why did we go to war in iraq?€¦ · the iraq war inquiry group consists of australians from...
TRANSCRIPT
WHY DID WE GO
TO WAR IN IRAQ?A CALL FOR AN AUSTRALIAN INQUIRY
Call for an Iraq war inquiry 5
Foreword RtHonMalcolmFraserACCH 6
Executive summary 10
1 Why an inquiry, and why now? ProfRameshThakur 13
2 How did we get there? GarryWoodard,PaulBarrattAOandAndrewFarran 21
3 What evidence was available? RodBarton 29
4 How highly did the children rate? DrJennyGroundsandDrSueWarehamOAM 37
5 What sort of inquiry is needed? EdwardSantow 45
6 A better Westminster way to war? ProfCharlesSampford 55
7 The UK inquiries into the Iraq war ProfGerrySimpson 67
8 Never again? DrAlisonBroinowskiandProfCharlesSampford 75
Some unanswered questions 80
Contributors 82
ContentsThe Iraq War Inquiry GroupconsistsofAustraliansfromdiversebackgroundswhoareconcernedthattherehasbeennoin-depth,high-levelandindependentinquiryintohowAustraliadecidedtotakepartintheinvasionofIraqin2003.Asaconsequence,therehasbeenlittleinformedpublicdiscussionofthelessonstobelearnedandthealternativesandpotentialimprovementsintheprocessbywhichAustralianinstitutionsrespondtofutureconflicts.
Cover:IraqichildrenwhofledescalatingviolenceinsouthernIraq.Credit: Bikem Ekberzade
Above:AcoalitionsoldieronpatrolinRiyahdvillageinIraqinMarch2007.Credit: Andy Dunaway
Published in August 2012
ThechaptersinthisdocumenthavebeenwrittenbymembersoftheIraqWarInquiryGroup,anddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofthegroupasawhole,oranyindividualmember,ineveryrespect.
Editor:DrAlisonBroinowskiConvenor:DrSueWarehamOAMLayout:TimWright
Website:www.iraqwarinquiry.org.auEmail:[email protected]:0431475465
Postal address:POBox1379Carlton,Victoria,3053
The2003invasionofIraqwasahumanitarian,legal,politicalandstrategicdisaster.Ithasleftatrailofdeathanddestructionandmillionsofrefugees.Ithasunderminedtheroleofinternationallawandstrengthenedterrorism.
Australia’sroleinthewarraisedveryseriousquestionsofgovernmenthonestyandaccountability.Ifwedonotlearnlessonsfromthisepisode,weareatgraveriskofengaginginequallyill-foundedwarsinthefuture.
TherearemanyunansweredquestionsinrelationtoAustralia’sdecisiontogotowar.Theyinclude:
n Whatwasthegovernment’sdecision-makingprocessandtimingthatledtoourparticipationintheinvasion?
n Whatweretheobjectives,andhowwassuccesstobedefined?
n Howdidthegovernmentreconcileconflictingintelligenceassessments?
n Howdidthegovernmentattempttosatisfyitselfofthelegalityoftheinvasion?
n WhichofthemanyNGOpredictionsofwidespreadandsevereciviliansuffering,includingbychildren,did
thegovernmentconsider?Ifnone,why?
n TowhatextentwerethestatementsmadetotheParliamentandthepublicconsistentwithalltheavailablerelevantassessments?
Australiantroopsareentrustedtohelpsafeguardoursecurity.Anysuspicionthattheirlives,andthelivesofhundredsofthousandsofcivilians,havebeenplacedinjeopardyonthebasisofanythingotherthanthemostrobustandrigorousdecision-makingprocesscannotbeignored.
BoththeUnitedKingdomandtheNetherlandshaveinitiatedofficialinquiriesintotheirowninvolvementinthewar;Australiahasnot.Nearlyadecadeafterthewarbegan,itistimewedidso.
WecallforanindependentinquiryintothedecisionsthatledtoAustraliainvadingIraq,andareviewofthewarpowersofthegovernment,todrawoutwhatlessonscanbelearnedforthefuture.
To sign this appeal, visitwww.iraqwarinquiry.org.au
Call for an Iraq war inquiry
AyoungIraqigirlwaitsoutsideherhouseduringaclearingoperationintheRasalkoorDistrictofMosulin2009.Credit: Kamaile Chan
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HowdidAustralianarmedforcescometobeinvolvedinthe
US-ledinvasionofIraqin2003,andwhy?Whatwerethedecision-makingprocessesthatledtothatcommitment?Werethoseprocessesadequateintermsofoursystemofgovernmentasweunderstanditandforthefuture?
Itisoftenstatedwithwideapprovalthatadecisionto‘gotowar’isthemostseriousactthatcanbetakenbygovernment.Whatthisstatementbeliesishowthosedecisionsaretaken.Rhetorically,Australiawasrespondingtoanexistingstateofaffairs,inthewordsofUSPresidentGeorgeWBush,the‘waronterror’.Butwherewasthe‘terror’inIraqinthatcontext?Wasthisarmedactiononapretext,extraneoustoIraq,premeditatedonanotheragendamoretodowithalliance‘obligations’totheUS?
TheseareseriousquestionsforAustralia’sfutureforeignanddefencepolicies,andhowtheseshouldbepursuedwithinademocraticframework.Theyareraisedinthistimelypublicationtolaythebasicgroundworkforadeeperinquiry.Thepurposeoftheinquirywouldnotbetorakeoveroldcoalsbuttodevelopabetterunderstandingofhowwarfaredecisionsarereachedand
tostrengthenthegovernmentalstructuresagainstprecipitousorill-consideredactionsinfuture.
Thenatureofwarthesedayshasradicallychanged.Itplacesanunusualweightandresponsibilityonasmallnumberoftroopswhocarrythemajorburden,whilemostpeoplefeelnoconsequencesfromthatwar.Twoaspectsofitsjustificationthatmayneedreformulationaretheconceptsof‘nationalinterest’and‘self-defence’.Bothcanbeabusedorexploitedforself-servingpurposes.IsthenationalinterestsuchthatAustraliashouldseeitselfinpermanentalignmentwithagivenpower,whosedecisionsonwarandpeacebecomeourdecisions?Orshouldthetouchstoneof‘nationalinterest’inourcaserelatefirstandforemosttospecificallyAustralianconsiderationsandfollowfromthere?Isitfar-fetchedtoproclaimthatactionsaworldawayinvolveourself-defenceandhencecanbejustifiedundertheoneexceptionprovidedfortheuseofforceintheUNCharter(article51)?WhenthatexceptionwasdrafteditenvisagedthreatsandactsagainstastateofanimmediatenatureleavingnoroomfordelayorreferencetotheSecurityCouncil.TheIraqsituationhadbeenwiththeSecurityCouncil
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Foreword formonths,andithadnotbeenimpressedenoughtosanctionarmedmeasures.
WhatthispublicationshowsisthattheinvasionofIraqwasbeingplannedsometwoyearsbefore,indeedimmediatelyafterGeorgeWBushwaselected,andwasconceivedattheinstigationoftheso-called‘neo-cons’.TherewasaterrorthreattotheUSandindeedtotheworld,butatthatstageitsbasewasessentiallyinAfghanistan.ThegroundworkfordealingwithitwasalreadywelldevelopedbutbecameacasualtyofthedistractioncausedbytheIraqdiversion.ByMarch2003theUSwaswellandtrulycommitted,withlargetroopandtankdeploymentsalreadyintheMiddleEast,whichcouldnotbrookfurtherdelayastheheatandsandstormsofthehotseasonapproached.Tohavepulledbackthenwouldhavebeenahumiliation.Itwasthisprematureover-commitmentwhichinexorablydrewtheUSanditspartnersintoaconflictwhichbothdesired;ithadnotreachedarelevantthreatlevel,andhadnotachievedtherequisitediplomaticandlegalbasis.ItlackedanirrefutablerationaleinthemindsofsignificantinfluentialBritons,AmericansandAustralians.
Inretrospect,whatwenowseewerefranticeffortstocreatetheprerequisitesbymanipulatingintelligenceassessmentstofitthe
case,withallthesophisticationthatthattaskrequired.ThegeneralpublichadbecomeconfusedastowhethertheweaponsofmassdestructionallegedlybeingdevelopedorheldbySaddamHusseinexistedandwerebeingplacedinastateofreadinesstojustifyboth‘nationalinterest’and‘self-defence’claims.Buttheextensiveworldwidepublicdemonstrationsagainsttheprospectofinvasion–exacerbatedbythepersistentdenialtotheUNweaponsinspectorofthetimeheneededtocompletehistask–suggestthataninstinctivewisdominformedthepublicperceptionwhich,haditprevailed,muchhumanlossanddestructioncouldhavebeenprevented.
Inallthis,theAustraliangovernmentmayhavethoughtithadnochoiceifitweretoretaintheconfidenceoftheUS.Butwasthisamisjudgement,confusingthenatureofourobligationsunderANZUS,whichrequiresonlyconsultationaboutthreatsinthePacificregion?DidthegovernmentreallythinkthroughtheissuesindependentlyandtheimplicationsforourstandingwithAsianneighbours?Diditreallyevaluatetheintelligencepresentedtoitandignoreitsflaws?Diditwantto?Diditreallyconsiderthelegalissuessurroundingtheproposedinvasionobjectively,orwasitnotreallyinterested?DidtheCabinet
Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CHAugust 2012
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formallysitdownandconsideralltheissuescalmlyandclearlyandmakeadeterminationbasedonthat?DiditallowtheprimeministerasearlyasSeptember2001,followingaquickphonecalltotheforeignministerfromWashington,invokingANZUS,effectivelytopre-emptthedeliberativeprocessandcommitAustralianarmedforcestotheproposedUSactionsregardlessoftheseconsiderations?Isthishowdecisionsaboutthecommitmentofourarmedforcestoforeigncampaignsshouldbemadenowandinthefuture?Theimplicationsareprofound.
Thisstudybywell-informedandexperiencedpersonsinthepracticeandstudyofgovernmentinmattersofdefence,foreignandconstitutionalaffairsconcludeswiththeproposalthatthemannerandconsequencesofAustralia’sparticipationintheSecondGulfWarshouldbethesubjectofapublicinquiryforthebettermentandintegrityoffuturedecision-makingprocessesinthesecritical
areasofpolicy–onthelinesoftheChilcotinquiryintheUK,whichhasasimilarandoverduepurposeinthatcountry.
Morespecifically,suchaninquirycouldleadtoare-evaluationofthe‘warpowers’ofgovernmentandtheirexercise,andaddresstheroleofparliamentintheauthorisationofarmedforceabroad.Asmattersstand,parliament’sroleisexpostfacto,toapproveactionsalreadytakenundertheprerogativeatastagewherethedenialoffinancewouldineffectbetraythearmedforces.Inanagewherearmedconflictsituationsoftenlackdefinition(neitherwarnorpeace),andwheresomethingstartedhasthepotentialtocreepandevenspinoutofcontrol,thepublicinterestrequiresthattheactionsofthegovernmentofthedaybebetterregulatedandconstrainedinsituationsotherthanwherethenationmightbefacingadirectarmedattackleavingnoroomfordelayorwiderdeliberation.
FOREWORD
IraqichildrenwalkbycoalitionsoldiersonpatrolatamarketinNarhwanin2007.Credit: Timothy Kingston
decisionsweremadetogotowar,wecannotsafeguardAustraliaagainstundertakingill-foundedmilitaryactionsinthefuture.
An Australian inquiry TheprimarypurposeofthiscollectionofpapersistoengageAustraliansinaconcertedefforttopreventtheIraqwarexperiencefromrecurring.WecallforaninquiryintothedecisionsthatledtoAustraliainvadingIraq,andareviewofthewarpowersofthegovernmentwithaviewtoimprovingtheprocessesbywhichthisdemocracygoestowar.
Thisisnottoprejudgetheissue.Thosewhothinkthattheoriginaldecisionwasandremainstherightone,theprocessesadequate,andtheoutcomeonbalancegoodcanandshouldbeabletomaketheircasebeforeanindependentreview.Othersmayhavechangedtheirmindsandhavemuchtosayabouthowtheprocessesshouldbeimproved.Othersagainwhoopposeditthenmaybeasunsurprisedastheyaresaddenedbytheoutcome,andeagertopreventitsrepetition.
Questions and answersContributorshavecometogetherfromawiderangeofdisciplines,eachbringingparticularexpertisetothiscollection.Theyraiseandrespondtoaseriesofquestions.RameshThakurconsiderswhy
Australiansshouldrecallthemismatchbetweenreasonsgivenforthewarandthewayitwasconducted,andwhythisisthetimetosetupsuchaninquiry.ThesecondchapterprovidesatimelineofeventsleadingtothewarinIraq,fromJanuary2001,wellbeforetheinvasion,toMarch2003,preparedbyGarryWoodardwiththeassistanceofPaulBarrattandAndrewFarran.Intheirrespectivechapters,RodBartonevaluatestheevidencetheAustraliangovernmentreliedonbeforeinvadingIraq,andSueWarehamandJennyGroundsinvestigatewhatconsiderationitgaveinadvancetothehumanitariancostsofthewar.Proposingfivepossiblemodelsforaninquiry,EdwardSantowtakesintoaccountthepowersaninquirywouldrequire,howitwouldhandleclassifiedinformation,andthedegreeofindependenceitwouldenjoy.CharlesSampfordlooksathowWestminster-stylegovernmentshavegonetowarandsomeofthemeansforimprovingthatprocessandhowthesedecisionsshouldtakeintoaccounttheANZUSTreaty.InquiriesheldbytheUKareinvestigatedbyGerrySimpson.AlisonBroinowskiandCharlesSampfordconsidersomenextstepsforAustralia,endingwithalistofquestionswhichthecontributorshopewillstimulatefurtherresearchanddiscussion.
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On19March2013,10yearswillhavepassedsinceAustralian,
BritishandUSforces(andaPolishcontingent)invadedIraq.Thereasonswedidso,andmaintainedamilitarypresencethereformostofthedecade,wereunclearthenandarenotyetsatisfactorilyexplained.TheinvasiontookplacewithouttheapprovaloftheUNSecurityCounciland,accordingtomostinternationallawyers,indefianceofinternationallaw.
CoalitionforcesoverthrewthegovernmentofIraq,andthenandintheyearsthatfollowedtheykilledandwoundedmanythousandsofIraqis,aswellassustaininggreatlossesthemselves.Prisonersundercoalitionsupervisionweretorturedandkilled,citiesweredevastatedanddegradationofthecountrysidewaswidespread.
BritishandAustralianpublicopinionwasstronglyagainstthewarbeforeitstartedand,whileUSpublicopinionwasinitiallyinfavour,thiswasatatimewhenaroundtwo-thirdsofAmericansbelievedthatSaddamHusseinwasatleastpartlyresponsiblefor9/11.ThejustificationsgivenbyUSandBritishleadersfortheinvasion,whichAustraliaaccepted,werelatershowntobebasedonfalseinformation,onwhichAustralia
apparentlyrelied.AfutureprimeministerofAustraliacouldcommitourcountrytoasimilarlydubiouswar,indefianceofpublicopinion,inbreachofinternationallaw,atevengreatercost,andwithnodemonstrablebenefittoAustralia.‘WhydidwefollowAmericawithoutquestion?’MalcolmFraseraskedinhisWhitlamOrationon6June2012.Australiansstillawaitananswerfromgovernment.
Weareaccustomedtoholdinginquiriesafternaturaldisastersandman-madeaccidentsinAustralia.Werigorouslydebateandscrutinisegovernmentadministrationandexpenditure,andwecarefullyinvestigatethecausesofdeathsandinjuries,seekingtoavoidfuturemistakesandlosses.ThedisastrousandcostlyIraqwarshouldbetreatednodifferently.
InquiriesintoithavebeenmadebyindividualsintheUnitedStatesandbygovernmentsinBritainandtheNetherlands,butinAustralia,apartfromtwoinvestigationsoftheintelligencethatinformedtheHowardgovernment’sdecision(oneheadedbyanMP,theotherbyaformerSecretaryoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade),nowide-ranging,independentinquiryhasbeenheld.Unlessweknowhow
Executive summary
CHAPTER 1
Why an inquiry, and why now?
AustraliansoldiersfromtheAlMuthannaTaskGroupcarryoutrangepracticeinIraqwith9mmBrowningpistolsin2006.Credit: US Government
dreamsandshatteredfuturesfortheirfamilies.Itcanleavefamiliesandentirevillagestraumatisedincountrieswherethefightingtakesplace.Itmaysowbitterhatredamongpeoplesandcreateforeignenemiesforgenerations.ItcaninspireactsofterroragainstAustralianpeopleandsymbols.Thisiswhywarmustalwaysbetheoptionoflastresortandmustneverbechosenlightly.
Domestically,thestateenjoysamonopolyonthelegitimateuseofviolence.Thepowerandmeanstouseviolenceisvestedinlawenforcementauthorities,includingtheauthoritytousedeadlyforcewhenwarranted.Evenso,inmostmoderndemocraticWesternsocieties,everytimethattheuseofforceinthelineofdutybyapoliceofficerresultsinadeath,afullinquiryisconductedbycompetentauthoritiesforanindependent
determinationastowhethertheactionwasjustifiedandhowsuchatragedymightbeavoidedinfuture.
