(u) review of ied activity in mexico - wikileaks army ngic review of... · (u) review of ied...

32
National Ground Intelligence Center Intelligence and Security Command 1 (U) Review of IED Activity in Mexico (U) Review of IED Activity in Mexico THIS INFORMATION IS FURNISHED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS TO BE USED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES ONLY; THAT IT IS TO BE AFFORDED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME DEGREE OF SECURITY PROTECTION AS SUCH INFORMATION IS AFFORDED BY THE UNITED STATES; THAT IT IS NOT TO BE REVEALED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY FURNISHING THE INFORMATION. The Overall classification of this Briefing is The Overall classification of this Briefing is CONFIDENTIAL//LES The information marked (//LES) in this document may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

Upload: buitram

Post on 06-Apr-2018

217 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

1

(U) Review of IED Activityin Mexico

(U) Review of IED Activityin Mexico

THIS INFORMATION IS FURNISHED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS TO BE USED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES ONLY; THAT IT IS TO BE AFFORDED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME

DEGREE OF SECURITY PROTECTION AS SUCH INFORMATION IS AFFORDED BY THE UNITED STATES; THAT IT IS NOT TO BE REVEALED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY OR

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY FURNISHING THE INFORMATION.

The Overall classification of this Briefing isThe Overall classification of this Briefing is

CONFIDENTIAL//LES

The information marked (//LES) in this document may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement,

public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not

be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

2

(U) Overall incidents in Mexico (U) Overall incidents in Mexico

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Approximately100 IEDs ReportedSince 2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

# of IEDsrecovered inCaches# of IEDs fromIncidents

UNCLASSIFIED

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

3

(U) Groups Known to Seek or Use IEDsin Mexico

(U) Groups Known to Seek or Use IEDsin Mexico

• (U) TCOs– Los Zetas– The Sinaloa Cartel– The Gulf Cartel– The Beltran Leyva

Organization (BLO) – The Tijuana Cartel– The Juarez Cartel– La Linea– La Familia Michoacana

• (U) Leftist Extremists / Other Criminal Organizations– Ejercito Popular

Revolucionario (EPR)– Zapatista Army of National

Liberation (EZLN) – Tendencia Democratica

Revolutionaria-Ejercito Del Pueblo (TDR-EP, The People’s Democratic Revolutionary Army)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TCO: Transnational Criminal Organization

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

4

(U) Known Explosive Material and IED Usage by TCOs and Other Criminal Organizations

(U) Known Explosive Material and IED Usage by TCOs and Other Criminal Organizations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Group Explosive Types Initiation/Switch TypesGulf Cartel Pipe Bombs (steel and PVC containers), VBIEDs (Orica) Cell phone, Time Delay

Los Zetas Cartel Claymore Mines, Grenades (possibly conventional and homemade), VBIEDs, C4

PMR, Time Delay (clock)

Tijuana Cartel VBIEDs with unknown explosives (reported interest) Unknown

Sinaloa Cartel TNT, possible improvised grenades Unknown

Juarez Cartel Possible improvised grenades Unknown

La Linea VBIEDs (Tovex) Cell Phone with Improvised Circuit Boards

La Resistencia PE4, C4 Cell Phone, Furtaba Toy Car Remote

BLO Improvised Grenades Unknown

La Familia Michoacana

Unknown Unknown

EPR Platter Charges, Possible Improvised Shaped Charges, ANFO, Tovex, SEMTEX

Time Delay (possible digital watch), Possible Cell Phone/Remote Control

TDR-EP Unknown Time Delay

ELZN HMTD, black powder (enhanced with sulfate, aluminum, paraffin, cyanide); containers used : bags, bamboo, gas drums, books

Unknown

(U) HMTD: Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamene

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

5

(U) Targets for IEDs in Mexico(U) Targets for IEDs in Mexico

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Commercial Infrastructure

Government Infrastructure

Civilian Populace / Businesses

Police Forces

Government Agencies

2004-2007

2008-2011

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) IED attacks in 2004-2007 were conducted by leftist extremists and other criminal organizations. These attacks were focused on infrastructure such as banks and pipelines.

(U) IED attacks in 2008-2011 were conducted primarily by TCOs. These attacks focused more on the Municipal and Federal Police and instilling fear in the local populace.

(U) The introduction of VBIEDs in 2010 showed a significant change in TCO tactics towards higher profile, bold attacks.

