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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,respondents.Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.MEDIALDEA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court(now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-

65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) ofPangasinan dated December 27, 1978; and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 denyingthe motion for reconsideration.It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and maynot be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certainexceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of thetrial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July 24,1989) in which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. This isOur task now.The antecedent facts are as follows:

About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua,

Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejasboarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven byTranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan tospend Christmas at their respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had toride in a jeepney that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was forthem to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence on thiscontractual relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor byFilriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contraryevidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the leftrear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right

rear passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a briefstopover at Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales,Pangasinan.Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney wasdetached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as aresult of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way)made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such amanner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced thenorth (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater


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portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north,among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) drivenby Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn andencroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or afterstopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the busbumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, threepassengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died whilethe other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What could have been a festiveChristmas turned out to be tragic.The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on

Appeal):The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit: fracture ofthe left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture of the left mandible;fracture of the right humenous; compound fracture of the left radious and ullmamiddle third and lower third; fracture of the upper third of the right tibia andfillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of

her death was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. Thefractures were produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a strong force.The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving vehicles(sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. . . .Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the leftparietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid; and abrasions (sic)on the left knee. Her internal lesions were: hematoma on the left thorax; multiplelacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the left lower lobe ofthe lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs,left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries which resulted inher death. . . .

The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per autopsy of Dr.Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen andtrauma. . . .

Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):. . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on theforehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and right leg.. . .

The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival atthe scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit "K" for private respondents "19"for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of

impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):. . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway, about six(6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond which are canals onboth sides. The road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of thepoint of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact orcollision (Exh. "K-4", Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-Pascua) was on the westernlane of the highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown bythe bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles)as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and greenish from the jeepney.


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The point of impact encircled and marked with the letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua,had a diameter of two meters, the center of which was about two meters fromthe western edge of cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witnessBisquera in the course of the investigation showed the relative positions of thepoint of impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua) the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh."P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh. "P-2 Pascua"), and thedamaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P-3 Pascua"). No skid marks of theRabbit bus was found in the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point ofimpact. On the other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters longpurportedly of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of, andextending up to the point of impact.

At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney,neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day wasfair.

After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San Manuel,Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary

investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence asregards the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced tosuffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he served his sentence.Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance ofPangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs ofCatalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139, spousesManuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140,spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo.In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were allimpleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon

and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs basedtheir suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.

was also impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136 only.For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect theaggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial expenses;P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 formoral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascuaclaimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 asexemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for thedeath of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and P3,000.00for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the deathof Adelaide, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moraldamages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees.Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the amountof P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during the period of


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repairs.On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, thedispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:

1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalothru their negligence, breached contract of carriage with their passengers theplaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and this Court renders judgment ordering saiddefendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs theamounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss ofearnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and P2,000.00 for moral damages;b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to pay herthe amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual expenses andP500.00 for moral damages;c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her heirs (theplaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P622.00

for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 formoral damages;d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or

Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the amount of P12,000.00 forindemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual expenses; P53,160.00 forloss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to ensureand answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damagesdue their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendantsFilriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said defendants(Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above

adjudicated in their favor in Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awardedsaid plaintiff, as set forth in paragraph one (1) hereinabove;3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendant,Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly andseverally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 asactual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.

All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of thecomplaints.Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo andFilriters Guaranty.

SO ORDEREDOn appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by findingdelos Reyes negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision is herebyREVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendantsIsidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly andseverally, the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 andP2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.


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and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants CasianaPascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit BusLines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the former jointly andseverally damages in amounts awarded as follows:For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awardedCivil Case No. 1136

a) Indemnity for the loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity 14,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 800.00d) For moral damages 10,000.00e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00f) For attorney's fees 3,000.00

Total P38,200.00 (sic)For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:Civil Case No. 1136

a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) P550.00b) Moral damages (disfigurement of theface and physical suffering 8,000.00c) Exemplary damages 2,000.00Total P10,550.00

For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales. the parents and/or heirs:Civil Case No. 1139

a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity 20,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00

d) Moral damages 15,000.00e) Exemplary damages 15,000.00f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00Total P65,500.00

For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:Civil Case No. 1140a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity 20,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00

d) Moral damages 3,000.00e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00Total P41,500.00With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the


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jeepney?The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106,Record on Appeal):

(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua thata long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune jeepney was"running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but didnot heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached causing the

jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concretepavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the jeepney made aU-turn (half-turn) in such a manner that it inverted its direction making it faceSouth instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the roadon the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by thelatter;(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the SanManuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the reported collission, foundthe real evidence thereat indicate in his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua ), the tracks of the

jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder(outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at asharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line andencroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place asevidenced by the point of impact;(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San ManuelPolice that the path of the jeepney they found on the road and indicated in thesketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which he described as"scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel wasremoved;"(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious

Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the Courtof First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal Information by theProvincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and hiscommitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon thefinality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom; and(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to thecircumstance that the collision occured (sic) on the right of way of the Phil.Rabbit Bus.

