148,17077.
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[Vol.12No.02684 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lanotherreasontosuspectthatthetraitsattributedtolawbypositivistsarelikelytoremain
compellingfocalpointsfortheoreticalaccountsoflegalphenomena.108
III.MustLegalTheoryBePositivist?
Mygoalistosuggestthatabroadpostpositivismisneitherdesirablenortrulypossible
giventhecurrentinstitutionalcontextofscholarlyproductioningeneralandlegaltheoryin
particular. Inarguingthatthetheoreticalpositionassociatedwithlegalpositivismisboth
accurateandcompelling,however, Idonotnecessarilymeanthat it is impossible foran
academic legaltheoristtobeanythingbuta legalpositivist,orthatAngloAmerican legal
theoryistrappedwithinasingleparadigm,theimplicationsofwhicharealreadyorsoonto
beexhausted,leavingnothingofinterestforlegaltheoriststodo. Inthissection,Iaddress
thefirstofthesepossibleconcerns;SectionDaddressesthesecond.
Myargumentmightbetakentosuggestnotonlythatpostpositivismisnotdesirablebut
also that all legal theory is positivistic. Brian Bix has argued that such a position is
untenablebecauseunderstanding legal theoryas a oneparty stateof thiskind isnot
illuminating.109
There are two problems with this contention from the perspective
advocatedhere. First,Bixsconclusionregardingthedesirabilityofamultipartystateof
legaltheorymaybeunrealisticandinconsistentwiththenatureoftheoreticaldiscourse. It
ispossiblethatwenotonlydobutmustinsomesensehaveakindofonepartystatein
legaltheory,ifalllegaltheoristsmustembracesomeorallofthepremisesidentifiedabove
inordertobecomprehensibletoandrecognizedbyotherlegaltheorists.110
Second,even
ifweassumethatBixisusingthetermmorenarrowlyandaccepthisconclusionaboutthe
undesirabilityofaonepartystate,hisobjectiondoesnotunderminemyargumentifit is
possibletoidentifyfeaturesdistinguishinglegalpositivismasIhavedescribeditfromother
forms of theoretical inquiry into law. This is possible by virtue of the features I have
identifiedwith legalpositivism inSectionB.I.2. Conceivablenonpositivistapproachesto
theacademicstudyof law includespecificrecommendations forthereformofparticular
legal institutions;accountsdenyingoneormoreoftheassumptionsdescribed inSection
B.I.2, such as the distinctiveness of law, the characterization of legal institutions as
systemic,ortheexistenceofmeaningfuldifferencesbetweenfirst andsecondorderlegal
discourse;andinterdisciplinaryaccountsoflaw,likesociologicalandanthropologicalones.
108 See, e.g., MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 29293 (discussing law, following Karl Poppers
terminology,asaWorldIIIthoughtobject). SeealsoRAZ,BETWEEN,supranote29,at265,269.
109
Bix,
supra
note
13,
at
29.
110Thus, JohnFinnis selfidentifiesand is identifiedbyothersas criticalof legalpositivism,yetheembracesa
perspectiveonthenatureof lawsimilar inmanywaystothatdescribedabove. SeeFinnis,supranote22. See
alsoBix,supranote9,at1613,1624.
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All of these are possible positions, and many of them have been advanced by legal
theorists. TheveryfractallogicidentifiedbyAbbotthat,Iargue,ensurestheperpetuation
of debates within what we think of as a legal positivist paradigm also ensures the
proliferationofsuchcompetingvarietiesoflegaltheory.
In other words, I am proposing not that legal positivism is the only possible mode of
academic discourse about law, or even the dominant one, but thatwithout significant
institutionalchangeintheacademy,AngloAmericanlegaltheoryisnotlikelyevertoexit
the debate over whether the best explanation of law involves acknowledgment of its
discursive,normative,systemic,suspensive,andselfreferentialcharacteristics. Thenature
of theoreticaldiscourseand thedynamicsof the institutionswithinwhich it isproduced
encourage attention to and efforts to clarify these characteristics of lawnot to the
exclusionofotherperspectives,butbecausethesecharacteristicsareespeciallywellsuited
as
topics
for
the
kind
of
theoretical
discourse
rewarded
in
these
settings.