Underconditionsofmoderninternationalsociety,fortheruleofinternationallawtobeentrenchedandwidelyestablished,itmaybehelpfulfortheleadingdemocraticstatestoadoptananalogouspolicywithrespecttowar.Thatis,atareasonablebutfixeddistanceintimefromwhenthedecisiontogotowarwasmade,anindependentinquirybycompetentauthoritiesshouldbeconductedtoreviewthedecisionanddrawappropriateconclusionsonjustification,preparationsandconsequences.Thisshouldbecomeanormalandroutineaspectofdemocraticaccountability.Itismeritedandwillmarkafittingculminationofthreeseparatehistoricaltrends:theincreasingrestrictionsplacedonstatestogotowarunilaterally,the
progressivetransferofauthoritytouseforceacrossborderstointernationalauthorities,andthedecliningcasualty-cum-fatalityrateswithanaccompanyingriseinthevalueplacedonindividuallives,evenofsoldiers,inmodernWesterndemocracies.
The progressivedelegitimisation of warViolenceisendemicinnatureandinhumanrelations.Warbetweenstateshasbeenanenduringfeaturesincetheemergenceofthecurrentinternationalsystemin1648,ironicallyfollowingthePeaceofWestphalia.Butitisfarfromanendearingfeatureandis,indeed,anaffronttothemoderninternationalisedhumanconscienceandsensibility.
Untilthesomewhatprematurelylabelled1914–18‘wartoendallwars’,theorganisedviolenceofwarwasanacceptedandnormalpartofthestatesystem,withdistinctiverules,normsandetiquette.InthatHobbesianworld,theonlyprotectionagainstaggressionwascountervailingpower,whichincreasedboththecostofvictoryandtheriskoffailure.ForvictorsanddefeatedalikeinEurope,warsmeantdisplacement,destruction,deprivation,privation,invasion,occupationandmassmurder.Europeanshaveasharedmemoryofwarasaterriblehuman-madecalamity:wouldFrancereallywant
torepeatits‘victories’inthetwoworldwars?
InthelateTonyJudt’swords,theUStoday‘istheonlyadvanceddemocracywherepublicfiguresglorifyandexaltthemilitary’.Britain,FranceandGermanylost1–2millionsoldierseachinWorldWarI;theUSlostfewerthan120,000.China,France,GermanyandtheSovietUnioneachlost2–11millionsoldiersinWorldWarII;theUSlostunderhalfamillion.ThetotalUSciviliandeathsfromthetwoworldwarswasunder2000,comparedwith2–16milliondeathsineachofGermany,Poland,theSovietUnionandChina.
Againstthisbackgroundoftheageoftotalwars,animportantstepinthedevelopmentoftheideathataninternationalcommunityhasboththerightandaresponsibilitytomutearmedconflictbetweenitsmemberstateswasthePactofParisof1928.Itssignatoriescondemned‘recoursetowarforthesolutionofinternationalcontroversiesandrenounce[d]itasaninstrumentofnationalpolicyinrelationswithoneanother’.Thenormativebreakthrough,thatwarwasanillegitimatemethodofdisputesettlement,wasofgreatsymbolicsignificanceevenifitfellshortofbeinganenforceablecontractualobligation.AlthoughtheLeagueofNationsfailedtopreventanotherworldwar,fromtheashesoftheSecondWorldWartheUnited
Prof Ramesh Thakur
Takingacountrytowaristhesinglemostsolemninternationalresponsibilityofanygovernment.Itrequiresoursoldierstokillcompletestrangerssolely
ontheauthorityofthegovernment.Itputstheirlivesontheline.Deathandseriousinjurytothediggerscanmeanbroken
WHY AN INQUIRY, AND WHY NOW?
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hadharbouredambitionstogetWMD,theIraqiprogramstobuildthemhaddecayedcompletely.UNsanctionshadhelpedtodismantlethemandUNinspectionshadgivenanaccurateassessmentofSaddam’sWMDcapability.NocredibleevidencewaseverproducedtolinkSaddamHusseintoal-Qaidaorinternationalterrorism,whiletheIraqinvasionitselfprovedapowerfulrecruitingweaponforal-QaidaamongalienatedMuslimcommunitiesaroundtheworld.
Thewarwasillegal.OnlytheUnitedNations,notindividualstates,hadtherighttodecideifIraqwasinbreachofUNresolutions.SecurityCouncilResolution1441didnotusethekeyphrase‘allnecessarymeans’toenforceit,hencetheneedforasecondUNresolutionthatnevercame.UNinspectorsunderHansBlixwerestilldoingtheirjobandIraqwasbeingcompliant.TheUSpositiononlegalitydidnotapplytoBritainandAustraliabecauseCongresshadgrantedspecialwar-makingpowerstoPresidentGeorgeWBush.InherresignationlettersubmittedontheeveoftheIraqwar,ElizabethWilmshurst,thedeputylegaladvisertotheUKForeignOffice,describedmilitaryactioninIraqas‘anunlawfuluseofforce’that‘amountstothecrimeofaggression’.
Althoughsomeadvocatesforthe
warmightstillwanttoarguethecaseforitslawfulness,mostwarsupportersinsteadaremorelikelytoarguethat,regardlessofitslegalstatus,itwasstilllegitimateinthatitridIraqandtheworldofSaddamHussein.Butinordertooustaregimebasedsolelyonmightwithfewredeemingfeaturestomakeitright,establishedinstitutionsandconventionsforensuringthatforceislegitimatelyexercisedweresetasidebyasuperpowersupremelyconfidentofitsmightandpreparedtoignorewhatisright.
Finally,itisdifficulttoseehowonecountrycanenforceUNresolutionsbydefyingtheauthorityoftheworldbodyanddenigratingitasirrelevant.
Why now?First,2013willmarkthe10thanniversaryofthelaunchoftheIraqwar.Adecadeonisagoodtimetoreflectbackonthereasons,circumstancesanddecision-makingproceduresbywhichacountrywenttoanywar,andtoconsideritsconsequences.
Second,thereisbynowwidespread,althoughnotunanimous,internationalagreementthattheIraqwarwasmorallywrong,illegal,unjustifiedandhadmanyseriouslydamagingconsequencesforWesterninterests.Theprimaryjustificationforgoingtowarwastodestroyanallegedactiveprogramofbuilding
WHY AN INQUIRY, AND WHY NOW?
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Nationsresurrectedthecauseofsecuringpeace.USPresidentAbrahamLincolnmeditatedonthe‘scourgeofwar’,anaptdescriptionthatfounditswayintotheUNCharter,whosepreamblebeginswiththeclarioncall:‘WethepeoplesoftheUnitedNationsdeterminedtosavesucceedinggenerationsfromthescourgeofwar,whichtwiceinourlifetimehasbroughtuntoldsorrowtomankind.’
Since1945,theUNhasspawnedacorpusoflawtostigmatiseaggressionandcreatearobustnormagainstit.TheUNvisionreplacedtheLeague’sfutileeffortstoabolishwarwithaprovisionforstatestousemilitaryforcecollectivelyandtoabidebytherulesoftheUNCharter.Assuch,negotiationsandtheruleoflawweretoreplacetheunilateraluseofforce.OnlytheSecurityCouncilcouldtakeorauthorisemilitaryactiontorestorethepeace.Thenormativeprimacyofpeacefuloverforcefulmeans,andofthepropositionthattheinternationalcommunityhasastakeinwaravoidance,justifyingitsinvolvementinbilateraldisputesbetweenmemberstates,isfirmlyentrenched.
Ofcourse,countriesretainedtherighttousemilitaryforceinindividualorcollectiveself-defence.Thatwasnotthecasein2003.Iraqwasnotimplicatedintheterroristattacksof11September2001.ReasonsfortheUNfailuretosupportthewarincludeddeepdoubtsoverthejustificationforgoingtowarandanxietyaboutthehumantoll,uncontrollablecourse
andincalculableconsequencesofwarinavolatileandalreadyinflamedregion.
WashingtonhadfivegreatclaimsfortheIraqwar:thethreatposedbytheproliferationofweapons
ofmassdestruction(WMD)toSaddamHussein’sIraq;thethreatofinternationalterrorism;theneedtoestablishabeachheadofdemocraticfreedomsandtheruleoflawintheMiddleEast;theneedtobringSaddamHusseintojusticefortheatrocitiescommittedbyhisregime;andthedutytobetheinternationalcommunity’senforcer.Eachgoalwasbadlyunderminedbythemeanschosen,andtheircollectivedamagetoworldorderwasgreaterthanthesumoftheirseparateparts.
InOctober2004,theCIA’sIraqSurveyGroupreportedwithfinalitythatwhileSaddamHussein
CHAPTER 1
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Since1945,theUNhasspawnedacorpusoflawtostigmatiseaggressionandcreatearobustnormagainstit.
consideringthetwoexperiencestogether,includingthedifficultquestionoftowhatextenttheIraqwarunderminedtheprospectsforsuccessinAfghanistan.
Seventh,theMiddleEastregionremainsastenseasever,withthevolatilesituationinSyriaandthestandoffwithIranoveritsnuclearprogramthreateningtodescendintointernal,regionaland/orinternationalwaratshortnotice.SomecommentatorsalsoperceiveAustraliaasbeingdrawnintoaUS-ledstrategyofcontainmentofChinainthePacific.Thistoohasconsiderablepotentialtoflareupintointer-stateconflictthatcouldentangleAustralia.Itwouldbedifficulttoconductathorough
andsatisfactoryinquiryintoapastwarinthemidstofanewwar.Itisbettertostudythelessonsnowwhenwestillcan:bothtoavoidanotherwarifwecan,andtoconductitafterduediligenceanddemocraticaccountabilityifwecannot.
Finally,Australiahasbeencampaigningforandiscautiouslyhopefulofbeingelectedtoatwo-yeartermontheUNSecurityCouncilin2013–14.Thisputsextraresponsibilityasamemberofthekeyinternationallawenforcementbodytoreaffirmitswar-makingauthorityandcompetence,andalsotomakesurethatwehavedrawnthehardlessonsfromapreviousflawedwar.
WHY AN INQUIRY, AND WHY NOW?
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weaponsofmassdestruction.Thishasbeenprovendefinitivelyfalse.In2008formerUSsecretaryofstateMadeleineAlbrightsaidthattheinvasionofIraqwas‘thegreatestdisasterinAmericanforeignpolicy’,worseeventhanVietnaminitsunintendedconsequences.‘AndthebiggestunintendedconsequenceinIraqis…thatactuallyIranhas…wonthewarinIraq.’Weneedtostudythelong-termeffectsofthewaronAustralia’ssecurityinterests.
Third,theIraqwarwasinviolationofAustralia’sinternationalobligationsundertheANZUSTreaty.Article1ofthetreatyobligatesAustralia‘tosettleanyinternationaldisputesinwhichtheymaybeinvolvedbypeacefulmeansinsuchamannerthatinternationalpeaceandsecurityandjusticearenotendangeredandtorefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceinanymannerinconsistentwiththepurposesoftheUnitedNations’.Asalreadyargued,thisobligationtorespecttheUNCharterwasbreachedin2003.
Fourth,theUKhashadseveralinquiriesrelatedtotheIraqwar,includingonewhichisyettoreport.Anall-encompassing
inquiryintoAustralia’sinvolvementintheIraqwarthereforewouldbefollowinginBritain’sfootsteps,notsettingaprecedent.
Fifth,since2003theinternationalcommunityhasforthefirsttimeagreedtoadefinitionofaggression.AttheconclusionoftheInternationalCriminalCourtreviewconferenceinKampala,Uganda,on12June2010,article
8bisoftheRomeStatutewasamended.The‘crimeofaggression’isdefinedtomean‘theplanning,preparation,initiationorexecution…ofan
actofaggression’inviolationoftheUNCharter.Anactofaggressionisdefinedas‘TheinvasionorattackbythearmedforcesofaStateoftheterritoryofanotherState,oranymilitaryoccupation,howevertemporary,resultingfromsuchinvasionorattack’.WemustcarefullystudytheimplicationsofthisanddrawtherightlessonsfromtheIraqwarforfuturecallstoarms.
Sixth,nextyearAustraliawillalsocommencedisengagingfrommilitarycombatoperationsinAfghanistan.BecauseofthegeographicalandchronologicalproximityofIraqandAfghanistan,aninquirycouldbenefitfrom
CHAPTER 1
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TheIraqwarwasinviolationofAustralia’sinternationalobligationsundertheANZUSTreaty.
CHAPTER 2
How did weget there?
AustralianarmouredvehiclesinfiringpositionsduringarangepracticeinIraqin2007.Credit: Rob Nyffenegger
ThefollowingisatimelinebuiltaroundthesequenceofeventsintheUSandtheUK:
2001
JanuaryTendaysafterbecomingpresident,GeorgeWBushmeetsforthefirsttimewithhisnationalsecurityprincipals,with‘Mideastpolicy’astheadvertisedsubject.Theprincipalsubjectis‘howIraqisdestabilizingtheregion’andtheoutcomeofthatdiscussionisthatSecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldandChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralHughShelton,areto‘examineourmilitaryoptions’and‘howitmightlook’touseUSgroundforcestochallengeSaddamHussein.
FebruaryCIADirectorGeorgeTenetpresentstoCongresstheintelligencecommunity’scomprehensiveannualstatementonworldwidethreats.ThesolementionofIraqinrelationtoweaponsproliferationisasinglesentencesayingthatIraqisprobablyconductingworkonballisticmissilesandthat,ifitreceivedforeignassistance,itcoulddevelopanintercontinentalballistic
missilecapability‘sometimeinthenextdecade’.Saddam’seconomicinfrastructureisinlong-termdecline,hisabilitytoprojectpoweroutsideIraqis‘extremelylimited’,andinternationalsanctionsarekeepinghisdiminishedmilitaryfromoperatingeffectivelyeveninsideIraq.
February—August TheUSdrawsupa‘liberationstrategy’forIraq.ThedominantthemeinadvicefromtheintelligencecommunityandtheStateDepartmenttopolicymakersduringthistimedownplaystheimmediacyorseverityofanythreatfromSaddamandspecificallyanythreatbasedonunconventionalweapons.
March 2001 through 2002TheintelligencecommunitiesproducediverseassessmentsofIraq’sWMDprogram,initiallywithparticularreferencetoaluminiumtubes.Australia’sintelligencecommunitywouldhavebeeninvolved.
AprilTheAustraliangovernmentisadvisedthatAWBLimitedisunderintensepressuretopaykickbackstotheSaddamHusseinregime.
HOW DID WE GET THERE?
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notaboutwhetherbuthow.Itwastakenforgrantedthattheprimeministerwasthedecision-makerandthatwhateverwastheprimeminister’sdecision,thatwouldbeit.Noministerorofficialofferedadvice,ordissent,onthisscore.IraqwasthereforeuniqueinAustralia’spost-warhistory,althoughithadmanycommonfeatureswiththepolicymakingproceduresforthepreviousmajorwarinwhichAustraliawasinvolved:Vietnam.
Therefore,aninquiryintohowAustraliawenttowarinIraqshouldconsidernotAustraliandecision-makingprocessesthemselvesbutratherthenature,adequacyandrelevancetoAustralia’snationalinterestsofreactionsbytheprimeminister
andCabinettothedecision-makingprocessesofitstwomajorallies,theUSandUK,particularlytheUS.Australiawouldnotalwayshavebeeninvolvedintheseprocesses,butitcanbetakenforgrantedthatitwascloselyinformed.Soadecisionnottoexpressaviewastheyproceededwoulditselfrepresentapolicyposition.
AninquirywouldbeexpectedtoelucidatetheextentofAustralia’sknowledge,throughministerialcommunications,diplomaticreportsandintelligenceexchanges,andofcoursethevoluminouspublicmaterialonUSandUKthinkingwhichwasavailableinthemedia.Towhatextentwasthisknowledgeproperlyevaluated,andwhatevidenceisthereforthis?
Garry Woodard with Paul Barratt and Andrew Farran
Therewasnoorderly,consecutiveprocessofdecisionmakingonwhetherAustraliashouldgotowarinIraqin2003.From9/11,in2001,PrimeMinisterJohnHoward
hadmadeuphismindtofollowUSPresidentGeorgeWBushinthewaragainstterrorism.Australiandecisionswere
TIMELINE 2001—2003
allowanuclearattackbyterrorists;theintelligencecommunityreportsthatIraqobtainedyellowcakeuraniumfromNiger(laterrejectedbyDIO);USDeputySecretaryofDefensePaulWolfowitzinGermanymakesthefirststatementaboutpre-emption.
MarchStatementsalongthesamelinesaremadebyUKPrimeMinisterTonyBlairduringavisittoLondonbyCheney;theForeignOfficeexpressesreservations.Thawley,oninstructions,issuesanultimatumtoSaddamonFoxTV.
