The Impacts of Air Strikes on

Islamic State VBIEDs in Iraq during 2014

January 31, 2016

Matthew Gulino

Introduction

My research attempts to determine what impacts the airstrikes that are being conducted by the

coalition (headed by the United States) in Iraq are having on the Islamic State’s (aka ISIS, Daesh, and

ISIL) ability to conduct military and terrorist attacks. This is an important question to answer because the

question about what to do next is currently dominating military and political discourse in the United

States. The only way that this can be answered is to evaluate the military actions against the Islamic State

thus far. This paper does not make recommendations for what types of military action needs to occur to

defeat the Islamic State. Rather it outlines a methodology that could be useful in determining how

effective airstrikes have been.

This is not a theoretical question. The U.S. is currently utilizing a great deal of air power against

the Islamic State in an attempt to “degrade, and ultimately destroy ISIL” (Harrison 2014, 37-46). There

have been various claims to how successful this campaign has been thus far, and extensive arguments

about what steps should be taken next. In order to determine what should be done next, the U.S. must first

determine how effective airpower has been in influencing the Islamic State. If this question can be

answered, perhaps we can intelligently determine what other steps need to be taken in addition to air

power.

The Islamic State’s military and terrorist actions are designed to gain territory, resources, and

popular support. Its military and terrorist attacks specifically are designed to demonstrate to the

opposition and its’ followers that the Islamic State can strike anywhere and at any time. These terrorist

and military attacks are also designed to prompt the opposition into over reacting against anyone who

might be suspected of supporting the Islamic State. This over reaction by the opposition (mainly the Iraqi

government and Shia militias) against Sunni civilians causes these groups to seek the help of the Islamic

State, and increases its popular support.

I decided to focus my research on the possible impacts of airstrikes on vehicle borne improvised

explosive device (VBIED) attacks because the Islamic State’s most effective military and terrorist tool is

the VBIED. For example, VBIEDs were instrumental in forcing government forces to leave the city of

Ramadi on May 17, 2015 (Alkhshali and Shoichet 2015, 1). Out of 3874 terrorist and military attacks

attributed to the Islamic State, Muslim Fundamentalists, or Unknown actors in Iraq in 2014, 779 of these

attacks were explosives delivered by vehicles. Additionally, over 31% (331 of 1058) of U.S. led coalition

airstrikes involved bombings of vehicles. I was very interested to see if these large numbers of airstrikes

had any impacts on the frequency and location of VBIED attacks.

Literature Review

There appear to be two ends of the spectrum in literature on how effective air power can be. One

school of thought holds that the Islamic State is a problem that cannot be solved through airstrikes alone.

This school of thought indicates that ground troops, most likely U.S. ground troops, will be necessary to

defeat the Islamic State (Johnson 2015, 7-17). The contrasting school of thought is that airpower can be

effective even without a ground offensive. It uses the example of the U.S. use of air power in Bosnia in

1999 as an example of this capability (Haulman 1999, 6-21). Other arguments that I found concerning the

utility of air power versus foes such as the Islamic State fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

Many articles discussing the combat of U.S. enemies (including the Islamic State) make the case for or

against the utility of air power because air power is currently the primary means that the U.S. uses against

its foes.

The articles used in this research mostly agree that air power is tremendously effective on the

battlefield. However, even one of the strongest proponents for air power that I found (Krause 2015, 42-

56) details the limitations that air power has in being the primary cause of coercion against an enemy.

Krause says that the U.S. can use airpower proficiently in contemporary risk and casualty-averse conflicts

but that the U.S. must first understand the broad evolution and maturation of airpower theory as well as

the state of the strategic environment in which we operate today. He argues that air power has

demonstrated that it can be the decisive element in compelling the enemy. However, the phenomenon of

the "Atrocity Threshold" severely limits the utility of air power when used against U.S. forces in

situations where the existence of the U.S. is not threatened. While this article is definitely arguing that air

power can be the decisive element in U.S. coercion, I think that it does the best job of all the articles I

read in explaining how U.S. opponents can systematically reduce the effects of air power.

Perceived limitations on air power are echoed in other writings that are decidedly less convinced

that air power can be the decisive element in coercing an enemy. One article in particular argues that the

very nature of the Islamic State makes air power less effective. Kan argues that air power is limited in

what it can accomplish versus the Islamic State because it is largely a criminal enterprise (Kan 2014-

2015, 71-80). By relying on criminal enterprises, the Islamic State has made itself into a highly adaptable

and resilient organization not easily swept from the battlefield. Some military actions, taken in a vacuum,

could actually strengthen the Islamic State. As a result, due to the significant role that crime plays in the

Islamic State’s power, the Unites States requires a more integrated financial and military strategy to

undermine the group’s territorial control and reach.

