venezuela aff and neg - russia - berkeley 2013

8/13/2019 Venezuela Aff and Neg - Russia - Berkeley 2013

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Venezuela Aff



1ac Russia Adv

Russia is using economic contacts in Latin America to establish geopolitical dominance and

challenge U.S. hegemony

Blank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J.,

“Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-

10.pdf, JMP)

However, none of the expanding economic ties should disguise Moscow’s fundamentally

geostrategic orientation. Medvedev wants the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to bring about

a genuine multipolarity and weaken U.S. hegemony in international financial institutions and

the global economic order .54 He and Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner advocated reforming international financial

institutions, a major thrust of recent Russian foreign policy, and Medvedev urged Argentina to recognize Russia as a market economy.55

Medvedev and subordinate officials have also urged Brazil to coordinate foreign policy with Russia to foster the multipolar world.56 Indeed, in

2006, then-Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov openly admitted that successful business contacts are

crucial to Russia’s geopolitical cooperation with other governments when he said, “I would notset higher targets for geopolitical relations without making a success in the economy first.”57

Similarly, Medvedev conceded that his own trip to Latin America was prompted by serious geopolitical reasons.58

Venezuela and Cuba

The dominance of geopolitics emerges quite strongly in Russian foreign policy towards its main

partners in Latin America, Venezuela and Cuba. Russia’s interests are fundamentally

geostrategic , not economic, and no Latin economy save perhaps Brazil can offer Russia much tangible benefit. Therefore,

geopolitical and strategic aims outweigh economic interaction with these states. For example, the BBC reported that Patrushev told Ecuador’s

government that Russia wanted to collaborate with its intelligence agency, “to expand Moscow’s influence in Latin America.” 59 Moscow also

signed an agreement to sell Ecuador weapons.60 Most probably Russia wants to link Ecuador and Venezuela with Russian weapons and

intelligence support against Colombia. Since they are both antagonistic to Colombia, they can then support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC), threaten a U.S. ally and seek to pin Washington down in another dirty war.61 Chávez’s open support of the FARC with Russian

weapons strongly suggests that Moscow knows all about his efforts and approves of them. The case of Viktor Bout, the notorious arms dealer

who enjoys protection from Russia’s government, reinforces this analysis. In 2008 Bout was arrested in Thailand for offering to deliver weapons

to the FARC as part of a sting organized by the United States. It may not be coincidental that Bout’s offers coincide with Russian support for

Chávez’s latest clash with Colombia.62 Once Bout was arrested and obliged to undergo an extradition hearing, Moscow brought immense

pressure to bear upon Bangkok so that he would not be extradited to the United States and forced to name names, dates, places and people.63

Undoubtedly, Moscow also fully recognizes Chávez’s conversion of Venezuela into a critical

transshipment center for narcotics from both Latin America and West Africa, his support for

insurgencies and terrorists throughout Latin America and his expansionist and revolutionary

dreams about Colombia, and seeks to exploit those factors for its own anti-American

purposes.64 Therefore one must treat reports of actual or forthcoming Russian agreements with Nicaragua and Venezuela on counter-

drug cooperation with great wariness, as they could be smokescreens for Moscow’s conscious support for drug running into Amer ica, Europe

and Latin America.65 Indeed, reports from 2003 point to Russian criminal penetration of Mexico’s narcotics gangs.66 More recently, in early

2009, a Russian and a Cuban citizen were both arrested for drug smuggling in Yucatán.67

Simultaneously, Russia openly wants to increase cooperation among the BRIC members’ intelligence services and Latin America in general.

Clearly Moscow wants to establish permanent roots in Latin America and use those contacts as bases for political influence to support thosestates and potential insurgent movements against the United States.

68 These are only some of the reasons why Moscow’s arms sales to Venezuela, and projected sales to Cuba, are perhaps the only truly

dangerous aspects of its policies in Latin America. These sales aim to give Chávez much of what he needs to foment his Bolivarian Revolution

throughout Latin America, since Chávez is running or selling weapons to insurgents and left-wing regimes all over the region, and second,

because these weapons make no sense unless he is planning an arms race in Latin America.

Chilean, Colombian and especially Brazilian reports all raise the alarm about the $5.4 billion in Russian arms sales to Venezuela. These reports

raise the specter of Venezuela “detonating” a continental arms race, acquiring the largest Latin American fleet due to its purchase of

submarines, the comprehensive arming of Venezuela’s army, fleet and air forces with huge arms purchases, and the acquisition of hundreds of

thousands of Kalashnikovs, and an ammunition factory. These reports also point out that since 2003, if not earlier, these automatic rifles and

https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf







ammunition have migrated from Venezuela to the FARC. This causes great fear that Russian arms will underwrite armed insurgencies and drug

running (submarines being excellently equipped for that purpose, as well as to defend Venezuela’s coastline from nonexistent threats).69

The sheer scale of ongoing Russian arms sales to Venezuela since 2004 justifies these alarms, as

they make no strategic sense given the absence of any U.S. or other military threat. Even Chávez

knows this, for he claims that the air defense missiles he ordered are meant to protect oil derricks!70 Therefore there are purposes beyond the

legitimate defense of Venezuela for these weapons. Moscow has sold Venezuela $5.4 billion in weapons since

2004. Those systems include 24 Su-30 fighters, 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, Ak-103 assault rifles, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.Venezuela also bought 53 Mi-17V-s and Mi-35M helicopters. In addition, Russia has helped develop factories in Venezuela that can make parts

for the rifles, their ammunition and the fighters, with an announced goal of producing 50,000 rifles a year. Venezuela plans to buy 12 Il-76 and

Il-78 tankers and cargo aircraft, or possibly 96-300 military transport planes, Tor-M1 anti-air missiles, a fifth generation anti-air system equally

effective against planes, helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and high precision missiles, and Igla-S portable SAM systems. In September 2009,

Moscow advanced Caracas a $2 billion credit to buy more arms: 92 T-72 main battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500

anti-ballistic missile system.71 Other Russian defense sources said that the tank deal could be expanded to include three diesel-powered

submarines “Kilo” class, combat helicopters Mi-28 and armored infantry vehicles BMP-3.72 Venezuela also seeks Mi-28n Hunter high-attack

helicopters and is discussing the possible purchase of submarines.73 There were also earlier discussions about selling

project 636 submarines (among the quietest subs in the world) to Venezuela during 2011-13, along with

torpedo and missile ordnance for Venzuela’s navy. The $2.2 billion loan in 2009 will go for 92 T-

70 and T-72 tanks, BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Smerch anti-tank missiles, multiple rocket

launchers, S-300, Buk M-2 and Pechora anti-aircraft missiles, all systems usable against

Colombia. In return, Russia got access to join Venezuela’s national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela,

