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KatharinaKniessHISL685‐01U.S.‐LatinAmericanRelationsProf.JustinWolfeFall2009

TouristicDiscourseandU.S.­NicaraguanRelations1936–1964

Introduction

This paper examines representations of Nicaragua in touristic advertising of the

1940s, 50s and 60s against the backdrop of U.S.‐Nicaraguan and U.S.‐Latin American

relations.ThisperiodofNicaraguanhistoryismarkedbythedictatorialruleoftheSomoza

dynastyanditsclosetiestotheU.S.government.DuringthistimeanimageofNicaraguaas

a land of prosperity, stability and progress was projected towards the U.S. in order to

attract North American tourists and investors. But the crafting of this positive image

clashedwiththehistoricalrealitiesofNicaragua’sdevelopmentanditsrelationtotheU.S.

How were issues of underdevelopment, dictatorial rule and international tensions

negotiatedthroughtouristicadvertising?

TheideatolookattourismdiscourseinthecontextofU.S.‐LatinAmericanrelations

wasinspiredbyKarlMarx’sconceptofcommodityfetishism.AccordingtoMarx,whenan

object turns into a commodity it acquires a newdimension, “abounding inmetaphysical

subtletiesandtheologicalniceties.”Anobject turns intoacommoditywhen it issoldand

therefore inserted into the market, obtaining exchange value on top of use value. A

commodityisnolongerattachedtoitsproducer,andthusthelaborthatwentintomaking

it becomes covert. Because commodities do not bear traces of the work that went into

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producingthem,theyappeartohavea“lifeoftheirown.”1Atelevisionboughtinastorein

theU.S. isdetached from its context; nothing suggests that theobjectwasproducedand

assembled in different places, by a number of individuals. Thismysterious aspect of the

commodity,thenotionthatitisinhabitedbyacontextwedonotknow,iswhatMarxrefers

towhenhecomparesthecommoditytoafetish.2

Because touristic advertising (and advertising in general) ismeant to attract the

consumer,itcanstronglycontributetothefetishizationofthecommodity,ifitscontextof

production isdeemedundesirable. In itsefforttoattract thetouristbyhighlightingsome

aspects of a country, touristic advertising creates adiscourse inwhichother aspects are

suppressed. Touristic discourse creates a fetish, in which every detail is the product of

negotiation between attractive and unattractive elements of a historical context. Thus,

touristicadvertisingisonlythevisible,or“official”partofanactivelyselectivediscourse,

thatcanrevealmuchaboutthe“unofficial”throughitsomissionoftheundesirable.

At the1965CentralAmericanConferenceonTourism, formerpresidentofMexico

MiguelAlemán,whoseadministrationturnedthecityofAcapulco intoaworld‐renowned

touristdestination,explainedtohisaudiencethat

Themore touristsconsumenationalproductsandthemore theyexport them, themore effort should be put into the conservation of these products that arecharacteristically national, since their value springs precisely from these nationalcharacteristics.3

1KarlMarx,DasKapital(Berlin:Kiepnheuer,1952),Vol.I,Ch.3.2Fetishisusedinthesenseof“aninanimateobjectworshipedforitssupposedmagicalpowersorbecauseitisconsideredtobeinhabitedbyaspirit.”OxfordDictionary.

3MiguelAlemán,“ConcienciaTurística,”RevistaConservadoradelPensamientoCentroamericano10:59(August1965),p.6‐7,mytranslation.

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Thus,thoseaspectsofnationalculturethatareinterestingforthetouristarethoseaspects

thatdeservethemostattentionfromthegovernment.FromaU.S‐LatinAmericanrelations

perspective this idea interesting because it suggests that what is “typically” national in

Nicaragua isco‐definedbyNorthAmericans.Oneof thequestions thispaperasks ishow

and why some elements of national culture are not selected to become “national

characteristics of Nicaragua.” In the case of Somoza’s Nicaragua the construction of a

nationalvisionthatwasattractivetotouristsrequiredtheomissionof“unsavory”aspects

ofnationallifethatwereparticularlyvisibleelementsofthedictatorship,suchaspolitical

oppression.

