yemen opr final report 12616

7/25/2019 Yemen OPR Final Report 12616

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FINAL REPORT Operational Peer Review

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OPERATIONAL

PEER

REVIEW

RESPONSE

TO THE YEMEN

CRISIS

RELEASE D ATE: 26 J ANUARY, 2016 MISSION DATES:28 NOVEMBER – 8 DECEMBER 2015

Summary .......................................... 1

Key Course Correctors ..................... 3

Context ............................................. 5

Rationale for the Operational Peer

Review .............................................. 5

Findings and Recommendations ..... 6

Leadership and Coordination ........... 6

Delivering Assistance ........................ 8

Accountability to Affected

Populations…………………………………..12

Protection ....................................... 12

Global

Issues……………………………………………15

Next Steps ...................................... 18 Annex I. Action Plan....................... 19

Annex II. Glossary of Terms ............ 27

Annex III OPR Schedule. ................. 29

Annex IV. List of Meetings and People

Consulted ....................................... 30

SUMMARY

1. The Saudi-led coalition, consisting of ten countries1, began targeted air

strikes on Houthi positions in Sana’a, Yemen on 26 March 2015. The

coalition airstrikes escalated an already unstable situation into a fully-

blown conflict. Humanitarian operations are being conducted in anactive war zone where bombs are being dropped daily. The levels of

insecurity under which the operation is being implemented cannot be

overstated. The coalition also imposed an aerial and naval blockade as

part of the military intervention, Operation Decisive Storm, which has

radically limited the import of goods which are essential to the daily lives

of all people in Yemen, and has exacerbated the suffering of affected

people.

2. As a result of the coalition’s escalation of hostilities, the UN started

evacuating staff from Yemen on the 28 March. The majority of

international NGOs also left the country, leaving Médecins Sans

Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) as the only international humanitarian presence in the country.

3. UN agencies started to return to Yemen shortly after with a limited

number of staff due to the security ceiling that was put in place. The

initial ceiling allowed 17 UN staff into Yemen. This was increased

incrementally to more than 105 slots (37 reserved for security staff) as of

14 October 2015, but fluctuates. During the OPR mission, the security

ceiling was reduced to 80 slots due to insufficient security guard capacity

in the Diplomatic Transit Facility, the residence of all UN staff in Sana’a.

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KEY COURSE CORRECTORS

BETTER HUMANITARIAN

ACCESS

(a) EXPAND FIELD

PRESENCE. BRING THE

RESPONSE CLOSER TO

THE PEOPLE

(b) STRENGTHEN SECURITY

MANAGEMENT TOBETTER ENABLE FIELD

PRESENCE AND

DELIVERY

(c) STRONGER

ENGAGEMENT WITH ALL

ACTORS THAT ENABLE

BETTER ACCESS

Strengthen delivery of assistance to the people in need.

Limited field presence and proximity to people affected by the crisis is impeding a

clear understanding of humanitarian needs and consequently hampering the

delivery of assistance in terms of scale, speed and appropriateness of response.

International humanitarian agencies and organisations need to expand their field

presence to ensure proximity to affected people in priority areas. This will result in

better information analysis, stronger evidence based assessments and direct

monitoring to accurately understand risks and needs and ensure adequate direct

support to those most in need.

A more effective security management system at the country level is required to

achieve better field presence (currently only one out of six field hubs is fullyoperational). Security decisions need to be made by the Senior Management Team

(SMT) in Sana’a, including the review of the “evacuation” status for locations

outside the capital, to support the long overdue request by operational agencies to

roll out their presence. In addition:

- The Chief Security Advisor (CSA) needs to lead the effort to roll out operations

to the field through support and advice to the DO and SMT and by participating

in missions outside Sana’a.

- Security Risk Assessments need to be carried out in support of operations.

UNDSS needs to adopt more of a robust, pro-active approach to support the roll

out of operations. The DO should make the most of Agency Field Security

Advisors (FSA) capacity to enable field presence.

Engage emphatically with actors that influence the humanitarian response to

create the space to deliver assistance.

Humanitarian partners need to engage more emphatically with all actors that

influence humanitarian operations in an effort to overcome impediments to

delivering assistance and engaging with affected people. Humanitarian partners

need to initiate a closer dialogue and raise awareness on humanitarian operations

as a trust building exercise with local authorities, community leaders, and other

parties to the conflict. This needs to be done strategically and with a common

approach between all actors to ensure consistency. The Humanitarian Country

Team (HCT) need to identify the most appropriate system based on the skills and

capacities in-country, to engage with these actors. A possible approach could be the

establishment of an access team that can include: OCHA (Civil-Military), the

Protection Cluster, and security actors (UNDSS and agency FSA). A similar model

functioned well in South Sudan.

Substantial and consistent engagement with interlocutors can trigger a positive

spiral of confidence building that will ensure substantial understanding of

humanitarian principals (neutral, impartial, independent) and the benefits it brings

to civilians caught in the middle of the conflict. Building trust with all interlocutors

will reduce risks and improve the security environment for humanitarian actors, it

will allow wider access to deliver assistance with minimal delays and open up the

space for direct monitoring of assistance and engagement with affected people.

Sustained engagement will also provide a basis from which to engage authorities on

the issue of bureaucratic impediments to reduce these.




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CONTEXT

12. Armed conflict has spread rapidly across much of Yemen since mid-March 2015, with devastating consequences for

civilians. The conflict continues to force women, men and children to flee their homes and impede or cut off

humanitarian access in parts of the country. Some 2.5 million Yemenis are now internally displaced (67 per cent are

women and children) and some 21.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (82 per cent of the

population). The main drivers for displacement are conflict related: ongoing air strikes, ground attacks and an

increasingly volatile security environment while the need for humanitarian assistance also stems from the pre-existing

crisis in Yemen as poverty, under-development and weak state authority and rule of law. The conflict is also reversing

gains made in recent years that had seen estimates of people in need in several sectors largely stabilise or decrease.

13. The districts most heavily impacted by the conflict are Sa’ada, Hajjah, Abyan, Al Dahle’e, Lahj, Taizz, Aden and Sana’a.

Currently, nearly half of all displaced people originate from the governorates of Sa’ada, Taizz and Sana’a (Amanat Al

Asimah). In some regions, mainly in the south, people have chosen to return to their homes. However, in most parts of

the country the security environment remains extremely volatile, and return cannot be considered a feasible option.

The people that have returned home, however, remain extremely vulnerable and the needs for assistance for conflict

affected people to rebuild homes and restart lives are immense.

14. Yemen depends significantly on commercial food and fuel imports to meet its basic needs. The country was highly

dependent on the import of basic commodities before the current phase of the conflict, illustrated by around 90 per

cent of its food needs coming from outside the country. In 2015, import restrictions due to the conflict exacerbated

the humanitarian situation and brought the economy to near collapse. The import constraints have led to widespread

shortages and steep increases in the price of food, fuel, water and other basic supplies for the civilian population. The

import challenges have also had a severe impact on the in-country delivery and distribution of humanitarian

commodities.

15. Humanitarian space in Yemen is constrained by widespread insecurity. In Sana’a, the threat against international staff,

including kidnapping and assassination, remains high as does the risk of complex terrorist attacks as Al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seek retaliation for military operations in the south. Outside Sana’a, field staff and partners

are constrained due to active conflict and the threats this brings to humanitarian workers, restrictions imposed by de

facto authorities and/or, insufficient security risk analysis that can facilitate critical aid delivery.

16. With little to no state authority in many areas, the most vulnerable in Yemen – migrants, minorities, refugees, IDPs,

women and children, especially girls – face serious protection risks. Violations include human trafficking, gender-based

violence and child recruitment into armed forces and groups. More generally, traditional sensitivities around certain

protection issues – notably gender – complicate efforts to address them.

17. The cluster system was activated in Yemen in 2009, and currently 11 clusters and two sub-clusters are active. At the

end of 2015, the total number of operational humanitarian partners in Yemen was 106 (9 UN agencies, 31

international NGOs and 66 national NGOs). Despite the encouraging number of partners – in particular, the increase

of national partners up from 42 to 66 in 2015 - the actual implementation capacity (humanitarian expertise and

experience) was less than before the conflict started. The commitment and dedication of the humanitarian community

to stay and deliver, despite the dangers and operational challenges, is fully recognised and appreciated.

RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW

18. The OPR is a requirement of the IASC’s Transformative Agenda for humanitarian crises of the highest magnitude, for

which a system-wide level-three (L3) response has been activated. The OPR is an internal inter-agency management

tool which serves to identify areas for immediate corrective action to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian

response. It is not a real-time evaluation. The OPR is a mandatory element of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle

(HPC) and ideally should be conducted within 90 days of the level-three declaration. The OPR for the Yemen response

was initiated by the Emergency Director’s Group (EDG) and the humanitarian leadersh ip of the Yemen response.

19. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) activated a system-wide Level 3 response to the Yemen crisis on 1 July 2015.

The OPR was conducted between the 28 November and 8 December 2015, five months after the L3 declaration. The

delay was due to the unpredictable security environment and to coincide with the arrival of the newly appointed

leader for the Yemen response: the triple-hatted Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator / Designated Official(RC/HC/DO).




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20. The primary aim of an OPR is to review four areas of the response: (1) leadership and coordination, (2) delivery, (3)

protection (4) accountability to affected people (AAP), and to recommend adjustments to the response as appropriate

(course correctors). The Terms of Reference for the OPR, additionally, requested that the team consider the specific

situation of women and girls, and how the response accounts for this. The OPR also looked into best practices for

system-wide learning and issues requiring support and policy adjustment from the global level.

21. Prior to the mission, the OPR team held bilateral interviews with Emergency Director level representatives (or

identified alternates) of UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs, and arranged two group discussions in Geneva withprominent donors and the international NGO community.

22. The OPR team initiated the mission with a day in Amman, Jordan, to meet with humanitarian partners and support

functions that are not present in Yemen, due to security restrictions. This included OCHA’s support of fice,

international NGOs, the Information Management Working Group (IMWG), donors, and some cluster coordinators.

The team then proceeded to Sana’a to meet with humanitarian agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, cluster

coordinators and cluster partners in a series of group meetings (self-assessments), bilateral meetings, and focus group

discussions. The team was restricted in its ability to travel outside Sana’a due to security restrictions, but engaged with

humanitarian partners in the Area Humanitarian Country Team (A/HCT) in the Hudaydah hub via skype. The team also

met with a limited number of representatives from affected communities at an IDP centre in the outskirts of Sana’a.

23. The team reviewed secondary data, collected qualitative feedback and perceptions through four self-assessment

exercises, and organized a retreat with the HCT in Sana’a to jointly review the findings and pinpoint potential areas for

improvement. The retreat formed the basis of the HCT action plan that will be implemented in the next three months.

