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Trends: Having It Both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATOAuthor(s): Richard C. EichenbergSource: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), pp. 627-659Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for PublicOpinion ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3521697Accessed: 28-11-2016 16:30 UTC

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THE POLLS-TRENDS

HAVING IT BOTH WAYS: EUROPEAN DEFENSE

INTEGRATION AND THE COMMITMENT TO

NATO

RICHARD C. EICHENBERG

After the failure to implement the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, decisions about European security occurred almost wholly within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. However, since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union (EU) has made more progress in the elaboration of a common security policy than it had made in the 50 preceding years. The Maastricht Treaty declared that the "Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy. . . . The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."'

The "eventual" framing of a common defense policy has been both rapid and concrete. In just over 10 years, the EU elaborated a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and began deploying a military force of 50,000-60,000 persons (the so-called European Rapid Reaction Force [ERRF]). These steps were accomplished through a flurry of treaties and declarations of the European Council subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty.2

After a substantial period in which the EU had confined its integrated policy

authority to the economic field, the pace and scope of these steps in the security field is nothing short of astonishing. The dramatic acceleration of the EU's efforts in security policy nonetheless raises a number of questions. Perhaps the most important is whether the EU will outrun popular support for the integration of security policy. Public support for the more general enterprise

RICHARD C. EICHENBERG is associate professor of political science at Tufts University. The author is grateful to Judith Walcott for research assistance and to the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, for responding cheerfully to persistent inquiries about European poll results. 1. Treaty on European Union, 1992, Articles J, J.1, and J.3. 2. The European Council is composed of the heads of government of member countries. For a detailed review of the evolution of the ESDP, see Cameron (1999), Haine (2003), and Rutten (2001, 2002).

Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 67:627-659 C 2003 by the American Association for Public Opinion Research All rights reserved. 0033-362X/2003/6704-0007$10.00


628 Richard C. Eichenberg

of European integration suffered a grievous decline after the Maastricht Treaty,

although the decline was in all likelihood because of economic policies and conditions rather than security policy decisions.3 Still, public support for integration remains lower than it had been in the period leading up to Maastricht.

Thus the question arises: Will the EU's common security and defense policy meet with popular support? Second, public consensus on issues of European security had already been

shaken during the crises of the 1980s, especially NATO's decision in 1979 to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons. For many, one lesson of the intense popular challenge that most European governments faced during the 1980s was that security policy would henceforth require a solid basis of domestic support. A second question thus arises: Quite apart from their endorsement of a common security policy, do Europeans support the EU's plans for a military force that could operate independent of NATO? Finally, the prospect of a European security policy and defense force has

predictably raised debates across the Atlantic and within Europe about the proper institutional framework for the pursuit of European security. Many observers on both sides of the Atlantic are asking if a European security capability will eventually supplant NATO or drain resources from its mission. The bitter disagreement in 2003 about the war against Iraq brought these concerns to a very public level. An important final question, therefore, is this: Do European citizens seek an alternative to NATO, which has been the cor- nerstone of European security for over 50 years? My review of the polling data on this subject, primarily focusing on France,

Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, yields several answers to these questions. First, public support for European foreign and defense policy integration is surprisingly high. Indeed, it is higher than support for integrating many domestic policy areas. Second, support for NATO also remains high, although there are indications that support for European security integration does weaken support for NATO, and there is strong sentiment in Europe for the EU to have a dominant decision-making voice in security policy. Nonetheless, the typical opinion profile is to support both NATO and European defense integration, a stance that matches the compromise formula reached by NATO members in 1996.4 Finally, although it is clear that most Europeans want to "have it both ways," the sheer novelty of the EU's common security policy should give us pause about making predictions concerning the likely future trend of opinion. With that caution in mind, the evidence suggests that, should European leaders continue to advance the ESDP, they will find a largely supportive public opinion in most countries.

3. The data are reviewed in detail in Dalton and Eichenberg (1998). 4. At the NATO summit in Berlin in July 1996, the member states agreed to the creation of a "European Defense Identity" within NATO that will allow the EU to undertake military missions when NATO declines to do so. See the NATO communique at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/ p96-063e.htm.


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 629

Early Public Opinion on Foreign and Defense Policy Integration in Europe

Students of European integration have traditionally considered foreign and security policy to be the last bastions of national sovereignty-the arena of "high politics" that would prove most resistant to arguments in favor of integration (Hoffmann 1966). It is therefore surprising that survey evidence demonstrates that, since the 1950s, Europeans have always been supportive of integration in these policy areas.

Early polls sponsored by the U.S. government investigated the level of public support for two common defense initiatives in Europe: the moribund EDC, which was proposed by treaty in 1952 but never ratified, and the West

European Union (WEU) established in 1954.5 As table 1 shows, there are three salient features to these early opinions. First, the level of nonresponses ("don't know") is very high, suggesting that these organizations remained new and unfamiliar in the early 1950s. Second, support for European defense cooperation was nonetheless fairly high among those who did express an opinion. Strong pluralities were in favor of "taking part" in a common European

army, and a strong majority considered a European defense organization to be

"necessary" (tables la , 1c, and ld). Finally, defense cooperation appeared to be more popular than defense integration. Question lb in table 1 posed the stark alternative of maintaining a national defense or forming "a common West European army," and this question elicits the lowest levels of support for the common approach. Still, it is worth noting that a majority favored either a European army or a combination of national armies and a "common" European force, because this is the policy option most often considered then or since.

Table 2 shows that Europeans have also long been in accord with the recent European Council statement that "the European Union shall play its full role

on the international stage."6 As early as 1974 and 1975, an average of over 80 percent of respondents thought that member states should act jointly through the "Common Market" rather than through their own national governments to "make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans or the

Russians." Subsequent Eurobarometer surveys reinforce this early finding. Table 3 shows responses to a question that asked European citizens from 1976 through 1985 if "decisions about [security and defense] should be taken by each country acting separately, or by the member countries of the European

5. U.S. government surveys were commissioned by the Office of Research, which was a part of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) until October 1, 1999, when it was merged with the rest of USIA into the Department of State. Thus, polls prior to October 1, 1999, are here attributed to USIA, and after that date to the Office of Research, Department of State (ORDOS). 6. This language appears in the EU Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense (Cologne, June 3-4, 1999), reprinted in Cameron (1999) and Rutten (2002).



Union acting together?" Across Europe, an average of 57 percent favored acting "together." Significantly, support levels were high even in Britain, where

citizens are generally skeptical of the integration process. An additional pattern worth noting in table 3 is the substantial increase in

support from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s for joint European action. Al- though support had always been fairly high, it increased significantly in every country as the controversy within NATO raged over the issue of new nuclear deployments and relations with the Soviet Union. By 1983, 60-70 percent of Europeans favored joint action on "security and defense." Based on statistical analysis reported elsewhere, I believe that this sentiment arose from dissatisfaction with the perceived hard-line and unilateralist tone of U.S. foreign and defense policy during the early 1980s.7 The data presented here suggest that European citizens reacted to U.S. foreign policy with an increased sense that Europe should act together to protect its interests. In any case, these early polls suggest three things. First, historical public

support for a common European security policy has been high; indeed, I know of no polls that show low support for common European efforts. Second, although there is robust evidence of support for acting "together" in security policy or "taking part" in joint military forces, some early polls also suggest that support for a wholly integrated "European army" was somewhat weaker- although even this option was not without substantial support. Third, the data from the 1980s suggest that dissatisfaction with the United States is one factor

that moves Europeans to seek common solutions in the security field.

