uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the united states and japan

8/3/2019 Uncertainty, Trust, And Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan

1/31

Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and JapanAuthor(s): Toshio Yamagishi, Karen S. Cook, Motoki WatabeSource: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Jul., 1998), pp. 165-194Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2990846

Accessed: 23/10/2010 16:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The

American Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2990846?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2990846?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/31

Uncertainty, rust, nd CommitmentFormation n the UnitedStates and Japan'Toshio YamagishiHokkaido UniversityKaren S. CookDuke UniversityMotoki WatabeUniversity f California, os Angeles

A theory f trust roposedby Yamagishi and Yamagishi providesthebasisfor hepredictionhat 1) socialuncertaintyromotesom-mitment ormation etween articular artnersnd (2) high rusterstend to form ommitted elations ess frequentlyhanwould lowtrusterswhenfacing ocial uncertainty.hese predictions eceivesupportntwo experimentsonductedntheUnitedStates andJa-pan. The findings rovide mpirical upport or hetheory f trustthatemphasizes he role ofgeneral rusttrustn othersngeneral)inemancipating eoplefrom heconfinesf afe, utclosedrelation-ships.The results lso offer theoreticalxplanation orwhat havebeen viewed n thepast as culturaldifferences.

INTRODUCTIONIntensefamily ies prevent rust rom eveloping eyond he confines fthefamily. his is the central hesis f Fukuyama's 1995)book on trust.From a similar heoretical erspective, amagishiandhisassociates Ki-yonari nd Yamagishi 1996; Yamagishiand Yamagishi 1989; Yamagishi' The research resentedn this rticlewas supported y scientificesearch rantsfrom he nstitutefNuclear afety ystemsnd theJapaneseMinistryfEducation.We would iketo thankJ.Misumi f the nstitute fNuclearSafety ystemsorhissupportndencouragementf our research roject.We are alsogratefulo NahokoHayashi,NobuhitoJin,NobuyukiTahakashi,YorikoWatanabe,MotokoKosugi,MasanoriTakezawa, ShawnDonnelly, nd Bob Duniwayfortheir ssistance nconductingxperiments.lease address orrespondenceo ToshioYamagishi, ac-ulty fLetters, okkaidoUniversity,10 W7Kita-ku, apporo,Japan060. E-mail:Toshiolet.hines.hokudai.ac.jp? 1998byThe UniversityfChicago.Allrights eserved.0002-9602/98/10401-0005$0250

AJS Volume104 Number1 (July1998): 165-94 165


3/31

AmericanJournal fSociology1995c,1995d,1996, npress;YamagishiandKomiyama1995;Yamagishiet al. 1996;Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, n press;Yamagishi et al.1995)have conducted esearch hatconfirmsheproposition hat ntensegroup ies, ften bserved ncollectivistultures, reventrust rom evel-oping beyondgroup boundaries. The proposition-strongfamily ndgrouptiesconfine trust" o within heboundaries f thefamilynd thegroup-advanced bythese and other cholars e.g.,Gellner1988; Haw-thorn 988)makes ntuitive ense on the onehand,but at thesame timeit contains ounterintuitivemplications.n particular,t mplies hat oci-etiescharacterizedy a prevalence fstrongocial ties such as Japanesesociety) roduce esstrustmong heirmembershando societiesnwhichsocial and interpersonalies areweaker.This implications counterintu-itive ince t is commonly elievedthata society haracterized y strongsocial andinterpersonalelations,uchas Japanese ociety,s also charac-terizedbya high evel oftrust mong tsmembers.Despite thiscommonview and consistentwiththe mplication f theabove proposition,ross-societal esearch omparing heUnitedStatesandJapanhas repeatedly emonstratedhat the evel ofgeneral rust smuchhighernAmerican ociety han nJapanesesociety. irst,basedon the above proposition, amagishiand Yamagishi 1994) derivedtheprediction hattheaverage evel ofgeneral rust i.e.,trust n others ngeneral)would behighermongAmericans han mong heJapanese ndconfirmedhispredictionn results btainedfrom cross-societalues-tionnaireurvey.Althoughhis urvey id not use nationally epresenta-tive amples, nother,more ystematictudy onducted ythe nstitute fStatisticalMathematicsHayashiet al. 1982)using epresentativeationalsamples reports similar cross-national ifference. ccordingto thisstudy, 7% of theAmerican ample N = 1,571)responded Peoplecanbe trusted"o thequestion, Do youthinkyou can put your rustnmostpeople,or doyouthinkt's alwaysbestto be onyourguard?" n contrast,only26% oftheJapanesesample N = 2,032)gave thesame response.Similarly, 7% oftheAmerican ample, ompared o 19%oftheJapanesesample, nswered hatpeopletry o be helpfulwhenasked,"Wouldyousaythatmostof thetimepeopletry o be helpful, rthatthey remostlyjust looking ut for hemselves?"Building n thepropositionhat trongnd stable ocialrelationssuchas family ies and group ties) promote sense of securitywithin uchrelations utendanger rust hat xtends eyond heserelations, amagi-shi and Yamagishi 1994) provided n explanation orthecounterintu-itive,butconsistent,inding hatAmericans remore trusting"han theJapanese.The purpose f his tudys toprovide urthermpiricalupportfor hetheory ftrustproposedbyYamagishi and his associates.After166


4/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentdescribing hetheorywe present indingsrom wocross-societalxperi-ments onductedn theUnitedStates Seattle) ndJapan Sapporo).INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS INDIVIDUALISTIC VIEWSOF CULTUREThe theoryf rust evelopedbyYamagishi ndhisassociates sprimarilybased on thecontrast etween nstitutionalnd individualistic iews ofculture. amagishi 1988a)compared he endencies fAmericanndJap-anesesubjects odesert oa group hat ontained ree iders. he commonview of he ulturesnAmerican ndJapanese ocieties-theformerhar-acterizedby individualismnd the atterbycollectivism-would mplythatJapanesesubjectswould have a stronger reference o stay n thegroupthanAmericanswould,given theexistence ffreeriding n thepartofother roupmembers. ontraryothis implisticiew ofAmericanand Japanesecultures, heresults fthisexperimentndicated hat thetendencyoremainnthegroupwas much trongermong heAmericansubjectsthan it was amongtheJapanese.More specifically, mericansubjectsexited hegroupon only lightlymorethanone out of 20 trialswhenthey ncurredmonetaryosts i.e., n thehigh-exit-costondition)for eaving,whereasJapanese ubjectsexitedthegroupmuchmorefre-quently on abouteight ut of 20 trials), espite hefact hatthey arnedmuch essmoneybydoing so. This differencen exitrates did notexistbetweenAmerican nd Japanesesubjectswhen theexit costswere low(i.e., nthe ow-exit-costondition). heseresultsndicate hatbothAmer-ican and Japanesesubjectsdisliked tayingn a group withfreeriders,as evidencedbythehigh evelof exitresponsesmongbothgroups nthelow-cost ondition. owever,Americanubjects tayednthegroupwhentheexitresponsewas costly,whereasJapanesesubjects werewilling opay extrafor he exitoption.These resultswould be difficulto explaininterms fthe ndividualisticiew ofculture.fJapanesepeople arecol-lectivistn thesensethattheyprefero be partof thegrouprather hanindependent rom hegroup, nd ifAmericanpeople are individualisticinthe ensethat hey alue independence rom hegroup, henAmericansubjects houldhave exitedmoreoften handid theJapanese ubjects nthisexperimentegardless fcost.This seeminglyounterintuitiveattern ffindingswas predicted yYamagishi 1988a) based onwhat he calls the institutionaliew" of cul-ture.According o thisview, theJapanese often prefer" o belongtogroups nd placegroup nterestsbove their wnindividual nterests otbecausetheyntrinsicallyike todo so,butbecause t s intheir wn ong-term nterest.n the context f freeriding n a collectiveworkgroup,Japanese ocietyhas developedsystems fmutualmonitoringnd sanc-

167


5/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologytioning o curtailfreeriding Hechter nd Kanazawa 1993), and thesesolutionsworkfor he group nsofar s such a "collective olution" o thefreeriderproblem s in place. However, n groups rtificiallyreated nthe laboratorywithout pportunities orface-to-facenteractioni.e., nthe groupsused in Yamagishi's experiment)uch collective olutions sinformalmutualmonitoringnd sanctioning o notexist. n such a situa-tion,Japanesepeople tendto prefer ot to stay nthe group, s indicatedbytheexperimentalesults.A collectivistulture idnot exist mong heJapanese ubjectswhoparticipatednthisexperimentecausetheartifi-cially reatedgroups ackedopportunitiesor hemutualmonitoringndsanctioningfeach other'sbehavior.Another xperiment y Yamagishi (1988b) provides an even clearercontrast etween he ndividualistic iewof culture nd this nstitutionalviewof culture.n a cross-societalxperimentetween he UnitedStatesandJapan comparing ooperative endenciesnsocialdilemmas, ubjectsin four-person roupswere each given 50? (U.S.) or V100 Japan)2 ndwere sked how much f hemoney heywanted oprovide or hewelfareoftheother roupmembers. heycouldcontributeny amountbetweenzeroand 50? or V100.The amountprovidedbythesubject was doubledinvalue and then qually llocated mong heother hreemembers. hus,if all four ontributedhe full mount, ach earned$1 or V200.However,thesubject ould have earnedmore $1.50/V300)fhe or shehadnot con-tributed nywhile the other hreefully ontributed. he decision wasrepeated12times Japan)or 16 timesU.S.), and thusthepurefree idercould earn$1.50times16 $24),or V300 imes12 V3,600). hese amountswere maller han hose heywouldhaveobtained f ll fourkept ontrib-utingnfull$16orV2,400). hus,not ontributingt all was thedominantor"rational" hoice.However, feveryone ad chosenthisdominant e-sponse achwouldhave earnedonly 0? orV100pertrial nd $8 orV1,200intotal.This situation epresents social dilemmanwhich 1) each mem-ber has a choice betweenC (cooperation, ontributinghe fullamount)and D (defection, ontributing othing),2) the choice ofD producesbetter utcome or memberhan he hoiceofC regardlessfthechoicesof the othermembers,nd yet 3) the ndividual utcomewhenall mem-bers chooseD is worsethanthe ndividualoutcomewhen all choose C(see Dawes [1980],Messickand Brewer 1983],and Yamagishi [1995b],forreviewsofthe social dilemma iterature).The individualistic iew of culture-thatJapanese ndividualsvaluegroup nterests ver individual nterestsmore so than Americansdo-predicts hatJapanese ubjects re more ikely o cooperatenthis xperi-mentthan are American ubjects.On theotherhand,the institutional2 At thetime f theexperiment,1.00 was worth boutX4200.168


