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PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT:

Case: Manguila vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. !"#!$% August !% !##!

&ACT': Petitioner Anita Manguila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under 

the name and style “Seafood Products” while respondent Loreta Guina is the presidentand general manager of Air Swift International engaged in a freight forwarding businessPetitioner the contracted the ser!ices of the respondent for the shipment of her productsto Guam" #SA Manguila the agreed to pay cash on deli!ery in fa!or of respondent$owe!er" despite the stipulation" petitioner failed to pay Loreta" prompting the latter tofile a ci!il case for collection of sum of money %hen summons is about to be ser!ed"Manguila is nowhere to be found" apparently she was already in Guam $ence" a writ of preliminary attachment was filed by Loreta" alleging that petitioner&s departure wasdone to defraud her creditors Manguila on the other hand" claim that the court has no

 'urisdiction o!er her persons since she has not yet been ser!ed by summons (hus" thewrit of preliminary attachment issued is defecti!e

I''(E: %hether or not 'urisdiction o!er Manguila&s person is necessary in order for thewrit of preliminary attachment to be enforced)

HEL): *+S Pri!ate respondent ne!er showed that she effected substituted ser!ice onpetitioner after her personal ser!ice failed Li,ewise" if it were true that pri!aterespondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a *iligent in+uir,%still she had some other recourse under the -ules of .i!il Procedure (he rules pro!idefor certain remedies in cases where personal ser!ice could not be effected on a partySection /0" -ule /0 of the -ules of .ourt pro!ides that whene!er the defendant&s1whereabouts are un,nown and cannot be ascertained by diligent in2uiry" ser!ice may"

by lea!e of court" be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of generalcirculation x x x1 (hus" if petitioner&s whereabouts could not be ascertained after thesheriff had ser!ed the summons at her gi!en address" then" respondent could ha!eimmediately as,ed the court for ser!ice of summons by publication on petitionerMoreo!er" as pri!ate respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the ser!ice of summons" this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of thecountry (his is the exact situation contemplated in Section /3" -ule /0 of the -ules of .i!il Procedure" pro!iding for ser!ice of summons by publication

 A (hree stages for the grant of preliminary attachments4/ (he court issues the order" granting the application56 (he writ of attachment is issued pursuant to the writ57 (he writ is implemented8or the initial two stages" it is not necessary that 'urisdiction o!er the person beobtained" $owe!er" once the implementation of the writ commences" the court mustha!e ac2uired 'urisdiction o!er the defendant for without such 'urisdiction" the court hasno power to act in any authority against defendant In the instant case" the writ of preliminary attachments was issued on September 69" /::;" and implemented on

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De!ertheless" we hold that Pasay is not the proper !enue for this case #nder the /::9-ules of .i!il Procedure" the general rule is !enue in personal actions is 1where thedefendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found" or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides" at the election of the plaintiff1 (he exception to this rule iswhen the parties agree on an exclusi!e !enue other than the places mentioned in the

rules >ut" as we ha!e discussed" this exception is not applicable in this case $ence"following the general rule" the instant case may be brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant" at the election of the plaintiff Epri!ate respondent hereinFIn the instant case" the residence of pri!ate respondent Eplaintiff in the lower courtF wasnot alleged in the complaint -ather" what was alleged was the postal address of her sole proprietorship" Air Swift International It was only when pri!ate respondent testifiedin court" after petitioner was declared in default" that she mentioned her residence to bein >etter Li!ing Subdi!ision" Paraa2ue .ity

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Case: -iente /. C0ui*an vs. 'an*igan1a,an – GR No. 2334% 5anuar, 3% !#.

&ACT': In this case" after the successful people&s re!olution that topples the Marcos

dictatorship" the Philippine go!ernment" filed before the Sandiganbayan against theMarcos spouses" se!eral go!ernment officials who ser!ed under the Marcosadministration" and a number of indi!iduals ,nown to be cronies of the Marcoses"including .huidan Ewho is said to be an alleged “dummy or nominee” of the Marcosesspouse in se!eral companies that ha!e been ac2uired illegallyF for the recon!eyance"re!ersion" accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth" allegedly ac2uired illegallyby the defendants %hile the case is pending" the -epublic of the Philippines filed amotion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachments o!er the LH. issued in fa!or of .huidan as a result of the earlier compromise agreement entered into by thepetitioner and the Philippine Go!ernment (he Sandiganbayan granted the writ of attachment despite the opposition of .huidan 8our years later" petitioner filed a motionto lift the attachment stating among others that “the preliminary attachment was" in thefirst place" unwarranted because he was not 1guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation1 In fact" the LH. was not a product of fraudulent transactions"but was the result of a #S .ourtappro!ed settlement” (he Sandiganbayan howe!er denied the motion

I''(E:  %hether or not the writ of preliminary attachment maybe lifted)

HEL): D

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this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the application of the writ" and theSandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima facie case of fraudcommitted by petitionerIn fine" fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminaryattachment" it was at the same time the go!ernments cause of action in the main case

%e ha!e uniformly held that4x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the sametime the applicants cause of action5 eg" 1an action for money or property embeJJled or fraudulently misapplied or con!erted to his own use by a public officer" or an officer of acorporation" or an attorney" factor" bro,er" agent" or cler," in the course of hisemployment as such" or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity" or for a willful!iolation of duty"1 or 1an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud incontracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought"1 thedefendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissol!e the attachment under Section /7 of -ule B9 by offering to show the falsity of the factual a!erments in the plaintiffsapplication and affida!its on which the writ was based K and conse2uently that the writ

based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued K the reason being that thehearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of themerits of the action In other words" the merits of the action would be !entilated at amere hearing of a motion" instead of at the regular trial (hus" this .ourt has time andagain ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment hasbeen issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment" otherwise anapplicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a meremotion

>

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.ase4 Lu8 )u vs. 'trong0ol* Insurane – GR No. "9"#% 5une 4% !##4

8A.(S4 In this case" Aurora

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charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon (hisprinciple applies with more force to this case" absent any allegation or proof thatStronghold had actual ,nowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of itsattachment (hus" the annotation of respondent&s notice of attachment was aregistration in good faith" the ,ind that made its prior right enforceable

> ?octrine4Preference is gi!en to a duly registered attachment o!er a subse2uent notice of lis

pendens" e!en if the beneficiary of the notice ac2uired the sub'ect property before the

registration of the attachment #nder the torrens system" the auction sale of an attached

realty retroacts to the date the le!y was registered

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.ase4 'ofia Torres et. Al. vs. Nianor 'atsatin et. al – GR No. 99$"3% Nove61er !"% !##3

8A.(S4 In this case" Dicanor Satsatin as,ed the petitioner&s mother Agripina Aledia if she wanted to sell their properties (he petitioners as owners of the said lands" agreedto sell it" executing a special power of attorney in fa!or of Satsatin to negotiate the saleSolar -esources Inc agreed to buy the said properties for P7B" " Petitionersalleged that Dicanor was supposed to remit them the total amount of P6;""and that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price agreed upon (hatrespondent 'ust remitted the amount of P:"" lea!ing a balance of P/:"" (hat despite repeated demands" Dicanor failed to remit them prompting thepetitioner to file a ci!il case for sum of money and damages against the latterPetitioners then applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstrespondents& properties which was granted by the trial court -espondents then2uestion the !alidity of the writ arguing amongst others that the sub'ect writ wasimproper and irregular ha!ing been issued and enforced without the lower courtac2uiring 'urisdiction o!er the persons of the respondents (hey maintained that the writof attachment was implemented without ser!ing upon them the summons together withthe complaint (hey also argued that the bond issued in fa!or of the petitioners wasdefecti!e" because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that itcan transact business with the -(. of ?asmarias" .a!ite

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In the instant case" assuming arguendo that the trial court !alidly issued the writ of attachment on Do!ember /B" 66" which was implemented on Do!ember /:" 66" itis to be noted that the summons" together with a copy of the complaint" was ser!ed onlyon Do!ember 6/" 66 .onse2uently" e!en if the writ of attachment was !alidly issued"it was improperly or irregularly enforced and" therefore" cannot bind and affect the

respondents

 A -e2uisite for appro!al of a surety bond4+!ery bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme .ourt showingthat the company concerned is 2ualified to transact business which is !alid only for thirtyE7F days from the date of its issuance $owe!er" it is apparent that the .ertificationissued by the