Kan argues that there are some clear limits to what the United States and coalition can achieve

without seizing and holding the Islamic State’s territory (Kan 2014-2015, 71-80). This sentiment is also

reflected in the writing of Press, who claims that while air power may play a decisive role in future U .S.

operations to halt an enemy's mechanized assault on a U.S. ally (Press 2001, 5-44). It will not likely be

decisive, however, if the United States or its allies need to conduct an offensive to take enemy-controlled

territory.

Other articles argue that the tactics that the Islamic State has adopted are making air power less

effective. Shafer claims that while air power has become overall more deadly on the battlefield, it is

decidedly less effective in the urban terrain that the Islamic State is operating in (Shafer 2014-2015, 93-

106). This limitation of air power is echoed in Johnson and Hashim (Johnson 2015, 7-17) (Hashim 2014,

69-83). Where Johnson and Hashim differ however is that Johnson argues for the introduction of large

numbers of U.S. ground forces to defeat the Islamic State, whereas Hashim states that while U.S. special

operations forces and air power are very effective, that the Islamic State cannot be defeated through

military means alone. This difference in opinion is reflected in other writers as well. Pape argues that air

power can be decisive when coupled with ground forces (Pape 1997, 93-114) and Head argues that air

power can be decisive in urban terrain when supporting ground forces (Head 2013, 32-51), while in

contrast Terrill and Harrison argue that military force can only be one element in a comprehensive

strategy to defeat the Islamic State (Terrill 2014, 13-23) (Harrison 2014, 37-46).

The vast majority of the literature that I reviewed (especially the more recent literature that deals

specifically with the Islamic State) seems to agree that air power cannot be the decisive factor that coerces

the Islamic State. The literature however seems to be evenly split as to what will be the decisive factor.

About half of the articles that I read argue for large numbers of Western ground forces to be utilized in

defeating the Islamic State, while the other half argue that military force alone will not defeat it. The

articles that question the ultimate utility of military force in determining a solution call for a grand

strategy based on political coalitions in the region. In essence, the difference in opinion appears to center

on who can be the decisive ground element against the Islamic State, western military forces or regional

powers. The articles calling for regional powers to take the lead deemphasize the military elements of this

strategy and instead look for regional countries to combat the Islamic State through interdiction of men,

money, and supplies.

Methodology

The independent variable in this research is the airstrike data and the dependent variable VBIED

attacks. A thorough exploration and analysis of the available data will help me determine if there are any

other variables of importance, such as locations of airstrikes or locations of VBIED attacks.

The difficulty of this project is that the locational data from the daily rollups of airstrikes were

extracted from text files and placed in a tabular form similar to the GTD. The limitation of this type of

research is that the GTD is only current through the end of 2014. Jane’s does have a similar database that

is more current, but you have to pay in order to get access (Vinograd 2015, 1).

My research is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. In that sense, it is an

exploratory case study. I didn’t expect a clear cut set of outcomes, but I did hope to determine if there are

any possible patterns or linkages between two sets of data. The study had five steps (Wollman 2012, 1):

1. Capture and Analyze the Data

2. Develop a Research Objective

3. Categorize the Data

4. Identify Patterns and Connections

5. Interpret the Data

The sources include press reports (and databases built from press reports), official government

documents, and academic studies. In the case of terrorist attacks in Iraq, a database has already been

created by the University of Maryland. It is called the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). In the case of

U.S. led coalition airstrikes, I created a database utilizing U.S. government press releases. I have also

analyzed academic studies concerning air power and the Islamic State in order to determine what major

questions and concerns about this subject exist. It appears that studies are pretty unanimous in their

conclusion that air power alone will not defeat the Islamic State, but they are evenly split on whether the

remaining effort should be accomplished by countries in the region, or by U.S. ground forces.

The second step involves developing a set of questions and determining how the data can be used

to answer these questions. In my study the relevant questions appear to be whether air strikes have

influenced the Islamic State’s number of terrorist and military attacks, or targets of terrorist and military

attacks.

The third step, categorizing the data, involves developing themes or categories that the data fits

into. In my research, I will largely be categorizing air strikes and terrorist attacks by numbers and

location. The location of air strikes will be difficult to accurately categorize and identify because the press

reports typically don’t provide a precise location. I will likely have to categorize them by cities and/or

Governates (Provinces) where they occur.