The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clearchance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the

cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test.concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by therespondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in asuit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where apassenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it

would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on theground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling in Anuran,


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et al. v. Buo et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224. 1 Thus, therespondent court erred in applying said doctrine.On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause ofthe accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):

. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time ofimpact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepneyassumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new roleof defensive driving. The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one whobumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to beat all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenlycome to a full stop, or change its course either through change of mind of thefront driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is giventhe responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear

vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe thevehicle in front of it.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-

turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was thentraveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters,crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters fromthe eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could nothave anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realizethat the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p.52, Rollo):

. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is asubstantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actorneither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner

in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement, Torts,2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accidentoccurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . .The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to thepassengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not evenattempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was thephysical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the

jeepney.The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):

According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at

4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this theactual stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driverthat he made three 40-minute stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling timeof 6 hours and 30 minutes.Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.)driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes.Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the pointof impact on the highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms.


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per hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time intraversing busy city streets.

Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed whenthe accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming suchcalculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot evenfault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skidmark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to thepoint of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney fromthe time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road

was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of collision, visible andunobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hourat the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would havecovered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation.To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the timeelement involved, there were no options available to him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107-

108, Record on Appeal):. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes,could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (westernshoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of theMangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existingexigencies of space and time.

As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and unrebutted thatthe Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall grasses which wouldindicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures(Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can benoticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop,

it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most probably on a canalon a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows thatall of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer leftrear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh P-2, Pascua) clearlyshows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only fivemeters from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show thatdriver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting theMangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune

jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit)must have been due to limitations of space and time.

Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus couldalso have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on thehypothesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear tobe good copy of it were based alone on the sketch made after the collision.Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider the time element involved, formoments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very eastern lane ata sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve tothe eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune


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jeepney either head on or broadside. After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that theproximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune andCarreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed tohave been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only beovercome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger wasdue to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies ofCaridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) convictionfor the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thruReckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. Thenegligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110,Record on Appeal):

To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their

witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks andmaintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before thecollision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding theright rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the causethereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain,much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . .

In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safelycarry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in theautomobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which wouldavoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly andseverally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable

with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this isreadily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to thepassenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of

Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, thecarrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for hisdriver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the

carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious andconsequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, 5contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 6We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to theindemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code,the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos(P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 toP30,000.00 (see Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-35697-99, April


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15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate AppellateCourt dated July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. Thedecision of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is REINSTATEDMODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty AssuranceCorporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity forloss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).SO ORDERED.Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino JJ., concur.


ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989

GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as Public Respondent, and

ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR respondents.Rodolfo d. Dela Cruz for petitioner.Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private vehicle whichfigured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said

vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the

latter.The facts are summarized in the contested decision, as follows:

From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio Catuar, Antonio Sarmiento, Jr., Ruperto Catuar, Jr. andNorberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento,Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number 77-99-F-I Manila,1971, owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas

Avenue, San Juan, Rizal; that plaintiff's jeep, at the time, was runningmoderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and while approaching Roosevelt

Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that suddenly, another jeep with plate

number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit andbumped plaintiff's jeep on the portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result ofthe impact plaintiff's jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards; that asa result plaintiffs jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential,the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that plaintiff

Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken andhe sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento,Sr. was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.Evidence also shows that the plaintiff Virgilio Catuar spent a total of P2,464.00


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for repairs of the jeep, as shown by the receipts of payment of labor and spareparts (Exhs. H to H-7 Plaintiffs likewise tried to prove that plaintiff VirgilioCatuar, immediately after the accident was taken to Immaculate ConcepcionHospital, and then was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital; that

while plaintiff Catuar was not confined in the hospital, his wrist was in a plastercast for a period of one month, and the contusions on his head were undertreatment for about two (2) weeks; that for hospitalization, medicine and alliedexpenses, plaintiff Catuar spent P5,000.00.Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento,Sr. sustained injuries on his leg; that at first, he was taken to the NationalOrthopedic Hospital (Exh. K but later he was confined at the Makati MedicalCenter from July 29, to August 29, 1971 and then from September 15 to 25,1971; that his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of eight (8) months; and thatfor hospitalization and medical attendance, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. spentno less than P13,785.25 as evidenced by receipts in his possession. (Exhs. N to N-1).

Proofs were adduced also to show that plaintiff Antonio sarmiento Sr. isemployed as Assistant Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary ofP1,200.00 a month; that as sideline he also works as accountant of UnitedHaulers Inc. with a salary of P500.00 a month; and that as a result of thisincident, plaintiff Sarmiento was unable to perform his normal work for a periodof at least 8 months. On the other hand, evidence shows that the other plaintiff

Virgilio Catuar is a Chief Clerk in Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary ofP500.00 a month, and as a result of the incident, he was incapacitated to workfor a period of one (1) month.The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, andagainst Gualberto Duavit as owner of the jeep.

Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep (PlateNo. 99-07-F-J Manila, 1971), denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano)

was his employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of defendantOscar Sabiniano at any time up to the present.On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendantOscar Sabiniano was an employee of the Board of Liquidators from November 14,1966 up to January 4, 1973 (Annex A of Answer).Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the

jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of thelatter (TSN, September 7, 1978, p. 8). He testified further, that Duavit even filed

charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push throughas his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.Defendant Oscar Sabiniano, on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate himselffrom liability, makes it appear that he was taking all necessary precaution whiledriving and the accident occurred due to the negligence of Virgilio Catuar.Sabiniano claims that it was plaintiffs vehicle which hit and bumped their jeep.(Reno, pp. 21-23)

The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-employee relationship between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a


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government employee and he took the vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner.The petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.The private respondents appealed the case.On January 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding thepetitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. The appellate court in part ruled:

We cannot go along with appellee's argument. It will be seen that in Vargas v.Langcay, supra, it was held that it is immaterial whether or not the driver wasactually employed by the operator of record or registered owner, and it is evennot necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and who theemployer of the driver is. When the Supreme Court ruled, thus: 'We must holdand consider such owner-operator of record (registered owner) as the employerin contemplation of law, of the driver,' it cannot be construed other than that theregistered owner is the employer of the driver in contemplation of law. It is aconclusive presumption of fact and law, and is not subject to rebuttal of proof tothe contrary. Otherwise, as stated in the decision, we quote:The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters will be

defeated and thwarted if we entertain the argument of petitioner that she is notliable because the actual owner and employer was established by the evidence. . ..

Along the same vein, the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be allowed to prove thatthe driver Sabiniano was not his employee at the time of the vehicular accident.

The ruling laid down in Amar V. Soberano (1966), 63 O.G. 6850, by this Court tothe effect that the burden of proving the non-existence of an employer-employeerelationship is upon the defendant and this he must do by a satisfactorypreponderance of evidence, has to defer to the doctrines evolved by the SupremeCourt in cases of damages arising from vehicular mishaps involving registeredmotor vehicle. (See Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226, 230). (Rollo, pp.

26-27)The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, thispetition.The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in holding him jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano in spite of the absence ofan employer-employee relationship between them and despite the fact that the petitioner's

jeep was taken out of his garage and was driven by Sabiniano without his consent. As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for anaccident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledgeand by a person not employed by him. Thus, in Duquillo v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134)

[1939] we said:Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. Atthe time of the accident, James McGurk was driving the truck, and he was not anemployee of the defendant, nor did he have anything to do with the latter'sbusiness; neither the defendant nor Father Ayson, who was in charge of herbusiness, consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident,as it was a holy day, and much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge ofdriving it; the use of the defendant's truck in the circumstances indicated wasdone without her consent or knowledge; it may, therefore, be said, that there was


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not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and thedefendant. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following ofthe Civil Code, cited by the appellant, have no application in this case, and,therefore, the errors attributed to the inferior court are without basis.

The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present daycircumstances.The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957]and Vargas v. Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, theregistered owner of the truck which collided with a taxicab, and which resulted in the killingof Erezo, claimed that at the time of the accident, the truck belonged to the Port Brokerage inan arrangement with the corporation but the same was not known to the Motor VehiclesOffice. This Court sustained the trial court's ruling that since Jepte represented himself to bethe owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation, registeredthe vehicle in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the representation had theright to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. Thus, even if Jepte were not theowner of the truck at the time of the accident, he was still held liable for the death of Erezo

significantly, the driver of the truck was fully authorized to drive it.Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred Vargas had sold her jeepney to athird person, so that at the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney.This court, nevertheless, affirmed Vargas' liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor

Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law andCommonwealth Act No. 146. We further ruled that the operator of record continues to be theoperator of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and assuch is responsible for the consequences incident to its operator. The vehicle involved was apublic utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the law does not only require the surrender of the

AC plates but orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a form ofpublic transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities.

As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in thepresent case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishapbut completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized thelatter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold,therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who wasneither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the ownerof a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard,

we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint orstolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants ormechanics of auto repair shops using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them

for servicing or repair.We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe foursquare with pending cases. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factualcircumstances. Where, as in this case, the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightestindicia of an employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or anyconsent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner liable.We, therefore, find that the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in holdingthe petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano to the private respondent.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are


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hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (nowRegional Trial Court) of Laguna, 8th Judicial District, Branch 6, dated July 30, 1981 isREINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.


ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC.,

petitioners,vs.SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON.COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.Carlo L. Aquino for Sweet Lines, Inc.REGALADO, J.:

A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine AmericanGeneral Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against privaterespondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc.

(DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig,Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damagedshipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to defendants'negligence, with the following factual backdrop yielded by the findings of the court below andadopted by respondent court:

It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH"belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board at BatonRouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later fortranshipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631and another 6,400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the

order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice toTagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered,respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier(Exhs. E and F). The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well asthe Commercial Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. Thecargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine

American General Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoesin the Port of Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign


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carrier awaited and made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "SweetLove" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier.These were commingled with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantationand also Standfilco.On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrierinto the custody of the consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977, uponthe instance of the plaintiff, shows the following:Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400bags of Low Density Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there weredelivered to the consignee 5,413 bags in good order condition. The survey showsshortages, damages and losses to be as follows:

Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during discharge from vessel-173 bags; undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilststored at the pier-699 bags; and shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs. P andP-1).

Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on thesame day shows an actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in goodorder condition. Likewise noted were the following losses, damages andshortages, to wit:

Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets during discharge fromvessel-17 bags.Undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored atthe pier-66 bags; Shortlanded-10 bags.

Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good ordercondition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss from this particular

shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to (sic).As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and someof the 1,080 bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or werefully/partially emptied, but, worse, the contents thereof contaminated withforeign matters and therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose. Theposition taken by the consignee was that even those bags which still had somecontents were considered as total losses as the remaining contents werecontaminated with foreign matters and therefore did not (sic) longer serve theintended purpose of the material. Each bag was valued, taking into account thecustoms duties and other taxes paid as well as charges and the conversion value

then of a dollar to the peso, at P110.28 per bag (see Exhs. L and L-1 M and O). 2Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, anddefendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement ofthe claim against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 grantedplaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I.Line and F.E. Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncementas to costs."The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this dispositiveportion:


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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff PhilippineGeneral American Insurance Company Inc. and against the remainingdefendants, Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre Inc. as follows:Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the sum ofP34,902.00, with legal interest thereon from date of extrajudicial demand on

April 28, 1978 (Exh. M) until fully paid;Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc.are directed to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, withlegal interest thereon from April 28, 1978 until fully paid;Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the additional sum ofP5,000 is reimbursable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;Each of said defendants shall pay one-fourth (1/4) costs. 4

Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground ofprescription, 5 in effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners, and the denial of theirmotion for reconsideration, 6 petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,faulting respondent appellate court with the following errors: (1) in upholding, without proof,

the existence of the so-called prescriptive period; (2) granting arguendo that the saidprescriptive period does exist, in not finding the same to be null and void; and (3) assumingarguendo that the said prescriptive period is valid and legal, in failing to conclude thatpetitioners substantially complied therewith. 7Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case, consideringtheir common interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy, to obviate anyquestion as to who the real party in interest is and to protect their respective rights as insurerand insured. In any case, there is no impediment to the legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen,even if it alone were to sue herein private respondents in its own capacity as insurer, it havingbeen subrogated to all rights of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment insured underits Marine Risk Note No. 438734 dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full settlement of the

claim thereunder as evidenced by the subrogation receipt 9 issued in its favor by Far East Bankand Trust Co., Davao Branch, for the account of petitioner TPI.Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to subrogation protanto, being of the highest equity, equips it with a cause of action against a third party in caseof contractual breach. 10 Further, the insurer's subrogatory right to sue for recovery under thebill of lading in case of loss of or damage to the cargo is jurisprudentially upheld. 11 However,if an insurer, in the exercise of its subrogatory right, may proceed against the erring carrier andfor all intents and purposes stands in the place and in substitution of the consignee, a fortiorisuch insurer is presumed to know and is just as bound by the contractual terms under the billof lading as the insured.

On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse theappealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce anyevidence in support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periodsfor filing a claim and for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered inevidence. Considering that the existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periodshave allegedly not been established, petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they canpossibly comply therewith. 12 In refutation, SLI avers that it is standard practice in itsoperations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted to it for carriage and that it in factissued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with proof of their existence


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manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of thedismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility forthe loss of and/or damage to the cargo. 14On this point, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolvedthat although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolveson such bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, theyare inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of therelative rights of the parties thereto. 15Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was soconsidered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance ofby the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainlyapparent on the face of relevant pleadings. 16 In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmativedefense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer, 17 except that the bills of ladingembodying the same were not formally offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone ofcontention to whether or not prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in thiscase, consequently upheld on the strength of mere references thereto.

As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage ascontained in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents

which under the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 andthe genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically deniedunder oath by the adverse party. 19 The rules on actionable documents cover and apply toboth a cause of action or defense based on said documents. 20In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is aprescriptive period, respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in itsanswer setting forth paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised thestipulation thereon by parties, to wit:

5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to

consignee or agent, if container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage.Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be filed within 30 daysfrom accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or loss, non-delivery ormisdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right ofaction. Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein providedconstitutes waiver of claim or right of action. In no case shall carrier be liable forany delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not inactual custody of carrier. 21

In their reply thereto, herein petitioners, by their own assertions that 2. In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer,

plaintiffs state that such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers ascontracts of adhesion (see Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R.No. L-37750, May 19, 1978) and, consequently, the provisions therein which arecontrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering defendant as

valid defenses. 22thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisionstherein, hence they impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity ofsubject stipulations.Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due