6/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentview of culture-thatJapanese ndividuals ooperatewith hegroupbe-cause thereexists a system f formal nd informalmutualmonitoringand sanctioning-predictshatJapanese ubjectswillcooperate essthanAmerican ubjectswill in suchan experimentalocial dilemma.This isbecause theJapanese reso accustomed oan environmentn which ol-lectivesystems fmutualsanctioning uaranteemutualcooperationnthegroupthattheywouldfeel nsecure n a social environmentackingsucha systemfmutualmonitoringnd sanctioning. singthis easoning,Yamagishi 1988b)predicted hatJapanese ubjectswouldhave a lowerlevel oftrust n strangersnd would cooperate ess in social dilemmasinvolvingtrangersompared othebehavior fAmerican ubjects.Thispredictionlso received learempiricalupport. ontraryothe ndividu-alisticviewofculture,nd consistent iththe nstitutionaliew,Ameri-cansubjects nthis xperimentooperatedmore ftencontributing6.2%of50? pertrial)thandid Japanesesubjects who contributed 4.4% ofV100 per trial).Furthermore,he questionnaire ata showed that theAmerican ubjectsweremoretrustinghantheJapanesewere.3 hat is,in a group onsistingfstrangers,acking pportunitiesormutual anc-tioning, merican ubjectsvoluntarilyooperated nd contributedmoreto the welfare f thegroupthantheJapanese ubjectsdid. On theotherhand, nanother onditionnwhich ubjectswere givenopportunitiesosanction ach other, heJapanese ubjectsbecamemuch morecoopera-tive.With he addition fopportunitiesormutual anctioning, apanesesubjects' averagecooperation evel increasedfrom 4.4% to 74.6%, animprovementf 30 percentage oints. n contrast,hesanctioningppor-tunities idnothaveas strongneffectn theAmericans. he sanctioningopportunitiesmproved he average cooperation evel of the Americansubjects'from 6.2% to 75.5%,an improvementf19 percentage oints.It was thusshownthatthe "collectivist"ehavior-cooperationfor hewelfare fthegroup s a whole-among theJapanese ubjectswas main-tainedto a largeextentby thesystem fmutualmonitoringnd sanc-tioning,ather hanbytheir resumedvaluesystem"ccording o whicheach individualplaces thegroup'swelfare bove his or her own self-interest.A THEORY OF TRUSTYamagishiand his associateshave developedthe "emancipation"heoryof trust s a theoreticalxtension f the nstitutionaliew of culture ro-'Earlier studies y Yamagishi ndhis associates Yamagishi 988b, amagishi ndYamagishi1994) lso report similar ifferencen the evelofgeneral rust etweenAmericannd Japanese espondents.

169


7/31

AmericanJournal fSociologyposed in their ross-societalxperiments.4ccording o thistheory, en-eraltrust trustnothersngeneral) nd commitmentormationre con-sidered lternativeolutions otheproblems aused bysocial uncertainty.Social uncertaintys ubiquitous nhuman society.Wheneverwe interactwithotherswefacetheproblem f ocialuncertainty. e engage nsocialinteractions ithothers o improve urown welfare,material r psycho-logical;however,n nteracting ith therswe makeourselves ulnerable.We seek to improve urwelfarewhiletaking he riskof ncurringosts.We use theterm socialuncertainty"o refer o therisk fbeing xploitedin social nteractions.hat is, socialuncertaintys defined s existing oran actorwhen 1) his or her nteractionartner as an incentive o act ina waythat mposes osts or harm)on theactor nd (2) theactordoesnothave enough nformationopredictf thepartnerwill nfact ct in sucha way.Kollock 1994)provides goodexampleof howsocialuncertaintyro-motes commitmentetweenparticular xchange partners.5 he exam-ples he uses are riceand rubbermarketsn SoutheastAsia. The qualityof rice is immediately pparentupon simple nspection. he buyerhaslittle isk fbeing heated n thequality fricehebuys, nd thushe facesa low level ofsocialuncertainty.n contrast,hequalityofraw rubber shardto udge; itsquality an be knownonly fterthas beenprocessed.Cheatingon quality s easier,and theconsequenceofbeingcheated nthis ituationsextremelyerious.n otherwords, hebuyer fraw rubberthusfaces a high evel ofsocialuncertainty.his differencensocialun-certainty oncerninghequalityof riceand rubber,Kollockargues, x-plainstheobserveddifferencenthedominant orm ftrade.Rice is usu-allytraded at openmarkets etween trangers, hereasrubber s oftentradedbetween particular roducer nd a brokerwho have formedlong-termelationship,ften xtending ver severalgenerations. highlevelof ocialuncertaintyoncerninghequality frubber s thedetermin-ing factorfor the development f such committed elationsbetweenrubberproducers nd brokers see also Akerlof 970).The experimentKollockconducted s a laboratory ersionof riceand rubber rades. none conditionthehigh uncertaintyondition), ellerscould lie to their4We call these xperimentscross-societal"ather han cross-cultural"ince heir ur-posewas to show hat ultural ifferencesan be often eexplainednterms fother,more angible heoreticalariables.'The term commitment"nthis rticle s used na strictlyehavioralmanner. neis defined s committedo a relationshipo thedegree hathe or sheforgoes etteralternatives. utualattraction,iking,ndloyaltymay mergensucha committedrelation,nd when hey o, theywill ertainlytrengthenhe ommitment.everthe-less, uchpsychologicalactors,owevertronglyelatedocommitment,re not om-mitmenttselfnthis ense.170


8/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentpotentialbuyersconcerning he quality of the productthey sold. Inthe other ondition the ow uncertaintyondition), ellers ould not ie.The results f Kollock's experimentemonstratedhatcommitmentor-mationbetween particulareller nd a particular uyer ccurredmorefrequentlyn the highuncertaintyondition han n the ow uncertaintycondition.Commitmentormations a solution o problems f socialuncertainty,however,has its ownproblems.While reducing heriskofbeing dupedin interacting ithunfamiliar eople,6 t imits he actor'schoicesfor x-ploring etter pportunitieshatmight xistoutside hecurrent elation-ship. Using terminologyrom conomics, ommitmentormation educestransactionosts, n the onehand,but mposesopportunityosts, n theother. n forming commitment ith a particular artner, ne obtainssecurityi.e.,a reductionnsocialuncertainty)nexchange or pportuni-ties.Commitmentormationsan efficient eansfor educing ncertaintyin a situationn whichoutsideopportunitiesre limited i.e., whenthegeneralevel ofopportunityosts s low).On theother and, uch commit-mentsbecome a liability ather han an asset as people facemoreandbetter pportunitiesutsidetheir urrent,mutually ommitted elation-ships i.e.,whenthegeneral evelofopportunityosts ntheenvironmentis high).General trust or trust n people in general)provides spring-boardforpeoplewhohavebeen "confined"ocommittedelationshipsomove out nto he argerworldofopportunities.7n thisway general rust6Accordingo Yamagishi nd Yamagishi 1994), ocialuncertaintysreducedncom-mitted elations or he ollowingeasons. irst, ommittedartnersccumulatenfor-mation bouteach other. econd, hostage-taking"ehaviors, hich angefrom heformationf mutual motional ttachmentso theestablishmentf relation-specificassets Helper ndLevine1992), evelop nmutuallyommittedelations;hesehos-tage-takingehaviors rovide eterrencegainst nilateralefectionShapiro, hep-pard, nd Cheraskin 992). inally, trategiesuch s tit-for-tatan be usedto controleach other's ehavior cf.Axelrod 984).7Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994)mention our easons or hedifficultyeoplehavein eaving committedelationshipvenwhen tbecomes liability. irst, ommittedpeople are bydefinitionhosewho staywiththecurrent elations espite utsideopportunitiessee n. 3 above).Theymay ventuallyeave the ommittedelationship,but hereypicallys a substantialimeag. Secondly,hemutual ttractionnd oyaltythathave developed hroughherelationshipeeppartnersntherelationship.hird,a temporaryetter ffer rom utsiders ould notbe sufficientor heone who hasinvested n relation-specificssets see n. 4 above) to leave the currentelationship.Social and psychologicalssets, uch as the warmmemoryfa pleasantpast andmutual nderstanding,aybe considered elation-specificssets hatkeeppeople nthese elationships.inally, ommitmento a particular artner fteneduces he eveloftrustn"outsiders"see KiyonarindYamagishi 1996]for xperimentalupport),creating vicious ycleofdistrust foutsiders; hosewho do not trust outsiders"tend ostay ncommittedelationships,ndbecausethey void "outsiders"hey e-comeeven ess trustingf"outsiders."