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8urther" petitioners& contention that respondents are barred by estoppel" laches" andprescription from 2uestioning the orders of the -(. issuing the writ of attachment andthat the issue has become moot and academic by the renewal of the attachment bondco!ering after its expiration" is de!oid of merit As correctly held by the .A4(here are two ways of discharging the attachment 8irst" to file a counterbond in

accordance with Section /6 of -ule B9 Second" to 2uash the attachment on the groundthat it was irregularly or impro!idently issued" as pro!ided for in Section /7 of the samerule %hether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in thelaw" the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to ha!e wai!ed any defect in theissuance of the attachment writ by simply a!ailing himself of one way of discharging theattachment writ" instead of the other (he filing of a counterbond is merely a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way

+ +ffect of late summons4Moreo!er" again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was !alidly issued"

although the trial court later ac2uired 'urisdiction o!er the respondents by ser!ice of thesummons upon them" such belated ser!ice of summons on respondents cannot be

deemed to ha!e cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ (he trial court

cannot enforce such a coerci!e process on respondents without first obtaining

 'urisdiction o!er their person (he preliminary writ of attachment must be ser!ed after or

simultaneous with the ser!ice of summons on the defendant whether by personal

ser!ice" substituted ser!ice or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the

case (he subse2uent ser!ice of summons does not confer a retroacti!e ac2uisition of

 'urisdiction o!er her person because the law does not allow for retroacti!ity of a belated

ser!ice

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Metro Inc. and spouses frederick and liza juan vs Lara’s gifts and decors

and mr and ms. Luis and lara villafuerte

GR no 171741 !ov. "7 "##$

FACTS: Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged

in the !siness of "an!fact!ring, prod!cing, se##ing and e$porting handicrafts. L!is

%i##af!erte, &r. and Lara Maria '. %i##af!erte are the president and icepresident of

LGD respectie#*. Frederic+ &!an and Lia &!an are the principa# o-cers of Metro, Inc.

So"eti"e in //0, Metro Inc. and LG% agreed t&at LG% 'ould endorse to

Metro Inc. purc&ase orders received () LG% from t&eir (u)ers in t&e *+ in

e,c&ange for a 1- commission to (e s&ared e/uall) () LG% and 0ames R.

addon 20R3 LG%’s agent. &e terms of t&e agreement 'ere later

em(odied in an e5mail la(eled as t&e 6"##1 greement.61In Ma* //2, LGD

3#ed 4ith the 'TC, 5ranch 067, Las 8i9as Cit* (tria# co!rt) a co"p#aint against Metro

Inc. for s!" of "one* and da"ages 4ith a pra*er for the iss!ance of a 4rit of

pre#i"inar* attach"ent. S!se!ent#*, respondents 8led an amended

complaint-and alleged t&at as of 0ul) "##" Metro Inc. defrauded t&em in

the a"o!nt of ;.'espondents a#so pra*ed for the iss!ance of a 4rit of

pre#i"inar* attach"ent. In its 2 &!ne //2 ?rder,the trial court granted LG%’s

pra)er and issued t&e 'rit of attac&ment against t&e properties and

assets of petitioners. 9n ": 0une "##; petitioners 8led a motion to

disc&arge t&e 'rit of attac&ment. Metro Inc. argued t&at t&e 'rit of

attac&ment s&ould (e disc&arged on t&e ground t&at respondents failed tosu(stantiate t&eir allegations of fraud 'it& speci8c acts or deeds s&o'ing

&o' petitioners defrauded t&em. After considering the arg!"ents of the

parties, the trial court granted Metro inc’c motion and lifted t&e 'rit of

attac&ment. LGD 3#ed a "otion for reconsideration. In its 0/ Septe"er //2

?rder, the tria# co!rt denied the "otion. According to the tria# co!rt, respondents

fai#ed to s!-cient#* sho4 that petitioners 4ere g!i#t* of fra!d either in inc!rring the

o#igation !pon 4hich the action 4as ro!ght, or in the perfor"ance thereof. The

tria# co!rt fo!nd no proof that petitioners 4ere "otiated * "a#ice in entering into

the //0 agree"ent. The tria# co!rt a#so dec#ared that petitioners’ fai#!re to f!##*

co"p#* 4ith their o#igation, asent other facts or circ!"stances to indicate ei#

intent, does not a!to"atica##* a"o!nt to fra!d. LGD 3#ed a petition for certiorari

efore the Co!rt of Appea#s. LGD a##eged that the tria# co!rt grae#* a!sed its

discretion 4hen it ordered the discharge of the 4rit of attach"ent 4itho!t re!iring

petitioners to post a co!nterond. ccording to t&e

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PRELIMINARY IN5(CTI;N:

.ase4 Teresita I*olor vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. 4"2% &e1ruar, $% !##

8acts4 In this case" (eresita Idolor executed in fa!or of pri!ate respondent Gumersindo?e GuJman a ?eed of -eal +state Mortagage with the right of extra'udicial foreclosureupon failure to redeem the mortagage to secure a loan of P6B"

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(he possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not agroundfor an in'unction

 A Dature and -e2uisites of Preliminary In'unction4In'unction is a preser!ati!e remedy aimed at protecting substanti!e rights andinterests3 >efore an in'unction can be issued" it is essential that the following re2uisites

be present4 < t0ere 6ust 1e arig0t in esse or t0e e=istene of a rig0t to 1eprotete*> !< t0e at against 70i0 t0e in?untion is to 1e *irete* is a violation of su0 rig0t $ence the existence of a right !iolated" is a prere2uisite to the granting of an in'unction In'unction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights 8ailure toestablish either the existence of a clear and positi!e right which should be 'udiciallyprotected through the writ of in'unction or that the defendant has committed or hasattempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existenceof said right" is a sufficient ground for denying the in'unction (he controlling reason for the existence of the 'udicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby pre!enta threatened or continuous irremediable in'ury to some of the parties before their claimscan be thoroughly in!estigated and ad!isedly ad'udicated It is to be resorted to only

when there is a pressing necessity to a!oid in'urious conse2uences which cannot beremedied under any standard of compensation

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Case: Ri6io Gustillio vs. Riar*o Real 'r. – AM No. MT5 ##@!"#% &e1ruar, !%!##

8A.(S4 In this case" -imio Gustilio was a candidate for punong barangay of >arangayPunta Mesa" Manapla" Degro

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 A Onus Probandi  of a writ of in'unction4(he onus probandi is on mo!ant to show that there exists a right to be protected" whichis directly threatened by the act sought to be en'oined 8urther" there must be a showingthat the in!asion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and

paramount necessity for the writ to pre!ent a serious damageQ/6R In this case"complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay$e had ta,en his oath of office #nless his election was annulled" he was entitled to allthe rights of said office %e do not see how the complainant&s exercise of such rightswould cause an irreparable in'ury or !iolate the right of the losing candidate so as to

 'ustify the issuance of a temporary restraining order “to maintain the status 2uo”

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Case: Mi0ael Lagrosas vs. /ristol@ M,ers – GR No. 992$% 'epte61er !% !##.

8A.(S4 In this case" Michael Lagrosas was employed by the >ristolMyers as one of 

their territorial managers in its Medical Sales 8orce ?i!ision ristolMyers After the meeting" Lim riding the car of .esar Me2uito" noticethat Lagrosas was following them She told .esar not to stop the car but Lagrosas slamthe latter&s car thrice A brief confrontation ensued in which petitioner hit Men2uito with ametal steering loc, and when Lim inter!ene" he hit her head (he incident wase!entually disco!ered by the company prompting it to dismiss the petitioner due tounwarranted beha!iour Lagrosas filed for illegal dismissal (he Labor Arbiter ruled infa!or of the petitioner" awarding the latter monetary awards for his dismissal ristolMyers and the >an, of the Philippine Islands for the balance of the 'udgment award -espondents mo!e to 2uash the writ and appliedfor a (-< for the enforcement of the writ of execution (he .ourt of Appeals ga!ecredence to the (-< which would later be substituted by an in'unction (he court a 2uoruled in fa!or of >ristolMyers (he latter then mo!ed for the release of the (-< andin'unction cash bonds by !irtue of the decision (he appellate court denied the motionsince the decision is not yet final and executor due to Lagrosas&s appeal to the Supreme.ourt

Issue4 %hether or not the .ourt of Appeals erred in denying the release of the (-< andIn'unction cash bonds)

$+L?4 *+S A preliminary in'unction may be granted only when" among other things"the applicant" not explicitly exempted" files with the court where the action or proceedingis pending" a bond executed to the party or person en'oined" in an amount to be fixed bythe court" to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damageswhich he may sustain by reason of the in'unction or temporary restraining order if thecourt should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto #pon appro!al of the re2uisite bond" a writ of preliminary in'unction shall be issued In this case" the .ourtof Appeals issued the writ of preliminary in'unction to en'oin the implementation of thewrit of execution and notices of garnishment 1pending final resolution of this case or unless the QwRrit is sooner lifted by the .ourt>y its ?ecision dated =anuary 6;" 6B" the appellate court disposed of the case bygranting >ristolMyers& petition and reinstating the ?ecision dated September 60" 66of the DL-. which dismissed the complaint for dismissal It also ordered the dischargeof the (-< cash bond and in'unction cash bond (hus" both conditions of the writ of preliminary in'unction were satisfiedDotably" the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awardsgranted by the labor arbiter and the DL-." and that the implementation of the writ of 

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execution and notices of garnishment was properly en'oined (his in effect amounted toa finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the in'unction (oreiterate" the in'unction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage byreason of the in'unction only .ontrary to Lagrosas& claim" it is not a security for the

 'udgment award by the labor arbiter

 A Dature and Purpose of Preliminary In'unction4(he in'unction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decidedthat the in'unction ought not to ha!e been granted Its principal purpose is to protect theen'oined party against loss or damage by reason of the in'unction" and the bond isusually conditioned accordingly

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.ase4 5anosa vs. )elariarte@ GR No. $!2% 'epte61er 3% !##.  