AprilTheNewYorkerpublishesanarticleonpre-emptiontoachieveregimechangeinIraqwhichprovestobeaccurateonBushadministrationthinkingandasapredictionofwhatwouldhappen.(Ex-JointIntelligenceOrganisationdirectorGordonJockellatertellstheJullcommitteein2007thatthiswouldimmediatelyhavebeenonintelligencecommunitydesksinCanberra.)BushandBlairmeetatCrawfordandagreeonthedesirabilityofregimechangeinIraq,Blairstatingthreedesirableprerequisitesbutnotmakingthempreconditions.BlairgivesaspeechinTexas.Howard,carryingabasicbriefonIraq,holdstalkswithBlair.BushtellsBritain’sITV:‘ImadeupmymindthatSaddamneedstogo.’
MayDonaldRumsfeldtellsCongressthatterroristsareseekingtoacquireWMDfromIraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Syria,etc.AskedifhehasaplantoattackIraq,GeneralFranksreplies:‘That’sagreatquestion…mybosshasnotyetaskedmetoputtogetheraplantodothat.’
JuneHowardisinWashingtontoaddressCongress.AccompaniedbyONADirectorKimJones,heluncheswithCIADirectorGeorgeTenet.Thedoctrineofpre-emptionisproclaimed(andlatertakenupbyHoward).Toadeputyraisingdoubtsaboutwar,nationalsecurityadviserCondoleezzaRicesays:‘Saveyourbreath.Thepresidenthasalreadymadeuphismind.’
JulyMI6’sRichardDearloveadvisesUKCabinetthattheUSissetonwar,wantstoremoveSaddambymilitaryaction,andisfixingtheintelligenceandthefactsaroundthepolicy.HementionsanticipatedacquiescenceofAustralia,whichmaywellhavebeenfullyinformed.ABritishCabinetOfficepaperof21Julypredictsthat‘Australiawouldbelikelytoparticipate[intheIraqwar]onthesamebasisastheUK’.TheForeignOfficequeriesthelegalityofmilitaryaction.Rumsfeldrejectsarmyandairforcesecretaries’warningofanother
HOW DID WE GET THERE?
25
September10thPrimeMinisterHowardarrivesinWashington,meetswithPresidentBushandattendsanembassybarbecuewithalltheUSneo-conestablishmentfromVice-PresidentDickCheneydown.11thTerroristsattacktheUSatseverallocations(theWorldTradeCenter,thePentagon,etc).ThereisimmediateUSdiscussionofreprisalsagainstIraq.DefenseSecretaryDonaldRumsfeldadvises,‘Gomassive.Sweepitallup.Thingsrelatedandnot.’MinutestakenbyaRumsfeldaidefivehoursaftertheattackread:‘Bestinfofast.Judgewhethergoodenough[to]hitSH[SaddamHussein]@sametime.NotonlyUBL[UsamabinLaden].’(Thisbecamepubliclyknownon4September2002.)DiscussionscontinueforafewdaysuntilPresidentBushordersconcentrationonAfghanistan.Howardisbriefedbywell-informedAustralianambassadorMichaelThawley(whoseadviceonAfghanistan,IraqandthefreetradeagreementHowardisacknowledgingtojournalistTonyJonesontheABCwhenBush’sacknowledgementisstoppedbytheshoe-throwingincident).
12thHowardpledgessupport,anddecidestoinvoketheANZUSTreatyafteradiscussionwith
USAmbassadorTomSchiefferandatelephonecalltoForeignMinisterAlexanderDowner.
26thPresidentBushmakesanaddresstothenation.TheDefenceIntelligenceOrganisation(DIO)criticismofitstoneprovescontroversialinCanberra.
November21stPresidentBushdirectsDefenseSecretaryRumsfeldtoconstructinsecretafreshplanforgoingtowarinIraq.
December 28thGeneralTommyFrankspresentsafirstdraftwarplan.Furtherdevelopmentofwarplans,withAustralianparticipationthroughanAustraliancolonelatUSCentralCommand(CENTCOM).
2002
JanuaryForcesstarttobereassignedfromAfghanistan.StateoftheUnionaddress:‘AxisofEvil’labelisappliedtoIraq,IranandNorthKorea.Principalthemes:terrorismandWMD.Rogueregimes‘could’giveadvancedweaponstoterrorists.
FebruarySecretaryofStateColinPowellspeakstoCongress;Vice-PresidentCheneysaystheUSwillnever
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24
2003
January27thHansBlixfromtheUNMonitoring,VerificationandInspectionCommissionandMohammedElBaradeifromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyreporttoUN,theformermoreequivocalandaskingformoretime.Thetenorofthereportisthatalthoughtheregimehasstilltoaccountformanybannedweapons,itiscooperatingwell,andnoWMDhavebeenfound.BlairisinWashington;heandBushagreetostartawaron10March,assertingtherewillbenoseriousreligiousorsectarianstrifeaftertheinvasion(thoughaCIAassessmenthascontradictedthis).
February4thPrimeMinisterHowardcherry-picksforeignintelligence.AtthistimeandthroughFebruary,ONAstrengthensadvicethatIraqhasWMD.
5thSecretaryofStatePowelladdressestheUN;someofhisevidence–forexample,mobilefactoriestoproducebiologicalweapons–provestobeincorrect,andisqueried,notablybyFranceandGermany,whicharedismissedbytheUSas‘oldEurope’.ThereisastalemateintheUN.
10thHowardisinWashingtonfortalkswithPresidentBush.
11thHowardseesHansBlixinNewYork.
MarchEarly MarchBlixandElBaradeireportfurtherprogress,sayingnoproscribedactivitieshavebeendiscovered.
14thHowardaddressestheNationalPressClubandisqueriedonhisfailuretoproduceevidenceoflinksbetweenSaddam,al-Qaidaand9/11byLaurieOakesandonregimechangebyMichelleGrattan.
17th RJMathewsfromtheDefenceScienceandTechnologyOrganisationwritestoHowardexpressingreservationsabouttheintelligenceandnotingregimechangewillincreasethedangerofdisseminationofIraqiknow-howonWMD.
18thHowardquotes(new)BritishadvicethatwarislegalandsaystheAustralianpositionissimilar.
19thWarstarts.AustraliantroopsareinactionbeforeanyannouncementandbeforetheultimatumtoSaddamhasexpired.
HOW DID WE GET THERE?
27
Vietnam,saying:‘We’regoingtogetin,removeSaddamandgetout.That’sit.’GeneralFrankssecretlyrequests$700millionforwarpreparations.Bushapproves,unbeknownsttoCongress.MoneyistakenfromanappropriationforthewarinAfghanistan.
AugustPowellalsoexpressesstrongreservationstoPresidentBushandnationalsecurityadviserRice.WhiteHousechiefofstaffAndrewCardestablishestheWhiteHouseIraqGrouptoplanandcoordinatethesellingofthewar.
7th ThecompletedwarplanissubmittedtoPresidentBushbyGeneralFranks.
September TheWhiteHouseIraqGroupcoordinatesPR,includingforandwithallies.
7—8thAmediablitz–‘wedon’twantthesmokingguntobeamushroomcloud’.Cheneypresents‘newinformation’ofalinkbetweenSaddamandal-Qaida(whichislaterrejectedbyAustralia’sDIO).
12thBushaddressestheUN,leadingtoSaddam’sagreeingtore-admitUNinspectorsonthe18th.TheAustraliangovernmentmakespublicuseofanONAreport,whichusesforeignintelligence
(latercriticisedintheFloodreportandbytheJullcommittee,whichsuggestedONAwasrespondingto‘policyrunningstrong’).
OctoberAmonthofintenseactivityandextremerhetoric(introducingunmannedaerialvehicles)astheBushadministrationseeksawarresolutionfromCongress,submittingahighlycontentiousnationalintelligenceestimate.TheUKNationalIntelligenceCommitteealsoproducesa‘dodgydossier’tojustifywar.
NovemberUNSecurityCouncilresolution1441offersIraqafinalopportunitytocomplywithitsdisarmamentobligationssetoutinpreviousresolutions.
DecemberSignificanttroopdeploymentsaremadetotheMiddleEast.
2001—2
AustraliandiscussionsofIraqrelatetomodalitiesandintelligence.Officialsarenotaskedforanddonotofferadvice–firstreportedbyformerDefenceDeputySecretary(StrategyandIntelligence)HughWhite;confirmed(specificallyfortheperiodfromOctober)bythreedepartmentalheadstoPaulKellyinTheMarchofthePatriots(2009).
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26
CHAPTER 3
What evidencewas available?
TheUNSecurityCouncilmeetson14February2003tohearabriefingontheprogressoftheweaponsinspectorsinIraq.Credit: Evan Schneider
thousandinspectors,includingmorethan150Australians,combedthecountrytoensurethatthedestructioncarriedoutwasdonecomprehensivelyandcompletely.Aspartofthisprocess,thousandsofIraqiscientists,engineersandmilitarypersonnelinvolvedwithIraq’sformerWMDprogramswereinterviewedandclosetoamilliondocumentsseized.Inshort,amassivedatabaseonIraqicapabilitieswasestablished,andalthoughitwascloselyheldbytheUN,inevitablysomeofthedetailsfilteredbacktothecountriesthatprovidedtheinspectors.
FollowingOperationDesertFox,aUSandUKbombingcampaignagainstIraqifacilitiesinDecember1998,Iraqbannedfurtherweaponsinspections.However,whenthethreatofwaragainloomedinlate2002,Iraqallowedentryofnewteamsofinspectors,andinspectionscontinueduntilalmosttheoutbreakofwarinMarch2003.Duringthistime,over300siteswerevisitedtoestablishwhethertherewereanyindicationsthatweaponsprogramshadbeenresumedduringthethreeyearstheinspectorshadbeenabsent.Someofthese300siteswerethosesuggestedbycountries,includingtheUS,thatbelievedtheyhadintelligenceonwhereIraqmightbemakingWMD.
Ofcourse,afteronlythreemonthsofinspections,there
werestilldiscrepanciesanduncertainties,andasHansBlix,theheadoftheUNweaponsinspectorate,reportedtotheSecurityCouncilon14February2003,‘wedonotknoweverycaveandcorner’ofIraq.ButhealsoreportedthattherewasnothingtoindicateanyrenewedWMDactivity.Onthesameday,MohammedElBaradei,theheadoftheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,similarlyreportedthathisteamshad‘foundnoevidenceofongoingprohibitednuclearornuclear-relatedactivitiesinIraq’,butpointedoutthattherewere‘anumberofissues…stillunderinvestigation.’
PerhapsmoresignificantthanthelackofevidenceforWMDwasthestateofIraq’sindustriesin2003:aWMDprogramneedsfacilitiessuchassteelworksandchemical,electronicsandfabricationplants.Afteryearsofsanctions,UNinspectorsnotedthatfactorieshadfallenintodisrepairandIraq’scapacitytosupportevenabasicWMDprogramwasseverelylimited.Supportforatechnologicallysophisticatedprogram,suchasonerequiredfornuclearweapons,wasnon-existent.
ThusthelargestdatabaseonIraqicapabilities,theUNcollection,providednoevidenceofanyrenewedWMDactivity.Althoughthereweresomeuncertaintiesandissuestobe
WHAT EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE?
3130
strongintelligenceassessment’andonwhatinformationwasitbased?TwomajorAustralianinquiriesintotheintelligencethatledAustraliatowarhavebeenheld,oneinDecember2003byaparliamentaryjointcommitteeonASIO,ASISandDSDintelligenceonIraq’sweaponsofmassdestruction,andtheotherinJuly2004byPhilipFloodintoAustralianintelligenceagencies.Althoughneitherinquiryhadtermsofreferencesufficientlybroadtoanswerallthequestions,andeachhadotherfailings,muchhasnowbeenplacedinthepublicdomain.Inaddition,atotaloffiveinquirieshavebeenconductedintheUSandtheUK,withwhichAustraliahasintelligence-sharingagreements,andthesehaverevealedfurtherinformationparticularlyonthesourcesforMrHoward’s‘verystrongintelligenceassessment’.
Sources of informationUndoubtedly,andperhapssurprisinglytosome,thegreatestsourceofintelligenceforIraq’sWMDcamenotfromintelligencecollectionagenciessuchastheCIA,butfromtheUnitedNationsviaitsweaponsinspectors.AftertheFirstGulfWarin1991,IraqwasrequiredbyaSecurityCouncilresolutiontodestroyitsnuclear,chemicalandbiologicalweaponsandalsothelong-rangemissilesthatcoulddelivertheseweapons.Notonlyweretheweaponsthemselvestobeeliminated,butalsoallthesupportfacilities,materialsandequipmentthatwereusedtomakethem.Thisincludedresearchinstitutes,manufacturingplantsandtestfacilities.TosupervisethedestructionofIraq’sWMDcapabilities,theUNestablishedaninspectioncommission,andfrom1991untiltheendof1998abouta
Rod Barton
‘Istandbythefactthatbeforeweenteredthewar,wehadaverystrongintelligenceassessmentthatIraqhadaWMDcapability.’SosaidJohnHowardon20July2003
shortlyafterhehadcommittedAustraliatowartoridIraqofitsweaponsofmassdestruction.Butwhatwasthis‘very
resolved,theserelatedtopre-1991weaponsandwhetherthesehadbeencompletelyeliminated.Iraqichemicalorbiologicalweapons,iftheydidexist,wouldbeatleast12yearsoldbyearly2003andwouldthereforebeofdubiousutility.Inanycase,UNweaponsinspectorsassessedtherewouldbeonlysmallnumbersofsuchweapons;eveniftheyexisted,theywouldposelittlethreatbeyondthebordersofIraq.
IntelligenceagencieshadalsobeencollectinginformationonIraq.USSecretaryofStateColinPowellpresentedadeclassifiedversionofthistotheSecurityCouncilon5February2003.Almostallofitwasambiguousandopentootherinterpretations.Forexample,telephoneinterceptsofIraqiofficialscouldbeinterpretedasreferencestohiddenweaponsbut,equally,otherexplanationswerepossible.Similarly,satelliteimagesoftrucksallegedlycarryingchemicalweaponscouldjustaseasilyhavebeentransportingsomethingmoreinnocent.
Themostdefinitive,althoughultimatelyincorrect,pieceofinformationpossessedbytheUSrelatedtoanallegedbiologicalweaponsfactorymountedonasemi-trailer.TheUSclaimedthat‘thesourcewasaneyewitness,anIraqichemicalengineerwhosupervisedoneofthesefacilities’.Atthetime,thismighthaveseemedlikepersuasiveevidence
exceptforthefactthatthiswasasinglesourceandtherewasnoothercorroboratinginformation.ItshouldnotthereforehavebeenacceptedasevidenceofaWMDcapabilityandindeedwasnotbyAustralianintelligenceagencies.
Infact,theso-called‘source’wasanIraqirefugeeinGermany.HehadnotbeeninterviewedbyUSauthoritiesbutbyGermanintelligence,whichhadpassedonitsfindingstotheCIA.Germanintelligencehad,however,advisedtheUSthattheybelievedthesourcewasunstableandafabricator.TheGermanreservationswerewelljustifiedandthesourcehassinceadmittedthathemadeupthestorytogetavisaandworkpermittoallowhimtoliveinGermany.
Assessment of intelligenceAustraliahadlimitedcapacitytocollectitsownintelligenceonIraq,butthroughintelligence-sharingagreementsmost,althoughnotall,oftheresultsofspecialcollectioneffortsbytheUSandUKwereavailabletoAustraliananalysts.Inaddition,AustraliananalystswerewellinformedonmuchoftheinformationinthevastUNdatabase.OfthetwoAustralianintelligenceassessmentauthoritiesadvisingthegovernmentbeforethe2003Iraqwar,theDefenceIntelligenceOrganisation(DOI)wasthebetterplacedtoprovidetechnicaladviceonWMD.It
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MembersoftheUNSCOMteaminspectmustardagentl55-mmartilleryprojectilesinFallujah,Iraq,inAugust1991. Credit: Shankar Kunhambu
availableatthetime.Bythistest,DIO’sassessmentthatIraqhadsomeoldweaponsbutnonewprogramswasreasonable.ONA’smoreaggressiveassessmentonthelikelihoodofrenewedweaponsprogramdoesnotseemobjectivelybased.Onecanonlyspeculateonwhy,withthesamerawintelligence,itsviewsdivergedsofarfromthoseofDIO.
Was it a ‘very strong intelligence assessment’?ItisnotclearwhatbriefingJohnHowardreceivedjustpriortotheIraqwar.ONAandDIOhaddifferentviewsontheevidenceforIraq’spossessionofWMD,andreportsfrombothwouldhavebeenforwardedtohisoffice.EvenifhehadlistenedonlytowhatONAwassaying,ithardlyseemstobethe‘verystrongintelligenceassessment’thatheclaims.Forexample,althoughONAassessedIraqhad‘almostcertainlybeenworkingtoincreaseitsabilitytomakechemicalandbiologicalweapons’,itdoesnotsuggestthatstockpilesofweaponshadactuallybeenmanufactured.Therefore,it
isnotsurprisingthatPhilipFlood,whoconductedoneoftheinquiriesintoAustralianintelligence,toldanSBSintervieweron22July2004thattheevidenceonIraq’sWMDwas‘thin,ambiguousandincomplete’.Soperhapsthisiswhyon4February2003theprimeminister,inpresentinghiscasetoparliamentfordecisiveactionagainstIraq,didnotrefertoAustralianintelligencebutinsteadcitedtheaggressiveUKandUSassessments.