Recent Opinion on the Integration of European Foreign and Security Policy

The acceleration of European integration during the mid-1980s and the end of the Cold War in 1989 stimulated governments on both sides of the Atlantic to investigate the degree of public support for extending economic integration to the fields of foreign and security policy. Such an extension made perfect sense to students of international relations. With the disappearance of the soviet threat and the initial uncertainty about the continuing presence of the United States in Europe, the EU had both the need to act and the room for maneuver that the Cold War had precluded. What is more, European disunity during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the extended crises in the Balkans lent new urgency to proposals for coordinating and integrating foreign and security policy.

Table 4 shows that such calls met with a solid basis of public support. As in the 1970s and 1980s, European public opinion strongly agreed that foreign

7. Eichenberg 1989, pp. 94-98, 148-50. For a similar interpretation based on substantial British data, see Crewe 1984.



policy "should be decided jointly within the European Union" rather than by national governments. This support appears to be largely constant over time, with minor upward fluctuations at times of major events or external challenge. Support for policy integration is weakest (though still usually at majority levels) in Great Britain.

Notwithstanding these fluctuations, European citizens appeared quite ready to support the aspiration to a common European foreign policy that was announced at Maastricht in 1991, and they have remained so ever since. Of course, the practical significance of this sentiment might be questioned. After all, Europeans may simply be endorsing a long-known fact: that the EU has for many years represented the member states in external relations, especially in the fields of external trade and development, but also in the political realm after the beginning of European Political Cooperation in 1970. However, this endorsement of a diplomatic role for the EU begs the devilish question of details: Will Europeans also endorse the EU's subsequent decisions to proceed to a truly integrated policy on security and defense that will include a substantial military force?

Table 5 provides a mixed answer. On the one hand, in France, Germany, and Italy, there is majority support in most years for a "security and defense" policy that would be handled by the EU rather than by national governments acting alone. It is obviously significant that majorities support integration in France and Germany, two member states that are truly crucial to European security. On the other hand, public support in Britain is consistently in favor of a national approach to security and defense. The level of support in France, Germany, and Italy for defense policy integration in this particular wording is higher than support for integrating many domestic policy domains, such as health, social security, education, and labor-management policy (where average support levels are as low as 30 percent).8

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this question on "EU versus national" decision making in defense is a very demanding one, for it reminds citizens not just of the substance of the policy challenge (security and defense) but also of the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Indeed, it has overtones of the "common European army" questions presented above, for it implies that henceforth sovereignty over security policy would be a purely EU responsibility with a correlative sacrifice of national independence. Moreover, because of the evocation of the issue of sovereignty, responses to this question are likely affected by evaluations of integration more generally, and we have noted that during the 1990s these evaluations fell sharply.'

Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that simply inquiring of support or opposition to a "common European defense force" results in much higher and

8. Reproduced in Dalton and Eichenberg 1998, pp. 258-59. 9. This may explain why the British responses show a mild secular decline after the Maastricht Treaty in tables 4 and 5, since British citizens are particularly sensitive to the issue of transferring sovereignty.



unequivocal support levels (tables 6 and 7). Note once again that support (in table 7) for a "common European army," although a majority, is lower than the assent to the question inquiring of support for a "European rapid reaction military force." Once again, public support in Great Britain is lower than in the other three countries. In any case, it is also worth noting that these support

levels-regardless of wording-are substantially higher than the levels for the 1950s reviewed in table 1. Although the historical data coverage is hardly rich, this piece of evidence suggests that support for both common defense forces and a fully integrated common defense policy has indeed increased since the early years of European integration. For proponents of defense integration in Europe, the glass is therefore half

full. There is strong support in crucial states, even on questions that suggest the sacrifice of sovereignty, and in any case support is much higher than students of integration would ever have thought possible in the field of national

security. Nonetheless, there are also signs in tables 5-7 that the glass may be half empty. One obvious potential difficulty is the skepticism of the British, and to judge from table 6, that skepticism may be increasing somewhat. Second, the crises in the Balkans may have reminded Europeans of their own weaknesses in the defense field and thus of their dependence on NATO and the United States. It appears that in 1994-95, as Europe and NATO became involved in negotiations, military actions, and peacekeeping deployments in Bosnia, citizens concluded that such challenges reinforced Europe's need to pursue a common security policy. As table 5 shows, support for integrating "security and defense" policy increased in 1995 in many countries. During the war against Serbia in the spring of 1999-an action clearly dominated by NATO and U.S. forces within NATO-precisely the opposite occurred: except in Italy, support for integrating security authority declined (table 5). To be sure, the support levels rebounded quickly as the EU moved in the second half of 1999 and throughout 2000 to confirm its commitment to the goals and detailed force planning required under EU Council declarations. Nonetheless, the short-term decline in support for the common security policy in 1999 lends support to the hypothesis that Europeans had been reminded by the war over Kosovo that its security commitments could not be maintained without NATO and the United States.

While one must be cautious about fluctuations in reaction to the events of

September 11 and the 2003 Iraq War, it is worth noting that change in support for integrating defense increased slightly in most states during November and December 2001. However, one should probably await future results before assigning much significance to these fluctuations; in most states, the range of fluctuation is very much the same as in the past, so that support for integrating defense in spring 2003 was close to the historical average in all countries. Thus, even after September 11 and the Iraq War, a summary of the data in tables 5-7 is that 50-70 percent of Europeans support the integration of security policy and the deployment of a common European defense force.



Is NATO Essential to European Security?

Political debate often frames European defense initiatives as a potential threat to NATO. Given very real differences of perspective and interests on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is the prospect that the European effort will drain resources from NATO or even lead to the establishment of a separate and

competing defense organization. Given the long-standing European aspiration to global influence and the more recent aspiration to joint military capabilities, the issue is of course very real, but the question has to be posed: How much do Europeans see their efforts in competition with the existing alliance within NATO?

Practical realities as well as long-standing transatlantic solidarity suggest limits to the independent potential of European policy. Just as European independence was constrained during the Cold War by the need for the NATO partnership to balance soviet geographic and military advantages, Europeans today find themselves constrained by budgetary and technological inadequa- cies that place limits on the missions that the EU can undertake. At least before the Iraq War in 2003, most European politicians had been quick to emphasize that the EU military force is meant as a supplement to NATO for missions that the alliance declines to undertake. Whether this commitment

will withstand the bitterness that accompanied the Iraq War is of course an important question.

The polls reveal support for a continuing commitment to NATO. Table 8 shows that substantial majorities in all European states considered NATO "essential" to European security even as the Cold War came to an end (the average considering NATO essential was 68 percent through 1991). Surpris- ingly, even the French were firmly committed to NATO. True, there was a noticeable dip in 1989 as the Cold War wound down, but it turned immediately upward in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991."'