8A.(S4 In this case" petitioners were high school students that were caught and

apprehended by the school for haJing A meeting was con!ened between the parents of the petitioners and the principal of the school which is the respondent in this case (hemeeting ended up with an agreement that instead of being charged and found guilty of haJing" the petitioners would 'ust ha!e to transfer to another school (he parents signifytheir conformity to the agreement and affixed their signatures to the minutes of themeeting (he school did not anymore con!ened the .ommittee on Student ?isciplineE.

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clean hands (he latter is a fre2uently stated maxim which is also expressed in the

principle that he who has done ine2uity shall not ha!e e2uity It signifies that a litigant

may be denied relief by a court of e2uity on the ground that his conduct has been

ine2uitable" unfair and dishonest" or fraudulent" or deceitful as to the contro!ersy in

issue

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R?

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Section 6: of the -epublic Act Do 63B" as amended ,nown as the .entral >an, Act"pro!ides that when a ban, is forbidden to do business in the Philippines and placedunder recei!ership" the person designated as recei!er shall immediately ta,e charge of the ban,&s assets and liabilities" as expeditiously as possible" collect and gather all theassets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors" and represent the ban,

personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or against the institution" exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including"but not limited to" bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the ban,(his is consistent with the purpose of recei!ership proceedings" ie" to recei!ecollectibles and preser!e the assets of the ban, in substitution of its former management" and pre!ent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the creditorsof the ban,

> an, at the time In said case" we stated that4$a!ing arri!ed at the conclusion that a foreclosure is part of a ban,&s business acti!itywhich could not ha!e been pursued by the recei!er then because of the circumstancesdiscussed in the .entral >an, case" we are thus con!inced that the prescripti!e periodwas legally interrupted by fuerJa mayor in /:96 on account of the prohibition imposed

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by the Monetary >oard against petitioner from transacting business" until the directi!e of the >oard was nullified in /:;/7/ E+mphasis suppliedF8urther examination of the .entral >an, case re!eals that the circumstances of Pro!ident Sa!ings >an, at the time were peculiar because after the Monetary >oardissued M> -esolution Do /933 on September /B" /:96" prohibiting it from doing

business in the Philippines" the ban,&s ma'ority stoc,holders immediately went to the.ourt of 8irst Instance of Manila" which prompted the trial court to issue its 'udgmentdated 8ebruary 6" /:90" declaring null and !oid the resolution and ordering the .entral>an, to desist from li2uidating Pro!ident (he decision was appealed to and affirmed bythis .ourt in /:;/ (hus" the Superintendent of >an,s" which was instructed to ta,echarge of the assets of the ban, in the name of the Monetary >oard" had no power toact as a recei!er of the ban, and carry out the obligations specified in Sec 6: of the.entral >an, Act

In this case" it is not disputed that Philippine Ceterans >an, was placed under recei!ership by the Monetary >oard of the .entral >an, by !irtue of -esolution Do 730

on April 6B" /:;B" pursuant to Section 6: of the .entral >an, Act on insol!ency of ban,s#nli,e Pro!ident Sa!ings >an," there was no legal prohibition imposed upon hereinrespondent to deter its recei!er and li2uidator from performing their obligations under the law (hus" the ruling laid down in the Pro!ident case cannot apply in the case at barMoreo!er" in the present case" a li2uidator was duly appointed for respondent ban, andthere was no 'udgment or court order that would legally or physically hinder or prohibit itfrom foreclosing petitioners& property5 despite the absence of such legal or physicalhindrance" respondent ban,&s recei!er or li2uidator failed to foreclose petitioners&property and therefore such inaction should bind respondent ban,? Inaction of a recei!er5 conse2uences4

Settled is the principle that a ban, is bound by the acts" or failure to act of its recei!er As we held in Philippine Ceterans >an, !s DL-." a labor case which also in!ol!edrespondent ban," all the acts of the recei!er and li2uidator pertain to petitioner" both ha!ing assumedpetitioner&s corporate existence Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that thenonpayment of M

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.ase4 C0ave8 vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. $42"9% 5anuar, !#% !##.8A.(S4 In this case" pri!ate respondent 8idela Cargas" a practicing lawyer owned afi!e hectares of land Emixed coconut land and rice fieldsF in Sorsogon %hile petitioner 

.ha!eJ reside in the remote part of the land (he two then agreed to di!ide the grosssales of all the products of the land between themsel!es" with pri!ate respondententrusting her shares to .ha!eJ for safe,eeping %hen petitioner .ha!eJ failed to remit8idela&s share" the latter filed a complaint against the petitioners for the reco!ery of possession" rent and damages with the prayer of an immediate appointment of arecei!ership before the -(. (he court a 2uo dismissed the complaint for lac, of 

 'urisdiction since the sub'ect matter in!ol!ed an agrarian dispute

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benefit $er complaint for dispossession under -epublic Act ;0; with the ?A-A>sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of 8idela or of the Philippine .oconut Authority(he abo!e cases are similar only in that they in!ol!ed the same parties and 8idela

sought the placing of the properties under recei!ership in all of them /ut reeivers0ip

is not an ation. It is 1ut an au=iliar, re6e*,% a 6ere ini*ent of t0e suit to 0elpa0ieve its purpose. Conse+uentl,% it annot 1e sai* t0at t0e grant of reeivers0ip

in one ase 7ill a6ount to res?u*iata on t0e 6erits of t0e ot0er ases. T0e grant

or *enial of t0is provisional re6e*, 7ill still *epen* on t0e nee* for it in t0e

partiular ation.

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REPLE-IN

Case: ;rosa vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. ##% April "% !###

8A.(S4 In this case" petitioner =ose

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 'udicata bars the determination of the present case (he two cases in!ol!e differentsub'ect matters" parties and see, different reliefs(he petition doc,eted as .AG- SP Do /0:7; was for certiorari with in'unction"brought by Stronghold Insurance .ompany" Inc alleging that there was gra!e abuse of discretion when the trial court ad'udged it liable for damages without due process" in

!iolation of -ule 3" Section / in relation to -ule B9" Section 6" of the -ules of .ourt(he surety also 2uestioned the propriety of the writ of execution issued by the trial courtpending appeal

> Issues were raised first time on appeal4Petitioner posits that the .ourt of Appeals committed gra!e abuse of discretion when itconsidered causes of actions which were raised for the first time on appeal (rue"pri!ate respondent submitted issues to the .ourt of Appeals which were not raised inthe original complaint Pri!ate respondent belatedly pointed out that41.1. It is pertinent to note that Defendant-Appellee has waived prior notie and de!and in order to be rendered in default" as in fat the Pro!issor# $ote expressl# stipulates

that the !onthl# install!ents shall be paid on the date the# fall due" without need of  prior notie or de!and.1.%. &aid Pro!issor# $ote li'ewise expressl# stipulates that a late pa#!ent harge of %( per !onth shall be added on eah unpaid install!ent fro! !aturit# thereof until full# 

 paid.1.). Of e*ual signifiane is the Aeleration +lause in the Pro!issor# $ote whihstates that if default be !ade in the pa#!ent of an# of the install!ents or late pa#!ent harges thereon when the sa!e bea!e due and pa#able" the total priniple su! thenre!aining unpaid" together with the agreed late pa#!ent harges thereon" shall at onebeo!e due and pa#able.Pri!ate respondent argued that based on the pro!isions of the Promissory Dote itself"

petitioner incurred in default since" e!en though there was actual payment of theinstallments which fell due on =uly 6;" /:;0" as well as the three installments on August6; to

