JOSE CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO, 38 PHIL 768 (1918)FACTS: Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Co. he lived in San Mateo, Rizal, which is upon the line of the railroad company; and he used his daily pass, which entitled him to ride upon the companys trains for free1. On Jan 20, 1915, Cangco was returning home by rail and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he made his way to the exit to jump from the slowing train 2. On the side of the train where the passengers alight, is a cement platform some distance away from the companys office and covers the length of several coaches3. As the train slowed down, another passenger Emilio Zuniga, got of the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground4. When Cangco, alighted from the train, his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons and as a result, his feet slipped and he fell violently on the platform. It appears that he alighted from train approximately 6 meters before the train came to a full stop5. The accident happened between 7 and 8pm on a dark night, and the railroad station was dimly lit by a single light located some distance away6. As a result of the incident, his arm was crushed and had to be amputated7. As such, Cangco instated an action for damages against Manila Railroad Co, based on the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them as such to be a menace to the security of the passengers.8. The trial court held Manila Railroad negligence but ruled that Cangco was entitled to recover due to his failure to use due caution in alighting from the coach

ISSUE: WON the liability of the defendant is based on a contract of carriage

HELD: Yes.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.

2. CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE:; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL. The distinction between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the performance of a contract (culpa contractual) pointed out.

3. CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.

LA MALLORCA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO L-20761 (1966)

1. COMMON CARRIERS; CARRIER - PASSENGER RELATION CONTINUES UNTIL PASSENGER HAS REASONABLE TIME TO LEAVE CARRIERS PREMISES. The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises (Ormond v. Hayes, 60 Tex. 180, cited in 10 C.J. 626).

2. ID.; ID.; "REASONABLE TIME" CONSTRUED. What is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform, is considered still a passenger (Keefe v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 142 Mass. 251, 7 N.E. 874). So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the companys premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents (Layne v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 68 W. Va. 213, 69 S.E. 700, 31 L.R.A., [N.S.] 414).

3. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR. In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when he end other members of his family alighted from the bus. The victim, one of his minor daughters, must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand to him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. Held: In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carriers agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautious person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading a baggage of some passengers. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVERMENT FOR QUASI-DELICT, ALTHOUGH INCOMPATIBLE WITH CLAIM UNDER CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE, PERMISSIBLE. The inclusion of the averment for quasi-delict in appellees complaint in the court a quo, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2, Rule 8 of the new Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and determined (Nelayan, Et. Al. v. Nelayan, Et Al., 109 Phil., 183).5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PRESENTATION OF PROOF OF CARRIERS NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR. - The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. This presumption not having been overcome, the employer must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for the death of the passenger.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. The allegation in the complaint to the effect that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent," sufficiently pleads the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated. This allegation was proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle.

7. APPEALS; WHAT CAN BE PASSED UPON ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellants brief. In the case at bar, plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them only P3,000.00 as damages for the death of their daughter. Neither did they point out in their brief in the Court of Appeals that the award was inadequate, or that the inclusion of that figure was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule (Section 7, Rule 51, new Rules of Court). The Court of Appeals therefore erred in raising the amount of the award.

PRECILLANO NECESITO V. NATIVIDAD PARAS, G.R. NO L-10605 (1958)

1. CARRIERS; LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY MECHANICAL DEFECTS. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.

2. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, WHEN RECOVERABLE. Under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code, in case to suits for breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and there is none in the case at bar. (But see Resolution on the Motion to Reconsider.)

3. CARRIERS; MECHANICAL DEFECTS. A carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance.

4. ID.; ID.; WHERE INJURY IS PATENT, INDEMNITY CANNOT BE DENIED. Where the injury is patent and not denied, the court is empowered to calculate moderate damages, although there is no definite proof of the pecuniary loss suffered by the injured party.5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF HEIRS OF DECEASED PASSENGER TO RECOVER MORAL DAMAGES. In case of accident due to a carriers negligence, the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. This special rule (Arts. 1264 and 2206, No. 3) in case of death controls the general rule of Article 2220.