The high "essentiality" of NATO also appears in longer historical trends (table 9). From 1967 through 2003, the average of Europeans who considered NATO "essential" was 65 percent. Clearly, Europeans value NATO. The downward dip at the end of the Cold War is visible once again when the data are examined in historical context, but the upward "rebound" after the Persian Gulf War is also evident. Perhaps most interesting are the trends in the major NATO partners. In Great Britain, estimates of NATO's value fluctuate around a very high mean; despite occasional downward dips resulting from international conditions (the nuclear weapons issue of the early 1980s, the end of

10. USIA surveys have also pushed respondents in questions noting that, "Some people say that we do not need NATO because there is no longer a Soviet threat." Responses to this question during the 1990s reveal that 60-90 percent of respondents in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy continued to believe that "we still need NATO," even in the absence of a soviet threat. See Office of Research, United States Information Agency, Opinion Analysis M-47-97, March 20, 1997 (Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency).



the Cold War), British attachment to NATO is extremely high. An interesting

development occurs at the opposite end of the spectrum-in France, where Gaullist suspicion of NATO was reflected in comparatively low estimates of the alliance in the 1960s and into the 1980s. However, the 1990s saw a growth of "pro-NATO" sentiment in France: whereas an average of 42 percent thought NATO essential prior to 1990, during the 1990s the average was 59 percent. The events of 2001 pushed French perceptions of NATO essentiality even higher, while the Iraq War of 2003 appears to have pushed them down once again-not surprising given French opposition to the war and its refusal to allow NATO to make early preparations for conflict. Still, even in 2003 French support for NATO remained higher than its historical average." In Germany the trend appears to be just the opposite. Prior to 1990, an

average of 76 percent of Germans thought NATO essential, a reflection of Germany's security vulnerability and its close relationship with the United States in NATO. During the 1990s, however, the percentage dropped to an average of 69 percent-still quite high compared with some others in Europe but a noticeable drop nonetheless given Germany's previously unwavering Atlanticist opinion profile. Although September 11 did push opinions of NATO higher, they quickly receded and in 2003 approached their average value for the 1990s.

The net result of these changes somewhat shifts the contours of opinion across Europe on the issue of "Europe versus NATO." British opinion continues to reflect a solid preference for NATO, as its support levels for NATO are matched by skepticism on some of the questions concerning European defense integration reviewed above. French opinion, in contrast, has always displayed a Gaullist affinity for European independence, but the growth in the 1990s in the view that "NATO is essential" brought estimates of the value of NATO and the value of European options into approximate equivalence in public opinion. The French, it seems, want to have it both ways, although the negative reaction to the Iraq War may yet bring a return to traditional French skepticism of NATO. The drift of German opinion produces a similar result, although it arrives from a different direction. As we have seen, Germans

are somewhat less likely to see NATO as "essential," and they are somewhat more likely to favor an integrated European defense. As a result, in 2003, 60 percent of Germans favored an integrated European defense (table 5), while 70 percent found NATO essential (table 9).

In summary, the cross-national pattern of support for NATO remains largely unchanged, although for the moment the level of support for NATO is slightly higher than before September 11, 2001. We should also keep in mind that

11. As noted in one U.S. government report, this may be because NATO represents a commitment to multilateralism at a time of concern about U.S. unilateralism. See ORDOS, "Key Europeans Still Mostly Negative about Military Action in Iraq: Confidence in U.S. at a Decade+ Low," Opinion Analysis M-53-03, May 14, 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency).



support for European defense initiatives also remains at approximately the average level of the 1990s. Despite the considerable turbulence of recent years, Europeans continue to "have it both ways."

Paying the Piper and Calling the Tune

Of course, the ultimate test of Europeanist versus Atlanticist sentiment comes in survey questions that force a choice: "Do you prefer that security policy be conducted within the NATO Alliance, or that it be conducted within the

EU?" Table 10 shows several variants on this question from 1989 through 2003. In 1989, the Eurobarometer asked two separate questions. The first (10a) was the familiar "NATO essential" question, but a second question (10b) asked, "Should NATO continue to be the most important forum for making decisions about the security of Western Europe in the future, or should the European Union make those decisions?""2 The results of this survey revealed two groups: a "Europeanist" group that included France and Italy, and a more "Atlanticist" group that included Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, even within the Atlanticist group, support for NATO was considerably lower when the EU was offered as an alternative to NATO within the same question. It appears that support for a European policy that would make "decisions about the security of Western Europe" does indeed weaken support for NATO's primacy in these matters.

The bottom half of table 10 shows that this sentiment has grown in the wake of the Iraq War in 2003. Once again I compare the "NATO essential" question (10a) with a question that forces a choice among NATO, the EU, and-in this variant-a preference for national decision making (10c)."3 The preference for the EU to make "decisions concerning European defense" outweighs a preference for NATO primacy in all countries but Britain, although even the British are closely divided on the question. Moreover, the preference for EU primacy clearly outweighs NATO in all but the British case, and the effect of the Iraq War was to widen the gap considerably. Clearly, Europeans prefer that their own institutions have predominance in defense policy decisions.

Table 10 shows that this sentiment is not new-it was clear in the 1989

survey as well. But the more recent trends were doubtless affected by worries that had emerged concerning the tone and direction of the Bush administration's foreign policy. The disagreements are well known. On such issues as missile defense, global warming, and relations with North Korea, the first months

12. Eurobarometer 32, as summarized in Eichenberg 2000, p. 163. 13. It is important to emphasize that the two questions at the bottom of table 10 (tables 10a and 10c) are separate questions asked by different organizations during different months of the years shown. The "NATO essential" question, taken directly from table 9, is repeated to facilitate comparison to the question that offers an alternative to NATO (table 10c).



of the Bush administration produced an outcry in Europe-so much so that many observers began discussing a deep-seated European "anti-Americanism" for the first time since the Reagan administration. Well before the Iraq War (August 2001), disapproval of President Bush's "international policy" aver- aged 55 percent in Britain, Italy, Germany, and France.14 Although the events of September 11 did produce an outpouring of solidarity and support for the "war against terror," in the spring of 2002 Europeans were still nervous about U.S. policies, especially in Iraq and the Mideast conflict. In April 2002 and May 2003, the Pew Center asked Europeans if "you think the partnership between the United States and Western Europe should remain as close as it has been or do you think that Western Europe should take a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs than it has in the past?" In 2002, there were already majorities favoring "a more independent approach" in all countries but Britain-where it was nonetheless favored by 47 percent of respondents. By May 2003, the majorities favoring European independence grew substantially. By the middle of 2003, the U.S. image in Europe was at an historic low, views of President Bush's policies were actually negative in most European countries, and in most countries other than Britain

citizens considered it "undesirable" for the United States to exert strong global leadership-a substantial reversal of earlier readings.15 Table 11 shows that the sentiment for Europe to have the primary voice

in security policy was also growing during the 1990s, especially in France and Germany. When asked whether NATO or the EU should "make the most important decisions about the security of Europe," strong majorities in France and Italy preferred EU primacy (an average of over 60 percent for the period shown in table 11), and in Germany a majority supporting this view emerged by 2002. The British responses are uncharacteristically divided by this question: the British are usually unambiguously "pro-NATO," but the level pre- ferring NATO in this question drops to an average of 40 percent, and there is fairly strong minority sentiment behind a primary EU voice in security, and in 2002 it was the plurality view even in Britain. An interesting question is whether this sentiment also translates into a

willingness to support the defense expenditures that may be required to implement the ESDP. During the 1990s, the USIA fielded a very interesting set of questions designed to measure the willingness of Europeans to assume more responsibility for security policy and also to spend more on defense as