171


9/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologyemancipates eoplefrom he confines nd security f stable,committedrelationships.8In Japanese ociety he stabilityf nterorganizationals well as inter-personalrelationshipsmakes exploitative,hort-termrofit-maximizingbehavior essprofitablehan nAmerican ociety. he one who desertsrelationshipor uick profit ill have a harder ime n a societyn whichother elationshipsre mainly losed to outsiders.n otherwords, he ta-ble nature f socialand organizational elationshipseduces ocial uncer-tainty nd provides ecurity nside of such relationships. his sense ofsecurityswhat s often onsidered trust"when characterizingheJapa-nese scene.However, once such sociorelational ases of securityre re-moved,the Japanesemayfeel more nsecure han Americans o. Whenfacingstrangers utsideof establishedrelationships,he Japanesearemoredistrustfulf othersn general. n short,n contrast oAmericans,Japanese eel greaterenseof ecurity ithin stablishednd stablerela-tionships ut aremoredistrustfulfpeopleoutside f the context fsuchrelationships.In theexperimentsresented elow,we conduct mpirical ests fcriti-cal aspectsofthetheoryf trust rieflyescribed bove. The firstxperi-ment ests hepropositionhat ocial uncertaintyacilitatesommitmentformation.n the second experiment, e test anothercriticalproposi-tion that trust mancipatespeoplefrom ommitted elationships. hesetwo experiments ere conducted n the UnitedStates and in Japan inorder o demonstrate hatthetheory ppliesto bothsocieties nd helpsto explainwhat have previously een viewed as strictlyulturaldiffer-ences.

8Wedo notdiscusshere hemechanismywhichpeople ivingnsuchan environ-ment ome o acquire high evelofgeneralrust. eingfully wareof hepotentiallyquasi-functionalature four rgument ithoutuch mechanism,e are proposingelsewhere ow nvestmentncognitiveesourcesrovidesuch mechanismYama-gishi 995a, 996), ccordingowhich eneralrusts a by-productf ognitivenvest-ments. hat is,thosewho have dedicated significantroportionf their ognitiveresources o developingkills o discernrustworthyrom ntrustworthyeoplecanafford o maintain ighdefault xpectationsf others' evelsof trustworthiness.ymaintaining high evel of general rust,hey njoy he advantage f being ble toexplore ullyhose pportunitieshat ie outside heir stablishedelationships.tthesame time, hey anquickly ull outofpotentiallyarmful rcostly elationshipstthefirstignofrisk.Those who havenotmade suchcognitivenvestmentsreslowindetectinghe igns funtrustworthinessn their artnersndthus re ess ikely oexplore otentiallyruitful,utriskyelationships.onsistent ith hismodel, everalexperimentaltudies Kikuchi,Watanabe, ndYamagishi 995;Kosugi 1996;Kosugiand Yamagishi1995) have shown hatcompared o low trusters,igh rustersremore sensitive o informationotentiallyevealing therpeople'strustworthinessand aremore ccuratendiscerningrustworthyeoplefrom hosewho are untrust-worthy.172


10/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd CommitmentEXPERIMENT 1The first tudy xamines he key proposition estedby Kollock 1994) inhis nvestigationf differencesn situations uch as thosereflectedn thecomparison f rice and rubbermarkets.Kollock's experimentimulatedtransactions etweenbuyers nd sellers. n one condition the uncertain-quality ondition),hetrue uality fthegoodssoldbysellerswas knownonly o theseller.The seller nnounced he qualityofthe goods he or sheofferedo sell to a potentialbuyer,but onlythesellerknewthetruth.Buyers n thiscondition ould be deceived concerning he qualityof thegoods theywerebuying. n thecertain-qualityondition,hequalityofall goodsofferedor ale weretransparentoeveryone,ncluding oth hesellers nd thebuyers.We also simulated rading ractices etween uyersand sellers.However,our experiment iffered romKollock's in threerespects. irst,onlyone person a buyer)was theactual human subjectin our study.The restwere "simulated ctors" r programmed esponsesbya computer. his changeprovided s with chanceto test hepredic-tionsunder more ontrolled nvironment.econd,we developed morepowerfulmanipulation fsocialuncertainty.n addition oallowing ell-ers through imulatedresponses)not to reveal the truequalityof theirgoods,we also gavethem hechanceto extortmoney romhebuyer. hepotentially egative onsequences fbuying rom hewrong eller nthisexperimentre thusmuchmore erious han nKollock'soriginal xperi-ment.Finally,we replicated he same experimentn theUnited Statesand inJapanto investigatehegeneralityfthepropositioncross twodifferentultures.Although he iteraturenJapanese ociety ndJapa-nese business mphasizes he table nd long-term ature f nterpersonaland interorganizationalelations n Japan,we predict hatthelevel ofcommitmentormation ould be thesame among Americans nd Japa-nese when theyface the same level of social uncertaintynd when theyare matched n their evelsoftrust. pecifically, e tested hefollowingtwohypotheses erivedfrom urtheory f trust.HYPOTHESIS 1.-Social uncertainty illfacilitate ommitmentorma-tion between articular artners.Thishypothesis as originally evelopedby Cook and Emerson 1978)and was successfullyested yKollock 1994).AccordingoKollock,whenfaced with high evel ofsocialuncertaintyr "a situationn whichonecan be taken dvantageof, henatural esponses to restrictne'stransac-tions o thosewhohave shown hemselves o be trustworthyi.e.,becom-ing committed o particular xchangepartners)"1994, p. 318). Further-more, onstructionfa mutually ommitted elationshipransformshe"one-shot" nteractionsnto"iterated"nteractions, sing gametheoreticterms, nd thusmakescooperative hoices ndividuallymoreprofitable

173


11/31

AmericanJournal fSociologythannoncooperativehoices s theprisoner's ilemma iteraturecf.Axel-rod 1984) indicates.The expectation f future enefits emovesuncer-tainty i.e.,the chance ofbeingexploited y thepartner) rom mutuallycommitted,ong-termelationship.n otherwords, he benefit xpectedin the future rovides ssurance ofthe partner'swillingness o act in abenign manner.Finally,the literature n prisoner'sdilemmanetworks(Hayashi 1993, 1995;Hayashi, Jin, nd Yamagishi 1993; Jin,Hayashi,and Shinotsuka 993;Schuessler 989;Vanberg ndCongleton 992;Ya-magishi nd Hayashi 1996;Yamagishi,Hayashi,and Jin 1994)providesfurtherxperimentalnd simulation videncethat people facing ocialuncertaintyend o formmutually ommittedelationships. he situationstudied nthis iteratures a "prisoner's ilemmanetwork"nwhichpeo-ple selectpartners oplay prisoner's ilemmagameswith i.e. nteractionsituations haracterizedya high evel ofsocialuncertainty).t has beenestablishedn this iterature hatone ofthe most effectivetrategiesnprisoner's ilemmanetworkssthe it-for-tattrategyAxelrod 984;Hay-ashi 1993,1995),according o whicha playerkeepscooperatingwithacooperative artner nd deserts hepartner s soon as he or shefailstocooperate.The playerwho has adoptedthis trategyecomes ommittedto a cooperativepartner, nd if thepartnerhas also adoptedthe samestrategyhey orm mutuallyommittedelation.n all ofthese cenarios,it is social uncertaintyi.e.,the risk ofbeing exploited n social interac-tions)thatdrivespeople to formmutually ommitted,safe" relation-ships.HYPOTHESIS 2.-The levelof commitmentormationmongJapanesesubjectswillnotbedifferentrom hat mongAmericanubjectswhen helevel of social uncertainty nd trust re made equivalent n the twogroups.

The theoryf rust roposed yYamagishi ndYamagishi 1994) positstwomajordeterminantsfcommitmentormation.he firsts the evelof ocialuncertaintyiscussed bove. The second s the evel of he ctor'sgeneral rust. eoplewith low level ofgeneral rustwouldprefer ot todealwith nyone utside heir stablished elations nd thus end o main-tain committed elations t a higherevel thando thosehavinga higherlevelofgeneral rust. he predictiononcerninghe ffect fgeneral rust,however,will not be tested nthefirstxperiment;t will be tested nthesecondexperiment.nstead,wematchedJapanese ndAmerican ubjectswithrespect otheir evels oftrust.Once these wofactorslevelof trustand amountofsocialuncertainty)re controlled, e have no theoreticalreasonto expecta cross-societal ifferencen the level of commitmentformation,nd thus we predict hat theJapaneseparticipants re notmore ikely o form ommittedelations han are theAmericans.174


12/31

Uncertainty, rust, nd CommitmentMETHODThe experimentimulated ransactionsetweenbuyers nd sellers. achexperimental roup onsisted f everalbuyers nd several ellers, ut thesubject who was "randomly"ssigned otheroleofa buyer)was theonlyhuman subject n the group.The rest, ncluding ll sellersand buyersotherthan the subject, were actuallyprogrammed esponsesfrom hecomputer.SubjectsSubjectswererecruited rom arious lassesattheUniversityfWashing-ton and at Hokkaido University. t the time ofrecruitment,t least afewweeks before heexperiment,ubjectswereaskedtofill utan eight-itemtrust cale developedby Yamagishi 1986, 1988b,1988c, 1992).Po-tential ubjectsrecruitednto he ubjectpoolweredivided nto hehigh-trust roup nd the ow-trustroupusing median plit.9 qual numbersofhigh rustersnd low trusters50 each)were selected rom hesubjectpool in each country. lthough revious tudies Yamagishi 1988b;Ya-magishi nd Yamagishi 1989, 1994)consistentlyroduced he result hatAmericanshave a higher evel ofgeneraltrust hantheJapanese, hiscross-culturalifferencen the level ofgeneraltrustwas removed s apossiblefactor y matching hesubjectswhoparticipatednthisexperi-ment n trustevels.We originally lannedtouse subjects' evelsofgen-eraltrust s an additionalfactor, oping o test hepropositionhat owtrustersremore ikely oformommitted elations han rehigh rusters,but thedata for heAmerican ubjects' ndividual rust coreswere notrecorded n such a way as to allow individualX individual inkageofscores ospecific ubjects. Thisfilewas destroyedndata shipment.)hescoreswereavailablebycondition ecausetheywere used toassign ndi-vidualstoconditions,uttheywerenot availableby ndividual or ubse-quent nalyses.Therefore, e knowthat heAmerican ndJapanese ub-jects are matchedwithregard o their rust coresby condition, ut wecannotuse trust s an independent actorn theanalysis.Five or six ubjectswere cheduled or achexperimentalession.Whenfewer than five subjects showed up fora session,confederateswerebroughtntothe aboratoryo createtheatmospherehatat least fiveorsix subjectswereparticipating. lthough ubjectswere ed to a privatecompartments soonas they rrived t the aboratorynd did nothave9Subjectswhose rust coreswere 28 orhigherwereclassifieds high rusters,ndlow trusters ad trust cores f 20 or ower.The median rust corewas 25.

