236405927 a-case-digest-1

CASE DIGEST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 NEU COLLEGE OF LAW

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PRELIMINARY READINGS

MARBURY v. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Facts: Plaintiff had been appointed a justice of the peace by President Adams in the last days of Adam’s presidency. Plaintiff’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate, but not finalized by commission before Adam’s successor, President Jefferson, took office. Upon seeking delivery of his commission from President Jefferson and being denied it, Plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to compel President Jefferson’s Secretary of State, by Writ of Mandamus, to deliver the commission. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Act), pursuant to which Plaintiff filed his claim, read, in relevant part, as follows: “The Supreme court . . . shall have power to issue writs of mandamus . . . [to] persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issue: Whether or not an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land

Held:

No

This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be; that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.

ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Facts: It isproclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly. Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner.

Issue:Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Held:

Yes.The EC is independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform. Thus, in cases of

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conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers. Judiciary asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the

Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

THE CONSTITUTION

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS

Facts: The respondent announced to sell 30% to 51% of shares through public bidding. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, won the bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share. Days later, the petitioner offered the same amount yet the respondent refused it. The hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issues: Whether or not the sale should be perfected to the highest bidder.

Held:No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.”

ENDENCIA vs. DAVID

Facts: The defendant as the Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial

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officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. FRANCISCO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts: The respondent adopted a resolution to conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the SC, yet dismissed due to insufficient in form. Within a year, the President filed an impeachment complaint to the respondent stating that the Chief Justice and the seven associate justices for culpable violation of Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crime.

Issue: Whether or not filing a second case of impeachment within a year is constitutional.

Held: No. It is stated in the Constitution that “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.

Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

NITAFAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Facts: The petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

Issue: Whether or not members of judiciary are exempted from income taxes.

Held: No. There shall be salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. Thus, it give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.The Court held that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office and the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution" The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

J.M. TUASON & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

THE STATE

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THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional

HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.

The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the peace process.

Article X. (Local Government)

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1. Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;

3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA

FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;

the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines.

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The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:

a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty

b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

CRUZ v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

COLLADO v. CA

The Facts

The petitioner filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (“Lot” for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, “[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.] Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as “petitioners” for brevity).

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.

ISSUES: whether or not the Lot in question is part of the public domain

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RULING: Yes

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).

PEOPLE

WILLIE YU VS. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

FACTS: In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, applied and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines, petitioner also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of one’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.

HELD: Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication

BENGSON III v. CRUZ

Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

ANGAT v. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.

OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.

RULING: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.

RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper civil registry.

TECSON v. COMELEC

FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and

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his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts: The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET) declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

TAN Co. VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA

FACTS: Hubert tan co was born March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene tan co, was born May 19, 1975.In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents co boon peng and lourdesvihong k. tan are Chinese citizen. Co boon peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.On August 27, 1998; they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds:

a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant;**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children

b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;

c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;

d) Application of ‘’pari material’’ rule of construction is misplaced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.

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HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their petition:

1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

2) They were born in the Philippines;

3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue with the proceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law.10 The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

FRIVALDO v. COMELEC

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was ―merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad.‖ He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within

10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.

Issue: WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo‘s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor‘s stance is assumed to have been taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a ―natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court

Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings

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FACTS:This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen

RULING:Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

REP vs. NORA FE SAGUN G.R. No. 187567 92012)

FACTS: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipinocitizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship uponreaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, sheexecuted an Oath of Allegiance[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized byAtty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local CivilRegistrar of Baguio City.Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denieddue to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she haselected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate thesame on her birth certificate

Issues: (1) whether or not respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence;

(2) whetherrespondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

Held: The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn there from is correct or not, is a question of law. In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of

Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for judicial declaration of election of

Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances. In granting the petition, the trial court stated: This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioner’s election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner

ELIZABETH LEE v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

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RULING: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.

LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009

Facts:In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement. Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral argument.

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In theelection that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantialdefects.

Issues:Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship

Held:No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In

our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:

Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern

Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was

subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US

Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a

residence certificate, although he continued making several trips

to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171

which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as

a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of

Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On

February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that

he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought

to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his

statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material

misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after

his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections

commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19,

2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the

cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern

Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001

as what he represented in his COC.