24. The OPR team would like to thank all individuals that have contributed to the mission and report, and particularly

OCHA staff that provided exceptional organisational support for the team during the mission, despite the substantial

demands of the humanitarian operation. The OPR team would also like to praise the commitment, energy, and good

nature of almost everyone that supported, helped with, and participated in the mission.

25. The OPR team consisted of four core members representing UN agencies and NGOs. The team was made up of Panos

Moumtzis (OPR Team Leader), Kate Halff (Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response, SCHR), Zlatan Milišić

(World Food Programme, WFP), Roberto Mignone (UN High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR). Stuart Kefford (Senior

Transformative Agenda Implementation Team, STAIT) participated in the mission, providing organisational support.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

26. The following narrative section of the report is organised in four sections that relate to the Transformative Agenda and

the specifics of the Yemen crisis: (1) leadership and coordination; (2) delivery of assistance; (3) protection; and (4)

accountability to affected people (AAP).

LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

27. The split between the HC and DO functions created a disconnect between security analysis and the humanitarian

operation which disempowered the HC’s decision-making capacity, particularly related to security and programme

issues. This has significantly impeded the expansion of humanitarian operations to field locations and the delivery of

assistance to people that need it the most. The appointment and deployment of the tripled hatted RC/HC/DO(December 2015) brings these functions under one leader and should address the disconnect. It is disappointing,

though, that the appointment and arrival of the RC/HC/DO (ASG) has come more than five months after the

declaration of the L3 (and nearly nine months after the start of the conflict).

28. The new RC/HC/DO will be expected to orient security decisions to be better balanced between the need for

humanitarians to work safely, and the need to deliver assistance. Security decisions, to date, have been perceived as

risk averse by most agencies, even though such concerns have not systematically been brought up in SMT meetings,

which is a reflection of the SMT’s functionality . SMT members need to be more engaged and vocal at the SMT and

ensure that its function addresses the relationship between humanitarian delivery and security, rather than security

and safety as a stand-alone issue.

29. The multiplication of leadership functions for the international humanitarian response in Yemen has provided some

benefits to the response. However, the need for two ASG-level functions in the region (outside Yemen) and none

inside the country (until the appointment of the RC/HC/DO) to support a humanitarian operation is questionable and




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has created more confusion than clarity in terms of achieving a coherent response under an established and

empowered leader in the affected-country. The lack of an identifiable unified structure has clouded accountability

lines and created confusion within the response, and for interlocutors that engage with the response.

30. Furthermore, the creation of multiple leadership functions in the region has created inconsistent communications and

messages from (and between) Sana’a, Riyadh and New York. There has also been ad hoc engagement by different

parts of the leadership with donors, authorities and parties to the conflict on issues related to humanitarian access,

operational priorities, the protection of civilians, and resource mobilisation. As a result, parties to the conflict havestarted to see the UN-led humanitarian response as disorganised, at best, and at worst subsumed by a political

agenda. It was not conclusive, and was not commented upon during the mission, as to whether the NGO community

was viewed in the same way. The different messages and confusion over leadership functions has not helped to build

trust with the various interlocutors that the humanitarian community have to engage with.

31. The leadership of the humanitarian response needs to be centred in Yemen and that needs to be clear for all

stakeholders, both in Yemen, and in the region. The appointment of the triple-hatted RC/HC/DO should go a long way

to providing the clarity and direction that is needed. However, a review of the roles of the Regional HC and the Special

Advisor is needed.

32. The potential to abolish the RHC and Special Advisor positions, as they currently stand, should be considered. The

opportunity to appoint a Senior Advisor or Liaison Officer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia authorities, in place of the

ASG-level Special Advisor, should be considered. This position should report to the RC/HC/DO in Yemen.

33. The HC/RC/DO and the HCT should also consider a stand-alone Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) based in

Sana’a, to support the HC function of the RC/HC/DO. The proposed DHC would have a particular focus on expanding

and supporting field operations. This would retain the crucial support functions that are needed to strengthen the

delivery of assistance, and create the space for the RC/HC/DO to be empowered as a leader for his roles, both inside

Yemen and in the region.

34. De-confliction procedures with the coalition in Riyadh are perceived as overtly cumbersome and unnecessarily

bureaucratic. The excessive information required to be ‘de-conflicted’ only adds an administrative burden onto

humanitarian actors with little or no security benefit. The necessity for humanitarians to provide photographs of the

front and back of each truck in a convoy, and a photograph of the driver of each truck was questioned when the

coalition’s military engagement is in the form of air strikes. These requirements are at the request of the KSA

authorities, and not the OCHA de-confliction team working in this area, and streamlining the process is not in the

hands of the OCHA or the Special Advisor. However, the possibility to streamline and simplify the process needs to be

considered and taken up with the KSA authorities. The importance of de-confliction for the safe delivery of assistance

and the safety of those delivering assistance should not be understated. But the mechanism needs to be simplified

and be less of an administrative burden.

35. There is a clear need for a consistent “whole-of-system” access strategy. There are several obstacles that are impeding

humanitarian access. The security situation is the main one, nevertheless, a lot more could be done to tackle other

issues such as the administrative and bureaucratic impediments and internal restrictions on movement of staff. The

RC/HC/DO and the HCT needs to develop a coherent access strategy to create and maximise opportunities to deliver

assistance in this challenging environment. Such a strategy would need to identify approaches and strategies to

engage with actors that can provide or influence access (parties to the conflict, local authorities, community, religious

and business leaders, etc.), finalise a plan to operationalise the hubs, and clarify criteria and processes for programmeprioritisation. It should also articulate roles and responsibilities of different actors, including the UNDSS) and agency

security advisors. Furthermore, this strategy will need to articulate how advocacy efforts can be harnessed from the

leadership of the IASC and other branches of the UN, including the office of the Secretary-General to encourage those

that control access, to open it up. This could include substantial advocacy efforts from the leadership of the IASC, the

UN Secretary-General and authoritative figures at the highest level. The strategy should be grounded in a regularly

reviewed analysis of risks, and its implementation should ensure that in-country leadership remains in the driving seat

and has final clearance on reviewing messages before they are issued.

36. There is also a need to improve dialogue between UN humanitarian and political actors to understand the activities of

each other, but more importantly to ensure a clear distinction between the political and humanitarian roles of the UN.

The humanitarian response needs to illustrate that it is grounded in the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

37. The strategic and operational levels of the humanitarian response are too de-linked, and neither fulfils its function tothe other. The HCT does not provide sufficient strategic direction to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism




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(ICCM), and the ICCM does not engage sufficiently with the HCT to provide analysis on operational issues to support

strategic decision-making. The Head of OCHA in Yemen has committed to take on the leadership of the ICCM to ensure

there is: (a) a clear vision and that priorities exist within the group, (b) the strategic guidance from the HCT is

transferred into operations through the clusters, and (c) that the inter-cluster mechanism provides sufficient input to

the HCT to support its strategic decision-making function.

38. Furthermore, the ICCM needs to be more focused on operationalizing the strategic guidance provided by the HCT. At

the moment, the clusters are utilized as a mechanism for primarily responding to information requests from a varietyof sources. This is distracting them from their primary function of operationalising the response. The reporting

structures and processes for the clusters need to be clarified and better organised to reduce the amount of time

cluster coordinators spend ‘chasing information’ from frequent requests from senior leadership in different locations.

If this is managed, cluster coordinators will be able to spend more time coordinating their members and

understanding operational challenges which will help HCT strategising (through the ICCM).

39. The Yemen crisis is under-reported in relation to other humanitarian situations around the world. It is incredibly

difficult for journalists to gain access to Yemen, and consequently the conflict, and its human impact, receives limited

coverage in international and regional media. The security ceiling also means that humanitarian agencies are

compromised in who they can bring into the country, and programme officers are prioritised over communications

officers (understandably so in the context and respecting the need to deliver). The absence of journalists and the small

number of communications officers working with the agencies and NGOs means the humanitarian story of Yemen isunder-represented to the outside world. This is negatively impacting on fundraising efforts, and is exacerbating the

perception by parties to the conflict that UN-led humanitarian action is subsumed by a political agenda. The story

needs to be clearly and accurately communicated.

40. OCHA and other agencies should appoint a Senior Arabic-speaking Communications Officers with experience of

working in the region, to drive and lead a coordinated inter-agency communication strategy and implementation plan.

The plan should be grounded in the complementarities offered by different agencies and organisations, and should

capitalise on communications capacity at regional and headquarters level to compensate for the limited presence of

these people inside Yemen. The work should be aimed at raising awareness and raising the profile of the operation

both internationally and regionally, and highlighting the plight of Yemeni citizens. This could catalyse and support

advocacy efforts on the humanitarian operation, human rights issues, protection, and contribute to fundraising

efforts. The potential for communications products and messages to support advocacy should be exploited as well,

including the need to ensure communications work does not undermine advocacy. Again, the RC/HC/DO and the HCTneed to be in the driving seat on communications and advocacy.

41. The humanitarian community has not effectively prioritised its programming in Yemen. This is particularly apparent in

the draft Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2016 which identifies 82 per cent of the population is in need of some

form of humanitarian assistance requiring a USD 2 billion dollar appeal2. It was clear throughout the OPR mission that

the emphasis of the statement is on some form of humanitarian assistance. There needs to be a more focused

approach on prioritisation in the response. The RC/HC/DO and the HCT need to understand the humanitarian needs

(assessment, information, listening to the affected people) and establish a prioritisation exercise that reflects the

capacities of agencies and NGOs to respond (including national NGOs) in relation to the needs of the people. The

clusters will need to provide strong justifications for plans and priority activities which address the strategic objectives

of the HRP. The Strategic Objectives of the HRP may also need to be adjusted to ensure they clearly reflect what is

needed and achievable in the response, rather than bland statements which are highly principled, but excessivelyaspirational.

DELIVERING ASSISTANCE

42. The conflict has had a brutal impact on the people of Yemen. Insecurity has dramatically hampered the ability of

humanitarian workers to access and deliver aid to people in need. It is a testament to the dedication and perseverance

of the humanitarian community that assistance is being delivered in all affected governorates (though not at the scale

required), despite strict security restrictions placed on UN agencies and NGOs that limits the number of international

2 NOTE: the original draft of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP, 2016) requested USD 2 billion, of which USD 1 billion was for food assistance

alone. The newly arrived HC/RC/DO has indicated his concerns regarding this figure and would like to apply a higher level of prioritization to the originalplan to reflect implementation capacity and a more realistic financial ‘ask’.