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execution, of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbalor written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or otherproceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same,and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or thatno such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness of aninstrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific

verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it maybe considered an admitted fact. 24Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has theprocedural earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, adenial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to whichare not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. 25 Thus,

while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy,the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admittedby them.We find merit in respondent court's comments that petitioners failed to touch on the matter of

the non-presentation of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier on in the appellateproceedings in this case, hence it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to beoverturned on that score, for to do so would mean an over-indulgence in technicalities. Hence,for the reasons already advanced, the non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in theformal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of this particular case, be considered a fatalprocedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from raising the defense of prescription.Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the timelimitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention.It is to be noted that the carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an"Application for Delivery of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in

Davao City 26 with the notation therein that said application corresponds to and is subject tothe terms of bills of lading MD-25 and MD-26. It would be a safe assessment to interpret thisto mean that, sight unseen, petitioners acknowledged the existence of said bills of lading. Byhaving the cargo shipped on respondent carrier's vessel and later making a claim for loss onthe basis of the bills of lading, petitioners for all intents and purposes accepted said bills.Having done so they are bound by all stipulations contained therein. 27 Verily, as petitionersare suing for recovery on the contract, and in fact even went as far as assailing its validity bycategorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then they necessarily admit that there is such acontract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its attendant stipulations they cannotnow be allowed to deny.

On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which unequivocally prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with thecarrier in case of loss of or damage to the cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right ofaction for instituting an action in court, which periods must concur, petitioners posit that thealleged shorter prescriptive period which is in the nature of a limitation on petitioners' right ofrecovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the earliercase of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 28 They postulate this on the theorythat the bills of lading containing the same constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore,

void for being contrary to public policy, supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc.


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vs. Teves, et al. 29Furthermore, they contend, since the liability of private respondents has been clearlyestablished, to bar petitioners' right of recovery on a mere technicality will pave the way forunjust enrichment. 30 Contrarily, SLI asserts and defends the reasonableness of the timelimitation within which claims should be filed with the carrier; the necessity for the same, asthis condition for the carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly all shipping companies ifthey are to survive the concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and thecountervailing balance afforded by such stipulation to the legal presumption of negligenceunder which the carrier labors in the event of loss of or damage to the cargo. 31It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overlandand river transportation but also to maritime transportation. 32 Moreover, we agree that inthis jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is more accurate to state that the filing of aclaim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under Article 366 actually constitutesa condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for damages caused tothe merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of thecondition and if he omits such allegations and proof, no right of action against the carrier can

accrue in his favor. As the requirements in Article 366, restated with a slight modification inthe assailed paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent, they arenot limitations of action. 33 Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede a suitfor enforcement 34 and the vesting of the right to file spit does not take place until thehappening of these conditions. 35Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause ofaction must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditionsprecedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed byagreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with beforecommencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or

waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition. 36

It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, whilea cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. Theright of action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the actionand may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or byother circumstances which do not affect the cause of action. 37 Performance or fulfillment ofall conditions precedent upon which a right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged, 38considering that the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action is upon theperson initiating the suit. 39More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of givingnotice of loss of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the

action for loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not anempty formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve thecarrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged andthat it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the natureand extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make aninvestigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguarditself from false and fraudulent claims. 40Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim forloss of or damage to goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to


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prevent the enforcement of the contract when not complied with, that is, notice is a conditionprecedent and the carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation,41 as the failure to comply with such a stipulation in a contract of carriage with respect tonotice of loss or claim for damage bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered. 42On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itselfagainst a carrier shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as suchstipulation merely affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. Inthe absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on thereasonableness of the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fixby agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to theshipment than that provided by the statute of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary topublic policy for it does not in any way defeat the complete vestiture of the right to recover,but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier period than would benecessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations. 43In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with therequirement for the filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation

to that effect. It may then be said that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of action,for failure to comply with the above condition precedent they lost whatever right of actionthey may have in their favor or, token in another sense, that remedial right or right to reliefhad prescribed. 44The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977,and it was from this date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) daystherefrom within which to file a claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may havebeen suffered by the cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. The findings of respondentcourt as supported by petitioners' formal offer of evidence in the court below show that theclaim was filed with SLI only on April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in the bills oflading 45 and violative of the contractual provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the

loss of petitioners' remedy or right to sue. Even the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 isof no remedial or practical consequence, since the time limits for the filing thereof, whether

viewed as a condition precedent or as a prescriptive period, would in this case be productive ofthe same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to begin with or, at any rate,their claim was time-barred.What the court finds rather odd is the fact that petitioner TPI filed a provisional claim withDVAPSI as early as June 14, 1977 46 and, as found by the trial court, a survey fixing the extentof loss of and/or damage to the cargo was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance ofpetitioners. 47 If petitioners had the opportunity and awareness to file such provisional claimand to cause a survey to be conducted soon after the discharge of the cargo, then they could

very easily have filed the necessary formal, or even a provisional, claim with SLI itself 48 within the stipulated period therefor, instead of doing so only on April 28, 1978 despite thevessel's arrival at the port of destination on May 15, 1977. Their failure to timely act brings usto no inference other than the fact that petitioners slept on their rights and they must now facethe consequences of such inaction.The ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this aspect is worth reproducing:

xxx xxx xxxIt must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation in thepresentation of claim for loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule


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prescribed under Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce which reads as follows: Art. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of themerchandise, the claim against the carrier for damage or average

which may be found therein upon opening the packages, may bemade, provided that the indications of the damage or average

which gives rise to the claim cannot be ascertained from the outsidepart of the packages, in which case the claims shall be admittedonly at the time of the receipt.

