Who Will Pay for Our Old Age? Who Will Pay for Our Old Age? A Cross-National Comparison of the Scope of A Cross-National Comparison of the Scope of Social Policy Reforms in Germany and JapanSocial Policy Reforms in Germany and Japan

Andreas Hoff & Tetsuo OgawaAndreas Hoff & Tetsuo Ogawa

1. Introduction

2. The Role of Social Policy Measures for Sustaining the Welfare of Old Aged People

3. The Current Debates of Social Security Reforms in the EU and Japan

4. Pension Reforms and the Prospective Outcomes in Germany and Japan

5. Conclusion

2. The Role of Social Policy 2. The Role of Social Policy Measures for Sustaining the Measures for Sustaining the Welfare of Old Aged PeopleWelfare of Old Aged People

Issues of the Co-ordination of

1) Pensions and Employment

2) Health and Social Care

to Establish Social Policies for the Old Age Protection by Several Sectors

3. The Current 3. The Current Debates of Debates of Social Policy Reforms in the Social Policy Reforms in the EU and Japan EU and Japan Role of Public PensionsPension Crisis? Ageing PopulationsAny strategy? In the Reforms of

Pensions in the EU

The Proportions of Older PeopleThe Proportions of Older People

3.1 Challenges to Policies on Ageing:3.1 Challenges to Policies on Ageing:

- Pressures on Pension Systems – Political Disagreement over Pension Debate

- Challenges: Ageing of the Workforce Growing Need for Social Care and Health

Care Establishment of the Common Ground of

Protection for Old Aged Persons (Citizenship) Complication of Reforms in Ideology and

Strategy

3.2 Social Security and Pension 3.2 Social Security and Pension Policy Reform: Policy Reform: Directions to Sustain the Directions to Sustain the Current PAYG SystemCurrent PAYG System

Option 1: Raising Contribution RatesOption 2: Reducing Pension BenefitsOption 3: Raising Employment RatesOption 4: Raising Retirement Ages

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform:

1) Raising the Legal Retirement Age1) Raising the Legal Retirement Age Eight Member States: Austria, Germany,

Greece, Italy, France (by raising the number of contribution years), Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.

Most countries are introducing greater flexibility in the age of retirement (except Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the U.K.)

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform: 2)The Combination of Pension and 2)The Combination of Pension and Income from WorkIncome from Work

Measures to restrict the pension formula The common reform: the Extension of the Contribution Period for

Pensions by tying the amount of the pension to the length of contribution (Italy and Sweden, to some extent Austria, France, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the U.K. )

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform: 3) Income Testing and Ways of Financing 3) Income Testing and Ways of Financing PensionsPensionsIn some northern countries (Denmark

and Finland) new forms of income testing have been introduced on the cumulative total of methods of financing pensions – to reduce the role of contributions, while increasing that of taxes (Portugal and Spain) and, by adding a funded element (Finland, Sweden, and Italy)

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform: 4) Curtailment of Pre- and early 4) Curtailment of Pre- and early

Retirement PoliciesRetirement Policies Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform:

5) Reductions in the Level of Pension5) Reductions in the Level of Pension

by means of changes in the methods of calculation by price-indexation instead of wage-indexation (so, virtually wage indexation has been abolished or substantially reduced )

3.3 Social Security Reform: 3.3 Social Security Reform:

6) Move to a More Mixed Pension System6) Move to a More Mixed Pension System Especially in southern Europe

governments are trying to reduce reliance on the first pillar (compulsory public schemes) by stimulating supplementary ones, both occupational and private, as a way of introducing elements of funded financing in parallel with pay-as-you-go (PAYG)

4. Social Security and Pension 4. Social Security and Pension Reforms and the Prospective Reforms and the Prospective Outcomes in Germany and Outcomes in Germany and JapanJapan - There are common phenomena in social

security and pension reforms in Germany and Japan (even in France and Italy):

Features of the Bismarckian welfare institutions

Co-ordination of state, family, private and voluntary sector in producing the welfare of older people in co-ordination with other social policy areas (Health and Social Care)

- Prospective Outcomes?To ensure inter-generational solidarityTo relate reform proposals to policies on

social security, pensions, health care and long-term care (i.e. the protective welfare perspective)

plus

Employment Policy (i.e. the productive welfare perspective)