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pro=i6ate result of t0e p0,sial suffering% 6ental anguis0% frig0t% serious an=iet,%1es6ir0e* reputation% 7oun*e* feelings% 6oral s0o% soial 0u6iliation an*si6ilar in?ur,. 'eon*% t0e at 6ust 1e 7rongful.Petitioner maintains that embarrassment resulted when he had to explain the suit to hisdaughters inlaws $owe!er" that could ha!e been a!oided had he not assigned the car 

to his daughter and had he been faithful and prompt in paying the installments re2uiredPetitioner brought the situation upon himself and cannot now complain that pri!aterespondent is liable for the mental anguish and humiliation he suffered

? Good faith as a defense against moral damages48urthermore" we agree with the appellate court that when pri!ate respondent broughtthe complaint" it did so only to exercise a legal right" belie!ing that it had a meritoriouscause of action clearly borne out by a mere perusal of the promissory note and chattelmortgage (o constitute malicious prosecution" there must be proof that the prosecutionwas prompted by a sinister design to !ex and humiliate a person" and that it was

initiated deliberately" ,nowing that the charges were false and groundless Such wasnot the case when the instant complaint was filed (he rule has always been that moraldamages cannot be reco!ered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith (he law always presumes good faith such that any person who see,s tobe awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of pro!ing that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill moti!e

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.ase4 '6art Co66uniations In. vs. Regina Astorga – GR No. "#$3% 5anuar,!% !##.

8A.(S4 In this case" respondent Artoga was employed by SMA-( as one of its ?istrictSales Managers As such" she is recei!ing additional benefits from SMA-( in thecourse of her position from the company

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said propert# as to re*uire its return to plaintiff" is outside the pale of o!petene of alabor tribunal and be#ond the field of speiali/ation of 0abor Arbiters  

 A =urisdiction of regular courts o!er reple!in cases4In >asaya" =r ! Militante" this .ourt" in upholding the 'urisdiction of the -(. o!er the

reple!in suit" explained4-eple!in is a possessory action" the gist of which is the right of possession in theplaintiff (he primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in speciewrongfully detained by another person It is an ordinary statutory proceeding toad'udicate rights to the title or possession of personal property (he 2uestion of whether or not a party has the right of possession o!er the property in!ol!ed and if so" whether or not the ad!erse party has wrongfully ta,en and detained said property as to re2uireits return to plaintiff" is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyondthe field of specialiJation of Labor Arbitersx x x x(he labor dispute in!ol!ed is not intertwined with the issue in the -eple!in .ase (he

respecti!e issues raised in each forum can be resol!ed independently on the other Infact in /; Do!ember /:;3" the DL-. in the case before it had issued an In'uncti!e %riten'oining the petitioners from bloc,ing the free ingress and egress to the Cessel andordering the petitioners to disembar, and !acate (hat aspect of the contro!ersy isproperly settled under the Labor .ode So also with petitioners& right to pic,et >ut thedetermination of the 2uestion of who has the better right to ta,e possession of theCessel and whether petitioners can depri!e the .harterer" as the legal possessor of theCessel" of that right to possess in addressed to the competence of .i!il .ourtsIn thus ruling" this .ourt is not sanctioning split 'urisdiction but defining a !enues of 

 'urisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws

> Dature of -eple!in4-eple!in is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may reco!er those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or ta,en" or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels It is designed to permit oneha!ing right to possession to reco!er property in specie from one who has wrongfullyta,en or detained the property T0e ter6 6a, refer eit0er to t0e ation itself% for t0ereover, of personalt,% or to t0e provisional re6e*, traditionally associated with it"by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained duringthe pendency of the action

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.ase: Hao vs. An*res – AM No. P@#$@!24% 5une % !##

8A.(S4

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custody of the seiJed property for at least fi!e days $ence" the act of Andres indeli!ering the seiJed !ehicles immediately after seiJure to Sil!er for whate!er purpose"without obser!ing the fi!eday re2uirement finds no legal 'ustification

 A Property seiJed is under ustodia legis4

Li,ewise" Andres& claim that he had no ,nowledge that the compound is owned by Sil!er fails to con!ince us -egardless of who actually owns the compound" the fact remainsthat Andres deli!ered the !ehicles to Sil!er prematurely It !iolates the rule re2uiringhim to safe,eep the !ehicles in his custodyQ6;R (he alleged lac, of facility to store theseiJed !ehicles is unacceptable considering that he should ha!e deposited the same ina bonded warehouse If this was not feasible" he should ha!e sought prior authoriJationfrom the court issuing the writ before deli!ering the !ehicles to Sil!erIt must be stressed that from the moment an order of deli!ery in reple!in is executed byta,ing possession of the property specified therein" such property is in custodia legis

 As legal custodian" it is Andres& duty to safe,eep the seiJed motor !ehicles $ence"when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor !ehicles to Sil!er" he committed a clear 

neglect of duty

> ?uty of the sheriff4S+. 0 ?uty of the sheriffK#pon recei!ing such order" the sheriff must ser!e a

copy thereof on the ad!erse party" together with a copy of the application" affida!it andbond" and must forthwith ta,e the property" if it be in the possession of the ad!erseparty" or his agent" and retain it in his custody If the property or any part thereof beconcealed in a building or enclosure" the sheriff must demand its deli!ery" and if it be notdeli!ered" he must cause the building or enclosure to be bro,en open and ta,e theproperty into his possession After the sheriff has ta,en possession of the property asherein pro!ided" he must ,eep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its

deli!ery to the party entitled thereto upon recei!ing his fees and necessary expenses for ta,ing and ,eeping the same E+mphasis suppliedF  S+. 3 ?isposition of property by sheriffKIf within fi!e EBF days after theta,ing of the property by the sheriff" the ad!erse party does not ob'ect to the sufficiencyof the bond" or of the surety or sureties thereon5 or if the ad!erse party so ob'ects andthe court affirms its appro!al of the applicant&s bond or appro!es a new bond" or if thead!erse party re2uires the return of the property but his bond is ob'ected to and foundinsufficient and he does not forthwith file an appro!ed bond" the property shall bedeli!ered to the applicant If for any reason the property is not deli!ered to theapplicant" the sheriff must return it to the ad!erse party E+mphasis suppliedF 

. -ationale of the “B day -ule”In Pardo ! Celasco" this .ourt held that4-espondent as an officer of the .ourt is charged with certain ministerial duties whichmust be performed faithfully to the letter +!ery pro!ision in the -e!ised -ules of .ourthas a specific reason or ob'ecti!e In this case" the purpose of the fi!e EBF days is togi!e a chance to the defendant to ob'ect to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or 

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sureties thereon or re2uire the return of the property by filing a counterbond E+mphasissuppliedF? ?ue diligence re2uired4It must be stressed that as court custodian" it was Andres& responsibility to ensure thatthe motor !ehicles were safely ,ept and that the same were readily a!ailable upon order 

of the court or demand of the parties concerned Specifically" sheriffs" being ran,ingofficers of the court and agents of the law" must discharge their duties with great careand diligence In ser!ing and implementing court writs" as well as processes and ordersof the court" they cannot afford to err without affecting ad!ersely the proper dispensationof 'ustice Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of 'ustice and as agentsof the law" high standards of performance are expected of them $ence" his failure toreturn the motor !ehicles at the time when its return was still feasible constitutesanother instance of neglect of duty

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.ase4 Navarro vs. Eso1i*o – GR No. "2$% Nove61er !$% !##3.