After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportationcharges have been paid, no claim shall be admitted against thecarrier with regard to the condition in which the goods transported

were delivered.Gleanable therefrom is the fact that subject stipulation even lengthened theperiod for presentation of claims thereunder. Such modification has beensanctioned by the Supreme Court. In the case of Ong Yet (M)ua Hardware Co.,Inc. vs. Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd., et al., 59 O.G. No. 17, p. 2764, it ruled that

Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce can be modified by a bill of lading prescribingthe period of 90 days after arrival of the ship, for filing of written claim with thecarrier or agent, instead of the 24-hour time limit after delivery provided in theaforecited legal provision.Tested, too, under paragraph 5 of said Bill of Lading, it is crystal clear that thecommencement of the instant suit on May 12, 1978 was indeed fatally late. In

view of the express provision that "suits arising from. . . damage or loss shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of rightof action," the present action necessarily fails on ground of prescription.

In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is usuallyheld or recognized that it is competent for the parties to a contract

of shipment to agree on a limitation of time shorter than thestatutory period, within which action for breach of the contractshall be brought, and such limitation will be enforced if reasonable .. . (13 C.J.S. 496-497)

A perusal of the pertinent provisions of law on the matter would disclose thatthere is no constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 ofsubject Bill of Lading. The stipulated period of 60 days is reasonable enough forappellees to ascertain the facts and thereafter to sue, if need be, and the 60-dayperiod agreed upon by the parties which shortened the statutory period within

which to bring action for breach of contract is valid and binding. . . . (Emphasis

in the original text.) 49 As explained above, the shortened period for filing suit is not unreasonable and has in factbeen generally recognized to be a valid business practice in the shipping industry. Petitioners'advertence to the Court's holding in the Southern Lines case, supra, is futile as what wasinvolved was a claim for refund of excess payment. We ruled therein that non-compliance withthe requirement of filing a notice of claim under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce does notaffect the consignee's right of action against the carrier because said requirement applies onlyto cases for recovery of damages on account of loss of or damage to cargo, not to an action forrefund of overpayment, and on the further consideration that neither the Code of Commerce


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nor the bills of lading therein provided any time limitation for suing for refund of money paidin excess, except only that it be filed within a reasonable time.The ruling in Sweet Lines categorizing the stipulated limitation on venue of action provided inthe subject bill of lading as a contract of adhesion and, under the circumstances therein, voidfor being contrary to public policy is evidently likewise unavailing in view of the discreteenvironmental facts involved and the fact that the restriction therein was unreasonable. In anycase, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 50 instructs us that "contracts of adhesion whereinone party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other . . . are contracts not entirelyprohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if headheres he gives his consent." In the present case, not even an allegation of ignorance of aparty excuses non-compliance with the contractual stipulations since the responsibility forensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of carriage devolves not on thecarrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as the case may be.While it is true that substantial compliance with provisions on filing of claim for loss of ordamage to cargo may sometimes suffice, the invocation of such an assumption must be viewed

vis-a-vis the object or purpose which such a provision seeks to attain and that is to afford the

carrier a reasonable opportunity to determine the merits and validity of the claim and toprotect itself against unfounded impositions. 51 Petitioners' would nevertheless adopt anadamant posture hinged on the issuance by SLI of a "Report on Losses and Damages," datedMay 15, 1977, 52 from which petitioners theorize that this charges private respondents withactual knowledge of the loss and damage involved in the present case as would obviate theneed for or render superfluous the filing of a claim within the stipulated period.Withal, it has merely to be pointed out that the aforementioned report bears this notation atthe lower part thereof: "Damaged by Mla. labor upon unloading; B/L noted at port of origin,"as an explanation for the cause of loss of and/or damage to the cargo, together with aniterative note stating that "(t)his Copy should be submitted together with your claim invoice orreceipt within 30 days from date of issue otherwise your claim will not be honored."