175


13/31

AmericanJournal fSociologya chanceto meet ther articipants,hecompartmentserenotwell nsu-lated and thus ubjects ould hear the experimenteralking o other ar-ticipants.DesignThe manipulation fsocial uncertaintylow vs. high) was crossedwiththesubjects'nationalityUnitedStates vs. Japanese).GeneralProceduresThe experiment as conductedn1993 nJapan ndin1994 ntheUnitedStates. n each country,he experiment ookplace in a comparably e-signedsocial psychologyaboratory omplexconsisting f several com-partments orthesubjects and a control oom.Subjectswereprovidedwith relevant nformationisplayedon a computerocated in front fthemneachcompartment,ndtheir esponseswere nterednto he om-puter hrough he keyboard. he subjects'computerswere networkedothe hostcomputerocated nthe control oom.Subjects had no opportu-nity o meet the otherparticipantsn personbefore, uring, r after heexperiment.Upon arrival t the aboratory omplex, ach subjectwas led toa com-partmentnd was handedthefirst et ofinstructions.he instructionstoldthem hatparticipants laytherole of either buyer ra sellerwhorepeatedly onduct ransactions. he last partof the nstructionsskedthesubjecttohita keyon a computer eyboard ostart random ssign-ment" f herole.While ubjectswere old hat herole ssignments ouldbe random, nlythe roleof"buyer"was assignedto them.The experi-menter hencame into thecompartment,ave furthernstructionson-cerning ow to read the nformationisplayed n thesubject's computerscreen, nswered uestions, anded outthe econd et of nstructionsforthebuyer," nd gave them 5.00incash.'0The instructionsor hebuyerincludedthe following nformation:1) Buyersare expected o use their$5.00 ntradingessions, ndprofitsr ossesthey xperience uring hesetrading essionswill be added to or subtracted rom hisfund i.e.,theywill be paid the nitial capital"of$5.00 plus profits r minus osses atthe end of theexperiment).2) The tradeswill be repeatedmanytimes(subjectswerenot nformedfthe otalnumber ftrials). 3) On each trial(or "trading ession"), buyer s matchedwith wo sellers nd has tobuy11Dollarfiguresnthe xperimentseportedelow hould e translatedoyenfigureswith heexchange ateof$1.00forX4200seen. 2 above).176


14/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmenta commodityrom ne ofthose wo sellers. 4) Each seller s also matchedwithtwo buyers.Thus, when one ofthe sellerscompletes deal withanother uyer, hesubjecthas totradewith he remaining eller. 5) Oneofthesellers sellerC) willbe available throughouthe experiment;heother eller A) will be replacedby another eller F) in the middleoftheexperiment.6) Each trial rtrading ession tartswith ellers nnouncingthepricesof thecommodity hey are selling.Then, comparing ellers'offering rices,buyersmust decide fromwhich sellerto buy. 7) Whenthequality fthecommoditysstandard, heexperimenteruysthecom-modity or 1.40.The actual quality fthecommodityold by a particularsellermaybe aboveorbelowthis tandard. he quality fthecommoditysoldbythesame sellermayalso varyfrom essionto session.The selleris supposed o have some nformationbout thequality fthecommodityshe s selling, utthe nformation ay not be very ccurate.Thus, some-times he ommoditysoverpricedrunderpriced,nd when hathappensit is notclear if thepricing s intentional r not.The buyerresells hecommodity he boughtfrom seller to the experimenter. he experi-menter urchases he commodity rom uyers t pricesreflectingts truequality.Subjects make profits hen their urchasing rice s lowerthantheresaleprice which ccurately eflectshe qualityof thecommodity);they ufferosseswhen hepurchasing rice shigherhan heresaleprice.(8)After achtrade, roulettepinsonthecomputer isplays fthetrad-ing partnerssince he ellers recomputer esponses,heroulettectuallyspins onlyon thebuyer'sdisplay).Whentheroulette itsa "strike,"heseller sgiven chanceto "extort" predeterminedmount fmoney romthebuyer.Whenthishappens, he eller ecideswhether rnot o use thischance and "rob"thebuyer.As trialsproceed, he amount o be extortedincreases.

After he nstructions,ubjectsweregivenfourpractice essions ogetused to the computerdisplayand the keyboard.The real experimentstarted fter hepractice essionswere over and all questionswere an-swered.Subjectshad two sellers o trade with sellersA and C) duringthe first 0 sessions.The computerwas programmeduch thateach ofthetwo sellerswould have the chance to extortmoney rom hesubjecttwice. The amount to be extorted rom hebuyer ncreasedfrom 1.20(sessions 1-7), to $1.90 (sessions 8-14), and to $2.60 (sessions15-20).Whengiventhe chance to extort, ellerA always used it,robbing heabove amountsfrom hesubjecteach time. n contrast, ellerC neverused thechance to exploit. n thiswaywe made sellerC a trustworthypartner. he offeringricesdid not ystematicallyifferetween hetwosellers.Both made offers t prices randomly etermined etween$1.00and $1.40 (uniform istribution).he resalepriceof thosecommoditieswere ndependentlynd randomly etermined ithin herangeof$1.30177


15/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologyand $1.50. Thus, subjects made profitsn most of their rades lthoughthey ufferedrom xtortion y A.The "untrustworthy"ellerA was replacedby another eller,F, afterthe twentiethession.For the rest fthe experimentsessions 1-30), thesubjectshad a differentet ofsellers o chosefrom, ellerC (the rustwor-thy eller) nd a new sellerF withwhom ubjectshad noprior xperience.The new seller, , made offers ithin herange f$1.00 and $1.25,under-cutting he offering riceof C on mosttrials.The experimentasted for30 sessionsaltogether. fter he thirtiethrial was over, subjects wereaskedtofill ut a postexperimentaluestionnaire, ere givendebriefinginformation,nd werepaid the mount hey ad earned n the xperiment.Manipulation fSocial UncertaintySocial uncertainty as manipulated y keeping r removinghe "extor-tion"opportunities uring he last 10 sessions after heuntrustworthysellerA was replacedbya newseller, ). In the owuncertaintyondition,theroulettewas removed rom hesubject's display nd thesubjectwastoldthat he ellerswould no longer e given he chance to extort.n thiscondition, either (thetrustworthyeller)nor F (the new seller) ouldextort rom he subject. n thehighuncertaintyondition, n the otherhand, the roulettend the chancetoextortwas notonlykeptduring helast 10 sessions ut themoney o be extorted as increased o $4.00. How-ever, heroulette everhit "strike"uring he ast10 sessions nd neitherA norF was actuallygiven chanceto extort rom he ubject.Thus,thetwo conditionswereequivalentwithrespect o the actual behaviorof Aand C.RESULTSManipulationCheckFirst,whetherrnot heuncertainty anipulation ad the ntended ffectonsubjectswas examinedby analyzing postexperimentaluestionnaireitem, How strongly ere you concernedwith the possibility hat yourmoneymight e takenaway during oulette hances?"As expected, hemain effect funcertaintyna nationality uncertaintynalysis f vari-ance (ANOVA) was significantF[1,193]= 4.66;P < .05)and subjects nthehigh-uncertaintyonditionweremoreconcerned M = 3.68 on a 5-point cale; SD = 1.11)than were those nthe ow-uncertaintyondition(M = 3.36; SD = 1.36). Second,sellerA was evaluatedbythesubjectsas less desirable han ellerC (2.50vs.3.39on a five-pointemantic iffer-entialscale in whichdesirable= 5 and undesirable 1; t[196]= 5.27;178