D. NewPathsforPositivistInquiry
Mycontentionthatlegalpositivismisprobablyheretostaydoesnotimplythatwemust
resignourselves to theendless recyclingof familiardebates. Anynumberof interesting
theoreticalquestionsandconcrete legalphenomenaremain largelyunexplored fromthe
perspective I identify as positivist. In this section, I briefly discuss two examples: the
phenomenonofpositivistadjudication(SectionD.I),andtheimplicationsoftheexclusivity
oflegalandtheoreticaldiscourse(SectionD.II).
I. PositivistAdjudicators
RonaldDworkinsworkhasbeenreadasacritiqueoftheaccuracyoflegalpositivismasa
description of actual practices of adjudication.111
Yet reallife adjudicators, including
judges in theUnited Statesthe system aboutwhichDworkinwrotehave adopted a
rhetoric intheirwrittenopinionsthatresembles the idiomsof legalpositivism.112
Some
111See,e.g.,Coleman, supranote10,at14546;Soper, supranote12,at50708,512. CompareDyzenhaus,
supranote8,at712,716(notingthataDworkinianjudgewouldnotbealegalpositivist)withLeiter,supranote
15,at27(notingthatDworkinmightbeconsideredanappliedpositivistseekingtodescribeadjudicativeprocess),
Perry,supranote13,at317(notingthatDworkinmightbeclassedasamethodologicalpositivist).
112Iamnotthefirsttomakethisobservation,butIhope inthissectiontosuggestsomeimplicationsthathave
notbeennotedbefore. Forpreviouscharacterizationsofparticularadjudicatorsandjudicialrhetoricasexamples
of legalpositivism inpractice, see, forexample,G.ToddButler,AMatterofPositivism: Evaluating the Legal
Philosophy
of
Justice
Antonin
Scalia
Under
the
Framework
Set
Forth
by
H.L.A.
Hart,
12
HOLY
CROSS
J.L.
&
PUB.
POLY
47,48,59 (2008) (concluding thatScalia isapositivistbecausehisopinionsbetrayhisadherenceto thesocial
factsthesisandtheseparationthesis,identifiedbyButlerasthetwofundamentaltenetsshare[d]byalllegal
positivists); Beau James Brock,Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictability in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623 (1991);Anita J.Allen,AutonomysMagicWand: Abortion and
ConstitutionalInterpretation,72B.U.L.REV.683,69394(1992)(describingbothJusticeScaliaandJusticeThomas
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[Vol.12No.02686 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lcommentators have even suggested that judicial rhetoric is by its nature positivistic.
113
More common is the identification of certain judges as positivist. U.S. Supreme Court
JusticeHugoBlackhasbeen referred to in thisway,114
but JusticeAntoninScalia is the
adjudicator nowmost commonly labeled a positivist.115
If, as I have argued, the legal
positivistcharacterizationoflawisintimatelytiedtotheacademicinstitutionalcontextin
which legal theory is produced, can a judge, who necessarily writes from a different
institutionalposition,trulybealegalpositivist? Inthissection,Ifirstconsiderthewaysin
whichajudgesuchasJusticeScaliamaybeconsideredalegalpositivistinthesenseIhave
outlined here. Analysis of this question suggests new ways of connecting currently
disparateareasoflegalscholarshiptogenerateinterestingnewquestions.
In the context of the framework presented here, calling a judge like Justice Scalia a
positivistmightmeanoneoftwothings: thatthejudgespeaksfromanacademicdomain
despite
his
or
her
role
as
a
judge,
or
that
the
judge
adopts
the
rhetoric
of
the
academic
domain. The latter seems tobe themoreaccuratedescriptionof JusticeScalia. Tobe
sure,JusticeScaliawasanacademicbeforebecominga judge,andtheapplicationofthe
legalpositivistlabeltohimisdueinparttohisscholarlywork.116
ButreferencestoJustice
Blackasapositivistcannotbeexplainedinthisway,andJusticeScaliahascontinuedtobe
identified as a positivist even after leaving the academy (although the precise sense in
which the termpositivist isbeingused isnotalwaysclear).
Atany rate,while Justice
Scalia ismoreofapublic intellectualthanmany judgesare,117
hedoesnotnowworkan
academiccontext. Rather,referencestohimasalegalpositivist,andhisselfidentification
assuch,appearmainlytorefertocertaincharacteristicsofhiswrittenopinions,thatis,to
hisadoptionofarhetoricofpositivism. Thesecharacteristicsincludeastressonstatutory
andconstitutionaltextandprecedentastheonlylegitimatereasonstoofferinsupportof
aspositivists);GeorgeKannar,TheConstitutionalCatechismofAntoninScalia,99YALEL.J.1297,1307,1310,1308,
1339(1990)(referringtoScaliaaspositivist).