8A.(S4 In this case" respondent Naren ( Go filed two complaints before the -(.

against petitioner -oger Da!arro (he second complaint is a prayer for the issuance of a writ of reple!in Apparently" petitioner Da!arro entered into a lease agreement with anoption to purchase a certain motor !ehicle Ema,eHtype 8#S< with mounted craneF withGo (he agreement was then sign by Naren Go&s husband Glenn Go" who is themanager of the NA-G< +D(+-P-IS+S" a sole proprietorship registered under thename of the respondent therein Da!arro deli!ered six E3F postdated chec,s each inthe amount of P33"77777 which were supposedly in payments of the agreed rentals"that when the fifth and the six chec,s were deli!ered and deposited by Go" the samewas dishonored for the reason that deposit account in which the chec, were issued didnot ha!e sufficient funds to co!er the same $ence" respondent demands the paymentof P/76" 33333" which were the balance remaining or to return the sub'ect !ehiclesPetitioner howe!er" failed to do the same" thus" the -(. issued writs of reple!in and thesheriff seiJed the !ehicle and deli!ered it to the respondent Petitioner then 2uestionsthe implementation of the writ of reple!in $e insists that a “prior demand” is necessarybefore the action of writ of reple!in is filed

ISS#+4 %hether or not prior demand is necessary before a party may file a writ of reple!in)

$+L?4 D

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otherwise plaed under ustodia legis" or if so sei/ed" that it is exe!pt fro! suhsei/ure or ustod#4 and 2d3 he atual !ar'et value of the propert#.(he applicant must also gi!e a 1on*" executed to the ad!erse party in double the !alueof the property as stated in the affida!it aforementioned" for the return of the property to

the ad!erse party if such return be ad'udged" and for the payment to the ad!erse partyof such sum as he may reco!er from the applicant in the action

>

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&etion 8. &pouses as parties. 6 9usband and wife shall sue or be sued ointl#" exept as provided b# law.$on-oinder of indispensable parties not ground to dis!iss ation+!en assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action" we ha!e held in anumber of cases" that the mis'oinder or non'oinder of indispensable parties in a

complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action&e. 11. isoinder and non-oinder of parties. $either !isoinder nor non-oinder of  parties is ground for dis!issal of an ation. Parties !a# be dropped or added b# order of the ourt on !otion of an# part# or on its own initiative at an# stage of the ation and on suh ter!s as are ust. An# lai! against a !isoined part# !a# be severed and 

 proeeded with separatel#.In ?omingo ! Scheer" this .ourt held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is

to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action (he court" either motu

proprio or upon the motion of a party" may order the inclusion of the indispensable party

or gi!e the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable

parties

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'(PP;RT

.ase4 )e Asis vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. !$"$% &e1 "% 333.

8A.(S4 In this case" Circel Andres" in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor Glen .amil Andres ?e Asis" brought an action before the -(." for maintenance andsupport against petitioner Manuel de Asis" alleging the latter to be the father of thesub'ect minor In his answer" petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor andtheoriJed that cannot be liable to pro!ide support ?uring the pendency of the case"Circel made a manifestation through her counsel withdrawing her action for support"since according to her" defendant&s admission of denial renders such action useless andfutile

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dismissed (hereafter" a similar case was instituted by Manuela" which the defendantmo!ed to dismiss" theoriJing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the second caseIn disposing such case" this .ourt ruled" thus4(he new .i!il .ode pro!ides that the allowance for support is pro!isional because the

amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the gi!er and theneeds of the recipient EArt 6:9F5 and that the right to recei!e support cannot berenounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated withwhat the recipient owes the obligator EArt 7/F 8urthermore" the right to support cannot be wai!ed or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the sub'ect of compromise EArt 67B5 .oral ! Gallego" 7; -ationale behind the proscription against renunciation" transmission" andHor compromise of the right to support4(he raison d etre behind the proscription against renunciation" transmission andHor compromise of the right to support is stated" thus4(he right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain hisexistence" he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would meansanctioning the !oluntary gi!ing up of life itself (he right to life cannot be renounce5hence" support which is the means to attain the former" cannot be renouncedxxx xxx xxx(o allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person tosupport is !irtually to allow either suicide or the con!ersion of the recipient to a public

burden (his is contrary to public policy

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.ase4 People vs. Mana0an – GR No. !"$% 'epte61er !3% 333

8A.(S4 In this case" (eresita (ibigar" filed a criminal complaint against the accused

Manuel" Manahan" when the latter forced the complainant to ha!e sexual intercourse(he incident resulted to (eresita&s pregnancy (he -(. con!icted the accused of rapeand sentence him to death penalty and to indemnify the complainant for moraldamages" pay costs and ac,nowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion (hematter was brought before the Supreme .ourt for automatic re!iew

ISS#+4 %hether or not Manahan can be compelled to ac,nowledge and support hisoffspring)

$+L?4 $e cannot be compelled to ac,nowledge" but he is liable for support Article 70B

of (he -e!ised Penal .ode pro!ides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced

to 1ac,nowledge the offspring" unless the law should pre!ent him from doing so"1 and1in e!ery case to support the offspring1 In the case before us" compulsory

ac,nowledgment of the child Melanie (ibigar is not proper there being a legal

impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man As pronounced

by this .ourt in People ! Guerrero" the rule is that if the rapist is a married man" he

cannot be compelled to recogniJe the offspring of the crime" should there be any" as his

child" whether legitimate or illegitimate1 .onse2uently" that portion of the 'udgment

under re!iew is accordingly deleted In any case" we sustain that part ordering the

accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law

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Lope8 vs Court of Appeals

8acts4 (he -egional (rial .ourt E-(.F of Malabon a decision declaring the nullity of

marriage between .herry Pie LopeJ and Alberto LopeJ a,a .esar LopeJ EpetitionerF

(he decision became final and executory based on a certification/ dated =anuary B"

6/ Petitioner mo!ed to reconsider 6 the support aspect of the decision but was

denied by

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.ase4 Montefalon vs. -as+ue8 – GR No. 9"#9% 5une $% !##

8A.(S4 In /:::" petitioner ?olores P Montefalcon filed a .omplaint0 for 

ac,nowledgment and support against respondent -onnie S Cas2ueJ before the -(. of Daga .ity Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Cas2ueJ" sheprayed that Cas2ueJ be obliged to gi!e support to copetitioner Laurence Montefalcon"whose certificate of li!e birth he signed as fatherB According to petitioners" Cas2ueJonly ga!e a total of P/:" as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in /::7Cas2ueJ allegedly also refused to gi!e him regular school allowance despite repeateddemands Petitioner ?olores added that she and Cas2ueJ are not legally married" andthat Cas2ueJ has his own family %hen the sheriff was about to ser!e the summons" therespondent was nowhere to be found" hence" the personal ser!ice thereof was ne!er been effected Instead" the sheriff ser!ed the summons through a substituted ser!ice onCaJ2ueJ careta,er (he -(. declared respondent in default for failure to file an answer"thus" the court a 2ou ruled in fa!or of Monetfalcon and ordered Cas2ueJ toac,nowledge Lawrence as his illegitimate child and support him in the amount of PB monthly

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/ Status It is of 'udicial notice that o!erseas 8ilipino seafarers are contractualemployees (hey go bac, to the country once their contracts expire" and wait for thesigning of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if theywish It is therefore common ,nowledge that a 8ilipino seaman often has a temporaryresidence in the urban areas li,e Metro Manila" where ma'ority of the manning agencies

hold offices" aside from his home address in the pro!ince where he originates In thiscase" respondent Cas2ueJ hails from .amarines Sur but he has li!ed in (aguig .itywhen the complaint was filed Dotice may then be ta,en that he has established aresidence in either place -esidence is a place where the person named in thesummons is li!ing at the time when the ser!ice was made" e!en though he wastemporarily abroad at the time As an o!erseas seafarer" Cas2ueJ was a 8ilipinoresident temporarily out of the country $ence" ser!ice of summons on him is go!ernedby -ule /0" Section /3 of the -ules of .ourt6 -ules applicable4&5+. 1hen an# ation iso!!ened against a defendant who ordinaril# resides within the Philippines" but who

is te!poraril# out of it" servie !a#" b# leave of ourt" be alsoeffeted out of thePhilippines" as under the preeding setion. 25!phasis supplied.3he preeding setion referred to states:&5+. 1. 5xtraterritorial servie.= >hen the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines" and the ation affets the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to"or the subet of whih is" propert# within the Philippines" in whih the defendant has or lai!s a lien or interest" atual or ontingent" or in whih the relief de!anded onsists"wholl# or in part" in exluding the defendant fro! an# interest therein" or the propert# of the defendant has been attahed within the Philippines" service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6;or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in suh plaes and for suhti!e as the ourt !a# order" in whih ase a op# of the su!!ons and order of theourt shall be sent b# registered !ail to the last 'nown address of the defendant" or inan# other !anner the ourt !a# dee! suffiient. An# order granting suh leave shall speif# a reasonable ti!e" whih shall not be less than sixt# 2

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court commissioned a (aguig .itybased sheriff to ser!e the summons >oth the Dagaand (aguig sheriffs in2uired about Cas2ueJs whereabouts" signifying that they did notimmediately resort to substituted ser!ice (here was no undue haste in effectingsubstituted ser!ice (he fact that the Daga court allowed a reasonable time to locateCas2ueJ to as far as (aguig shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in ser!ing

the summons

In this case" we agree that the substituted ser!ice in (aguig was !alid and 'ustifiedbecause pre!ious attempts were made by the sheriffs to ser!e the summons" but to noa!ail ?iligent efforts were e!idently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs inthe performance of their official duty Also" the person who recei!ed the alias summonswas of suitable age and discretion" then residing at Cas2ueJs dwelling

> Meaning of “residene 1-esidence1 is the place where the person named in the summons is li!ing at the time

when the ser!ice is made" e!en though he may be temporarily out of the country at thetime A plaintiff is merely re2uired to ,now the defendants residence" office or regular business place $e need not ,now where a resident defendant actually is at the !erymoment of filing suit $e is not e!en dutybound to ensure that the person upon whomser!ice was actually made deli!ers the summons to the defendant or informs him aboutit (he law presumes that for him It is immaterial that defendant does not recei!e actualnotice. +stablishment of Illegitimate filiation4

 Article /9B of the 8amily .ode of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation maybe established in the same way and on the same e!idence as legitimate children #nder 

 Article /96"69 the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following4 E/F

through record of birth appearing in the ci!il register or a final order5 or E6F by admissionof filiation in a public document or pri!ate handwritten instrument and signed by theparent concerned5 or in default of these two" by open and continuous possession of thestatus of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the -ules of .ourt andspecial laws

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.ase4 Li6 vs. Li6 – GR No. 92!#3% ;to1er 2#% !##3.