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staff working in the country, and significantly impedes their ability to travel outside Sana’a. At this point all UN

international staff are based in Sana’a with the exception of one sub-regional hub in Hudaydah. There are national

staff based in the other hub locations, but there was general agreement from interviews and assessments that

international staff are needed to take some of the risk burden away from national staff and national partners and help

strengthen assessments, delivery and monitoring.

43. The humanitarian response is compromised by the limited number of international staff working with UN agencies and

the 32 international NGOs operating in country, all of whom are working with reduced levels of staffing because of thesecurity situation, and international NGO concerns about evacuation procedures and capacity and restrictions on

visas, amongst other issues. Furthermore, agencies and NGOs have lost national staff members who have been

forcibly displaced themselves as a result of the conflict which has further compromised their ability to deliver.

However, these capacities are being rebuilt and there is an increasing ability for programmes to be implemented as a

result. It should be noted that few agencies and international NGOs stopped implementation during any part of the

crisis. National staff remained in the country and continued to operate in the absence (or reduced levels) of

international staff. The role of national staff should be recognized. Equally so, the role of national NGOs.

44. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)3 have the largest presence

in Yemen of the international actors (outside the combined UN presence), and operate in multiple field locations. Both

organisations felt their ability to remain in the country and deliver assistance with relative safety, while other UN

agencies and NGOs evacuated, was a result of consistent advocacy to their partners (authorities, community leaderetc.) on their principled approach to humanitarian work, their visibility when delivering assistance in an impartial and

neutral manner, a higher appetite for risk4, and their independence in terms of logistics and evacuation capacity. The

impression that they are there for the people is clear, and this creates the space for the ICRC and MSF to remain in

Yemen and continue their work.

45. The limited presence of international staff from UN agencies and international NGOs i n locations outside Sana’a and

Hudaydah severely impedes the ability to deliver assistance. International NGOs need to continue to get international

staff back in country to expand their operations. This has happened substantially already, but the need for them to

return with full capacity was expressed several times, in a testament to their ability to deliver where needed. Many

international NGOs are facing restrictions over entry visas for their security officers and are concerned that evacuation

procedures are still not in place to ensure they can evacuate their international staff. Both of these issues restrict

their commitment to return fully and scale up their presence in Yemen. The HCT and SMT need to revisit and clarify

evacuation procedures to encourage international NGOs to return and provide a level of confidence that the UNsystem, with the support of UNHAS, will evacuate international NGO staff if needed. If these procedures are already in

place, as was communicated to the OPR team, then they need to be adequately communicated to all NGOs. This

should include providing details on eligibility requirements for evacuation, and confirming evacuation options,

including the availability of stand-by aircraft, or designated aircraft that can be provided from UN missions in the

region. This would go a long way in giving international NGOs the confidence to scale up their operations in Yemen.

The HC/RC/DO also needs to ensure that they are supported in advocating for visas for security officers.

46. The need to utilize the full capacity of national NGOs is also essential. UN agencies and international NGOs work

primarily with only six national NGOs from a total of forty-nine that are referenced in the HRP. Both the UN and

international NGOs need to review and expand partnerships with well reputed and experienced national NGOs in a

spirit of equal partnership and mutual learning. They also need to support national NGOs to satisfy the demands of

donors and their own requirements for partnership. The HCT should develop a curriculum or approach (training,mentoring, and partnerships) to build national NGOs capacities to operate effectively and based on humanitarian

principles. Such capacity building exercises have been initiated prior to the conflict and need to be built on. National

NGOs are of paramount importance to the humanitarian response, particularly in view of the access constrains that

exist in Yemen. They need to be supported, respected, and engaged as equal partners in the response.

47. The humanitarian response to Yemen is hampered by the limited footprint of humanitarian agencies and international

NGOs. The L3 benchmarks identified five humanitarian hubs (six including Sana’a) that needed to be operationalized

3 MSF is represented by four societies, MSF-Netherlands, MSF-France, MSF-Spain and MSF-Switzerland.

4 It should be noted that ICRC lost two staff members in September in an attack on one of their vehicles, and a further two were abducted in December.

One was subsequently released. MSF health facilities have been bombed and destroyed by coalition forces in September, December, 2015 and January,2016.




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to allow the response to expand to areas outside of Sana’a: Aden, Mukalla, Hudaydah, Sa`ada and Taizz. However,

only the hubs in Sana’a and Hudaydah had been established with international staff presence at the time of the OPR

mission. It is acknowledged that efforts to re-establish the hubs in Aden, Hudaydah (now operational), Sa`ada and

Taizz have been made, and that some agencies have some national staff based in these locations. But the hubs have

not been set up and the capacity to deliver at scale is inadequate. The SMT needs to review the processes and

arrangements which have not permitted these hubs to be adequately operationalized. It needs to reconsider its

strategy to expand the response to areas outside of Sana’a . The need for a safe and secure environment needs to be

balanced with the need to deliver humanitarian assistance.

48. OCHA has provided plans for expanded field presence in the hubs which require approval from the SMT. However, the

current approach to Security Risk Management has not prioritized or enabled the expansion of humanitarian field

presence. It has inadequately supported the concept of ‘Stay and Deliver’. Many humanitarian actors referenced an

absence of a pro-active and hands-on approach to security risk assessments by UNDSS staff, and that there is a clear

need for DSS staff, including the Chief Security Advisor (CSA) to undertake missions to the field in order to better

advise the operation. Several actors felt compelled to report that the CSA had primarily focused his attention on

Sana’a and had never gone to Aden or other field locations (except one visit to Hudaydah). There is a need for UNDSS

to have a more client-oriented approach that supports humanitarian actors carry out their functions. The disconnect,

or misunderstanding, of the need for security advice to support humanitarian operations and not only ensure safety of

staff and assets is concerning.

49. The separation of the DO and HC functions has contributed to the disconnect between security advice to keep people

and assets safe, and security advice to support humanitarian delivery. Security decisions have regularly been deferred

to New York as opposed to making the decision at the field-level based on analysis from the ground. As already

mentioned, the combined RC/HC/DO function should overcome many of these issues. The SMT, as a body, also needs

to ensure security advice is provided in support of the humanitarian imperative. The responsibility does not rest with

one person alone.

50. The bottom line is that operationalizing the field hubs has been highly ineffective for several months and this is not

only due to insecurity. There has been insufficient detailed analysis to differentiate the security situation in different

parts of the country. The SMT has assessed the security level of the country as a whole, rather than assessing the

different level of risk in different areas of the country. This could at least have opened up access for a partial

expansion of operations. In addition, this has also impeded the lifting of the ‘evacuation status’ and ‘relocation status’

in less unstable areas. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to security analysis to support the delivery of humanitarianassistance rather than putting staff safety and security above the needs of the people directly affected by the crisis.

The approach should not be reckless, but more balanced than it currently is.

51. UNDSS needs to immediately expedite Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) in priority locations to support SMT decisions

on the expansion of field presence (particularly operationalising the hubs), and to permit more extensive field travel.

UNDSS and UN agencies have to work together on establishing more streamlined processes for expediting field

mission requests, and ensure decisions for such missions are made at the field-level based on substantial security

analysis and programme criticality. There is significant potential for UNDSS to capitalize on the security capacities that

exist in UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and IOM (ten senior Field Security Advisors). This will significantly help bring a stronger

humanitarian mind-set to security discussions and provide the balance between a safe and secure environment, and

an environment that facilitates humanitarian delivery. Finally, an approach to engage international NGOs in security

discussions needs to be developed, and security information needs to be shared with the international NGOcommunity. The SMT is comprised of UN agency heads only, and exceptionally an invitation was extended to one

NGO representative in Yemen. But this was not sufficient to ensure all NGOs were privy to security information and

decisions discussed at the SMT. It is unclear why security information that is relevant to all international humanitarian

actors is not systematically shared with them.

52. Sub-national coordination structures need to be revived with the operationalization of the hubs. The coordination

structures for the hubs need to be re-established and need to be delegated authority by the HC/HCT to be focused on

delivery, despite the unstable security situation. The HC needs to designate an Area Coordinator with clear reporting

lines and a delegation of authority that allows the decentralization of certain decisions to the field level. The expansion

of field presence needs to proceed as a matter of priority.

53. Limited access is not only a consequence of insecurity alone. The potential to expand the humanitarian community’s

presence to areas where it needs to work is also undermined by bureaucratic impediments to access: the denial ofclearances to work in certain locations by authorities and/or armed groups, the denial of visas for staff waiting to




11

enter the country, holding armoured vehicles at the port which are badly needed by humanitarian agencies. These

issues, and the internal constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have severely curtailed the presence of the

UN in the field, and their visibility. Furthermore, international NGOs are increasingly facing bureaucratic delays and

blockages imposed by local authorities over project agreements and travel authorisations. The humanitarian response,

as a whole, has not been present where it matters and has not been sufficiently engaged with interlocutors and

parties to the conflict to articulate the impartial and neutral role of the humanitarian response, and its importance.

Consequently, the UN’s reputation has been damaged and its humanitarian purpose questioned. It is not always

considered impartial, and according to information from interviews and groups session, its help is not always

welcome.

54. The HC/HCT needs to develop a strategy on how to overcome such impediments and to win back the trust that is

being lost as a result of field absence. This should include reaching out to all interlocutors to sensitize them to the

principles of humanitarian action and illustrate clearly that the humanitarian response is neutral and impartial in

delivering assistance based on needs. This will not only raise awareness of humanitarian principles amongst

interlocutors but it will also build trust and confidence between individuals or groups that control access, and

humanitarian actors. The need to engage in dialogue with all actors cannot be overstated. We need to be engaging

with all actors that influence humanitarian access.

55. The Protection Cluster, with a grounding in international humanitarian law and human rights law, is well-positioned to

support activities as part of this trust building and access strategy (see also para. 73 - 75), and could be a critical playerin developing the strategy. There are also critical roles for OCHA (Civil-Military and Access), and UNDSS with agency

security staff for security analysis. A similar structure for engaging with interlocutors and establishing access and has

been rolled out in South Sudan previously with some success, when resourced.

56. But the HC/HCT should not be left alone to overcome access challenges. The potential for senior level support and a

strong lobby from the highest levels of the UN needs to be harnessed to help unlock bureaucratic (and security)

impediments to access. Consistent senior level support to the HC in Syria (and the HCs individual efforts) has resulted

in an increase in visas approvals in recent months, and a ceasefire agreement to allow assistance to be delivered in

three enclaves that were previously beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. This indicates the potential for

senior level advocacy to work in other contexts. Similar support needs to be provided to the leadership in Yemen.

However, it needs to be consistent, substantial and regular to help the HC/HCT overcome the bureaucratic and

security impediments to access that they face.

57. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and cluster plans do not clearly illustrate a correlation between needs and

planned activities. Firstly, there is insufficient data to support a strong evidence base to build the response plan and

prioritise activities. In response to this, clusters and cluster partners need to clarify their assessment work. The clusters

have produced 79 assessments since the start of the conflict i.e. no lack of assessments, but it feels like there is a lack

of information and understanding of needs collectively. The links between needs, capacities, targets, and results are

not clear, and consequently difficult to assess and measure. There is a clear need to systematize assessments, better

coordinate processes for reporting, and improve information management as part of this process. The clusters and the

inter-cluster mechanism are central to this. It needs strong leadership at the cluster level, and experienced

information management staff to support the cluster coordinators. This leadership and information management

capacity has not been fully supported by all cluster lead agencies since the declaration of the L3, and is only starting to

take shape now. Agency headquarters need to support their country offices and their inter-agency obligations to the

clusters with the necessary and appropriate staff at the right time and with sustainability. This has largely nothappened in Yemen and the coordinated and collective response has suffered as a result.

58. There is also a significant gap in understanding activities funded outside the official HRP process which is undermining

the efficiency of the response. There is a need for the HCT to build a planning and reporting process into the HRP that

takes into account funding that is disbursed, and activities that are planned and implemented, outside the HRP and

the clusters. In the context of Yemen, the issue is particularly relevant for the Gulf States and charities that that have

contributed approximately USD 500 million to the response in 2015. There is a limited understanding of how this

money is spent and what activities it supports. The outputs of this funding are most likely contributing to humanitarian

goals and objectives, but this is not captured or measured effectively in relation to the HRP. The potential for OCHA’s

Financial Tracking System (FTS) to track such funding should be explored, and these donors and operational partners

should be encouraged to engage with the clusters. The clusters should also look at ways of adapting their modus

operandi to accommodate partners from other parts of the world that have not traditionally engaged with the

conventional humanitarian structures. At the moment, a significant part of the response is not coordinated.




12

59. Development agencies also have a role to play in Yemen, but they are currently struggling to reflect how best they can

contribute to humanitarian operations. These agencies have a considerable understanding of context and strong

networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response. Humanitarian operations cannot (or

should not) work independently from the recovery and development agenda and the two are clearly interlinked.

There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort and this needs to be planned.

This is not a new issue, and this is the essence of early recovery which has been an enduring discussion for many years

but still remains a debate. However, there is an increasing understanding that early recovery is a process which UNDP

(but not only) can provide leadership on, strategically in-country with direct support to the HC and to humanitarian

and strategic planning. The process needs to be seen less as a series of early recovery activities sitting under a cluster,

and more as an approach that sees the humanitarian response open the way for, and potentially contribute to, a

recovery agenda as and when the time is appropriate. This approach needs to be operationalized and recovery and

development actors need to clearly articulate their role and function in the Yemen context, and illustrate this function

to the HCT. The newly arrived RC/HC/DO has indicated a desire to resume meetings of the UNCT, which last met in

May 2015. This is an indication that the RC/HC/DO feels the space exists for recovery and development actors to carve

out a role that is complementary to the humanitarian response. Development actors need to illustrate their function

clearly in this situation and show how they can contribute to the collective response.

ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE (AAP)

60. The potential for humanitarian actors to reach out to communities and understand their needs is compromised by thelimited presence of humanitarians on the ground, and access to people affected by the crisis. However, the high

number of assessments (approximately 79 according to OCHA’s statistics, but probably more) indicates that it is

possible to engage with communities to seek their feedback, understand more clearly their needs, and communicate

clearly what can be expected in terms of assistance i.e. give account, take account, and be held to account.

61. However, the information collected from assessments is not considered of a sufficient quality for decision-making and

planning, and there is a general feeling that feedback from affected people is not adequately influencing cluster plans

and programmes, and is not supporting the operationalisation role of the ICCM and the strategic direction and

decision-making of the HCT.

62. As in other humanitarian crises, UN agencies and NGOs are engaging with the people that they are assisting, and

numerous systems have been established to collect feedback on programmes, assistance, and needs. This includes the

use of telephone call centres to register complaints from beneficiaries (UNHCR and WFP); the use of WhatsApp toregister issues of concern and raise issues that need to be addressed (Education Cluster); and focus group discussions

facilitated by national NGOs in areas beyond the reach of international actors. However, there is no common

mechanism that brings these various modalities together to provide an overall picture of the situation to support the

HCT, ICCM and clusters to provide strategic guidance and operational direction broadly, that reflects feedback from

the people that we, as humanitarians, are accountable to.

63. A strategy on Accountability to Affected People has been developed which identifies approaches to bring information

from numerous sources together in a way that would assist the HCT understand, from the perspective of affected

people, how the response can be adapted to ensure humanitarian programmes are appropriate to the context and the

needs. There is great excitement about this strategy amongst the majority of agencies, and rightly so. It is well-defined

and has been developed with significant contributions from the humanitarian community i.e. it has the ‘buy-in’ that is

necessary for it to become operational. However, there are also concerns about the implementation and roll out ofthe strategy following the departure of the OCHA SURGE staff that developed it.

64. OCHA needs to ensure that dedicated capacity is recruited, or is committed by another agency, to ensure the strategy

is implemented and rolled out. It is an excellent start to an issue which is often neglected in crisis situations. There is a

need to make sure that the initiative has enough fuel to keep it going to its destination.

PROTECTION

65. The Yemen crisis is characterized by indiscriminate killings; disappearances and torture; arbitrary detentions; sexual

and gender-based violence (SGBV); recruitment of children into armed groups; landmine incidents; aerial bombings

and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure by all parties to the conflict. There has been massive internal

displacement and refugee outflows; there are severe restrictions on freedoms; and there is little access to basic

services. The benchmarks for Yemen specifically reference the importance of operationalizing the ‘centrality of




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protection’ as a fundamental theme in the humanitarian response to ensure that it is given the attention it deserves

(benchmark 7.1).

66. Despite the importance of protection and its high profile on the humanitarian agenda, there is still an insufficient

common understanding of it in regard to the different dimensions that it entails, given the broad and expanding scope

of protection: mainstreaming protection; a protection cluster strategy and protection programming; the centrality of

protection and links to the Human Rights Up Front (RUF) initiative. Consequently, protection, in all its facets has not

been operationalised sufficiently, although progress has been made. The Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters (childprotection, SGBV) have been established, have capable coordinators, and work well together. An experienced Cluster

Coordinator (Protection) was key in facilitating progress on protection in several aspects of the work, but this initial

work needed to be continued with the deployment of a dedicated and full-time cluster coordinator. For example, a

Protection Strategy has been produced, as has a draft Rights Up Front Framework and Action Plan. The Protection

Cluster and Child Protection and SGBV sub-clusters have started to work with other clusters to ensure protection is

mainstreamed in all clusters across the response, and a Committee on Arbitrary Detentions has been promoted by a

member of the Protection Cluster. Also, a PROCAP Advisor is being deployed imminently (at the time of writing). But

more needs to be done to strengthen the collective understanding of protection, and there needs to be a stronger and

clearer link to the HCT to bring the centrality of protection to the senior level. This would also create the space for a

clearer articulation of issues to be taken up with the RUF initiative.

67. Despite progress on protection, there is still a need to identify why and how protection needs to, and can be,

operationalized in the response. There needs to be a clearer and stronger articulation of (1) the life-saving dimensionof protection, and (2) how a protection approach can support and improve the whole response. The protection

narrative has become a little lost amongst the various strategies on the different strands of protection that are

expected from the Protection Cluster, other clusters, and the HCT.

68. A report by Action on Armed Violence and OCHA registered that 2,355 civilians had been killed in the six months up to

mid-September. The death toll from bombings and other forms of violence continues to rise. 93 per cent of the total

killed was civilians. 32,200 casualties (injured) have been accepted into health facilities since the conflict started in

March, 2015 (as reported in October 2015). OHCHR has verified 8,875 reports of human rights violations since the

start of the crisis, an average of 43 violations every day (as reported in November 2015). Due to limited direct access

and difficulties in collecting data, it is likely that these figures do not reflect the reality, and the actual impact on the

population is probably higher. It is clear that there has been a substantial impact on human life but the protection

narrative focuses on strategies, advocacy and protection as a cross-cutting issue.




14

69. Despite the best efforts of the HC in the past months, protection has not gained sufficient traction with the HCT to

highlight and operationalize an approach on key protection concerns. The protection cluster, or the in-coming PROCAP

Advisor, needs to engage more substantially with the HC/HCT (or a smaller team of senior members) on drafting the

HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy and operationalising it, as well as assisting the HCT to capitalize on potential

support from, and links to, the RUF initiative. This will require the development of a strong advocacy approach based

on clear evidence.

70. Protection needs to be more focused on the human security dimension of the crisis and clearly identify ways toprotect people from the direct impact of the conflict. This includes raising the profile of the crisis, highlighting the

impact of the conflict in terms of people killed and injured, collecting data, compiling an analysis on violations of

human rights and of international humanitarian law, and advocating for action to be taken to mitigate the impact of

the conflict on people’s lives: stressing the life-saving dimension of protection. This is being done to a certain degree.

OHCHR continues to collect data, and UNDP has recently received funds to do a similar activity (and will coordinate

with the work of OHCHR) but it is not clear how this data will be utilized and what action is planned or being taken to

strengthen the protection of civilians. All of these issues and approaches will underpin the centrality of protection

strategy and its implementation, and establish the most pressing protection concerns on the agenda of the HCT.

71. In order to support advocacy, a key element of the centrality of protection strategy (and links to the RUF initiative),

protection actors need to strengthen data collection and analysis and agree to use a common system for harmonizing

data from different actors. Information exists, but it is not sufficiently consolidated. Protection actors have carried out58 rapid assessments, alone, but bringing this information together to paint a holistic picture is mitigated by the

absence of direct access, common indicators, joint analysis, and a common system for protection information

management. Several of these efforts were rapid assessments at the ‘big picture’ level and do not have the level of

granularity for a comprehensive analysis of needs and gaps to inform plans, programmes, and underpin a credible

advocacy approach. UNICEF’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in

conflict situations is a leading example of information collection for advocacy purposes, and is working well in Yemen.

As mentioned, OHCHR is active in collecting information on human rights violations and is supported by other actors.

UNDP has been funded to implement a similar activity, and UNFPA have a GBV information management system that

collects evidence on rights violations against women, men, boys and adolescent girls. The combined efforts of these

systems, and others, would provide a strong evidence base for advocacy on protection and provide a platform for the

HCT and the highest levels of the UN system, through the RUF initiative, to hold parties to the conflict accountable for

violations carried out on their watch. The ActivityInfo information management system has been set up in Yemen and

could have the potential to operate as a collective platform for information management, and many agencies and

NGOs are inputting to this and using it. But it needs to extend its reach and encourage more operational actors to

participate and utilise it.