Leftist Insurgents/Criminal OrganizationsTransnational Criminal Organizations

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

6

(U) IED Specifics

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Unknown RCIED Time VOIED

7

(U) IED Components in Mexico(U) IED Components in Mexico

ANFOUNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

• (U//LES) Types of improvised container indentified in Mexican IEDs:• (U//LES) Butane tanks• (U//LES) Backpacks, Duffel Bags• (U//LES) Metal and PVC containers• (U//LES) Military munitions (mines, grenades)

• (U//LES) Switches– (U//LES) Few types of improvised switches have been identified– (U//LES) Primary switches in order are:

• (U//LES) Remote controlled using primarily cell phones orwalkie-talkies.• (U//LES) Time Delay using either clocks or digital watches

• (U//LES) Explosive Charges– (U//FOUO) A wide variety of explosives are used in Mexico. The most common are used in

the mining industry or commercial explosives.

• (U//FOUO) C4, PE-4, Tovex, Orica manufactured explosives, ANFO, Black Powder, Smokeless Powder and R1.

• (U//LES) Initiators:– (U//LES) Electric blasting caps

• (U//LES) Types of improvised container indentified in Mexican IEDs:• (U//LES) Butane tanks• (U//LES) Backpacks, Duffel Bags• (U//LES) Metal and PVC containers• (U//LES) Military munitions (mines, grenades)

• (U//LES) Switches– (U//LES) Few types of improvised switches have been identified– (U//LES) Primary switches in order are:

• (U//LES) Remote controlled using primarily cell phones orwalkie-talkies.• (U//LES) Time Delay using either clocks or digital watches

• (U//LES) Explosive Charges– (U//FOUO) A wide variety of explosives are used in Mexico. The most common are used in

the mining industry or commercial explosives.

• (U//FOUO) C4, PE-4, Tovex, Orica manufactured explosives, ANFO, Black Powder, Smokeless Powder and R1.

• (U//LES) Initiators:– (U//LES) Electric blasting caps

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

8

(U) Device Employment(U) Device Employment

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

• (U//FOUO) Devices are typically thrown or surface laid.

– (U//FOUO) 2006 TDR-RP attacks on multiple banks used IEDs concealed in backpacks placed near targeted banks

• (U//FOUO) VBIEDS are static – not suicide. Come-on tactics have been used in Juarez and Hidalgo.

– (U//FOUO) Suicide attacks are not a TTP used in Mexico. There have been two accidental suicide bombings in Mexico:

• (U//FOUO) 13 March 2010 – Bomber armed an IED while exiting a vehicle to emplace the device. The IED is assessed to have prematurely detonated.

• (U) 1 Aug 2010 – Bomber reportedly intended to place an IED inside Police Headquarters in Mexico City, but the IED prematurely detonated approximately 200 yards away.

• (U//FOUO) The necessity for buried or roadside attacks does not exist in Mexico.

– (U//FOUO) Majority of incidents are targeting specific organizations, facilities, infrastructure or are designed to instill fear and show capability.

– (U//FOUO) Targets are not randomly chosen

• (U//FOUO) Devices are typically thrown or surface laid.

– (U//FOUO) 2006 TDR-RP attacks on multiple banks used IEDs concealed in backpacks placed near targeted banks

• (U//FOUO) VBIEDS are static – not suicide. Come-on tactics have been used in Juarez and Hidalgo.

– (U//FOUO) Suicide attacks are not a TTP used in Mexico. There have been two accidental suicide bombings in Mexico:

• (U//FOUO) 13 March 2010 – Bomber armed an IED while exiting a vehicle to emplace the device. The IED is assessed to have prematurely detonated.

• (U) 1 Aug 2010 – Bomber reportedly intended to place an IED inside Police Headquarters in Mexico City, but the IED prematurely detonated approximately 200 yards away.

• (U//FOUO) The necessity for buried or roadside attacks does not exist in Mexico.

– (U//FOUO) Majority of incidents are targeting specific organizations, facilities, infrastructure or are designed to instill fear and show capability.

– (U//FOUO) Targets are not randomly chosen

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

9UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(U//FOUO) Improvised Shape Charge from Mexico

(U) 2007 EPR Pipeline Attacks

(U//FOUO) On 10 July 2007, in Mexico City and Guanajuato, assailants detonated multiple explosive devices near natural gas pipelines, damaging the pipelines but causing no injuries. The Revolutionary People’s Army (EPR) claimed responsibility.

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

Time Delay(Casio Watch)

Improvised Shaped Charge

Unknown Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

10

(U) 9 Sept 2009 Los Zetas Safe House Cache Recovery

(U) 9 Sept 2009 Los Zetas Safe House Cache Recovery

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSISTIVE

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

Time Delay(Alarm Clock)

MI8A1 Claymore Mine

C4 M4 Electric Blasting Cap

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

(U//FOUO) Few details are known about the Zetas IED types and usage. This modified alarm clock with military claymore mine was the 1st identified improvised device associated with the Zetas. It was recovered in a weapons caches in Tlaxcala, Mexico.