16/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd CommitmentP < .001). Theseresultsuggest hatour experimental anipulationsuc-ceededin creating he ntended ffects.HypothesisThe untrustworthyellerA was replacedby a new seller,F, after hetwentiethession.The new sellerwas programmedo offer ower pricesthanC's price.The lower priceprovides n incentive or he subjecttotrade withF unless she is committedo C, thetrustworthyeller.Thefrequencyfsessions nwhich he ubjectbought rom instead ffromF during he ast10 sessions s thus reated s an indicator fcommitmentformation ythe subjectwithC. As predictedn hypothesis , subjectsboughtfromC morefrequentlyn thehigh-uncertaintyonditionM =6.70 sessions;SD = 2.67) than in the low-uncertaintyondition M =4.77sessions; D = 2.36),and themaineffect f socialuncertaintyntheuncertaintysubject'snationalitynalysisof variance was highly ignifi-cant F(1,196)= 29.19;P < .0001]).Ananalysis fpostexperimentalues-tionnairetems urtheronfirmshis esult. ubjectswere sked, To whatextentwerethe followingonsiderationsmportantoyouindeciding ntransactions uring he experiment?"ossible answerswere 1) keepingthe sameseller s a tradepartnern order o developa trustingelation-shipwithhimorheror 2) tradingwith partnerwho can be trusted otto takeaway yourmoney venwhenhe or shegets n opportunityo doso. An analysisoftheaverageof thesubjects'responseson a five-pointscale) revealeda significant ain effect f uncertaintyF[1,193]= 4.19;P < .05). Subjectsfelt he need todevelopa trustingelationship ithCmorestronglyn the high-uncertaintyonditionM = 4.11; SD = 0.99)than nthe ow-uncertaintyonditionM = 3.81;SD = 0.99).Hypothesis1 s thus learly upported ytheresults fthis xperiments inKollock's(1994)study see fig.1).HypothesisThe results ndicatenodifferencenthedegree fcommitmentormationwithC between hetwogroups f ubjects 5.85sessions mongJapanesesubjectsvs. 5.62 sessionsamongtheAmericans;F[1,196] = 0.41,NS).Furthermore,heeffect funcertaintyid notvary ignificantlyetweenthetwogroups s indicated ytheweak,nonsignificantnteractionffectintheaboveANOVA (F[1,196]= 0.85,NS). In addition, eitherhemaineffect fnationalityF[1,193]= 0.01, NS) northeuncertainty national-ity nteractionF[1,193]= 0.08,NS) intheanalysis fthepostexperimen-tal questionnairetemswas significant.hese results learly upporthy-pothesis .

179


17/31

American Journal of SociologyMHighUncertaintyM Low Uncertainty. ............ .................................................................................... . . .. . ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................I.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................I.................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................ ................................... . . . . . . . . . . ................................... ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................... ................................... . . . . . . . . ................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . ................................... ................................... . . . . . . . . . ................................... ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . ................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... .................................................................... ............................................................... ............................................. ....................................... .................................................................... .............................................. ................................... .....................I....................... ................................... .............................................. ................................... ............................................. ............................ ................................... ----------..... ................................... .............................................................. ................................... . . . . . . . . . . ................................... ................................................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ....................... ..............5 ............ ....... ............................. ............................ ............................ ............... . . ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ .......................................... ............................ ............................ .................... ...................... ............................ ................ .... ................ .......................... ......................... ............................... ............... ............................. ............................... .......... ................... .................... .................... .......................... .............................. ............................ ............................ ............... . . . . ............... ............................ ........................... ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ............... . . . . ............... ............................ ............................ ............................ ............................ ..............2- ............... ........................ ............... .......................... ............... ............................ ........................ ............... .......................... ............... ............................. ........................................................ .............................. ............................ ................... ........ ................... ............. ............. .................... ......................... ........................... ......................... ............... ....................... -------

0- Japanese AmericanFIG. i.-Commitment formationmongJapanese nd American ubjects s afunction fthe evel of socialuncertainty.

EXPEFJMENT 2The resultsof the first xperimentprovideadditional supportfor heprop-osition that social uncertaintyfacilitates commitmentformationbetweenparticularexchange partners.The resultsfurther emonstrated that socialuncertaintyhas comparable effects n commitment ormation othamongAmerican subjects and Japanese subjects, at least in this experiment nwhich the two groups were matched on their evels ofgeneral trust.Thepurpose of the second experimentwas (1) to replicate the effect f socialuncertainty n commitmentformationusinga differentxperimental itu-ation and to further nhance the generalizabilityof the proposition thatsocial uncertaintyfacilitates commitmentformation, 2) to test the otherproposition critical to Yamagishi and Yamagishi's (1994) theoryoftrust,that ow trusters, ompared tohightrusters,would be more strongly om-mittedto a particularpartner, nd (3) to test the extentto which theabovetwo propositions apply equally to American and Japanese subjects.180


18/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd CommitmentHYPOTHESIS 3.-Low trusterswill form committed elations morestronglyhanhigh trusters.HYPOTHESIS .-The effect fgeneral rust n commitmentormationpredictedn hypothesis is stronger hen the evel of ocial uncertaintyis highthan when t is low.HYPOTHESIS .-The effectf ocial uncertaintynd trust n commit-ment ormation redicted bove will be comparable or the twogroups fsubjects.The second experiment as differentrom he firstn the followingrespects. irst, ubjects' general rustwas used as an experimental actor

inthis tudy.As mentioned arlier,American nd Japanese ubjectswerematchedwithrespect o theirgeneral rust evels n the firstxperiment,but trust evel was not used as a factor n the data analysisdue to theloss of the American ubjects' individualtrust cores n data shipment.Second, the experimentnvolved an abstract nterdependentituationrather han hemore oncretenterdependenceetween ellers nd buyersas used nthefirstxperiment.inally, wo nstead fone human ubjectsparticipatedneach experimental roup.Details concerningheseproce-duralchangesfollow.METHODDesignand SubjectsThe experimentnvolved 2 X 2 X 2 factoriallyrosseddesign uncer-tainty low vs.high;nationalityf he ubjects= American s.Japanese;subject's level ofgeneral rust= low vs. high).All threefactors re be-tween-subjectsactors. ubjectswere recruitedn a similarmanner s inthe firstxperiment.he subject pool in each countrywas divided ntohightrustersnd low trusterst the mediantrust core 25 points) ftheJapanese sample.11 igh trusters ere those whose trust cores were 27orhigher;owtrusters ad trust cores f23 or ower.From theJapanesesubjectpool,we drew 107high rustersnd the ame number f ow trust-ers; 100 American ubjectsfrom ach trust evel also participatedn theexperiment. owever,a postexperimentalnalysisof thedistributionfthe subjects' trust cores revealeda systematic ifferencen the trustscoresbetween hetwocountries;heAmerican ample ncluded largernumberof subjectswhose trust cores were slightly elow the cutting" We usedthemedian core f heJapanese ample or ividinghe ubject oolsincethe xperimentas conductednJapanbeforet was conductedntheUnited tatesand thus t was impossibleoobtain heAmericanmedianwhen heJapanese ubjectpoolwas divided.

181


19/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologyscore i.e.,belowtheJapanesemedian).This occurred ince hepopulationmean of the Americanpool was higher han the populationmean of theJapanese pool (i.e., mostAmericanswere high trusters ccording o theJapanese tandard) nd thus majority fthe ow-trustingool clusteredslightly elow the cutting core. We therefore ecided to delete pairs nwhich t least one subject's trust corewas only lightly elow thecuttingscore i.e., ubjectswith coresof22 or23)inorder o make theAmericanandJapanese ubjectscompatible n their rust cores.12This resultedn186 Japanese 74 low trusters nd 112 high trusters) nd 141 American(42 low trusters nd 99 hightrusters)ubjects.GeneralProceduresThe second experiment as conducted n 1994 in bothJapan and theUnitedStates. As in the firstxperiment,ubjectswere ed individuallyto a private oomuponarrival nd were handed a set of writtennstruc-tions.They did not have theopportunityo see the otherparticipantsbefore, uring, rafter heexperiment. heycouldsensetheexistence fotherparticipants, owever,due to the layoutof the rooms.Althoughsubjectsweretoldthat heexperiment ould be run na group fseveralparticipants,ach experimental roup actually nvolvedonlytwo sub-jects. Two or moregroupswere runsimultaneouslyo createthe atmo-sphere hatmore hanfour ubjectswere nfact nvolved.Whenonly nepair was run at a time, onfederates erebroughtnto create heatmo-sphereofa largergroup.As in the firstxperiment,elevant nformation as displayedon thecomputercreen ocated nfrontfeach subject, nd the ubjects nteredtheir esponses t thekeyboard. ubjects' computerswere controlled ythehostcomputerocated nthecontrol oom.The experimentonsistedof 60 trials, utsubjectswere not nformedfthis.Subjectswere askedto answer thepostexperimentaluestionnaire, ebriefed,nd thenpaidfor heir articipation. he wholeexperimentncludingnstructionsndthepostexperimentaluestionnaireook about80 minutes.Subjectswereeach given $5 (high-uncertaintyondition) r $3 (low-uncertaintyondition) t thebeginning f theexperiments "capital"tobe used in theexperiment."3he take-home ayfor hesubjectwas thisinitial ndowment lustheprofit ainedor minus he oss ncurredn the12The subjects'behaviorswithin group actually pair)were tronglynterdepen-dent o thatpairsrather han ndividualswereused n theanalysis.13Theamount f he nitial ndowmentaried ytheuncertaintyondition,ince heamount fprofitso be earned ntheexperimentas expectedo differ.