72. It is important that information is not derived from quantitative data only. It is equally important to collect qualitative

data to provide the context of protection and underpin the numbers with analysis and explanations of the situation

that needs to be addressed. For instance, in the case of IDPs, numbers alone do not paint the whole picture. Trends,

profiles, needs and reasons for displacement need to be explained and understood in order to convey the gravity of

the situation and to plan appropriate responses. A holistic and collective approach to information management is

required and the protection cluster needs to discuss how this can be done, together with the ICCM and the HCT. The

potential to reach out to the Information Management Working Group could be utilized to take this forward.

However, this group is currently based in Amman, and the evidence from interviews and discussions during the OPR

indicated that it is insufficiently engaged with the clusters to be of much value, and there is limited confidence thatthis group is sufficiently active or has the capacity to establish a common information system (with the exception of

one or two strong individuals).

73. The Protection Cluster could have a significant role to play in terms of access. The Protection Cluster is well-positioned

to reach out to interlocutors to raise awareness of humanitarian obligations and principles. This would help develop a

better understanding of humanitarian principles and humanitarian action (especially neutrality and impartiality), and

help to build trust with interlocutors that influence access to areas most affected by the conflict. The Protection

Cluster and its members should support the HCT to start a programme to engage more substantially with all

interlocutors to raise awareness on humanitarian principles and build trust with actors that influence access. This is a

strategy that is successfully implemented by the likes of ICRC and MSF (and other NGOs) to maintain access in areas

off-limits to other international actors. These organizations clearly demonstrate their value to communities affected

by the conflict, maintain a close working relationship with interlocutors that have the authority to allow humanitarian

operations to deliver assistance, and retain the ability to deliver assistance. This idea of building trust to support

access is highlighted in the course correctors, and is also covered in the ‘Delivery’ section of this report (see para. 55




15

also). It is replicated here to reference the key role of the Protection Cluster, and other actors ( such as OCHA’s Civil-

Military section, and security actors from DSS and the agencies) have in the development of strategies and activities to

support its implementation.

74. The Protection Cluster should take a step-by-step approach to this activity (trust building), and start engaging with

relevant actors in Sana’a and Hudaydah, where humanitarian actors have some level of consistent and predictable

presence, and then progress to other areas of the country. The Protection Cluster should engage a variety of actors

(local authorities, tribal leaders, parties to the conflict, if possible) in a dialogue and mutual learning exercise. Thiscould be done through a systematic and progressive roll out of workshops on the Guiding Principles on Internal

Displacement, and on humanitarian principles (independence, neutrality, impartiality) to counter the concern that the

UN is not viewed as neutral and impartial.

75. This approach, if done successfully in the initial stages, will catalyse a positive spiral as it will raise awareness of

humanitarian principles and build confidence between the humanitarian community and key stakeholders that have

influence on granting access. This increased level of trust will reduce some misperceptions of the international

community’s (mainly UN agencies) humanitarian work, and reduce the risk of operating in insecure areas, though it

will never nullify the risk. This will permit wider access for the humanitarian community to deliver assistance and

provide better protection for people affected by the crisis.

76. The Protection Cluster should also expand workshops to include national partners on humanitarian and protection

principles. This is particularly critical, given that many national NGOs are still the main deliverers of assistance and

services and need to be doing it in accordance with the principles of humanitarian work. This relates to a formal

capacity building approach for national NGOs referenced in para. 46, which should be driven by the HCT.

77. The Protection Cluster has initiated specialized trainings on protection mainstreaming to all its members, its sub-

clusters (child protection, SGBV), and to national NGOs. But the cluster needs to accelerate the planned roll out of

trainings to other clusters. The Protection Cluster also needs to ensure that protection is embedded in the functions of

the ICCM to support the mainstreaming approach in the operational response as a whole, and also to make the vital

link between the clusters and the HCT to ensure protection is high on the agenda at the decision-making and strategic

level of the humanitarian response. Currently, protection is rarely discussed at the ICCM and even less at the HCT

level. The commitment, during the OPR mission, of the OCHA Head of Office to chair the ICCM is expected to improve

the linkages between the HCT and the ICCM.

78. The Protection Cluster also needs to identify organisations in the response that are dealing in specialized areas to

ensure all people that are affected by the conflict are taken care of the extent possible. This should include

organisations covering the protection needs of the elderly, the disabled, and other marginalized groups. This is not

only important to support these marginalized groups, it would also illust rate the humanitarian community’s presence

in communities and indicate the humanitarian value of the work being undertaken as part of the response. This would

build trust and support the spiral of trust already mentioned (para. 73-75).

79. There was an almost complete absence of discussions during the OPR mission on the humanitarian community’s

obligations to the Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) agenda. The fact that it was rarely

mentioned, is mentionable in itself. It was agreed, when it was brought up in discussion groups, that a stronger

commitment on PSEA from agencies, NGOs and the HCT, collectively, needs to be taken. The absence of allegations

against humanitarian workers abusing their position vis-a-vis affected people (or other people, for that matter) is

positive. However, this should not detract from agencies and NGOs taking a proactive approach to PSEA to make surethat the absence of reports against humanitarian staff in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, continues. Further

action needs to be taken to ensure the positive record is maintained. The first step to this has already been taken by

the out-going HC who appointed a focal point for PSEA in each cluster, and requested a workshop on the issue to be

organised in early 2016.

GLOBAL ISSUES

80. The OPR identified several issues that have impacted the response in Yemen which are more relevant for the global

level to take action on, rather than resting with the HCT or other actors in Yemen. Some of these issues have been

mentioned already and are included in the main narrative of this report and in the course correctors, but they are




16

reiterated in this section for clarity. Several of these issues are relevant to all level-three (and non-level-three) crises,

not only the Yemen context.

81. Leadership arrangements should be reviewed immediately when a level-three is declared and action taken promptly

by the IASC Principals, and ultimately by the ERC. The Yemen crisis started in March 2015, and the L3 was declared on

1 July 2015. The triple-hatted RC/HC/DO was only identified and deployed to Yemen on 6 December. It is advisable

that more prompt action for such an important position be taken.

82. All humanitarian agencies need to review the capacities that exist in-country when a level-three is declared,

particularly their leadership arrangements. The L3 declaration did not trigger a change in leadership for any

operational UN agency or international NGO (members of the HCT) in Yemen despite commitments to deploy senior

and experienced leaders to a level-three crisis. The importance of strong leadership and experience of level-three

situations is not only relevant to the operational impact of the agencies, but also to the collective approach. The SMT

would have had the ability to exert more influence on security and programme decisions if seasoned humanitarian

professionals with previous level-three (or similar) experience participated in these meetings. The obligation to

strengthen leadership and commit the highest capacity human resources to level-three emergencies needs to be

taken into account by agencies and NGOs operating in level-three crises.

83. All humanitarian agencies need to review their SURGE processes. A key element of the Transformative Agenda is the

deployment of senior staff as part of the SURGE, during the early stages of the level-three activation. SURGE was also

referenced as a key benchmark for the Yemen response. Significant concerns were raised, however, that SURGE staff

sent in support of leadership and coordination functions were often too junior and inexperienced in complex

emergencies, and were deployed for an insufficient period of time to be of any real value (two or three weeks only, on

occasions). The turnover of SURGE staff has been excessive in the Yemen crisis and the utility of short-term

deployments undermined the consistency, continuity and predictability of the response. The short-termism of such

deployments is damaging to the reputation of the collective humanitarian response, and more importantly,

undermines the capacity to respond effectively to the crisis and serve people that are suffering. Agencies, at

headquarters level, should review their approach to SURGE and support coordination and programme functions with

SURGE deployments of no less than two months initially, with replacements recruited on fixed term contracts or other

contractual modalities for a duration of no less than six months. Senior staff should be recruited at the P4/P5 level for

these important positions. This is relevant to all crisis situations, not only Yemen.

84. Cluster coordinators are insufficiently supported by the global clusters. The global clusters have developed manyproducts that can be beneficial to cluster coordinators in-country, which are under-utilized. As an example, cluster

coordinators in Yemen struggled to develop common indicators for their partners to work with, and few coordinators

were aware of the indicator registry that has been developed by all global clusters and is available on

humanitarianresponse.info. This is just one example of how the global clusters can help support their in-country

coordinators. There is also a tendency for headquarters functions to overload cluster coordinators with excessive

demands which strains the relationship with cluster partners. There appears to be a limited awareness that every

request that is put to a cluster coordinator means the coordinator needs to request information from its partners.

These partners have programmes to run and other tasks to fulfil for their own agency or organisation, and this needs

to be respected. Cluster Lead Agencies (CLAs) and senior leadership need to better understand that the effectiveness

of clusters relies on strong partnerships with the members, and requests for information need to be planned, clear

and concise to retain these partnerships and not abuse the good will of cluster members. Demands for information

need to be given with realistic deadlines and the type of information required needs to be agreed and predictable socoordinators can plan for anticipated requests. CLAs, OCHA headquarters, and senior humanitarian leaders (HCT,

ICCM, and global actors) need to give cluster coordinators the space to coordinate rather than be used as information

gatherers only. The information requests may be communicated through the HC, the Head of OCHA, agency heads or

someone else. But each request usually gets loaded onto the cluster coordinator.

85. There is a need for a fundamental reform of safety and security processes and capacities in humanitarian operations.

The current culture reflects a risk averse approach which undermines the ability to deliver assistance. The IASC

Principals need to be more involved in supporting UNDSS recruit and deploy security staff with a profile more relevant

for humanitarian operations. UN agency security staff consistently demonstrate a better understanding of the balance

between safety and security with the need to deliver assistance. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to reflect the

need to assist agencies and NGOs to ‘stay and deliver’, and support humanitarian operations in a safe and secure

environment, rather than stress safety and security to the detriment of the operation. UNDSS need to consider the

importance of training its security officers in international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, and the conceptof stay and deliver. The potential for developing stronger relationships between UNDSS and UN agency security




17

officers will help to orient security processes towards a more appropriate balance between safety and security and the

need to deliver assistance.

86. Protection is consistently identified as an issue which needs strengthening in all humanitarian crises. It is often

inadequately articulated and consequently misunderstood by many actors. The Global Protection Cluster should adopt

a position where it deploys, without question, a senior expert immediately after the declaration of the level-three to

ensure that the HCT and inter-cluster mechanism are clear on their role in regard to protection (centrality of

protection, Rights up Front, protection mainstreaming, protection programming, advocacy and data and informationcollection). The deployment of the PROCAP Advisor (pending at the time of the OPR mission) had not happened nine

months after the start of the conflict, and almost six months after the L3 declaration i.e. slower than the selection and

deployment of the RC/HC/DO.