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

11

(U) 8 Mar 2010 RCIED in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon

(U) 8 Mar 2010 RCIED in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon

• (U) SUMMARY: On 8 March 2010, a RCIED detonated in a public bathroom at a Pemex gas station in Cadereyta.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIED (Motorola Cell

Phone)

2 x PVC Pipes with Screws

Black Powder Cattle Prod

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

12

(U) 13 Mar 2010 RCIEDs in TuxtlaGutierrez, Chiapas

(U) 13 Mar 2010 RCIEDs in TuxtlaGutierrez, Chiapas

• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 13 March 2010, one of two RCIEDs detonated in a car killing the passenger and injuring the driver. It is assessed that the IED prematurely detonated as the bomber was exiting the vehicle to emplace the device. The target was the Mexican Department of Justice.

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIEDs(Motorola PMRs

with SCR and safe to arm

switch)

N/A 2 x Blocks of C4 (one per device)

Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

13

(U) Apr 2010 RCIED in Reynosa, Tamaulipas

(U) Apr 2010 RCIED in Reynosa, Tamaulipas

• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: In April 2010, a RCIED was recovered in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. Details are not available on the emplacement or recovery of the device.

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIED (Nextel Cell

Phone)

PVC Pipe with Nails

Smokeless Powder

Taser

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

14

(U) 29 June 2010 RCIED in Tapachula, Chiapas

(U) 29 June 2010 RCIED in Tapachula, Chiapas

• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 29 June 2010, four RCIEDs were seized and an amount of C4 assessed to be enough for four additional RCIEDs.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIEDs(Motorola PMRs

with SCR and safe to arm switch)

N/A M12 Blocks of C4 Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

15

(U) 9 Sept 2010 IED Recovery in Tonala, Jalisco

(U) 9 Sept 2010 IED Recovery in Tonala, Jalisco

• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 9 Sept 2010, IED materials including two RCIED switches and various amounts and types of plastic explosives were recovered.

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIEDs(Furtaba Toy Car

Controller, Nokia Cell Phone with unknown

circuit board)

N/A C4, PE4 Det Cord

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

16

(U) January 2011 Chilean Embassy IEDs Recovered in Mexico City

(U) January 2011 Chilean Embassy IEDs Recovered in Mexico City

• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 17 and 21 January 2011, IEDs were delivered to the Chilean Embassy.

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

Magnetic Sensor Pipe Bomb Black Powder Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

17

(U) VBIEDs

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

(U) VBIEDs in Juarez(U) VBIEDs in Juarez(U) SUMMARY: Two VBIEDs have been identified in Juarez on two separate occasions – 15 July & 11 September 2010

- (U) Come-on tactics used in both VBIEDs(U//FOUO) The first VBIED on 15 July was reportedly in retaliation for the arrest of the La Linea member “El 35.” The

explosives filled briefcase was placed on the floor behind the passenger seat. A dead rival cartel member was dressed as a municipal police officer to lure in additional police.

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

Unknown (Likely RCIED - PMR)

VBIED - VaultzBriefcase

22lbs Tovex Electric Detonator/Det Cord

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

19

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIED (Kenwood TH-K2AT

PMR with DTMF capable circuit board made by SYSCOM)

VBIED –Fragmentation added (bolts)

Tovex – 220lbs, ANFO

Electric Blasting Cap/Det Cord

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(U) VBIEDs in Juarez cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Juarez cont’d(U//FOUO) The second Juarez VBIED on 10 September reportedly targeted the Federal Police. A similar come-on tactic

was used in this incident as well. A gunshot victim was placed inside a vehicle to lure in police, while the explosives were in a nearby vehicle.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

20

(U) 10 Sept 10 VBIED in Juarez(U) 10 Sept 10 VBIED in Juarez

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

21

(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria• (U) SUMMARY: Three VBIEDs have detonated in Ciudad Victoria on two separate occasions – 5 August & 27 August 2010

• (U) The VBIED on 5 Aug 10 detonated at approximately 5:20pm outside of the Tamaulipas State Public Safety Complex.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator

RCIED (Nokia Cell

Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer

VBIED - Metal Box

Orica – HydrogelSlurry: Approx 20-

25 sticks

Electric Blasting Cap

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

22

(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria cont’d

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED

(Nokia Cell Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer

VBIED - Metal Box Orica - Hydrogel Slurry Electric Blasting Cap

• (U) Two VBIEDs detonated on 27 Aug outside a television station and a transit police headquarters.• (U//FOUO) Information obtained to date indicates the VBIEDs were nearly identical to the 5 Aug 2010 incident.• (U) The television station was reportedly targeted by the Gulf Cartel because of “bad press.”

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

23

(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon(U) Summary: Nuevo Leon had a total of 4 VBIEDs between December 2010 and January 2011.