182


20/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentcourse of the experiment. hen, subjects performed ivepractice rials.The practice rialswere programmedo that he subjects xperienced llthe possible cases describedbelow. The experimental rialsbegan afterall thequestions ollowinghepractice rialswere nswered.On each trial,the subject dealt with either human participant r the computer.Onthe trial n which the subject dealt with the computer, he received namountofmoney andomly etermined ithin he rangeof 12? (or yen)and 27? (or yen) on the roulette isplayed on the subject's computerscreen.On the trial nwhichthesubject nteractedwithanotherhumanparticipant,he twopartnerswere each given 10?. Then,one of the twowas randomlyelectedfor chance to appropriate hepartner's10?. Ifthe one who was randomly electedusedtheoption, heearned 20?, andthepartner's arnings nthat rialwere ero. fshe didnotusetheoption,each earned10?.Whether hesubjectwas to deal withthecomputer rwitha humanon thefirst rialwas randomly etermined ithequal probability.Thesubjectwas toldthattheassignment as random, ut was not nformedoftheprobability.) ince only wo human ubjectswere ncluded neachgroup, he assignments ere synchronized.When theywere assignedtointeractwith humanparticipant,hey nteracted ith hesameperson.However,theywere made to believe thatat least fourparticipants ereinvolved nd thatthe probabilityf nteracting iththesame persononthe next nteraction as small.From the second trialon, whether he subjectdealt with he computeror with a human participantwas determinedn thefollowingmanner.When thesubjectdealt with thecomputer n theprevious rial, t wasdeterminednthe ame manner s inthefirst rial.Whenthe ubjectdealtwith humanon theprevious rial, hesubject and the partner actuallytheonlytwo humansubjects)were each giventhechoiceof nteractingwith he samepartner.fthe twochose to interactwith hepartner romtheprevious rial, hetwo did infact nteractwith ach other n thenewtrial. fthishappened, ach was given 10? and oneofthe two was givena chance to appropriate hepartner'smoney.When at least one of thetwodeclined ointeractwith he same partner, henbothfacedthe samesituation s on the firstrial.Each was randomly ssignedto deal withthe computer r to interactwith a humanparticipant. ince only twohumansubjects participatedn each group, hesame pair was formedevery ime he ubjectwas assigned o nteractwith humanparticipant.However, ubjectsweremade tobelievethat heymight ematchedwithanyone of everalparticipants. hus,thechoicefor he ubjectwas inter-actingwith hesamepartner rtaking he chanceofdealingwith com-puter a suregainof 12?-27?) or a "newpartner."

183


21/31

AmericanJournal f SociologyManipulation f Social UncertaintySocial uncertaintyn the current ontext s the expected oss caused bythe self-servingehaviorof the partner,which s a product f the proba-bility fexpected oss and the ize of theexpected oss. n thefirst xperi-mentas well as inKollock'sexperiment),ocialuncertaintyas manipu-lated by varying he probability f a loss being mposed. n the secondexperiment, owever, ocial uncertainty as manipulated y varyinghesecond omponentf he xpected oss, hat s,the izeof he xpectedoss.This design hangewas introducedn order o test he generalizabilityfthe previous findings oncerning he effects f social uncertainty.Wehoped to test the notion hat thepredicted ffects f social uncertaintywould occur whichever omponent f theexpected oss (the probabilityestimate r the size of the oss) is used tomanipulate ocial uncertainty.In the low-uncertaintyondition, he loss caused by the partner's elf-serving ehaviori.e., ppropriationf he ubject'smoney ythepartner)is limited o 10?. In the high-uncertaintyondition, n extra oss of50?was imposed n addition o theoriginal10? when thesubject's partnerused theappropriation ption.The extra oss of50? was explained o thesubjectas similar o the cost ofa broken arwindowcausedbythe theftof a car stereo.OpportunityostsThe emancipation ffectftrust resumednthetheory equires heexis-tence fopportunityosts.The levelofopportunityosts i.e., hepotentialprofits hat could be obtainedoutsideof the committed elationship,rthedifferenceetween hecomparisonevelfor he lternativeCLait)andthecomparisonevel forthecurrent elationshipCL; see Thibaut andKelley 1959)was set at a fairly igh evel nboth uncertaintyonditions.In a commitmentelationshipn whichbothpartners efrain rom singtheappropriation hance, hesubjectearns10? pertrial.By choosing ointeractwith the same partnerwho has provento be cooperative notusing he ppropriationhance) nthepast,the ubject anexpect fairlysure1Q?.By leaving hesecurityfthecommittedelationship,owever,thesubject s givena chance to deal with thecomputer,whichgivesaminimum f12 and a maximum f27 . The differenceetween hesure10?and theexpectedgainof19.5?from hecomputers theopportunitycost used in thisexperiment.n this situation nvolving n opportunitycost,hightrusters ho expectthat mostotherparticipantswillnotusethe ppropriationhanceeven na newencounter illbetemptedo eavethecommittedelationshipnsearchofa chanceto meet he more ucra-tivepartner inthiscase,thecomputer). n theotherhand, ow trusterswhoexpect hatmost ther articipants ill usethe ppropriationhance184


22/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentin a newencounter illhesitate o eave the lready stablished ecurityfa committedelationshipnwhich hechanceofgetting uped sminimal.RESULTSExcept for heresults rom uestionnaireesponses, ll analysesusepairsas the tatistical nitofanalysisdue tothe nterdependencefthebehav-ioral responses f the subjectswhoparticipatedn the study ndyads.ManipulationCheckSubjects' responses o a postexperimentaluestion-How strongly ereyou concernedwith hepossibilityhatyourmoneywould be taken waywhenthepartner eceived 'chance'?-were used to see if hemanipula-tion of social uncertaintyad the ntendedmpacton thesubjects.Themain effect fsocial uncertaintyn a nationalityX uncertainty trustANOVA was highly ignificantF[1,320]= 10.14;P < .01) proving hevalidity fthemanipulation. ubjects n thehigh-uncertaintyondition(M = 3.37; SD = 1.13 on a five-pointcale) were more concernedwiththepossibilityfgetting uped bythepartnerhanwerethose n the ow-uncertaintyonditionM = 2.94; SD = 1.28).The onlyother ffect hatwas statisticallyignificantas themain effect ftrustF[1,320]= 17.48;P < .01) indicating hat ow trustersM = 3.47; SD = 1.27)were moreconcerned hanwerehigh rustersM = 2.96;SD = 1.16).The maineffectof trust s a testimonyo thepredictive alidity f the trust cale used intheassignmentfsubjects.

Utilization f theAppropriationhancesBefore ngagingnhypothesis esting,et us briefly resent descriptiveoverviewofhow subjectsused the appropriation hances available tothem.The overall relative requencyfthe trialsduringwhichsubjectswho weregiven heappropriationhanceactuallydid use itwas .51 (SD= .31). That is,subjects nthis xperimentngaged nexploitative ehav-ior about halfof the time heywere giventhe opportunityo do so. In anationality ncertainty trustANOVA, themain effect funcertainty(F[1,156] = 55.37;P < .0001) was significant.ubjects' exploitative e-havior was much morefrequentn the ow-uncertaintyonditionM =.67; SD = .27) than in the high-uncertainty ondition (M = .33; SD =.30).This effect fsocialuncertaintyuggests hat ubjectswho saw theconsequence f their xploitative ehavior s more erious o thepartner(involvingheextra ossof50?)refrained romngagingnsuchbehavior.Although hismight eem to weaken themanipulation fsocial uncer-185


23/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologytainty, heresult fthemanipulation heckpresented bove indicates hatthemanipulation f ocial uncertainty as strong noughdespite hefactthat subjects n the high-uncertaintyondition efrained rom ngagingin exploitative ehavior.No other ffects ere significant.HypothesisThe degreeof commitmentormationnthisanalysis s measured s theprobability hatan existing airoftraders n one trial s maintained nthenext rial. It is a measureof repeat nteractions.) s predictednhy-pothesis , subjects nthehigh-uncertaintyonditionM = .30;SD = .27)formed ommittedelationshipsinwhichtheykept nteracting iththesamepartner)morefrequentlyhandid those nthe ow-uncertaintyon-dition M = .19; SD = .18),and the difference as highly ignificantna nationality uncertainty trustANOVA (F[1,156]= .83;P < .001).14Furthermore,hecommitmentntentionndex onfirmshe amepattern.In this analysis, commitmentntentionndex was calculatedforeachindividualby dividing he number f trials n which a subject chose tointeractwith he amepartnernd did not actexploitativelyythenum-ber of trials n whichthesubjectwas givena chanceto keep nteractingwiththe same partner. he main effect fsocial uncertainty as againsignificantFI[1,156] 18.11;P < .0001) subjectswantedto nteractwiththe same partnerwho had not used the appropriation hance morestronglyn thehigh-uncertaintyonditionM = .48; SD = .24) than nthe ow-uncertaintyonditionM = .36; SD = .15). Finally, ubjects nthehighuncertaintyondition evealed preferenceormaintainingom-mitted elations n all ofthefiverelevant uestions:

1. How importantwas it during he experiment o continue radingwiththesamepartner? F[1,320] = 11.01;P < .001)2. Did you think hatdealingwith he ame partnerwas advantageousinsofar s thepartner id notuse the chance'? (F[1,320] = 21.99;P < .0001)3. How important as itforyouto actina wayto mprove hechanceofbeing hosenbythe amepartner ontinuously?F[1,320]= 11.25;P < .001)4. How stronglyidyou try otradewith he samepartnernorder obuilda trusting elationship?F[1,320]= 27.12;P < .0001)

The distributionf he ommitmentndex shighlykewed s is shown n the om-parison f the mean and thestandard eviation. hus,the sameanalysiswas con-ductedwith squareroot ransformation.he resultswere similar o theoriginalanalysis F[1,1561 6.13;P < .05).

186


24/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitment5. How stronglyid youwish to trade with a personwho wouldnotutilize he chance'? (F[1,320]= 33.; P < .0001)

These results learly upport hehypothesishat ocial uncertaintyacili-tates commitmentormation etweenparticular xchangepartners.

HypothesisAs predicted,nationality f the subjects did not have a main effect(F[1,156]= 2.44;NS) on commitmentormationF[1,156]= 2.00;NS) oron commitmentntention, eplicatingheresults f the firstxperiment.HypothesisAs predictedn hypothesis , low trustersM = .27; SD = .24) formedcommitted elationships orefrequentlyhandidhigh rustersM = .23;SD = .23).The main effect f trustna nationality uncertainty trustANOVA analysisof thepairwise ndexof commitment ormationwassignificant iththeoriginal ata (F[1,156]= 3.99;P < .05)and with hesquareroot ransformationF[1,156]= 4.80;P < .05).The samepatternwas observedwiththe commitmentntentionndex,butthe main effectdid not reach thesignificanceevel F[1,156]= .56; NS).

