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Amphibian trucks in the ETO, by Lt Col F.

G. H. Smith. Command and Staff College.

1946-47.

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES

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1946-1.947

Amphibian- Trucks in the ETO

Lt. Col.F.G.H. Smith

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Tah of Contflt.,

Index

Bibliography

Introduction

Development of the Amphibian Truck

Amphibian Trucks in the ETO

Conclusions 16

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Bibliography

1. Army Ordnance - Vol.25 - July-December 1943

2. USFET general Board - Vol.XXII

3. R-2740 - Shore Engineers in Sicily

4. R-2078-1 - Report of Quartermaster Activities inSicily

5. S-2765 - Working of Sicilian Beaches

6. R-4477 - The DUKW,Operation and Uses

7. R-5461-10 - Operation Report Neptune

8. S-6990 - Amphibious Operations, August to December1943

9. S-3934 - Handling Supplies Across Beaches

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IN TSOIIC ION

The purpose of this monograph is to illustrate,so faras possible in the limited time available,a few of the waysin which two and one half ton amphibian trucks (better knownas DUKySi may be successfully employed and some of the pro-blems encountered in their operation and maintenance in theETO which effected their efficiency with the hope that thisinformation may be of some value to you as commanders andstaff officers in making the best possible use of this par-titular vehicle.

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Development of the Amphibian Truck

I would like to discuss, briefly the development of theamphibian truck.

Records indicate that subsequent to 1920 some Army per-ssonel forsaw the necessity for an amphibian vehicle in fut-ure operations and had given condiderable thought to "'amphib-ianizing" conventional vehicular equipment. Prior to 1940,however the theory was generally held to be a "crackpot"''idea.

Early attempts at making vehicles amphibious centeredlargely.around the idea of providing detachable flotationgear and using an outboard motor as a means of propulsion.

The first definitely expressed requirement for an am-phibious vehicle in the United States Army was formallypresented when the military characteristics for the ton,4x4 truck were drawn up on 27 June,1940. These militarycharacteristics specified that the vehicle was to be amph-ibious, if practicable. These amphibious characteristic were not incorporated into the "Jeep" specifications as itwas not considered possible of accomplishment at the timewithout a complete redesigning of the body and the chassis.

On 15 April 1942 the Quartermaster Corps was author-ized by the War Department to pursue the development of anamphibian trek based on, the use of the standard 2- ton,6x6 truck and its components. The research on this vehiclewas turned over by the Quartermaster Corps to the NationalDefense Research Council. A development contract was signedwith the Yellow Truck and Coach Division of General MotorsCorporation,15 April,1942 and forty three days later thefirst pilot model was demonstrated to the QuartermasterMotor Transport Subcommitee. This pilot model was basicallythe DUKW as we know it to-day except for the tires. Theoriginal pilot model was. equipped with standard 7:50x20truck tires. These tires did ,not have sufficient flotationfor use on. sand and the vehicle when thus equipped had noadvantage.. to offer over the standard truck when ,operatingon a beach. The pilot iodel was further tested at FortBelvoir and was then driven to Fort Story for testing inheavy surf. The vehicle stayed at Fort Story for some time.but due to continuing light surf conditions no conclusivetests could be condated. Finally HQ ASF,feeling that pre-liminary tests had indicated the value of the vehicle tothe Army,directed the purchase of several hundred DUKWSincorporating certain recommended changes such as the usel1:00x18 desert type tires and a self contained air com-pressor. Retooling of factories and the introduction ofsome major and many minor changes in the specificationsdelayed the production and issue of this vehicle in time

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for it to be used in the invasion of North Africa.

Amphibian Trucks in the ETO

The landings in North Africa in November 1942 demons-trated the vital need for an amphibious vehicle with areasonably large cargo capacity. During landing operationsthe landing craft engaged in ship to shore operationsfrequently grounded down on what appeared to be the beachbut which in reality were offshore sandbars and as a resultsome men and a considerable amount of supplies and equip-ment were lost when they fell into deepwater runnels. Aconsiderable number of landing ,craft were either lost ordamaged when they broached in the'-surf while landing orbeing unloaded. Furthermore,supplies and equipment carriedin landing craft had to be manhandled at the waterline andsince ther was a serious shortage of both men and landtransportation these supplies were concentrated in largedumps dangerously close to the beach and\ so located as tooffer little or no protection from either the elements orthe enemy. The few available standard trucks were unsatis-factory when used to unload supplies directly from landingcraft since they bogged down in the soft beach sand. As aresult of these experiences a recommendation was made tothe War Department thatin the future,forces making largescale amphibious landings he equipped with some type ofamphibious vehicle capable of continuous ship to shoreunloading operations. This recommendation apparentlyfocused attention on the production of the DUKW.

