Extend one – kick two

Backstory

Directions

You are neg and giving a 5 min Neg Block speech.

The Aff was the BIT 1AC – with plan text #2 (the one Jack hates).

The advantages were relations (warming, Taiwan, and SCS)…. And the Protectionism adv (Protectionism impact + Econ impact).

In your 1NC, you read the following offcase.

The 2AC answers are included.

IN your 5 minute speech, extend one of the offcase and kick the other two.

You will be speaking in front of one of me or Camila.

When not prepping your speech, you should be working in your research groups.

1NC

1NC – cplan and internal net benefit

Text:

The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China in exchange for China’s willingness to agree to a high-quality Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States. The term “high-quality” would require China to agree to reduce protections for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and to further narrow its “negative list” of sectors exempt from a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.

QPQ approach solves – China will “swap” a shorter negative list if they get a transparent CFIUS process from the US.Chen ‘15

Chen Jie is a journalist and editor with The Xinhua News Agency. This evidence internally cites Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy and Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE. The PIIE is The Peterson Institute for International Economics, and is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - “China, U.S. pin high hopes on Xi's visit for breakthrough in BIT talks” - Source: Xinhua- Sept 20th - http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2015-09/20/content_6689649.htm

The two countries confirmed the BIT negotiations as "a top priority" in their economic relationship, hoping to further boost

economic cooperation and achieve a win-win result through investment liberalization. Officials and experts from both sides believe that a high-standard BIT will not only benefit the top two economies in terms of boosting mutual investment and job opportunities, but

also conduce to the global economy. Nathan Sheets, undersecretary for international affairs at the U.S. Treasury, stressed the benefits that U.S. investors will harvest. "Such an agreement could be a game changer in terms of unlocking new opportunities and leveling the playing field for U.S. firms and investors," he said in

April. " A high-standard BIT, with strong provisions for market openings and equal treatment, would greatly benefit the commercial relationship," U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie said two months later. Geoffrey Sant, special counsel of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, spoke out his similar opinion in a recent interview with Xinhua. "A BIT would be extremely beneficial to both nations by more closely intertwining the two nations' economies," he said. "Chinese investors in the United States will benefit from U.S. growth, and U.S. investors in China will benefit from Chinese growth." Such a treaty will help address a number of investment concerns of the United States and China, and investors from both countries will get better access to each other's markets, said Yukon Huang, former World Bank's country director for China and senior associate with the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy, has seen some other advantages the treaty will bring about to the two countries. China and the United States are complementary in many areas, especially in capital, Li told Xinhua recently. The United States needs large capital for infrastructure construction so as to prompt its economic recovery, while China, with relatively abundant funds, has already become a net exporter of capital, he said. Also, the Chinese government has been following a strategy of "going out" to encourage firms to invest overseas. On a broader scale, the China-U.S. relationship cries out for a stabilizer to address sensitive and complicated issues emerging in the development of bilateral ties, the Chinese economist

said, adding that the BIT will serve as such a stabilizer in the future. HIGH HOPES FROM BOTH SIDES The BIT talks started in 2008 when China

and the United States sought to increase mutual investment. But little progress had been made before they agreed in 2013 to conduct negotiations on the basis of pre-establishment national treatment with the negative list approach, which outlines sectors closed to foreign investment. A new phase of talks opened in June, as the two sides made an "important milestone" exchange of initial offers of negative lists. Last month, negotiators discussed profoundly the pending second negative lists in Beijing at the 20th round of BIT talks. Xi's state visit to the United States, the first since he took office in 2013, has been regarded widely as a golden opportunity to make major advancement in the negotiations, as the issue is expected to top the agenda of a planned meeting between Xi and his U.S. host,

President Barack Obama. Ahead of the summit, government officials and scholars, among others, from both countries expressed optimism about a positive result in the BIT talks. Chinese Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said in June that China hopes

to conclude the negotiations under the Obama administration , which will end in January 2017. Zhu voiced

the hope that the second negative list offers will produce substantial improvement so that the two heads of state could confirm "major progress" at their summit and give further clear instructions to both negotiating teams to move on. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew believed that the summit could inject new momentum to the BIT talks. "I think the fact that there's a leaders' meeting happening will focus all of the efforts to make progress for that," he said earlier. U.S.-China Business Council President John Frisbie has urged both governments to "double their efforts to advance the negotiations" on the treaty as much as possible before Xi's visit. David Denoon, New York University professor of Politics & Economics and director of NYU Center on U.S.-China Relations, echoed Frisbie in a recent interview with

Xinhua. "The two of them (Xi and Obama) can cooperate together to reach some agreements here. Also, I think the bilateral investment treaty should move as far as possible," he said. It would be "a very healthy thing" if the two leaders could show some real progress towards reaching the treaty, said Fred Bergsten, a senior fellow and director emeritus at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). "President Xi's visit is an important step, maybe a final one, to push ahead with the BIT talks, as both leaders have strong willingness to achieve a breakthrough," said Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy. The Chinese expert predicted that Obama "will

make a big issue on international affairs, including the BIT," as the end of "his presidential term" is approaching. JOINT EFFORTS TO CRACK NUTS Though both sides share a strong aspiration for a treaty to facilitate and boost bilateral investment, the BIT negotiations have by no means advanced as smoothly as

expected given complicated situations. Further unremitting efforts from both countries are called for to crack the hardest nuts -- to hammer out shorter and better negative lists from both sides, among other difficulties. Denoon said "there are many areas on the negative list in China and many areas on the negative list in this country," adding " how to get a good trade among

those is not easy to work on." The negative list approach, generally viewed as more liberal to foreign investment, means that all sectors are open to foreign

investment except those listed, while the positive list approach, adopted by China for many years, means that only listed sectors are accessible to foreign

investment. Zhang Xiangchen, Chinese deputy international trade representative and assistant minister of commerce, told reporters in June that "the negative list issue is more difficult for China," as it "represents a new challenge" and will "fundamentally change the foreign investment administration regime in China." To produce the negative list and speed up the process of the negotiations, China has done tremendous work. An inter-ministerial mechanism in the State Council have been established, and "tens of thousands of laws, regulations and rules" governing foreign investment with the positive list

approach have been reviewed, according to the official. For the United States, aside from an improved negative list, its investment environment for Chinese enterprises calls for urgent improvement. Many Chinese companies have been put to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS ), an inter-agency organization tasked to review foreign

investors' acquisition activities in the country, for national security reasons . The number of Chinese companies subject to such reviews is disproportionately high considering China's relatively small investment scale in the United States. As a result, Chinese firms are facing rising uncertainties and restraints when investing in the U.S. soil. Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE, said there is a need to improve the transparency of the CFIUS . "What the BIT can do is to increase the transparency of the CFIUS procedure to ensure that it is a narrowed focus." China hopes that the U.S. side could treat Chinese enterprises equally , remove its discriminating practices , and drop the wrong hypothesis that all Chinese investments have a governmental background with untold political and military motives, Li said.

Our internal net benefit is that a High-Quality BIT is good.