87. The linkages between the ICCM and the HCT are inadequate in Yemen. The same situation has been evident from

other OPR (and STAIT) missions. The inter-cluster mechanism needs to have a better capacity to operationalize the

response and link its work to the strategic level that is provided by the HCT. HCs and inter-cluster coordinators (Heads

of OCHA) need to be fully aware of the importance of the functions and how they inter-relate. There is an argument to

create a roster of dedicated inter-cluster coordinators that are highly experienced and have previously operated in

senior positions in level-three or level-three-like operations. There is a need, as has been mentioned in para. 37 and

38, to manage the demands that are increasingly being placed on cluster coordinators (and by extension, the ICCM)

which is detracting them from the coordination function. The operationalization of the humanitarian response, andthe linkages between the HCT and the ICCM will remain weak if cluster coordinators are not given the space to

coordinate their clusters and contribute clear operational challenges to the ICCM for consideration by the HCT. There

is a tendency at the moment to utilize cluster coordinators as an extension of an information management function.

88. The self-assessment methodology of the OPR mission clearly reflected areas for the HCT (and broader humanitarian

community) to improve the response. The HCT members felt that the suggestions would have been useful even earlier

in the mission in steering the response in the right direction from day one (after the L3 declaration). This led to an ad

hoc recommendation from the HCT that a light inter-agency team should be deployed at the onset of an level-three

emergency to provide immediate support to the HC and the Head of OCHA to help identify specific issues that are

predictable in a mega-crisis and need to be addressed, and to set up appropriate systems and processes to ‘set the

direction’ for the first months of the response. The Yemen HCT voiced appreciation for the OPR mission and suggested

the direction provided during the OPR would have also been relevant at the start of the L3.

89. There is an understanding that approximately 50 per cent5 of the humanitarian response to Yemen (financial

contributions and programmes) is not programmed through traditional humanitarian tools such as the HRP and

OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). This means a substantial contribution to the response is not tracked and

therefore not well coordinated, thereby affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. There is a need to

better understand the financial and programmatic contributions of donors and organisations operating outside the

HRP. The IASC Principals, led by the ERC, need to engage with traditional and non-traditional donors and operational

partners to encourage them to participate in existing systems, or alternatively revisit the existing systems (FTS, OPS) to

understand how they can be adjusted to accommodate contributions and programmes that currently fall outside the

HRP. A similar recommendation was suggested in the OPR for the Whole of Syria Response, to disaggregate donor

contributions between the three main hubs in that response.

90. Development agencies have a significant role to play in an emergency context but have difficulty articulating what this

role can be i.e. how best they can contribute to the humanitarian response. These agencies have a considerable

understanding of context and strong networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response.

There is also a recognition that humanitarian operations cannot work independently from a recovery and

development agenda. There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort. This is

not a new concept, and is the essence of early recovery. UNDP and its Global Cluster on Early Recovery need to clearly

articulate how recovery and development actors can contribute to a better humanitarian response that links to

recovery and development and illustrate how this can be achieved. This could include holding discussions with donors

on the need for more flexible arrangements for humanitarian and development funding, in addition to deploying early

5 NOTE: other estimates suggested 30 per cent. However, it is clear that accurate information is not available. The point is that a significant part of the

humanitarian funding and response happens outside the official humanitarian system.




18

recovery advisors to work for the HC in all humanitarian emergencies. The average length of a humanitarian

emergency is now seventeen years. This is no longer only a humanitarian emergency, and ‘our’ systems have not

adapted to this reality.

NEXT STEPS91. The findings of this review will be communicated to the senior leadership of the Yemen response and leadership at the

IASC level: the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator/Designated Official (RC/HC/DO), the Humanitarian Country Team;

the Emergency Directors’ Group (EDG), the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the IASC Principals. Interested donors

and other stakeholders will be briefed on the outcomes of the mission.

92. As per the guidance document governing the OPR, the senior leadership in Yemen, represented by the Humanitarian

Coordinator, is requested to provide the Emergency Directors with a status report against the Action Plan (see Annex

I) three months after the submission of this report (by 1 May 2016). In order not to distract the leadership from their

primary responsibilities to deliver humanitarian assistance, the STAIT team can provide some support for compiling

the report, although the ownership rests clearly with the HC and HCT.

93. Support will be offered by the OPR and STAIT team to the HCT, where useful, to guide the implementation of the

Action Plan and facilitate global support for the response where this is of interest to the HC/HCT.

94. The global learning will be shared with the relevant ‘owner’ of the particular issue, through IASC bodies or otherwise,

and the OPR team and STAIT will follow up as appropriate.

95. The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) will remain in contact with HC, HCT, Cluster

Coordinators and OCHA office to capture further learning which is of global value. The STAIT will actively disseminate

good practices to strengthen humanitarian response in other contexts.




19

ANNEX I ACTION PLANS

Issue/Problem Action Desired Outcome Who When Status Update

FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATIONSenior leadership roles and

responsibilities unclear:

The roles and

responsibilities of the

Regional HC and Senior

Advisor to the ERC in Riyadh

are not clear internally as

well as externally.

RHC and the Senior Advisor

to the ERC positions to be

reviewed by the

RC/HC/DO, and if required,

the positions to be

abolished or re-oriented as

articulated by the

RC/HC/DO.

Streamlined and clear

leadership structure with

no ambiguities on decision-

making and lines of

accountability.

ERC; EDG; RC/HC/DO 31/01/2016

Narrative of the

humanitarian crisis and

response in Yemen is not

communicated sufficiently

and strongly enough.

Appoint a Senior

Communication and

Advocacy Advisor/Officer

to drive the development

and implementation of a

HCT communication and

advocacy strategy

(including engagement

with international news

agencies). S/he will be a

member of the HCT and

lead an inter-agency

communication and

advocacy working group.

a) HCT members (and

other international NGOs)

adhere to a common

communication and

advocacy framework,

based on a regularly

reviewed risk analysis.

b) The Yemen

humanitarian story is

profiled in international

media and through social

networks.

OCHA

HCT members and INGOs

01/03/2016

Inconsistent messaging

between Sana’a, Riyadh and

New York.

There is ad hoc engagement

with authorities and parties

HQ messaging related to

the humanitarian situation,

including access,

humanitarian space and

Protection of Civilians is

In-county leadership

reviews messaging before

it is issued.

RC/HC/DO 15/02/2016 and on-going




20

to the conflict on issues

related to humanitarian

access and protection of

civilians (including political

dimension).

developed based on

consultations with agency

and organisations’ in-

country leadership.

DPA appoints a senior focal

point in Sanaa who sits as

an observer on the HCT.

There is consistent

exchange between the UN

Special Envoy and the

HC/RC/DO.

DPA 15/02/2016 (dependent on

security ceiling, visa etc.)

Implemented

Strategic guidance (HCT)

and operationalisation

(ICCM) are delinked.

The ICCM to be chaired by

the Head of OCHA or the

Dep. HC; ICCM

recommendations and

issues are addressed by

the HCT.

- The HCT provides

strategic guidance to

the ICCM on issues

raised by the ICCM

and other relevant

issues.

- Revisit / review the

TOR of the ICCM and

HCT.

The HCT is informed by

ICCM recommendations

and provides relevant

strategic guidance to ICCM.

- The ICCM provides

technical and

operational advisory to

the HCT.

- The HCT focuses on

strategic issues related

to delivery.

Head of OCHA; HC 15/12/2015 and on-going Implemented

FOCUS AREA: ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE

Community feedback does

not influence the

humanitarian response:Perceptions, needs and

complaints, and other

feedback mechanisms does

not influence cluster, ICCM

and HCT decision-making

HCT reviews proposal for a

common service for a

feedback mechanism andarticulates how it will be

operationalised, who will

be responsible and

accountable for its roll out

and implementation.

A common service bringing

together the data sets and

analysis from the differentfeedback mechanisms is

available and accessible to

HCT members and other

interested stakeholders.

- Feedback from affected

HC and HCT

Cluster leads, ICCM lead, HC,

15/12/2015

01/03/2016

Implemented




21

There is limited common

understanding on most

appropriate communication

channels for two-ways

communication with

affected populations.

populations in terms of

needs, perceptions and

complaints is taken into

account by clusters, the

ICCM and the HCT.

Humanitarian response

activities are adjusted

appropriately.

and UNICEF/ Search for

Common Ground.

FOCUS AREA: DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Insufficient field presence

of humanitarian actors indifferent parts of the

country.

Revisit the approach to risk

management so as toenable field presence and

delivery (‘Stay and Deliver’)

and take appropriate

action with focus on

delivery (with support of

relevant enabling

organization, particularly

DSS).

Utilise differentiated

movement regimes for

national and international

UN staff.

Less Risk Averse

Approaches that facilitateexpanded field presence

and delivery of assistance.

National staff movement

less restricted,

where/when appropriate.

SMT

SMT

31/12/2015

15/02/2016

Being implemented

Security risk management

not effectively enabling

field presence and delivery

(‘Stay and Deliver’).

Streamline Programme

Criticality criteria, process

and consensus.

Complete Security Risk

Assessments (SRAs) in

priority locations.

Programme Criticality

endorsed, ideally by UNCT

consensus.

SRAs done in priority

locations to permit

operational activities.

HC/HCT

DSS

22/02/2016

31/03/2016

Risks are passed onto

national staff and partners,

Identify main capacity gaps

of national partners and

Capacity Strengthening

Assessments done and

ICCM/Clusters 31/03/2016




22

while not adequately

building their capacity.

staff and develop plans to

address them.

plans developed, and roll

out of initial capacity

building programmes.

Inadequate speed and

scale of humanitarian

assistance delivery.

Limited monitoring

activities.

Improve linkages between

the strategic (HCT) and

operational levels (ICCM)

of the

response architecture

- ICCM to be chaired by

Head of OCHA

- Revisit / review the

TOR of the ICCM and

HCT

Better and tighter

prioritisation by clusters

and facilitated by the

ICCM, with guidance from

the HCT

Strengthen monitoring

systems and increase

monitoring activities.

- Assess existing 3rd

party and mobile /

remote monitoring

practices for possible

expansion and use

across clusters.

Improved strategic HCT

decision-making and

delivery.

Critical activities prioritised

in line with needs and

available funding.

More regular and robust

monitoring of assistance to

affected people, activities,

results. Clearer

understanding of the

humanitarian situation.