The fourth step determines how the categories that I have established are connected. These

patterns will give an insight into why things are occurring. I attempt to determine connections and

patterns by analyzing the numbers and locations of air strikes over time, and comparing this data in Arc

GIS, CartoDB, Tableu, and Excel to the number and terrorist attacks over time. This allowed me to

determine if there are country wide patterns, or perhaps patterns in particular governates and/or cities.

This involved creating choropleth maps in which regions of in the map (in this case governates of Iraq)

are given various colors that match the numbers of terrorist attacks and/or air strikes, and creating maps

of air strike and VBIED intensity and density at specific locations. Lastly, I interpret the data in the

paper’s conclusion.

The limitations of the study are based on the data available. I am not privy to exact locational data

of the airstrikes. If I had better geospatial locations for both airstrike and VBIEDs I would likely be able

to conduct more advanced geospatial analysis on these datasets. I also don’t have data on particular

personalities that may have been killed in particular airstrikes. Neither do I have data on what were the

intentions of the particular air strikes. I cannot evaluate if killing particular Islamic State leaders were

effective with this data. I cannot determine if the U.S. led coalition was placing interdiction of terrorist

attacks as a priority to be combatted by air strikes. I can only evaluate the air strikes geospatially and

compare this with a geospatial depiction of terrorist and military attacks to determine if there are any

linkages to be found. I think that this is a valid approach however because I am trying to see the

cumulative effects of air strikes on the Islamic State in the country of Iraq, and not the effectiveness of

particular air strikes.

Analysis and Findings

The first thing I did (once the airstrike data had been captured in tabular form) was to compare

the frequency of airstrikes on vehicles and buildings, to the frequency of VBIED attacks on government

(military, police, and government) and civilian (businesses, educational institutions, journalists, religious

institutions, private citizens, and transportation methods) targets. VBIED attacks on government targets

could be termed acts of warfare, while VBIED attacks on civilians would typically be seen as terrorist

attacks. My aim was to determine what impacts airstrikes had on the Islamic State’s ability to conduct

both types of attacks. The chart below shows that VBIED attacks on both government and civilian targets

were declining in the months leading up to the August 8, 2014 commencement of airstrikes. It also shows

that the number of airstrikes began to dramatically increase in December, 2014.

Chart 1: Airstrikes and VBIEDs by Month in 2014

Based solely on this chart, it appears that airstrikes could be having an impact on the ability of the

Islamic State to conduct VBIED attacks. There is a dramatic decrease in VBIED attacks on both

government and civilian targets in the month of December, just as there is a dramatic increase in the

number of airstrikes on both vehicles and buildings. I believe that analyzing trends is the most important

aspect to making this determination. You can see that between August and November 2014, both types of

VBIED attacks increased. However, once the numbers of airstrikes dramatically increase in December,

both of these types of attacks begin to decrease.

Next I compared the locations of airstrikes to the locations of VBIED attacks to determine if there

was any geospatial correlation that could be responsible for this decrease in VBIED attacks. The

following series of maps depict the locations of airstrikes against vehicles (and their relative intensity)

compared to the location of probable Islamic State VBIED attacks (and their relative density). I made a

map for each month in 2014 where airstrikes were conducted. What is striking in each month is that

airstrikes against vehicles and VBIED attacks are happening in different locations of the country. In

retrospect, this should not have been surprising because VBIED attacks are occurring largely in urban

areas where airstrikes are more difficult to conduct due to the proximity of large civilian populations.

Additionally, I assume that airstrikes would likely be used in conjunction with Iraqi ground forces rather

than as an over watch of civilian population centers.

Figure 1: August 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

Figure 2: September 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

Figure 3: October 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

Figure 4: November 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

Figure 5: December 2014 Airstrikes vs Vehicles compared to likely Islamic State VBIEDs

By comparing Figure 5 with Figures 1-4 you see that not only did the numbers of VBIEDs

decreased, but the expanse of territory over which they were conducted decreased significantly as well.

And while there were still large numbers of VBIED attacks in the Baghdad area, even here the numbers

significantly declined.

Figure 6: Comparing July and December 2014 VBIED Attack Locations

Figure 6 geospatially compares VBIED attacks in July 2014 (the month before airstrikes began)

with VBIED attacks in December (when the numbers of airstrikes dramatically increased). In July,

VBIED attacks on government targets occurred primarily in the central part of the country, especially in

Baghdad. In December, VBIED attacks on government targets become more common in the Western part

of the country (Anbar Governate) but less common everywhere else. In July VBIED attacks on civilian

targets are the most common in the central part of the country, but also occur elsewhere. In December,

VBIED attacks on civilian targets occur only in the central part of the country but in reduced numbers.