The Aff and permutation would lower US negotiating standards for the sake of completing a deal. That hampers higher-quality BITs that crackdown on Chinese SOEsDonnelly ‘13

Ambassador (Ret.) Shaun E. Donnelly formerly served in a series of senior economic policy assignments at the US Department of State, as Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East and as US Ambassador to Sri Lanka and Maldives. “Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues” by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment - Columbia FDI Perspectives - No. 90 March 4, 2013 - http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_90.pdf

I agree with Sauvant and Chen at that broadest level, but my sense of what an acceptable US-China BIT would look like, and how one would get there, is very different. Their analysis seems to be that, on key issue after key

issue, one must split the difference between fundamental US and Chinese positions — in other words, you cut the

baby in half. I disagree; you do not get to the sort of comprehensive 21s' century BIT both sides need by splitting the difference down the middle between an ambitious, market-opening text on one hand and a text allowing for screening,

government interventions, protected monopolies, and protected state-owned enterprises ( SOEs ) and national champions on the other hand. Make no mistake. China has come an incredibly long way in its investment policies, as in so many other areas, over the past 30 years. China deserves, and generally receives, strong recognition from the international business community. But China has not yet established an open, market-based investment regime. Far from it. Screenings, controls, restrictions, informal pressures, forced localization, and political interventions unfortunately remain central to the Chinese investment system. Sauvant and Chen suggest that, on areas they identify as "more pronounced" "differences"2 such as: I) performance requirements, 2) labor and environment standards, 3) investor-state dispute settlement, 4) national treatment, including pre-establishment, 5) non-conforming measures, and 6) sectoral carve-outs and restrictions, the inevitable way

forward lies in splitting the difference between Chinese and US positions. A "split the difference" approach may offer the best chance for a quick agreement. It does not offer the best path to an agreement that can protect,

encourage and catalyze FDI flows between the US and China in both directions. Or to an agreement that would actually give

China what it wants in terms of clearer access into the US or building its own economy. Rather, both parties need a high- standard , comprehensive agreement that ensures real protections, real transparency, real dispute settlement, and real market-opening to investors from both sides. I believe the 2012 US Model BIT provides a template for such an agreement. Obviously in serious negotiations , there will need to be compromises, additions, tweaks, phase-in

periods, and limited exceptions. I believe, for example, we need to enhance existing BIT provisions on SOEs and cross-

border data flows on any US-China BIT. But simply splitting the differences on core BIT protections as a quick path to a US-China BIT and a possible template for a multilateral investment agreement will not pass the "smell test" with US business, the US Administration or the US Congress. Let us all accept the reality that a US-China BIT is very important for both sides and for the world but it is not a short-term deliverable, it is not going to be an easy "feelgood" negotiation and it is not a split-the-baby proposition.

A BIT won’t solve for the Chinese economy unless it’s high-quality. That’s key to check economic meltdown and spiraling unrest.

Held ‘16

Robert Held is a financial consultant operating out of Geneva, Switzerland. He holds degrees from Wake Forest University and The University College, London - “China: Why reciprocity in market access is pivotal” – Asia Times - June 29, 2016 - http://atimes.com/2016/06/china-why-reciprocity-in-market-access-is-pivotal/

In the US, China pushed through deals worth more than $33 billion until May this year, a massive surge compared to last year’s rather fickle

$2.9 billion of deals finalized in the same period. However, distrust towards Chinese SOEs is growing fast, as national security concerns render some of the proposed outbound deals involving Chinese firms under increased scrutiny. The largest such deal, between ChemChina and Swiss agricultural company Syngenta, is currently being investigated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States (CFIUS) and by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). Given the mounting problems that SOEs are facing abroad,

it is high time China opened up its economy to foreign investment as well. What’s more, a recent groundbreaking EU ruling has increased the pressure on Chinese SOE business ventures abroad. Analyzing a joint venture’s consequences in relation to other Chinese SOEs operating in the nuclear sector in other markets, the ruling introduced an expanded review process that focuses on all the assets managed by China’s Central SASAC [State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council] active in a given industry. As Reuters reported, the decision effectively adds an extra barrier that could either scuttle of delay future Chinese SOE mergers, which will now be forced to go through a lengthy approval process in Europe. Moving in the right direction? Although the high-level eighth Strategic

and Economic Dialogue between the US and China yielded only few results, such as China agreeing to extend a rather symbolic RMB 250

billion Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor quota to the US, officials from both countries emphasized their desire for concluding the Bilateral Investment Treaty ( BIT ), which had been stalled for years, raising hopes China is officially ready to allow

more foreign investment to flow in. Indeed, the biggest stepping-stone in concluding the BIT between the two

countries so far has been China’s lack of reciprocity , namely its barring of foreign investors from entering a

number of protected economic sectors. Hence , bringing China to downsize the “negative list” of off-limits sectors

is pivotal in reaching an agreement – which is precisely what Beijing promised would do on June 6. While signs seem positive in that regard,

the economic benefits that China could reap from a BIT could be rendered void by China’s systemic

internal shortfalls unless the Chinese leadership decides to embark on economic reforms in earnest.

Without more reform, concerns that the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping’s aegis will go down a dark path, characterized by the continuous sheltering of the dysfunctional state enterprise sector, a sector that lives under CCP’s wing, will only grow. As David Dollar of the Brookings Institution pointed out, SOEs tend to dominate sectors such as finance, telecommunications, transportation, and media. Ever since China began to readjust its growth model, “these service sectors are now the fast-

growing part of the economy, while industry is in relative decline.” However , if China hopes to maintain good economic growth rates in the years to come and stave off potential civic unrest , access to international funding,

investment and competition is crucial. The net outcome of bringing BIT negotiations to a fruitful conclusion would signal a greater amount of trust between the world’s two largest economies. And considering their ongoing geopolitical competition around the South China Sea, that may go beyond the economic realm. Indeed, a BIT would alleviate a variety of issues for both countries. First, it could be a sensitive way of compelling China to commit to its own goals of opening up these sectors to competition and private international investment.

Second, according to the US-China Business Council (USCBC), a “high-quality US-China BIT would give American companies better access to China’s market, and equal rights as Chinese firms, [and] provide American companies with a better opportunity to expand in China.” Third, a BIT could help alleviate Chinese concerns over the activities of the CFIUS. China has a long history of complaining about the CFIUS blocking its investments into the US, but a BIT could lead to greater transparency in the review process and

clarification of review criteria for both private firms and SOEs. Unless China starts showing sincere goodwill to foreign investors by

allowing reciprocity in market access, mistrust towards the intentions of Chinese SOEs can only rise. Defensive measures against SOEs will become more stringent as well, leading to the possibility that Syngenta’s trials in the US and, even more

dramatically, in the EU, could become the norm. The writing’s on the wall: reciprocity can no longer be postponed by Beijing without hurting its own interests.

Chinese Econ growth checks nationalist flares that escalate territorial disputes. Checks won’t solve.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing_use-Xi_Jinping_CSR

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter . Since 1989, the party has deliberately and

carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and

relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this

potent nationalist vein through foreign policy , burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the country's economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession

on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites. On economic matters, concerns over growth and

employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers

are running articles blaming the country's economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious "foreign forces" that seek to sabotage the country's rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or S outh C hina S ea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given that Japan is a prominent target of China's propaganda and media, and that memories of Japan's brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China and Japan may continue to worsen.

SCS conflict causes huge death tolls.Wittner ‘11

(Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist , there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons . The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet an other example of this phenomenon . The gathering tension between the U nited S tates and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and

military strength, the U.S . government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea , increased the U.S.

military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region.

According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could . After all, both the United States and

China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military

ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,

between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it

is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear

attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War , NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and

its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States

would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and

radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far highe r . Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot

out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction .

1NC – Beast Mode Cowboy Astronaut

Obama’s rising popularity ensures Clinton wins in 2016 – attempts to distance from plan or stick obama with the blame only undermine her coattails strategyStanage 16 --- Niall, Contributor @ The Hill, "Clinton's ace in the hole: Obama," 5/29, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/281575-hillary-clintons-ace-in-the-hole-obama)

Hillary Clinton will have a not-so-secret weapon in her quest for the White House: President Obama .