4.1 The Case of Germany4.1 The Case of Germany

The Beginnings of Social InsuranceSI 'invented' in Germany in late 19th century:

- 1883 Health Care Insurance- 1884 Occupational Accident Insurance- 1889 Pension Insurance- 1927 Unemployment Insurance- 1995 Long-term Care Insurance

Characteristics of Multi-Pillar Characteristics of Multi-Pillar Pension Policy SchemePension Policy Scheme

1st tier = Statutory pension scheme (SI) for blue-/white-collar workers

- earnings-related, defined benefit type- funded by contributions (PAYG),

employer/employee on equal parts- claims accumulated on individual accounts- takes into account all earnings of a life-time- entitlement in case of old age, disability, death

of spouse

• covers about 70 per cent of all expenditure for old-age security, i.e. 10 per cent of GNP (Schmähl 2002)

Characteristics of Multi-Pillar Characteristics of Multi-Pillar Pension Policy Scheme (II)Pension Policy Scheme (II)

2nd tier = Supplementary Occupational Pension- all public sector workers are covered by uniform

occupational scheme (collective agreement)- voluntary in private sector – only about half of

private sector employees covered (Schmähl 1997)

3rd tier = Private Savings and Insurances for Old Age- voluntary - difficult to give accurate estimate of savings for

old age

Background of Pension ReformBackground of Pension Reform

• Demographic development

dependency ratios 18-65 years old (1990: 21% 2002: 25%) (Gerostat 2003)

• Past success and much of today’s trouble caused by post-war Pension Reform Act in 1957

dynamic pensions , i.e. pensions linked to development of gross earnings

• equal SI contributions by employees/employers seen as obstacle to competitiveness of German enterprises

Pension reforms during 1990sPension reforms during 1990s

1992 Pension Reform Act- motivated by rapid societal ageing as shown in demographic scenarios

(passed in 1989, i.e. before German unification)

Major changes:

(a) pensions linked to aver. net earnings rather than gross earnings

(b) aimed at postponing retirement age

- since introduction of ‚flexible retirement age‘ in 1972 many Germans have retired well before reference retirement age of 65 years

(c) new formula for calculation of federal grants to stabilise pension expenditure

- despite heavy reliance on insurance principle some tax money used for re-distribution (covering periods of childcare, education, etc.)

Pension reforms during 1990s (2)Pension reforms during 1990s (2)

Increase of reference retirement age for women and unemployed (1997)

• Reference retirement age for women and older unemployed people was 60 – not 65 years, as for men

reference retirement age for older unemployed stepwise increased to 63 years by 1999

further increase to 65 by 2001, otherwise deductions

reference retirement age for women increased to 65 years by 2004

• Introduction of ‚part-time employment‘ for workers aged 55+ (combination of part-time pension (60) with part-time employment)

Pension reforms during 1990s (3)Pension reforms during 1990s (3)

1999 Pension Reform Act- Main difference to previous Pension Acts was change in public climate (rising awareness of „demographic time bomb“)

- Societal background: Germany moving towards economic recession, numbers in registered unemployment approaching 4.5 million, massive public spending deficit (Maastricht criteria)

- increasing tensions trade unions vs. employers

• Main innovation: Demographic factor in pension formulareduction of standard pension from 70% of average net earnings to 64% in 2030 this is based on assumption of 45 years contribution record – thus only 50% of male and a mere 5% of female OAP qualify

Year Background Main Reform Measure1992

(1989)

Rapid societal ageing shown in demographic scenarios

Pensions now linked to average NET earnings

1997 Massive increase in early retirement

- firms lay off older workers early retirem.

Stepwise raising reference retirement age

(a) Older unemployed

6063 (1999) ; 6365 (2001)

(b) Women 6065 (2004)

1999 Public awareness of “demographic timebomb”

4.5 million unemployed

Introduction of ”demographic factor” to pension calculation formula

pensions level reduced 70%64% (2030)

2001 Crisis of pension funds Introduction of a 4th tier to pension scheme “Riester-Pension”: a tax-free, state subsidised private pension insurance

2003 Economic recession Expert commission recommends to increase reference retirement age to 67

Return of poverty in old age?Return of poverty in old age?

2001 Pension Reform Act

• Introduction of a fourth tier: So-called “Riester-Pension” (named after the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs)

tax-privileged and publicly subsidised private old-age pensions- so far it is voluntarily- contribution rate is fixed, to increase from 1% to 4% of average net earnings

• commitment that contributions to pension insurance must not exceed 22% in 2030

Return of poverty in old age?Return of poverty in old age?