S.A. (PDVSA), in exploring oil fields in the Orinoco River basin.74

The signed agreements make it clear that each of the three Russian companies has staked its own bloc in the Orinoco oil belt. Thus, LUKOIL has

received permission to explore the Junin-3 block. In effect, it has extended its three-year-long contract with PDSVA on the block's evaluation

and certification. The new two-year agreement provides for the bloc's joint exploration and development. Once accomplished, the two

companies plan to establish a joint venture to develop the deposit. This will require billions of dollars in investment. The oil from this project

could then be sent to an oil refinery in Italy. LUKOIL has just bought 49.9% of its shares. TNK-BP and PDSVA signed an agreement on the joint

study of the Ayacucho-2 block in the wake of a framework memo signed last October. As with the LUKOIL agreement, it provides for a second

phase - the sale of the produced oil abroad.75

Venezuela’s arms purchases make no sense unless they are intended for purposes of helping

the FARC and other similar groups, fighting Colombia, projecting power throughout Latin

America, drug running with subs that are protected against air attacks, or providing a

temporary base for Russian naval and air forces where they can be sheltered from attacks but

threaten North or South America.76 Since Putin has said that permanent bases in Cuba and

Venzuela are unnecessary, this leaves the door open to temporary bases, including submarine

bases as needed.77 Recently Bolivia, too, has offered its territory as a base in return for arms sales and economic help on energy and

other projects.78 Much of what Russia sells to Venezuela is compatible with that idea, as is Putin’s call for restoring Russia’s position in Cuba

and ongoing talks between Russian and Cuban military officials (e.g., Sechin’s trips in 2008).79

The following facts are also particularly noteworthy. Chávez is not only arming the FARC; he is also training other Latin American states’ military

forces (e.g., Bolivian forces).

80 Venezuela aided Iranian missile sales to Syria, Chávez told Iranian leaders about his desire to introduce “nuclear elements into Venezuela,”

(i.e., nuclear weapons) and Russia supports the allegedly peaceful Venezuelan development of nuclear energy and explorations for finding

uranium and an alternative nuclear fuel, thorium.81 Iran is now actively helping Venezuela explore for uranium.82 These developments

suggest the possiblity of Venezuela functioning as a kind of swing man or pivot for a Russo-

Venezuelan-Iranian alliance against the U nited S tates. Certainly elements in the Iranian press and

government believe that Tehran should further intensify its already extensive efforts here to

create the possibility of a “second front” in political or even in military terms against the U nited

S tates. Hizbollah already raises money and runs drugs in Latin America and many have noted the

growing network of ties between Iran and Latin American insurgents and terrorists facilitated

by Chávez.83



In particular, Russia uses oil investments to secure military ties to contain the U.S.

Farah, 13 --- veteran newsman and founder of WorldNetDaily.com (3/3/2013, Joseph, “Russia-China standoff in Venezuela; Both eye oil

reserves as they compete for influence,” www.wnd.com/2013/03/russia-china-standoff-in-venezuela/)

WASHINGTON – As Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez remains gravely ill and may die soon, Russia and China are weighing

their future in the country where they have billions of dollars in oil investments, according to report

from Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin.

In an effort to secure a position for the future, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent close former KGB

associate Igor Sechin to Venezuela to discuss with Venezuelan Vice President Nicolas Maduro future

bilateral relations. Sechin has been handling Latin American issues for years. He also happens to be the executive chairman of the

Russian oil conglomerate Rosneft.

Sechin and Maduro finalized a number of agreements that help assure Russia’s future position

in Venezuela and keeps pace with China, which has loaned billions of dollars to the Chavez government to help ensure

security of its own oil investments in the country.

Both countries are in the process of helping develop Venezuela’s oil reserves, said to be the largest in the world at an estimated 296 billion

barrels.

Regional sources say that Sechin negotiated almost $47 billion in investments in the Venezuelan

oil sector, including agreements to set up a joint Russia-Venezuela drilling and manufacturing company and to permit increased Russian

access to offshore oil reserves. However, both countries also have an ulterior strategic reason for maintaining their position in

Venezuela, and that is having a base from which to watch and undertake a containment

approach toward the U nited S tates

Russia is using its investments as a way to obtain more bases for its navy . In 2008, Russia

sent in long-range bombers and a naval squadron to Venezuela . While it hasn’t done a repeat

of these deployments, Russia wants permanent basing rights in Venezuela .

Russia also has expanded its arms sales to Venezuela, including more than 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, Mi-35 helicopters, Su-30 jet fighters, air

defense systems, tanks and armored vehicles.

If Chavez dies, there is a question as to what extent a new leader will be as friendly to both Russia

and China. Any new leadership probably will continue working with them but could be friendlierto the U nited S tates, unlike the Chavez regime, according to informed sources. In turn, this could create a climate for

further American investment which the Russians would then find competitive with their own

interests .

The plan crowds out Russia’s critical energy cooperation with Venezuela which it is using to

undermine U.S. influence

Rinna, 13 (3/9/2013, Anthony, “Russia’s Uncertain Position in post-Chávez Venezuela,”

http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-in-post.html, JMP)

The domestic and regional implications of the death of Hugo Chávez are numerous and wide-ranging, but unique to Venezuela is the

reverberations the death of its leader will have in faraway Russia and Eastern Europe. With the passing of “El Comandante,"

it’s possible that Russia’s geopolitical influence in Latin America may weaken and that it’s arms

exports will decline, directly affecting Russia’s economic growth. Much of this depends on who

succeeds Chávez and what sort of relationship his successor pursues with Russia.

In the 21st century, Russia has had a tendency in its foreign policy to pursue relations with smaller, less powerful, but in many cases very

central, states in regions around the world (i.e. Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, etc.) in an effort to increase its own role in the so-

called “multi-polar” world. While Russia’s major ally in Latin America is actually Brazil, Russia has found Venezuela to be a

http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/russia-china-standoff-in-venezuela/


http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-in-post.html

http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-in-post.html




willing partner in supporting Russia’s own foreign policy, with Venezuela even going so far as to (hypocritically)

recognize South Ossetia’s declaration of independence from Georgia while opposing Kosovo’s independence from Serbia because of the “bad

precedent” it would set. Venezuelan vice president Nicolás Maduro said that "the unipolar world is collapsing and

finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a multipolar

world."

Russia’s ties with Venezuela as its Latin American partner was a perfect match- Chávez was anoutspoken critic of the U nited S tates and his country controlled vast reserves of energy, which

gave Russia an excellent opportunity to exert its influence in the country and counter

American power in the region , namely, by combining mutual feelings on U.S. influence abroad

with the capacity to develop Venezuela’s energy industry.

Venezuela was billed as a regional leader for Latin America. For while Chávez’s leftist administration was one of several that proliferated

throughout the region, his had been by far the most vocal (it is not uncommon, in fact, for Latin American governments to be relatively aligned

on the right-left spectrum, with rightist governments predominating in the 1970’s and 80’s). Chávez carefully developed relations with Evo

Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and the two most recent Argentine administrations, that of the late Nestor Kirchner and his wife

Crisitina Fernández (who succeeded her late husband in 2007). His flamboyant anti-American rhetoric was occasionally balanced out by Brazil’s

center-left president Inácio Lula da Silva and Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff. Nevertheless, Venezuela provided a beacon through which Russia

was able to exert geopolitical influence in a region far beyond its periphery.