Early in the spring of 1943 the first amphibipusvehicles were received in the theater and were assignedto the 361st QM Amphibious Bna unit of the Ist EngineerSpecial Brigade. This battalion was given the mission oflearning to operate and maintain these various .types ofvehicles with the least practicable delay. This 'unit hadneither seen -nor heard of these vehicles before and thefact that only one copy of the operating and maintenanceinstructions for each type of -vehicle was made availableadded to the other training problems.

The ton amphibious truck .was found to be ,unsea-worthy in rough water and surf.. The LVT had certaininherent, mechanical deficiencies and ,required a greatamount of maintenance after short periods of operation.For these reasons these vehicles were eliminated foremployment on a large ,scale in future operations.

Training facilities ashore were excellent in theArzew - Port a Poule area. Afloat they left much to bedesired. All, offshore. movements had to be coordinatedwith the Navy and if such movements were outside theharbor area a Naval escort was required. Night opera-tions were frowned upon. Cargo nets and mooring gear had

to be made by the IDW company personnel in their sparetime. Only on ocio could permission be obtained toparticipate in the actual unloading of ships. Captainsof merchant ships complained about wasting their timeby unloading their cargo.into "washtubs on wheels".LST captains were reluctant at first to lower theirramps in deep water and allowing the DUKWS to practiceentering and leaving the LST's at sea. Later these sameLST skippers were among the DUKWS staunchest supporters.

Initially the DUkW operators themselves had beensomewhat skeptical of the DUKWS lability, especially itsability to. carry large drafts of cargo under adverseoperating conditions. Much of this doubt was bas ed onthe fact that a DUKW has a very thin hull and' has a freerboard of twenty three inches forward and eighteen inchesaft. As their operating skill improved so did theirconfidence in the DUKW. This, confidence in the DUKWwas apparently not felt by higher authorities despitefrequent conferences with high powered salesmen sent tothe theater by the War Department with the sole missionof selling the DUKW to these people. As the DUKW companiesbecame more skilled they started to make experiments. Theyfound that with proper rigging a light tank could besafely floated ashore between two DUKWS providing the

•.water was reasonably calm; that by lashing two DUKWStogether abreast and decking over the cargo hatches,halftracks, small and medium sized tractors and fighter planescould easily be ferried ashore; that jeeps and 105 mmhowitzers could be carried in a DUKW; and that by mount-ing an A frame on the stern of a DUKW that it made anexcellent emergency substitute for a mobile crane. Much ofthe credit for the development of the method of carrying105's in DUKWS must go to the 5th FA Bn who volunteeredtheir guns and gun crews for, the exper:iments. GeneralClift Andrus,iot Division Artillery Officer and Col.Waters,Executive Officer,after watching a demonstration of theDUKWS carrying the lOb's .were highly enthusiastic and itis believed that it was their recommendation that DUKWS beused to 'take, in light artillery with the assault echelonsin amphibious operations that. made the initial crack inthe shell of skepticism which seemed to surround highercommanders whenever DUKWS were mentioned. At' a demonstrationput on by the Fifth Army Assault Training Center the DUKWSwere given a prominent place but the only high rankingofficer to show much interest in them was General Montgomery.A few days after this show General Patton requested thathe be taken for a ride in a DUKW. The ride as a whole wasrather uneventful. but it wound up in' a breath taking tripacross some steep sand. dunes on which some of the Generalsproud tanks were badly bogged down. The trip left the Gen-eral white faced and slightly breathless. After looking atthe General the ccrew and other passengers were also white

faced and breathless,but the DUKW had been sol:' In nouncertain words General Patton,:told everyone withinhearing that he wanted DUKWS,lots of DUKWS. He also orderedseveral new DUIWS sent to Arzww together with an equalnumber of SCR 399 radios which were to be installed inthe DUKWS for use by his headquarters. The installation ofthese radios posed a great many problems but tnese wereovercome and the test runs were successful. It is assumedthat they operated satisfactoily thereafter since there twere no epercussions fvm hi gner headquarters.