HypothesisThe predicted ncertainty trust nteraction id not reachthe signifi-cance level ntheanalysis fthepairwise ndexofcommitmentF[1,156]= 1.84,NS, withthe original ata; F[1,156]= 1.39,NS, withthetrans-formed ata). The commitmentntentionndex data reveal a marginaleffect f theuncertainty trust nteractionF[1,156] = 3.01; P < .09).The pattern f theinteractionhown n figure is consistentwith thehypothesis, oth withthepairwise data and the individual-level ata.Furthermore,nalysesofsimplemain effectsf trust n the twouncer-taintyonditions howthat rust as a significantffectnthehigh-uncer-taintyonditionF[1,156]= 4.76;P < .05,with hepairwise riginal ata;F[1, 156] = 4.81; P < .05, with the transformedata; F[1,156] = 2.65;P < .11,with the ndividual-level ata), but not n the ow-uncertaintyconditionF[1,156]= 0.25, NS, withthepairwiseoriginal ata; F[1,156]= 0.63, NS, withthetransformedata; F[1,156] = 0.57, NS, withtheindividual-level ata). These resultsprovideadditional upportforhy-pothesis .

187


25/31

AmericanJournal f Sociology0.6 03Low-trusters Hg! High-trusters Uncertaintyu J-.. . . . .. .0.5- High .....-Uncertaintyncertainty

FIG. ~.Th dere ofcommitmentomto an th strngt ofntentions:

naltyh nt naitycertinty X tut: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . X. _,.........._

0.3 0S.4-

02- -.

..~~~~~.......... . .._-.... . .._.:._-:f f . _ .: . . _.::.- .' . .......~~~~~~~~~~~~~. :. t:.. _..--''_0:i

cial ~~ncertaintyrmtscmimn fomaios.ositetl.sp

. : :,.. .-.'.,::'_:-w _ 0~~~. ..._..... _ . ,. ..... _ .. ..

1IGnlyiswThhe teransoformedidtamlsecntfirmetonadhisnlsioen.tfitnin

188form commitmentelationshipnexperiment.2.

Hypothesis ~ .... ........As predictd,eithe uncertainynor trutignificntly.inteacted.wit00223, .. ...... ...CONCLUSION~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......The~~~~~~~ ~....eslt ..h.xermns.rvdespor.o. teto.ao.pooitions n theemancipation" heory f trust~.. sth.popsiio.tatsocial~~~~~~nceraint .....comtetfomto wscnitetyspAnalysisiththeransfored ata lsoconfirmedths...nclusion188~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. ...


26/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentportednbothexperiments.onsidering he ubstantial ifferencesntheexperimentalesignbetweenourtwoexperimentsnd between he cur-rentexperimentsnd Kollock's (1994) experiment,t would be safe toconcludethatsupport or hispropositions fairly obust.Commitmentformations a readily vailableand commonly sedresponse mongpeo-ple facing ociallyuncertain ituations,nd thetendency o form tablerelationswith pecific artnersncreases s the evel ofsocialuncertaintyincreases. n thefirstxperiment,he evelof socialuncertainty as ma-nipulated ia a change nthe ikelihood ffacing riskyituationnsocialinteractions.n thesecondexperiment,twas manipulated ia a changein thepotential oss caused by exploitative ehaviorof the interactionpartner. he factthat thepredicted ffectmergedn bothexperimentsprovides basis to arguefor hevalidity fdefiningocialuncertaintynthismanner,hat s,as theexpectedoss causedbyan untrustworthyart-ner.Furthermore,ocialuncertaintyad similar ffectsmongAmericansubjectsand Japanesesubjects n both experiments.his is consistentwith the nstitutionaliew ofculturediscussed n the ntroduction. c-cording othewidely haredviewthatcharacterizes apaneseculture s"collectivist,"t is the "mind"of theJapanesepeople thatmakes themgo alongwith hegroup.The results fthesetwoexperiments,owever,demonstrate hatonce the relevantvariables-degree of social uncer-taintynd the evel ofgeneral rust-are controlled, merican ndJapa-nesesubjectsdo notexhibit ifferencesntheir endencies ovoluntarilyform ommittedelationships.The secondpropositionhatreceived xperimentalupport s thatthelevel ofgeneral rusts negatively elated othe ndividual's endencyoform stablerelationship ith particular artner. gain, hepredictedeffect fgeneral rust ncommitmentormation as notdifferentmongAmericans nd theJapanese.An additionalpropositionhattheeffect ftrustwouldbe stronger henthe evelofsocialuncertaintys highthanwhen t is low also received xperimentalupport, lthough hesupportwas not as strong s itwas for he other wopropositions.These results, aken ogether, rovidefurthermpirical upport or hetheoryftrust roposedbyYamagishiandYamagishi 1994).The theoryemphasizes heroleofgeneral rusttrustnothersngeneral) s an eman-cipator fpeoplefrom heconfines fsafebutclosedrelationships.Whena society s a whole s characterized yclosedrelationsas typicallyb-servedncollectivistocieties),heone who s"emancipated" rom closedrelation annot ind betternteractionartner ince ll theother elationsare closedto"outsiders." heJapanese mploymentystemmongmajorcompaniesfor hepastfewdecadesis oneof thebestexamplesofsuch a"collectivist"ociety,lthough hesituation s rapidly hanging. mploy-ment pportunities ere lmost ompletelylosedtothosemakingmidlife

189


27/31

AmericanJournal f Sociologycareerchanges, nd thusoppprtunityostsforthe employees fmajorcompanieswereminimal.n such an environmenteveloping high evelofgeneral rust nd becoming emancipated" rom heconfines f estab-lishedrelations rings irtually o positive utcomes.Being highly rust-ful, xpecting enign reatmentrom strangers,"nsuchan environmentmakesa person nrealisticallyptimistic.n contrastothis,we can thinkof a society n which better pportunitiesre abundantoutsideof theestablished elations. he American mploymentcene is closerto thisideal-typehanto thepreviously resentedollectivistdeal-type. avinga high evelofgeneral rust nd not stayingn the established elationsdespitebetter utsideopportunitiesan have positiveconsequences nsuchan environment. amagishiand Yamagishi 1994) derived he hy-pothesis hatAmericanswouldhave a higherevelofgeneral rust hantheJapanesebased on thisreasoning nd confirmedhishypothesis ithsurveydata from cross-societal uestionnaire. he findings eportedhereprovide upport fa differentind-based onexperimental ethod-ologyrather hansurvey esearch-and thusadd to the validity fthetheory.The only nomalyobserved nthe data is the unexpected ffect f thesubject'snationalityn thefrequencyfexploitative ehavior.AmericanandJapanese ubjectswere notdifferentrom ach otherntheir enden-ciesto form ommittedelations,s expected.Ontheother and,Japanesesubjectsshoweda strongerendency o behave exploitativelyhandidAmericanubjects.Althoughhisdifferencead notbeenpredicted eforetheexperiment,t s consistent ith he nstitutionaliew ofculture hatunderlies he current tudy.According o thisview ofJapanesesociety(Benedict1946;Hechter nd Kanazawa 1993;Yamagishi 1988a,1988b),it s informalmutualmonitoringnd sanctioning ather han nternalizedmoral values that nsurethat theJapanesewill cooperate n achievinggroupgoals. Yamagishi's (1988b) cross-societalxperimenthows thatonceopportunitiesormonitoringnd sanctioningreremoved,heJapa-nese areinfact esscooperativenachieving roupgoalsthan are Ameri-cans. The experimentalituation sed nthe urrentxperimentesemblestheone used in Yamagishi's (1988b)social dilemmaexperimentn thisrespect,nd it s nowonderwhytheJapanese cted esscooperativelyrmoreexploitativelyhandid theAmericans.The findinghatnationalityfthe ubjectsdid notplaya majorrole ndetermininghe evel ofcommitmentormationequires pecialattention.Thisfindinguggests hatcross-societalxperimentationan be a power-ful oolfor xploringwhat have beenrelegated o thecategory fgeneral"cultural ifferences."n this tudy,we startedwith theoretical redic-tionthatthe evel ofcommitmentormationetweenparticular artnersis determined y the evels of socialuncertaintynd opportunityosts n190


28/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd Commitmentthe environmentnd the evelofgeneral rust f the partners. he "cul-tural difference"hatJapanese tend to form table, ong-term elationsbetween articular artners r within articular roups hould husdisap-pear once thesethreefactors re experimentallyontrolled. nd, this sexactlywhathappened nthe twoexperimentseported bove. Ifwe stillfind "culturaldifference"ven after xperimentallyontrolling or hetheoreticallyelevantvariables, hen we are furtherncouraged o lookmoredeeply nto heaspectsofculture hat re responsible or he resid-ual" differences.f we do not, henwe do not need to revert o culture oexplaintheexistingcultural" ifferences.n brief,hegoal ofcross-soci-etal experimentations to demonstratehat cultural" ifferencesan beinvestigatedmorefully y experimentallyontrollingr manipulating hetheoreticallyelevant ariables.This is a differentse ofexperimentationthanis typical n cross-culturalxperimentation,n whichtheprimarygoal is to demonstrate hat culturaldifferenceso exist;for xample, oshow thattheJapanese ct in a different anner han Americans o.Finally, et us comment n thenature fthe amplesused ntheexperi-ment. t is clearthatoursamplesdo notrepresentny well-definedopu-lation within ach society.This is a "problem" ommon o most experi-mental tudies ince t s practicallympossible obring random ampledrawnfrom largepopulationnto he aboratory.What we have tokeepin mind,however, s thatexperimental indingsre notintended o begeneralized eyondthelaboratoryn thedescriptiveense. That is, de-scriptive eneralizations not hepurpose f heoreticallynformedxperi-mentalwork. nstead, hegoal of an suchexperimentations theoryest-ing. If a theory s disprovedwith a particular sample that is notrepresentativefanyspecific opulation, he result t least tells us thatthere s an importantet of hiddenvariables nvolved hat nteractswiththe theoretical ariablesunder tudy.This allowsus to improve he the-ory.With xperimentalesearch,hecritical indofgeneralizationsgen-eralization fthetheoryr thespecificationf relevant ariables hatpo-tentiallynteract ith heprimaryheoreticalariables, otgeneralizationoftheparticular indings erse.Forthispurpose, eplications ithdiffer-entexperimental anipulationsnd situations re critical.We have dem-onstrated hegeneralizabilityfthepropositionserived rom amagishiandYamagishi's 1994) theory ftrust eyond neparticular xperimen-tal setting.REFERENCESAkerlof, . 1970. The Market orLemons':Qualitative ncertaintynd theMarketMechanism." uarterly ournal fEconomics 4:488-500.Axelrod, . 1984.The Evolution fCooperation. ew York: Basic.

