Philosophy and Methodology of the Natural and Social SciencesCourse Syllabus

Lecturer: Simon SkemptonClass Teacher: Stefan Firth

Course Description

Philosophy and Methodology of the Natural and Social Sciences is a one semester course for second year ICEF students. The course provides a broad introduction to the main themes and issues in the philosophy of science in general and the philosophy of social science in particular. It is principally concerned with the epistemological, logical, metaphysical and ethical underpinnings of scientific methodology. Fundamental philosophical questions are presented with a view to demonstrating how they are relevant to and how they inform scientific inquiry. The course explores topics such as, among others, the possibility of knowledge, the distinctiveness of science, the logic of scientific method, scientific explanation, whether science describes reality or not, whether social science should be based on the methods of natural science, the nature of practical rationality, the place of ethical values in relation to science, and critiques of scientific rationality. All topics are presented as problems and areas of dispute.

Course Objectives

Aside from providing an introduction to the principal questions explored by the philosophy of science and social science, the course aims to cultivate in students a critical awareness of the assumptions and conditions that lie behind scientific theories and arguments. Upon successful completion of the course, students should be able to analyse and judge the validity of an argument, construct extended coherent arguments that engage critically with the existing philosophical literature, apply and connect philosophical arguments to pertinent issues in the sciences (particularly in those disciplines that they are currently studying) and use the conceptual resource provided by the course to think logically, critically and independently. The particular content of the course is relevant to scientific study in general and the skills that the course develops are transferable and widely applicable in academic and professional life. The educational ethos of the course is to contribute to the development of the students’ faculty of autonomous critical reasoning rather than the robotic repetition of given information.

Methods

The methods and forms of study used on this course include lectures, seminars, teachers’ consultations and students’ own self-study. There is one weekly lecture and one weekly seminar. Each seminar is based on the contents of the preceding lecture. Seminar discussions encourage students to actively engage with the ideas presented in the lectures, a process that should clarify

and deepen their understanding of the issues. Students must do a set preparatory reading before participating in a seminar.

The forms of assessment used on the course include a two thousand-word essay, a five-minute presentation, a mark for seminar participation, and an end-of-course exam (a three-hour written exam in which students are to answer four exam essay questions).

Main Reading

1. Godfrey-Smith, P., Theory and Reality: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

2. Hollis, M., The Philosophy of Social Science: an Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

3. Ladyman, J., Understanding the Philosophy of Science, (London: Routledge, 2002).

4. Turner, S. P. and Roth, P. A. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Social Science, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

Supplementary Reading

i. Losee, J., A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

ii. Machamer, P. and Silberstein, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

iii. Psillos, S., Philosophy of Science A – Z, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

iv. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Philosophy of Science, (London: Routledge, 1998).

Internet Resources

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP): http://plato.stanford.edu/

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP): http://www.iep.utm.edu/

Grade DeterminationThe final grade consists of the following four components:

Exam 50%

Essay 30%

Presentation 10%

Seminar participation 10%

Course Outline

1. Knowledge as suchWhat is knowledge? The challenge of scepticism. Rationalist, empiricist and constructivist

approaches to epistemology. The problem of the criterion and responses to it. The relationship between philosophy and science; Quine’s epistemological naturalism and objections to it.

(1, pp.149-155; 2, pp.23-93; 3, pp.5-14)

2. What is specific about science?The emergence of science. The shift from the Aristotelian teleological worldview to a

mechanical one. Methodological distinctions between science and pre-science.The demarcation question between science and pseudo-science. Science and ideology. Popper

on falsifiability.(1, pp.13-17, 57-74; 3, pp.62-6; i, pp.46-71)

3. The logic of scientific method in general: deduction and inductionDeductive and inductive logical validity. The inductive and the hypothetico-deductive

methods. The use of observations, theories, models and axioms. Attempts to develop a logic of induction. Inductive and abductive inference.