Obama’s approval ratings have been marching upward since the start of the year. He retains immense popularity with the Democratic base, including vital groups such as young people, with whom Clinton has struggled. And experts also say that there is no one better positioned to unify the party behind the former secretary of State as her long and sometimes bitter struggle with primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) draws to a close. If Obama could run

for a third-term, “he’d be reelected in a walk,” said New York-based Democratic strategist Jonathan Rosen. “He can play a huge role in bringing the Democratic base and independents, together to unite behind her candidacy .” That could be particularly important given evidence from the primary season that suggests Clinton has failed to thrill some parts of the Obama coalition, even while she has drawn strong support from other blocs. She has struggled

mightily among younger voters, for example, even while beating Sanders by huge margins among African-American Democrats. The political relationship between Obama and Clinton is a long and knotty one. Distrust still festers among some of the aides who worked for each candidate during their titanic 2008 primary struggle. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton rallied support for Obama in the general election that year, even coming to the Democratic National Convention floor to move a motion for the then-Illinois senator to become the nominee. In 2012, former President Bill Clinton — whose role in the 2008 primary was contentious — gave a famously

effective speech lauding Obama’s economic record. Before Hillary Clinton began her quest for the presidency this time

around, she seemed to distance herself from the man whom she served as secretary of State . Back in August

2014, she critiqued a foreign-policy view synonymous with Obama saying, “Great nations need organizing principles

and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle.” That attitude carried through into the early months of the campaign. Last fall, according to NPR, she told voters in Davenport, Iowa, “I am not running for my husband’s third term of

President Obama’s third term. I am running for my first term.” Clinton’s rhetoric shifted as the challenge from Sanders became more serious , however. On healthcare, she cast herself as the protector of Obama’s signature

domestic achievement, the Affordable Care Act. A Clinton ad on gun control featured the candidate saying, of the president, “ I’m with him .” Part of Clinton’s pivot was clearly aimed at stopping the Sanders insurgency in its tracks. But Clinton’s political proximity to Obama could pay dividends in the general election , too.

Gallup’s daily tracking poll at the end of last week showed 52 percent of adults approving of Obama’s job performance and 44 percent disapproving. At the beginning of the year, Obama won approval from just 45 percent of adults in the equivalent poll, while 51 percent disapproved. Some independent experts believe that the feverish tone of the primary season in both parties

has fueled Obama’s climb. “As the conflicts got more into the gutter during the primary season, President Obama looks much better by comparison,” said Grant Reeher, a professor of political science at Syracuse University. “I think that he personally has been helped by what has happened in both primaries — but particularly the Republican one — which reminded people why they liked the guy eight years ago.” Experts like Reeher noted that traditionally it has been difficult for a candidate to win the White House after his or her party has held the presidency for the preceding eight years. Only once since 1948 has someone pulled off that feat. President George H.W. Bush succeeded his

fellow Republican President Reagan by winning the 1988 election. But 2016 could be exceptional. The polarizing nature of the

presumptive Republican nominee could leave some voters seeking a “safe haven” with a known quantity such as Clinton, experts say. That dynamic could be enough to counteract Clinton’s own lowly favorability numbers, as well as the traditional

reluctance to give a party three successive White House terms. “It is obviously a challenge to win the White House for

three straight elections and as a candidate, as a front-runner, everyone takes shots at you. But that challenge can be overcome when you have a popular sitting president ,” said Democratic strategist Evan Stavisky.

Its not a rational issue - Plan has unique symbolic importance in voters psyche – inevitably gets tied to deep seated sense of overall frustration and anxiety felt on all issues – now is key and link alone turns caseHe, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

U.S. Election and Its Impact on China The United States presidential election is now in full swing , with both parties going all out in a feverish effort to gain the upper hand. The 2016 vote is watched very closely all over the world, because whoever occupies the White House next January is going to face a fast-changing world with multiple challenges crying out for active American involvement and a more isolationist and inward-looking America unwilling to take on the role of “world policeman”. Before we delve deeper into the impact of the

election on China and US-China relations for the coming years, there is a need to offer a brief analysis of what insight this election process has brought us into the American phyche . First and foremost , it has laid bare the rising populist sentiments that are oozing out every pore of American politics both domestic and international. One example is the Republican candidate Donald Trump whose fiery words on immigration and Muslims has won him high approval ratings even though those words are obviously on the extreme end of populism . Three Republican candidates, Trump, Cruz and Carlson, are considered politically extreme but have consistently won as a group over 50% support among Republican voters based on recent polls. It shows that voters are rejecting traditional candidates. What it reveals is that men-on-the-street in America are simply tired of

traditional politics and politicians. The fact that Jeb Bush falls behind Trump therefore comes as no surprise. Populist sentiments reflect the unhappiness ordinary people have harbored against status quo where American economy is still under the shadow of financial crisis and slow recovery as well as enfeebled responses of the American government in the face of global challenges. To put it in perspective, they represent the frustration and anxiety of American people feel about the changed and still fast changing world they live in. The American supremacy and sense of safety both physical and economic is threatened . That’s the essence of what people fear.

Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people , a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is

on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “ Scapegoating” China is inevitable . “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “ election value ”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune

of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China- bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections . This time around is no different. What is different is that while

without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that

nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this

connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who

said the US-China relationship enters “ dangerous waters” in 2016.

That flips the election for the GOP – our link prices in other factors and we don’t need to win that Hillary gets the blameNeedham 16 (Vicki, The Hill, 1/21, “Moody’s model gives Dem candidate advantage in 2016,” http://thehill.com/policy/finance/266668-moodys-model-gives-dem-candidate-advantage-in-2016)

The Democratic presidential nominee will win the race for the presidency, but the election is shaping up as historically tight ,

according to a political model. Less than 11 months from Election Day, Moody’s Analytics is predicting that whomever lands the Democratic nomination will capture the White House with 326 electoral votes to the Republican nominee’s 212. Those results are heavily dependent on how swing states vote. The latest model from Moody’s reflects razor-thin margins in the five most important swing states — Florida, Ohio, Colorado, New Hampshire and Virginia. In each of those states, the Democratic advantage is less than 1 percentage point , well within the margin of error. The election model weighs political and economic strength in each state and determines the share of the vote that the incumbent party will win. The most important economic variable in the model is the growth in incomes in the two years leading up to the

election. That factor captures the strength of the job market in each state , including job growth, hours worked, wage growth

and the quality of the jobs being created. The model also factors in home and gasoline prices. So far, the strength of the economy has kept the model on track for

the Democratic nominee. But the trajectory of the president’s approval rating also makes a difference in who could win the White House. If President Obama’s approval rating shifts only a little more than 4 percentage points , a bit more than the margin of error for many presidential opinion polls, the move could further cut into Democratic hopes to retain the White House . Growing concern about terrorism and other issues could dent Obama’s approval rating further. Usually, if the sitting president’s approval rating is improving in the year leading up the election, the incumbent party receives a boost . But in most elections, the president’s rating has declined in the lead-up to the election, favoring the challenger party.

extinction – climate change, global wars, and turns caseNisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for

the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement“, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the “stupid”

Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary

Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises , creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad . Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before

President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress . In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and “criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke

widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump’s bravado and reckless unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals

and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict . In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the

historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher .

1NC – K

The aff’s claims that “China is a threat” influences policy formulation at every stage. The only way to achieve a coherent China foreign policy is to interrogate discourse and epistemology in policy making. The K is prior to solvencyTurner 13—Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]

The modern day China ‘threat’ to the U nited States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal rep resentation s which , to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security . This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon . Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real . China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’ — whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms . As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening , regardless of Beijing's intentions . Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy . Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the

future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous . For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

The Aff is indistinct from other flawed approaches that are driven by a fundamental fear of the Other. A better response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1AC – this is the only way to solve inevitable extinction Ahmed ‘12

(Nafeez Mosaddeq, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis)

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security ' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues .106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises ,

orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them . Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state

integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movement s . Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks , groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts -

which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities . Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to

climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources , or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising

population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim- majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of

particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in

this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves .

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict . The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually

respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and

classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms , in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups , and the legitimisation of violence towards them .

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate . Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded . This breach is now

increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable . This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems . Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others' , newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe . Such an outcome , of course, is not inevitable , but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and

historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober , effective , and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

2AC

2AC vs. version 1.0 - CPlan and internal net benefit

1. Perm – do the cplan.

It doesn’t sever – adding more conditions is a textual addition to the plan. Cplans must be textually and functionally competitive – or else the worst consult cplans compete.

2. “Add a condition” cplans are a voter – they shatter engaging the 1AC, by allowing any condition to be tacked-on. History goes our way – the Neg’s theory brought us “add sea turtle protections” and “reverse conditions – do the plan unless Israel agrees to give up Palestine”. That kills in-depth debate and gives the neg stale generics.

3. Aff solves the turn – we immediately get US investors in. That changes inefficient SOEs. Delay is bad.

Paulson ‘13

Henry Paulson was formerly the U.S. Treasury secretary and now serves as the Chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago – “The Path to Double Happiness” – Wall Street Journal - June 4, 2013 - http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323469804578523144222235104

In addition to addressing these two key issues, promoting cross-border investment flows is also necessary. One vehicle for doing so, while advancing negotiations on market access and securing equal competitive conditions, is the Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT. Such a treaty would enhance investor protections for both sides. If China is to achieve its new economic model, it must introduce competition into its economy . In financial services, for

example, allowing foreign financial firms to compete equally will create more open and efficient capital markets

and help transition China to a nation of investors, not just savers. Beijing should also introduce more competition to help its own

private sector. Anticompetitive practices hurt Chinese private firms nearly as much as foreign ones. For all their subsidies , benefits and preferential access to credit available only to state-owned enterprises , it is private firms that are the major source of Chinese job creation . Weaning state-owned companies off subsidies will benefit them by making them more competitive . It also would ensure market rules for the private, small and medium-size businesses that

create most Chinese jobs, yet are largely excluded from state-backed loans and resource subsidies. Ultimately, both countries need capital to flow more freely: Americans because they need job-creating capital flows, including direct investment from China, and the Chinese because Beijing wants to invest more in the U.S. China complains about a lack of clarity in the U.S. regulatory framework. The U.S. could help address that concern by enacting more transparent investment policies,

which would lead to more Chinese investment in the U.S. This is a rare moment of opportunity for both

countries. We can continue to play defense, or we can play offense by using negotiations to make our economies more balanced. If we squander the moment, we will regret it.

4. It’s offense for us:

External pressure – like the cplan – will fail. Gaining better US access to the Chinese market – like the plan - solves best.GOODMAN & PARKER ‘15

Matthew P. Goodman is senior adviser for Asian economics and holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS. The Simon Chair examines current issues in international economic policy, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Previously, he served as director for international economics on the National Security Council staff, working on the G-20, APEC, and other presidential summits. Before joining the White House, Goodman was senior adviser to the undersecretary for economic affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He has also worked at Albright Stonebridge Group, Goldman Sachs, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Goodman holds an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.Sc. from the London School of Economics. David A. Parker is a research associate with the Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS. He manages research projects on Northeast Asian states' economic policy and policymaking and U.S. economic strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region. His current research interest is in Chinese, Japanese, and American economic strategies in the Asia Pacific. “NAVIGATING CHOPPY WATERS” - A Report of the CSIS Simon Chair in Political Economy - MARCH 2015 – available via: https://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0ahUKEwj06f2Ah9PNAhXE7D4KHeJ5AAQQFghOMAc&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcsis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fs3fs-public%2F150327_navigating_choppy_waters.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFnaJKFXAFDvzQW5r_Zgg184FBWwg&cad=rja

At the same time, it would be a mistake to simply write off the limited progress made so far on capital account liberalization as observers misreading Beijing's intentions en masse. The initial framing of the Shanghai experiment put finance front and center on the reform agenda along with administrative reform, and most observers agree that progress on the former has been disappointing. This frustration is not by design. To some degree, it is likely that China's leaders initially oversold the zone, and have since had to roll back their ambitions in light of the

difficulties so far encountered. For all Beijing's (real and perceived) penchant for planning, China's leaders are fallible, time-pressed individuals making policy in the context of incomplete information. Their extreme emphasis on maintaining stability makes them hyperaware of

the need to adapt policy to changing circumstances, even as their political culture makes public backpedaling difficult. POLICYMAKING PATTERNS As the above cases suggest, the Xi administration's approach to financial reform demonstrates both important aspects of continuity with earlier periods and its own distinct characteristics. Perhaps the most distinct characteristic of the Xi leadership's approach to financial reform is a decisive, centralized style of decisionmaking. When a specific, short-term problem is identified, a decisive deployment of specific countermeasures follows. In two of the three cases, this approach proved largely successful in achieving policy objectives. However, as the development of the Shanghai FTZ shows, when the goals of reform are less explicit, the reform requires implementation over a longer time frame, and there is a broader range of actors involved, achieving decisive outcomes has proven more challenging. This suggests that successful implementation in finance and other areas of reform will require the leadership to

employ strategies beyond those demonstrated in these case studies. In other ways, the approach of the Xi leadership has been in keeping with established patterns of Chinese economic policymaking. For example, achieving coordination between Chinese ministries clearly remains a major challenge, and one not easily solved by top leadership's sweeping policy pronouncements. While such pronouncements and the promise to "give the market a decisive role" have set the tone for policies to be implemented, achieving concrete outcomes and effective coordination will additionally require top leaders to take ownership of initiatives and supply the close supervision and clear directives needed to drive processes forward. Even if leaders do take a more hands-on approach, the Shanghai experience shows that there remain important capacity and mindset gaps for designing and implementing more market-based reforms (let alone administering the resulting system) at the local level. These will inevitably take time to address. Alternatively, leaders may attempt to sidestep coordination altogether, as they did in June 2013 and the first quarter of 2014, empowering one ministry to act decisively to achieve a narrow objective. However, this tactic is not universally applicable; some mechanism for achieving coordination will ultimately be necessary, and such a mechanism is not yet evident. For example, reports suggest the PBOC-led financial regulatory coordinating body established in August 2013

(following the June shock) has been hobbled by intermin-isterial conflict.149 This is the same problem that frustrated earlier attempts to establish such a regulatory coordinating mechanism, and more general attempts to achieve effective coordination between state agencies of equal formal rank. Coordination also clearly remains a challenge between the central and local governments: even in Shanghai, despite its leaders' close ties to Zhongnanhai and Xi's own experience as its party secretary, this has proven difficult. A continued preference for experimentation remains evident in financial reform, albeit of an unusually cautious and incremental kind. In the case of the Shanghai FTZ, this "incremental" approach is due at least in part to coordination challenges and other factors discussed earlier. However, it also likely reflects another characteristic of Chinese policymakers' tactics in financial reform more generally: a careful attention to sequencing, widely accepted as central to avoiding instability. This is evident in Beijing's approach to interest rate liberalization, where, among other reforms, deposit insurance has been stressed as an essential prerequisite to full liberalization. It is also the case in exchange rate and capital account reform, where the widening of the RMB trading band and the creation of the Hong Kong-Shanghai stock exchange connection, respectively, represent incremental advancements rather than dramatic leaps toward the eventual (stated) goal of full liberalization. As is evident in the Shanghai case, the current leadership is also drawing from the tried-and-true playbook of wielding external pressure to drive reform. However, the relatively lackluster

progress thus far serves as an important reminder that external pressure alone cannot drive reform ; it must be wielded. For example, China's WTO accession was closely overseen by the premier with direct investment in the process, guided and coordinated by the state councilor directly reporting to the premier, and coordinated by two major ministries in close cooperation with the State Council general office.150 No such approach to the BIT negotiations, or to financial reform, is so far evident, nor is an organizing principle as comprehensive as

the WTO accession process necessarily available. In contrast to external pressure, however, external forces ,

particularly from financial markets , clearly constrain the options available to Chinese policymakers and influence their policy choices, as demonstrated by June 2013 and the widening of the RMB trading band (as well as China's challenges in dealing with capital outflows in the first quarter of 2015).151