14. "Bush Unpopular in Europe: Seen as Unilateralist," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Survey Reports, August 15, 2001, available at http://www.people-press.org. 15. The surveys mentioned in this paragraph are taken from "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Survey Reports, April 20, 2002, available at http://www.people-press.org/reports; "The Pew Global At- titudes Project: Views of a Changing World 2003," Survey Reports, June 3, 2003, available at http://www.people-press.org/reports; and German Marshall Fund of the United States, "Trans- atlantic Trends: Key Findings," September 4, 2003, available at http://www.gmfus.org. These surveys confirm results reported in ORDOS, "Key Europeans."



a consequence (table 12). The results, at least through 1995, are close to astonishing: in every country but Britain (in 1995), a majority of respondents was willing to spend more on defense in order for Europe "to reduce the role of the U.S. in NATO and strengthen the role of western Europe." The results are astonishing because if there is one constant in historical trends in European public opinion, it is the persistent unpopularity of defense spending. Indeed, in Britain, France, and Germany-the countries for which useful time trends are available-the average level of support for increasing defense spending was 13 percent from the 1960s through 1998.'6 Thus, the finding that majorities

of Europeans would contemplate increases in defense spending to finance increased European responsibilities must be considered a truly significant fact.

Europeans, it seems, were reacting favorably to sentiments like those ex- pressed by Prime Minister Tony Blair, when he said in May 1999 that "we should begin with capabilities. . . . To put it bluntly, if Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs modern forces, strategic lift, and the necessary

equipment to conduct a campaign. . ... If we were in any doubts about this before, Kosovo should have removed them."" Of course, the practical question is whether the hypothetical endorsement of increased defense spending to match increased European responsibility would yield public support in the face of real defense budget increases. The ORDOS surveys in June 2002 tested this sentiment in two separate questions: the first inquired about support

for a strengthened European role, and the second pushed respondents on the issue of increased defense spending to finance such a role. The combined support for increased European responsibility and increased defense spending yields lower percentages: France (42 percent), Germany (25 percent), Italy (39 percent), and Britain (17 percent).'8 Still, these levels are actually higher than comparable levels of support for increased defense spending that were evinced during the 1970s and 1980s (15 percent in Britain, France, and Ger- many) when real increases to defense budgets did occur in most fiscal years.

A final estimate of the relative importance of NATO and the EU also comes from ORDOS polls that have asked respondents since the early 1990s how much confidence they have in the two institutions to "deal effectively with European problems" (table 13). Once again a fairly clear pattern emerges. Britain and Germany have higher (majority) confidence in NATO and much more closely divided opinions concerning the effectiveness of the EU. In France, opinions show a similarity to the recent evolution of polls reviewed earlier: although the French are clearly more confident in the EU than their partners, their confidence in NATO is equally high.

German opinions reveal a significant change. German confidence in both NATO and the EU began declining after 1992. Although it is surely a sig-

16. This is based on surveys analyzed in Eichenberg and Stoll 2003. 17. Cited in Cameron 1999, p. 79. 18. ORDOS, Opinion Analysis M-116-00, July 21, 2000, and ORDOS 2002.



nificant development that the French now profess higher confidence in NATO than do the Germans, in the end their profiles are quite similar: whereas the British see NATO as far more effective than the EU, the French and Germans

have about equal confidence in the two. British opinion reflects the primacy of NATO, while German and French opinion continues to have it both ways.

Summary and Conclusions

Five decades of opinion polling on the subject of European defense integration yield several important conclusions. First, public support for the aspiration to a common European policy on

security and defense is long-standing. From the 1950s through the new century,

European public opinion has supported the assertion of European influence, the integration of policy making in security and defense, and the establishment

of common defense forces. The skepticism of the British is the only exception to this generalization among the four countries studied here. Second, support for the establishment of a European defense force (such

as the recently created ERRF) is very high, and this is true in Britain as well. Based on fragmentary data, there are indications that these levels of support are much higher than in the 1950s, when such proposals were last broached seriously.

Third, Europeans have also consistently supported membership in NATO and consider it "essential" to European security. Nowhere is there significant sentiment to end NATO membership. Although there are some signs that support for NATO has weakened recently over its historical levels (Italy, Germany), even in these countries support remains high. Europeans want it both ways, as reflected in NATO's 1996 compromise in which the European Defense Identity is acknowledged and even endorsed, but only within the context of NATO.

Fourth, the fact that public opinion matches the consensus reached within (and between) EU and NATO decision-making councils is no guarantee that tensions will not arise. Most important, public opinion in Europe now strongly supports the position that the EU-rather than NATO-should have the "primary voice" in matters of European security, but this is decidedly not the view of the U.S. government. This tension has already been revealed as the EU moves to activate the ERRF and establish decision-making procedures to govern its use, and skepticism of U.S. policy has been evident in reactions to the policies of the Bush administration.

Finally, as has been true of European security policy for over 5 decades, much depends on the actions of the United States, and on this score the immediate short term appears to herald a continuation or-more likely-an increase in European public support for both defense policy integration and independence from NATO. As was true in the early to mid-1980s, European



opinion has reacted to the perceived unilateralism--or realpolitik--of the Bush administration with a truly substantial decline in confidence in the United States, a factor that almost certainly influences support for European independence. In summary, should European leaders continue or accelerate the ESDP, it seems likely that they will find a solid basis of support in public opinion.

Appendix

Abbreviations

Eurobarometer: European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communica- tion, Public Opinion Analysis Sector

LHF: Louis Harris France

USIA: United States Information Agency

Data Sources and Archiving Information

Data Sources. An expanded version of the tables published in this article is available electronically in Eichenberg (2003), which provides additional data not published here, including data for all 15 members of the EU, some cross-national surveys from recent years, and a comparison of elite and public opinion.

A substantial listing of raw historical data on Atlantic Alliance and European security issues can be found in the following: Eichenberg (1989, 2000), Flynn and Rattinger (1985), Merritt and Puchala (1968), and Szabo (1988). Substantial listings of USIA/ ORDOS surveys from the early to mid-1990s appear in ORDOS (2002) and USIA (1995, 1996). Eurobarometer reports (which include marginals and some demographic

breakdowns) are available from 1995 at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgl0/infcom/ epo/polls.html.

Archiving. Eurobarometer is archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Po- litical and Social Research at the University of Michigan. In addition, the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne maintains a very useful page on Eurobarometer: http://www.gesis.org/end/data_service/eurobarometer.