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RULING:

No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he

had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the

time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether

the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his

certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false

representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy,

thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case

at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a

candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the

certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material

fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of

candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy

in this case is thus fully justified.

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999 IN RE: CHING

Facts: Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.

The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;

2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and 3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.

He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.

The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.

In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"

2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

Co v. HRET

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Co ran for Congressman of the 2nd District of Samar. Private respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was declared winner. Although Ong's mother is a natural born-Filipina, his father was only naturalized as a Filipino when the respondent was already nine years old. Given these facts, petitioner contends that Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore disqualified from being elected Congressman.

Issue: Whether or not Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Affirmative. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such. The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr.Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Bengzon V. HRET, Cruz

Facts:The respondent in this case, Teodoro Cruz is a natural

born Filipino citizen. However, he was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the

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Philippines and took an oath of allegiance to the US government which led to the loss of his Filipino citizenship.

Later on, respondent reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation, and ran and was elected as the representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.

Herewith, the petitioner filed a case against the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal claiming that Cruz is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural born

Filipino citizen who became an American citizen, can still be considered as a natural born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held:Yes. Cruz regained his Filipino citizenship. Repatriation

led to the recovery of the original nationality and it is stated under R.A. No.2630 that:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Also, the court defined natural-born citizen in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Tecson V. COMELEC

Facts:Zoilo Velez filed a case which raised the issue of

citizenship of Ronald Allan Kelly Poe(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), one qualification needed in the presidential election. He raised that FPJ is not a natural born citizen because he is not a Filipino since his ancestors are not Filipino citizens including Lorenzo Pou(Grandfather), a mestizo, Allan Poe( father), a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelly(mother), an American citizen.

Issue:Whether or not, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe(a.k.a. Fernando

Poe, Jr.) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Held:Yes and the Court resolved to dismiss the case. The

Court also held that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines even though he is an illegitimate child of his Filipino father, Allan Poe and American citizen mother, Bessie Kelly Poe. Based from Article 4, Section 1(2) of the Constitution, “Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” are considered as natural born citizen and being a legitimate child is not a condition that needs to be met by an individual because it is not specified in the Constitution.

Mercado vs. Manzano

Facts:A petition for disqualification was filed against Eduardo

Manzano stating that he is an American citizen. Herewith, his proclamation as Makati’s Vice Mayor was hold due to the pending petition filed by Ernesto Mamaril.

Issues:Whether or not, respondent Manzano possesses dual

citizenship and whether he should be disqualified as a candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

Held:No. The Court held that the respondent already

renounced his citizenship when he voted in the Philippine Election. Moreover, the declaration of the petitioner that he is an American citizen is a proof that he will fulfil his undertaking made under the oath. Also, he has already taken an oath of allegiance to the republic of the Philippines.

Lopez V. COMELEC

Facts:Petitioner Eusebio Lopez was a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines who sought to become an American Citizen and later on become a dual citizen by reacquiring Filipino citizenship. The petitioner ran as barangay captain and won. However, during the campaign period, his competitor, Tessie Villanueva filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner Eusebio Eugenio Lopez is a

dual citizen and whether or not he should be disqualified in the barangay election.

Held:The Court held that yes. COMELEC found out that the

petitioner was not able to reacquire his citizenship in the manner provided by law wherein to be able to qualify in the barangay elections, the petitioner should have made a personal sworn renunciation of any foreign citizenship. Wherein, the petitioner failed to do so.

Gallego vs. Verra

Facts:The case at bar is a petition for certiorari to review the

decision of the Court of Appeals confirming that petitioner Gallego does not comply in the residence requirement needed in election.

His opponent, respondent Verra filed a petition stating that Gallego did not have the residence qualification to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte and the Court of Appeals sided with him.

This is due to the fact that Gallego worked in Malaybalay. In addition with that, he also transferred his right to vote in that place which serves as proof that he resided in

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Malaybalay. However, he refused to bring his family with him but continue to visit them at Abuyog. Later on, he went back to his domicile and ran for Municipal Mayor and won.