One of the biggest areas of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela is the energy sector , a

fact recently underscored by Vladimir Putin’s decision to send Igor Sechin, CEO of Russia’s state owned oil company Rosneft, as a special

presidential envoy to Hugo Chávez’s funeral. Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of crude oil in the world, but the oil is in need of a more

intense refinement process than most other crude supplies around the world. Russia has the technological capabilities Venezuela needs to

refine its heavy crude, and Russian energy companies are active in several aspects of the Venezuelan

energy industry.

Russian companies plan to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela by 2019 and multiply energy output

fourfold in an attempt to expand cooperation to offshore areas and oil services, according to Reuters.

Sechin has said Rosneft will finance production with loans from Russian banks and credit lines from international banks. Because the

Venezuelan economy is currently in shambles, it is highly likely that the Russian-Venezuelan energy cooperation will continue, with the

possibility that if a government friendlier to the U nited S tates should take power, existing contracts with Russian

companies would continue, but that American companies would be invited to participate in new

ventures .

The situation in Venezuela may actually effect Russia’s energy relations with one of its Eastern European neighbors- Belarus. Belarus has had a

rather unique relationship with Russia, and is part of a “union state” with Russia. Yet since 2007, the one thorn in the side of Belarus-Russia

relations has been energy, mainly because of a dispute which emerged when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning Russian gas transported

through Belarus and selling it at world market prices (Belarus had enjoyed Russian gas at a discounted price). When Russia refused to meet

Belarusian quotas for energy imports, Belarus turned to Venezuela for energy imports starting in 2010, with energy shipped via tankers from

Venezuela to the Ukrainian port of Odessa, then up to Belarus through a pipeline.

Belarus has sought 23 million tons of oil from Russia for 2013, but Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has stated that if Russia will only

sell Belarus up to 18 million tons (as it has stated) and it will import energy from Venezuela and Azerbaijan. Yet if Venezuela for any reason

suspends its sales of energy to Belarus, this may give Russia more leverage over Belarus as it (Belarus) will have lost a valuable supplier of

alternative energy. This situation seems unlikely since Venezuela can only benefit from the influx of cash, but is still an example of how far

reaching the implications of the upcoming transfer of power in Venezuela really are.

After energy, Russia’s most valuable export is armaments and military hardware. Chávez constantly feared a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, and

had been engaged in a long-standing dispute with neighboring Colombia over the presence of U.S. troops in Colombia (these U.S. troops

including most notably the U.S.’s élite Special Forces, whose purpose is to assist with counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency). This, inprinciple, was the basis for his decision to enter into contractual agreements with Russia regarding arms sales.

Venezuela is the second-largest customer for Russian military hardware (after India), and as Russia’s economy is famously lacking in diversity of

exports outside of energy, a willing market for arms is greatly welcomed (a situation only enhanced by the instability in another major importer

of Russian arms- Syria). In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a possible arms race between Colombia and Venezuela.

Since 2006, the gross income for Russian military sales abroad has doubled, and Russian arms sales are now almost exclusively handled through

state-owned company Rosoboronexport. Chávez’s death, however, could reduce Russia’s client relationship with Venezuela in the arms

industry, depending on how the succession plays out. It would be easy to assume that Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s vice president, would

succeed the late Chávez, yet Venezuela’s opposition is relatively strong. The Venezuelan economy, despite the strength of the country’s crude

reserves, is not entirely healthy, and if the Venezuelan opposition ends up in power they may decide that it is not economically viable to have

such contracts arms with Russia. Viachelav Nikonov, deputy chair of the Russian Parliament’s committee on foreign affairs, has stated that he



of the Russian Empire in the first decade of the 19th century, and like them was later absorbed into the Soviet Union as a part of the Soviet Republic of Georgia. When the Soviet Union broke up in the early 1990s, the newly

independent nation of Georgia incorporated the two former Soviet autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia lost little time asserting control over the two restive regions, launching a

war in 1991 against Ossetia, which had been in open revolt for two years. Russia entered the war on the side of the Ossetians, and after more than a year of bitter fighting and several thousand deaths, a cease-fire was signed

restoring to Ossetia some measure of the autonomy (but not full independence) that the Georgian parliament had revoked in 1990. Gamsakhurdia, although a genuine Georgian patriot and longtime dissident against the Soviet

government, was, like many of his compatriots, unwilling to give any political recognition to Georgia's minorities. "Georgia for Georgians" was a popular slogan at the time of independence, and self-determination on the part of the

reviled Ossetians was not to be -contemplated. No sooner had the Ossetian conflict cooled in the summer of 1992 than Georgia invaded Abkhazia with several thousand troops, using the kidnapping of a Georgian government

minister as a pretext. The Georgians took the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi with little resistance, but were eventually repulsed and driven from Abkhazia by a large force consisting of Abkhaz militia and sympathetic minorities from all

over the Caucasus — Circassians, Chechens, Cossacks, Ossetians, and others. The Abkhaz proceeded to expel or kill large numbers of Georgians, in a Balkan-style episode of "ethnic cleansing" little remarked in the West but possibly

costing tens of thousands of lives, both Abkhaz and Georgian. Eduard Shevardnadze, former foreign minister of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and sometime president of Georgia, was in Sukhumi at the time and narrowly

escaped death. From the early '90s to the present day, an uneasy status quo has held sway in both breakaway republics, with both Georgia and Russia maneuvering for control of the regions. With the ouster of President

Shevardnadze in 2003 and the rise of Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgian politics have taken a decidedly pro-American tilt. Georgia sent a very large contingent of troops into Iraq — all of whom were speedily evacuated and returned to

Georgia, with American help, following the outbreak of the August war — and, along with newly assertive Ukraine, applied for NATO membership. At the same time, Georgia has become a transit center for oil from the Caspian Sea.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, completed in 2005, crosses the country en route to the Turkish coast, and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, brought online in 1999, ends at the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa. Given the intractable

enmities bound up in the Georgian conflict, it would seem unwise for America to take sides or otherwise inject its influence, but that is precisely what the Bush

government has chosen to do. Vowing to push for Georgian entry into NATO, the Bush administration has leveled a steady barrage of criticism against Moscow for behaving precisely

as the United States — or any great power — is wont to behave in its sphere of influence. "Russia has invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic government elected by

its people," said President Bush. "Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century.... Russia's government must respect Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Given recent U.S.

military interventions in Haiti and Panama (not to mention Iraq), the Bush administration's moral posturing over Russia's Georgia adventure (in which a number of Russian peacekeepers were

killed before Moscow ever launched her counterattack) ring hollow, to say the least. Nor is there any basis for defending Georgia's NATO ambitions, at least from an American point of view.