113See,e.g.,GeraldB.Wetlaufer,RhetoricanditsDenialinLegalDiscourse,76VA.L.REV.1545,1555(1990).
114Brock,supranote112,at632.
115Seesourcescitedsupranote112.
116SeeANTONINSCALIA,AMATTEROFINTERPRETATION: FEDERALCOURTSANDTHELAW25(1997);AntoninScalia,Morality,
Pragmatism,and theLegalOrder,9HARV. J.L.&PUB.POLY123,125 (1986) (Ihaveneverbeenable to isolate
obligationsof justice,exceptbydefining themas thoseobligations that the law imposes.). Similarly, Justice
Scaliasdictum that[t]hereare timeswhenevenabad rule isbetter thanno ruleatallcanbe takenasan
articulationoftheseparabilitythesis. AntoninScalia,TheRuleofLawasaLawofRules,56U.CHI.L.REV.1175,
1179
(1989)
[hereinafter
Scalia,
The
Rule
of
Law].
117 SeeDavidM.Zlotnick, Jusice ScaliaandHisCritics: AnExploration of Scalias Fidelity toHisConstitutional
Methodology,48EMORYL.J.1377,142728(1999)(arguingthatJusticeScaliaismoreaccuratelycharacterizedasa
politicianthanasajudge);StephenA.Newman,PoliticalAdvocacyontheSupremeCourt:TheDamagingRhetoric
ofAntoninScalia,51N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV.907(2006).
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a judicial decision and a disavowal of reliance on policy (i.e., moral or practical)
considerations118 and emotion.119 In other words, in his opinions, Justice Scalia
representsthelawasadiscursivesysteminwhichsometypesofreasonsaresuspendedor
excluded,andhedoessothroughstatementsreferringtothesystemitself.120
ReferencestoJusticeScaliaasapositivistarebasedonhisrepeateduseofstatementsof
thiskind,ratherthanonhisoccupationofaparticularinstitutionalrole.121
Thisdoesnot
mean that Justice Scalias opinionwriting technique offers support for the claim, often
attributedtoDworkin,thatevery judgeisa jurisprude.122
Rather,itsuggeststhatJustice
ScaliadeploysinhisopinionswhatHarryCollinsandRobertEvanshavecalledinteractive
expertise in the academictheoretical discourse of legal positivism. Collins and Evans
defineinteractiveexpertiseastheabilitytomasterthelanguageofaspecialistdomainin
theabsenceofpracticalcompetence (the latterwouldpermitthecontributionofnovel
propositions
in
the
discourse
of
the
domainfor
example,
Justice
Scalia
would
exhibit
practicalcompetence ifhewere tocontribute tooneofthetheoreticaldebateson legal
positivism).123
Alternatively,becauseofhisacademicbackground,JusticeScaliasrhetoric
mightbeunderstoodasaformofreferredexpertise,theuseofanexpertiselearnedin
onedomainwithinanother.124
118E.g.,Cardenv.ArkomaAssocs.,494U.S.185,196(1990)(Theresolutionswehavereached...canvalidlybe
characterizedastechnical,precedentbound,andunresponsivetopolicyconsiderations... but...thathasbeen
thecharacterofourjurisprudenceinthisfield.).
119E.g.,Penryv.Lynaugh,492U.S.302,359(1989)(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart)(Itisan
unguided,emotionalmoralresponse[injuries]thatthe[majorityopinion]demandsbeallowedanoutpouring
ofpersonalreaction...,anunfocusedsympathy. NotonlyhaveweneverbeforesaidtheConstitutionrequires
this, but [in prior decisions we have] sought to eliminate precisely the unpredictability it produces.).
CommentatorshavenotedthatthisdisavowalisbeliedbyJusticeScaliasuseofcolorfullanguagetocharacterize
viewswithwhichhedisagrees. SeegenerallyNewman,supranote117.
120InlinewithH.L.A.Hart,JusticeScaliahasarguedthattheexclusionofcertainconsiderationsfromthedomain
of legitimate legal reasonsadvancescertaintyandpredictability. CompareScalia,TheRuleofLaw,supranote
116,withHART,supranote27,at42,252(arguingthatabenefitofaruleofrecognition is itsenhancementof
certaintyandpredictability).