(1, pp.19-46; 3, pp.14-30; i, pp.132-142)

4. The problem of induction and methodological alternativesHume’s inductive scepticism. Paradoxes of confirmation: Hempel’s ‘raven’s paradox’;

Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’. Justifications of induction (meta-inductive, pragmatic).The falsificationist alternative and problems with it. Quine’s confirmation holism.(1, pp.30-34, 46-56, 57-74; 2, pp.71-83; 3, pp.31-91)

5. Bayesian confirmation theoryEvidence and probability. Subjectivist probability. How Bayesianism relates to the problem of

induction. Objections to Bayesian epistemology.(1, pp.202-217; i, pp.220-227; ii, pp.149-172)

6. Scientific explanationTheories of explanation in science: Hempel’s covering law theory (both deductive-

nomological and inductive-statistical versions); Salmon on statistical relevance and causation; Kitcher on unificationism.

(1, pp.190-201; 3, pp.196-228; i, pp.210-21; ii, pp.37-54)

7. Laws of natureThe place of ‘laws of nature’ in science. What is a law? Necessity versus regularity. The

status of statistical laws.(iv, pp.211-215; IEP, SEP)

8. Realism and anti-realismDoes science describe reality? Appearance and reality: the place of unobservables in science.

Arguments in favour of realism. Forms of anti-realism: phenomenalism, instrumentalism, constructivism. The theory-ladenness of observation. The underdetermination of theory (Quine). Kuhn on the incommensurability of paradigms.

(1, pp.173-189; 2, pp.50-59, 77-90; 3, pp.129-194; i, pp.252-263)

9. Scientific change and progressCumulative continuity versus discontinuity in theories of scientific change. Bachelard and

Kuhn on epistemological breaks and paradigm shifts. Kuhn on normal and revolutionary science. Lakatos on research programmes. Laudan on problem-solving.

(1, pp.75-110; 2, pp.84-90; 3, pp.93-123; i, pp.197-209)

10. The specificities of social sciencePositivism, social scientific naturalism and the unity of science. Dilthey and Weber on

meaningfulness and social ‘understanding’. Interpretivism: causes and reasons, explaining and understanding.

(2, pp.142-162, 183-201; 4, pp.311-333)

11. Rational agencySocial action as rational behaviour. What is rationality? Instrumental reason: rational choice

theory; game theory; decision theory.Alternatives to the instrumental conception of rationality, e.g. Habermas’s communicative

reason.(2, pp.115-141; 4, pp.110-165)

12. Methodological individualism versus holismIndividuals versus structures: conflicting social ontologies and their methodological

consequences. Functional explanations and specifically social facts. Self and roles, social and personal identity. Ideological assumptions and implications involved in the methodological debates on the issue.

(2, pp.94-114, pp.163-182; SEP)

13. Science and normativityThe distinction between facts and values (Hume, Moore). The questioning of this (Dewey,

Laudan). The possibility of a value-neutral social science. Weber on value-freedom and value-relevance. Critiques of the supposed value-neutrality of the social and human sciences (the Frankfurt School, Foucault).

The norms of science and the scientific community (Merton).(1, pp.122-125; 2, pp.202-223; IEP)

14. The limits of scientific rationalityHeidegger on scientific objectification and the forgetting of being. Adorno and Horkheimer

on the dialectic of Enlightenment. Derrida on logocentrism. Lyotard on meta-narratives and incommensurable language-games. Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism. Paradoxes and paraconsistent logic.

(1, pp.110-117; iv, pp.172-175; SEP; IEP)

Distribution of hours for topics and types of work

No Topic Total Lectures Classes Self-study1.2.3.

4.

Knowledge as suchWhat is specific about science?The logic of scientific method in general: deduction and inductionThe problem of induction and methodological alternatives

888

16

222

4

222

4

444

8

5. Bayesian confirmation theory 8 2 2 4No Topic Total Lectures Classes Self-study

6.7.8.9.

10.11.12.13.14.

Scientific explanationLaws of natureRealism and anti-realismScientific change and progressThe specificities of social scienceRational agencyMethodological individualism versus holismScience and normativityThe limits of scientific rationality

88888888

16

222222224

222222224

444444448

Total 128 32 32 64