5. “high quality” is a code-word for “US demands China changes before offering concessions”. That stance will fail – that’s our 1AC Hu and Martina ev

6. QPQ’s and prior conditions fail to build US-Sino ties.Paulson & Rubin ‘15

Henry M. Paulson Jr. is the chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Bush administration (2006–09). Robert E. Rubin is a co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration (1995–99) – “Why the U.S. Needs to Listen to China” - The Atlantic - June 2015 - http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/

Discussions of the U.S.-China economic relationship too often begin with a recital of each country’s grievances

against the other. The usual litany of American criticisms includes China’s management of its exchange rate, subsidies that benefit state-owned enterprises, and barriers to American companies seeking to operate in China. Another prominent critique involves Chinese cyber-hacking of U.S. businesses’ intellectual property, and China’s failure to protect intellectual property more generally. For its part, China castigates the U.S. for its irresponsible fiscal trajectory, its political opposition to Chinese investment in American companies and infrastructure, and its export-control laws, especially those restricting the export of technologies with

potential military applications. We believe it’s time to turn the typical exchange of economic critiques on its head. The two countries have largely been engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, each blaming the other for its own failings, exerting pressure on the other to accede to its demands , and too often waiting for the other to act first. In fact, it is in each country’s self-interest to meaningfully address the criticisms made by the other.

7. Perm – do both – do the plan and also offer the cplan.

8. Chinese diversionary war will never happen. Levi & Economy ‘16

et al; Michael A. Levi and Elizabeth Economy are both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), director of CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, and director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change. He is an expert on energy, climate change, nuclear security, and the interplay of global economics and international politics. Before joining CFR, Dr. Levi was a nonresident science fellow and a science and technology fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. Prior to that, he was director of the Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Security Project. Elizabeth Economy is the C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Economy has published widely on both Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Dr. Economy is a frequent guest on nationally broadcast television and radio programs, has testified before Congress on numerous occasions, and regularly consults for U.S. government agencies and companies. Levi & Economy hosted a workshop along with the Council on Foreign Relations' Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and Asia Studies program. This report is includes the thoughts of the CFR participants at the workshop – “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” - February 25,2016 – pdf available via: http://www.cfr.org/china/economic-geopolitical-fallout-chinas-slowing-growth/p37554

But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This "wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that

strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars , it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for the ir restive populace. Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by

an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

9. Empirically false – growth rates have been slowing, and the impacts haven’t happened. And, there have been tensions in the SCS and ECS without any escalation.

10.We solve SCS and ECS better – relations is a bigger internal link

2AC vs. Elections

( ) Uniqueness overwhelms the link - Clinton is inevitable – she only needs FloridaSchneider 7-5 – Christian Schneider, columnist and blogger for the Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 2016 (“No matter how you look at it, Trump's not winning: Column”, USA Today, Available online at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/nation-now/2016/07/05/no-matter-how-you-look-trumps-not-winning-column/86715020/, Accessed on 07-07-2016, KG)

Amid the incessant din of election-year punditry and prognostication, one fact reigns supreme: Republicans vote for Republicans and Democrats vote for Democrats . It is an inescapable truth that informs 90% of races; the more members of one party that reside in any given state or district, the better chance a politician of that party will win. It is why America is freckled with "red" and "blue" states

and "safe" congressional seats. It is also why American presidential races are typically close, regardless of who the candidates may be. But 2016 is no typical year . Republicans have nominated a candidate who is only recently and tangentially Republican, and whose staunchest supporters are left to argue he is fit for the presidency only because his Democratic opponent is more unfit. It has long been clear that Donald Trump's party fluidity almost certainly will spell doom for Republicans in November . Trump hurdled the GOP primary field because he said things politicians could never say — and now Republicans are going to learn the hard way why politicians never say those things . Trump is now the Bruce Willis character in "The Sixth Sense": his candidacy is dead, he just doesn't realize it yet . (Sorry for the spoiler, but c'mon — it's been 17 years.) The myriad ways Trump's candidacy will fail provide a Rashomon-style buffet of scenarios to contemplate. Even if "Generic Republican" were on the ballot, he or she would be at a distinct electoral disadvantage — Trump's repulsiveness simply accelerates that disadvantage. (If anyone has a black and white "Generic Republican" yard sign, decorated with a UPC bar code, I will happily purchase one.) As Chris Cillizza of

the Washington Post frequently points out, given the GOP's built-in underdog status, Hillary Clinton only needs to win every state Democrats have won in every presidential election since 1992, then add Florida, and she is the winner. Perhaps you enjoy talk of battleground states. Well, there's a scenario for you, too. First, pick the six "closest" swing states ( VA , NH , IA , OH , FL , NC ). Got it? Now understand that New Hampshire excepted, Clinton only has to win one of them in order to reach the requisite 270 electoral votes to win. (Optional third step for Republicans only: start shotgunning Pabst Blue Ribbon and don't stop until November.) Lest any

Trump supporters seek solace in poll numbers, recent polls have Trump sliding further behind in all the relevant swing states . According to a Ballotpedia battleground poll released last week, Trump trails by 14% in Florida, 4% in Iowa, 10% in North

Carolina, 9% in Ohio, and 7% in Virginia. And what will Trump do to turn these numbers around? Maybe his vice presidential pick will make a big splash? Not so fast. Trump is reportedly considering names such as former Speaker of the

House Newt Gingrich and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie as his running mate — meaning the sole qualification Trump seeks in a VP is how much of Trump's boot polish the pick has on his sleeves. Both Gingrich and Christie are among the least popular politicians in America — picking either of them to resurrect a campaign is like going to a doctor for pinkeye and the doctor suggesting you contract jock itch to take your mind off your conjunctivitis. This is why some Republicans could make a move to oust Trump at the party's national convention in Cleveland this month,

in a desperate attempt to salvage the party's chance at winning in November. But at this point, Trump isn't really a candidate. He is an idea, an ethos. Trump is a primal scream against politicians who didn't listen to voters who now want payback. Thus, even if the GOP were able to boot Trump from the top of the ticket, "Trumpism"

would remain, poisoning the party and dividing its voters. As Thomas Dewey once said of banning communism, "you can't

shoot an idea with a gun." And in 2016, Republicans found a way to commit suicide using only the ballot box.