USIA surveys are archived in several locations. Through the 1980s, most surveys are archived at the National Archive and Record Service (http://www.archives.org); a listing of National Archive files for several West European countries through the 1980s is found in the bibliography to Eichenberg (1989). An even more accessible collection

is available through the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research: http:// www.gesis.org/en/za/index.html. The Central Archive is particularly useful for the surveys conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, although some later surveys are also archived. Finally, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut has some holdings of USIA surveys (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu).

Technical specifications. Eurobarometer surveys are nationally representative samples of approximately one thousand respondents from the population age 15 and older.

USIA/ORDOS surveys are nationally representative samples of approximately one thousand respondents from the population age 18 and older. Detailed specifications



(including survey contractors) can be found at the Eurobarometer Web address listed above; for USIA/ORDOS surveys, see technical specifications in USIA (1995, 1996). Geographic units. For Britain, both Eurobarometer and USIA/ORDOS sample

"Great Britain," that is, England, Wales, and Scotland. For Germany, Eurobarometer reports separate results for the former East Germany and West Germany, as well as for the newly unified Germany after 1990. In this article, results for the former West

Germany are presented to preserve historical comparability. USIA/ORDOS surveys prior to 1991 are for the former West Germany only; thereafter they are for unified Germany.

Early Public Opinion on Foreign and Defense Policy Integration in Europe

Ila. USIA (9/52): Are you for or against [your country] taking part in a common West European army?

Don't

For Against Know (%) (%) (%) N

France 45 26 29 1,345

Germany 48 37 15 1,588 Italy 42 25 33 1,505 Britain 42 24 34 1,503

lb. USIA (9/52): What do you think is the best way to strengthen Western European defense; for each country to build up its own army, or to form a common West European army?

European Own Don't Army Army Both Know (%) (%) (%) (%) N

France 32 23 15 30 1,345 Germany 39 31 5 25 1,588 Italy 26 29 12 33 1,505 Britain 32 39 10 19 1,503



Ic. USIA (9/52): Here is a short description of a West European army [hand card showing that a West European army would include participating nations West Germany,

France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg]. Soldiers from all these countries will wear the same uniform and will serve in their own national divisions under an

international Supreme Command. Would you be for or against having [your country] take part in such an army?

Don't

For Against Know (%) (%) (%) N

France 48 30 22 1,345 Germany 45 37 18 1,588 Italy 45 29 26 1,505 Britain 42 35 23 1,503

Id. USIA (2/55): In your opinion how necessary is it to establish a West European defense organization at the present time?

Very Somewhat Not So Not at All Don't Necessary Necessary Necessary Necessary Know (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N

France 22 21 7 15 35 900

Germany 26 28 17 14 15 820 Italy 34 20 3 13 30 814 Britain 48 20 7 5 20 805

2. Eurobarometer: Would you please look at this list of problems? For each of the problems, can you tell me if, in your opinion, it would be better to deal with it by combined action through the Common Market or rather by an action of our own government independently of other countries? . . . To make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans and Russians.

Common Own

Market Government Total

(%) (%) (%) N Belgium: 11/74 90 10 100 1,507 5/75 91 9 100 1,554

Denmark:

11/74 73 27 100 1,100 5/75 76 24 100 1,073

France:

11/74 86 14 100 1,042 5/75 87 13 100 1,000



Germany: 11/74 82 18 100 1,042 5/75 86 14 100 1,039

Italy: 11/74 86 14 100 1,021 5/75 83 17 100 1,043

Netherlands:

11/74 86 14 100 1,012 5/75 88 12 100 1,093

Ireland:

11/74 67 33 100 1,000 5/75 76 24 100 1,000

Great Britain:

11/74 63 37 100 1,039 5/75 66 34 100 1,328

3. Eurobarometer: Here are a number of present-day problems. ... For each one, would you tell me if it is better that decisions about it be taken by each country acting separately or by the member countries of the EU acting together . . . security and defense?

Together Separately Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N

France:

11/76 49 34 17 1,356 11/78 49 35 16 1,194 4/83 67 25 8 1,011 11/84 68 26 6 1,006 11/85 61 35 4 1,006

Germany: 11/76 56 29 15 1,007 11/78 54 28 18 1,006 4/83 60 29 11 1,049 11/84 60 34 6 1,053 11/85 61 32 8 1,028

Italy: 11/76 40 37 23 1,052 11/78 48 31 21 1,030 4/83 75 15 10 1,031 11/84 72 20 8 1,097 11/85 70 23 6 1,047

Great Britain:

11/76 45 46 9 1,351 11/78 49 43 8 1,339 4/83 60 33 7 1,348 11/84 57 36 7 1,405 11/85 51 44 5 1,383



Recent Opinion on the Integration of European Foreign and Security Policy

4. Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided

by the [national] government, and which should be decided jointly within the EU ... foreign policy toward countries outside the EU?

National Don't

EU Government Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/89 73 21 6 2,000 11/90 63 23 14 1,022 3/91 71 20 9 1,000 11/91 72 19 9 1,007 4/92 76 18 6 1,005 10/92 70 22 8 1,005 4/93 71 23 6 1,019 11/93 68 26 6 1,024 5/94 74 18 8 1,335 12/94 74 18 8 1,007 5/95 77 16 7 1,002 12/95 75 20 5 1,000 11/96 74 21 5 1,003 6/97 72 21 7 1,001 11/97 78 14 8 1,006 5/98 76 18 6 1,045 11/98 76 17 7 1,003 4/99 73 19 8 1,000 11/99 74 21 5 1,003 5/00 77 17 6 1,003 12/00 76 19 5 1,003 11/01 72 22 6 1,005 5/02 75 19 6 1,010 11/02 78 18 4 1,004 4/03 77 18 5 1,075

Germany: 11/89 67 27 6 2,217 11/90 60 32 8 1,021 3/91 69 26 5 1,073 11/91 67 27 6 1,000 4/92 69 26 5 1,065 10/92 75 21 4 1,013 4/93 72 22 6 1,036



11/93 68 27 5 1,047 5/94 68 26 6 1,415 12/94 72 21 7 1,018 5/95 73 19 8 1,055 12/95 71 20 9 1,095 11/96 73 21 6 1,024 6/97 71 21 8 1,056 11/97 72 19 9 1,038 5/98 73 19 8 1,005 11/98 74 19 7 1,016 4/99 72 20 8 1,022 11/99 75 18 7 1,018 5/00 74 19 7 1,015 12/00 72 21 7 1,013 11/01 75 18 7 1,001 5/02 75 17 8 1,000 11/02 75 18 7 1,018 4/03 75 18 7 1,050

Italy: 11/89 78 12 10 2,088 11/90 74 15 11 1,073 3/91 78 12 10 1,007 11/91 77 13 10 1,076 4/92 78 11 11 1,046 10/92 82 9 9 1,052 4/93 75 11 14 1,039 11/93 74 14 12 1,012 5/94 78 11 11 1,358 12/94 78 11 11 1,055 5/95 76 12 12 1,057 12/95 81 10 9 1,028 11/96 79 11 10 1,059 6/97 83 9 8 1,003 11/97 73 15 12 997