NATO already commits the United States Armed Forces to defend all sorts of out-of-the-way places of no strategic value to the United States.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, former Soviet republics all, are already members; is America ready to start World War III to defend them? Yet

that is precisely what the NATO alliance will require of us, should Russia ever decide to re-annex them, and it will do the same vis-à-vis Georgia,

should this trouble-prone Caucasus state ever become a member. The Chief Motive As events stand, the Georgia/South Ossetia War, a brief,

inconsequential flare-up in a region where the United States has no business looking for trouble, has already led to near-naval confrontation

between Russia and the United States in the Black Sea. At the time of this writing, Russian bombers are in the Western Hemisphere (in Venezuela) for the first time since the Cold War, and the United States is

threatening further unspecified measures against Russia for her intransigence. For her part, Russia has withdrawn her military forces from most of Georgia proper, but has kept large garrisons in both breakaway regions and

formally recognized the independence of both. In spite of the triviality of the Caucasus flare-up, the powers that be in the West seem bent on antagonizing Russia. Immediately after the Georgian conflict, the Bush administration

announced a deal to station missile interceptors — ostensibly to defend Europe against Iranian warheads — in Poland. Russia responded by sending long-range bombers to Venezuela and threatening to re-militarize Cuba. Defense

of Georgia or even of

her oil pipelines seems inadequate rationale for potential nuclear war, yet the Bush administration seems determine d to turn this regional brush fire into a Cuban Missile Crisis-like international stare -down. The chief motive for

the exaggerated hullabaloo is the expansion of NATO, which continues to absorb more nations and redefine its organizational mission almost two decades after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. What was once touted as a

militaryalliance to defend the West and its interests against the communist menace has been reinvented as an all-purpose global military force. NATO led the Western European and American intervention in the various Balkan wars in the

1990s, and NATO forces are now in command of the war in Afghanistan, a conflict far removed from Cold War animosities. "Presumed dead more often than the hero in a melodrama," U.S. Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns

wrote in 2003, "the new NATO keeps on defying the pundits' predictions by adapting itself to a rapidly changing world." Absorpt ion of Georgia, the Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics has become a prime objective of the

NATO organization, as NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made clear in a recent speech in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. "The process of NATO enlargement will continue, with due caution but also with a clear purpose

— to help create a stable, undivided Europe," Sc heffer said. "No other country will have a veto over that process, no r will we allow our strong ties to Georgia to be broken by outside military inte rvention and pressure." If the

purpose of NATO is now the creation of a "stable, undivided Europe," Americans would do well to wonder why America still belongs to the organization. After all, America's military was created to protect

America and her vital interests, not those of Europe, much less the remote and fractious Caucasus. Yet if the Eurocrats in charge of NATO have

their way, Georgia, along with all her Caucasian broils and her blood feud with Russia, will be drawn into the alliance, an event that will make

war between Washington and Moscow much more likely than it ever was during the Cold War.

US/Russian war causes extinction – most probable

Bostrom ‘2 (Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related

Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, Wake Early Bird File)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a

possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and

terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear

arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an

existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminalrisk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes aremere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html



2ac U.S. Action Crowds Out Russia

Russian oil investment high now but increased U.S. involvement will crowd it out --- peaceful

coexistence is not likely

RT, 13 (3/6/2013, “Chavez’s death opens oil industry questions for Venezuela,” http://rt.com/business/chavez-venezuelan-death-oil-887/, JMP)

Venezuela a 'priority' for Russian oil investment

Similar to the US, Russia has also had a large presence in the Venezuelan energy sector. For almost a

decade, Russia’s largest privately owned oil company Lukoil has been developing the

Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt with the country’s state-oil firm Petroleum of Venezuela, the world’s

third largest.

Another Russian energy major, Gazprom has been developing gas deposits in the Gulf of

Venezuela since 2008.

Last month Russia's leader in petroleum industry, Rosneft announced Venezuela will be a ‘priority’

for the company in foreign energy projects. The oil giant agreed to develop several fields in the

crude-rich southeast region, and has committed $40 billion in investment. However, Petroleum ofVenezuela will control the majority of the project’s stake, at 60%.

Russia hopes all the agreements reached with Venezuela under the Hugo Chavez presidency will

remain in place and the two countries will retain the same level of cooperation, Russian Deputy Prime

Minister Arkady Dvorkovich said on Wednesday.

“We hope that all the agreements that were reached will be implemented. We also intend to fulfill our commitments and hope that the policy

of Venezuela will stay the same,” Mr Dvorkovich said.

Oil games

If the opposition comes to power in Venezuela, the rules of the oil game can change and not necessarily to the benefit of Russian companies,

Konstantin Simonov, head of the National Energy Security Fund told RT Business.

“The opposition in Venezuela is quite strong. We remember elections in 2012 when the gap between Chavez and his closest rival was just a

small percent. It means Mr Maduro can lose the election and this scenario will be extremely dangerous for the Russian companies. I’m pretty

sure in that case we will see American companies returning to Venezuela,” Mr Simonov said.

Russian companies will be forced out of major projects they managed to nail, once American

players enter the game, as they will try to eliminate unwanted rivals and become sole

shareholders of the projects. Peaceful co-existence is unlikely to happen there , says Konstatin

Simonov, as the costly production of the cites will leave not enough profit to be shared among all

sides engaged. A new leader can also take advantage of the competition among the companies for the rights to get their hands on Venezuela’s oil reserves, Mr

Simonov goes on, and simply sell the projects Russia has only agreed to develop but has yet to finialize.

“If we are speaking about the Junin-6 project, Rosneft and its Russian partners paid Chavez an “entrance ticket” of $1 billion. It wasn’t an

investment, just a payment. So instead of asking for $1 bln, how about half a billion, to take these assets from Russian companies and sell them

to Americans. This is very simple logic with such political regimes – if we see a new leader come to power, they'll try to abolish all the old

contracts and sell the same assets to the new parties because you can sell the same assets twice. This tactic clearly makes for very good

business.”

But experts say that it is likely that the country’s policies will not change much, as Nicholas Maduro,

endorsed by Chavez, is favored by political pundits to take over as president. The election will be held in 30 days.“My expectation is that we will see the status quo, with a transition to a similar style of government from Chavez’s successor,” said Katherine

Spector, head of commodity strategy at CIBC World Markets in New York.

http://rt.com/business/chavez-venezuelan-death-oil-887/





2ac Latin America Key

Latin America is key


“Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Russia’s Policies and Objectives in Latin America

For these reasons, we cannot ignore Russia’s activities in Latin America. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Latin

America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin America’s economic growth but because of the

congruence between Latin governments’ foreign policies and Russia’s attempt to bring them

into its concept of a multipolar world.

