Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 106279 July 14, 1995SULPICIO LINES, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Twelfth Division) and JACINTA L. PAMALARAN,respondents.QUIASON,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse the Decision dated April 8, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21919, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran City, which awarded the claim for damages filed by private respondent against CBL Timber Corporation (CBL), AGO Lumber Company (ALC), Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Ernie Santiago (Civil Case No. 2864).We deny the petition.IA contract of carriage was entered into between petitioner and ALC for the transport of the latter's timber from Pugad, Lianga, Surigao del Sur.On March 17, 1976, petitioner sent its tugboat "MT Edmund" and barge "Solid VI" to Lianga to pick up ALC's timber. However, no loading could be made because of the heavy downpour. The next morning, several stevedores of CBL, who were hired by ALC, boarded the "Solid VI" and opened its storeroom. The stevedores were warned of the gas and heat generated by the copra stored in the holds of the ship. Not heeding the warning, a stevedore entered the storeroom and fell unconscious. Two other stevedores followed, one of whom was Leoncio L. Pamalaran. He also lost consciousness and eventually died of gas poisoning.Thus, Civil Case No. 2864 for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran by Pamalaran's heirs against petitioner CBL, ALC and its manager, Ernie Santiago. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, finding a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered:Ordering defendants CBL Timber Corporation, AGO Lumber Company, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Ernie Santiago to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally:1. Actual and compensatory damages of P40,000.00;2. Moral damages of P50,000.00;3. Attorney's fees of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit (Rollo, p. 57).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated April 8, 1992 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 21919, affirmed the lower court's decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the appealed judgment there being no justifiable reason that warrants the reversal thereof. Costs against defendant-appellant (Rollo, p. 32).

Not satisfied with the appellate court's decision, petitioner filed this petition.IIPetitioner raises the following arguments:1. Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner. Therefore, it is not liable as a common carrier;2. Petitioner and its employees were not negligent in the series of events which led to the death of Pamalaran;3. Petitioner is not liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code;4. It is CBL and/or ALC which should be held liable for the death of the victim; and,5. Petitioner should have been granted its just and valid counterclaims and cross claims.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that although Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner, still the latter is liable as a common carrier for his death. The Court of Appeals relied onCanas v. Dabatos,8 Court of Appeals Report 918 (1965). In said case, 13 persons were on board the vessel of defendant not as passengers but as 'cargadores' of the shipper's goods. They were there with the consent and knowledge of the owner of the vessel. Despite the absence of a passenger-carrier relationship between them, the appellate court, just the same, held the patron thereof liable as a common carrier. The appellate court ruled:There is no debate as to the fact that not one of the thirteen passengers have paid an amount of money as fare for their conveyance from Hingotanan to Cebu. The undisputed fact, however, is that all of them were in the boat with the knowledge and consent of the patron.The eleven passengers, other than Encarnacion and Diosdado were in the boat because they have helped in loading cargoes in the boat, and"to serve as cargadores of the cargoes,"presumably, in unloading them at the place of destination.For those services they were permitted to be in the boat and to proceed to their destination in Cebu.The services rendered were the valuable consideration in exchange for the transportation fare. "In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; . . ." (at p. 925; emphasis supplied).

ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner. The presence of the stevedores sent by ALC on board the barge of petitioner was called for by the contract of carriage. For how else would its lumber be transported unless it is placed on board? And by whom? Of course, the stevedores. Definitely, petitioner could not expect the shipper itself to load the lumber without the aid of the stevedores. Furthermore, petitioner knew of the presence and role of the stevedores in its barge and thus consented to their presence. Hence, petitioner was responsible for their safety while on board the barge.Petitioner next claims that its employees even warned the stevedores and tried to prevent their entry into the storeroom. Such argument, again, is demolished by the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:. . . . However, appellant failed to prove that its employees were actually trained or given specific instructions to see to it that the barge is fit and safe not only in transporting goods but also for people who would be loading the cargo into the bodega of the barge.It is not enough that appellant's employees have warned the laborers not to enter the barge after the hatch was opened.Appellant's employees should have been sufficiently instructed to see to it that the hatch of the barge is not opened by any unauthorized person and that the hatch is not easily opened by anyone. At the very least, precautionary measures should have been observed by appellant's employees to see to it that no one could enter the bodega of the barge until after they have made sure that it is safe for anyone to enter the same.Failing to exercise due diligence in the supervision of its employees, the lower court was correct in holding appellant liable for damages(Rollo, pp. 31-32; Emphasis supplied).