Moreover, knowledge on the part of the carrier of the loss of or damage to the goods deduciblefrom the issuance of said report is not equivalent to nor does it approximate the legal purposeserved by the filing of the requisite claim, that is, to promptly apprise the carrier about aconsignee's intention to file a claim and thus cause the prompt investigation of the veracity andmerit thereof for its protection. It would be an unfair imposition to require the carrier, upondiscovery in the process of preparing the report on losses or damages of any and all such lossor damage, to presume the existence of a claim against it when at that time the carrier isexpectedly concerned merely with accounting for each and every shipment and assessing itscondition. Unless and until a notice of claim is therewith timely filed, the carrier cannot beexpected to presume that for every loss or damage tallied, a corresponding claim therefor has

been filed or is already in existence as would alert it to the urgency for an immediateinvestigation of the soundness of the claim. The report on losses and damages is not the claimreferred to and required by the bills of lading for it does not fix responsibility for the loss ordamage, but merely states the condition of the goods shipped. The claim contemplated herein,in whatever form, must be something more than a notice that the goods have been lost ordamaged; it must contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to claim. 53Thus, to put the legal effect of respondent carrier's report on losses or damages, thepreparation of which is standard procedure upon unloading of cargo at the port of destination,on the same level as that of a notice of claim by imploring substantial compliance is definitely


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farfetched. Besides, the cited notation on the carrier's report itself makes it clear that the filingof a notice of claim in any case is imperative if carrier is to be held liable at all for the loss of ordamage to cargo.Turning now to respondent DVAPSI and considering that whatever right of action petitionersmay have against respondent carrier was lost due to their failure to seasonably file therequisite claim, it would be awkward, to say the least, that by some convenient process ofelimination DVAPSI should proverbially be left holding the bag, and it would be purespeculation to assume that DVAPSI is probably responsible for the loss of or damage to cargo.Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre operator does not labor under a presumption ofnegligence in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods discharged into its custody. Inother words, to hold an arrastre operator liable for loss of and/or damage to goods entrustedto it there must be preponderant evidence that it did not exercise due diligence in the handlingand care of the goods.Petitioners failed to pinpoint liability on any of the original defendants and in this seemingly

wild goose-chase, they cannot quite put their finger down on when, where, how and underwhose responsibility the loss or damage probably occurred, or as stated in paragraph 8 of their

basic complaint filed in the court below, whether "(u)pon discharge of the cargoes from theoriginal carrying vessel, the SS VISHVA YASH," and/or upon discharge of the cargoes from theinterisland vessel the MV "SWEET LOVE," in Davao City and later while in the custody ofdefendant arrastre operator. 54The testimony of petitioners' own witness, Roberto Cabato, Jr., Marine and Aviation ClaimsManager of petitioner Philamgen, was definitely inconclusive and the responsibility for the lossor damage could still not be ascertained therefrom:

Q In other words, Mr. Cabato, you only computed the loss on thebasis of the figures submitted to you and based on the documentslike the survey certificate and the certificate of the arrastre?

A Yes, sir.

Q Therefore, Mr. Cabato, you have no idea how or where theselosses were incurred?

A No, sir.xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed and investigated theclaim involving the shipment in question. Is it not a fact that in yourprocessing and investigation you considered how the shipment wastransported? Where the losses could have occurred and what is theextent of the respective responsibilities of the bailees and/orcarriers involved?

xxx xxx xxx A With respect to the shipment being transported, we have ofcourse to get into it in order to check whether the shipment comingin to this port is in accordance with the policy condition, like in thisparticular case, the shipment was transported to Manila andtranshipped through an interisland vessel in accordance with thepolicy. With respect to the losses, we have a general view wherelosses could have occurred. Of course we will have to consider thedifferent bailees wherein the shipment must have passed through,


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like the ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the arrastre, butdefinitely at that point and time we cannot determine the extent ofeach liability. We are only interested at that point and time in theliability as regards the underwriter in accordance with the policythat we issued.

xxx xxx xxxQ Mr. Witness, from the documents, namely, the survey of Manila

Adjusters and Surveyors Company, the survey of Davao Arrastrecontractor and the bills of lading issued by the defendant SweetLines, will you be able to tell the respective liabilities of the baileesand/or carriers concerned?

A No, sir. (Emphasis ours.) 55Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish thestage in the course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. Whatcan only be inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo

was discharged to DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not

have possibly occurred while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by theobservations of the trial court quoted at the start of this opinion.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal ofthe complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged

judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127957 February 21, 2001

COLLIN A. MORRIS and THOMAS P. WHITTIER, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Division) and SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM,

respondents.

PARDO,J.:

Petitioners appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which reversed thedecision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for damagesagainst respondent for breach of contract of air carriage.

On February 14, 1978, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati branch 143 anaction for damages for breach of contract of air carriage against respondent airline becausethey were bumped off from SAS Flight SK 893, Manila-Tokyo, on February 14, 1978, despite aconfirmed booking in the first class section of the flight.


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Petitioners Collin A. Morris and Thomas P. Whittier were American citizens; the vice-presidentfor technical service and the director for quality assurance, respectively, of Sterling Asia, aforeign corporation with regional headquarters at No. 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Respondent Scandinavian Airline System (SAS for brevity) is and at times material hereto has

been engaged in the commercial air transport of passengers globally.1wphi1.nt

Petitioner Morris and co-petitioner Whittier had a series of business meetings with Japanesebusinessmen in Japan from February 14 to February 22, 1978. They requested their travelagent, Staats Travel Service. Inc. to book them as first class passengers in SAS Manila-Tokyoflight on February 14, 1978. Respondent booked them as first-class passengers on Flight SK893, Manila-Tokyo flight on February 14, 1978, at 3:50 in the afternoon.