HCT; ICCM

HCT; ICCM; Clusters

OCHA; Clusters, all

humanitarian actors

24/03/2016

31/01/2016

24/04/2016

Implemented

Ongoing

Unclear links between

needs (evidence),

capacities, targets

(priorities), and

achievements / results

Systemise and better

coordinate needs

assessment processes and

content at the inter-cluster

level.

Comprehensive and

comparable presentation

of humanitarian needs

overall, across clusters.

ICCM, OCHA 01/03/2016




23

(indicators).

ICCM to analyse and feed

more and better

information to the HCT for

improved decision-making

and delivery.

Regular inter-cluster

analysis of needs and

responses; Better strategic

thinking and decisions.

ICCM, OCHA 01/03/2016

Insufficient spirit of

togetherness and

collaboration to overcome

common obstacles.

Partners utilizing common

services (Logistics, UNHAS,

Emergency

Telecommunications) to

provide information on

their needs, plans,

requirements,

expectations in a timely

manner (in advance) to be

serviced adequately.

Expand partnerships with

credible national NGOs to

support expanded delivery

opportunities, and to use

their knowledge and

presence across the

country to better

understand needs, collect

information and engage

with communities affected

by the crisis.

Better planned and more

effective and responsive

from Common Services.

Improved reach and

outreach in areas where

international actors have

limited presence/capacity;

empowered local actors;

more robust national

response systems.

Common Service Users

All Hum Actors, HCT, OCHA

01/02/2016 and on-going

01/03/2016

Being implemented

Ongoing

Critical impediments to

delivery caused by third

parties (authorities and

parties to the conflict)are

inadequately addressed.

Develop a more

comprehensive Access

Strategy and mechanisms

for the HCT as a whole.

Closer engagement with

Better informed and

coordinated approach to

access; faster handling of

issues.

More access to

HCT, OCHA

HC, ERC

15/03/2016

31/01/2016 Being implemented




24

authorities on the ground

to address access denials,

diversions, and

interference with

programmatic plans (see

also Protection Section in

this Action Plan on

engaging with

interlocutors: authorities

and parties to the conflict ).

Address de-confliction

challenges, especially for

road movements and

distributions sites (with

Coalition).

Closer engagement with

authorities (on both sides)

to approve visas, travel

permits and clearances,

allow the import of

humanitarian goods and

other items to support

humanitarian work such as

security andtelecommunications

equipment, armoured

vehicles etc.

Organise workshops/

training on humanitarian

populations in need; less

diversion of assistance;

improved reputation and

perception (reality) of

impartiality in the eyes of

interlocutors.

More effective de-

confliction mechanism

permits more movement,

field missions and

increased humanitarian

outreach (NOTE: not only

dependent on de-

confliction).

Humanitarian presence,

movements and

operations enabled.

Equipment delivered into

the country, more

clearances granted. More

understanding and

responsiveness of

authorities tohumanitarian actors and

operations.

Better understanding and

more enabling

HC, Liaison to the KS

Centre, KSA), ERC

HC, ERC

Protection Cluster, OCHA

31/01/2016

15/01/2016

01/03/2016 and on-going

Ongoing

Ongoing




25

issues, Human Rights and

Humanitarian Principles for

interlocutors, including

parties to the conflict.

environment for

humanitarian action by

governments and

authorities.

FOCUS AREA: PROTECTION

Limited common

understanding of Protection

and of its life-saving nature:

- Protection should be at

the core of the

humanitarian response(Centrality of

Protection).

PROCAP to work with the

Protection Cluster and HCT

to elaborate a strategy to

bring most significant

protection issues on to the

agenda of the HCT(Strategy on the Centrality

of Protection).

Centrality of Protection

firmly on the agenda of the

HCT: HCT prioritizes and

takes action on two-three

high priority protection

concerns in Yemen.

PROCAP

Protection Cluster

HC (to lead the process)

01/03/2016

Protection is not

mainstreamed in all

clusters.

Protection Cluster trains

other Clusters, with the

support of the GPC, on

mainstreaming protection,

including sharing best

practices and concrete

models that can be

utilized.

Protection is

mainstreamed across the

humanitarian response:

Clusters incorporate

protection concerns as a

central element of their

planning, responding and

reporting.

PROCAP

Protection Cluster

Other Clusters

Global Protection Cluster

01/05/2016

Direct access to

communities is severely

limited due to security

constraints and security

management procedures

that limit the potential of

humanitarian actors to be

present in areas of highest

need.

Confidence building

measures with

interlocutors: Systematic

and progressive roll out of

workshops on the Guiding

Principles on Internal

Displacement and on

humanitarian principles

(neutrality and

impartiality) to counter the

perception that UN

agencies are not delivering

Perception (amongst all

interlocutors) that UN

agencies and partners are

neutral and impartial in

their humanitarian role.

Significant confidence and

trust built between the UN

(and its partners) and

interlocutors that are in a

position to grant access

and permit the delivery of

Protection Cluster

Coordinator as lead.

Protection Cluster

members as support.

OCHA (Civil-Military)

UNDSS

UN agencies (security

officers)

15/03/2016, and on-going




26

based on needs. Strong

engagement with

authorities, tribal and

community leaders and

parties to the conflict, on

all sides of the conflict

(where and when

possible).

assistance.

Information collected by

different systems is not

harmonized.

Clarify a common system

(possibly ActivityInfo) to

harmonise protection data

and information collected

by different actors and

cluster mainstreaming

protection into their

activities: Protection

indicators included in

common assessments e.g.

MIRA.

Harmonized system of

reporting that facilitates

analysis and packaging of

protection issues and

activities is in place.

Protection Cluster All

Clusters

Information Management

Working Group

01/03/2016, and on-going

RUF strategy is unclear and

not operationalized.

Advocacy efforts are

unclear, particularly in terms

of roles and responsibilities

(especially Yemen vis-a-vis

the region and NY,

especially for high level

public advocacy).

Assign roles and

responsibilities and

timeframe to develop and

finalize the RUF Action

Plan.

Discuss and agree among

Yemen, regional level and

NY on who is going to

speak out, when, how andon what.

Clarity of roles and

responsibilities for

operationalising the RUF

Action Plan are defined.

RUF Action plan finalized

and showing signs of

implementation.

HC

HCT

PROCAP

Protection Cluster




27

ANNEX II GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AAP: Accountability to Affected People

A/HCT: Area Humanitarian Country Team

ASG: Assistant Secretary-General

CLA: Cluster Lead Agency

CSA: Chief Security Advisor

DHC: Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator

DPA: Department of Political Affairs

DTF: Diplomatic Transit Facility

EDG: Emergency Directors’ Group

ERC: Emergency Relief Coordinator

FSA: Field Security Advisor

FTS: Financial Tracking Service

GPC: Global Protection Cluster

HNO: Humanitarian Needs Overview

HPC: Humanitarian Programme Cycle

HQ: Headquarters

HRP: Humanitarian Response Plan

ICCM: Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP: Internally Displaced Persons

IMWG: Information-Management Working Group

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

L3: Level 3 crisis

MIRA: Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NNGO: National Non-Governmental Organisation

OHCHR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OPR: Operational Peer Review

OPS: Online Project System

PROCAP: Protection Standby Capacity Project

RC/HC/DO: Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator / Designated Official

RHC: Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

RUF: Rights Up Front




28

SCHR: Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response

SGBV: Sexual and Gender-based Violence

SMT: Security Management Team

SRA: Security Risk Assessments

STAIT: Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team

TA: Transformative Agenda

UNCT: United Nations Country Team

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS: United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UNHAS: United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNVIM: United Nations Verification and Inspection Mission

WFP: World Food Programme




29

ANNEX III SCHEDULE OF THE OPR TEAM

Day 1 Sunday 29 November / Amman

Bilateral Meeting, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA

Bilateral Meeting, Humanitarian Financing Unit, OCHA

Group Meeting, Information Management Group: OCHA, FAO, World Relief, UNDP, IOM

Group Meeting, Humanitarian Donors: ECHO, DFID, USAID

Group Meeting with NGOs(presence in Amman): Mercy Corps, World Relief, IMC, Save the Children

Bilateral Meeting, UNDP Yemen, Country Director

Group Meeting, Cluster Coordinators (not in Yemen): WASH Cluster, Refugees and Migrants Cluster

Day 2 Monday 30 November / Djibouti

Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR

Day 3 Tuesday 1 December / Sana’a

Bilateral Meeting with authorities

Day 4 Wednesday 2 December / Sana’a

Self-Assessment, Humanitarian Country Team

Self-Assessment, International NGO

Group Meeting, National NGOs

Day 5 Thursday 3 December / Sana’a

Group Meeting, Area HCT, Hudaydah, Skype Meeting

Small Group Meeting, Education Cluster

Small Group Meeting, Food Security Cluster

Small Group Meeting, Logistics Cluster

Bilateral Meeting, Intersos

Bilateral Meeting, Danish Refugee Council

Bilateral Meeting, CSW (national NGO)

Bilateral Meeting, The Humanitarian Forum (national NGO)

Small Group, UN Agency Security Staff Meeting

Day 6 Friday 4 December / Sana’a

Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR Bilateral Meeting, IOM

Bilateral Meeting, OHCHR

Bilateral Meeting, GENCAP Advisor

Bilateral Meeting, IOM

Bilateral Meeting, UNFPA

Bilateral Meeting, WFP

Bilateral Meeting, Oxfam

Bilateral Meeting, UNDSS




30

Day 7 Saturday 5 December / Sana’a

Self-Assessment, Inter Cluster Coordination Mechanism

Small Group Meeting, Health Cluster

Bilateral Meeting, Early Recovery Cluster

Small Group Meeting, Nutrition Cluster

Small Group Meeting, Shelter and NFI Cluster

Small Group Meeting, WASH Cluster

Small Group Meeting, Protection Cluster (and sub-clusters)

Bilateral Meeting, ICRC

Bilateral Meeting, UNHAS and ETC

Day 8 Sunday 6 December / Sana’a

Bilateral Meeting, MSF

Day 9 Monday 7 December / Sana’a

Humanitarian Country Team Retreat

ANNEX IV PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONS

CONSULTED

PRE-MISSION INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS:

OCHA-Yemen

Telephone, Monday 9 November

First Name Surname Organisation Position

Trond Jensen OCHA Head of Office, OCHA-Yemen

Humanitarian Coordinator, Yemen



Johannes Van der Klaauw UNHCR / IASC Humanitarian Coordinator, Yemen

NGO focus group

Geneva, Tuesday 10 November


Michael Gallagher Jesuite Refugee Service, JRC Geneva Office

Reshma Adatia ACT Alliance Geneva Office

Emma WilliamsNorwegian Refugee Council,

NRCGeneva Office

Charlotte Stemmer Oxfam Geneva Office

Gareth Price-Jones CARE Geneva Office




31

Donor Group

Geneva, Wednesday 11 November


Tristen Slade Australia Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

Joshua Tabah Canada Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

Intern Intern Netherlands Permanent Mission, Humanitarian OfficeAnh-Thu Duong Switzerland Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