Inanycase,thepossessionbyIraqofWMDisnotthepoint.Beforeadecisiontogotowarin2003,thequestionthatshouldhavebeenaskedis:didIraqposeathreateithertoneighbouringcountriesortothewiderinternationalcommunity,includingAustraliaanditsallies?AgainitisnotclearwhetherthiswasaddressedbytheAustralianintelligencecommunity,althoughitseemsnot.Andmorecritically,wasthisaskedbytheHowardgovernment?Wedonotknowtheanswer,butifthisquestionwasnotasked,thenthatwasafundamentalandcatastrophicfailing.
WHAT EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE?
35
hasabranchstaffedwithhighlyqualifiedpersonnelwhoareexpertsinchemical,biologicalandnuclearweapons.Ontheotherhand,theOfficeofNationalAssessments(ONA)intheDepartmentofPrimeMinisterandCabinethasfewtechnicalspecialists,buthasgreaterexpertiseinthepoliticaldimensionsoftheMiddleEast.Theagenciesworkedinclosecooperation,butproducedtheirownindependentassessmentstothegovernmentinthelead-uptothewar.
IthasbecomeevidentthatuptoSeptember2002bothagencieshadsimilarassessmentsofIraq’sWMDcapabilities,butafterthatdateviewsdiverged,astheparliamentaryjointcommitteerevealedinDecember2003andtheFloodinquirylaterconfirmed.DIOmaintaineditspreviouslyheldviewthatIraqhadnotrestarteditsWMDprograms.Forexample,itstatedonbiologicalweaponsthat:‘Thereha[ve]beennoknownoffensiveresearchanddevelopmentssince1991,noknownBW[biologicalweapons]productionsince1991andnoknownBWtestingorevaluationsince1991.’Andonchemicalweapons,DIOasserted:‘ThereisnoknownCW[chemicalweapons]production.’
ONA,however,afterSeptember2002,wasmoreupbeat.Forexample,itreported:‘Iraqhas
almostcertainlybeenworkingtoincreaseitsabilitytomakechemicalandbiologicalweapons.’
BothagenciesassessedthatIraqprobablyretainedsomeoldpre-1991weaponsinlimitednumbers,butDIOaddedthatovertimetheywouldhavedegradedandhence‘thecapacityforIraqtoeffectivelyemployweaponisedCWagentsisuncertain’.
Were these assessments fair and reasonable?TheIraqSurveyGroupreportedon30September2004thatatthetimeoftheIraqwarinMarch2003,IraqhadnoWMDandnoprogramstomakethem.Thisisnowwellestablished.Therefore,bothAustralianassessmentagencieshadgotitwrong,ONAmoresothanDIO.Ontheotherhand,neitheragencyhadmadethegrosserrorsoftheirUSandUKcounterpartsthathadpresentedtheintelligenceasdefinitive,hadstatedwithcertaintythatIraqhadresumeditschemical,biologicalandnuclearweaponprograms,andthatIraqposedanimminentthreattotheinternationalcommunity.Afterthewar,BritishandAmericaninquiriesshowedthatmanyclaimsaboutIraq’sWMDwerefalse.
ThebenchmarkbywhichtheAustralianintelligenceagenciesshouldbejudgedisnotwhatisknownnow,butwhethertheyhadfairlyassessedtheevidence
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CHAPTER 4
How highly did the children rate?
AnIraqiboywatchesasUSsoldiersconductsitesurveysintheAlEwajregionofTikritinSeptember2009.Credit: Steven King
HansvonSponeck,successiveheadsoftheOil-for-Foodprogram,eachresignedfromthatpositioninprotestattheeffectsofthesanctions,whichcontinuedtotakeaheavytolloninnocentlives.
Againstthisbackground,reportsthatemergedin2002and2003expressedalarmatthefurthersufferingthatwouldbeinflictedbytheimpendingwar.
Pre-war warningsInNovember2002Medact,theUKaffiliateofInternationalPhysiciansforthePreventionofNuclearWar,releasedareportCollateralDamage:ThehealthandenvironmentalcostsofwaronIraq.Thereportexaminedtheshort-andlong-termeffectsofthe1991GulfWar,thesanctions,andtheno-flyzonesimposedonIraqwithcontinuedbombingbyUSandUKforces,andportrayedanation,in2002,thatwasweakenedandimpoverished.‘TheIraqipeople’smentalandphysicalhealthandwell-beingwereseriouslyharmedbythedirectimpactofthe1990–91war,’itstated.‘Theywerefurtherweakenedbytheindirecteffectsoftheconflictinavarietyofwaysthatstemfromtheconsequencesofeconomiccollapse,andfromwidespreadinfrastructuraldestructionanddamagetoservicesandfacilities.’
Thereportarguedthatevenabest-casescenario–ashortwarcomparabletothatof1991–would
haveamuchgreaterimpactontheIraqipeopleandsurroundingcountriesthanthatwardid.ItwasestimatedthatnewattacksonIraqcouldleadtouptohalfamilliondeathsonallsides,includingtheeffectsoftheinitialattack,ongoingconflictandrefugeedeaths.
TheAustralianlaunchofCollateralDamagewasatParliamentHouseinCanberraon12November2002,anditreceivedsignificantmediacoverage.ThereportwascommendedbyGeneralPeterGration,formerchiefoftheAustralianDefenceForce,whosaid,‘Thisisnotanexaggeratedtractbyabunchofzealots.Itisacoldlyfactualreportbyhealthprofessionals,whodrawonthebestevidenceavailable…erringonthesideofcaution.’
ThefindingsoftheCollateralDamagereportwerereinforcedinJanuary2003bytheCenterforEconomicandSocialRightsinNewYork,whichalsopredictedhumanitariandisasterintheeventofwar.TheCentersentateamofexpertsinfoodsecurityandnutrition,publichealthinfrastructure,publichealthcare,andemergencymedicinetoIraqtoexaminepreparednessforfurtherviolenceanddeprivation.Theirreport,TheHumanCostsofWarinIraq,statedthattheinternationalcommunity(theUNandreliefagencies)wasunpreparedforthehumanitarian
HOW HIGHLY DID THE CHILDREN RATE?
3938
Millionsofpeopleinthestreetsinover800citiesthroughouttheworld,includinginAustralia,couldseethatIraqicivilians,includingchildren,wouldpaythecostfortheactionsoftheirleaders.Whatisnotclearistheextent,ifany,towhichthepredictionsoflarge-scalehumansufferingweighedintheAustraliangovernment’sdecision-makingprocess.
Warningsofthelikelyconsequencesofthewarpresentedaconsistentmessage–thatIraqisocietywasdegradedbythe1991GulfWarandover10yearsofcripplingeconomicsanctions,andthatitwouldnotbecapableofwithstandingfurthermilitaryconflict.Theimpactofthesanctionshadbeendocumentedrepeatedlyduringthe1990s,byamultitudeofUNagenciesandnon-governmentorganisations.AsearlyasJuly1993,theFoodand
AgricultureOrganizationandtheWorldFoodProgrammereportedthattheeconomicsanctionshad‘virtuallyparalysedthewholeeconomyandgeneratedpersistentdeprivation,chronichunger,endemicunder-nutrition,massiveunemploymentandwidespreadhumansuffering’.Large-scalestarvationwasavoidedduetoaneffectivepublicrationingsystem.
TheUNOil-for-Foodprogram,implementedin1996,providedsomereliefbutnotamajorimprovementinthewell-beingofthepeople,andwidespreadmalnutritionremained.Infantmortality,whichisagoodindicatorofacountry’shealthstatusgenerally,hadfallento65per1000livebirthsjustbeforethe1991GulfWar,buthadrisenagainto103by1998,reflectingthehugedeteriorationinhealthconditionsinthatperiod.DenisHallidayand
Dr Jenny Grounds and Dr Sue Wareham OAM
TheinvasionofIraqwasahumanitariandisaster.Thiswasnottheresultofthingsunexpectedlygoingwrong.During2002and2003,manyindividualsandgroups
expressedconcernaboutthecertainharmtohumanhealth,andalsototheenvironment,ifthewarproceeded.
disasterofanotherwarinIraq.Thehealthcaresystemwasextremelyfragileandgrosslyinadequateevenbeforethewarbegan.Oneofthereport’sauthorsstatedthat‘Iraqhasbecomelikeavastrefugeecamp’.TheauthorsalsoexpressedconcernthatPentagonwarplansforIraqexplicitlythreatenedcivilianinfrastructure.
AlsoinJanuary2003,theInternationalStudyTeam,anindependentgroupofacademics,researchers,andpractitionerswhohadreportedoninfantmortalityinIraqasaresultofthe1991warandtheeconomicsanctions,publishedafurtherreport,OurCommonResponsibility:TheimpactofanewwaronIraqichildren.Thereportstatedthat:
n Iraqichildrensufferedsignificantpsychologicalharmfromthethreatofwarthatwashangingoverthem
n Iraqichildrenwerestillinasignificantlyworsestatethantheywerebeforethe1991war
n Becausemostofthe13millionIraqichildrenweredependentonfooddistributedbytheIraqigovernment,thedisruptionofthissystembywarwouldhaveadevastatingimpactonchildrenwhoalreadyhadahighrateofmalnutrition
n Theinternationalcommunityhadlittlecapacitytorespond
totheharmthatchildrenwouldsufferbyanewwar.
On25FebruarytheWorldFoodProgrammealsowarnedthattheimpendinginvasionmightdisruptthegovernmentfoodhand-outstomillionsofIraqis–asystem,itsaid,thatwasveryeffectiveindeliveringessentialrations.(Aspredicted,thedistributionoffoodrationswasdisrupted.)
Australia’sfederalparliamentar-ianswereawareofatleastsomeofthesedirepredictions,andmanyexpressedtheiroppositiontoourparticipationintheimpendingwar.Theyissuedastatementinearly2003noting:‘Civiliansarethefirstcasualtyofwar.Warwillmeanfurtherhumanitarianandenvironmentaldevastation,andafloodofnewrefugees.’
War and its effectsThewarbeganon19March,anditseffectswereapparentveryearlyon.InlateMarchUNICEFexpressedconcernatfrequentpowercuts,leadingtocutstocleanwatersupplyinBasra.InApriltheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossreportedthatthemedicalsysteminBaghdadhadvirtuallycollapsed.AlsoinAprilUNagenciesreportedthatlootingandlawlessnessobstructedtheiroperations.On2MayUNICEFreportedonthedangersconfrontingIraqichildren,
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40
AvehicleburnsinBaghdadin2006afterbeinghitbyamortar.Credit: Keith W. DeVinney
The violence continuesTragically,predictionsofongoinginstabilityandviolencetriggeredbythewarwereaccurate.AfurtherstudypublishedinTheLancetinOctober2006–fromrespectedresearchersusingsoundtechniques–estimatedafigureof655,000excessdeaths(deathsoverandabovethosethatwouldusuallyhaveoccurred)fromthestartofthewaruntilJuly2006,92percentofthesebeingduetodirectviolence.Whileprecisionwithsuchfiguresisnotpossible,theauthorsgaveapossiblerangefrom390,000to940,000excessdeaths.
AtthelowerendofestimatesofthedeathtollisthedatabaseIraqBodyCount,whichanalysespressandmediareportsofdeaths.Ithasdocumented107,000–117,000IraqiciviliandeathsfromviolencesincethestartofthewaruntilJuly2012.
Regardlessoftheexactnumberofdeaths,whichwewillneverknow,thetollisenormous.Fargreaterstillisthelegacyofshatteredbodiesandmindsandhumanmisery.
In2003,beforeAustraliawentto
war,DefenceMinisterRobertHillgaveassurancesthatourtroopswouldadheretointernationalhumanitarianlawandwouldnotattackciviliantargets.However,thegovernmentknew,orshouldhaveknown,thatduringthe1991Iraqwar,theattacksbyUSforcesoncivilianinfrastructurehaddestroyedmuchofIraq’selectricalgeneratingcapacity,withadisproportionateeffectonchildren’shealthfromcontaminatedwatersupplies(seeTNagy,Iraq:Thehumancostofhistory,2004).Australianswouldhavebeennaivetoassumethatinplanningandexecutingthe2003invasiontheprotectionofcivilianswouldbeourally’shighestpriority.
Nearly10yearslater,thechildren,womenandmenofIraqarepayingaheavypriceforthewar,astheywillcontinuetodoforalongtime.Theydonothavetheluxuryof‘movingon’.Ifwearetolearnanythingfromthisdisaster,wemustestablishhowitunfoldedandtherole,ifany,playedbytheamplewarningsthataccuratelypredicteditsfullhorror.
HOW HIGHLY DID THE CHILDREN RATE?
43
includinginsecuritywhichpreventedaiddelivery,infectiousillnessfromdegradedwatersupply,unexplodedmunitions,schoolclosuresandchildrenonthestreets,andenormousstressonhospitalswithinadequatesuppliesandongoingmalnutrition.Theproblemofinsecuritywassogreatthat,bySeptember2003,staffoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,Oxfam,SavetheChildrenandMerlin(MedicalExpertsontheFrontline,aUKservicedeliveryorganisation)hadwithdrawntheirinternationalstafffromBaghdadandwerescalingdowntheiroperationsinIraq,aftertheAugustbombingoftheUNheadquartersandtheJordanianembassyinBaghdad.
Theterribleplightofthechildrencontinued.InFebruaryandMarch2004theWashingtonPost,theNewYorkTimesandTheIndependentreportedontheappallingconditionsinIraq’spaediatrichospitals,withverypoorsanitationandshortagesofessentialmedicationsandequipment.Deathsandmaimingfromunexplodedordnance,includingclusterbombs,tooka
furthertollonchildren.TheUNNewsServicereportedasearlyas17July2003thatover1000childrenhadbeenkilledorinjuredbyclusterbombsorIraqimunitions.
Refugeesfromthewarnumberinthemillions.CostsofWar,aJune2011reportfromBrownUniversity’sWatsonInstituteforInternationalStudies,statedthat‘3.5millionIraqishavefledtheir
homesandhavenotreturned’since2003.Thatnumberincludes1.7millioninternallydisplacedpersonsand1.8millionIraqiexpatriates.TheUNHighCommissionerforRefugeesputsthenumberevenhigher,estimating4.7milliondisplacedIraqis
sincetheinvasion.Despitegreatdifficultiesindata
collection,andintheabsenceofanyofficialciviliancasualtyfigures,someestimatesofthewar’sdeathtollemerged.InOctober2004themedicaljournalTheLancetreportedaclustersamplesurveywhichestimatedthatthewarhadcausedthedeathsofapproximately100,000Iraqis,withviolencebeingtheprimarycauseofdeath.Theviolencewasmainlyattributedtocoalitionforces.
CHAPTER 4
42
Ifwearetolearnanythingfromthisdisaster,wemustestablishhowitunfoldedandtherole,ifany,playedbytheamplewarningsthataccuratelypredicteditsfullhorror.
CHAPTER 5
What sort of inquiryis needed?
IraqiresidentsmustwadethroughalakeofwaterduetoamainbreakinBaghdadin2008.Credit: Charles Gill
thosewhohaveparticipatedintheinquiryprocess–mighthavemoreofastakeintheirimplementation.
Havingsaidthat,thestrictpartydisciplinewithinthemodernincarnationofAustralianWestminsterdemocracymightdiscouragethosememberswhofearpoliticalembarrassment,werethereporttocriticisepastgovernments,fromexercisingcompletecandourintheinquiryprocess.Totheextentthattheinquirymembersareinquiringintotheirownbehaviour,orthosewithwhomtheyhavestrongpoliticalallegiances,thereisariskthattherecouldbeatleastaperceptionoflessindependence.
senate inquiry
TheSenatehasthepowertoinitiateaninquiryviaitscommitteesystem.Thisinitiation,whichoccursbywayofreferral,wouldsetoutthemattersonwhichthecommitteecaninvestigateandreport.TherecanalsobereferraltoacommitteeifthereisabillbeforetheSenate.InChapter16ofOdgers,thepowersofcommitteesareoutlined.LikeRoyalCommissions,thereisapowertosendforpersonsanddocumentsbywayofsummonsandrequeststhatdocumentsbeproduced.
Thereisthepowertoholdvideo-recordedproceedings.Therecanbeadecisionbythecommitteetoholdtheproceedingsinpublicorinprivate.Proceedings
mightbeheldinprivateif,forexample,therelevantportionoftheproceedingsmightdisclosematerialthepublicationofwhichcoulddamagenationalsecurity.Thereisalsotheoptionofreleasingtheprivateevidenceofthehearinginthefuture,whentheinformationisnolongerclassifiedandissafetorelease.
Theadvantagesofthismodelofinquiry,especiallyintermsofpublicperception,includethatitcanprovideaforumforafullinvestigationofissues.However,shouldtherebeinvolvementofASIOorASIS,theSenatecommitteemightlackthepowertoreceivehighlyclassifiedinformation.SuchinformationmayonlybeabletobereleasedtotheOppositionLeaderandNationalSecurityCommitteeofCabinet.