15 Similarly Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has also said that “ Latin America is becoming a noticeable

link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming — we will pay more and more

attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.”16 So while neither Russia nor

Venezuela will challenge the U.S. militarily, (e.g., by Russian bases in Cuba), their individual and

collective goals entail the deliberate and substantial worsening of East-West relations and of

Latin America’s pre-existing acute problems.17








Russia Increasing Latin American Ties

Russia trying to continue ties with Venezuela now—a lot depends on domestic developments

in Venezuela

Christou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations. (April 21, 2013, “Russia and

Venezuela after Chavez” http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/)

<So following Chavez’s death what is the potential of the relationship to continue? Obviously, much depends on domestic developments in

Venezuela. So far continuity has prevailed, with Chavez’s appointed successor Nicolas Maduro agreeing to visit Russia in June, while in the

immediate aftermath of Chavez’s death both sides pledged to continue co-operation. Maduro stressed the economic and strategic importance

of the relationship while in his aforementioned telegram, Putin expressed his hope for the continuation of “political, economic and

humanitarian relations”. Russia was also very fast to capitalise on Venezuelan oil, with Rosneft (Russia’s state oil firm) and Petróleos de

Venezuela S.A. (the Venezuelan equivalent) forming a partnership to exploit a Venezuelan oil field within two weeks of Chavez’s death.>

Russia is boosting ties with Latin America now

Blank 11 – Professor of Strategic Studies at United States Army War College (August 18, 2011, “Russia’s Second Wind in Latin America”

https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)

<In 2008 Russia generated many headlines by overtly angling for a big role in Latin America’s international politics. Although Russian interest inLatin America seemingly waned after that, recent signs suggest Russia is gaining a second wind in Latin America. This new upsurge begins from

that 2008 baseline. Although it utilizes the same instruments of arms sales and energy exploration, Moscow appears to have refocused its

priorities without sacrificing its friends in Caracas and Havana. Thus, this new campaign validates President Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 remarks

that Russia was only beginning to upgrade its ties with Latin America, which he and other officials recognize as a growing presence in world

affairs.2 He further emphasized that Russia would undertake comprehensive and multidimensional relations with Latin America. So we should

not expect a full Russian retreat from Latin America, even if its foreign policy retrenches. Instead, further advances and, to be frank, anti-

American probes, should be expected.>

Russia is boosting its influence in Latin America

Blank 10 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S Army War College (April 13, 2010, “Russia and

Latin America: Motives and Consequences” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf)

<Russia’s recent quest for influence throughout Latin America began in 1997. The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated a collapse in the

Russian Federation’s influence in South America, as the successor to the Soviet Union. This led Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov to begin to

revive Russia’s standing in Latin America as a global great power in 1997. Since then Russia’s goals have remained remarkably consistent, as

have the instruments of its policy: trade, arms sales and political support for governments seeking to escape U.S. influence. What has changed

is Moscow’s capability to implement its policies and its steadily growing anti-Americanism. But because the economic crisis has reduced

Russia’s and Latin American states’ capabilities for joint action, most notably in Venezuela’s case, the vigor of Russia’s thrust into Latin America

will probably diminish commensurately for a time. Russia’s ability to obtain meaningful influence and a truly strategic position in Latin America

stems from, and varies with, its capacity for large-scale foreign policy initiatives. Therefore we can anticipate a limited retrenchment in 2009-10

from 2008’s more grandiose perspectives. But clearly those perspectives remain in place and will return if Russian capacities for action recover.

>

http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/


http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/russia-to-get-venezuelan-oil-for-a-few-cents-a-barrel/

https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf





http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/russia-to-get-venezuelan-oil-for-a-few-cents-a-barrel/




Russia Competes With U.S. for Influence

Russia competes with the US for influence in Latin America



<While China’s huge entry into Latin America deservedly receives more attention, clearly Russia intends to compete with the

United States throughout Latin America. Moreover, one consequence of Russia’s deals may be to corrupt Latin American officials and

governments while buying influence. Even if Russia’s influence here is arguably minimal, some analysts argue that Washington should engage in

dialogue with Moscow about its activities in the region to make clear the importance of issues such as Hugo Chávez’s subversive activities, and

to gain a platform from which to counter Moscow in a dialogue about the former Soviet space.27 Be that as it may, both Moscow and Beijing

are seriously challenging our policies in Latin America. While we should not panic about Russia’s presence in the region, it is necessary that we

maintain a vigorous U.S.security policy towards Latin America.>





Russia Influence => Multipolar World

Latin America provides a critical role in Russia’s quest for a multipolar world



<Similarly Putin also stated that “Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming – we will pay

more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.”9As before, energy and arms sales are the main instruments of this

foreign policy. The biggest recent deal concerns Brazil, not surprisingly, in view of the aforementioned “strategic partnership.” In July, the

Russian oil company TNK-BP bought 45% of the Petra Energia project in the Amazonian micro-region of Alto-Solimões for about $1 billion. This

project comprises 21 exploration blocks over an area of about 48,000 square kilometers in the Solimões river basin in the upper reaches of the

Amazon, 11 of which are already being exploited.10 Paraguay, the least-explored Latin American country for hydrocarbons, just sent a

delegation to the Russian company Gazprom 3which is interested in forming a joint venture with the Paraguayan state-run company Petropar,

should it find reserves. Money is allegedly no object and Gazprom is ready to conduct all phases of the operation: exploration, exploitation,

transport and commercialization. Gazprom has already established joint ventures (JVs) with Bolivia and Venezuela, and its Bolivian deal could

possibly give it entrée into Brazil’s electricity market.11 Beyond existing deals, Gazprom is also eyeing a 20% stake in Bolivia’s ACERO project

and mulling “joint energy projects” with Peru.12 More broadly in the Russia’s relation plans with Latin America economic sphere, Russia is one

of the states with which Ecuador is currently negotiating for loans.>





AT: Russia CP --- ** Don’t Read with Russia Adv **

Doesn’t solve the case --- Russia will not be able to successfully expand energy coop with

Venezuela



<Still, while Russia will continue expanding its ties to Latin America, Russia’s capacities for deep

involvement are less than it wants, as is Latin American states’ ability to support Russian goals.

This is especially true for countries like Venezuela that depend on energy or commodities revenues, as their capabilities

have also declined due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will only partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even

in stricken economies like Cuba. Likewise, Russian companies charged with developing relations with Latin

America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion will occur anytime soon. For

example, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously agreed to create oil and gas

companies, Russian companies have few liquid assets for investing in Latin America . Indeed, Russia

habitually makes grandiose claims and then fails to implement them, as we can see in

Moscow’s energy programs in Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, even

Venezuela displays skepticism about Russia’s ability to transform its ties to Venezuela, which

are mainly in arms sales, into a relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic

coordination.>

Latin America prefers cooperation with the US instead of Russia



<While these points accord with Russian rhetoric, Latin American elites overwhelmingly prefer cooperation with the

United States based on its acceptance and appreciation of their needs interests and views. They refuse to be pawns once again in a

new version of the Cold War. Indeed, Brazilian President Inacio “Lula” da Silva openly expressed his hope that President Obama implements a

‘preferential’ relationship with Latin America. Unfortunately, Russian and Venezuelan foreign policies, albeit for different reasons, aim to

embroil the continent in a contest with the United States. Russia still covets a global, or even superpower, status equal to that of the United