5/98 77 11 12 1,000 11/98 78 14 8 1,000 4/99 79 11 10 1,000 11/99 81 10 9 1,010 5/00 83 12 5 1,000 12/00 78 13 9 987 11/01 81 12 7 999 5/02 80 10 10 1,000 11/02 82 12 6 1,043 4/03 80 12 8 1,027

Great Britain:

11/89 61 30 9 2,498 11/90 64 28 8 1,047 3/91 68 25 7 1,056



11/91 64 30 6 1,076 4/92 67 29 4 1,016 10/92 63 29 8 1,058 4/93 60 31 9 1,073 11/93 62 31 7 1,061 5/94 60 30 10 1,392 12/94 62 30 8 1,045 5/95 61 31 8 1,066 12/95 62 31 7 1,070 11/96 56 36 8 1,067 6/97 55 35 10 1,105 11/97 55 35 10 1,078 5/98 59 31 10 1,055 11/98 58 32 10 1,066 4/99 53 35 12 1,040 11/99 52 36 12 1,002 5/00 46 41 13 1,070 12/00 51 38 11 1,058 11/01 57 34 9 1,000 5/02 54 35 11 1,004 11/02 57 33 10 1,014 4/03 58 30 12 1,011

5. Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [nationality] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the [national] government, and which should be decided jointly within the EU ... security and defense?

National Don't

EU Government Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/89 51 45 4 2,000 11/90 42 52 6 1,022 3/91 47 49 4 1,000 11/91 44 52 4 1,007 4/92 53 44 3 1,005 10/92 53 44 3 1,005 4/93 43 53 4 1,019 11/93 40 56 4 1,024 5/94 48 48 4 1,335 12/94 53 44 3 1,007 5/95 59 39 2 1,002 12/95 53 44 3 1,000 11/96 52 44 4 1,003



6/97 54 40 6 1,001 11/97 56 40 4 1,006 5/98 53 43 4 1,045 11/98 54 41 5 1,003 4/99 49 44 7 1,000 11/99 50 47 3 1,003 5/00 53 43 4 1,003 12/00 50 47 3 1,003 11/01 48 48 4 1,005 5/02 47 50 3 1,010 11/02 50 48 2 1,004 4/03 47 50 4 1,075

Germany: 11/89 58 39 3 2,217 11/90 50 44 6 1,021 3/91 52 44 4 1,073 11/91 54 42 4 1,000 4/92 59 37 4 1,065 10/92 55 42 3 1,013 4/93 62 35 3 1,036 11/93 53 43 4 1,047 5/94 59 37 4 1,415 12/94 58 37 5 1,018 5/95 59 36 5 1,055 12/95 58 37 5 1,095 11/96 61 34 5 1,024 6/97 60 34 6 1,056 11/97 59 35 6 1,038 5/98 61 32 7 1,005 11/98 59 35 6 1,016 4/99 52 43 5 1,022 11/99 57 37 6 1,018 5/00 60 35 5 1,015 12/00 56 39 5 1,013 11/01 58 37 5 1,001 5/02 55 40 5 1,000 11/02 52 43 5 1,018 4/03 60 35 4 1,050

Italy:

11/89 56 40 4 2,088 11/90 60 34 6 1,073 3/91 61 34 5 1,007 11/91 56 41 3 1,076 4/92 69 27 4 1,046 10/92 68 28 4 1,052 4/93 58 35 7 1,039 11/93 49 45 6 1,012 5/94 52 43 5 1,358



12/94 38 57 5 1,055 5/95 66 29 5 1,057 12/95 61 33 6 1,028 11/96 60 35 5 1,059 6/97 64 32 4 1,003 11/97 59 34 7 997

5/98 59 35 6 1,000 11/98 58 38 4 1,000 4/99 60 35 5 1,000 11/99 64 32 4 1,010 5/00 60 37 3 1,000 12/00 57 38 5 987

11/01 66 31 3 999

5/02 65 30 5 1,000 11/02 60 37 3 1,043 4/03 59 38 3 1,027

Great Britain:

11/89 39 57 4 2,498 11/90 42 55 3 1,047 3/91 44 54 2 1,056 11/91 39 59 2 1,076 4/92 45 53 2 1,016 10/92 37 61 2 1,058 4/93 44 52 4 1,073 11/93 34 63 3 1,061 5/94 37 60 3 1,392 12/94 41 55 4 1,045 5/95 45 50 5 1,066 12/95 39 58 3 1,070 11/96 37 58 5 1,067 6/97 35 60 5 1,105 11/97 33 62 5 1,078 5/98 34 60 6 1,055 11/98 30 63 7 1,066 4/99 27 67 6 1,040 11/99 27 64 9 1,002 5/00 28 64 8 1,070 12/00 32 61 7 1,058 11/01 38 58 4 1,000 5/02 36 59 5 1,004 11/02 34 62 4 1,014 4/03 32 63 6 1,011



6. USIA: There have been a number of proposals for actions the EU could take in the next several years. For each of the following, please tell me whether you are strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed--or haven't you heard enough about it to say: the development of a common European defense force?

Total Total Don't

Favor Oppose Know (%) (%) (%) N

France:

5/92 72 19 9 1,000 3/93 84 14 2 1,000 6/95 79 15 6 1,000 6/96 74 16 10 1,002 1/97 69 23 8 1,003 4/98 70 21 9 1,012 4/99 70 20 10 1,003 11/99 80 8 10 1,006 6/00 77 19 10 1,015 5/01 64 26 10 1,003

Germany: 5/92 68 32 0 1,000 3/93 69 26 5 1,000 6/95 70 28 2 1,189 6/96 66 33 1 1,200 1/97 63 29 8 1,045 4/98 68 21 11 1,148 3/99 68 22 10 948

11/99 66 24 10 1,019 6/00 57 25 10 1,055 5/01 57 27 6 1,005

Italy: 5/92 80 11 9 1,000 3/93 75 14 11 1,000 6/96 73 19 8 1,000 9/97 77 13 10 1,000 4/98 81 16 3 1,000 5/99 77 13 10 1,001 11/99 86 9 5 1,002 6/00 78 10 12 1,005 5/01 82 11 7 1,000

Great Britain:

5/92 61 28 11 1,000 3/93 71 19 10 1,000 6/95 68 25 7 1,007 6/96 56 33 11 1,010 9/97 52 28 20 1,098 4/98 53 25 22 1,029 4/99 57 28 15 1,048



11/99 57 27 16 864

6/00 56 27 17 1,056 5/01 47 30 23 1,003

7a. Louis Harris France (12/00): Personally, are you in favor or opposed to ... the creation [I'instauration] of a common European army?

Favor Oppose Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N

France 69 28 3 1,000

Germany 59 36 5 945 Greece 56 36 8 1,000

Italy 65 24 11 800 Netherlands 59 28 13 603

Spain 57 31 12 812 United Kingdom 36 53 11 1,000

7b. Louis Harris France (12/00): Personally, are you in favor or opposed to ... the creation of a European rapid reaction military force?