( ) Too Unique - Electoral Math is overwhelmingly in favor of ClintonCassidy 5-25-16. [John, staff writer, "THE CHALLENGES FACING HILLARY CLINTON" The New Yorker -- www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-challenges-facing-hillary-clinton]

With some people I know in panic mode about the latest opinion polls showing Donald Trump performing well in a

prospective fall campaign against Hillary Clinton, I thought it might be worth stepping back a bit and looking at the prospects for such a race in November. For Democrats and others alarmed by Trump’s advance, the outlook is reassuring, but not

entirely so. Assuming that Hillary Clinton wraps up the Democratic nomination pretty soon, she will be the firm favorite to win the general election. But she faces some significant challenges, not least of which is confronting a demagogue who daily traduces her

and her husband. Arguably, the biggest factor in Clinton’s favor is demography . The Obama coalition of minority voters, young people, single women, and highly educated white voters of both sexes, which has seen the

Democrats to victories in 2008 and 2012, remains intact. Indeed, it is growing. Meanwhile, the Republican base of older, whiter,

and less educated voters continues to shrink. Back in March, I spoke with the political scientist Ruy Teixeira, who has written widely on

the Obama coalition, and he pointed out that the minority share of the electorate will likely increase by another two percentage points this year, to twenty-eight per cent. Clinton, as she has demonstrated during the Democratic primary campaign,

has strong support among minority voters, and she also scores well with other elements of the Obama coalition, such as

working women and the highly educated. Unless Trump can attract more minority voters, which seems unlikely, he will need to rack up huge majorities among white voters. To carry Ohio, for example, Teixeira reckons that Trump would have to win the white working-class vote by twenty-two or twenty-three percentage points, and hold on to, or even expand, Mitt Romney’s

double-digit margin of victory among college-educated white voters, who might be put off by Trump’s extremism. The political map should also be friendly to Clinton. In every election since 1992, the Democrats have carried eighteen states that have a combined total of two hundred and forty-two votes in the Electoral College—just twenty-eight short of the two hundred and seventy needed to assure victory. The Republicans’ base in the Electoral College is smaller: twenty-three states with a hundred and ninety-one electoral votes. As usual, this year’s contest is likely to come down to a dozen or so

battleground states. But Clinton, if she holds onto the core Democratic states, will have many more ways to get to two hundred and seventy. Figures like these—together with the fact that Democratic candidates have won the popular vote in five

out of the past six Presidential elections—help to explain why Clinton remains the bettors’ choice to win. At the British online bookmakers, the odds of her being the next President are about 1:2, which means that you have to wager a hundred dollars to win fifty.

Trump’s odds are about 2:1. (You bet fifty dollars to win a hundred.) These odds imply that the probability of Clinton winning is 66.7 per cent , and the probability of Trump winning is 33.3 per cent .

( ) Kaine means Hillary can’t lose – he locks up Virgina. Virgina + Florida = guaranteed win for Hillary

( ) Trade agreements are actually incredibly popular with voters in states that will play a role in winning the general—Colorado, Florida, Nevada and Ohio—Plan’s popularity helps Clinton Needham, 6/22 (Vicki, experienced correspondent and reporter, 06/22/16, “Poll: Trade is popular in swing states, among Democrats,” The Hill, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/284539-poll-trade-is-popular-in-swing-states-among-democrats)

Trade is more popular with voters in swing states than the presumptive Democratic and Republican presidential nominees might think, especially among Democrats, according to a new poll. Voters in four battleground states — Colorado, Florida, Nevada and Ohio — expressed positive views about the U.S. expanding trade, even while Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump call for major changes to the nation's global commercial outreach. A new Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) poll on Wednesday shows that by a 55 to 32 percent margin swing-state voters say that new high-standard trade deals can help the U.S. economy and support good-paying jobs. Democrats are particularly supportive, 66 to 25 percent. All four states will play an out-sized role in who wins the presidency in November. President Obama is trying to convince Congress to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before he leaves office but he faces widespread Democratic opposition on Capitol Hill and among major labor unions. In an article for RealClearPolicy, PPI's Will Marshall and Ed Gerwin argue that voters roundly reject the idea that the United States can prosper by walling off its borders from the global economy. They also don’t believe that ending current trade agreements will make the nation's manufacturers or workers better off. Trump has said he would slap high tariffs on countries like China and would scrap all U.S. trade agreements and renegotiate them to get better terms for workers. Marshall and Gerwin said the poll revealed that voters understand that American companies and workers face intense competition in a complex global economy and know that there are no simple solutions. “ As we’ve detailed, protectionism is bad economics ,” Marshall and Gerwin wrote. “But, apparently, it’s been good politics for Trump as well as Bernie Sanders, both of whom used trade-bashing populism to energize angry voters during primary elections, where extreme partisans often play an outsized role,” they wrote. “And Trump promises to double down on opposition to trade as he pivots toward November.” Marshall and Gerwin say that as time ticks away toward the general election in November that “Trump — and Hillary Clinton — will face a different political calculus on trade.” Clinton has said she opposes the TPP in its current form and that she wants a better deal for the U.S. economy and workers. The new poll, conducted by Democratic pollster Peter Brodnitz, shows that these voters want the United States to step up its global game, not pull back. The poll shows that 75 percent, including 73 percent of swing voters and 82 percent of Democrats, said that a strong economy requires a reliance on heavy trade with other countries. "Our poll’s findings suggest that to prevail with swing voters and in swing states, Democrats, in particular, will need to craft messages and support policies that transcend protectionism — that recognize trade’s role in supporting American prosperity, acknowledge the complexity of global competition and highlight the benefits of high-standard trade agreements," Marshall and Gerwin wrote. On overwhelming majority — 90 percent — say the United States must create an environment that enables companies here to compete against foreign businesses, "and a strong majority believe that workers can and should benefit from company success." Of the voters concerned about U.S. manufacturing jobs moving overseas, about 66 percent, and 72 percent of Democrats, say the biggest threat to job losses comes primarily from greater foreign competition rather than from the "bad trade

agreements" that Trump and Sanders often discuss. Similarly, when asked to choose among policies to keep jobs in America, 67 percent chose either lowering corporate tax rates or educating more highly skilled workers. Only 19 percent said that ending trade agreements was the solution. More than 85 percent said that higher levels of education and training and increased investment in infrastructure are keys to advancing the U.S. economy. When asked to evaluate trade agreements with strong labor and environmental standards, 55 percent said they believe these agreements can help the economy and create good paying jobs; only 32 percent felt that the costs of high-standard deals outweigh the benefits. "To address this legitimate frustration and build a stronger economy for all, it’s critical that the nation do more to help alienated Americans left behind by the global economy," they wrote. "This will require stronger backing for real, broadly supported solutions — such as enhancing job training and improving infrastructure — that can help assure that trade’s undeniable benefits are more widely shared."

( ) Relations outweigh—US-Sino war likely and will lead to extinction. Warming only gets solved if countries like China cooperate with the US

( ) No impact-- Climate change won’t influence voters—means that Clinton won’t push for any sort of reforms while in office—also means that green tech and policies are not a priority for investors or congressNoon, 2/27 (Marita, The author of Energy Freedom, Marita Noon serves as the executive director for Energy Makes America Great Inc., and the companion educational organization, the Citizens’ Alliance for Responsible Energy (CARE). She hosts a weekly radio program: America’s Voice for Energy—which expands on the content of her weekly column, February 27, 2016, “NOBODY CARES ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 2016 ELECTION,” the Conservative Review, https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/02/nobody-cares-about-climate-change-in-the-2016-election)