States and therefore wants to join every international club that exists, whether or not it has any real interests in the area.23 Thus Russia

expressed to Argentina its interest in becoming an observer at the South American Defense Council that is part of the Union of South American

Nations (UNASUR). Russia also wants to participate as an observer in the Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations

(Alcopaz).This craving for status lies at the heart of Russian foreign policy. Consequently Russian policy in Latin America is ultimately an

American policy. It aims to instrumentalize Latin America as a series of countries or even a weak, but still discernible,political bloc to support

Russian positions against U.S. policy and dominance in world affairs. Therefore Russia argues that Latin American states that wish to challenge

America need to rely on Moscow. Thus President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua pledged to Russia Nicaragua’s opposition to a “unipolar” world

and welcomed Russian presence in Latin America as a sign of opposition to that unipolarity by saying “extreme conditions are being created in

Latin America and all the governments are welcoming Russia’s presence.” Chávez’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had similar

objectives in mind.>









AT: Russian Influence / SOI DA

Venezuela Relations with Russia are gone with Chavez

Tarasenko and Safronov 13 (March 11, 2013, “Will Russia’s Cozy Relationship with Venezuela Die with Chavez”

http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-

military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/)

<Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple

of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky

voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.

Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and

Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.

Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition

candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.

“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative

of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition

wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”

The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is

convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and

that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views andambitions.”

Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be

revisited.”

<Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of

this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries,

there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”

According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national

companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”

“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were

interested, anyway,” Semago explained.

There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately

connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military contracts, for over $550 million

worth of military equipment. “The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both

sides,” said a source familiar with the negotiations. “And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role.”

In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though

extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,”

explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but

Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.” >

http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosneft

http://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/meet-the-former-bus-driver-who-could-take-over-for-cancer-stricken-hugo-chavez/maduro-ch-vez-cancer-cabello-psuv-candidate/c1s10367/

http://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/top-kremlin-foe-dies-of-aids-after-prison-ordeal-raising-human-rights-questions/c1s3877/

http://worldcrunch.com/tech-science/estonia-how-a-former-soviet-state-became-the-next-silicon-valley/tallinn-skype-developers-internet-high-tech/c4s10988/


http://worldcrunch.com/culture-society/in-putin-039-s-russia-a-modern-return-of-the-ultra-patriotic-cossacks/russia-cossack-military-unit-ussr/c3s10879/











Iran Influence Adv

Venezuela allying up with Iran will cause relations to fall with US

Suchlicki 12 – Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami (August 5, 2012, “Venezuela- Iran-

Iran’s influence in Venezuela: Washington should worry” http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/05/2930050/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington.html)

<The most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the Chávez regime has been allying Venezuela with Iran. Chávez has allowed

the Iranians to use Venezuelan territory to penetrate the Western Hemisphere and to mine for uranium in Venezuela. Chávez policy is aiding

Iran in developing nuclear technology and in evading U.N. sanctions and U.S. vigilance of the Iranian drug trade and other illicit activities.

The Chávez regime is also providing Venezuelan passports to Iranian operatives. Venezuela’s Mining and Basic Industries Minister Rodolfo Sanz,

acknowledged that Iran is “helping Venezuela to explore for uranium.”

What would stop the Iranians, once they develop their own weapons, from providing some to their close ally in Caracas? Or worse, will the

Iranians use Venezuela as a transshipment point to provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups? Or with the help of Venezuelans, would the

Iranians smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S.?

Given Chávez’s erratic and irresponsible behavior, these possibilities should not be dismissed lightly. Fidel Castro helped the Soviet Union

surreptitiously introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba aimed at the United States. The October 1962 missile crisis is a grim reminder that poor

U.S. vigilance, a daring leader in the Caribbean and a reckless dictator in Russia almost brought the world to a nuclear holocaust.

Iran is also providing Venezuela with technical assistance in the areas of defense, intelligence, energy and security. Iranians, as well as Cuban

personnel, are advising and protecting Chávez and training his security apparatus. This triple alliance represents a clear threat to thehemisphere.>



Venezuela Neg



AT: Russia Adv

Russian-Venezuelan cooperation will be limited --- won’t create more international influence

Christou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations. (April 21, 2013, “Russia andVenezuela after Chavez” http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/)

<So the future of Russo-Venezuelan relationship depends on two things. One is how Nicolas Maduro chooses to pursue his foreign policy should

he win the upcoming election, which looks ever more likely. The other, and more important factor, is the international events which occur in

the near and further future. The unfolding North Korean crisis suggests that Russia may co-operate with

the US to achieve de-escalation, continuing its quest for greater involvement in the Korean Peninsula which will also allow it to

influence events and be seen as a mediator. Obviously Venezuela holds less clout internationally, but in the case of a Maduro victory it seems

likely that anti-US rhetoric will continue. As such, all indications point to continued Russo-Venezuelan co-

operation, in the spheres of trade and energy, however that the relationship will evolve to one

with greater international influence seems unlikely. Instead, it suits both parties to focus on

their co-operation at the micro-level . This allows Russia influence in South America, a trade market and access to

Venezuela’s highly sought after energy supplies. For Venezuela it means the access to arms, but more importantly the claim to a major

international ally. In all it is a relationship of convenience for both and one which looks set to continue.>

Venezuela Relations with Russia are gone with Chavez

Tarasenko and Safronov 13 (March 11, 2013, “Will Russia’s Cozy Relationship with Venezuela Die with Chavez”

http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-

military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/)

<Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple

of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky

voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.

Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and

Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition

candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.

“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative

of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition

wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”

The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is

convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and

that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and

ambitions.”

Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be

revisited.”

<Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of

this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries,

there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”

According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national

companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”

“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were

interested, anyway,” Semago explained.

There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately

connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military contracts, for over $550 million



http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/04/03/296264/us-calls-on-china-to-restrain-n-korea/














http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/04/03/296264/us-calls-on-china-to-restrain-n-korea/




worth of military equipment. “The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both

sides,” said a source familiar with the negotiations. “And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role.”

In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though

extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,”

explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but

Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.” >

Russia’s involvement superficial



10.pdf, JMP)

Still, while Russia will continue expanding its ties to Latin America, Russia’s capacities for deep

involvement are less than it wants, as is Latin American states’ ability to support Russian goals.