Thismodelalsoallowsforhearingstobeasopenaspracticable,whileallowingthecommitteetohearclassifiedevidence.Theoptionofpartialpublicationseekstobalancenationalsecurityandopenness,byallowingscrutinyofclassifiedmaterialbutpreservingtheoptionofpubliclyreleasingtheclassifiedinformationatsomelaterdate.
Independenceisalsoenhancedbytheseparationoftheperson(s)conductingtheinquiryfromgovernmentbodiesthataredirectlyinvolvedinoperations,suchastheAustralianDefenceForces,ASIO
WHAT SORT OF INQUIRY IS NEEDED?
4746
withthepowersofaRoyalCommission;anadhoc(judicial)inquirywithoutRoyalCommissionpowers;aninquiryundertakenbytheAustralianLawReformCommission;oracitizens-initiatedinquirythatisinitiatedwithouttheinvolvementoftheCommonwealthGovernment.Indeterminingwhichmodelismostappropriate,themanyfactorsthatmightbetakenintoaccountinclude:
n Thepowersoftheperson(s)leadingtheinquiry(suchaspowersofcompulsionforevidencetobegiven,toforceattendanceandtoascertainclassifiedinformation)
n Howtodealwithinformationthathasbeenormaybeclassified,includinginrelationtothefinalreport
n Thelevelofindependenceoftheinquiry.
Parliamentary inquiriesOneoptionwouldbetoholdaninquirythroughthefederalparliamentarysystem.ThiscouldbeundertakenbytheSenate,bytheHouseofRepresentativesorbyajointcommitteeofbothHousesofParliament.Oneadvantageofaparliamentaryinquiryisthatsubmissionsandevidencegiventotheinquirycouldbemadepubliclyavailableandcoveredbyparliamentaryprivilege.(Section16ofthefederalParliamentaryPrivilegesAct1987providesforthisimmunity).Thiswouldprovideimmunityagainstdefamationandotherlegalliabilityinrespectofwitnesstestimony.
Anadvantageofaparliamentaryinquiryisthatitwouldbeundertakenbythelegislativearmofgovernment,withaccesstotheseniorexecutive.Ifreformsareproposed,thelegislators–atleast
Edward Santow
AssumingthereshouldbeaninquiryintothelegalityofAustralia’sinvolvementinthewarinIraq,thereareanumberofpossiblemodelsforsuchaninquiry.
Theseincludeaparliamentaryinquiry(bytheHouseofRepresentatives,theSenateorajointcommittee);aninquiry
ARoyalCommissionhasverybroadpowerstoconductinquiries.However,inestablishingacommissionofaninquiry,thegovernmentmightopttogivethecommissionlessthanthefullpowers.Thiscouldbeinrelationtoajudicialinquiry.AjudicialinquiryisalsocreatedbytheGovernor-Generalthroughissuingletterspatent.Thereisalsotheabilitytoestablishanon-statutoryformofinquiryintoparticularevents.
TheRoyalCommissionsActprovidesaRoyalCommissionorinquirywithpowersincluding:
n Tosummonwitnessesandtakeevidence
n Toapplyforsearchwarrantsn Toissueapenaltyforthe
refusaltogiveevidenceorbesworn
n Tohaveapersonarrestedforfailingtoappear
n Toinspect,retainormakecopiesofdocuments
n Toissuepenaltiesinrelationtofalseormisleadingevidence,briberyofwitnesses,fraudonwitness,destroyingdocumentsorotherthings,preventingawitnessfromattending,causinginjurytoawitness,employersdismissingemployeeswhoarewitnessesattheRoyalCommission,andcontemptoftheRoyalCommission.
WitnessesandothersgivingevidencetoaRoyalCommissionwouldhavethesamerightsasiftheyweregivingevidenceintheHighCourt.Similarly,aRoyalcommissionerwouldenjoyalloftheimmunitiesandprivilegesthataHighCourtjusticehas,andalegalpractitionerassistingthecommission,orappearingonbehalfofapersonatthecommission,wouldhavethesameprivilegesthattheywouldhaveinappearingbeforetheHighCourt.
RoyalCommissionshavespecialrulesinrelationtoprivilege.Generallyspeaking,apersoncannotrefusetoproduceadocumentonthebasisoflegalprofessionalprivilegewithoutfirsthavingtheirclaimacceptedbythecommissioner.
Thereisalsoaprovisioninrelationtotheprivilegeagainstself-incrimination.Itisnotanexcusetofailtoprovideevidenceordocumentsiftheymayincriminatetheperson.Itisonlyacceptableifit‘mighttend’toincriminatethepersoninrelationto:
n Anoffenceandthepersonhaseitherbeenchargedwiththatoffenceandproceedingsrelatingtoithavenotconcluded,or
n Apenaltyandproceedingshavecommencedinrelationtothepenaltyandhavenotbeenconcluded.
WHAT SORT OF INQUIRY IS NEEDED?
49
andASIS.However,suchaninquirywouldremainwithinthepoliticalrealm.Assuch,itisunlikelytohave–inperceptionorreality–thesamelevelofindependenceas,forexample,aRoyalCommission.
house of representatives inquiry
TheprocessbywhichtheHouseofRepresentativesmightinitiateaninquiryofthisnatureissummarisedontheParliament’swebsite.Itsays:
Theinquiryprocessmayvaryfrominquirytoinquiryascircumstancesdemandbutusuallyconsistsofthefollowingsteps:1. Referencereceivedbythe
committee.2. Referenceadvertised
throughvariousmedia,andsubmissionssoughtfromindividualsandorganisations.
3. Submissionsreceivedandauthorisedforpublication.
4. Committeeconductson-siteinspections,backgroundbriefingandseminars(whereappropriate).
5. Committeeconductspublichearingswithselectedindividualsandorganisationsrequestedtogiveoralevidence.
6. Committeeconsidersevidenceandpreparesreport.
7. ThereportispresentedtotheParliamentandmaybedebated.
8. CopiesofthereportaremadeavailablethroughvariousmeansincludingthroughthenationalandstatelibrariesandpublicationontheParliament’swebsite.
9. Governmentconsidersreport.
10. GovernmentrespondstoreportbypresentingresponseintheParliament.
ThepowersandrelativemeritsofaHouseofRepresentativesinquirywouldbeverysimilartothepowersofaSenatecommitteeinquiry.However,itshouldbenotedthat,bydefinition,thegovernmentofthedaycontrolstheHouse,andsoitislesslikelytobeabletobreakfromthestricturesofpoliticalpartydiscipline.
A Royal Commission and ad hoc inquiry without Royal Commission powersTheestablishmentandfunctioningofaRoyalCommissionisgovernedbythefederalRoyalCommissionsAct1902.TheGovernor-General,actingontheadviceofthegovernmentoftheday,institutesaRoyalCommission.Sheorheissuesletterspatent,establishingtheRoyalCommissionandsettingouttheinquiry’sremit.
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48
thedisclosureoftheidentityofparticipantsinaninquiry
n Makingordersrelatingtohowapersonshouldbeexaminedandwhatdocumentscanbeshowntotheperson
n Adaptinginquiryprocedures,forexample,implementingarrangementswithinquiryparticipantsandtheAustraliangovernmenttoenableagreementtobereachedonwhatportionsofthetranscriptshould,andshouldnot,bepublished
n Requiringinquiryparticipantstoprovidenoticepriortoreferringtonationalsecurityinformationinthecourseoftheinquiry,includinginsubmissions
n Preparingconfidentialvolumesorannexuresofthereportandplacinglimitsontheirdistribution
n MakingrecommendationstotheAustraliangovernmentregardingwhichpartsofareportshould,orshouldnot,bemadepublic
n Preparingabridgedversionsoffindingsandrecommendationssuitableforpublication
n Examiningnationalsecurityinformationandpreparingsummariesofsuchinformationforuseintheconductoftheinquiry
n Enteringintoarrangements
withAustraliangovernmentagenciesfortheprotectionofnationalsecurityinformationprovidedtotheinquiry,includinghandlingandstorage
n Makingarrangementsforpersonsaccessingnationalsecurityinformationinthecourseofaninquirytoobtainsecurityclearances.
relative merits
TheALRChasfoundthatRoyalCommissionsareperceivedbythepublictobemoreindependentandthepublicare‘morelikelytoacceptinquiryprocessesanddecisions’ofRoyalCommissions.Ithasalsocommentedthattheyare‘sometimesseentobemoreindependentthanothertypesofinquiriesbecausetheyaresupportedbystatute’.
ThereisthedisadvantagethataRoyalCommissioncannotimplementorlegislateanyofitsrecommendations.Instead,itisthelegislature’sresponsibilitytoconsiderand,ifitdeemsitappropriate,toimplementtheserecommendations.
Inquiry by the Australian Law Reform Commission TheALRCwasestablishedtoconductinquiriesondifficultquestionsoflegalandpublicpolicy.ItsinquiriescanbeinitiatedonlybytheAttorney-Generalreferringa
WHAT SORT OF INQUIRY IS NEEDED?
51
Anadhocjudicialinquiryisaninquirythatisestablishedbythegovernmentinrelationtoaparticularmatter.Itis‘judicial’inthesensethattheinquiryisledbyaformerorservingjudicialofficer.Whilethispersonwouldbeactingintheirpersonalcapacity,andsowouldnotbringwiththemtheirjudicialpowerstodeployforthepurposesoftheinquiry,theirstatusasacurrentorformermemberofthejudiciarymightlendtheinquiryagreatersenseofindependence.SuchaninquirycanresembleaRoyalCommissioninsomerespects.TheissuingofletterspatentbytheGovernor-Generalcouldbeusedtoinitiateanadhocjudicialinquiry.TheextenttowhichsuchaninquirywouldresembleaRoyalCommission,aswellasitsrelativeindependence,wouldlargelydependontheextentofthepowersprovidedtotheinquirycommissioner.
Frequently,adhocjudicialinquiriesarecommencedbywayofanenablingactofParliament.Itwoulddependonthecontentofsuchlegislationastowhetherthereisprotectionofallinvolvedintheinquirybyprivilege,andhowfarsuchprivilegeswouldextend.IfanadhocjudicialinquiryisestablishedwithsomepowersthataRoyalCommissionhas,theissuesofprivilegewouldresemblethosediscussedabove.TheAustralianLawReformCommission(ALRC)
notedin2009that‘non-statutoryinquiriesmaynotprovidelegalprotectiontoinquirymembers’.ThisindicatesprivilegemaynotattachtoallinvolvedinaninquirythatiscommencedwithoutanenablingactofParliament.
classified information
AstheALRChasexplained,RoyalCommissionshavetendedtodealwithclassifiedinformationdifferentlyfromadhocjudicialinquiries.ItappearsthatthereisnoprimafacierightforRoyalCommissionstohaveaccesstoclassifiedinformation.TheALRCnotedsomeofthedifficultiesinrelationtoclassifiedinformation.TheClarkeinquiryintothecaseofDrMohammedHaneef(anadhocjudicialinquiry)isindicativeofsomeoftheproblemsthatwouldbefacedinrelationtoclassifiedinformation.TheALRChassummarisedsomeofthewaysthatclassifiedinformationhasbeendealtwithbyRoyalCommissions:
n Holdinghearingsandexaminationsinprivate
n Withholdingmaterial,suchastranscriptsandexhibits,frompublication,ordeferringpublicationofsuchmaterial
n Makingordersprohibitingthedisclosureofparticulardocumentsorclassesofdocuments
n Makingordersprohibiting
CHAPTER 5
50
relative merits
TheALRCisanindependentstatutoryauthority,andsoismoreautonomousthanaparliamentarycommittee.However,itisonlyabletoinquireabouttheissuessetoutbytheAttorney-General.Further,thereisnoobligationonthegovernmenttofollowtheALRC’srecommendations,althoughhistoricallyahighproportionofitsrecommendationsareimplementedbygovernment.
Citizens-initiated inquiryAcitizens-initiatedinquirywouldbeaninquirythatisestablishedbyagroupofcitizenswithouttheofficialimprimaturofgovernment.Suchaninquirycouldbelaunchedbyanindividual,oneormorenot-for-profitorganisations,orabroadcoalitionofstakeholders.Acitizens-initiatedinquirywouldnotattracttheprivilegesorpowersthatareattachedtoaparliamentaryinquiry,adhocjudicialinquiry,RoyalCommissionorALRCinquiry.Thereareprivileges,suchasprivilegeagainstself-incrimination,professionallegalprivilegeandparliamentaryprivilege,whichattachtovariousothermethodsofinquirythatwouldnotoperateinthismethodofinquiry.Assuch,witnessesgivingevidencewillnotbecoveredbytheseprivileges,andmaybelessinclinedtoprovideevidence,asthiscouldexposethemtolegalaction.
Asanobviouspracticalmatter,theresourcesavailabletoacitizens-initiatedinquirywoulddependonthosestakeholderswhochoosetobackit.Whileitwouldlackthelegalpowertocompeltheproductionofevidenceortheappearanceofparticularwitnesses,itcouldusethefederalFreedomofInformationActtoobtaingovernment-heldinformationthatisnotexemptfromdisclosure.Ofcourse,however,inaninquirysuchasthis,itishighlylikelythatthegovernmentwouldrelyonthestatutoryexemptionfromdisclosureinrespectofinformationthatmightprejudicenationalsecurityorinternationalrelations.Thiswouldsignificantlyhampertheabilityofsuchaninquirytoobtainevidencenotalreadyinthepublicdomain.
relative merits
Inprinciple,acitizens-initiatedinquirycouldbeexpectedtogeneratestrongerpublicsupportgiventhatitwouldbecompletelyseparatefromgovernment,whichwouldbethemainsubjectoftheinquiry.However,inpractice,thissupportanditsrelativeindependencewouldrelyheavilyonthepeoplemostcloselyassociatedwiththeinquiry.Iftheinquirywereperceivedasbeingcloselyalignedtoaparticularpoliticalpartyorideologicalcause,itsindependencewouldbediminished.
WHAT SORT OF INQUIRY IS NEEDED?
53
mattertotheALRCandprovidingtermsofreferencethatdemarcateitsinvestigativeboundaries.
However,thecommissiontendstofocusitsinquiriesongeneralissues(suchasprivacy,seditionorgenepatenting)asdistinctfromthelegalityofaparticulardecision.InordertobringanALRC-ledinquirywithinitsstatutoryremit,thefocusoftheinquirywouldneedtobeonthelegalprocessbywhichAustraliaentersarmedconflictgenerally.ThiswouldnotprecludetheALRCfrominvestigatingthelegalityofAustraliagoingtowarinIraq,butthisprobablycouldnotbethemainfocusoftheinquiry.
UnlikejudicialinquiriesandRoyalCommissions,theALRCdoesnotwieldanycoercivepowerstorequireevidenceordocumentstobegiventotheinquiry.Assuch,itappearsthattheissuesrelatingtoprivilegebeingclaimedwhereevidenceordocumentsarecalledfor,likeinadhocjudicialinquiriesandRoyalCommissions,wouldnotarise.However,theALRCdoeshavethe‘powertodoeverythingnecessaryorconvenienttobedonefor,orinconnectionwith,theperformanceofitsfunctions.’Itsmodusoperandiistoconsultrelevantstakeholdersandundertakeresearch.ThisinformstheALRC’sthinkingandisreflectedinitsprocess,whichusuallystartswithanissuespaper(providingbackgroundcontext
andaskingaseriesofquestions),followedbyadiscussionpaper(settingoutdraftproposalsforreform)andconcludingwithafinalreportthatcontainsitsreformrecommendations.
Thefinalreportisprovidedtothegovernment,whichisobligedtotableitinParliament.ThegovernmentretainsfulldiscretionregardingwhethertoimplementtherecommendationsoftheALRCthroughlegislativechanges.
WhiletheALRCwouldlackthepowertoobtainclassifiedinformation,itdoeshaveexperienceindealingwithquestionsofnationalsecurity.Anexampleisitsinquiryintoclassifiedinformation,KeepingSecretsReport:Theprotectionofclassifiedandsecuritysensitiveinformation.Asnotedabove,theALRCdoeshaveawide-rangingpower.ThereisnostatutoryprovisionprovidedforintheALRCAct1996thatdealswiththeissueofprivilege.However,theALRCpublishedapolicyinJune2010inrelationtosubmissionsandinquirymaterial.Generally,theALRCattemptstomakeallsubmissionspublic.However,whereinformationisprovidedtoitinconfidence,itwillnotmaketheinformationpubliclyavailable.IfarequestforsuchadocumentweremadeunderthefederalFreedomofInformationAct1982,theALRChasstatedthatinmostinstancesitwouldbedeniedundersection45.
CHAPTER 5
52
CHAPTER 6
A better Westminster way to war?
AnAustraliansoldiertakespartinajointexercisewiththeUSmilitaryatShoalwaterBayinQueenslandin2011.Credit: Andrew Dakin
besatisfiedofthelegalityofthedecisiontaken.