6. ATTORNEYS FEES; LITIGANT CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF FEE IF HE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVERY. A litigant who improvidently stipulates higher counsel fees than those to which he is entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger indemnity; but, by parity of reasoning, he should not be deprived of counsel fees if by law he is entitled to recover them.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS AND JESUS SAMSON, G.R. NO L-46558 (1981)

CLEMENTE BRINAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO L-30309 (1983)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND CONCLUSION DRAWN THEREFROM: CORRECT AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED; CASE AT BAR. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan," they stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more."aw library2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; CULPA CONTRACTUAL; TRAIN CONDUCTORS NEGLIGENCE; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PASSENGERS DEATH. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant Brinas. It was negligence on the conductors part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE VICTIMS; NOT A GROUND FOR EXCULPATION OF OFFENDER. The negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INCLUSION OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FILING OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; ACTIONS CONSTITUTE TWO DISTINCT SOURCES OF OBLIGATION WITHIN THE COURTS JURISDICTION. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellants arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant Brias. Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of obligation. The complainants in the criminal action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file at independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against thePetitioner-Appellant.

5. CRIMINAL LAW; ITEMS OF DAMAGES THAT MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF DEATH BY REASON OF THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, WELL-SETTLED. It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.

6. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; INDEMNITY RECOVERABLE SEPARATELY FROM AND IN ADDITION TO THE FIXED INDEMNITY FOR THE SOLE FACT OF DEATH. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.

CESAR ISAAC V. A.L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO, G.R. NO L-9671 (1957)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND CONCLUSION DRAWN THEREFROM: CORRECT AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED; CASE AT BAR. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan," they stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more." virtua1aw library

2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; CULPA CONTRACTUAL; TRAIN CONDUCTORS NEGLIGENCE; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PASSENGERS DEATH. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant Brinas. It was negligence on the conductors part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE VICTIMS; NOT A GROUND FOR EXCULPATION OF OFFENDER. The negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INCLUSION OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FILING OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; ACTIONS CONSTITUTE TWO DISTINCT SOURCES OF OBLIGATION WITHIN THE COURTS JURISDICTION. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellants arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant Brias. Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of obligation. The complainants in the criminal action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file at independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against thePetitioner-Appellant.

5. CRIMINAL LAW; ITEMS OF DAMAGES THAT MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF DEATH BY REASON OF THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, WELL-SETTLED. It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.

6. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; INDEMNITY RECOVERABLE SEPARATELY FROM AND IN ADDITION TO THE FIXED INDEMNITY FOR THE SOLE FACT OF DEATH. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.

BATANGAS TRANPORTATION CO V. GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL ET ALL, G.R. NO L-22985 (1968)

1. COMMON CARRIERS; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; DUTY OF CARRIER TOWARDS PASSENGERS; ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; FINDINGS AS TO NEGLIGENCE; DUTY OF COURT. In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code. (Brito Sy v. Malata Taxicab & Garage, Inc. 102 Phil. 482).

2. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEYS FEES. Where respondents were forced to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights, and the public utility operators are not conscious of the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers; and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also, with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof, as disclosed by the letter thereof, award of attorneys fees is authorized under Article 2208, paragraph 11 thereof.

BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181 (1957)FACTS: Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after midnight. 1. While the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. 2. Ten men came to help. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside.3. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover damages from Mariano Medina.4. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengersHELD: The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.

Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court holds that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

1. DAMAGES; CARRIERS LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED. "The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might be probably result therefrom.

2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with the lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where the lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch the most handy and available; and what was more natural, that said rescuers should innocently approached the overtuned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Held: That the proximate cause of the death of B was overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of defendant and his agent.

3. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS. The burning of the bus wherein some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in the position in which the overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.

HERMINIO NOCUM V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO, G.R. NO L-2733 (1969)

1. COMMON CARRIERS; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; DUTY OF CARRIER TOWARDS PASSENGERS; ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; FINDINGS AS TO NEGLIGENCE; DUTY OF COURT. In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code. (Brito Sy v. Malata Taxicab & Garage, Inc. 102 Phil. 482).

2. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEYS FEES. Where respondents were forced to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights, and the public utility operators are not conscious of the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers; and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also, with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof, as disclosed by the letter thereof, award of attorneys fees is authorized under Article 2208, paragraph 11 thereof.

EDGARDO CARIAGA V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO, G.R. NO L-11037 (1960)

1. COMMON CARRIERS; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; DUTY OF CARRIER TOWARDS PASSENGERS; ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; FINDINGS AS TO NEGLIGENCE; DUTY OF COURT. In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code. (Brito Sy v. Malata Taxicab & Garage, Inc. 102 Phil. 482).

2. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEYS FEES. Where respondents were forced to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights, and the public utility operators are not conscious of the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers; and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also, with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof, as disclosed by the letter thereof, award of attorneys fees is authorized under Article 2208, paragraph 11 thereof.

VILLA REY TRANSIT INC V. FERRER, 25 SCRA 845 (1968)FACTS: Prior to 1959, Jose Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, Villa Rey Transit. He sold 2 certificates of public convenience to Pangasinan Transportation Co (Pantranco) for P350,000 on the condition that Villarama shall not apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer for 10 years1. Barely 3 months later, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit Inc (VRTI) was organized; Natividad (Jose Villaramas wife) was one of the incorporators and the rest was subscribed by the brother and sister-in-law of Villarama. Nativad was the treasurer of the corporation 2. In less than a month after its registration with SEC, VRTI bought 5 certificates of public convenience, 49 buses, and equipment from one Valentin Fernando3. The very same day the aforementioned contract of sale was executed, the parties immediately applied with PSC for its approval, with a prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in favor of the vendee corporation to operate the service therein involved4. The sheriff levied on 2 of the five certificates pursuant to a writ of execution issued by CFI Pangasinan in favor of Ferrer against Fernando5. VRTI then filed a complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs shale of the 2 certificates of public convenience in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale to Pantranco 6. Pantranco, on its part, filed a third-party complaint against Jose Villarama alleging that Villarama and VRTI are one and the same; that VIllarama and/or VRTI are disqualified from operating the two certificates by virtue of the agreement between Villarama and Pantranco

ISSUE: WON the piercing doctrine should be applied

HELD: Yes. The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement of perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil of corporate fiction will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as a aggregation of individuals.

Based on the facts, the preponderance of evidence shows that VRTI is an alter ego of Jose Villarama and that the restricted clause in the contract between Villarama and Pantranco is also enforceable and binding against VRTI. For the rule is that a seller or promisor may not make use of a corporate entity as a means to evading the obligation of his covenant. Where the corporation is substantially the alter ego of the covenantor to the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing with the covenantee.

CAB: Although Villarama was not an incorporator or stockholder of VRTI, the finances of the corporation which are under the control and management of the treasurer, were nonetheless manipulated and disbursed as if they were the private funds of Villarama in such a way that Villarama appeared to be the actual owner-treasurer of the business without regard to the rights of the stockholders.

ISSUE: WON VRTI is liable for the claims against Villarama

HELD: Yes. Based on the facts, the preponderance of evidence shows that VRTI is an alter ego of Jose Villarama and that the restricted clause in the contract between Villarama and Pantranco is also enforceable and binding against VRTI. For the rule is that a seller or promisor may not make use of a corporate entity as a means to evading the obligation of his covenant. Where the corporation is substantially the alter ego of the covenantor to the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing with the covenantee.

CAB: Although Villarama was not an incorporator or stockholder of VRTI, the finances of the corporation which are under the control and management of the treasurer, were nonetheless manipulated and disbursed as if they were the private funds of Villarama in such a way that Villarama appeared to be the actual owner-treasurer of the business without regard to the rights of the stockholders.

FERNANDO LOPEZ V. PAN AMERICAN WOWRLD AIRWAYS, G.R. NO L-22415 (1966)

1. CASHIERS; BREACH OF CONTRACT TO PROVIDE FIRST CLASS ACCOMMODATIONS; CASE AT BAR. Plaintiffs made first class reservations with defendant in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight. The reservations having been confirmed, first class tickets were subsequently issued in favor of plaintiffs. Through mistake, however, defendants agents cancelled the said reservations. Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would be made before the flight time, the reservations supervisor decided to withhold from plaintiffs the information that their reservations had been cancelled. Upon arrival in Tokyo, defendant informed plaintiffs that there was no accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they could not go unless they take the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the United States, plaintiffs were constrained to take the flight as tourist passengers, but they did so under protest. Query: Whether defendant acted in bad faith in the breach of its contract with plaintiffs. Held: In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its aforesaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self interest in holding on the plaintiffs as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the same, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith.

2. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES RECOVERABLE. - As a proximate result of defendants breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.

3. ID.; ID.; RATIONALE BEHIND EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES. The rationable behind exemplary or corrective rationale is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.

4. ATTORNEYS FEES; WHEN WRITTEN CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEYS SERVICES SHALL CONTROL THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID THEREFORE. A written contract for attorneys services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the subject matter of the present controversy, of the professional standing the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the extent of the service rendered by him, shows that the amount provided for in the written agreement is reasonable.

PAZ FORES V. IRENEO MIRANDA, G.R. NO L-12163 (1959)

1. PUBLIC UTILITIES; SALE OF PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLE; APPROVAL OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; REASON. Transfer of a Public Service Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. The provisions of Section 20 of the Public Service Act are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, of an operators property, franchise , certificates, privileges or rights, or any part thereof without approval or authorization of the Public Service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the Public Service Commission is obtained, the vehicle is in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operation standing in the records of the Commission to which the public has a right to rely upon.

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROVISION OF SECTION 20 (Z) PUBLIC SERVICE ACT INTERPRETED. --The proviso contained in Section 20 (Z) of the Public Service Act, to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval", means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and binding between the parties. (Montoya v. Ignacio 50 Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 108). the phrase "in ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso "or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its property," could not have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself but at most may refer only to such property that can be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.

3. DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ATTORNEYS FEES INCLUDED IN THE CONCEPT; AWARD BY COURT OF APPEALS MOTU PROPRIO. Although the Court of First Instance did not provide for attorneys fees in the sum of P3,000 and no appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed on the point, it was not an error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu propio because attorneys fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable.

4. ID.; MORAL DAMAGES NOT RECOVERABLE IN ACTION ON BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPROTATION. Moral damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of transportation in view or the provisions of Articles 2218 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.

5. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN CASE OF DEATH OF PASSENGER. The exception to the basic rule of damages is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, of the Civil Code that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased." (Necesito v. Paras G. R. No. L-10605, Resolution on motion to reconsider, Sept. 11, 1958).

6. ID.; ID.; NO DEATH; PROOF OF MALICE OR BAD FAITH REQUIRED. Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The mere carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.

7. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; NOT CARRIERS BAD FAITH. While it is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice, that fact must be shown in evidence. A carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carriers employees.

8. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS SAFELY. The theory that carriers violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach of the passengers confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages, under Article 2220 of the New Code is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed and it would never be accountable for simple negligence while under Article 1756 of the Civil Code the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently and not maliciously, and Article 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.

9. ID.; CARRIERS; ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; WHEN PRESUMPTION OR CARRIERS LIABILITY ARISES. An action for breach of contract imposes on the carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury of the passenger; the latter does not have to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Congco v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil., 768, 777.) Morever, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. (Art. 1759 New Civil Code, Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. Supra; Prado v. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900)

AIR FRANCE V. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO L-21438 (1966)

1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; REQUIREMENT OF LAW. Courts of justice are not burdened with the obligation to specify in the sentence every bit and piece of evidence presented by the parties upon the issues raised. The law solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the courts conclusion is drawn.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, EFFECT OF; DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH DETAILS. The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the evidence presented for the defense or to specify in the decision the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirement of the law and the Constitution. There is no law that so requires. A decision is not to be clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURTS DEFINED. Findings of fact may be defined as the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon; they consist of the courts "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts on issue."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW EXPLAINED. A question of law is "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." virtua1aw library5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS. It is not appropriately the business of the Supreme Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact because, by statute, only questions of law may be raised in an appeal bycertiorarifrom a judgment of the Court of Appeals, which judgment is conclusive as to the facts.