Favor Oppose Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N

France 70 26 4 1,000

Germany 70 24 6 945 Greece 60 31 9 1,000

Italy 69 20 11 800 Netherlands 65 20 15 603

Spain 55 32 13 812 United Kingdom 45 38 17 1,000

7c. Eurobarometer: What is your opinion of the following statement? Please tell me whether you are for it or against it. One common defense and security policy among the member states of the EU.

For Against Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N

France:

11/02 77 19 4 1,004 4/03 77 14 9 1,075

Germany: 11/02 80 11 9 1,018 4/03 81 10 9 1,050



Greece:

11/02 79 16 4 1,003 4/03 84 9 7 1,003

Italy: 11/02 85 8 7 1,043 4/03 86 5 8 1,027

Netherlands:

11/02 75 16 9 1,000 4/03 78 15 8 1,008

Spain: 11/02 79 9 13 1,000 4/03 76 10 14 1,000

Great Britain:

11/02 49 33 18 1,014 4/03 47 31 22 1,011

Is NATO Essential to European Security?

8. Eurobarometer: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country's security. Which view is closer to your own?

NATO Not

Essential Essential Total

(%) (%) (%) N Belgium: 10/80 74 26 100 1,022 11/88 75 25 100 1,024 11/89 64 36 100 1,999 3/91 74 26 100 1,061

Denmark:

11/88 75 25 100 1,006 11/89 74 26 100 2,000 3/91 79 21 100 1,000

France:

10/80 56 44 100 986

11/88 72 28 100 1,005 11/89 60 40 100 2,000 3/91 72 28 100 1,000

Germany: 10/80 92 8 100 1,008 11/88 85 15 100 1,061 11/89 71 29 100 2,217 3/91 76 24 100 1,073



Greece:

11/88 51 49 100 1,000 11/89 52 48 100 2,015 3/91 62 38 100 1,001

Ireland:

11/88 69 31 100 1,006 11/89 70 30 100 1,945 3/91 67 33 100 1,015

Italy: 10/80 68 32 100 1,108 11/88 64 36 100 1,022 11/89 62 38 100 2,088 3/91 69 31 100 1,007

Netherlands:

10/80 71 29 100 1,114 11/88 71 29 100 1,025 11/89 66 34 100 2,036 3/91 79 21 100 1,035

Portugal: 11/88 68 32 100 1,000 11/89 69 31 100 2,000 3/91 83 17 100 1,000

Spain: 11/88 27 73 100 1,001 11/89 34 66 100 1,996 3/91 51 49 100 1,001

Great Britain:

10/80 86 14 100 1,432 11/88 81 19 100 1,276 11/89 80 20 100 2,498 3/91 83 17 100 1,056

9. USIA: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country's security. Which view is closer to your own?

Not Don't

Essential Essential Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/69 47 37 16 1,210 7/71 54 35 11 1,263 5/73 42 34 25 1,000 8/76 42 35 23 854

3/77 44 29 27 993

3/78 39 35 26 938



10/80 44 34 23 986

7/82 34 26 40 915

2/87 49 28 24 939 9/87 48 19 32 939

10/88 58 22 20 1,001 10/89 41 28 31 2,000 2/90 50 19 31 1,000 3/91 58 23 19 1,000 5/91 55 26 19 1,000 5/92 52 37 10 1,000 1/93 55 29 17 1,000 9/93 66 30 4 1,000 1994 58 30 12 1,000 6/95 68 25 7 1,000 6/96 54 39 7 1,002 1/97 58 29 13 1,003 9/97 49 34 17 1,016 4/98 50 37 13 1,012 4/99 66 22 12 1,003 11/99 66 29 5 1,006 5/00 54 31 15 1,015 10/00 60 35 5 1,000 5/01 53 31 17 1,000 10/01 67 28 5 1,013 7/02 61 33 6 1,001 7/02 67 24 8 1,003 4/03 56 1,003

Germany: 10/69 76 13 11 1,158 7/71 84 11 5 1,211 5/73 73 13 14 993

8/76 85 10 5 960

3/77 79 7 14 962

3/78 84 5 11 950

10/80 88 8 4 1,008 3/81 62 20 19 1,000 7/82 66 18 16 923

7/83 86 12 2 2,035 5/84 87 10 3 1,033 2/87 71 11 17 922

9/87 70 15 15 1,022 10/88 76 15 9 1,051 10/89 59 24 17 2,217 2/90 53 24 23 1,000 3/91 62 27 11 1,000 5/91 69 19 12 1,000 5/92 65 23 11 1,000 1/93 70 12 12 1,000



9/93 64 32 4 1,000 1994 76 13 5 1,000 6/95 76 21 3 1,189 6/96 69 29 2 1,200 1/97 68 21 11 1,000 9/97 68 21 11 951

4/98 60 23 17 1,148 3/99 71 12 12 948

11/99 71 20 9 1,019 6/00 66 16 18 1,055 10/00 72 24 4 1,000 5/01 62 21 16 1,000 10/01 86 12 3 1,001 7/02 74 22 4 1,000 7/02 76 18 6 1,005 4/03 73 1,003

Italy: 11/69 66 23 11 1,202 8/76 58 30 12 982

3/77 54 24 22 2,057 3/78 58 22 20 1,037 10/80 59 28 13 1,108 3/81 62 27 12 1,113 7/82 55 31 14 1,053 7/83 61 26 13 1,984 5/84 63 24 14 1,040 2/87 58 29 13 977

9/87 65 23 12 1,061 3/91 57 25 18 1,000 5/91 65 24 11 1,000 9/93 60 31 9 1,000 4/98 64 31 5 1,000 5/99 60 23 17 1,001 11/99 68 26 6 1,002 6/00 51 28 21 1,005 10/00 58 35 7 1,000 5/01 57 28 16 1,000 10/01 72 22 6 1,000 7/02 68 27 5 1,000 7/02 71 22 6 1,000 4/03 64 1,000

Great Britain:

11/69 68 15 17 1,155 7/71 81 12 7 1,240 7/76 69 15 16 1,008 3/77 73 8 19 1,788 3/78 70 10 20 985 10/80 79 13 8 1,132



3/81 70 15 15 1,132 7/82 65 25 10 967

7/83 72 16 12 2,296 5/84 76 12 12 1,131 6/85 76 13 11 1,183 2/87 72 17 12 963

9/87 72 16 12 964

10/88 72 17 12 1,276 10/89 67 17 16 2,498 2/90 70 21 9 1,000 3/91 74 15 12 1,000 5/91 68 15 17 1,000 5/92 74 16 10 1,000 1/93 69 16 15 1,000 9/93 76 20 4 1,000 1994 77 18 6 1,000 6/95 78 17 5 1,007 6/96 71 23 5 1,010 1/97 69 20 12 1,000 9/97 66 17 17 1,098 4/98 67 15 19 1,029 4/99 77 10 13 1,048 11/99 63 15 22 864

6/00 68 16 16 1,056 10/00 70 22 8 1,000 5/01 68 12 20 1,000 10/01 79 16 6 985

7/02 76 20 4 1,000 7/02 77 13 11 1,003 4/03 64 1,005

10a. Eurobarometer (11/89): Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country's security. Which view is closer to your own?