Frustrated that nobody seems to care about climate change, “the country’s biggest individual political donor during the 2014 election cycle,” has pledged even more in 2016. Tom Steyer spent nearly $75 million in the 2014 midterms, reports Politico. He intends to “open his wallet even wider” now. But just what do his millions get him in this “crucial election”? Based on history, not much. In 2014, his NextGen Climate Action group specifically targeted seven races. Only three went his way — to Democrats. In Iowa, the group “invested in billboards and television and radio, newspaper and web ads,” to target Republicans and “agitate for more conversation about the topic in debates.” According to Politico, NextGen “attempted to convince Iowans to caucus for a candidate based on that candidate’s energy plan.” They “identified over 42,000 voters in the state who tapped climate change as a voting priority”…“over 1,500 were registered Republicans.” With 357,983 people participating the Iowa caucus, Steyer’s efforts reflect just 11.7 percent of voters and less than 1 percent of Republicans. Steyer’s millions were spent trying to get people to vote based on “energy plans.” Only one candidate’s energy policy got any real media coverage: Ted Cruz’s opposition to the Renewable Fuel Standard, also known as the ethanol mandate. He won the Republican caucus, ahead of Donald Trump who pandered to the powerful lobbying group: America’s Renewable Future. (Since then, Archer Daniels Midland, the biggest proponent and producer of ethanol, may be scaling back, which according to the Financial Times, “suggests the reality for this industry has changed.”) Perhaps Steyer needs to realize his reality has

changed. On February 11, Politico released survey results from “a bipartisan panel of respondents” who it claims are “Republican and Democratic insiders”…“activists, strategists and operatives in the four early nominating states” who answered the questions anonymously. The results? As one Republican respondent from South Carolina (SC) put it: “ Climate change is simply not a front burner issue to most people .” A Nevada Democrat agreed: “I don’t believe this is a critical issue for many voters when compared to the economy and national security.” One SC Republican said that no “blue-collar swing voter” ever said: “I really like their jobs plan, but, boy, I don’t know about their position on climate change.” Over all, the Republicans don’t think that opposing public policy to address the perceived threats of climate change will hurt their candidates. The topic never came up in the recent SC Republican debate. Steyer sees that on the issue of climate change, “the two parties could not be further apart.” However, the “insider” survey found that Democrats were split on the issue. When asked if “disputing the notion of manmade climate change would be damaging in the general election,” some thought it would, but others “thought climate change isn’t a major issue for voters.” One SC Democrat pointed out: “the glut of cheap energy sources makes green technology less of an immediate priority for Congress, investors and the voting public.” When it comes to energy, there are clearly differences between the parties, but strangely both agree that climate change isn’t “a major issue for voters.” While we are far from the days, of “drill, baby drill,” when asked about increasing production, Republicans see that their pro-development policies are unaffected by “price fluctuations.” A SC Republican stated: “Most Republicans view this issue through a national security lens. Low prices might diminish the intensity, but GOP voters will still want America to be energy independent regardless of oil prices.” On February 12, Politico held a gathering called “Caucus Energy South Carolina” that featured several of the SC “insiders” among whom the host said are “influential voices,” who offer “keen insight into what’s going on on the ground.” There, Mike McKenna, who has consulted a wide variety of political and corporate clients with respect to government relations, opinion research, marketing, message development and communications strategies, and who has served as an external relations specialist at the U.S. Department of Energy, declared: “ Energy is a second tier issue. Climate change is fifth tier. Nobody cares about it. It is always at the bottom.” The climate change agenda has been the most expensive and extensive public relations campaign in the history of the world. Gallup has been polling on this issue for 25 years. Despite the herculean effort, fewer people are worried about climate change today than 25 years ago. Pew Research Center has repeatedly found that when given a list of concerns regarding the public’s policy priorities, respondents put jobs and economy at the top of the list, with climate change at the bottom. Polling done just before the UN climate conference in Paris, found that only 3% of Americans believe that climate change is the most important issue facing America. Even Democrat Jane Kleeb, an outspoken opponent of the Keystone pipeline, acknowledged that climate change, as an issue, doesn’t move people to act. David Wilkins, a former U.S. Ambassador to Canada who has worked on issues such as energy, national security, and the environment, said that voters are “not going to let the environment trump the economy.” He believes there will be a reapplication for the Keystone pipeline and that eventually it will be built. Another insider, Democrat Inez Tenenbaum, disagreed, saying: “people don’t want to be energy dependent.” To which Wilkins quipped: “All the more reason to get oil from our friends.” When it comes to energy, there are clearly differences between the parties, but strangely both agree that climate change isn’t “a major issue for voters.”

( ) Protectionism outweighs—in the event of a trade war countries are more likely to exploit the environment in order to gain access to resources that they could previously get from other nations

( ) Elections are complicated – it’s unlikely that one variable will swing the whole thing

( ) GOP painting Clinton as soft on China hands her the election – highlights her experience and their lackGolan, 15[Shanhar, The Henry Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Winter, 2015, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y]

Alongside the Hillary factor, a nother complication in any future plan of the Republican Party to oppose Clinton is their party’s vastly divided stances . First of all, unlike the Democrats, the Republicans have many possible front-runners in 2016, and their primaries are promising to be a tough battle. A recent New York Times article described the upcoming fight for the Republican nomination as “a crowded field of people who say they are considering running for president — including Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, former Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas and the 2012 presidential

nominee, Mitt Romney — has emerged. That means the party is expecting a bruising ideological battle for the nomination ” (Chozick, 2015, n.p.). Although since the publication of the article, Mitt Romney has bowed out, the description continues to be relevant to the challenges facing the Republican Party. Added to this contentious reality, there is also increasing plurality in top Republican’s positions on foreign policy. While it has been established earlier in this report that since the Korean War the Republicans have managed to brand themselves as the more hawkish of the two parties, a different trend of conservatism is currently gaining momentum in the Republican Party. As Dueck points out in his book, “conservative anti interventionists have no doubt become a more visible national presence in recent

years, producing some writing of high quality in venues such as Reason and the American Conservative” (Dueck, p.304). This raise of anti-interventionism can be seen most straightforwardly in aspiring presidential candidate Rand Paul. Kelly

also observes a shift in the Republican Party’s foreign policy asserting that “even within the GOP, there appears to be a small if growing constituency for military spending restraint,” a call that contradicts the Republican mainstream in the post WWII era (Kelly, p.497). While mainstream Republicans still present themselves as vehement hawks, the alternate policy positions present in this multipolar Republican primary a promise to provide an array of problematic foreign policy statements.

These likely assertions are sure to haunt the eventual nominee of the GOP. This lack of consensus is a massive boost for the Democrats , and thus eases domestic pressures on the reforms. Clinton, who has served as Secretary of State, Senator, and the First Lady , would be a difficult contender in the realm of foreign policy for a GOP candidate , even if that individual sailed through the primaries. The current political realities make the ‘China’ and ‘North Korea’ cards highly unlikely to improve the Republican standing . With the divided camp in the Republican Party, as well as Clinton’s perceived relative hawkishness, attacking her for being soft on the PRC and the DPRK seems like a dangerous game to play for any aspiring Republican presidential candidate .

( ) Trumps rhetoric on TPP should have triggered the link—he’s been grand-standing on China for a while now

2AC vs. Security K

( ) Perm – do both.

( ) Security impact wrong – too sweeping and proves alt fails.