6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY COURT OF APPEALS OF TRIAL COURTS DECISION. When the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment of the trial court, and the findings of fact of said appellate court are not in any way at war with those of the trial court, nor is said affirmance upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the trial courts conclusions, such judgment of affirmance is (1) a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been so raised have been finally adjudicated as free from all error.

7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE COMPLAINT NOT REQUIRED. Although there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE; FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A FIRST CLASS SEAT. The Court of Appeals properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline, because it will always be easy for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say that there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.

9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF BAD FAITH CURED BY NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO PROVE AND BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT OBJECTION; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE UNNECESSARY. If there was lack of specific averment of bad faith in the complaint, such deficiency was cured by notice, right at the start of the trial, by plaintiffs counsel to defendant as to what plaintiff intended to prove: while in the plane in Bangkok, plaintiff was ousted by defendants manager who gave his seat to a white man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract presented without objection on the part of the defendant. An amendment of the complaint to conform to the evidence is not even required.

10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON AN ENTRY IN A NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY NOT COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE RULE. The testimony of a witness that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene," is competent and admissible because the subject of the inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. It does not come within the prescription of the best evidence rule.

11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT BAR. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for damages. Damages here are proper because the stress of respondents action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty by petitioner- aircarrier a case of quasi-delict.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. Award of moral damages is proper, despite petitioners argument that respondents action is planted upon breach of contract, where the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion, the contract having been averred only to establish the relation between the parties.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE; CASE AT BAR. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his employees is well settled in law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must answer for the willful, malevolent act of its manager.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT; CASE AT BAR. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages, the only condition being that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." As the manner of ejectment of plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal precept, exemplary damages are well awarded, in addition to moral damages.

15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys fees. The court below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees be given and the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well-exercised as it is here should not be disturbed.

16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So, any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. (4 R. C. L-1174-1175).

17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A TORT. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH DEFINED. "Bad faith", as understood in law, contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

FRANCISCO ORTIGAS JR. V. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES, G.R. NO L-28773 (1975)

AIR FRANCE V. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO L-21438 (1966)

1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; REQUIREMENT OF LAW. Courts of justice are not burdened with the obligation to specify in the sentence every bit and piece of evidence presented by the parties upon the issues raised. The law solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the courts conclusion is drawn.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, EFFECT OF; DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH DETAILS. The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the evidence presented for the defense or to specify in the decision the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirement of the law and the Constitution. There is no law that so requires. A decision is not to be clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURTS DEFINED. Findings of fact may be defined as the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon; they consist of the courts "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts on issue."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW EXPLAINED. A question of law is "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." virtua1aw library5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS. It is not appropriately the business of the Supreme Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact because, by statute, only questions of law may be raised in an appeal bycertiorarifrom a judgment of the Court of Appeals, which judgment is conclusive as to the facts.

6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY COURT OF APPEALS OF TRIAL COURTS DECISION. When the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment of the trial court, and the findings of fact of said appellate court are not in any way at war with those of the trial court, nor is said affirmance upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the trial courts conclusions, such judgment of affirmance is (1) a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been so raised have been finally adjudicated as free from all error.

7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE COMPLAINT NOT REQUIRED. Although there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE; FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A FIRST CLASS SEAT. The Court of Appeals properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline, because it will always be easy for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say that there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.

9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF BAD FAITH CURED BY NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO PROVE AND BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT OBJECTION; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE UNNECESSARY. If there was lack of specific averment of bad faith in the complaint, such deficiency was cured by notice, right at the start of the trial, by plaintiffs counsel to defendant as to what plaintiff intended to prove: while in the plane in Bangkok, plaintiff was ousted by defendants manager who gave his seat to a white man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract presented without objection on the part of the defendant. An amendment of the complaint to conform to the evidence is not even required.

10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON AN ENTRY IN A NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY NOT COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE RULE. The testimony of a witness that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene," is competent and admissible because the subject of the inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. It does not come within the prescription of the best evidence rule.