2 The‘prerogative’exerciseddirectlybythesovereign–seenastheresidueofthesovereign’soncetheoreticallyabsolutepower.Thesewereincreasinglyexercisedonadviceandthosepowerswhichcouldbeexercisedwithoutadvicecametobecalledthe‘reservepowers’.
3 Statutorypowersgiventoministersornominatedofficialsunderlegislation.
4 Powersthatareneitherstatutorynorprerogative(suchasthepowertoentercontracts).
Mostexecutiveactivityiscarriedoutthroughthelasttwobutthemostsignificantdecisionsarecarriedoutthroughthefirsttwo.
The war power in AustraliaAtFederation,Australiadidnotgainfullindependence.Althoughsection61oftheConstitutionvestedexecutivepowerinthequeenandexercisablebythegovernor-general,thisdidnotincludethepowertodeclarewar.WhenthekingdeclaredwaractingonhisUKadvisers,Australiaautomaticallywenttowaraswell.
In1942,Australiaadoptedthe1931StatuteofWestminster,becameindependentandhencetransferredthewarpowertothe
governor-general.ActingontheadviceoftheAustraliancabinet,hedeclaredwaragainstfourbelligerents.Itwasgenerallyassumedthatthesedeclarationsweremadeundersection61oftheConstitution,whichnowincludedfullexecutivepower.
However,toputthematterbeyondanydoubt,Attorney-GeneralHVEvattarrangedforaformaldelegationofwar-makingpowerfromthekingtothegovernor-generalundersection2oftheConstitution.Asitwasinwar,soitwasinpeacewiththegovernor-generalsigningoffonpeacewithGermanyin1951.
In2003,mostconstitutionallawyersexpectedthatthepoliticaldecisionwouldbetakenbycabinetasawholeorthesecuritycabinetbutlegallyauthorisedbythegovernor-generalonadvicefromtheprimeministereitherexercisingtheprerogativeorthroughtheFederalExecutiveCouncil.
Thegovernor-general,PeterHollingworth,certainlythoughtso:‘Isawitasmydutytoaskthegovernmentofthedaywhatinstruments,ifany,wererequiredtoinvokesuchanactionortoratifythedecisionsofgovernment.’WithregardtoAfghanistan,‘thePrimeMinisterinformedmethatnoorderfromtheGovernor-Generalwasrequired.Inthatmatter,hecitedtheANZUSTreatyasthebasisforactionbythegovernment.’
A BETTER WESTMINSTER WAY TO WAR?
5756
Aslegislativeandjudicialpowerswereseparatedfromexecutivepowersandgiventoparlements/parliamentsandcourts,thepowertomakewarremainedclearlywithintheexecutivepoweroftheEnglishsovereigns.Butthispowerwasalwayssubjecttopracticallimitationsoffindingthenecessarysoldiers,armsandmoneytopayforthem.
Fromthe17thcentury,thepowerofthepurseoftheEnglishparliamentconstrainedallgovernmentactionandmeantthatmonarchsstartedtoappointministerswhocouldgetlegislation,especiallymoneybills,throughparliament.Theycametobeled,coordinatedandthennominatedbya‘prime’minister.
The‘loss’oftheAmericancoloniesledtothecrystallisationoftheparliamentarysystem.Althoughexecutivepowerlegally
remainedinthesovereign’shands,itwasincreasinglyexercisedbyministersappointedbythesovereignunderpowersconferredbylegislationorexercisedbythesovereignonthe‘advice’ofministers–advicewhichwasincreasinglytaken.Executivepowerwasdividedintofourkinds:
1 Powersgivento‘Queen-in-Council’or‘PrivyCouncil’inwhichthesovereignwouldmakedecisionsinthepresenceof,andontheadviceof,herministers.CommonwealthcountrieshadsimilarbodiescalledtheGovernor-General-in-Counciland/orFederalExecutiveCouncil.Actionscanonlybetakenonministerialadvicebutthegovernor-generalcanaskquestionsandwillgenerallywantto
Prof Charles Sampford
InMontesquieu’sfamoustripartiteseparationofpowers(executive,legislativeandjudicial),thepowertomakewarwasclearlypartoftheexecutivepower.Itwasthe
quintessentialsovereignpowerwhenthesovereignandstatewereinseparableandsupposedlyallpowerful.
oftheMinister’.ThismaynotsoundlikeadelegationofpowertothedefenceministertomakewarandthereisnohintofsuchanintentionintheTangereport,whichrecommendedthechange,orthedebatethataccompaniedit–includingassurancesthatthegovernor-general’spowerswouldbeunaffected.Theotherintriguingelementofthegovernor-general’sstatementistheundertakingbytheprimeministertotakethematterbeforetheFederalExecutiveCouncil‘fornoting’.ItisnotclearwhetherthereisaplaceinFECmeetingsfornotingdecisionsand,ifso,whetheritprecludesthegovernor-generalaskingquestionsashecanwithregardtonormalFECdecisions(includinglegalonessuchastheoneheasked).
Enhancing the processTheprocesswherebydecisionstogotowararetakenbycabinet,especiallythoseundertheeffectivecontrolofstrongprimeministers,hasbeenqueriedbymany,andseveralsuggestionshavebeenmadefortheirimprovement.MostofthesesuggestedchangeshaverootsinourorotherWestminstersystemsandtheiradoptionwouldbeincompleteaccordwiththelongstandingWestminstertraditionofprogressthroughincrementalreformincorporatinglessonslearnedininstitutionalpractice.Wewillbrieflyreviewtheminturn.
parliamentary approval
ParliamentaryapprovalinthelowerhousewassoughtandsecuredbybothTonyBlair(inadvance)andJohnHoward(retrospectively).SomehavesoughttolegislatetorequiresuchapprovalreflectingtherequirementforcongressionalapprovalundertheUSconstitution.However,itshouldberememberedthatCongressisnotinapositiontogetridofapresidentthroughano-confidencemotion–whichisamuchbroaderpowertocontrolgovernmentsincurringthedispleasureofamajorityofthelowerhouse.Ifparliamentaryapprovalisrequiredinbothhouses,apotentialcheckisimposedongovernmentsandcoalitionsthatdonotcontroltheupperhouse.GarryWoodard’ssuggestionofanationallytelevisedjointsittingisagoodonebutisconstitutionallydifficult.AvariationcouldbethatdecisionstogotowarbesupportedbyamajorityinthelowerhouseandamajorityofallMPsinbothhouses,whichwouldhavethesameeffect.
Butweshouldbecarefulofexpectingtoomuchofsuchrequirements.EvenintheUS,thisconstitutionalprovisionisalimiteddeterrenttowarsofaggression.ItdidnotstopthewarsagainstCanadain1812,Mexicoin1846,Spainin1898orIraqin2003.
Muchdependsonthequalityofinformationparliamentreceives.
A BETTER WESTMINSTER WAY TO WAR?
59
OnIraqhewrites:
Ihadpreviouslyreadpublicstatementsmadebysomeacademicsandinternationallawyers,and,ontheadviceoftheOfficialSecretary,IsoughtclarificationfromtheAttorney-Generalastotechnicalramificationsthatcouldariseunderinternationallaw.Ihadnotrequestedit,butheimmediatelyreferredthemattertothePrimeMinisterwhometwithmetoaddresstheissuesfromavailablelegaladvice.He…informedmethatnorecommendationswereeverputtoanyofmypredecessorsinrelationtotroopdeploymentstoplacessuchasSomalia,Bougainville,Bosnia,Cambodia,Rwanda,thePersianGulf,VietnamorEastTimor.
HehadpreviouslygivenanundertakingthatinsuchcircumstanceshewouldinfuturerequesttheMinisterforDefencetorecommendtotheGovernor-GeneralinCouncilthatthedeploymentofAustralianforcesoverseasbenotedbywayofrecognitionofthepositionofGovernor-GeneralessentiallyasthetitularCommander-in-ChiefoftheAustralianDefenceForces.
WhenAustraliawenttowar,theprimeministersetoutthe
politicalprocessbywhichthedecisionhadbeenmade,citingtheprocessfollowedbyPrimeMinisterBobHawkein1991.However,itwaswidelyknownthatGovernor-GeneralBillHaydenhadcomplainedthathehadnotbeenaskedtogivehispriorapprovalandithadbeenassumedthatthiswasanerrorwhichwouldhavebeenrectified.Theclaimtoalong-standingpracticewassurprising–thoughalloftheotherconflictsHowardcitedhadinvolvedactivitiesapprovedbythesovereignpoweranddidnotinvolveawarbetweensovereignstatesthatwouldgiverisetoadeclarationofwar.
Thisdoesraisethequestionofthelegalmeansbywhichthepoliticaldecisionbycabinethadbeeneffected.Cabinethasneitherconstitutionalstatusnorlegalpower.Politicaldecisionsreachedtherearelegallyexecutedbyministers,officials,thegovernor-generalortheFederalExecutiveCouncilunderoneofthefourformsofexecutivepowersetoutinthefirstsectionofthischapter.
Itnowappearsclearthatcabinet’sdecisionwaseffectedthroughastatutorypowervestedinthedefenceministerundera1975amendmenttotheDefenceActwhichvests‘thegeneralcontrolandadministrationoftheDefenceForce’intheministerandrequiresthemilitarytoexerciseitspowers‘inaccordancewithanydirections
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58
legal advice
BlairandHowardprovidedlegaladvicetoparliament.Theadvicewasmuchcriticised,notleastforrepresentingaminorityviewamonginternationallawyersandnotrecognisingeitherthemajorityviewofthelikelyoutcomesifitwenttocourt.BlairdidnotsupplyLordGoldsmith’searlierandfulleradvicetocabinet,letalonetoparliament.Howarddidnotevenconsultthesolicitor-general.Parliamentneedsindependentadvice.
Insomejurisdictionstheattorney-generalhasadutytomakelegaldecisionsandgivelegaladviceindependentlyofcabinet–traditionallybyconventionintheUKandCommonwealthjurisdictionsandlegislatedinQueensland.IntheUK,thisincludedtheprovisionoflegaladvicetoparliamentaswellasthegovernment.However,thiscangiverisetosignificanttensionsasillustratedbyGoldsmith’ssecretandpublicadvice.Someoftheindependentpowershavebeenlargelytransferredtostatutorybodies(mostnotablythatoverprosecutions).InAustralia,theattorney-general’s‘client’isthegovernmentandnottheparliament.Understandingorderstheattorney-generalcannotbeaskedforalegalopinioninquestiontime.Theattorney-generalatthetimeoftheIraqwar,Daryl
WilliamsQC,consideredthathispositionincabinetandthefargreaterexecutiveresponsibilitiesofAustralianattorneys-generalcomparedtoBritishattorneys-generalmeantthatthesolicitor-general(anindependentstatutoryofficer)shouldbetheonetoprovidewrittenopinions.
Giventhisbackground,Westminsterparliamentsmightconsiderarangeofoptions:
n Securingalegalopinionfromthesolicitor-generalprovidedtheyaresatisfiedwiththegovernment’sbrief
n Securingindependentlegalopiniononthebasisthattheclientofthesolicitor-generalisthegovernment
n Seekinganadvisoryopinionfromtheultimateappellatecourt.Giventhegravityofgoingtowar,itwouldbenotunreasonabletorequirethecourttogivethispriority,buttheAustralianHighCourthasruleditdoesnothavetheconstitutionalpowertodoso
n Establishingastandingpanelofformerjudgesorprominentinternationallawyerstoprovideadvice.
Asproofofgoodfaith,AustraliashouldalsoconsideracceptingthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeforanyoccasiononwhichit
A BETTER WESTMINSTER WAY TO WAR?
61
resortstoarmedforceprovidedthatthestatewhichseekstoquestionanyclaimedillegalitybyAustraliaalsoacceptsthecourt’scompulsoryjurisdictionoverbreachesofinternationallawcitedbyAustraliaasareasonfortheuseofarmedforce(whatIcallthe‘sosueme’approach).
Seekingandhearingsuchopinionscouldbegiventoaparliamentarycommitteewhichreportedtoparliament.Thiswouldgiveitthetimeandtheabilitytohandleanyconfidential,privilegedorsecretinformation.Therearemanyparliamentaryandcongressionalcommitteeswhichhandlesuchmatterswithnecessarysecurityclearances.Thepresenceofoppositionmembersisnobartotheirreceivingsuchbriefingsastheycouldbeministersfollowingthenextelection.
military and intelligence advice
Thesamecommitteethatheardlegaladvicecouldalsoreceiveconfidentialbriefingsonmilitaryandintelligenceassessments.Theseassessmentsmust,ofcourse,beprofessional,independent,frankandfearless.
the federal executive council
WhiletheIraqwarwasnotbroughtbeforetheFederalExecutiveCouncil,thereismeritindoingsoanditwouldappearprocedurallysuperiortoboththe
governor-generalactingontheprerogativealoneonadviceorthedefenceministeractingundersection8oftheDefenceAct.
Underthecabinethandbook,theattorney-generalwouldpresumablyhavetoprovideacertificate(thoughclarificationwouldneedtobemadeastowhetherthecertificatemerelydealtwiththedomesticlegalityortheinternationallegalityaswell).Thereisalsoanopportunityforthegovernor-generaltoperformtheroleWalterBagehotidentifiedforaconstitutionalmonarch–tocounsel,adviseandwarn–andtoaskquestionsaboutthelegalbasisofadecisionbeforesigningoffondocuments.
The ICC imperativeNowthatAustraliahasagreedtoextendthejurisdictionoftheInternationalCriminalCourttocrimesofaggressionandsubjectitselftothatjurisdiction,theUSprosecutor’sclosingstatementatNurembergiscomingtrue:‘LetmemakeclearthatwhilethislawisfirstappliedagainstGermanaggressors,thelawincludes,andifitistoserveausefulpurposeitmustcondemnaggressionbyanyothernations,includingthosewhichsitherenowinjudgment.’
Australiawillneedtoprovidemechanismsforevaluatingproposalsforgoingtowartoprotectministers,governors-
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generalandservicechiefsfromsubsequentinvestigationandprosecution.ItwillalsoneedtoestablishcredibleandindependentmeansforsuchinvestigationandprosecutionwithinAustraliatoensurethattheICCwillnotfeelitnecessaryinafutureconflict.
WhileAustraliahasfiveyearsinwhichtodothis,dothisitmust.Ifitgetsinearly,itwillprovideamodelforotherWestminsterdemocraciesandensurethatanydecisionstoenterconflictsbeforethataretakenonasoundbasisandnotruntheriskofthedamagesomanybelievetohaveoccurred.
Public and parliamentary debateWhiletheformalparliamentaryprocessesareatthenaturalcentreofdiscussion,theydonotoperateinavacuumbutinahighlychargedpublicdebate.Thequalityofdebateinparliamentwillaffectandbeaffectedbythatpublicdebate.Severalimportantprofessionsareinvolved–lawyers,soldiers,journalistsandpoliticians.
Lawyersshouldrememberthattheirprimarydutyistothelawandthesystemofjustice(inthiscaseinternationaljusticeaswellasdomesticjustice)andshouldnotusethelesserlikelihoodoflitigationtogiveclientstheadvicetheywanttohear–ortoclaimthatthelawisastheywouldlikeittoberatherthanasitislikelytobedeterminedbyacourtofcompetent
jurisdiction.Lawyersmayadvocateforlegalchangebutnotpretendthatithasalreadyhappened.
Similarlyprofessionaljournalistshaveacriticalroleintheformationofpublicopinioninademocracy–nevermoresothaninthegravestdecisionanynationcantake.
Themilitaryprofessioniscalledontorisktheultimatesacrificeduringwarandneedtoprovidetheirprofessionalopinionwhentheircivilianmastersareconsideringwhetherornottheyarecalledupontodoso.Somedonotseepoliticiansinprofessionalterms.Wecananddoandagainseethegreatestneedforthatprofessionalismwhentheyaremakingthatdecisiononbehalfofthepeopletheyserve.
ANZUSMrHoward’sreferencetoANZUSdidnotaddressDrHollingworth’squestionaboutdomesticconstitutionalprocesswithrespecttotheAfghanistanwar.Butitdidaddressanimportantissueofnationalpolicy.WedonotyetknowexactlywhatparttheUSallianceplayedintheIraqdecisionandhowthiswassquaredoffwithotherissues(legality,WMD,potentialciviliancasualties).Onesuspectsthatitloomedverylarge.