Ling ‘97 (et al – LL.H.M. Ling is Associate Professor on the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School. She graduated from Wellesley College, and from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a Ph.D.; along with Anna M. Agathangelou and , Director of the Global Change Institute in Nicosia and Former Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies and Politics at Oberlin; Studies in Political Economy, v54, Fall, p. 7-8)

Given these concerns with political transformation, post-colonialism exposes several internal ironies in dissident IR. Sankaran Krishna

summarizes them accordingly:46 *A Fixation on the West Dissident IR claims to recognize all identities in the study and practice of

international life but perpetuates a "remarkably self-contained and self-referential view of the West that is] oblivious to the intimate dialogue between 'Western' and 'non-Western' economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the

disenchantment with modernity that characterizes the present epoch." 'Absence of Materiality Despite its emancipatory intentions , dissident IR tends to gloss over "a vital and phvsicalistic sense" of life's injustices (as in war ) when "so preoccupied with practices of representation and signification." 'Binding Dualisms While denouncing the dualisms that shackle

sovereign i nternational r elations (e.g., order vs. chaos, domestic vs. international, objectivity vs. subjectivity), dissident IR itself re produces dichotomies such as a totalizing critique vs. a capitulationist narrative, dissidence vs. sovereignty, good vs. bad. 'Disabling Politics in its deep suspicion of a stable subjectivity and unitary agency,

dissident IR undermines an enabling politics for an emancipatory future . Left unresolved, these internal ironies may lead to a "new recipe of discipline and dominance." 47 Dissident IR's fixation with the West offers little analytical room for an interactive, articulating, and self-generating Other in international relations. It relegates to the Other, instead, an identity assigned by sovereign IR: i.e., as a mute, passive reflection of the West or as an Utopian projection based solely on its Otherness from

the West With this construction of Self-Other relations, dissident IR tends to romanticize the dangers of its self-isolation

into a totalizing critique — especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. Indeed, dissident IR's distaste for a singular, "sovereign" subjectivity further accentuates its elitism. After all, who can afford to not negotiate with sovereignty while refusing a coherent identity? As bell hooks writes. "Should we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the 'subject' when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?"48 In short, these

internal ironies of dissident IR continue to marginalize, silence, and exile precisely those it seeks to embrace. Worse yet, adds Roger

Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation " frees us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it."49

( ) Prefer policy framework. Checks regress – endless items become nexus questions. Other options unfairly whisk away the 1AC and fail to teach practical approaches to change.

( ) Epistemology should not be the top priority for the ballot – that violent moves us from teaching effective action.Jarvis 2K

(D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate , and

analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one , smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly

marginalized, oppressed and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war , or

the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley

forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some, way bad — is a

contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily.

Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “So what?” to what purpose do they deconstruct problematize , destabilize , undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition ? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics " be judged pertinent relevant helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be

scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

( ) No link and turn – we haven’t said China is an intrinsic threat. We’ve said action-reaction cycles exists and that the US SHOULD MINIMIZE VIOLENT FORMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW. We’re the opposite of the link.

Talking about threats isn’t tied to creating Chinese containment. Refusing to consider threats is a much worse alternative. Friedberg ‘1

(Aaron L. Friedberg, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Professor of Politics and International Affairs, “News Post”, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html, 10/17/12, atl)

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown SinoAmerican rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass ? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios”

of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect . On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea . Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them , as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so , it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

( ) perm – Do the Aff and deploy our reps solely to justification for engaging China. Security reps might lead to containment – but they aren’t intrinsically tied to such responses. We don’t sever anything – we never defended containment.

( ) Representational Alt bad in the context of US-Sino affairs. It won’t trickle up and it boosts violence.Strub ‘15

Doug Strub is a second year M.A. candidate in the International Affairs program at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Relations. His research interests are East Asia, emerging markets, and U.S.-China relations. He recently returned from spending seven months in China studying Mandarin and working at the China Economic Review – “In Response: Seeking Truth from Facts: U.S.-China Relations Require More Than Rhetoric” - International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2012%20Seeking%20Truth%20from%20Facts%20-%20Strub.pdf

Finally. Mitchell argues that "Embracing China's 'new model' language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements," and "...that reluctance to us the phrase is largely unjustified".19 This kind of reasoning is not, in fact, a pragmatic way to approach such a crucial issue. Considering that both the United States and China have expressed the idea that confrontation between a rising power and an established

power is inevitable, simply relying on optimistic rhetoric could ultimately prove quite dangerous. 20 The U.S.-

China relationship has not yet reached a point of trust and cooperation wherein rhetoric alone can serve as a driving force for grand strategy concerns. Terms such as "may" and "largely unjustified" fail to appreciate the importance of the relationship or

the seriousness of the situation and thus fall well short of providing acceptable motivation for policy formulation. Mitchell's recommendation, while contributing significantly to the intellectual discourse on China's rise and its effect on the U.S.-China

relationship, falls short when it comes to the practicality of real world implementation . Several other more

pragmatic and viable approaches exist, including gradual operationalization and elevation of relations to make tangible progress toward a specified target. Agreeing to a "new model" in hopes that it eventually facilitates change merely exchanges immediate progress for the hope of future improvements. If both China and the United States are serious about this issue, an agreement should be reached on what terms will satisfactorily define a "new model," followed by the concurrent signing of commitments to these arrangements and elevation of the status of the relationship. If, on the other hand, one or neither of the actors is in fact genuinely committed to this concept,

then no amount of optimistic linguistic manipulation will solve the issues confronting them. A new arrangement of "major power relations" cannot come into existence overnight merely by declaring it so. Rather, this relationship must continue to grow gradually and define itself through empirical realities as opposed to rhetoricall y

labeling it as something new in the hopes that the act of doing so will eradicate the associated complications and produce a mutually acceptable outcome.

(When the author of this evidence references “Mitchell”, the author is responding to the following article: Ryan Mitchell. "Redefining Pragmatic Engagement: The 'New Model* of U.S.-China Relations and the Opportunity of Shared Consequences,'* International Affairs Review 23. no. 3 - Summer 2015: 114. http://www.iar-gwu.org)

( ) Security K’s dated and bankrupt. Alt fails and associated frameworks hamper understanding the world.

Hynek ‘13

et al; Dr. Nik Hynek is Associate Professor of International Relations and Theory of Politics at the Metropolitan University Prague and Charles University. He holds PhD degree in International Politics and Security Studies from the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford - “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies”- Critical Studies on Security - Volume 1, Issue 1, 2013. Modifed for potentially objectionable language. Obtained via Taylor & Francis Fresh Journals Collection

These ‘post-emancipatory’ scholars still frame Western and international intervention in potentially emancipatory terms, but the horizons and aspirations have been substantially lowered from the universalist call to radical academic policy advocacy, of the founders of emancipatory approaches within

security studies. While the initial confident calls for emancipatory alternatives at least had an understanding of the need for emancipatory agency,

unfortunately found only in Western powers and international institutions, the later approaches lack this clarity and confidence, merely suggesting that

more ‘open’, ‘unscripted’, ‘locally sensitive’, ‘desecuritised’ and less ‘universalist’ and ‘liberal’ approaches can avoid the ‘resistances’

held to come from the local level. If these approaches are ‘emancipatory’ they lack any clear project or programme as to what these claims might mean or how they might be carried out in reality and are little different to mainstream think tank

proposals calling for more ‘local ownership’, ‘local capacity-building’, ‘empowerment’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ (see Chandler 2012, Forthcoming). This article

has argued that the appendage ‘critical’ should be removed to allow Security Studies to free itself of the baggage of its founding. It is clear that what little

emancipatory content critical security theorising had initially has been more than exhausted and, in fact,

thoroughly critiqued. The boom in CSS in the 1990s and early 2000s was essentially parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses, which emphasised the radical and emancipatory possibilities of power, rather than on the basis of giving theoretical clarity to counter-hegemonic forces. We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the ‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and

critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other. Judging policy-making and policy outcomes , on the basis of this imputed goal , may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative

standpoints but it does little to develop academic and political understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater straw man (strawperson ) could have been imagined , than the ability to become ‘critical’ on

the basis of debates around the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory policy missions . Today, as we witness a

narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira

2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere. Some academics and

policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local demands’.

(Note to students: “CSS” is an acronym standing for “Critical Security Studies”)