11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT BAR. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for damages. Damages here are proper because the stress of respondents action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty by petitioner- aircarrier a case of quasi-delict.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. Award of moral damages is proper, despite petitioners argument that respondents action is planted upon breach of contract, where the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion, the contract having been averred only to establish the relation between the parties.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE; CASE AT BAR. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his employees is well settled in law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must answer for the willful, malevolent act of its manager.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT; CASE AT BAR. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages, the only condition being that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." As the manner of ejectment of plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal precept, exemplary damages are well awarded, in addition to moral damages.

15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys fees. The court below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees be given and the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well-exercised as it is here should not be disturbed.

16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So, any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. (4 R. C. L-1174-1175).

17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A TORT. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH DEFINED. "Bad faith", as understood in law, contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO L-31150 (1915)

FACTS: The KLM Dutch Airlines secured seat reservation for respondents and their two companions from carriers that would ferry them through their world tour. 1. Their itinerary included the Barcelona-Lourdes route, serviced by only one airline, the Aer Lingus. They were issued KLM tickets for their entire trip, but their coupon for the Aer Lingus portion (Flight 861, June 22, 1965) was marked "RQ" which means "on request." 2. At the KLM office in Frankfurt, Germany, respondents obtained a confirmation from Aer Lingus of seat reservations on flight 861. In the afternoon of June 22, 1965, the Aer Lingus manager at Barcelona Airport directed respondents to check in. They did as instructed and were accepted for passage. 3. However, although their companions were allowed to take the plane, respondents were brusquely off-loaded and shoved aside on orders of the Aer Lingus manager with the aid of policeman who shouted at them "Coos! Ignorantes Filipinos." As a result they had to take a train to Lourdes.

4. Respondents sued petitioner for damages arising from breach of carriage and for humiliating treatment received by them in the hands of Aer Lingus. After the hearing, the trial court awarded damages to respondents. 5. On appeal, the KLM sought exoneration, but the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court and increased the award of damages.6. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and prayed for exculpation. It argued that its liability for damages is limited only to occurrence on its own lines citing. Art. 30 of the Warsaw Convention which provides that in the case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers the passenger can take action only against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or delay occurred

1. AIR CARRIER; DAMAGES; ARTICLE 30 OF WARSAW CONVENTION DOES NOT APPLY TO DAMAGE RESULTING FROM WILLFUL MISCONDUCT. Article 30 of the Warsaw providing that in case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers, the passenger can take action only against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or the delay occurred presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or delay in the course of the air strip, and does not apply if the damage is caused by the willful misconduct on the part of the carriers employee or agent acting within the scope of his employment.

2. ID.; DUTY OF CARRIER TO INFORM PASSENGER OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A CONTRACT. It would be unfair and inequitable to charge a passenger with automatic knowledge or notice of a condition which purportedly would excuse the carrier from liability, where the notice is written at the back of the ticket in letters so small that one has to use a magnifying glass to read the words. To preclude any doubt that the contract was fairly and freely agreed upon when the passenger accepted the passage ticket, the carrier who issued the ticket must inform the passenger of the conditions prescribed in the ticket or, in the very least, ascertain that the passenger read them before he accepted the passage ticket. Absent any showing that the carriers officials or employees discharged this responsibility to the passenger, the latter cannot be bound by the conditions by which the carrier assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing agent for other airlines and limited its liability only to untoward occurrences in its own lines.

3. ID.; LIABILITY OF TICKET ISSUING CARRIER IN CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE TO BE PERFORMED BY SUCCESSIVE CARRIERS. Where the passage tickets provide that the carriage to be performed thereunder by several successive carriers "is to be regarded as a single operation," the carrier which issued the tickets for the entire trip in effect guaranteed to the passenger that the latter shall have sure space in the various carriers which would ferry him through the various segments of the trip, and the ticket-issuing carrier assumes full responsibility for the entire trip and shall be held accountable for the breach of that guaranty whether the breach occurred in its own lines or in those of the other carriers.

4. COURTS; DUTY OF COURTS TO ASSIST THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. It is but and in full accord with the policy expressly embodied in our civil law which enjoins courts to be more vigilant for the protection of a contracting party who occupies an inferior position with respect to the other contracting party.