Inasmuch as the findings of the Court of Appeals are merely an affirmance of the findings of the trial court, which findings are supported by the evidence, we do not find any reason to reverse the same.There is no quarrel that ALC and CBL are also liable as they were in fact held liable by both the trial and appellate courts.Both the counterclaims and cross claims of petitioner are without legal basis. The counterclaims and cross claims were based on the assumption that the other defendants are the ones solely liable. However, inasmuch as its solidary liability with the other defendants has clearly been established by both the trial and the appellate courts, which we find to be in order, we cannot make a different conclusion contrary to that of the said courts.Finally, the indemnity for the death of Leoncio L. Pamalaran is increased from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling inPeople v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994).WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual and compensatory damages is increased to P50,000.00.SO ORDERED.Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Pan American World Airways vs. Rapadas (G.R. No. 60673)Post undercase digests,Commercial LawatThursday, February 23, 2012Posted bySchizophrenic MindFacts:Privaterespondent Jose Rapadas held passenger ticket andbaggage claimcheck forpetitioners flight No. 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. While standing inline to board the flight at the Guam Airport, Rapadas was ordered by petitioners hand carry control agent to check-in his samsonite attach case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-pasengers were permitted to hand carry baggage. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try of he can get through without havingto registerhis attach case. However, the same man in charge of had carry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him againto registerhis baggage. Upon arriving in Manila on the same day, Rapadas claimed and was given all hischeckedin baggage except the attach case.

Issue:Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger under the Warsaw convention, shall applyin case ofloss, damage or destruction to aregisteredluggage of a passenger.

Held:After a review of the various arguments of the appointing parties, the court found sufficient basis under the particular facts ofthe case forthe availment of the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention. There is no dispute and the courts below admit that there was such a notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governsin case ofdeath or injury of passengers or of loss, damage or destructionto a passengers luggage. Art. 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude an award of attorneys fees. That provision states that the limits of liability prescribed in the instrument shall not prevent the court from awarding in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and other expenses oflitigationincurred by the plaintiff.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,respondents.Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.MEDIALDEA,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27, 1978; and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July 24, 1989) in which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. This is Our task now.The antecedent facts are as follows:About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit: fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound fracture of the left radious and ullma middle third and lower third; fracture of the upper third of the right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of her death was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a strong force. The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. . . .Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the left parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid; and abrasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were: hematoma on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries which resulted in her death. . . .The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. . . .

Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):. . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and right leg. . . .

The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit "K" for private respondents "19" for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):. . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway, about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact or collision (Exh. "K-4", Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-Pascua) was on the western lane of the highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked with the letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the center of which was about two meters from the western edge of cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the course of the investigation showed the relative positions of the point of impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua) the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh. "P-2 Pascua"), and the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P-3 Pascua"). No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found in the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point of impact. On the other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters long purportedly of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of, and extending up to the point of impact.

At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he served his sentence.Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo.In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136 only.For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect the aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Adelaide, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees.Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during the period of repairs.On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of carriage with their passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and this Court renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs the amounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and P2,000.00 for moral damages;b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages;d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in their favor in Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awarded said plaintiff, as set forth in paragraph one (1) hereinabove;3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of the complaints.Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.SO ORDERED

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57,Rollo):WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded as follows:For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awardedCivil Case No. 1136 a) Indemnity for the loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity 14,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 800.00d) For moral damages 10,000.00e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00f) For attorney's fees 3,000.00

Total P38,200.00 (sic)For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:Civil Case No. 1136a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) P550.00b) Moral damages (disfigurement of theface and physical suffering 8,000.00c) Exemplary damages 2,000.00Total P10,550.00

For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales. the parents and/or heirs:Civil Case No. 1139a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity 20,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00d) Moral damages 15,000.00e) Exemplary damages 15,000.00f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00Total P65,500.00

For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:Civil Case No. 1140a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity 20,000.00c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00d) Moral damages 3,000.00e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00Total P41,500.00With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106, Record on Appeal):(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a manner that it inverted its direction making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by the latter;(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the reported collission, found the real evidence thereat indicate in his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua ), the tracks of the jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact;(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road and indicated in the sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was removed;"(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal Information by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon the finality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom; and(5) The application of the doctrine ofres-ipsa loquitar(sic) attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured (sic) on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.

The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test. concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling inAnuran, et al. v. Buo et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224.1Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49,Rollo):. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal positionvis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p. 52,Rollo):. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.