ThecaseforaninquirydoesnotdependonoppositiontoANZUSandtheUSalliance,thoughsomemayseektofalselyportrayitas
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such.Inmyview,thereisastrongcasetobemadebythose,likeme,whoarestrongsupportersofboth.
an alliance to be valued
MysupportforthatallianceisbasedonsharedvaluesonwhichthatalliancewasforgedandforwhichAustraliansandAmericansfoughtanddied.LikemanyAustralians,thisisbolsteredbypersonalandfamilyties.Amongthesharedvalueswasconcernfortheinternationalruleoflaw.Thiswasrecognisedasco-signatoriesofthe1928PactofParis,whichwasenshrinedinarticle2oftheUNCharter,theNurembergtrialsandarticle1oftheANZUSTreatyitself.PresidentDwightDEisenhowereloquentlystatedin1959acorevalueofthatalliancethatwasreflectedintheUNCharterandarticle1oftheANZUSTreaty:
Thetimehascomeformankindtomaketheruleoflawininternationalaffairsasnormalasitisnowindomesticaffairs…PlainlyonefoundationstoneofthisstructureistheInternationalCourtofJustice.ItishearteningtonotethatastrongmovementisafootinmanypartsoftheworldtoincreaseacceptanceoftheobligatoryjurisdictionofthatCourt…Onefinalthoughtonruleoflawbetweennations:wewillallhavetoremindourselvesthatunderthissystem
oflawonewillsometimesloseaswellaswin.But…ifaninternationalcontroversyleadstoarmedconflict,everyoneloses;thereisnowinner.Ifarmedconflictisavoided,therefore,everyonewins.Itisbettertoloseapointnowandtheninaninternationaltribunal,andgainaworldinwhicheveryonelivesatpeaceunderaruleoflaw.
ThisisastatementbyanAmericanpresident,aRepublicanandoneoftheUnitedStates’mostdistinguishedandsuccessfulsoldierswholed‘UnitedNations’forces(astheywerealreadycalled)inWesternEuropeatthetimeouralliancewiththeUSwasforged.Thelastcommentisparticularlypoignantcomingfromanex-soldier.ItalsoremindsusthattheUSwascommittedtotheinternationalruleoflawandthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheICJformostofthehistoryoftheUN,andlongerthanAustralia.
ThefamilyconnectionrelatestoanothergreatthemeoftheIraqwar–theuseofintelligence.Intelligencecooperationbetweenourtwocountriescommencedin1942withcode-breakingactivityandtheformationoftheCombinedOperationsIntelligenceCentreatGeneralMacarthur’sHeadquarters.MembersincludedZelman(laterSirZelman)CowenandCasparWeinberger(andotherlesswell-
knownbrightyoungvolunteersincludingLtHorrieSampford,whomtheAmericansdecoratedforhiswork).TheywereentrustedwithallthesecretsofthePacificWartoprovideintelligenceanalysis.Theanalysisprovideddidnotalwaysaccordwiththeexpectationsorviewsof‘thebrass’.Buttheyrecognisedboththetemptationandthefollyoftellingtheirsuperiorswhattheywantedtohearratherthanwhattheyneededtohear.Doingthelatterwasneitherdisloyaltynorinsubordinationbuttheirprofessionaldutyandthebestservicetheycouldrendertoouralliesandfriends.Todootherwiseriskedlives,battlesand,in1942whenthebalanceofforceswasmoreeven,thewaritself.
Supportforthealliancedoesnotmeanuncriticalsupportofanally.Allfriendshaveflaws,allnationshaveflawsandgreatnationspermitgreatflawsaswellasgreatstrengths.Weshouldunderstandratherthanjudge.Butweshouldnotofferblindsupport.AustraliawasacheerleaderfortheAmericandesiretogotowar.Wemighthaveconsidered
ourselvesloyal.Butthosewhoarecheerleadersforafriend’sfollyarenotlikelytobethankedforitwhenthefollyisrealised(andIamsadtosaythatIthoughttheterm‘folly’wasappropriateeventhen).Atruefriendwarnsagainstfollyevenattheriskofthatfriend’sdisapproval–asPrimeMinisterRobertMenziesdidinwarningPresidentEisenhowerhewouldnot
joininconflictovertheTaiwanStraits.Thiscantakecourage.In2003,wedonotappeartohavequestionedUSintelligenceforecasts.Wepubliclyendorsedtheirclaimstothelegalityofthewarthatnoothercountryaccepted(accordingtoLordGoldsmith’scontemporary
advicenotpublisheduntil2006).Weshouldrecognisethedamage
sufferedbytheUnitedStatesandtheconsequentriskstoourperceivedsecurityinterests:
n ThewarcosttheUStrillionsofdollars,weakeningtheUSasamilitaryandeconomicpower.ThisweakenedtheUSrelativetoChinaandotherpotentialrivalsandincreasedthelikelihoodthattheUS
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wouldloseitsnumber-onepositionandbringforwardthetimeatwhichthatmighthappen.AmericanweaknesschangesthebalanceofpowerinthePacificandisnotinAustralia’sstrategicinterests.
n ThehumancostfortheAmericanswassignificantbutthesufferingcausedtootherswasmanytimesthat.EvenifthatwereunimportanttoANZUSmembers,thecosttotheUSinits‘softpower’wasenormous.
n Thepotentialdamagetothevaluesweshare.
n Thebadexamplewesetforrisingpowers.
TheUScannotaffordmorefolliesofthisnature.Asagoodfriendwithaperceivedinterestintheirstrengthandprosperity,weshouldhelpthemavoidthem.Weshouldinquireintoourownapproachtowartobeamoreeffectivefriendandacountrymoresecureandmoreconfidentofourvalues.
TheUSwascommittedtotheinternationalruleoflawandthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeformostofthehistoryoftheUN,andlongerthanAustralia.
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The UK inquiries into the Iraq war
Six-year-oldAbdullahwasinjuredduringaUKclustermunitionstrikeonBasrain2003.Credit: DanChurchAid
prosecutionsbroughtagainstUKservicemenunderBritishlaw);orahumanrightsclaimunderrelevantlegislationorunderaregionalhumanrightstreaty;orcivildisobediencecasesinwhichtheallegedcriminalityofthewarformspartofadefencetovariousmoreminorcriminalcharges.
FormerprimeministerTonyBlairhashadtoanswerquestionsbeforequasi-judicialpanelsinamannerresemblingthatofadefendantinacriminaltrial,aftertheLabourgovernmentthatheledbecameaworldleaderinestablishingadministrativeinquiriesintodifferentaspectsoftheIraqwar.Threeinquiriesweresetup,andareconsideredbelow.Themostwide-raging–andstillongoing–istheIraqInquiryitself,underitschairman,JohnChilcot.DotheseinquiriesofferusefulprecursorsormodelsforanAustralianIraqinquiry?
The Hutton inquiryOn29May2003,theBBCflagshipradioprogram‘Today’carriedareportbyoneofitsjournalists,AndrewGilligan,contendingthattheBlairgovernmentand,inparticular,itspressofficerAlistairCampbell,had‘sexedup’anintelligencedocumentonthethreatposedbytheBaathregime.Particularattentionwasgiventothegovernment’sclaimthatIraqcoulduseweaponsofmassdestruction
in45minutes.DavidKelly,anarmscontrolexpertattheMinistryofDefence,whohadbeenGilligan’ssourceforthestory,appearedattheForeignAffairsCommitteeoftheHouseofCommons,andwaslaterfounddeadinwoodsnearhishome.Asaresult,thegovernmentestablished,inJuly2003,aninquiryunderLawLordBrianHuttonintothecircumstancessurroundingthedeathofDrKelly.
Butwhatwerethesecircum-stances?Or,moreproblematically,whatwasthepermittedambitofreviewablecircumstances?Atoneextremewastheviewthatthiswassimplyaglorifiedcoroner’sreport.Butformanyothers,thiswasaninquiryintothewaritself.LordHutton’sjob,intheeyesoftheanti-warcoalitions,andinthefearsofthegovernmentitself,wastoputHerMajesty’sgovernmentontrialandperhapseventoconvictitofcriminalacts.
On24January2004,LordHuttontoldthenationthatDrKellyhadcommittedsuicide,admonishingtheBBCseverelyandtheBlairgovernmentgently(forhavingreleasedKelly’snamewithoutwarninghim,andfor‘subconsciously’influencingtheJointIntelligenceCommittee’sintelligencewarnings).LordHutton’sreportdeclaredthattheBlairgovernmenthadmadeaninnocentmistake.Butitdidnotstillthedesireforjudgement.
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ofotherpossibleavenuesforjudicialorquasi-judicialreview.Attheinternationallevel,theInternationalCourtofJusticemightbecompelledtoofferajudgementonthelegalityofthewarorthesubsequentoccupation.Thiscouldoccurinoneoftwoways:eitherthroughanadvisoryopinionrequestedbyanorganoftheUnitedNations,orbecauseastatethathasitselfacceptedthejurisdictionofthecourt(aroundathirdofstateshave)bringsacaseagainsttheUnitedKingdom(or,conceivably,Australia)claimingthatithasviolatedinternationallawbyinvadingand/oroccupyingIraq.BeforetheInternationalCriminalCourt,individuals,too,mightbeheldresponsibleforbreachesofinternationallaw.Indeed,theprosecutorofthatcourtdidinitiateapreliminaryinvestigationintoallegedUKwarcrimesandcrimes
againsthumanityinIraqbutfoundthattherewasnoevidenceofthesortofsystematicabuseofinternationallawthatmightenliventhecourt’sjurisdiction.TheICCdidnothavein2003,andwillonlypossessattheearliestby2017,jurisdictionoverthecrimeofaggression(acrimeprosecutedsuccessfullyatNurembergandTokyo;andonethatsomeobserversconsidermayhavebeencommittedbymembersofthe‘coalitionofthewilling’in2003).
Atthenationallevel,thereisthepossibilityofclaimsforjudicialreviewofgovernmentdecisionstogotowar(theUKCampaignforNuclearDisarmamentbroughtjustsuchacase,unsuccessfully,againsttheBlairgovernmentin2002);criminalprosecutionsofleadersorservicepersonnelforcrimescommittedduringthewar(therehavebeencriminal
Prof Gerry Simpson
ThereareanumberofwaysinwhichthedecisiontogotowarinIraqmightbesubjecttosomesortofadministrativeorjudicialscrutiny.Thischapter
considers,aspossiblemodels,threerecentBritishinquiriesintotheIraqwar,butbeginsbyplacingtheseinthecontext
The Butler inquiryOnlydaysafterHutton’sreport,USPresidentGeorgeWBushtoosetupaninquiryintotheintelligencereceivedleadingtotheinterventioninIraq.Shortlyafterthat,on3February2004,TonyBlairentrustedaseniorcivilservant,RobinButler,todoasimilarjobfortheUK.ThisinquirytouchedonmatterstakenupatHuttonandforeshadowedthosecurrentlyunderinvestigationatChilcot,namely,thepartplayedinthedecisiontogotowarbyintelligencerelatingtoIraq’sWMDcapacity.
TheButlerinquiryhandeddownconclusionsthatweremorecriticalofthegovernmentandtheintelligencecommunitythanHutton’s,findingthattheintelligenceprovidedtothegovernmentwas‘unreliable’andassessmentsofthatintelligencewereinflated.Butlercriticisedthegovernmentalsoforrelyingtooheavilyon‘flawed’intelligencefromotherstates,forhavingtoomuchfaithinmaterialandassessmentssuppliedbynotdisinterestedIraqidissidents,andforconstructingdossiers(intendedtoconvincethepublic)fromrawintelligencematerial.Theintelligencecommunitywascriticisedforfailingtofollowvalidationproceduresinrelationtodubioushumanintelligenceandforatendencytoacceptworst-caseestimates.Themostcontentiousofthefindings
relatedtotheinfamousNigeruraniumyellowcake(PresidentBushhadreferredtoit,asevidenceofIraq’sintentions,inhis2003StateoftheUnionspeech).Butler,surprisingly,foundthattherewasevidencetosuggestthattheIraqishadtriedtoacquireuraniumfromNiger(thoughthisfindingitselfwasnotfullysubstantiated).
Intheend,though,theButlerinquiryconcludedthatnorecentintelligencehadmadethecaseforgoingtowarmorecompellingthanithadbeenin,say,July2001thanitmighthavebeeninrelationtootherstatesatthattime.Theinquiryendedbystatingitsconcernabouttheeffectofthegovernment’spolicy-makingproceduresonreducingthescopeforinformedcollectivepoliticaljudgement.
The Chilcot inquiry On15June2009,inthedyingdaysoftheBrowngovernment,theprimeministerestablishedaninquiryintoaperiodofdecision-makingbeforeandafter(2001–2009)theIraqwar,andintotheadequacyofgovernmentprocessesthathadledtothedecisiontogotowar.Therewerenolawyersonthepanel,thoughthelegalityofthewarhasabsorbedagreatdealofthepanel’sattentionandinternationallawyershavebeenaskedtosubmitlegalopinionstotheinquiry.
TheChilcotinquirybeganitshearingson24November2009.
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70AcoalitionairstrikeattheedgeofFallujah,Iraq,inNovember2004.Credit: James J. Vooris
ministersandofficials,andgovernmentrecords(someofthemclassified),anyinquirythatisestablishedwillbeunabletoconductitsworkproperly.
Second,themembershipofaninquirypanelmustbebothindependentandcapableofforensicexaminationoftheissues.(MembersshouldnothavesupportedtheIraqwarorhavepresentedthegovernment’sintelligenceinsupportofit,aswasthecaseintheButlercommittee.)
TheChilcotpanelhasimpressedinmanyrespects.Itcertainlyhasnotalloweditselftobecowedbythewitnesses,andthemixtureofhistorians,civilservantsandpoliticianshasworkedwellattimes.However,itmaybeworth
thinkingaboutappointingaformerjudgeorleadingbarristertoanyAustralianpanel,sincesomeofthequestionsengagedwillinvolvenicelegaldistinctionsandrequirefurtherpursuit.
Third,theinformationgatheredandthewitnessinterviewsmustbemadewidelyandpubliclyavailablethroughhighlyprofessionalmeansofcommunication(atChilcot,theabilitytoaccessfulltranscripts,declassifieddocumentsandvideoevidencehasbeenextraordinarilyuseful).Aninquiry,undertheseconditions,intoAustralia’sdecisiontogotowarisclearlyrequired.FurtherinvestigationofAustralia’sparticipationinthewarandengagementintheoccupationcouldbeofgreatbenefit.
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Ithasthepowertorequesttheappearanceofofficialsandpoliticiansoperatingatthehighestlevelsofgovernmentduringthecrisis,and,indeed,therehavebeensomeveryhigh-profileappearancesfromthegovernmentside,andfromthecivilservice.Theinquiryhasgeneratedanenormousamountofdeclassifiedmaterialonthegovernment’sdecision-makingleadinguptotheIraqwar,adocumentaryrecordthatisquiterevealing.
Itisunclearwhentheinquirywillconcludeitsreport,butitisexpectedtoexceedamillionwords,andisunlikelytobepublishedbeforelate2013.Acontroversyisbrewingaboutwhethertheinquirycanpublishclassifiedmaterialthatithasneverthelessseen(adialogueisunderwayonthisquestion).Onehundredandfiftywitnesseshaveattestedtotheirunderstandingofwhathappenedinthedecision-makingaroundtheIraqwar,morethan20witnesseshaveprovidedwrittensubmissions,andoftensofthousandsofwrittenrecords,
manyhavebeenpublishedontheinquiry’swebsite.Theinquiryhasheldseminarsonitswork.So,evenifnoreportispublishedthiswillhavebeenavaluableundertaking.
Butthereportmayleavesomequestionsunanswered.Theymayinclude:Whatroleshouldinternationallawadviceplayindecisionstouseforce?Whatpreciselyistheroleoflawofficers,
liketheattorney-general,whenprovidingadvice(advocateoradviser)?Shouldlegaladvicebeputbeforecabinet?Fulladvice?Summaryadvice?Conceptualquestionsariseaswellaboutthenatureoflawitself:whetherthelawfulnessorunlawfulnessofactscanbe
decidedbyinternationallaw,orwhetheritis‘prettyvague’(asJackStraw,Blair’sforeignminister,toldtheChilcotinquiry)andreducibletoamatterofopinion.
AustraliahasacloseinterestinthreelessonsthatmaybedrawnfromChilcot.First,itisvitallyimportantthatanyinquiryhasthefullsupportofgovernment.Withoutaccesstogovernment
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Itisvitallyimportantthatanyinquiryhasthefullsupportofgovernment.Withoutaccesstogovernmentministersandofficials,andgovernmentrecords,anyinquirythatisestablishedwillbeunabletoconductitsworkproperly.
CHAPTER 8
Never again?
AsandstormneartheAlAsadAirBaseinIraqinSeptember2011.Credit: Cecilio Ricardo
obligationswhichhisgovernmenthadbolsteredbyincludingajointparliamentarycommittee.AsPM,neitherHawkenorHowardwasobligedtoputtheinvasionofIraqtoavoteinparliament–bothseekingonlyretrospectiveendorsementofcabinet’sdecision.Neitherinvolvedthegovernor-general.Unfortunately,MrHowarddidnotcarrythroughwithanundertakingtohaveit‘noted’bytheFederalExecutiveCouncil–whichwouldhaveconstitutedanimprovement.AstotheendsforwhichAustraliawenttowar,hedescribedthetaskofAustralianforcesashelpingtheUnitedStatesfindanddestroyIraq’sweaponsofmassdestructiontostopthembeingpassedtoal-Qaida,orbeingusedtoattackothercountries.HedeclaredthatAustraliasupportedPresidentBush’sglobalwaronterror.HavingrepeatedlydeniedthatAustraliawascommittedto‘regimechange’inIraq,hetoldtheparliament,on4February2003,thatAustraliawouldsharetheburdenofdestroyingSaddamHussein.Hedidnotspecifywhetherthepurposeofthelong-plannedinvasionwastostopIraqdevelopingnuclearweapons,takecontrolofIraqioil,reformtheMiddleEastonecountryafteranother,orsomethingelse.HedidnottellAustralianshowlongheanticipatedourforceswouldbethere,howmuchthewarcould
cost,howwewouldknowiforwhenwehadwonorlost,orwhatAustralia’sresponsibilitieswouldbeforhumanitarianaid,rebuildingIraqorcopingwithrefugees.