2003: Report by Expert Commission“Rürup-Kommission”

Intention to provide policy makers with recommendations on social security reform (mainly pension, health care, LTC insurances)

• Main recommendation in regard to pensions:

Raise statutory retirement age to 67 years

- seen as in-line with rising life expectency

- critics argue that many (especially poorly qualified) will become unemployed instead

Return of poverty in old age?Return of poverty in old age?

OUTLOOK – What will German Pensions Scheme of the Future look like?

(1) Combination of PAYG, social insurance scheme + private, capitalised pension insurance schemes

(2) SI will move towards “basic pension” at social assistance level – supplemented by occupational + private pension schemes

(3) Raise in reference retirement age will come

(4) Higher flexibility (those who wish to work until 70+ will do so)

(5) We will see higher degree of social cleavages in old age.

4.2 The Case of Japan4.2 The Case of Japan

Social Security Policy Imperatives:

1) Demography

2) Adequacy of the Current Benefit Level

3) Sustainability

Change of Japan’s Ageing and Population Change of Japan’s Ageing and Population

ProjectionsProjections

Considerations over Policy Actions in Considerations over Policy Actions in Social Security and PensionSocial Security and Pension Its coordination, in terms of financial

arrangement, with Social Policy Reforms in Health and Long-Term Care

How equal should it be? Policy making for Inter-generational Solidarity Integration of Ageing Related Policies to

Create a Life-time Saving System

Old-Age Dependency Ratios (U.N. World Population)

Japan’s Potential Support Ratios with 5 Scenarios

Source: U.N. Population Division 2000.

333643363641472025

212728252820272000U.S.U.K.ItalyGermanyFranceCanadaJapan

4.772.192.071.711.712050

4.772.592.352.242.242025

4.774.033.993.993.992000

Constant Ratio 15-64/65 Years or Older

Constant age Group 15-64

Constant total Population

Medium Variant with Zero Migration

Medium Variant

Issues of Social Security Issues of Social Security Reforms in JapanReforms in Japan 1) Broadly, as Public Social Expenditures have

increased, it is necessary to tackle ageing issues through a series of related social policy reforms, i.e. on Pensions, Health Care and Long-Term Care.

2) To be more focused on ageing issue, the discussion is about

(1) how to cope with the rise of social protection expenditure?

(2) to what extent should benefits be cut if this is politically feasible?

3) As a whole, are expenditures cost-effective to meet the most pressing requirements?

Policy Imperatives for Social Security Policy Imperatives for Social Security ReformsReforms in Japan in Japan

Economy and Employment Environment GDP growth – 0.46 % (2000-2001)Unemployment Rate 5.03% (2001)Public Debt 136.70 % of GDP Central and Local Government Finance Borrowings (by Japanese National Bonds)State JPY 414 Trillion (€ 3.23 Trillion)Local JPY 109 Trillion (€ 0.85 Trillion)Rate of Social Protection/General Expenditure 38.4 % Demographic Changes TFR 1.39 (2002) Projected as of 2050

Social Security Social Security ReformsReforms

1) Pensions,1) Pensions,

2) Health Care,2) Health Care,

3) Long-Term 3) Long-Term Care Care

and and

4) Employment4) Employment

PolicyPolicy

Features of Japan’s Social Protection Features of Japan’s Social Protection SystemSystem

Universal Health Care Insurance, Pension and Long-Term Care Insurance

Japan’s Social Protection System is financed by Social Insurance (61%) and Tax (28%).

health care, long-term care, public pension, employment and work-related accidents are partially covered by social insurance.

The ideology concerns: 1) sharing the risk among insured persons,

and 2) Re-distributing income among people

The Advantages of Social Insurance lie in:

1) Compulsory membership 2) Specific contract with two advantages A. protection can be given against risks that the

private market cannot insure. B. the risks can change over time. Thus, in

sharpest contract with actuarial insurance, social insurance can cope with not only with risk but with uncertainty.

3) The Bismarckian tradition same as the Continental Europe?