Historicalbackground

Nicaraguan history at the beginning of the 20th century was marked by U.S.

intervention in localpoliticsandeconomy.Between1909and1933U.S. troopsoccupied

Nicaragua, which was in a state of constant turmoil as a result of the violent conflicts

between Liberals and Conservatives. U.S. military and political intervention, such as the

removal of President Zelaya in 1909, was geared towards preventing Nicaragua from

negotiatingwith foreignpowers tobuild an interoceanic canal to cross the isthmus.The

U.S. administration also controlled Nicaraguan finances (Dawson agreements (1911),

Knox‐CastrilloTreaty,Bryan‐ChamorroTreaty (1916)) and turnedNicaragua into aU.S.

protectorate. PoliticalinstabilitypersisteddespiteU.S.militaryinterventionandfinancial

supervision. The State Department demanded the replacement of the Nicaraguan police

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andarmybyanon‐partisanNationalGuard.NicaraguanelectionsweresupervisedbyU.S.

officialsin1928,1930and1932,theyearinwhichtheU.S.Marinesleftthecountry.4

The Liberal Augusto César Sandino, who formed his own army to fight for

Nicaraguansovereignty,ledthestrongestoppositiontoU.S.imperialisminNicaragua.After

thewithdrawalofU.S.Marinesin1933,theNationalGuardcontinuedfightingSandinoand

his 3000 man strong Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua (EDSN).

Despite peace negotiations, the conflict between the EDSN and the National Guard

persisteduntilSandino’sassassinationwasorderedbytheU.S.backedcommander‐in‐chief

oftheGuard,AnastasioSomozaGarcíain1934,whowastobecomeNicaragua’spresident

in1937.5

The first decades of the twentieth century were marked by U.S. supervision of

Nicaraguanfinancialaffairs.DollarDiplomacyfacilitatedloansinexchangeforthecontrol

ofbanks,theNationalRailway,thegovernment’sbudgetandcustomsduties.Bytheendof

the1920sfinancialstabilityhadbeenachievedthroughthecontrolofdebt.However,this

also meant a stagnation of growth. Almost one third of government spending was

concentratedontheformationoftheGuardiaNacional(1926),whileexpenditureonpublic

workswasverylow.The1929depressionledtoaneconomiccrisis,whichwascausedby

Nicaragua’sdependencyontheexportofproducts,whichlostvalueduringthedepression.6

ThispatternofdependencyontheexporteconomyandU.S.aidandpoliticalsupportwould

4VictorBulmer‐Thomas,"Nicaraguasince1930,"inTheCambridgeHistoryofLatinAmerica,Vol.VII:LatinAmericasince1930:Mexico,CentralAmericaandtheCaribbean.Ed.LeslieBethell(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),317‐323.

5Ibid.,325‐331.6MichelGobat,ConfrontingtheAmericanDream:NicaraguaunderU.S.ImperialRule(Durham:DukeUniversityPress,2005),123‐175.

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becontinuedundertheruleofAnastasioSomozaGarcía(1937–1956)andhistwosons,

Luis Somoza Debayle (1957 – 1967) and Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza Debayle (1967 –

1979).

PrecursorsoftheNicaraguanTourismIndustry:1936–1939

The historiography of tourism in a Latin America is relatively young.Most of the

books on this subject have been published in the past two decades and recently have

focused on two topics: sex tourism (especially in the Caribbean)7 and ethnic tourism

(especiallyinregionswithlargeindigenouspopulationssuchasGuatemala).8Otherfields

thatarebecomingincreasinglyimportantareTourismandeconomicdevelopment,andthe

riseofEco‐Tourismasaformofsustainableexploitationofnaturalresources.9

FewstudieshaveexploredtheimportanceoftourismagainstthebackdropofU.S.‐

LatinAmericanrelations10orlookedattheserelationsinthecontextofCentralAmerica.In

the case ofNicaragua, the history of the national tourism industry before the Sandinista

Revolution in 1979 remains extremely fragmented.11While there are secondary sources

7SeeKamalaKempadoo(ed.),Sun,SexandGold:TourismandSexWorkintheCaribbean(NewYork:Rowman&Littlefield,1999);DeniseBrennan,What’sLoveGottoDoWithIt?TransnationalDesiresandSexTourismintheDominicanRepublic(Durham:DukeUPress,2004);AmaliaCabezas,EconomiesofDesire:SexTourisminCubaandtheDominicanRepublic(Philadelphia:TempleUPress,2009).