The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55,Rollo):According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three 40-minute stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy city streets.

Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes, could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existing exigencies of space and time.As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most probably on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh P-2, Pascua) clearly shows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to limitations of space and time.Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the hypothesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it were based alone on the sketch madeafterthe collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider the time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside.

After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed preciselypro hac vice.Inculpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code2or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event3(Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur supra.The negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by acaso fortuito. . . .

In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not acaso fortuitowhich would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.4Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver,5contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.6We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (see Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).SO ORDERED.Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino JJ., concur.Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-9907 June 30, 1958LOURDES J. LARA, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA,defendant-appellant.Castillo, Cervantes, Occea, Lozano, Montana, Cunanan, Sison and Castillo and Eligio G. Lagman for defendant-appellant.
Donato C. Endriga and Emigdio Dakanay for plaintiffs-appellants.BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:This is an action for damages brought by plaintiffs against defendant in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the death of one Demetrio Lara, Sr. allegedly caused by the negligent act of defendant. Defendant denied the charge of negligence and set up certain affirmative defenses and a counterclaim.The court after hearing rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount: (a) P10,000 as moral damages; (b) P3,000 as exemplary damages; and (c) P1,000 as attorney's fees, in addition to the costs of action. Both parties appealed to this Court because the damages claimed in the complaint exceed the sum of P50,000.In their appeal, plaintiffs claim that the court a quo erred in disregarding their claim of P41,400 as actual or compensatory damages and in awarding as attorneys' fees only the sum of P1,000 instead of P3,000 as agreed upon between plaintiffs and their counsel. Defendant, on the other hand, disputes the finding of the court a quo that the oath of Demetrio Lara, Sr. was due to the negligence of defendant and the portion of the judgment which orders dependant to pay to plaintiffs moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys' fees, said defendant contending that the court should have declared that the death of Lara was due to unavoidable accident.The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao with an annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. The work Lara of lasted for six days during which he contracted malaria fever. In the morning of January 9, 1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if he could take him in his pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which defendant agreed, and in that same morning the pick-up left Parang bound for Davao taking along six passengers, including Lara.The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be accommodated and the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides and with a 19 inches tall walling at the back. Before leaving Parang, the sitting arrangement was as follows: defendant was at the wheel and seated with him in the front seat were Mrs. Valencia and Nicanor Quinain; on the back of the pick-up were two improvised benches placed on each side, and seated on the right bench were Ricardo Alojipan and Antonio Lagahit, and on the left one Bernardo and Pastor Geronimo. A person by the name of Leoning was seated on a box located on the left side while in the middle Lara sat on a bag. Before leaving Parang, defendant invited Lara to sit with him on the front seat but Lara declined. It was their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, Cotabato, the passengers were to alight and take a bus bound for Davao, but when they arrived at that place, only Bernardo alighted and the other passengers requested defendant to allow them to ride with him up to Davao because there was then no available bus that they could take in going to that place. Defendant again accommodated the passengers.When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers remained the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on a suitcase and his head cove red by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara. He sought the help of the residents of that place and applied water to Lara but to no avail. They brought Lara to the nearest place where they could find a doctor and not having found any they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of Kidapawan. But when Lara arrived he was already dead. From there they proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the local authorities. An investigation was made regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Lara but no criminal action was taken against defendant.It should be noted that the deceased went to the lumber concession of defendant in Parang, Cotabato upon instructions of his chief in order to classify the logs of defendant which were then ready to be exported and to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. It took Lara six days to do his work during which he contracted malaria fever and for that reason he evinced a desire to return immediately to Davao. At that time, there was no available bus that could take him back to Davao and so he requested the defendant if he could take him in his own pick-up. Defendant agreed and, together with Lara, other passengers tagged along, most of them were employees of the Government. Defendant merely accommodated them and did not charge them any fee for the service. It was also their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, the passengers would alight and transfer to a bus that regularly makes the trip to Davao but unfortunately there was none available at the time and so the same passengers, including Lara, again requested the defendant to drive them to Davao. Defendant again accommodated them and upon reaching Km. 96, Lara accidentally fell suffering fatal injuries.It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to aninvited guestto exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride" (5 Am. Jur., 626-627). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law (Articles 1755 and 1756, new Civil Code).The question that now arises is: Is there enough evidence to show that defendant failed to observe ordinary care or diligence in transporting the deceased from Parang to Davao on the date in question?The trial court answered the question in the affirmative but in so doing it took into account only the following facts:No debe perderse de vista el hecho, que los negocios de exportacion de trozos del demandado tiene un volumen de P1,200. Lara era empleado de la Oficina de Montes, asalariado por el gobierno, no pagado por el demandado para classificar los trozos exportados; debido a los trabajos de classificacion que duro 6 dias, en su ultimo dia Lara no durmio toda la noche, al dia siguiente, Lara fue atacado de malaria, tenia inflamada la cara y cuerpo, sufria dolores de cabeza con erupciones en la cara y cuerpo; que en la manana, del dia 2 de enero de 1954, fecha en que Lara salio de Davao para Parang, en aeroplano para clasificar los trozos del demandado, el automobil de este condujo a aquel al aerodromo de Davao.x x x x x x x x xEl viaje de Cotabato a Davao no es menos de 8 horas, su carretera esta en malas condiciones, desnivelada, con piedras salientes y baches, que hacen del vehiculo no estable en su marcha. Lara estaba enfermo de cierta gravedad, tenia el cuerpo y cara inflamados, atacado de malaria, con dolores de cabeza y con erupciones en la cara y cuerpo.A la vista de estos hechos, el demandado debia de saber que era sumamente peligroso llevar 5 pasajeros en la parte trasera del pick-up; particularmente, para la salud de Lara; el permitirlo, el demandado no ha tomado las precausiones, para evitar un posible accidente fatal. La negative de Lara de ocupar el asiento delantero del pick-up no constituye a juicio del Juzgado una defensa, pues el demendado conociendo el estado delicado de salud de Lara, no debio de haber permitido que aquel regrese a Davao en su pick-up; si querria prestar a aquel un favor, debio de haver provisto a Lara de un automobil para su regrese a Davao, ya que el demendado es un millionario; si no podia prestar a aquel este favor, debio de haver dejado a Lara en Samuay para coger aquel un camion de pasajero de Cotabato a Davao.