Japan’s Pension SystemJapan’s Pension System

PAYG system: Three Pillars (Multi-Pillars) Universality of the Basic Pension Mixture of Public and Private Schemes

1st pillar: the Basic Pension

2nd pillar: the Employees' Pension Insurance, National Pension Funds, Mutual Funds

3rd pillar: Individual-based DC pensions (paid by Individuals); Corporation Pensions (DB) plus

Corporation-based DC Pensions (paid by employers)

Japan’s Pension SchemesJapan’s Pension Schemes

Current Issues in Social Security Current Issues in Social Security and Pensionsand Pensions

Financial Problem with Public Pension Non-Compliance and High Drop-out from the

Basic Pension Scheme Financial Pressure on Enterprises Extension of Defined Contribution Pension

Scheme to some other parts? Pension Fund Investment: successful?

Policy Choices for PensionsPolicy Choices for PensionsBenefit Cuts? There have been various questions of how to cut net

pension benefits, including through 1) Reductions in the gross replacement rate (59%

to 50%), 2) Higher taxation of pension incomes, 3) An increase in the retirement age, and 4) A shift to privately financed pension schemes Higher Government Transfers? Maintaining high benefits at lower contribution rates

would require an increase in government transfers via the social security system

Or, To transform from PAYG schemes to a Partially Funded System to accumulate Funds?

Pension ReformsPension Reforms There are three policy options that have already been

implemented, i.e.

Cutting Benefits (1) Cutting Pension Benefits by 0.9% from April 2003

onwardsHigher Government Transfers(1) Raising the Retirement Age to 65(2) Raising Consumption Tax by 3 – 5%System Change (1) Introducing DC pensions (2002)(2) Transforming to a Partially Funded System to achieve Actuarial Fairness

Prospective Pension Policy Changes Prospective Pension Policy Changes

(2004) (2004) Switching to a Notional Defined-Contribution

(NDC) Plan such as in Sweden? Partially Funding Shift to a Consumption-

Based Tax Possibility of Reducing Benefits Shift to Income-Related Contributions for

Non-Employees Extension of the Coverage of Part-Time

Employees

Current Issues in PensionsCurrent Issues in PensionsSustainability of PAYG Public Pension Non-Participation and High Drop-Out

from the Basic Pension Scheme Financial Pressure on Firms? Extension of Defined Contribution (DC)

Pension Scheme to some other parts? Pension guarantee and fund issues in a

global context Who is responsible for your retirement?

The 2004 Pension ReformThe 2004 Pension Reform Choice of Cutting Benefits, Higher

Government Transfers, or System Change Various ideas on Prospective Pension

Reform: (1) The Elder Representative Group: Replacement Rate

59%; Contribution Rate 26% (2) The Japan Federation of Economic Organisations:

Replacement Rate 36%; Contribution Rate 13.58% (3) The Ruling Party (LDP and the Komei Party)

Replacement Rate 50%; Contribution 18.3% (4) The Opposition Party (DPJ) Replacement Rate 50%; Contribution 13.58% +

Consumption Tax Rise 3%

The Overview of the 2004 The Overview of the 2004 ReformReform1. Employees’ Pension Insurance Rise from 13.58% (2004) to 18.3% (2017) 0.354 % rising-up every year 2. Introduction of the New Indexation (till 2023) New Indexation = Consumer Price Index - 0.9% The Content of 0.9 %= 0.3% (the Rate of Increase as

an Extension of Life Expectancy) + 0.6% (the Pace of Decrease as Labour Force Down)

3. Income Replacement Rate 59% (2004) > 50% (2023)

5. Conclusion5. Conclusion

Direction of the Reforms:

Status Quo (Bonoli, 1999)

Pension Capitalism (Clark, 2001)

A Paradigm Shift (Schmähl, 2002)

are not linked to

Inter-generational solidarity

So,Who Will Pay for Our Old Age?

This research has shown that, albeit with much efforts, policy reform and the socio-economic welfare of older people is not always directly linked. Therefore, it should not be over-stated to achieve inter-generational equity and social solidarity. Indeed, we need further our exploration of the availability and applicability as to Who Will Pay for Our Old Age?

Contact details:Contact details: Dr Tetsuo Ogawa

Oxford Institute of Ageing

University of Oxford

3rd Floor Manor Road,

Oxford OX1 3UQ,

U.K.

Email: tetsuo.ogawa@diplomats.com

Tel:+44(0)1865 286 190 Fax:+44(0)1865 286 171 Wed site: www.ageing.ox.ac.uk