Nance Kyloh USA Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

Intern Intern Germany Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

Kim Nason European Union Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office

NGO Forum, Yemen

Telephone, Wednesday 11 November


Lisa Piper Danish Refugee Council

Country Representative and Chair, Steering

Group, NGO Forum

OCHA/Emergency Directors' Group

Telephone, Wednesday 11th November


John Ging OCHA Chair, Emergency Director Group

OCHA CRD

Telephone, Thursday 12 November


Paola Emerson OCHA Chief, Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Melissa Fernandez OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Farhad Movahed OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

James Weatherill OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Jiyoung Lee OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Nathalie Fustier OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Moira Little OCHA Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD

Riyadh Liaison Office (Deconfliction)Telephone, Thursday 12 November


Max Gaylard OCHA Head, Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia

Abdul Haq OCHA Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia

David Woods OCHA Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia




32

World Health Organisation, WHO

Geneva, Friday 13 November


Ina Bluemel WHO Assistant Desk Officer, Yemen

Karen Hobday WHO Desk Officer, Yemen

US Department of State

Washington DC, Monday 16 November


Virginia Terhar

State Dept. Bureau of

Population, Refugees and

Migration

Programme Analyst

OHCHR

Geneva, Monday 18 November


Frej Fenniche OHCHRDirector (a.i.), Asia, Pacific, Middle East and

North Africa Branch

Samah OHCHR Emergency Section

Mohammad OHCHR Desk Officer, Yemen

Rights Up Front Initiative (RUF)



Andrew Painter Rights Up Front, Exec. Office ofthe SG

Senior Officer, RUF Initiative

UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, FAO

Telephone, Friday 20 November


Daniele Donarti UN FAO

International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC

Geneva, Friday 20 November


Yehia Khalil ICRC Desk Officer

United Nations Development Programme, UNDP



Bruno Lemarquis UNDP Deputy Director, Crisis Response Unit

Cecile UNDP Desk Officer




33

UK Department for international Development, DFID


First Name Surname Organisation

Stuart Little DFID

Mike Irwin DFID

MSF

Telephone, Tuesday 27 November


Antoine Bieler MSF Director, Regional Advocacy and Policy

Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, RHCTelephone, Friday 27 November


Amer Daoudi IASC Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

UNICEF



Yasmin Haq UNICEF Emergency Director

In-coming Humanitarian Coordinator



Jamie McGoldrick IASCHumanitarian Coordinator (Nepal), in-coming for

Yemen

OPR MISSION MEETINGS, AMMAN AND DJIBOUTI

Bilateral Meeting, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA

Amman, Sunday 29 November


Paul Thomas OCHA Dep. Head of Office (in Amman), OCHA

Bilateral Meeting, Humanitarian Financing Unit



Laurianne Leca OCHA Head of Unit, Humanitarian Financing

Liisamarie Keates OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer




34

Group Meeting, Information Management Group



Joseph Kandeh OCHA Information Management Officer

Daria Lisi Food Security Cluster, FAO Information Management Officer

Frederic Dagorne World Relief, Germany Information Management Officer

Gabriel Oduori Early Recovery Cluster, UNDP Information Management Officer

Duncan Sullivan Refugees & Migrants Cluster Information Management Officer

Group Meeting, Humanitarian Donors



Christophe Reltien ECHO

Philip Royan DFID

Briana White-Gaynor USAID

Group meeting with NGOs (presence in Amman)



Jonathon Bartolozzi Mercy Corps Country Director

Nate Harper World Relief, Germany

Orlena Scorville IMC Programme Officer

Grant Pritchard Save the Children Country Director

Bilateral Meeting, UNDP Yemen, Country Director



Mikiko Tanako UNDP Country Director

Group meeting, Cluster Coordinators (not in Yemen)



Derek Hyun Kim WASH Cluster Cluster Coordinator

TBC TBC Refugees and Migrants Cluster Cluster Coordinator

Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR

Djibouti, Monday 30 November


Claire Bourgeouise UNHCR Regional Refugee Coordinator




35

OPR MISSION MEETINGS, YEMEN

Bilateral Meeting with authorities

Sana'a, Tuesday 1 December


Ali Al-Kuhlani MOPIC

Abdulwahab Alweshlay Executive Unit for IDPs

Humanitarian Country Team Self-Assessment

Sana'a, Wednesday 2 December


Lisa Piper DRC Country Director

Edward Santiago Save the Children Programme Officer

Nicoletta Giordano IOM Country Director

Ahmed Shadoul WHO Country Representative

Sajid Mohammad Sajjad Oxfam Country Director

Christina Thevenot ACF Head of Mission

Johannes Van der Klauuw IASC Humanitarian Coordinator

Salah El Hajj Hassan FAO Country Representative

Jordan Hoffman INGO Forum INGO Forum Coordinator

Trond Jensen OCHA Head of Office

Marie Spaak OCHA Deputy Head of Office

George Abu Alzulot OHCHR Country Representative

Purnima Kashyap WFP Country Representative

Nasir Fernandes UNHCR Representative (acting)

Syrma Jamil NRC Representative (acting)

Deborah Clifton GenCap GenCap Advisor

Ezizgeloi Hellenon UNFPA Country Representative

Julien Harnies UNICEF Country Representative

Filipo Tarakinikini UNDSS Chief Security Officer

International NGO Self-Assessment








Edward Santiago Save the Children Programme Officer

Evelyn Vernont Intersos Country Director




36

Group Meeting, National NGOs



Amal Al Saqqaf Image

Musaeed Musaeed RRDF

Awfa Annaami UFDHRWaleed Al-Khayat RRDF

Noha Yehya Aleryami HFY

Mohammed Ali Al-Kanani CHR-Taiz

Mohammed

TahirAl-Jaseem SHS

Mohammed Amani ADO

Mohamed Al Gieez YFCA

Ishraq Motohaz Zabarah YWU

Motohar Al-Haidani CSSW

Fahmi Satari YDN

Group Meeting, Area HCT, Hudaydah, Skype Meeting

Sana'a, Thursday 3 December


Abdulkarim Hussein Ali OCHA Head of Sub-Office

Other participants: UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, CCSW, IOM, FAO, WFP, WHO, OHCHR, Oxfam, Save the Children, ACTED, NRC,

Islamic Relief, STC (national NGO).

Education Cluster, Small Group Meeting



Ahmed Giahad Education Cluster Cluster Coordinator

Nabila-Alkumain AbdulmoulaLife Markets Meeting

Place

Mohey al-Dein GIZ

Abdullah Modhesh UNICEF Programme Officer

Food Security Cluster, Small Group Meeting

Sana'a, Thursday 3 DecemberFirst Name Surname Organisation Position

Gordon Duchi Food Security Cluster Cluster Coordinator

Awfa Annaami NFDHR

Etienne Peter-Schmitt FAO

Alamnew Endalhachew WFP




37

Logistics Cluster, Small Group Meeting



Christophe Morard Logistics Cluster Cluster Coordinator

Yasser al-Azazi UNICEF

Intersos, Bilateral Meeting



Evelyn Lernout Intersos Country Director

Danish Refugee Council, Bilateral Meeting




CSW (national NGO), Bilateral Meeting



Abdulwas'a Al Wasai CSW Director

The Humanitarian Forum (national NGO), Bilateral Meeting



Noha Yeyha al-Eryani Humanitarian Forum Director

UN Agency Security Staff Meeting, Small Group



Petra Finianos UNHCR Field Security Advisor

Ahmad Alousaily WFP Field Security Advisor

Stuart Wright UNICEF Field Security Advisor

Hind Ghorayeb UNICEF Field Security Advisor

Alen Hodzic IOM Field Security Advisor

UNHCR, Bilateral Meeting

Sana'a, Friday 4 December


Johannes Van Der Kraauw UNHCR Representative

Nasir Fernandes UNHCR Deputy Country Director




38

IOM, Bilateral Meeting




OHCHR, Bilateral MeetingSana'a, Friday 4 December



GENCAP Advisor, Bilateral Meeting



Deborah Clifton GENCAP GENCAP Advisor

IOM, Bilateral Meeting




UNFPA, Bilateral Meeting



Himyar Abdulmoghni UNFPA Assistant Representative

WFP, Bilateral Meeting



Purnima Kanhyap WFP Country Director

Oxfam, Bilateral Meeting



SajidMohammad

SajjadOxfam Country Director

Department for Safety and Security, UNDSS, Bilateral Meeting







40

Shelter and NFI Cluster, Small Group Meeting

Sana'a, Saturday 5 December


Nasir Abel FernandesShelter/CCCM/NFI

Cluster

Senior Emergency Coordinator/ Cluster Coordinator

Mohammed Nassir UNHCR Field Officer

Monir AlSobariShelter/CCCM/NFI

ClusterSenior Cluster Associate

Fouad Diab IOM Shelter Coordinator

Mona Alhajri CSSW Project officer

Mohamed Tahir Al-Jaseem SHS Field Coordinator

Abeer Mezher DRC Emergency and Early Recovery Coordinator

WASH Cluster, Small Group Meeting



Marije Broekhuijsen WASH Cluster Coordinator / Programmes

Protection Cluster (and sub-clusters)



Randhir Wanigasokara Protection Cluster Coordinator

Mia JeongChild Protection Sub-

ClusterCoordinator

Ghamdan Mofarreh SGBV Sub-ClusterCoordinator and Reproductive

Health Programme

ICRC Bilateral Meeting



Simon Schorno ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation

UNHAS and ETC, Bilateral Meeting



George Harb WFP UNHAS Chief Air Transport Officer

Christophe Morard Logistics Cluster Logistics Cluster, Coordinator

Purnima Kanhyap WFP Country Director




MSF, Bilateral Meeting

Sana'a, Sunday 6 December


Jerome Alin MSF Country Director

Humanitarian Country Team RetreatSana'a, Monday 7 December



Edward SantiagoSave the Children

InternationalProgramme Officer


Ahmed Shadoul WHO Country Representative



Johannes Van der Klauuw IASC Humanitarian Coordinator

Salah El Hajj Hassan FAO Country Representative


Trond Jensen OCHA Head of Office

Marie Spaak OCHA Deputy Head of Office


Purnima Kashyap WFP Country Representative

Nasir Fernandes UNHCR Representative (acting)


Deborah Clifton GenCap GenCap AdvisorEzizgeloi Hellenon UNFPA Country Representative

Julien Harnies UNICEF Country Representative


yemen opr final report 12616

Documents