10b. Eurobarometer: In your opinion, should NATO continue to be the most important forum for making decisions about the security of Western Europe in the future, or should the EU make those decisions, or should some other organization?

NATO Essential NATO versus the EU

NATO Not

Essential Essential NATO Decides EU Decides

(%) (%) (%) (%) N France 41 28 21 46 1,000 Germany 59 24 45 31 1,136 Italy 46 28 19 60 1,032 Great Britain 67 17 42 31 947



10c. Eurobarometer: In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defense policy be taken by national governments, by NATO, or by the EU?

NATO Essential

(from table 9) NATO versus the EU

NATO National

Essential NATO EU Governments

(%) N Date (%) (%) (%) N France:

10/01 67 1,013 11/01 13 49 21 1,005 7/02 67 1,003 11/02 16 49 21 1,004 4/03 56 1,003 4/03 8 58 18 1,075

Germany: 10/01 86 1,001 11/01 30 35 21 1,001 7/02 76 1,005 11/02 30 41 17 1,018 4/03 73 1,003 4/03 17 46 21 1,050

Italy: 10/01 72 1,000 11/01 16 60 15 999 7/02 71 1,000 11/02 16 64 12 1,043 4/03 64 1,000 4/03 11 69 12 1,027

Great Britain:

10/01 79 985 11/01 29 23 30 1,000 7/02 77 1,003 11/02 33 20 26 1,014 4/03 64 1,005 4/03 22 26 30 1,011

11. USIA: In your opinion, what organization should make the most important decisions about the security of Europe in the future: NATO, the EU, or some other organization?

Other/

NATO EU Don't Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

10/89 14 59 27 1,000 2/90 14 71 15 1,000 9/97 22 53 25 1,016 4/98 27 61 12 1,012 4/99 34 51 15 1,003 11/99 16 64 20 1,006 5/00 19 63 18 1,015 7/02 16 73 11 1,003

Germany: 10/89 44 24 32 1,000 2/90 17 43 40 1,000 9/97 33 35 32 951

4/98 32 49 19 1,148 3/99 32 46 22 948



11/99 26 52 22 1,019 6/00 30 53 17 1,055 7/02 29 57 14 1,005

Italy: 10/89 16 65 19 1,000 9/97 19 59 22 1,000 4/98 13 67 20 1,000 5/99 19 61 20 1,001 11/99 18 76 6 1,002 6/00 14 66 20 1,005 7/02 17 71 12 1,000

Great Britain:

10/89 39 37 24 1,000 2/90 36 44 20 1,000 9/97 41 29 30 1,098 4/98 40 33 27 1,029 4/99 49 34 17 1,048 11/99 38 26 36 864

6/00 40 33 27 1,056 7/02 38 43 19 1,003

Paying the Piper and Calling the Tune

12. USIA: One way some people have proposed to deal with post-Cold War security issues is to reduce the role of the United States in NATO and strengthen the role of Western Europe. This would mean Europeans would have a much greater say on issues of Western security. However, Europe would have to spend more money on defense and assume more of the responsibility for the security of Western Europe. Which do you think would be the best for the security of Western Europe-keeping the same security relationship with the United States or assuming more of the responsibility and control of our security?

Assume

Same More Don't

Relationship Responsibility Know (%) (%) (%) N

France:

1994 25 71 4 1,000 6/95 27 70 3 1,000 6/96 37 57 6 1,002 9/97 34 53 13 1,016 4/98 38 55 7 1,012 11/99 21 77 2 1,006

Germany: 1994 38 55 7 1,000



6/95 43 54 3 1,189 6/96 44 52 4 1,200 9/97 39 42 19 951

4/98 55 31 14 1,148 11/99 32 58 10 1,019

Italy: 6/96 33 60 7 1,000 9/97 37 56 7 1,000

Great Britain:

1994 44 48 8 1,000 6/95 46 51 3 1,007 6/96 52 41 7 1,010 9/97 59 25 16 1,098 4/98 55 30 15 1,029 11/99 51 31 18 864

13. USIA: I would like to ask you how much confidence you have in the following institutions to deal effectively with European problems. Do you have a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence at all in NATO to deal effectively with European problems? What about the EU?

NATO

France 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 64 63 62 67 70 62 Not confident (%) 16 26 35 29 20 30 Don't know (%) 20 11 3 4 10 8 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,003 1,016 Germany 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 76 71 69 62 59 48 Not confident (%) 20 28 27 36 32 37 Don't know (%) 4 1 4 2 9 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,045 951 Italy 5/92 1994 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 72 74 79 66 Not confident (%) 17 23 14 28 Don't know (%) 11 3 7 6 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 951 Great Britain 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 72 64 74 78 74 67 Not confident (%) 20 22 21 20 16 18 Don't know (%) 10 4 5 2 10 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000 1,098 France 4/98 4/99 11/99 5/00 7/02

Confident (%) 67 71 68 66 63 Not confident (%) 27 23 28 28 32



Don't know (%) 6 6 4 6 5 N 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003 Germany 4/98 3/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 55 58 57 56 55 Not confident (%) 33 32 36 30 42 Don't know (%) 12 11 7 15 3 N 1,148 948 1,019 1,055 1,005 Italy 4/98 5/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 67 66 65 58 67 Not confident (%) 31 27 34 32 32 Don't know (%) 2 7 2 11 1 N 1,000 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000 Great Britain 4/98 4/99 11/99 6/00 7/02

Confident (%) 72 72 59 66 67 Not confident (%) 14 17 24 20 24 Don't know (%) 14 11 17 14 9 N 1,029 1,048 864 1,056 1,003

EU

France 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 76 65 78 66 70 Not confident(%) 14 31 21 26 24 Don't know (%) 10 4 1 8 6 N 1,000 1,000 1,002 1,003 1,016 Germany 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 63 56 55 52 41 Not confident (%) 32 38 42 42 44 Don't know (%) 4 6 3 5 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,045 951 Italy 5/92 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 83 79 79 Not confident (%) 11 14 17 Don't know (%) 7 7 4 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 Great Britain 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 52 49 53 53 46 Not confident (%) 40 41 43 33 37 Don't know (%) 9 10 4 15 18 N 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000 1,098 France 4/98 4/99 11/99 5/00 7/02

Confident (%) 73 71 66 69 68 Not confident (%) 24 22 32 27 30 Don't know (%) 3 4 1 4 2 N 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003 Germany 4/98 3/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 54 51 50 53 48 Not confident (%) 37 37 43 30 50 Don't know (%) 9 11 7 18 2 N 1,148 948 1,019 1,055 1,005



Italy 5/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 80 64 68 75 Not confident (%) 14 34 23 24 Don't know (%) 7 2 9 1 N 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000 Great Britain 4/98 4/99 11/99 6/00 7/02

Confident (%) 52 53 33 40 43 Not confident (%) 34 33 52 45 51 Don't know (%) 14 14 16 15 6 N 1,029 1,048 864 1,056 1,003

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