At 1:30 in the afternoon of February 14, 1978, a limousine service of the travel agency fetchedpetitioner Morris at his house in Urdaneta Village, Makati City. Thereafter, they went toMerville Park, Paraaque and fetched petitioner Whittier, arriving there at around 2:00 in theafternoon. From Paraaque, they went to the Manila International Airport and arrived at 2:35in the afternoon.

Upon arrival at the airport, representatives of the travel agency met petitioners. It tookpetitioners two to three minutes to clear their bags at the customs section. After that, theyproceed to the SAS check-in counter and presented their tickets, passports, immigration cardsand travel documents to Ms. Erlinda Ponce at the reception desk.

After about fifteen (15) minutes, petitioners noticed that their travel documents were notbeing processed at the check-in counter. They were informed that there were no more seats onthe plane for which reason they could not be accommodated on the flight.

Petitioner Morris contacted Staats Travel Service and asked the latter to contact themanagement of SAS to find out what was the problem. After ten (10) minutes, Staats Travel

Service called and confirmed their booking. Thereafter, petitioner Morris and Whittier returnedto respondent's check-in counter anticipating that they would be allowed to check-in. However,the check-in counter was closed. When they informed Ms. Ponce, in charge at the check-incounter that arrangements had been made with respondents office, she ignored them. Evenrespondent's supervisor, Raul Basa, ignored them and refused to answer their question whythey could not be accomodated in the flight despite their confirmed booking.

When petitioners went to the supervisor's desk to check the flight manifest, they saw that theirnames on top of the list of the first class section had been crossed out. They pressed thesupervisor to allow them in the flight as they had confirmed tickets. Mr. Basa informed themthat it could not be done because the flight was closed and it was too late to do anything. Theychecked in at exactly 3:10 in the afternoon and the flight was scheduled to leave Manila

International Airport at 3:50 in the afternoon.2

Petitioner Morris said that they were advised to be at the airport at least an hour before

departure time. This has been respondent's policy in petitioner's previous travels abroad. 3

Ms. Erlinda Ponce, SAS employee on duty at the check-in counter on February 14, 1978testified that the economy class of SAS Flight SK 893 was overbooked; however, the first classsection was open. She met petitioners, who were booked in the first class section, when theyapproached the counter to check-in. They not accomodated on the flight because they checked-


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in after the flight manifest had been closed forty (40) minutes prior to the plane's departure.

Petitioners' seats were given to economy class passengers who were upgraded to first class.4

Upon cross-examination, Ms. Ponce sait that petitioners might have arrive at the airport earlierthan 3:10 in the afternoon when the flight manifest was closed; she was sure that they arrivedat the check-in counter at past 3:10 in the afternoon. The first class seats ot petitioners were

given to upgraded economy class passengers three (3) minutes before the flight manifest was

closed.5

Raul Cruz Basa, a supervisor of respondent airline company, testified that SAS Flight SK 893on February 14, 1978 was overbooked in the economy class. Petitioner. Morris and Whittier

were among the names listed in the first class section of the flight manifest. However, theirnames were crossed out and the symbols "NOSH", meaning NO SHOW, written after theirnames. The "NO SHOW" notation could mean either that the booked passengers of his traveldocuments were not at the counter at the time of the closing of the flight manifest.

Mr. Basa said that he talked to petitioners at about 3:20 in the afternoon after receiving a radio

call from the ground staff at the check-in counter about complaints from passengers.He learned from Ms. Ponce that petitioners checked in late after the flight manifest had beenclosed, after which time waitlisted passengers from the economy class had been upgraded. Heexplained to petitioners that they could not be accommodated on the plane because the seats

were all filled up. He admitted that there were about six (6) passengers in the counter who were refused boarding because waitlisted passengers had been accepted. Most of those who

were refused boarding came in late.6

Alice Magtulac, another witness of the respondent, testified that she was supervisor ofticketing and reservation section. She said that petitioners Morris and Whittier had confirmedreservation tickets to the first class section of SAS Flight SK 893, Manila-Tokyo flight, on

February 14, 1978. She confirmed that Ms. Thelma Lorraine Sayer was one of the economyclass passengers who was not able to leave because the flight was overbooked on the economyclass.

Ms. Magtulac said that it was not SAS' policy to upgrade economy passenger to first class if

passengers booked for first class did not show up.7

On August 24, 1988, the trial court rendered a judgement against respondent and in favor ofpetitioners Morris and Whittier. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgement infavor of the plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former

the following:

1. Moral damages to plaintiff Collin A. Morris in the amount of P1,000,000.00and to plaintiff Thomas P. Whittier the sum of P750,000.00;

2. Exemplary damages in the sum of P200,00.00;

3. Attorney's fees in the am

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