8SeePierreVanDenBerghe,TheQuestfortheOther:EthnicTourisminSanCristóbal,Mexico,(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,1994.)

9SeeTimothyDuval,TourismintheCaribbean:Trends,Development,Prospects,(London:Routledge,2004);OctavioGetino,Turismo:Entreelocioyelneg­ocio.IdentidadculturalydesarrolloeconómicoenAméricaLatinayelMercosur(BuenosAires:Ciccus,2002).

10AnimportantandrecentexceptionisDennisMerrill’sNegotiatingParadise:U.S.TourismandEmpireinTwentieth­CenturyLatinAmerica(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2009).

11AverybriefbutinformativehistoryoftheNicaraguanTourismindustryhasbeensketchedbyMarioArceSolórzano,CatalinaRuizandJimmyMembreñoinNicaragua,undestinoturístico.

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dealing with travel accounts of the 19th century (E.G. Squier, etc.) and with “political

tourism”aftertheSandinistaRevolution,12theperiodoftheregimeoftheSomozadynasty

hasreceivedlittlecoverage.ThelackofmaterialonthespecifictopicofNicaraguantourism

can be attributed to the fact that Nicaraguawas not an important tourist destination in

LatinAmericaforNorthAmericans,aswereMexicoorCuba.The1967WorldEncyclopedia

of Travel notes that “though the potential of visitor interest in Nicaragua is substantial,

muchofitisunderdevelopedandpresentfacilitiesfordoingandseeingthingsofinterest

are scattered and inadequate.”13 Although from the 1940s on it became easier to get to

Nicaragua using the PanAmericanHighway, the lack of visitors can be attributed to the

internalunderdevelopmentoftheindustry.Thisstudywillnotfocusontheactualindustry

of tourism as the organization and operation of vacations. Rather, itwill concentrate on

government efforts to create such an industry and to attract North Americans to visit

Nicaragua.

The first formal attempt at building a tourism industry in Nicaragua was the

creationoftheNationalTourismBoard(JuntaNacionaldeTurismo,JNT),abranchofthe

MinistryofPublicWorks(SecretaríadeFomentoyObrasPúblicas),inJuly1936.Thiswas

only shortly after Anastasio Somoza, then director of the National Guard, had gained

completemilitarycontrolofthecountryandhadoustedPresidentSacasathroughaseries

BreveHistoriadelTurismoyEco­TurismoNicaragüense1936–2003(Managua:CentrodeInvestigacionesTurísticasNicaragüenses,2004),81‐210.TheauthorsbasetheirhistoryofNicaraguantourismonprimarysources,mainlylegaldocumentsandnewspaperarticles.Theirtreatmentoftheperiodbetween1936and1979(pp.81‐110)ispatchy,butprovidesavaluablebaseforthegovernmentperspectiveoftourisminNicaragua.

12See,forexample,PaulHollander,PoliticalHospitalityandTourism:CubaandNicaragua(Washington:CubanAmericanNationalFoundation,1986).

13“Nicaragua,”in:WorldEncyclopediaofTravel,Vol.I,ed.NelsonDoubledayandC.EarlCooley(NewYork:Doubleday&Company,1967).

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of extra‐constitutional maneuvers, convincing Congress to nominate his friend Carlos

BrenesJarquínasinterimpresident.

Decree 287, which mandated the formation of the JNT stated that it was “a

necessity”thatthegovernmentaswellasprivateenterprisesprovidedtheirfacilitiesforall

travelers and tourists, in order to promote the “natural beauties” of Nicaragua, its

“monuments, cities, and anything that could be historically, politically, artistically and

archeologically interesting.”14 Three months after its creation, the JNT published its

regulationsintheofficialgovernmentnewspaper,statingitsmaingoals,whichincludedthe

development of infrastructure necessary for tourism, the establishment of a fully staffed

central office of tourism, the cooperationwith hotels, the expansion andmaintenance of

roads,thecooperationwithinternationalfairsandexpositionsinwhichNicaraguacouldbe

presented, the organization of “celebrations and spectacles” to attract tourists, and the

releaseofinformationpackageslocallyandinternationally.15

The promotion of Nicaragua as a tourist destination by the government occurred

during a time of unrest and instability. Only two years had passed since Sandino’s

assassination, in which Somoza had been involved, and the political situation since had

beenmarkedbythestruggleforpowerbetweenPresidentSacasaandSomoza,culminating

in Sacasa’s resignation. In addition, Nicaraguawas experiencing a devastating economic

crisis caused by the fall in coffee prices resulting from theGreatDepression.Why, then,

duringsuchtimesofturmoil,wassomuchemphasisputonthepromotionoftourism?