EventhoughhetoldtheNationalPressClubhecouldnotjustifywarifSaddamHusseinhadnoWMD,hecontinuedtodosoevenwhennoWMDcouldbefound,nowclaimingthattheworldwassaferasaresultoftheinvasionofIraq.However,itwasnotclearthatAustraliawasasaferplace.On13March2001,MrHowardsaidhetooka‘veryproactiveviewoftheAmericanalliance’,butcouldgivenoassuranceoftheUnitedStates’reciprocalprotectionofAustralia.ItcouldbearguedthatthewarweakenedtheUnitedStatesanditsabilitytoassistus.
Finally,thedecisiontogotowarexposedAustraliatotheaccusationofhavingwagedanillegalwar(whichwouldbethefirstinourhistory).Whilehecontinuedtoinsistthatthewarwaslegal,hisgovernmenthadtakenstepswhichmadeitdifficultfortheInternationalCourtofJusticetohearsuchacase.(Beforethat,acountryattackedbyAustraliacouldtakeustotheICJ,butIraqin1991andAfghanistanin2001wouldhavebeenfoolishtodoso).HeneverseemedtorecognisethepossibilitythathisdecisiontoinvadeIraqwaswrong,nordidheestablishedageneralinquiry
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predictableconsequenceofthedecisiontogotowar.Weneedextraordinarilygoodreasonstoengageinit.
GeoffreyBlaineyobservesthatwarsbeginwhentheleadersofcountriesonbothsidesbelievethatmorecanbegainedfromfightingthannotdoingso–pointingoutthatatleastonesidewillbewrong.Eisenhowerseesworseodds–inarmedconflict,everyoneloses.TheIraqwarisaclassicexample.
Yet,10yearsaftergoingtowarinIraq,Australiansstillhavereceivednocomprehensiveaccountfromthegovernmentaboutthereasonsfordoingsooranevaluationofitsresults.TheeventsdescribedinthechaptersaboveindicatetheabilityofanAustralianprimeministertotakeustowarforgoodorill,andthelimitedchecksandbalancesavailabletoensurethatthecausewillbejust,theendsdefined,the
prospectsforsuccessgoodandthatthekillingandsufferingislikelytobeproportionatetotheachievableends.WhateveronethinksofLabororLiberal,HawkeorHoward,thetwoPresidentsBush,orthedecisionsofeach,thevitalethical,legalandgovernancequestioniswhetherthisisthewaywewanttogotowar.ImmediatelyaftertheattacksonNewYorkandWashington,DC,inSeptember2001,MrHowardinvokedtheANZUSTreaty,unilaterallyextendingitsapplicationtosupporttheUnitedStatesanywhereinthenon-specific‘waronterror’.Itisrightandpropertoconsultanallyfollowinganattack,andoneallymayoffertoassistanotherevenifnotboundtodoso(wewouldhopetheUSwoulddothesameifourciviliansweretargetedoutsidethePacificarea).Butwehaveprocessesforconsideringtreaty
Dr Alison Broinowski and Prof Charles Sampford
Goingtowaristhemostseriousdecisionagovernmentcanmake.Warisnot‘politicscarriedonbyothermeans’.Itisaformoforganised,pre-meditatedmass
killing–deliberateinthecaseofcombatantsandinevitableinthecaseofnon-combatantswhodieandsufferasanentirely
intothewarastheBritishhavedone.ThishasnotpreventedAustralianresearchersseekingtolearnthelessonsoftheIraqwar.JohnLangmorehaspointedtothedangerofarisk-aversepublicservicethatshirksitsresponsibilitytospeaktruthtopower.HeandGarryWoodardremindusofthedangersofremovingtheboundariesbetweenpolicyandintelligence,lessonswethoughtwehadlearnt.Moresuggestionsforimprovementsinthewaywegotowarinclude:
n Requiringsupportinonehouse,bothhousesoratelevisedjointsitting
n Morecomprehensiveinformationprovidedtoparliament,includingindependentlegaladviceandfullmilitaryandintelligencebriefingsgiventoaparliamentarycommittee
n Finalsign-offinFederalExecutiveCouncilfollowingtheissueofacertificateoflegalitybytheattorney-general
n AcceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionoftheICJforanywarsweengagein,andprovisionfortheinvestigationandprosecutionofthecrimeofaggression(aswillbenecessaryafter2017)
n Promotionofwell-informedpublicdebate,and
governmentregardfortheviewsexpressed.
ThesechangesarebeingproposedbythosewhodonotwishAustraliatorepeatwhatmanyseeastheillegality,errorsofintelligence,lossoflife,humanitariancatastrophes,andhugewasteofmoneyandmaterialthatoccurredinIraq–alongwiththedamagetoAustralia’sinternationalstanding.Theywillnotpassivelyacceptthataninvasionis‘inthenationalinterest’,norcompliantlyagreethatcontinuingalong,costlywaris‘stayingthecourse’,‘gettingthejobdone’and‘therightthingtodo’.
Ifwedonottakethisopportunity,adecadeonfromtheinvasionofIraq,Australiaisatriskofbeingdrawnintofuturewarsthatdousmuchmoreharm.Theycouldgoasbadlyforusasforthosewefight,andwecouldmakelastingenemiesofpowerfulcountrieswhichshouldremainmajortradingpartners.
Weareobliged,therefore,todemandthattheAustraliangovernmentbedemocraticallyaccountableforfuturedecisionstogotowar,andfortheresultsofsuchdecisions.Toachievethischange,anIraqwarinquiry,longoverdue,isanecessaryfirststep.Theimplementationofrecommendedchangesinthewaydecisionsforwararemadeisanecessarysecondstep.
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79PrisonerabuseatAbuGhraibPrisoninIraqinNovember2003.Credit: US Government
whetherIraqposedanactualthreat?Iftherewasathreatassessment,whatdiditsay?
n PhilipFlood,whoconductedapost-warinquiryintoAustralianintelligence,describedtheevidenceonIraq’sWMDas‘thin,ambiguous,andincomplete’.HowdoesMrHowardreconcilethiswithhispresentationtoparliamenton4February2003?
Humanitarian issues
n WereanyUN,NGOorotherreportsoftheeffectsofthe1991GulfWar,theeconomicsanctionsandthelikelyeffectsofafurtherwarconsideredinthegovernment’sdecisiontogotowarin2003?Ifnot,whynot?Ifso,whichreports,andhowmuchweightwasgiventothem?
n Whatdegreeofciviliansufferingdidthegovernmentexpectfromthewar,andwhatlevelofsufferingwasconsideredacceptable?Didthegovernmentrequestestimatesofciviliancasualties?
n Wereanycontingencyplansmadebythegovernmenttohelpreduceanddealwiththepredictedenormoushumanitarianeffectsofthewar?
Legal issues
n WeretheAustralianlawyersdraftingthegovernment’sadviceincontactwiththosedraftingadvicefortheBritishandAmericangovernments,andwhichAustralianministersorministerialstaffwereinformed?Whatotherlegaladvicedidthegovernmentseek?Whatlegaladvicewasprovidedtothegovernor-general?
n WhydidtheAustraliangovernmentchangeitsacceptanceofthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticewhenitdid?Wasitsresponseinparliamentonthewarmisleading?
n WhydidtheprimeministerfailtobringthedecisiontogotowartotheFederalExecutiveCouncilashehadtoldthegovernor-generalhewould?
81
Ourgrouphasnottakenanimmutableposition,nordo
weclaimtohaveaddressedalltheconcernsthatothersmayhave.Thisisacollectionofpapers,intendedtostimulatedebateandinvitesupporttocoalescearoundoptionalcoursesofaction.Wehavegatheredsomepossibilitiestogetherunderseveralheadingstoassistdiscussion,whichwelisthereintheformofquestions.
Models for an inquiryAnumberofmodelsexistforaninquiryincludingaRoyalCommission,a‘judicial’inquiry,aparliamentaryinquiry,aninquiryundertakenbytheAustralianLawReformCommissionorothergovernmentbody,andacitizens-initiatedinquiry.n Ontherelativemerits,
whichmodelwouldbemostappropriateforourpurposes?
n Whatshouldbethescopeofthisinquiry?Thatis,whatissuesshoulditbepermittedtoconsider?
n Howshouldtheproposedinquirybeestablishedwithreferencetokeyissuesincluding:confidentialandclassifiedinformation;securingindependencefrom
governmentandotherkeystakeholders;powers,forexample,tocompelwitnessestogiveevidence;timing,reportandrecommendations.
IntelligenceAccordingtotheintelligenceinquiriesinAustraliathatfollowedthe2003Iraqwar,viewsdivergedbetweenONAandDIOconcerningthenatureoftheevidenceforthepossessionbyIraqofWMD.Weneedtoknow:
n WhatwastheAustralianintelligenceadvicegiventothegovernmentinthelead-uptothewarandhowwasthedivergenceofviewsbetweenthetwoassessmentagenciesreconciled?
n Wastheintelligenceadvicechallengedatthetimebyanymembersofthegovernment,andifsobywhom?
n Whatwasthenatureofthechallenges,whatwastheresponsebytheassessmentagenciesandhowweredoubtsresolved?
n WastheintelligencegiventothegovernmentrestrictedtoadviceonthepossessionbyIraqofWMD,orwaswideradvicealsoprovidedon
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Some unanswered questions
theCommonwealthCommitteeofEminentPersonsin1989andChairmanoftheUNCommitteeonAfricanCommodityProblems.MrFraserisasenioradvisertotheInternationalCrisisGroup,honorarychairmanofInterActionCouncilandamemberoftheAsia-PacificLeadershipNetworkforNuclearNon-ProliferationandDisarmament.Hehaswrittentwobooks,CommonGround(2002)andMalcolmFraserthePoliticalMemoirs(withMargaretSimons,2010).MrFraserwritesarticlesforTheAge,TheConversationandProjectSyndicate.InJune2012hegavetheWhitlamOration,callingformoreindependenceandconfidenceinAustralianforeignanddefencepolicy.
Dr Jenny GroundsisPresidentoftheMedicalAssociationforPreventionofWar(Australia)andaGPinruralVictoria.ShetrainedandworkedattheRepatriationHospitalinHeidelbergandlaterincommunityhealthininnerMelbourne,workingwithrefugeesfrommanydifferentwarsituations.
Prof Charles SampfordisDirectorofTheInstituteforEthics,GovernanceandLaw(ajointinitiativeoftheUnitedNationsUniversity,Griffith,QUT,ANU,CenterforAsianIntegrityinManilaandOPJindalGlobalUniversity,Delhi),andPresident,
InternationalInstituteforPublicEthics.HeisFoundationDeanandProfessorofLawandResearch,ProfessorinEthics,GriffithUniversity,andAdjunctProfessor,QUTandYorkUniversity.Hehascompleted25booksand111articles/bookchapters.ForeignfellowshipsincludeVisitingSeniorResearchFellowatStJohn’sCollegeOxfordandaFulbrightSeniorAwardtoHarvard.In2002,hewasamemberofataskforceonthreatstodemocracyco-chairedwithSecretaryAlbright.ProfSampfordisabarristerandhasbeenconsultedbybusiness,governmentandvariousparliaments.
Edward SantowistheChiefExecutiveOfficerofthePublicInterestAdvocacyCentre,anindependent,non-profitlawandpolicyorganisation.HeisalsoaSeniorVisitingFellowattheUniversityofNewSouthWales,aboardmemberoftheNationalProBonoResourceCentreandamemberofthefederalgovernment’sInformationAdvisoryCommittee.In2009,hereceivedanAustralianLeadershipAward.HispreviousappointmentshavebeenintheUNSWLawSchoolandtheGilbert+TobinCentreofPublicLaw,theAustralianLawReformCommission,aSydneylawfirm,andasassociatetoJusticeHeydonoftheHighCourtofAustralia.StevenHampson,whocontributed
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Paul Barratt AOspentover30yearsintheCommonwealthpublicservice.KeyappointmentsincludeSecretaryoftheDepartmentofDefence,SecretaryoftheDepartmentofPrimaryIndustriesandEnergy,DeputySecretaryoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,andSpecialTradeRepresentativeforNorthAsia.Heisnowanindependentconsultantinaspecialisedadvisoryfirm.
Rod BartonisaformerDirectorofStrategicTechnology,DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation.In1991hebecameaUNweaponsinspector,ajobthathewastoworkatforthenext13years,includingasaspecialadvisertoHansBlix,ExecutiveChairmanoftheUNMonitoringandVerificationCommissiononIraq.Followingthe2003Iraqwar,RodBartonwasemployedasthesenioradvisertotheCIAinthehuntforIraq’smissingweaponsbytheIraqSurveyGroup.HeistheauthorofTheWeaponsDetective:TheinsidestoryofAustralia’stopweaponsinspector(2006).
Dr Alison Broinowski,formerlyanAustraliandiplomat,isaVisitingFellowatAustralianNationalUniversityandanHonorary
ResearchAssociateattheUniversityofWollongong.Sheistheauthor/editorof11booksandmanyarticlesontheAustralia/Asiainterface,ontheUnitedNations,andonAsianAustralianfiction.ShewroteHoward’sWar(2003)andAlliedandAddicted(2007).
Andrew Farranservedasadiplomatandministerialadviserbetween1962and1971,includingasexecutiveassistanttoSirArthurTangeinDefencein1971.Hewasaseniorlecturerinconstitutionalandinternationallaw,andsub-deanofgraduatestudiesintheLawFaculty,MonashUniversity,from1972to1985.Sincethenhehasdirectedbusinessesinprofessionalpublishing,tradepolicyadvisingandsheepfarming.HewasPresidentoftheAustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairs(Victoria)from1987to1990.HeisamemberofChathamHouse(RIIA)andIISS,UK,andaregularcontributortoprintandonlinemedia.
Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CHservedasAustralia’s22ndPrimeMinisterfrom1975to1983.Sinceleavinggovernment,MrFraserhasplayedaneminentroleininternationalrelations,includingasCo-Chairmanof
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Contributors
AyoungIraqigirlwatchescoalitiontroopsconductingatmosphericsinAlQurnainApril2010.Credit: Christopher Wellner
tothearticle,isaPracticalLegalTrainingInternatPIAC.
Prof Gerry Simpson isaProfessorofInternationalLawattheUniversityofMelbournewhereheholdstheKennethBaileyChair.HealsoisaVisitingProfessorattheLondonSchoolofEconomicswherehewasaProfessorofInternationalLawuntil2009.Gerryhaswrittenseveralbooksandnumerousarticles.Hisnextbook,TheMarginsofInternationalLaw,willbepublishedin2013.
Prof Ramesh ThakurisDirectoroftheCentreforNuclearNonproliferationandDisarmamentattheAustralianNationalUniversity,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsintheANU’sCrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,andAdjunctProfessorintheInstituteofEthics,GovernanceandLawatGriffithUniversity.HewasformerlySeniorViceRectoroftheUNUniversityandUNAssistantSecretary-General,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsattheUniversityofOtago,andHeadofthePeaceResearchCentreattheANU.Heistheauthor/editorofover40booksand400articlesandbookchapters,andisamemberofinternationaladvisoryboardsofinstitutesinAfrica,Asia,EuropeandNorthAmerica.
Dr Sue Wareham OAMisaVice-PresidentoftheMedicalAssociationforPreventionofWar(Australia)andamemberofthemanagementcommitteeinAustraliaoftheInternationalCampaigntoAbolishNuclearWeapons.InApril1999shetookpartinaninternationaldelegationtoIraqtoinvestigatetheimpactofeconomicsanctionsontheIraqipeople.SheisaCanberraGP.Garry WoodardisanhonorarySeniorFellowlecturingattheUniversityofMelbourneandaformerambassadortoBurma,ChinaandMalaysia,memberoftheboardoftheAustralia–JapanCouncilandtheMuseumofVictoria,memberoftheAdministrativeAppealsTribunal,nationalpresidentoftheAustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairsandpatronoftheAustralia–BurmaCouncil.HeistheauthorofAsianAlternatives:Australia’sVietnamdecisionandlessonsongoingtowar(2005)andNowWeKnowaboutGoingtoWarinIraq(2007).
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AnIraqiwomanandherfamilysitoutsidetheirmudhutwhilecoalitionsoldiersvisittheirfarmhouseneartheSinjarmountainsinnorthernIraqtoinspectawellin2009.Credit: Carmichael Yepez
‘HowdidAustralianarmedforcescometobeinvolvedintheUS-ledinvasionofIraqin2003,andwhy?Whatwerethedecision-makingprocessesthatledtothatcommitment?Werethoseprocessesadequateintermsofoursystemofgovernmentasweunderstanditandforthefuture?’
Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CH, Foreword