Even if we admit as true the facts found by the trial court, still we find that the same are not sufficient to show that defendant has failed to take the precaution necessary to conduct his passengers safely to their place of destination for there is nothing there to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or without taking the precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. It should be noted that Lara went to the lumber concession of defendant in answer to a call of duty which he was bound to perform because of the requirement of his office and he contracted the malaria fever in the course of the performance of that duty. It should also be noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the deceased in his own pick-up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of transportation that regularly makes trips for the public, and if defendant agreed to take the deceased in his own car, it was only to accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that he be so accommodated. It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in the pick-up of defendant took their respective seats therein at their own choice and not upon indication of defendant with the particularitythat defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat but which invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to his desire to be at the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position because such was more convenient for him due to his feverish condition. All the circumstances therefore clearly indicate that defendant had done what a reasonable prudent man would have done under the circumstances.There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an unforeseen accident accused by the fact that at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have fallen from the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy, rough and full of stones.The finding of the trial court that the pick-up was running at more than 40 kilometers per hour is not supported by the evidence. This is a mere surmise made by the trial court considering the time the pick-up left barrio Samoay and the time the accident occured in relation to the distance covered by the pick-up. And even if this is correct, still we say that such speed is not unreasonable considering that they were traveling on a national road and the traffic then was not heavy. We may rather attribute the incident to lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open and he was then in a crouching position. Indeed, the law provides that "A passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to himself" (Article 1761, new Civil Code), which means that if the injury to the passenger has beenproximatelycaused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.All things considered, we are persuaded to conclude that the accident occurred not due to the negligence of defendant but to circumstances beyond his control and so he should be exempt from liability.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION,respondents.Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner.M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent.REGALADO,J.:In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the decision1of respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of October 27, 1982, is hereby affirmed with the modification that appellant Aboitiz Shipping is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellees the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; actual damages of P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.

The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the courta quoand adopted by respondent court, are as follows: .The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder" (See also Exh. "B"). For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana who was only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in good health. His average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.2

Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint3for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.In its answer.4Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint5against Pioneer imputing liability thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint,6raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage or injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the direct and proximate cause of his death; and that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the crane operator, Alejo Figueroa.In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court,7Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid the Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F 5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation to reimburse defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation the said amounts that it is ordered to pay to herein plaintiffs.

Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.In an order dated October 27, 1982,8the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which the courta quoruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its liability stems from a breach of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for (sic) any liability for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V Antonia owned by defendant third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation it appearing that the negligence of its crane operator has not been established therein.

Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the case in the face of the undisputable fact that the factual situation under the La Mallorca case is radically different from the facts obtaining in this case;(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of the court a quo and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the deceased, Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his death; specifically the honorable respondent Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code;(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent Court of Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned to pay damages to the private respondents we respectfully submit that it committed a reversible error when it dismissed petitioner's third party complaint against private respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents Vianas.9

At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine inLa Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al.10is not applicable to the case at bar.The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises.11Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.12The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.13It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad company and its agents.In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag orbayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.14

It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time elementper sewithout taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case ofLa Mallorcathere was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling inLa Mallorcais inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.15More particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.16Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.17This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination,18which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to prevent the accident from happening.As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar,19petitioner has expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-28692 July 30, 1982CONRADA VDA. DE ABETO, CARME0000LO ABETO, CECILIA ABETO, CONCEPCION ABETO, MARIA ABETO, ESTELA ABETO, PERLA ABETO, PATRIA ABETO and ALBERTO ABETO,plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INCORPORATED,defendant-appellant.Quijano, Arroyo & Padilla Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako, Belo and Associates for defendant-appellant.RELOVA,J..Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding that defendant-appellant "did not exercise extraordinary diligence or prudence as far as human foresight can provide ... but on the contrary showed negligence and indifference for the safety of the passengers that it was bound to transport, " and for the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, defendant- appellant was ordered to pay plaintiffs, the heirs of Judge Abeto, the following:1st For the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, the amount of P6,000.00;2nd For the loss of his earning capacity, for 4.75 (4 ) years at the rate of P7,200.00 per annum in the amount of P34,200.00;3rd For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of P10,000.00;4th For actual damages in the sum of P2,000.00 minus P400.00 received under Voucher Exhibit 'H' the amount of Pl,600.00;5th For attorney's fees, the sum of P6,000.00 and/or the total sum of P57,800.00 and; To pay the costs of this proceedings.

Plaintiff's evidence shows that about 5:30 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960, Judge Quirico Abeto, with the necessary tickets, boarded the Philippine Air Lines' PI-C133 plane at the Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City for Manila. He was listed as the No. 18 passenger in its Load Manifest (Exhibit A). The plane which would then take two hours from Iloilo to Manila did not reach its destination and the next day there was news that the plane was missing. After three weeks, it was ascertained that the plane crashed at Mt. Baco, Province of Mindoro. All the passengers, including Judge Abeto, must have been killed instantly and their remains were scattered all over the area. Among the articles recovered on the site of the crash was a leather bag with the name "Judge Quirico Abeto. " (Exhibit C.)Judge Abeto, prior to the plane crash, was a Technical Assistant in the Office of the President receiving an annual compensation of P7,200.00; and before that, has held the various positions in the government, namely: Municipal President of Iloilo; Provincial Fiscal of Antique, Negros Occidental and Cebu; Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Secretary of Justice. He was in good health before the incident even if he was already 79 years old at that time.Plaintiff-appellee Conrada Vda. de Abeto was appointed administratrix of the estate of Judge Abeto. The other plaintiffs-appellees are the children of the deceased. When they received the news of the plane crash, Mrs. Abeto was shocked and until it was ascertained that the plane had crashed three weeks after, she could not sleep and eat. She felt sick and was miserable after that. The members of the family also suffered.Personal belongings which were lost amounted to P300.00. Burial expenses of the late judge was P1,700.00.When defendant-appellant would not hear demands for settlement of damages, plaintiffs-appellees were compelled to hire counsel for the institution and prosecution of this case.Defendant-appellant tried to prove that the plane crash at Mt. Baco was beyond the control of the pilot. The plane at the time of the crash was airworthy for the purpose of conveying passengers across the country as shown by the certificate of airworthiness issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). There was navigational error but no negligence or malfeasance on the part of the pilot. The plane had undergone 1,822 pre- flight checks, 364 thorough checks, 957 terminating checks and 501 after maintenance checks. These checks were part of the quality control operation of defendant airline Further, deviation from its prescribed route was due to the bad weather conditions between Mt. Baco and Romblon and strong winds which caused the plane to drift to Mt. Baco. Under the circumstances, appellant argues that the crash was a fortuitous event and, therefore, defendant-appellant cannot be held liable under the provisions of Article 1174 of the New Civil Code. Besides, appellant tried to prove that it had exercised all the cares, skill and diligence required by law on that particular flight in question.The trial court, finding for the plaintiffs, said:The Court after a thorough perusal of the evidences, testimonial and documentaries submitted by both parties has come into the conclusion that the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs have established the following significant facts which proved the negligence of the defendant's pilot of the plane on that flight- in question.1st That the Pilot of the plane disobeyed instruction given in not following the route of Amber 1 prescribed by the CAA in Violation of Standard Regulation.Second The defendant failed to perform the pre-flight test on plane PIC-133 before the same took off from Mandurriao Airport to Manila in order to find out a possible defect of the plane.Third When the defendant allowed during the flight in question, student Officer Rodriguez on training as proved when his body was found on the plane's cockpit with its microphone hanging still on his left leg.Fourth When the Pilot during the flight in question failed or did not report his position over or abeam Romblon which is a compulsory reporting point.These facts as established by the evidence of the plaintiff lead to the inevitable conclusion that the defendant did not exercise extraordinary diligence or prudence as far as human foresight can provide imposed upon by the Law, but on the contrary showed negligence and indifference for the safety of the passengers that it was bound to transport. By the very evidence of the defendant, as shown by the deposition of one Jose Abanilla, dated December 13, 1963, Section Chief of the Actuarial Department of the Insular Life Insurance Company regarding life expectancy through American experience, the late Judge Abeto at the age of 79 would still live or have a life expectancy of 4.75 years.