15ArceSolórzano,Nicaragua,undestinoturístico,85‐89.

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PerhapspromotingtheideathatNicaraguawasprogressingwasmeanttocounter

thesenseofpolitical,economicandsocialinstability.Decree287statedthat“esbeneficioso

paraelEstadoquelospaíseshermanosdeAmérica,comolosdeotroscontinentestengan

una ideade lacondiciónculturalyadelantomaterial enqueseencuentraNicaragua(my

emphasis).”16The vision that is beingprojected is oneofmaterial and cultural progress.

Thepromotionof tourismcouldthusbe interpretedasanattempttorestoreNicaragua’s

reputationnationallyandinternationallybyshowingitsdevelopmenttowardsbecominga

modernizedcountry.

Once Somoza García was officially in power, the promotion of ideas of progress

continuedtobeanimportanttooloflegitimization,asgovernmentpublicationsofthetime

show.ApamphletpublishedbytheMinisteriodeFomentoyObrasPúblicasin1938titled

Nicaragua Vial consists of a series of photographs showing the expansion of the road

network,considered“degrantrascendenciaparaelpaís.”17Thepamphletemphasizedthe

bettermentof the road system in comparisonwithpreviousgovernments andattributed

thebettermentandgrowthofpublicworksdirectlytoSomozaGarcía.18NicaraguaVialalso

promotedtourismtoacertainextent.Asidefrompresentingthesuccessofthegovernment

intheadvancementoftheroadsystem,thepamphlet includespicturesanddescribesthe

roadsinawayresemblingthetoneofatouristicbrochure.TheAsososcaroad,forexample,

is described as “una de las más encantadoras rutas” with “un aspecto encantador y

románticoalbajarlahistóricaCuestadelPlomo.”19

16CitedinArceSolórzano,Nicaragua:Undestinoturístico,86.17NicaraguaVial,(Managua:MinisteriodeFomentoyObrasPúblicas,1938),1.18Ibid.,3.19Ibid.,4.

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ThefirstattempttopromoteNicaraguaasatouristdestinationwasalsoanattempt

to create an image of Nicaragua independent from the reality of the country. In this

fetishization, Somoza is credited for the infrastructural advancement that would

supposedlymakeNicaragua amodern country.Due to theweakeningof the agro‐export

economy by the Depression, Somoza developed important new industries and public

works,suchastheabove‐mentionedexpansionoftheroadnetwork.However,thisprocess

of industrialization and modernization was not only meant to substitute the damaged

exporteconomy,itstrategicallyservedthepersonalinterestsofSomozaandU.S.investors.

Since the beginning of his presidency, Somoza began accumulatingwealth as a business

andlandowner.TheSomozasboughtmanyofthenewimportsubstitutionindustriesand

regularlyacquirednewrealestateproperties.Oftenthenewlybuiltroadsweretoprovide

betteraccess toSomoza’sownproperty.20Somozanotonlyaccumulatedwealth,butalso

power buying out his opponents and repressing political freedoms. For example, press

censorship was practiced through threats from the National Guard and a network of

informants, called orejas (ears). In addtion, the 1939 constitution granted even more

powers to the National Guard, which was under Somoza’s direction, and extended the

presidentialtermfromfourtosixyears.21

U.S.–NicaraguanRelationsandtheTouristicDiscourse1940­1956

By the end of the 1930s, Somoza’s non‐democratic government had caused a

negative impression inWashington. In 1940 President Roosevelt invited Somoza to the

20EduardoCrawley,NicaraguainPerspective(NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,1984),98‐100.21Ibid.