This is especially true for countries like Venezuela that depend on energy or commodities

revenues, as their capabilities have also declined due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will

only partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken economies like Cuba.5 Likewise, Russian companies

charged with developing relations with Latin America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion will occur anytime soon. Forexample, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously agreed to create oil and gas

companies, Russian companies have few liquid assets for investing in Latin America .6 Indeed,

Russia habitually makes grandiose claims and then fails to implement them, as we can see in Moscow’s

energy programs in Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia.7 Not surprisingly, even Venezuela displays skepticism about

Russia’s ability to transform its ties to Venezuela, which are mainly in arms sales, into a

relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic coordination.8

Plan doesn’t solve --- Russia is trying to secure deals with lots of Latin American countries



10.pdf, JMP)

To support this economic and strategic agenda, Moscow has made extensive economic

overtures to Latin American governments from Mexico to Argentina and Chile. Russia has

offered them all deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium, electricity, weapons

sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and space launches. Indeed, Medvedev’s trip and talks with

local leaders appear to have focused principally on economic issues. 47 Nonetheless, certain patterns are clear. For example, Russia fully

understands Brazil’s importance as South America’s largest economy and power and seeks

much closer economic ties with it. Since at least 2006, Moscow has been pursuing what it calls a “technological alliance” with

Brazil, allegedly because together they can initiate world-class technological projects.48 Russia also wants to take part in a

projected gas pipeline from Argentina to Bolivia, as well as other key energy projects with

Venezuela and other states.49 One important reason why Moscow included countries like Braziland Peru is to expand its “commercial beachhead” in South America beyond traditionally anti-

American governments and compete more vigorously with the United States, both

commercially and politically.50
















Can’t solve --- Russian military coop with Cuba



10.pdf, JMP)

Furthermore, Chávez has sought to engage Moscow not just in a formal alliance, which it has so far resisted, but also in participation in the

Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribean (ALBA). Medvedev has indicated Russia’s willingness to discuss participation in this

organization, since it accords with Russia’s ideas about a multipolar world and international division of labor. 84 Neither has Moscow

forgotten about its military partnership with Cuba. Russia has pledged to continue military-

technological cooperation (arms sales) with Cuba.85 Russian officials continue to say Cuba holds

a key role in Russian foreign policy and that Russia considers it a permanent partner in Latin

America.86

Unlike Venezuela, Russian foreign policy interests largely intersect with those of the U.S.

Christou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations. (April 21, 2013, “Russia and

Venezuela after Chavez” http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/)

<But despite this continuation in rhetoric and action, the international context may or may notaffect how the relationship continues. Some claim, Maduro is even more anti-American than his

predecessor and arguably Russia and Putin have hardened their stance towards the United

States in recent years as the “reset’ in their relationship failed to take off. However, a notable

difference arises when one considers the actions of both states towards the US. Russia, despite

its quest for great power status has in many cases fallen in line with American foreign policy

goals. North Korea is a good example. While Russia has never issued rhetoric as strong as that of the United States, Russian politicians have

always stressed Russian desire to mediate in the ongoing disputes arising from North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capability. In fact, in

the current impasse which is arising following continued North Korean provocations Russia’s Foreign Ministry essentially fell in line with the US

view: “For Russia – which is a member of United Nation’s Security Council – this is completely unacceptable”. Another example where Russia

has essentially fallen in line was 9/11, when Vladimir Putin pledged co-operation with the US to defeat terrorism – the link here was obviously

Russian desire to justify its own actions against what is saw as domestic terrorism in Chechnya. Obviously, disagreements still exists, and serious

ones at that. Syria is a major case in point, with Russia having blocked three Security Council resolutions to date. None-the-less the Russian sidehas called for alleviation of the crisis, and in broader terms that even the Americans would be reluctant to intervene in the conflict. But the

point is that Russian foreign policy can in many cases correspond with that of the US. Russia won’t

always agree with the US but its actions in the foreign policy arena suggest a mindset where

domestic considerations will prevail, and even if these don’t correspond with American desires

rhetoric will be strong but overly scornful.>






http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/06/venezuelan_president_hugo_chavez_dies_at_58_22693.html

http://rt.com/politics/korea-nuclear-moscow-talks-330/

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBRE9100KS20130202

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBRE9100KS20130202

http://rt.com/politics/korea-nuclear-moscow-talks-330/

http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/06/venezuelan_president_hugo_chavez_dies_at_58_22693.html






--- XT: Russia Not Making Inroads in Latin America

Russia is not making real inroads into Latin America


“Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Despite’s Russia’s efforts to make economic inroads in South America, and especially

Venezuela, in fact its actual achievements are modest , especially in view of the current global

economic crisis whose repercussions are felt everywhere. Cuba may want restoration of former economic

cooperation with Russia, but Russia cannot afford such cooperation beyond a few economic sectors like energy or arms sales. The Russo-Cuban

relationship’s economic dimension is quite limited compared to what it was a generation ago.88 Neither is truly large-scale

Russian investment in Venezuela possible. Accordingly, projects like the plan to carry gas from Venezuela to Argentina

across the Amazon basin, which was under-financed to begin with and economically senseless as well, will probably not go anywhere.89

Moreover, in fact few projects have actually been signed or carried out, or will be. Additionally, there are

serious problems (as is frequently the case) with the quality of Russian weapons and

Venezuelan maintenance of them.90 Medvedev sidestepped Chávez’s call for a real alliance and

no major agrements were signed during his trip.91

Indeed, Cuba may be turning back to Moscow because it cannot depend any longer on

Venezuela’s energy supplies, due to the crisis.92 Similarly, although Nicaragua seeks larger trade links with Russia, China

and Latin American members of ALBA, the difficulties are immense. While Ortega acknowledges the presence of a crisis, it is unlikely that

Moscow and Beijing will create an ALBA monetary zone based on a regional currency, as he wishes to do.93 For the same reason, the

agreement between Moscow and Caracas to trade in their national currencies may not go far.94








Arms Race DA / Turn

Venezuela uses its oil revenues to purchase Russian arms

Suchlicki 12 – Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami (August 5, 2012, “Venezuela- Iran-

Iran’s influence in Venezuela: Washington should worry” http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/05/2930050/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington.html)

<Chávez is also using Venezuela’s oil wealth for other purposes. Chávez’ support for Cuba exceeds $7 billion per year in subsidized petroleum

shipments and investments in Cuba’s oil infrastructure. The Venezuelan regime supports a variety of leftist, anti-American regimes in Latin

America including Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador. And Chávez has spent more than $6 billion in purchasing Russian weapons, creating a long

term Venezuelan dependency on the Russian military. Venezuela remains an open back door for Cuba’s acquisition of sophisticated Russian

weapons.

Emboldened by Venezuela’s vast oil resources and his close relationship with Iran and Russia, Chávez has laid claim to the leadership of the

anti-American movement in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro’s illness and Cuba’s weak economy thrusted the

leadership of Latin America’s left onto Chávez. If Fidel was the godfather of revolutionary/terrorist/anti-American groups, Chávez is the trusted

“capo.”

The Venezuelan leader has manipulated past elections, and will manipulate future ones. He is increasingly deepening his Bolivarian revolution

by weakening and subverting Venezuela’s democratic institutions. At best, Venezuela’s weapons purchases from Russia are leading to a major

arms race in the region, with Colombia acquiring U.S. weapons and Brazil turning to France. Other countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, are also

spending their much-needed resources in the acquisition of weapons. A coalition of Venezuela and its allies, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia andNicaragua, may develop into a club of well-armed, anti-American regimes exercising influence in the region by intimidating its neighbors.>



Russia Defense

Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider war

Cartwright et al 12[Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief

negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme AlliedCommander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON

REPORT, http://orepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cartwright-report.pdf]

These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of

nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of

mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the

U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral.

Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the

Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in

the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side.

Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed

to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale

in comparison quantitatively.

Russia has abandoned aggression in favor of cooperation

Sawczak 11*Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed

paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011,

http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf]

As a measure of their optimism, US officials like to point – cautiously – to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy

towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach . Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for

this, the United States has at least shown Russia the dividends which could flow from enhanced cooperation. This is most palpably

reflected in the Russian foreign policy paper leaked in May 2010, which identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual

interdependence with the leading world powers, such as the European Union and the US,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s

modernisation agenda. The fact that Russia has sought, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at

Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway , in addition to partnering

with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests to US policy-makers that a rethink, however tenuous, isunderway. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant

leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to

home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war .

Russia is losing influence and won’t intervene even though it has interests

Klotz 4-15-2013(Frank G. Klotz, Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies and Arms Control, “How does Russia challenge U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Middle East?”

http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/does-russia-challenge-us-diplomatic-efforts-middle-east/p30446?cid=rss-fullfeed-

how_does_russia_challenge_u.s.-041513&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr_main+%28CFR.org+-

+Main+Site+Feed%29&utm_content=Google+Reader)

The Russian government generally rejects outside intervention in any nation's internal affairs,

including the Syrian civil war. Russia urges instead a negotiated solution between the Syrian government

and the opposition.

Russia is deeply concerned about a post-Assad Syria, and the potential loss of Russian influence in the

region. Syria represents Russia's last real foothold in the Middle East. Russia also fears that instability in the Middle East, whether in Syria or

elsewhere, could spill over into areas closer to home, possibly stoking unrest in Russia's own restive regions and among its own sizable Muslim

population.

http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf

http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/does-russia-challenge-us-diplomatic-efforts-middle-east/p30446?cid=rss-fullfeed-how_does_russia_challenge_u.s.-041513&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29&utm_content=Google+Reader






http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf



Russia today may have less influence in the Middle East than previously, but it continues to

have a stake in the region's stability and sees it as an area in which it has important national interests, often at variance with

U.S. goals and objectives.

No expansionism

Armstrong 4/18*Patrick, Analysis, Ottawa, Canada “Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security concerns: it is not threatening nuclearwar today – expert” http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Russia-is-not-very-pertinent-to-Washington-s-strategic-and-security-concerns-it-is-not-

threatening-nuclear-war-today-expert/2013]

Countries enjoy claiming highfalutin values and principles as justification for their often sordid actions. But these principles are usually pretty

malleable.Washington, for example, was firm on the principle of inviolability of borders in the Georgian

case in 2008 but less so in Yugoslavia in 1999; Moscow firmly held the opposite position each

time. Moscow was supportive of the human rights of Ossetians but not so much about those of Kosovars; Washington, again, the opposite.

Each was adept at manufacturing reasons why the inviolable principles of one case did not

apply in the other.This article of part of the Voice of Russia Weekly Experts’ Panel Discussion

But it is pleasing to one’s to self esteem to claim high motives. For years Washington has claimed the

moral high ground of “democracy” and now we see Moscow claiming to be the home of stability.

These noble self-portraits look most convincing at some distance. For Moscow to claim to be the thumb that keeps the scales of world powerbalanced is to slip over its partial responsibility for the transformation of another Balkan squabble into a world war in 1914 and ignore most of

the years between 1917 and 1990. Washington focuses its moral-quizzing glass on Russia rather than say, Saudi Arabia: an “Arab Spring” for

Libya but not for Bahrain.

But above this normal level of sanctimony-cloaked interest, the US goes further with its bizarre obsession about

Russia. It is bizarre because Russia is not very pertinent to Washington’s strategic and security

concerns: it is not threatening nuclear war today; nor is Obama considering using force against

it; nor does he see it as the greatest threat. Russia has surely seldom appeared in White House threat briefings for a

decade and a half. If not a real opponent, then, Russia must fill some other need: a cost-free shadow opponent; a contrast that can be painted

as dark as you like; an object of feel-good moral righteousness; a sullen teenager who must be brought to obedience.

Americans seem to need a rival, an opponent, a type of geopolitical chiaroscuro: the light can shine only against the darkness.

Russia is large and significant and provides a contrast more substantial than, say, Venezuela.

Because US-Russia trade is pretty inconsequential, Russia is a low-cost object of periodic Americanfits of moral censure. An issue as trivial as Pussy Riot can be played up as a momentous violation whereas any sustained

condemnation of the treatment of Shiites or Pakistani and Filipino servants in Saudi Arabia would come at a cost. Outrage against

Russian “occupation” of parts of Georgia is cheap; outrage about Chinese occupation of Tibet is not. Russia’s sins

are a perfect fit: giving a pleasing moral superiority without expensive consequences.Or is Russia an ungrateful child? In the 1990s there was much talk about US aid and advice reforming Russia and some saw it as on the verge of

becoming “just like us”. But it didn’t and such back-sliding cannot be forgiven.

And, of course, when you are looking down from a moral prominence, disagreement is sin. Moscow cannot just be

disagreeing about the Syrian nightmare; it must be blocking “the legitimate aspirations of the

Syrian people.”

So, the differences do seem incompatible so long as the curious American obsession endures.

As for global realities, how are the last two “humanitarian interventions” working out? The Guardian quotes reports identifying Hashim Thaçi,put into power by NATO, “as one of the ‘biggest fish’ in organised crime” in Kosovo and the less said about the “success” in Libya, the better. In

these two cases, therefore, it doesn’t seem to be Moscow that is out of touch with global realities.

http://english.ruvr.ru/by_author/94378709/

http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Russia-is-not-very-pertinent-to-Washington-s-strategic-and-security-concerns-it-is-not-threatening-nuclear-war-today-expert/



http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_18/Are-the-international-stances-of-Russia-and-the-US-inherently-incompatible/



http://www.google.ca/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&oq=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&gs_l=hp.3..0l4.1554.7403.0.7721.29.11.0.18.18.0.102.924.10j1.11.0...0.0...1c.1.9.psy-ab.V8JZOu86HKg&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/04/biden-aipac-speech-iran-threat


http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/294054/terror-or-iran-romney-obama-clash-over-greatest-threat

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57467452/clinton-friends-of-syria-must-unite-to-stop-russia-china-blockading-progress/



http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/24/hashim-thaci-kosovo-organised-crime







http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/294054/terror-or-iran-romney-obama-clash-over-greatest-threat



http://www.google.ca/#hl=en&sclient=psy-ab&q=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&oq=north+korea+threatens+nuclear&gs_l=hp.3..0l4.1554.7403.0.7721.29.11.0.18.18.0.102.924.10j1.11.0...0.0...1c.1.9.psy-ab.V8JZOu86HKg&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.




http://english.ruvr.ru/by_author/94378709/

venezuela aff and neg - russia - berkeley 2013

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