Once- the DUKWS had been "sold" the next problem wasone of obtaining and training the personnel necessary tooperate and maintain them. The 361st QM Bn was given themission of training eleven hundred troops in ten weeks.The results of this training were. fairly good consider-ing the 361st's limited experience with DUKWS,the limitedfacilities available, administrative difficulties and thepeople they were given to train. The British cadres wereof better than average caliber. The QM battalion werenewly formed units whose personnel had been obtained fromvarious armored units and AAA units which had been brokenup. Their morale was low and their organization anddiscipline. were not of the best. The Engineer regirmentsinsisted on sending thier "eightballs" until the policywas adopted of returning such personnel promptly to therparent units. One Ordnance company was sent up to learnDUKW maintenance. They stayed about three days and wereordered out on some other mission. To help alleviate thedriver shortage,about one hundred fifty drivers wereshipped .from,. the States as fillers. They were a fine, groupof youngsters and were fairly good DUKW drivers but theyin turn posed. another training problem. They had receivedno basic training and arrived completely equipped with onesummer uniform,one suit of impregnated fatigues and one eachcot folding.

Most: of the DUKW units that were to take part in the...Sicilian landings were equipped with new vehicles whichwere shipped by rail to the staging areas. The vehiclesof the 361st QM Bn were ,driven overland from Arzew toBizerte,a distance of about one thousand miles. Althoughthese vehicles had been previously been used almost cont-inuously for training drivers,this long trip over variedterrain and all types of roads presented no unuaual main-tenance problems. The hulls were not damaged and thevehicles were ready for water operation on arrival at Bizerte.

The success of the DKW in, the Sicilian campaign wasphenomenal. It was used for many purposes,including somenot planned for. In addition to carrying in light artillerythey were used by some infantry units to land elements of

the Heavy Weapons company. During an enemy cQunterattackon Gela they were used to move a Ranger Bn to a beachnear the port and contributed greatly to the German defeat\They were operated far inland to evacuate casualties andprisoners directly to the ships. However there were manydrawbacks to suceessful DUKW operations. Very littleweather or hydrographic information was available. DUKWSwere parceled out as individual vehicles or in smallgroups without provision being made for their} return tobattalion control after the original mission nad beencompleted and as a result some DJkWS wej.e Lretained bycombat units for weeks --- until they bro e down or theirtires wore out. Operational control of the UKWS on thebeach and at shipside originally was vested]in personnelwho had little or no knowlegegof DUKW operations and someDUKW were sunk due to overloading at shipside despitedrivers protests. Communications between shore and shipwere poor and there was delay and confusion in dispatch-ing DUKWS to ships. There were insufficient drivers andmechanics in the companies to provide for round the clockoperations nor were trained replacements replacementsavailable for casualties losses. Tired drivers raised theaccident rate and at times DUKWS had to be immobilizedbecause of driver fatigue. Due to a shortage of standardtrucks DUKWS were required to make long inland runswhich reduced their efficiency in unloading ships. Lackof maintenance equipment and spare parts were seriousfactors. Other factors were the tendency of cargo shipsto anchor to far off the beaches; unsatisfactory rangelight on the beaches for night operations; delays inunloading at the dumps due to lack of service personneland cranes; difficulty in handling palletized loads; lackof road signs and military police; and the lack of an SOPfor dispersal of landing craft during air raids. Despitethese drawbacks the DUKWS had demonstrated their usefulness and no operation after "HUSKY" was attempted withoutthem.

The following extracts are taken from after actionreports on operation "HUSKY":

FROM TIE 1 ST ENGTNEER SPEC(TAL BRTADAf RE PORT"This was.s the first large scale employment of DUKWS.