8A.(S4 In this case" respondent .heryl S Lim is married to +dward Lim" son of the

petitioners E.heryl&s parentsinlawsF therein (heir union blessed them with threechildren .heryl and her husband together with their children all li!ed with the petitionersand .hua Gia," an inhouse midwife $owe!er" due to a !iolent confrontation betweenthe spouses Lim E+dward was caught cheating with .hua Gia,F" respondent abandonedher home bringing the children with her She subse2uently filed before the -(. for support (he court a 2uo granted the petition and ordered +dward and the petitioners to“'ointly” pro!ide P0" E+dward shouldering P3" and the remaining balance tothe petitionersF monthly support to the respondents An appeal was made by thepetitioners before the .ourt of Appeals assailing their liability to support .heryl and her children $owe!er" it affirmed the decision of the trial court" arguing that althoughparents and their legitimate children are obliged to support each other" this obligationextends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren as mentioned in

 Article /:B of the 8amily .ode $ence" the matter was brought before the Supreme.ourt

ISS#+4 %hether petitioners are concurrently liable with +dward to pro!ide support torespondents)

$+L?4 *+S $ere" there is no 2uestion that .heryl is unable to discharge her obligationto pro!ide sufficient legal support to her children" then all schoolbound It is alsoundisputed that the amount of support +dward is able to gi!e to respondents" P3" amonth" is insufficient to meet respondents& basic needs (his inability of +dward and.heryl to sufficiently pro!ide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to theascendants in the nearest degree" both in the paternal EpetitionersF and maternal lines"following the ordering in Article /:: (o hold otherwise" and thus subscribe to petitioners&theory" is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material depri!ationof children because of parental inability to gi!e ade2uate support e!en if ascendantsone degree remo!ed are more than able to fill the !oid $owe!er" petitioners& partialconcurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonlyunderstood to refer to relati!es" by blood of lower degree As petitioners& grandchildrenby blood" only respondents Lester +dward" .andice Grace and Mariano III belong tothis category Indeed" .heryl&s right to recei!e support from the Lim family extends onlyto her husband +dward" arising from their marital bond

 A Support under Parental Authority E(itle IF !s Support E(itle CIIIF4Petitioners themsel!es admit as much K they limit their petition to the narrow 2uestion of when their liability is triggered" not if they are liable -elying on pro!isions found in (itleI of the .i!il .ode" as amended" on Parental Authority" petitioners theoriJe that their liability is acti!ated only upon default of parental authority" concei!ably either by itstermination or suspension during the children&s minority >ecause at the timerespondents sued for support" .heryl and +dward exercised parental authority o!er 

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their children" petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter&s offspring endswith themDeither the text of the law nor the teaching of 'urisprudence supports this se!ereconstriction of the scope of familial obligation to gi!e support In the first place" thego!erning text are the rele!ant pro!isions in (itle CIII of the .i!il .ode" as amended" on

Support" not the pro!isions in (itle I on Parental Authority %hile both areas share acommon ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to pro!ide legalsupport" they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and itsconcurrence among relati!es of differing degrees (hus" although the obligation topro!ide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child"the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during theobligees lifetime Also" while parental authority under (itle I Eand the correlati!eparental rightsF pertains to parents" passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension" the obligation to pro!ide legal support passes on to ascendants not onlyupon default of the parents but also for the latter&s inability to pro!ide sufficient support

>

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ID(+-PL+A?+-4

.ase4 Eternal Gar*ens vs. IAC – GR No. $2$34% 'epte61er % 3.  

&ACT': +(+-DAL Gardens Memorial Par,s .orporation E+(+-DALF and Dorth

Philippine #nion MISSI

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 'ustice and e2uity4 1that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or 

funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoe!er will

ultimately be decided as entitled thereto1

(he case at bar was ele!ated to the .ourt of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and

mandatory in'unction Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos

are in!ol!ed5 so that on interest alone for sa!ings or time deposit would be

considerable" now accruing in fa!or of the +(+-DAL 8inding that such is !iolati!e of 

the !ery essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest

of 'ustice in this case" the .ourt of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower 

court committed a gra!e abuse of discretion which re2uires correction by the

re2uirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a ban, appro!ed by the

.ourt

 A +ssence of Interpleader4

 As correctly obser!ed by the .ourt of Appeals" the essence of an interpleader" aside

from the disa!owal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner" is

the deposit of the property or funds in contro!ersy with the court It is a rule foun*e*

on ?ustie an* e+uit,: Dt0at t0e plaintiff 6a, not ontinue to 1enefit fro6 t0e

propert, or fun*s in litigation *uring t0e pen*en, of t0e suit at t0e e=pense of 

70oever 7ill ulti6atel, 1e *ei*e* as entitle* t0ereto.

>

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>ut a careful re!iew of the records shows that there is no 'udgment on the merits in

G- Do 97B3: and in the case at bar" G- Do 979:05 both of which deal on mere

incidents arising therefrom

In G- Do 97B3:" the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for 

reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for execution"while in the case at bar" what is assailed is the propriety of the order of respondent

appellant court that petitioner +ternal Gardens should deposit whate!er amounts are

due from it under the Land ?e!elopment Agreement with a reputable ban, to be

designated by the .ourt In fact" there is a pending trial on the merits in the trial court

which the petitioner insists is a pre'udicial 2uestion which should first be resol!ed

Moreo!er" while there may be Identity of parties and of sub'ect matter" the Land

?e!elopment .ontract" there is no Identity of issues as clearly shown by the petitions

filed

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.ase4 a a Golf Clu1 vs. Lee E. on – GR No. !2"% Mar0 !9% 3$9

&ACT': %ac,wac, Golf and .ountry .orporation issued certificates of stoc, to its

members A problem arose when its membership fee certificate 6/ was being claimedby two parties Although the .orporation officially recogniJed one >ien!enido (an as the

owner of the stoc,s in 2uestion" another person" Lee %on also claimed ownership

Instead of compelling claimants %on and (an to settle their dispute amongst

themsel!es so that the .orporation could !alidly recogniJe the rightful owner of the

stoc,s" %ac,%ac, .orportion chose to do nothing

 And so" Mr %on filed a ci!il case against the corporation for the issuance of stoc,

certificates wherein the .ourt ruled in fa!or of %on

Later on" e!en when the decision in the abo!estated case had already become final"the .orporation still went on to file an Interpleader suit against both %on and (an (his

suit was dismissed because defendant %on claimed res 'udicata

 And so" the .orporation appeals its case arguing that its interpleader suit was proper as

there were two conflicting claims against its issued stoc, certificate and that the

corporation itself wasn&t claiming ownership of said certificate It also argued that with

regards to res 'udicata" the same is not applicable to its interpleader suit because there

is no identity of the parties" sub'ectmatter" and cause of action with the earlier case filed

by Mr %on

I''(E: Should the interpleader suit be dismissed on the ground of res 'udicata) %as

the interpleader suit filed by %ac,wac, proper as there were in fact two claimants to its

certificate)

HEL): (he interpleader suit should really be dismissed but not on res 'udicata but

because the interpleader suit was filed out of time #pon its ,nowledge that two parties

were battling for the ownership of membership .ertificate of Stoc, 6/" %ac,%ac,

should ha!e already filed an interpleader suit in order two compel the conflicting parties

to settle as to whose claim %ac,%ac, should recogniJe In other words" thereasonable time to ha!e filed the interpleader suit was after dispute had arisen without

waiting to be sued by any of the claimants" otherwise he may be barred by laches

 And so" the corporation&s action is deemed to late when it was filed only after 'udgment

against it had already been rendered by one of the claimants in an independent suit