121Becausewecanonlydetecttheoccupationofalegalpositivistpositionthroughstatementslikethosemadeby
JusticeScalia,thedifferencebetweenoccupyingtheinstitutionalpositionassociatedwiththegenerationoflegal
positivistdiscourseandtheuseofpositivistrhetoricbyonefunctioningwithinanotherinstitutionmaynotbeall
thatsignificant. Cf.COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at86.
122
RONALD
DWORKIN,
LAWS
EMPIRE
90
(1986)
(Jurisprudence
is
the
general
part
of
adjudication,
silent
prologue
to
everydecisionatlaw.).
123COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at14.
124Id.at15.
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[Vol.12No.02688 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lAjudgecouldborrowdiscursiveexpertisefromtheacademicdomainforuseinthejudicial
formanyreasons,mostofthemprudential: tobetterunderstandorexplain the judicial
domain, to contribute to the expansion of the intellectual territory claimed by that
domain,125
tofacilitatecommunicationwithexpertsinbothdomains,ortoconfersomeof
thestatusorauthorityassociatedwiththeacademicdomainonthejudicialone. Indeed,
to anonexpert audience, referredor interactiveexpertise is indistinguishable from
whatCollinsandEvanscallcontributoryexpertise,126
andwhenthestatusorlegitimacy
ofaborrowingdiscourseisquestionable,theuseofthiskindofparasiticexpertisemay
bevirtuallytheonlymethodoflegitimatingthediscourseinquestion.127
Inlightofother
characteristics of his jurisprudence, it seems most likely that Justice Scalia borrows
positivistidiomstoconferstatus,authority,andlegitimacyonhisopinions.128
ThisunderstandingofJusticeScaliaspositivismhelpstoclarifythenatureoftheparallels
between
the
academic
and
legal
domains
discussed
above.
Justice
Scalia
is
considered
a
positivistjudgebecauseofthestatementshemakesinhisopinionsabouttheproperkind
of reasons to provide in support of a legal decision. But the type of discursive self
referenceinvolvedinthesestatementsisnotthesameasthediscursiveselfreferencethat
is, on the legal positivist account, inherent in law. Instead, it is a selfreference that
importsthehigherorderdiscourseofanotherinstitutionalsetting,thatoftheoriesoflegal
justification,reasoning,andauthority.129
Considering the phenomenon of positivist adjudication in this light raises several
interestingquestions. OneisthebasicquestionofhowtypicalJusticeScaliasmethodis. If
positivistjudgingisdefinedasamatterofthedeploymentofinteractiveexpertise,orasa
matterofdiscursiveperformance,thenthecontentanalysisofjudicialopinionsshouldbe
abletotellushowoftenitoccurs.130
Initself,informationabouthowoftenjudgesusethe
languageofpositivismmightnotbeofgreat interest. Butcontextualizedproperly,such
information would have significant practical and political, not to mention theoretical,
125Id.at7076.
126Id.at5254,6063.
127AsCollinsandEvansargue,distancelendsenchantment,thatis,themoredistantoneisfromthelocusof
thecreationofknowledgeinspaceandtimethemorecertainwilltheknowledgeappeartobe. Id.at20.
128SeegenerallyKannar,supranote112;Zlotnick,supranote117. SeealsoMatthewKramersargument that
legalofficials often act forprudential rather thanmoral reasons, KRAMER, supra note 4, at 6477, and Jamal
Greenesargument,not limitedto JusticeScalia,about thereasonsfor theuseoforiginalistrhetoric in judicial
and
popular
discourse,
Jamal
Greene,
Selling
Originalism,
97
GEO.
L.J.
657
(2009).
129Seesupranotes116&117.
130Foranoverviewofworktakingthistypeofapproach,seeMarkHall&RonWright,SystematicContentAnalysis
ofJudicialOpinions,96CAL.L.REV.63(2006).
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2011] 689PostPositivism
implications. One question to ask would be whether judges using the language of
positivismtendtodecidecases inawaythatdifferssystematically fromthedecisionsof
nonpositivist judges.131
Without relyingon the terminologyofpositivismandexpertise
usedhere,anumberofscholarshavealreadysoughttodeterminewhethertherear
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