191


29/31

AmericanJournal f SociologyBenedict, . 1946.The Chrysanthemumnd the word: atternsfJapanese ulture.Boston:Houghton-Mifflin.Cook,K. S., and R. M. Emerson. 978. Power, quity nd Commitmentn ExchangeNetworks." merican ociologicalReview43:721-39.Dawes, RobynM. 1980. SocialDilemmas."AnnualReviewofPsychology1:169-93.Fukuyama, . 1995.Trust: he Social Virtues nd the Creation fProsperity. ewYork: Free Press.Gambetta, iego,ed. 1988.Trust:Making ndBreaking ooperative elations.Ox-ford: asil Blackwell.Gellner,. 1988. Trust, ohesion,nd the ocialOrder." p.214-37 n Trust:MakingandBreaking ooperative elations, dited yD. Gambetta. xford: asil Black-well.Hardin,R. 1990. Trusting ersons, rustingnstitutions."p. 185-209 nStrategyand Choice, ditedbyR. J.Zeckhauser. ambridge,Mass.:MIT Press.Hawthorn,G. 1988."Three ronies n Trust."Pp. 111-26 in Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperative elations, dited by D. Gambetta.Oxford:Basil Black-well.Hayashi,N. 1993. FromTit-for-TatoOut-for-Tat"in Japanesewith n Englishabstract). ociologicalTheoryndMethods :19-32.. 1995. Emergence fCooperationn One-Shot risoner's ilemmas nd theRoleofTrust" inJapanesewith n English bstract). apanese ournalfPsychol-ogy66:184-90.Hayashi,N., N. Jin, ndT. Yamagishi. 993. Prisoner's ilemmaNetworks: Com-

puter-SimulationfStrategies"inJapanesewith n English bstract). esearchnSocial Psychology:33-43.Hayashi,C., T. Suzuki,G. Suzuki, nd M. Murakami. 982.A StudyofJapaneseNationalCharacterinJapanesewith nEnglish ummary),ol. 4. Tokyo: demit-sushoten.Hechter,M., andS. Kanazawa. 1993. Group olidaritynd Social OrdernJapan."Journal fTheoreticalolitics5:455-93.Helper, .,andD. Levine.1992. Long-Term upplier elationsnd Product-MarketStructure."ournal fLaw,Economics nd Organization:561-81.Jin,N., N. Hayashi, ndH. Shinotsuka. 993. AnExperimentaltudy fPrisoner'sDilemmaNetwork: he Formation f CommitmentnSelective yads" in Japa-nesewith nEnglishbstract) apanese ournalf xperimentalocialPsychology33:21-30.Kikuchi,M., Y. Watanabe, nd T. Yamagishi. 1995."The Ability f AccuratelyPredictinghe nteractionartner's ooperativenessnd the GeneralTrust:AnExperimental tudy" inJapanese).Paper presentedt the Forty-thirdnnualMeeting f theJapaneseGroupDynamicsAssociation, eptember3-24, Tokyo.Kiyonari, ., and T. Yamagishi.1996. Distrusting utsiderss a Consequence fCommitmentormation"inJapanesewith nEnglish bstract). apanese ournalofExperimentalocial Psychology6:56-67.Kollock, . 1994. The Emergence f Exchange tructures:nExperimentaltudyofUncertainty,ommitment,ndTrust."American ournal f ociology 00:313-45.Kosugi,M. 1996. Trust nd Gullibility: n Experimentaltudy." aper presentedat theFiftieth nniversaryonferencef the KoreanPsychological ssociation,June 7-29, Seoul,Korea.Kosugi,M., and T. Yamagishi. 995. Trust s a Cognitive rait" inJapanese). aperpresentedttheForty-thirdnnualMeeting f heJapaneseGroupDynamicsAs-sociation, eptember3-24, Tokyo.Luhmann,N. 1979.Trust nd Power.Chichester:Wiley.

192


30/31

Uncertainty,rust, nd CommitmentMessick, avidM., and Marilynn . Brewer. 983. Solving ocialDilemmas:A Re-view."Pp. 11-14 in ReviewofPersonalitynd Social Psychology,ol. 4. Edited

by Ladd Wheeler. everlyHills,Calif.:Sage.Schuessler, . 1989. ExitThreats nd Cooperation nderAnonymity."ournal fConflict esolution 3:728-49.Shapiro, . L.,B. H. Sheppard,nd L. Cheraskin. 992. Business n a Handshake."Negotiation ournal :365-77.Thibaut, .W., andH. H. Kelley. 959.The Social PsychologyfGroups. ew York:Wiley.Vanberg,V., and R. Congleton. 992."Rationality, orality,nd Exit."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview86:418-31.Yamagishi,M., andT. Yamagishi. 989. Trust, ommitment,nd theDevelopmentofNetwork tructures."aper presentedt the workshop, eyondBureaucracy,December 8-21,Hong Kong.Yamagishi, . 1986. The Provision f Sanctioningystem s a PublicGood."Jour-nal ofPersonalitynd Social Psychology1:110-16.. 1988a. Exitfrom heGroup s an ndividualisticolutionothePublicGoodProblemntheUnited tates nd Japan." ournal fExperimentalocialPsychol-ogy24:530-42.. 1988b. TheProvisionf a SanctioningystemntheUnited tates ndJa-pan."Social Psychology uarterly1:265-71.. 1988c. Seriousness f Social Dilemmas nd the Provision f a SanctioningSystem."ocial Psychology uarterly1:32-42.. 1992. "GroupSize and theProvision f a Sanctioningystemn a SocialDilemma."Pp. 267-87 in A Social Psychological pproacho Social Dilemmas,editedbyW. B. G. Liebrand, . M. Messick, nd H. A. M. Wilke.Oxford: er-gamon.. 1995a. Have Americans eallyBecomeDistrustful?"aperpresentedt theAmerican ociologicalAssociation nnualMeetings, ugust19-23, Washington,D.C. .1995b."SocialDilemmas." p. 311-35 nSociological erspectivesn SocialPsychology,ditedbyK. S. Cook,G. Fine, ndJ.House. Boston:Allyn& Bacon.. 1995c. Trust s Cognition,rust s Reflection."aperpresentedt theSec-ondWorkshopnConstructionnd Maintenance fTrust, eptember -10, Se-attle.

.1995d. "Yakuzas, Lovers,Commitment,nd Trust." aper presentedt theWorkshopn Constructionnd Maintenance fTrust, ebruary 5-26,New York.. 1996. In-Group ias and Culture fCollectivism."roceedingsf heKoreanPsychological ssociation iftieth nniversaryonference,p. 119-33.. npress.Trust nd EstablishmentfRelationships"inJapanese).nConflictResolution,ditedbyK. Ohbuchi.Tokyo:Nakanishiya huppan.Yamagishi, ., andN. Hayashi.1996. Selective lay:Social Embeddedness fSocialDilemmas." p. 363-84 nFrontiersnSocial DilemmaResearch, dited y W.B.G. Liebrand nd D. M. Messick.Berlin: pringer-Verlag.Yamagishi, ., N. Hayashi, ndN. Jin. 994. Prisoner's ilemmaNetworks: elec-tion trategyersusAction trategy."p.233-50 nSocial Dilemmas ndCoopera-tion, ditedbyU. Schulz,W. Albers,nd U. Mueller.Berlin: pringer-Verlag.Yamagishi, ., andH. Komiyama. 995. Meaningsnd the Structuref Trust" inJapanesewith n English bstract).NSS Journal :1-59.Yamagishi,T., M. Watabe,N. Takahashi,N. Hayashi, nd M. Yamagishi.1996."Trust nd Commitmentnder ocialUncertainty"in Japanesewith n Englishabstract). esearchn Social Psychology1:206-16.Yamagishi, .,and M.Yamagishi. 994. Trust nd CommitmentntheUnited tatesandJapan."Motivation nd Emotion18: 9-66.

193


31/31

AmericanJournal f Sociology. In press. Trust ndCommitments Alternative esponseso Social Uncer-tainty."n NetworksnJapan, dited yMarkFrunin. ambridge: ambridge ni-

versity ress.Yamagishi,T., M. Yamagishi,N. Takahashi,N. Hayashi, nd M. Watabe. 1995."Trust nd Commitment:nExperiment"in Japanesewith n English bstract).Japanese ournal fExperimentalocial Psychology5:23-34.Zucker, . 1986. ProductionfTrust: nstitutionalources f Economic tructure,1840-1920." esearchnOrganizational ehavior :53-111.

uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the united states and japan

Documents