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 And because %ac,%ac, has offered no explanation as to why it wasn&t able to file an

interpleader suit much sooner" nor as to why it didn&t implead (an in the suit against it"

the .orporation has already become independently liable

(o now permit the .orporation to bring Lee to court after the latters successful

establishment of his rights in ci!il case 6300 to the membership fee certificate 6/" isto increase instead of to diminish the number of suits" which is one of the purposes of 

an action of interpleader" with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the

fa!orable 'udgment (his cannot be done because ha!ing elected to ta,e its chances of 

success in said ci!il case 6300" with full ,nowledge of all the fact" the .orporation must

submit to the conse2uences of defeat

 A Dature of Interpleader4

/ #nder Section /6 of the .ode of .i!il Procedure4 (he action of interpleader" under 

section /6 of the .ode of .i!il Procedure" is a remedy whereby a person who haspersonal property in his possession" or an obligation to render wholly or partially" without

claiming any right to either" comes to court and as,s that the persons who claim the said

personal property or who consider themsel!es entitled to demand compliance with the

obligation" be re2uired to litigate among themsel!es in order to determine finally who is

entitled to tone or the one thing (he remedy is afforded to protect a person not against

double liability but against double !exation in respect of one liability

6 #nder the -ules of .ourt it is the same as that under the .ode of .i!il Procedure"

except that under the former" the remedy of interpleader is a!ailable regardless of the

nature of the sub'ectmatter of the contro!ersy" whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the sub'ectmatter of the contro!ersy is personal property or relates

to the performance of an obligation

> -easonable diligence of a sta,eholder4

 A sta,eholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to

court $e need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing

a bill of interpleader $e should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time

after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending

claimants

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It has been held that a sta,eholders action of interpleader is too late when filed after 

 'udgment has been rendered against him in fa!or of one of the contending claimants"

especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the

 'udgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the ad!erse claimants in the suit

where 'udgment was entered (his must be so" because once 'udgment is obtained

against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter

? General -ules in Interpleader4

/ It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to as, for 

an order of intrepleader" he must be prepared to show" among other prere2uisites" that

he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants

6 It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after 

 'udgment has been rendered in fa!or of one of the claimants of the fund" this being

especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior tothe rendition of the 'udgment and had an opportunity to implead the ad!erse claimants

in the suit in which the 'udgment was rendered

+ .onse2uences of not a!ailing the remedy on time4

(he remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and

haJard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand5 but one who" with

,nowledge of all the facts" neglects to a!ail himself of the relief" or elects to ta,e the

chances for success in the actions at law" ought to submit to the conse2uences of 

defeat (o permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to

interplead" is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits5 to put upon the

shoulders of others the burden which he as,s may be ta,en from his own

>esides" a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated ad!ersary in an

interpleader suit and compelled to pro!e his claim anew against other ad!erse

claimants" as that would in effect be a collateral attac, upon the 'udgment

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.ase4 Pasri0a vs. )on Luis )i8on Realt, – GR No. 294#3% Mar0 4% !##

8A.(S4 Petitioners are lesees of nine rooms in a building owned by lessor ?on Luis

?ison -ealty" Inc of the San Luis >uilding" located at +rmita" Manila It was clear intheir contract that all the rooms may be occupied right away except for three rooms"

which may be occupied only when the tenants !acate said premises (he lease of three

rooms howe!er did not materialiJe lea!ing only six rooms as sub'ects of the lease

contracts %hile the contracts were in effect" petitioners dealt with 8rancis Pacheco

EPachecoF" then General Manager of pri!ate respondent (hereafter" Pacheco was

replaced by -oswinda >autista EMs >autistaF Petitioners religiously paid the monthly

rentals until May /::6 After that" howe!er" despite repeated demands" petitioners

continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent

>ecause petitioners still refused to comply" a complaint for e'ectment was filed bypri!ate respondent through its representati!e" Ms >autista" before the Metropolitan (rial

.ourt EMe(.F of Manila Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for 

the leased premises starting =uly until Do!ember /::6" but claimed that such refusal

was 'ustified because of the internal s2uabble in respondent company as to the person

authoriJed to recei!e payment

(he Me(. rendered a decision dismissing the complaint because of Ms >autista&s

alleged lac, of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation It ruled howe!er" that the

nonpayment of the rental fee was un'ustified (he -(. on appeal adopted the Me(.&s

finding on petitioners& un'ustified refusal to pay the rent" which is a !alid ground for e'ectment It" howe!er" faulted the Me(. in dismissing the case on the ground of lac, of 

capacity to sue Instead" it upheld Ms >autista&s authority to represent respondent

notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect" since her authority was

implied from her power as a general managerHtreasurer of the company (he .A

affirmed the -(.&s decision $ence the present appeal

I''(E: %hether or not petitioners are 'ustified in withholding payments of rental fee on

the ground that there is confusion as to whom shall payment be made)

HEL): D

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contract As borne out by the records" the fact is that respondent turned o!er to

petitioners the ,eys to the leased premises and petitioners" in fact" reno!ated the

rooms (hus" they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the right to

the use and en'oyment of the same (hey" li,ewise" had the right to resist any act of 

intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property" e!en as against the lessor itself

*et" they did not lift a finger to protect their right if" indeed" there was a !iolation of the

contract by the lessor

%hat was" instead" clearly established by the e!idence was petitioners& nonpayment of 

rentals because ostensibly they did not ,now to whom payment should be made

$owe!er" this did not 'ustify their failure to pay" because if such were the case" they

were not without any remedy (hey should ha!e a!ailed of the pro!isions of the .i!il

.ode of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the -ules of .ourt on

interpleader

Deither can petitioners !alidly in!o,e the nondeli!ery of three -ooms as a 'ustification

for nonpayment of rentals Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine

rooms" the terms of the contracts with their particular reference to specific rooms and

the monthly rental for each easily raise the inference that the parties intended the

lease of each room separate from that of the others (here is nothing in the contract

which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to be made

dependent upon the lease of all the nine E:F rooms Accordingly" the use of each room

by the lessee ga!e rise to the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the

same Dotably" respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actuallydeli!ered to" and used by" petitioners

 A .onsignation under the .i!il .ode4

 Article /6B3 of the .i!il .ode pro!ides4

If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without 'ust cause to

accept it" the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the

thing or sum due

.onsignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases4

x x x x

E0F %hen two or more persons claim the same right to collect5

x x x x

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.onsignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a 'udicial

authority" before whom the tender of payment shall be pro!ed in a proper case" and the

announcement of the consignation in other cases

In the instant case" consignation alone would ha!e produced the effect of payment of 

the rentals (he rationale for consignation is to a!oid the performance of an obligationbecoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him

Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared

!ouchers for their monthly rentals >ut that was insufficient to constitute a !alid tender of 

payment +!en assuming that it was !alid tender" still" it would not constitute payment

for want of consignation of the amount %ellsettled is the rule that tender of payment

must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be

produced

> Interpleader when proper4

Moreo!er" Section /" -ule 36 of the -ules of .ourt pro!ides4

&etion 1. >hen interpleader proper. 6 >henever onfliting lai!s upon the sa!e

subet !atter are or !a# be !ade against a person who lai!s no interest whatever in

the subet !atter" or an interest whih in whole or in part is not disputed b# the

lai!ants" he !a# bring an ation against the onfliting lai!ants to o!pel the! to

interplead and litigate their several lai!s a!ong the!selves.