Issues:Whether or not, respondent Gallego did not qualify in

the residence requirement.

Held:No. The Court held that the petitioner didn’t lost his

residence or domicile in Abuyog, Leyte. Also, the Court believed that the petitioner didn’t have the intention of residing in Malaybalay and of not returning to Abuyog. Moreover, the petitioner also contends that assuming he lost his residency in Abuyog, he reacquired it during his residency once more for more than a year and the overwhelming vote and support of the people in Abuyog is the proof that he didn’t lose contact to the people of Abuyog.

ROMUALDEZ v. RTC

Facts:

Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and a son of a former governor of Leyte Benjamin “Kokoy” and sole nephew of First lady Imelda Marcos. He served as a barangay captain of the said place during snap election in 1986.

He fled the country and went to U.S. and sought asylum, took special studies in the development of Leyte-Samar with International business studies as well.

WhenRomualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National Congress the Commission on Election allowed him to vote and have him registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte where he had resided.

However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in MTC. The former allege that Romualdez was not a resident of the said municipality because he leave the country and resided in U.S. Massachussets. He just recently arrive here and did’nt acquired 1 year residency here yet.

The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the Registration of Romuladez on the said precinct and the right to suffrage. But the RTC reverse the discretion and disqualified the voter registration of Romualdez favoring the petitioner.

The respondent prayed that the MTC’s discretion over questioning his right to suffrage will be affirmed.

ISSUE:

1. WON MTC and RTC will find jurisdiction over respective petitions.

2. WON respondents court will not stray the investigation regarding his sudden leave in the country, abandoning his residency in Tolosa.

Ruling:

The petition was impressed merit, although the said respondent had leave the country. He Is still a sovereign here in the Philippines and not to question his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the respondent was for the purpose of safety and security to his family from the rage of Marcos regime.

The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesn’t mean that there would an estopped to exercise his privilege as a Filipino citizen in registering his name from the said precinct in Leyte: questioning right to suffrage.

The petition was GRANTED WITH DUE COURSE, RTC’s discretion was reverse and the TRO issued is in permanent to question the decision of the trial court, initiating a no cost promulgation, and MTC’s decision is hereby REINSTATED.

AKBAYAN VS. COMELEC

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.

HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA

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8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights

CENIZA VS. COMELEC

Facts: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

CAASI VS. CA

FACTS Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is apermanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of agreen card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes.Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status areconclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

NICOLAS-LEWIS VS COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitionersfaield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrageprovided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

VELASCO vs. COMELEC

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FACTS: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the COC Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The distinctions between inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to vote when it cancelled his COC.

ISSUE: Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any future action challenging one’s right to be registered as a voter?

HELD: Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings. A decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding.

GOVERNMENT

THE UNITED STATES Vs FRED L DORR, ET AL.,

FACTS: The defendants were charged of scurrilous libel against the Government of the United Statesand the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands because of an editorial it published in the issue of “Manila Freedom”. The defendants were convicted for said offense basing upon Section 8 of Act. No. 292 of the Commission. Defendants then appealed for reversal of judgment made by the lower courts.

ISSUE Is the editorial published by the defendants directed towards the Government of the UnitedStates and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands?

RULING/HELD

No, the editorial was not directed towards the government itself but towards the aggregate of individuals who were administering the government at that time.“We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By “administration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in theirstrictness, and that "government" is often used for

"administration."”In this case, the editorial published by defendants where directed towards the personnel of the Commission whom they described as "notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of nopersonal character". This as being ruled out by the Supreme Court was an attack not to thegovernment system but to the aggregate of individuals by whom the government is beingadministered.

The final judgment of the convictions of the defendants was reversed by the Supreme Court acquitting the defendants with costs against the officials

BACANI v. NACOCO

FACTS: Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the rate of P1 per page.

However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

HELD: No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of being part of the government because they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products“, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518 – the law creating NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government. Constituent functions are those which constitute the

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very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature. According to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as follows:

1. The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. 2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. 3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. 4. The determination of contract rights between individuals. 5. The definition and punishment of crime. 6. The administration of justice in civil cases. 7. The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. 8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.

On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles to consider whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

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