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White House. Although the Roosevelt disapproved of the dictatorship,22 Somoza used

Washington’s invitation to show just the opposite, that the U.S. fully backed his

government.Managua’smain avenuewas renamed Avenida Roosevelt and amonument

wasdedicated to theAmericanpresident. Somoza also showedhis political allegiance to

theU.S.bydeclaringwartotheAxisPowers.However,tensionsbetweenNicaraguaandthe

U.S.onlygrewintheperiodleadinguptothe1947elections.Somoza’sliftingofthebanon

reelections ledtoawaveofriotsanddemonstrations,whichwereviolentlyrepressedby

theNationalGuard.In1945,theTrumanadministrationthreatenedtobreakoffdiplomatic

relations as well as to freeze financial aid if Somoza did not desist from running for

president.AlthoughSomozaresignedfromhiscandidacy,heseizedpowerinacoupd’etat

afterthenewpresidentArgüellowaselected.AlthoughtheTrumanadministrationdidnot

recognize Somoza’s presidency, he tried to gain sympathy from the U.S. by including a

numberofanti‐communistprovisionsinthenewconstitution,aswellasofferingtosetup

U.S.militarybasesinNicaraguanterritory.

InthefaceofthisproblematicrelationshipwiththeU.S.,thequestionarisesofhow

bothgovernmentsnegotiatedtheseconflictspublicly.Touristicpublicationsofthetimehad

to support an official discourse that dealtwith these issues in a diplomaticmanner that

carefullypresentedbothcountries inapositiveor“neutral” light.AfterWorldWarII, the

Travel Division of the Pan American Union, the bureau of the Organization of American

States, began publishing pamphlets and brochures informing the American public on

22ExemplifiedbytheinfamouscommentallegedlymadebySecretaryofStateCordellHullinaconversationwithFDRthatSomoza“sureis[asonofabitch],butheisoursonofabitch!”QuotedinCrawley,NicaraguainPerspective,99.

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different Latin American tourist destinations. As OAS publications, the pamphlets were

widelydiffused23sourcesofhegemonicrepresentationsofNicaragua.

One of these pamphlets, published in 1945,was dedicated entirely to the capital,

Managua. The city is presented as a vibrant center of modernization. The pamphlet is

clearly written for tourists, recommending excursions and beach resorts, but it also

describes Managua’s evolution from a small village to modern capital. It mentions a

number of factories, including “the only milk pasteurization plant as well as the only

whiskeydistilleryintherepublic.”24Thereisalsomentionofanewjuvenilelibrary,which

isvisitedby“asmanyas600childrenamonth.”25AllofthisevokesanimageofManaguaas

a city of progress, inwhich rural backwardness has been overcomeby industrialization,

technologyandeducation.Perhapsmoreinterestingthanwhatthepamphletmentions, is

what it omits. Ten of the fifteen pages in the pamphlet are dedicated toManagua’s past

since thearrivalof theConquistadores.There isnomentionof recentpolitical eventsor

Somoza, but great emphasis onRubénDarío andhis significance forNicaraguan culture.

More importantly, Darío is presented as a “genius admired throughout the Spanish

speakingworld.”26AsinthecaseofDarío,thoseelementsofNicaraguancultureandhistory

are highlighted which acquire their significance in relation to a cosmopolitan context.

Through this mechanism, Nicaragua it is presented as a country that is up to par with

modern industrial nations. Not only doesManagua countwith all kinds of industry and

23By1962,theTechnicalUnitonTourismandformerTravelDivisionoftheOASwasprintingoveronemillionpamphletsandleafletsaboutLatinAmerica,mostlyinEnglishandSpanish,butalsoinPortuguese,French,GermanandJapanese.OctavoCongresoInteramericanodeTurismo:ActaFinal(UnionPanamericana,1962),75.

24PanAmericanUnion,Managua(Washington:OrganizationofAmericanStates,1945),12.25Ibid.,13.26Ibid.,14.

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varietyofconsumerproducts,butalsowith“largehotels,equippedwithswimmingpools

and other luxuries,” a “great new cathedral,” 27 “social clubs,” a “finemilitary academy,”

“attractive suburbs.”28Allof theseare things thatarealso status symbols in theU.S. and

thusshowManagua’spotentialtobecomea“worldcity.”