;t0er7ise state*% an ation for interplea*er is proper 70en t0e lessee *oes notno7 to 70o6 pa,6ent of rentals s0oul* 1e 6a*e *ue to onfliting lai6s on

t0e propert, For on t0e rig0t to ollet

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?+.LA-A( an*

a *elarator, ?u*g6ent on t0e onstitutionalit, of t0e ats of religious lea*ers

en*orsing a an*i*ate for an eletive offie% or urging or re+uiring t0e 6e61ers

of t0eir flo to vote for a speifie* an*i*ate.  >ro +ddie Cillanue!a submitted"

within the original period Qto file an AnswerR" a Motion to ?ismiss Subse2uently"+xecuti!e Minister +rao Manalo and >ro Mi,e Celarde" filed their Motions to ?ismiss

%hile $is +minence =aime .ardinal L Sin" filed a .omment and >ro +li Soriano" filed

an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the

Petition All soug0t t0e *is6issal of t0e Petition on t0e o66on groun*s t0at it

*oes not state a ause of ation an* t0at t0ere is no ?ustiia1le ontrovers, (hey

were ordered to submit a pleading by way of ad!isement" which was closely followed by

another ro Mi,e Celarde" >ro +ddie

Cillanue!a and +xecuti!e Minister +rao Manalo mo!ed to reconsider the denial $is

+minence =aime .ardinal L Sin" as,ed for extension to file memorandum ro +li

Soriano complied with the first ro +ddie Cillanue!a and +xecuti!e Minister +rao Manalo" which raised no new

arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss After 

narrating the abo!e incidents" t0e trial ourt sai* t0at it 0a* ?uris*ition over t0e

Petition% 1eause in pra,ing for a *eter6ination as to 70et0er t0e ations

i6pute* to t0e respon*ents are violative of Artile II% 'etion 9 of t0e

&un*a6ental La7% Kt0e Petition 0as raise* onl, a +uestion of la7.  It then

proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition K the separation of 

church and state K e!en tracing" to some extent" the historical bac,ground of the

principle (hrough its discourse" t0e trial ourt opine* at so6e point t0at t0e

Ken*orse6ent of speifi an*i*ates in an eletion to an, pu1li offie is a lear 

violation of t0e separation lause. After its essa, on t0e legal issue% 0o7ever% t0e

trial ourt faile* to inlu*e a *ispositive portion in its assaile* )eision. (hus"

Celarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for -econsideration which were denied by

the lower court Celarde filed the petition for re!iew

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Issue [1: %hether S=S has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief

!eld [1: Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial

interest in the case" such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in'ury as a

result of the challenged act Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected

by the 2uestioned act or instrument" as distinguished from a mere incidental interest inthe 2uestion in!ol!ed Celarde alleged that “QiRn see,ing declaratory relief as to the

constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse" or re2uire the members of the

religious floc, to !ote for a specific candidate" herein -espondent S=S has no legal

interest in the contro!ersy”5 it has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered

2uestion would benefit or in'ure it Parties 1ringing suits 0allenging t0e

onstitutionalit, of a la7% an at or a statute 6ust s0o7 not onl, t0at t0e la7 Kor 

at is invali*% 1ut also t0at Kt0e, 0ave sustaine* or Kare in i66e*iate or 

i66inent *anger of sustaining so6e *iret in?ur, as a result of its enfore6ent%

an* not 6erel, t0at Kt0e, suffer t0ere1, in so6e in*efinite 7a,.  (hey must

demonstrate that they ha!e been" or are about to be" denied some right or pri!ilege to

which they are lawfully entitled" or that they are about to be sub'ected to some burdens

or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of 8irst" parties suing as

taxpayers must specifically pro!e that they ha!e sufficient interest in pre!enting the

illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation A taxpayer&s action may be properly

brought only when there is an exercise by .ongress of its taxing or spending power

$erein" there is no allegation" whether express or implied" that taxpayers& money is

being illegally disbursed Second" t0ere 7as no s0o7ing in t0e Petition for 

)elarator, Relief t0at '5' as a politial part, or its 6e61ers as registere*

voters 7oul* 1e a*versel, affete* 1, t0e allege* ats of -elar*e% et al.% if t0e+uestion at issue 7as not resolve*. T0ere 7as no allegation t0at '5' 0a*

suffere* or 7oul* 1e *eprive* of votes *ue to t0e ats i6pute* to t0e -elar*e et

al.. Neit0er *i* it allege t0at an, of its 6e61ers 7oul* 1e *enie* t0e rig0t of 

suffrage or t0e privilege to 1e vote* for a pu1li offie t0e, are seeing.  8inally"

the allegedly ,een interest of its “thousands of members who are citiJenstaxpayers

registered !oters” is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by

our 'urisprudence Dot only is the presumed interest impersonal in character5 it is

li,ewise too !ague" highly speculati!e and uncertain to satisfy the re2uirement of 

standing

Issue [": %hether the constitutional issue in the S=S Petition raises an issue of 

transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people" so as to allow the

cogniJance of the Petition" e!en sans legal standing

!eld [": In not a few cases" the .ourt has liberaliJed the locus standi re2uirement

when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance

to the people $erein" the .ourt deemed the constitutional issue raised in the S=S

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Petition to be of paramount interest to the 8ilipino people (he issue did not simply

concern a delineation of the separation between church and state" but ran smac, into

the go!ernance of our country (he issue was both transcendental in importance and

no!el in nature" since it had ne!er been decided before (he .ourt" thus" called for

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.AS+4 Al6e*a vs. /at0ala Mareting In*ustries – GR No. "##9% 5anura, !%

!##

&ACT': -espondent >athala Mar,eting Industries renewed its contract of lease with

Ponciano Almeda" the father of -omel Almeda and the husband of +ufemia" who are

the petitioners in this case (he contract of lease contains the following pro!isions whichgi!e rise to the instant case" to wit4

“SI($ It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is

based on the present rate of assessment on the property" and that in case the

assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax" charge or burden be

imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located"

L+SS++ shall pay" when the rental herein pro!ided becomes due" the additional rental

or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased5 pro!ided" howe!er" that in the

e!ent that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced" L+SS++

shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental" li,ewise in proportion to the portionleased by him5

S+C+D($ In case an extraordinary inflation or de!aluation of Philippine .urrency

should super!ene" the !alue of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the

obligation shall be the basis of payment5”

?uring the effecti!ity of the contract" Ponciano died Petitioners therein in a letter"

ad!ised respondent >athala that it would be assessed and collect CA( from its monthly

rentals In response" >athala contend that CA( may not be imposed as the rentals fixed

on the contact of lease were supposed to include CA(" in lieu that there contract wasestablished when the CA( law has been effected $owe!er" respondent recei!ed

another letter from the petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be

increased by 97V pursuant to condition no 9 of the contact and Article /6B of the ci!il

code >athala opposed the said increased arguing that there was no extraordinary

inflation to warrant the application of the said Article $ence" respondent >athala

instituted an action for declaratory relief to determine the correct interpretation of the

conditions no 3 and 9 of the contract of lease In turn" petitioners instituted an action for 

e'ectment" rescission and damages against respondent for failure to heed the demand

to !acate the premises In addition" they mo!ed to dismiss the action for declaratory

relief since respondent already breach the obligation and the case would not end thelitigation and settle the rights of the parties (he -(. ruled in fa!or of >athala athala was in

breach of obligation when it filed the action before the trail court)

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$+L?4 *+S Petitioners insists that respondent was already in breach of the contract

when the petition was filed %e do not agree After petitioners demanded payment of 

ad'usted rentals and in the months that followed" respondent complied with the terms

and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein

-espondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners e!en during the pendency of 

the present suit (here is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a

breach of the sub'ect contract of lease (hus" respondent is not barred from instituting

before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief

 A -e2uisites of ?eclaratory -elief4

?ecisional law enumerates the re2uisites of an action for declaratory relief" as follows4

/F the sub'ect matter of the contro!ersy must be a deed" will" contract or other written

instrument" statute" executi!e order or regulation" or ordinance5

6F the terms of said documents and the !alidity thereof are doubtful and re2uire 'udicial

construction5

7F there must ha!e been no breach of the documents in 2uestion5

0F there must be an actual 'usticiable contro!ersy or the 1ripening seeds1 of one

between persons whose interests are ad!erse5

BF the issue must be ripe for 'udicial determination5 and

3F ade2uate relief is not a!ailable through other means or other forms of action or 

proceeding

>

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.AS+4 Re,es vs. ;rti8% GR No. 2$$34% August % !##.

&ACT': (he instant cases are consolidated Petitions for ?eclaratory -elief" .ertiorari

and Prohibition In G- Do /799:0 E/st caseF" petitioners -eyes et al see, to declarenull and !oid the proceedings in an e'ectment case before Me(." .aloocan and another 

case for -eco!ery of Possession and autista" Sps Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of +rlinda -eyes"

Sps MatienJo and Sergio Abe'ero" who are occupants of separate homelots in

.amarin (he first case was initiated by Segundo >autista" as the registered owner" he

filed a complaint against land occupants Sps MatienJo in -(." .aloocan E-+.AF (he

O.-(. issued Preliminary In'unction freeJing all e'ectment cases in the Me(.s of O.

in!ol!ing (ALA +state >elie!ing the said In'unction beneficial to them" Sps MatienJo

filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the -eco!ery .ase which was denied5

li,ewise" the M- was denied (rial on merits started on ?ec 6" /::;

(he second case" an e'ectment case" was filed by Sps >ernard and 8lorencia Perl

against -eyes before Me(." .aloocan (hereafter" Sps Perl also filed an e'ectment

cas