(U) The first VBIED detonated in Zuazua, Nuevo Leon on 17 Dec 2010 and targeted the municipal police.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED

(Nokia Cell Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer

VBIED – 5 gallon Gas Can utilized to enhance

the blast

Unknown Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

24

(U) The second VBIED detonated in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon on 18 Jan 2011, targeting the municipal police.

(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

25

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown

(U) The third VBIED detonated in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon on 20 Jan 2011 targeting the municipal police. The explosive device was placed between the two front seats.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown

26

(U) The fourth VBIED detonated in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon on 21 Jan 2011.

(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) VBIEDs in El Carmen-Tula, Hidalgo(U) VBIEDs in El Carmen-Tula, Hidalgo(U) Summary: The first VBIED in Hidalgo detonated on 22 Jan 2011 targeting a municipal police chief. Come-on tactics similar to the Juarez VBIEDs were used: a body was reported in the trunk of a vehicle prompting a police response. The VBIED detonated as the police chief approached the side of the car.

Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED

(Unknown with unknown circuit board

VBIED – 3 x 20ltr gas containers, 1 x 15kg butane container –

various fragmentation added (nuts and bolts)

Possible Tovex or ANFO – 25-50kg

estimated

Unknown

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

28

(U) Guatemala

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

29

(U) Guatemala IEDs/VBIEDs(U) Guatemala IEDs/VBIEDs• (U//FOUO) IED activity in Guatemala has largely been unreported in intelligence

channels.

• (U) Recent IED and VBIED events however have gained increased interest from law enforcement, counter-drug agencies and analysts, and the intelligence community.

• (C) According to US Embassy reporting, “Guatemalan authorities are genuinely concerned about the amplified use of VBIEDs and proliferation of technical expertise among organized crime entities within the country.”

• (U//FOUO//LES) IED usage in Guatemala has primarily been used inextortion cases associated with one particular bomb maker affiliated with the criminal gang “Little Psycho Criminal”.

• (U) According to reporting, each of the IEDs recovered in Guatemala have been very similar – making authorities confident that there were looking for one bomb maker.

• (U) The gang leader who is assessed to be responsible for the IED/VBIEDs has been detained.

CONFIDENTIAL//LES

CONFIDENTIAL//LES

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

30

Cigarette lighters

Alcatel Cell PhonesDC Motor

(U) VBIED in Guatemala City, 15 Sept 2010

(U) VBIED in Guatemala City, 15 Sept 2010

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

31

(U) Conclusion(U) Conclusion

• (U//FOUO) A significant increase in IED usage in Mexico will likely be a reaction to C-IED and Counter-drug efforts of the Mexican military or increased violence between TCOs and other criminal organizations.

• (U//FOUO) 2010 has already superseded the past 6 years of IED activity in Mexico, and it is likely to continue to increase. As knowledge of how to improve the employment of available weaponry is proliferated from other conflicts, members of the TCOs and criminal organizations are likely to experiment to find more effective devices to serve their overall purpose.

– (U//FOUO) Currently no evidence exists to indicate that there has been a direct sharing of technology, devices, or training between TCOs or criminal organizations, insurgents and militants in the Middle East, Colombia, or Africa.

• (U//FOUO) Sharing of IED successes between TCOs operating in Central and South America is going to be an important trend to watch. TCOs have been successful in Mexico, but not so much in Guatemala – this could change if the TCOs perceive they are achieving expected results utilizing IEDs and VBIEDs.

• (U//FOUO) A significant increase in IED usage in Mexico will likely be a reaction to C-IED and Counter-drug efforts of the Mexican military or increased violence between TCOs and other criminal organizations.

• (U//FOUO) 2010 has already superseded the past 6 years of IED activity in Mexico, and it is likely to continue to increase. As knowledge of how to improve the employment of available weaponry is proliferated from other conflicts, members of the TCOs and criminal organizations are likely to experiment to find more effective devices to serve their overall purpose.

– (U//FOUO) Currently no evidence exists to indicate that there has been a direct sharing of technology, devices, or training between TCOs or criminal organizations, insurgents and militants in the Middle East, Colombia, or Africa.

• (U//FOUO) Sharing of IED successes between TCOs operating in Central and South America is going to be an important trend to watch. TCOs have been successful in Mexico, but not so much in Guatemala – this could change if the TCOs perceive they are achieving expected results utilizing IEDs and VBIEDs.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command

32

POCs: NGIC IED and Mines Branch

Sherry Hatch - SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM IED Team Lead: [email protected]: 434-951-1976 DSN: 521-1976

Ted Kanokogi – SOUTHCOM IED [email protected]: 434-951-1466 DSN: 521-1466

Questions???