They proved to be very sturdy vehicles that could go any-where. They are a reliable and; rapid means of gettingsupplies' from ship to shore. The use of beach sleds forcarrying shore engineer equipment, and supplies met withvarying degrees of success. One regiment reported verygood results; another regiment had fair results; .anotherregiment wants to burn its sleds. All regimental command-ers agree that DUKWS would eliminate the sled problem.One i'tem sadly lacking was a sificient supply of tires

and tubes for the DUKW~. Brake fluid was another major lack.In this general connection, the equipping of shore troopswas very late and never entirely or satisfactorily comp-leted. This delay was seriously felt during the operation

" DUKWS have been an. outstanding success. The greatestrisk which an assaulting force runs when opposed by a deter-mined enemy is probably that of a counter attack close tothe beach before supporting arms have been taken ashore. Thesupporting arms for the invasion of Sicily were largely inLCT's 'and the wind which arose on D-1 resulted in a delayof several hours in the arrival' of these craft. On manybeaches there was a further delay, also of a few hours, ingetting LCT's close enough to the beaches to allow of thesupporting arms being, unloaded,and that this type of delayis likely to occur so long as we rely mainly on LCT's fordischarge of supporting arms. The obvious solution,if it canbe arranged, is to swim the supporting arms ashore in DUKWSat the same time as the assaulting troops. DUKWS wereactually used in swimming in a number of 105 mm guns twoof which were sunk in the process through adding to muchammunition. We ought to develop more fully the Seventh Armymethod by which supporting arms,with 'nitial ammunitionloads,are brought ashore in DUKWS, andthen unloaded by therDUKWS or by small cranes. taken ashoref or the purpose. Inthis respect the use of sixteen DUKWS by the Americans onD day to D 4 2 for unloading artillery up to and including105 mm proved most successful,artillery being got ashoreand ready to fire very quickly. Seventh Army found thatDUKWS,dripping sea water as they leave the sea are excell-ent beach road preservers. Lastly,it must be emphasisedthat discharge rate at any beach or area is largely depen-dent upon nmbers of small craft and especially DUKWS,avail-able. Seventh Army had very much greater numbers of DUKWSthan Eighth Army and no doubt owed much to this (each DUKWbeing probably worthon average,one ton per working hour).Incidentally,the morta~ty among Seventh Army DUKWS wassurprisingly lpw having only about ten out of commissionout of a total of over t o hundred on~July 22,1943. Onegot the impression that the proportion of lame PTlW,andespecially non-swimming DUKWS,was rather-larger than thisat some Ei th Army beaches'".

In operation "Avalanche" (Salerno) much greater usewas made bf. DUKWS for taking in artillery and anti-tankweapons. Probably due to the lack of standard trucks,agreat many DUKWS were retained ashore after making theirinitial run in. This adversely affected the unloading ofsupplies on the beaches. The Navy was especially criticalsince they were dependingheavily on the DUKWS for ship to

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shore operations.Reports indicate that the British used their DUKWS

on long inland runs and encountered a great deal oftrouble when the DUKWS broke down and blocked the narrowinland roads.

Minimum use was made of DUKWS In this operation.Several trained DUKW units were diverted to operatingstandard trucks. Some of the DUKWS were operated to alimited extent by provisional companies organized fromshore engineer personnelthe balance of the DUKWS wereparked and not used.

During the preliminary training for operation "SHINGLE"(Anzio) a considerable umber of DUKWS and 106 mm howitzerswere gost at sea. This loss was largely due to inexper-ienced personnel and improper operation. In the actualoperation, however,the DUKWS took in the artillery withouta loss. They were invaluable in this operation for in addi-tion to thA&r normal role of carrying cargo direct fromship to shore they were used to unload LCT 1 s which couldnot be beacheo because of bad weather and surf conditionswhich prevailed. Twenty five percent of the cargo unloadedat Anzio was carried by DUKWS.

There were many instances where DUKWS were used in theETO to expedite the movement of troops,small vehicles andsupplies during riTar crossings but in most of these casesthe use. of DUKWS was a last resort. It is felt that the useof DUKWS in river crossings and in pursuits and exploitationscould be of great value,especially to the Infantry,in anyfuture operations of this nature.

JUndoubtably the greatest use made of DUKWS in the pastwar was on the Normandy beaches.

In planning operation "NEPTUNE" personnel familiar withDUKW operations were, for the first time in any operation,consulted by high level staff planners concerning the use ofthe DUKWS in the assault and succeeding phases of the oper-ation. For the first time,DUKW companies were authorized andfurnished adequate organic third echelon equipment. For thefirst time, consideration was given to the idea of givingthe DUKW companies sufficient personnel to operate roundthe clock and lasutb not least DUKW units were given anopportunity to participate in the training of the units theywere to support in the initial phases. One other lesson hadbeen learned -- DTJKWS were no longer to be hastily organizedinto provisional units or scattered individually throughoutother units without adequate means for maintenance or oper-ational control.