Figure 7: Comparing July and December 2014 VBIED Attack Locations in Baghdad

The most dramatic change in the numbers of VBIED attacks between July and December

occurred in Baghdad. VBIED attacks against government targets declined by 75%. Figure 7 shows the

reported locations of 8 VBIED attacks on government targets in July, and the 2 VBIED attacks on

government targets that occurred in December. VBIED attacks against civilian targets also declined by

21%. Figure 7 shows the reported locations of 14 VBIED attacks on civilian targets in Baghdad in July,

and the 11 VBIED attacks on civilian targets that occurred in December. This reduction in attacks cannot

be explained by coalition kinetic strikes in Baghdad however because there were no coalition airstrikes in

the Baghdad area in December 2014.

Conclusion

The analysis that I have conducted is not conclusive, but it does raise the possibility that U.S. led

coalition airstrikes could be significantly impacting the Islamic State’s ability to conduct VBIED attacks

targeting the government and civilians. There was a significant increase in airstrikes in Iraq in December

2014 that coincided with a significant decrease in the number of probable Islamic State initiated VBIED

attacks. The most striking change was a 75% reduction of VBIED attacks against government targets in

Baghdad. This study is limited by the fact that only 2014 VBIED attack data was available however. I

would be very interested to see if this trend continued into 2015 and 2016. It is possible that the decrease

in VBIED attacks was not a long term trend.

It is important to note that the 75% decrease in VBIED attacks against government targets in

Baghdad in December 2014 contrasted sharply to a 21% decrease in VBIED attacks against civilian

targets. This could be an indicator of the relative value that the Islamic State places on these types of

attacks. The coalition airstrikes destroyed a large number of Islamic State vehicles (and hopefully drivers)

in 2014. The Islamic State appeared to dedicate many of its remaining vehicles to conducting VBIED

attacks against civilians in Baghdad rather than against government targets. I would be interested to see if

this prioritization of VBIEDs against civilians in Baghdad continued.

The geospatial analysis conducted in this research project determined that there was no geospatial

correlation between airstrikes and VBIED attacks in Iraq in 2014. These types of events happened in

mostly different regions of the country. Airstrikes occurred most frequently in the North and West of

country, while VBIED attacks occurred primarily in the center of the country (especially near Baghdad).

The geospatial signature of VBIED attacks against government and civilian targets appears to be

drastically different however. VBIED attacks against government targets appear to become more

dispersed after the airstrikes begin, while VBIED attacks against civilian targets appear to become more

concentrated on Baghdad after the airstrikes begin.

Although airstrikes are not geospatially correlated with VBIED attacks, this does not mean that

they are not having a significant impact on the Islamic State’s ability to conduct these types of attacks.

331 (over 31%) of airstrikes in 2014 were conducted against vehicles. It is possible that the large amount

of vehicles (and drivers) destroyed by airstrikes caused the Islamic State’s to reduce using VBIEDs by

December 2014.

I would recommend conducting this same type of research for VBIEDs and airstrikes in 2015 and

2016 when this data becomes available. The University of Maryland is slated to release the GTD data for

2015 in the summer of 2016. This type of research could inform and influence the current political

argument about how effective airstrikes are against the Islamic State.

References

Ross Harrison. “Confronting the “Islamic State”” Parameters 44, (Autumn 2014): 37-46.

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forces pull back,” CNN, last modified May 17, 2015, accessed January 31, 2016,

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/17/asia/isis-ramadi/.

Ross Harrison, “Confronting the “Islamic State” Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS,” Parameters

44 (Autumn 2014) 37-46.

Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 21

(2014), 69-83.

Daniel L. Haulman. “The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999 “ Air Power History, (Summer

2015): 6-21.

David E. Johnson, “Fighting the “Islamic State” The Case for US Ground Forces,” Parameters 45 (Spring

2015), 7-17.

Paul Rexton Kan, “Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy,” Parameters 44 (Winter

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History (Winter 2013) 32-51.

Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”

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Security Research (Winter 2014-2015), 93-106.

W. Andrew Terrill, “Confronting the “Islamic State” Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of

ISIS,” Parameters 44 (Autumn 2014) 13-23.

Cassandra Vinograd, “ISIS Attacks Soared in Past 3 Months: HIS Jane’s Database,” NBC News, October

22, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-attacks-soared-

past-3-months-ihs-janes-database-n448401

Lauren Wollman "Qualitative Analysis", Learning Materials from the NPS Center for Homeland Defense

and Security, last modified on October 12, 2012, accessed on January 10, 2016,

https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_qualitative_methods/player.html

Data