Appealing to this Court, defendant claimed that the trial court erred:I... in finding, contrary to the evidence, that the appellant was negligent;III... in not finding that the appellant, in the conduct and operation of PI-C133, exercised its statutory obligation over the passengers of PI C133 of extraordinary diligence as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard for all the circumstances and in not finding that the crash of PI-C133 was caused by fortuitous events;... in awarding damages to the appellees; andIV... in not finding that appellant acted in good faith and exerted efforts to minimize damages.

The issue before Us in this appeal is whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.The provisions of the Civil Code on this question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, ... to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance ... for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case." Article 1755 establishes the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is, "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by providing that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers ... cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that afternoon of November 23, 1960, with Capt. de Mesa, as the pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway "Amber l," and the prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the designated route because it was some 30 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. According to defendant's witness, Ramon A. Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have not happened had the pilot continued on the route indicated. Hereunder is Mr. Pedroza's testimony on this point:Q Had the pilot continued on the route indicated, Amber A-1 there would have been no crash, obviously?A Yes, Your HonorATTY. HILADO:(To the witness)Q Because Mt. Baco is 30 miles from Amber I?A Yes,sir.(TSN,p.75,Oct.22,1963 hearing)

xxx xxx xxx

And, Assistant Director Cesar Mijares of the Civil Aeronautics Administration testified that the pilot of said plane was "off course."Q But the fact is that you found him out, that he was off course?A Yes, sir.Q And off course, you mean that he did not follow the route prescribed for him?A Yes, sir.Q And the route for him to follow was Amber A-l?A Yes, sir.Q And the route for Iloilo direct to Manila, is passing Romblon to Manila?A Yes, passing Romblon to Manila.Q And you found that he was not at all following the route to Romblon to Manila?A Yes, sir.Q You know Mr. Witness that a disregard or, violation, or disregard of instruction is punishable by law?A Yes,sir. (TSN,pp.247-248,Dec. 20, 1963)

xxx xxx xxxIt is clear that the pilot did not follow the designated route for his flight between Romblon and Manila. The weather was clear and he was supposed to cross airway "Amber I" over Romblon; instead, he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of air traffic rules.

At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by appellant as to how the accident occurred, the presumption is, it is at fault.In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved. (Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171.)

The total of the different items which the lower court adjudged herein appellant to pay the plaintiffs is P57,800.00. The judgment of the courta quois modified in the sense that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against defendant-appellant.Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Vasquez, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO PON,petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES,respondents.Sibal, Custodia, Santos & Nofuente for petitioners.Restituto L. Opis for respondents Pamfilos and Rosaleses.Citizens Legal Assistance Office for N. Neri and Baylon Sales.PARAS,J.:Before Us is a Petition to Review by Certiorari, the decision1of the respondent appellate court which affirmed with modification the joint decision of the trial court in four (4) cases involving similar facts and issues, finding favorably for the plaintiffs (private respondents herein), the dispositive portion of said appellate judgment reading as follows:WHEREFORE, with the modification that the death indemnity is raised to P30,000.00 to each set of the victims' heirs, the rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmedin toto. Costs against the defendants-appellants.SO ORDERED. (p. 20, Rollo)

From the records of the case We have gathered the following antecedent facts:The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by c