Training plans for operation "NEPTUNE",in so far asthey pertained to DUKWS,were initially based on information

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from the States which indicated that the additional DUKWunits being furnished would be trained and fully equipped.They were fully equipped although their DUKWS did nbtarrive until sometime after the troops which was a serious-training handicap. Most of the white companies were welltrained as DUKW operators but their maintenance platoonswere poorly trained especially in third echelon maintenance.this was, largely due to the policy in the training centerthat all third echelon maintenance was to be performed atthe Ordnance maintenance shops. In addition,the ability ofthe units tb live and operate under field 'conditions leftmuch to be desired.

The colored units were the biggest training problem.These units had been hastily activated and neither theofficers were trained in DUKW operations. Although theseunits records indicated that they had been inspected, andtheir status of training approved,both by TC inspectorsand by various- I ectors General it was found by actualcount in three. companies that approximately seventy per-cent of the men could not drive a vehicle of any kind. Thebulk of the officers,while they had previously been stationedat the TCRTC,had held administrative jobs which did notrequire them to know anything about DUKW operations. Themaintenance platoons were so poorly trained that it wasnecessary to farm out most of their maintenance to othercompanies. Despite vigorous protests to higher headquarters,no replacements were made available to replace these peoplenor could permission be obtained to leave them in the UKuntil they could be trained.

Maps, charts, hydrographi c and weather informationfurnished the DUKW units prior to D day were excellentand this information was, kept current to within an houror so of sailing time. After the landing the weatherinformation and tide tables furnished by the Air Forcewas "to little and to late" and the little amount ofshort range weather information received was not veryaccurate. Accurate short range forecasts would have beeninvaluable in planning day to day operations.

On D day the DUKWS assigned to Utah Beach landed onschedule and with compare tively light losses due to enemyfire and mines. Off Omaha Beach f rty four out of onehundred fifty saix DUKWS were lostargely due to inexperience.These DUKWS had been loaded with ' minimum of five tons--each and some were loaded with as much as seven tons. Dueconditions on the beach during the e arly. stages of theassault were ordered not to land but rendevous offshoreand await further orders. Apparently no thought had beengiveno the fact that most of :hese vehicles had been putafloat fifteen miles offshore and that their normal rangeat sea without refueling is twenty eight nautical miles.

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The water was to rough for the DUKWS to refuel in the opensea with the loads they were carrying. They were allowedto circle until their fuel was exhausted, their pumps stoppedand they foundered. Other DUKWS were lost due to inexperienceddrivers stowing gear in the bilges which clogged the pumpsor placing gear over the air intakes which burned up theengines.

DUKWS helped solve the traffic problem on Utah Beachby making their own road over the sand dunes after engineershad blasted holes in the seawall

As usual,DUKWS were forced to operate far inland dueto lack of truck transportation. As more trucks becameavailable this condition was corrected by the establish-ment of beach transfer points.

During the initial phases of the operation approx-imately eighty percent of the casualties were evacuatedfrom holding points to hospital ships by DUKWS. This methodof evacuation was faster, eliminated several handlings of tihpatients and also gave them a muh smoother ride.

During the big storm of 19-22 June the DUKWS againdemonstrated their seaworthiness and their value as cargocarriers. Due to .the critical supply situation they wereoperated as long as cargo could safely be put over thesides of the ships and they were able to operate again assoon as the storm ab tdd sufficiently to a: ow the shipsgear to be worked. The DUKWS could. safely negotiate thesurf which was creating havoc among other types of landingcraft and were safely ashore- making maximum use of thisunexpected .free, time to effect repairs and to rest. A fewDUKWS were used to maintain a constant watch on the beachand were aed, to evacuate crews o other damaged craft; toevacuate AAA guncrews from shipd forming the "Gooseberry"as they broke up; to carry rations to other AAA gun crewson the "Gooseberry"; and to take medical aid to injuredcrew members on cargo ships.

After the storm DUS were used extensively as towingcraft in clearing the beaches,. The maintenance platoonswere invaluable in effecting hull repairs on the largerships since they could mount their heavy duty weldingequipment in DUKWS,travel easily from. ship to ship andmake the necessary repairs without leaving the DUKW.

Truck battalion headquarters which were given commandof DUKW .companies were inefficient due to lack of trainingin DUKW operations and the result was that operationalcontrol had to be centralized in the experienced battalionheadquarters which placed an .undue burden on such units.

Once again maintaannce, maintenance supplies and main-tenance personnel were a serious problem. In the coloredcompanies it was necessary to have practically all of thesecond and third echelon maintenance performed by PW mech-anics. White companies also had to re-inforce their maint-enance platoons with PW mechanics due to the lack of spare

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parts. Hulls were patbhdd with salvaged metal from tankshrouds; exhaust tubes were made by welding sections ofsteel pipe; manifolds had to be welded and rewelded;control cable had to be salvaged from wrecked aircraftand gliders or made from barrage balloon cable; strutbearings were made from apple wood and strut bearing capsfrom angle iron; brass for repairing propellors was obtainedby cutting shell casings into small strips. Only a fewspare tires were avAilabe and the tire repair units whenthey finally arrived were not equipped to repair DUKW tires.Ordnance Heavy Maintenance units were not equipped to makerepairs to electrical units,propellors or propellor shafts.Informal arrangements were made with nearby Air Corps unitsto obtain aircraft control cable on a few hours notice fromthe UK. Navy repair ships were also of immense aid to theDUKW units when they were in the vicinity of the beaches.They repaired electrical units,-propellors and propellorshafts rapidly,the workmanship was excellent and there wasno red tape involved. All of this extra maintenance burdenon the DUKW units could have been avoided by proper staffplanning at higher levels.

One of the unforesean problems that was encountered,especially in the colored units,was a reluctance on thepart of some drivers to operate alone at night at seaunder blackout conditon ns or ashore when they were subjectto sniping fire. Many of these men had a very real fearof the water and should never have been assigned to a DUKWunit.

Many of the officers and some of the men in the newDUKW units were overage or limited service and were notphysically capable of enduring sustained round-the-clockoperations in rough water which is the rule rather thanthe exception the English Channel.

Signal communications ashore were excellent but shoreto ship communications were poor due to lack of trainedsignal personnel and the lack of suitable equipment. Poorship to shore communications resulted in delays in shiftingDUKWS to ships which needed them from ships which had asurplus of DUKWS waiting to be loaded.

The Navy had some difficulty in locating incomingships and getting them anchored in the right place at theright time. This function was taken over by the EngineerSpecial Brigades and DUKWS equipped with radios werediverted for use as control boats since the boats of theHarborcraft company were not sufficiently sturdy or sea-worthy.

Another drain was placed on the experienced DUKWcompanies personnel by poorly trained and poorly equip-ped Port companies. It was necessary to organize riggingcrews from DUKW companies personnel to meet incomingship~s:cith necessary gear and rig the ships for DUKWoperations. They were also frequently called on to re-pair damaged hoisting gear and to make slings,barrelhooks,etc. 14

There is practically no information available as tothe use made of the DUKWS in the major. continental ports.Reports indicate that the DUKW units at Cherbourg werevery efficient and were responsible for unloading a con-siderable part of the cargo which passed through that port.

At LeHavre the tDUKS were not used efficiently. At onetime there were ten companies at the port and due,partlyto lack of training but largely due to lack of propersupervision,some of these companies could only mustereight operational DUKWS per day. With the ideal operatingconditions which prevailed at this port and the portslimited capacity for handling cargo ashore,two or threeproperly trained companies would have been sufficient.

Considerable experimental work was done in conjunc-tion with the Engineers using D KS in bridging andferrying operations in preparation for the Rhine crossings.From what little information is ava ilable,it appears thatthey were used successfully.

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1. The DUKW is a sturdy,seaworthy vehicle and an efficientcargo carrier when operated by properly trained perssoneland its versatility makes it invaluable in amphibianoperations.

2. More DUKW units will be required in any major operationin the near future because of the probable destructionof major pports by atomic missiles.

3. The DUKW is a specialized peice of equipment and person-nel intended to operate it require extensive specializedtraining in addition to thorough basic training.

4. As they are now organized, DUKW companies and battalionheadquarters do not have sufficient personnel for eff-icient round-the-clock operations.

5. If maximum efficiency is to be obtained from new typesof equipment as it is adopted by the Army,more closelycoordinated staff planning at the higher levels isnecessary to assure that properly selected and trainedpersonnel are available to operate the equipment andthat adequate parts,naterials and equipment are avail-able for maintaining it,

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