In its fetishization of Managua, the pamphlet creates a city devoid of political

conflict, but also of people: The city seems to be solely populated by objects. All social

activityiseitherrelegatedtothepastorstereotyped,asinthevaguedescriptionofcountry

clubguests,who“enjoythepassivebutsociablesavoringof life inducedalikebyawarm

climateandtheinheritanceofaLatincivilization.”29Themosttourist‐orientedbrochureof

the Travel Division of the Pan American Union is Visit Nicaragua. The cover shows a

mestizowoman dressed in traditional garb holding a basket containing pineapples. The

captionreads“NottheleastofNicaragua’sattractionsareherprettyseñoritasandluscious

fruit.”30NicaraguaisportrayedasanexoticplacewhereNorthAmericanscanspendtheir

vacations.Thetravelbrochuregives“asketchofthepast,”inwhichNicaragua’shistoryis

told until 1933. Interestingly, the Somoza dictatorship is completely left out, as are the

Nicaraguan people, with the notable exception of the señorita on the cover and Rubén

Darío. Instead, the brochure focuses on practical matters such as transportation, sight

seeing,sportsandentertainment,shopping,nativefoodsandwhattowear.31

27Ibid.,12.28Ibid.,14.29Ibid.30ThePanAmericanUnionpamphletsclearlyfetishizeNicaraguaintermsofraceandgender,usuallyeitherrelegatingitsmestizoandindigenouspopulationtothepastorhighlightingitasexotic.Unfortunately,thistopicgoesbeyondthescopeofthispaper.

31PanAmericanUnion,VisitNicaragua(Washington:OrganizationofAmericanStates,1957).

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Another series of pamphlets, titledNicaragua and published in different editions

between1950and1956withminorchanges,providedinformationonthewholecountry.

ThesepamphletsaremuchmoredetailedthantheManaguabrochureinthattheyinclude

sections on “the land and the people,” history, principal cities, national economy,

transportation and communications, labor and social welfare, public health, culture

(education, literature, art, music and dance). While the historical sections are still

predominant,significantportionsofthesepamphletsarealsodedicatedtothepresent.The

positivecontemporaryportrayalofNicaraguaasa“democraticnation”inthepamphletsis

indicativeofthesupportivepositiontheU.S.nowhadtowardsNicaragua.

By the end of the 1940s, Somoza had regained support from the Truman

administration as well as from the OAS by denouncing and militarily countering an

allegedlycommunistrebellioninneighboringCostaRica.U.S.–Nicaraguanrelationswere

furtherstrengthenedbythecommondenominatorofanti‐communismwhentheNational

GuardplayedanimportantroleinsupportingtheC.I.A.ledcoupd’etatofJacoboArbenzin

Guatemalain1951.DuringthisbeginningstageoftheColdWar,anti‐communismnotonly

providedanexcuseforSomoza’srepressiveregimeideologically,italsomeantthepolitical

andfinancialsupportoftheU.S.

The historical sections of the pamphlets downplay the role of the U.S. in shaping

Nicaragua’s financialandpoliticalsystem,andeuphemizethe longpresenceoftheU.S. in

Nicaraguaasmere“assistance.”32 Thesectionon“ConstitutionandGovernment”stresses

the democratic foundation of the constitution (“sovereignty of the people,” “President

32PanAmericanUnion,Nicaragua(Washington:OrganizationofAmericanStates,1950),8.

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electedbypopularvote”)anditssimilaritytotheUnitedStates,33butmakesnotmentionof

howpoliticsareactuallyactedoutunder theSomozaGarcíagovernment.Aparagraph is

added to the historical section of the1956 edition, which affirms that “for the past two

decades,Nicaraguahasbeenfollowingapeacefulandorderlypathtoprosperityunderthe

leadershipofGeneralAnastasioSomoza,whowas firstelectedpresident in1937.”34This

positiveportrayal of Somoza coincideswithU.S. foreignpolicy’s emphasis on stability in

Latin America at the time. “Political stability” in the form of right wing military

dictatorships in the region was preferred over more democratic forms of government,

whichallegedlyallowedroomforrevolutionarysentimentsandactions.Thispreferenceof

“stability”overdemocracywasalsovisible in theroleof theOASduringthis time,which

primarily acted as an anti‐communist alliance during the U.S. intervention in Guatemala

and alsowhen Somoza intervened inCostaRica. 35 The Somoza administration acted in

accordancewiththeOAS’sroleinitssupportofArbenz’soverthrowandwasrewardedby

recognition. Although “only” a tourist pamphlet, the Nicaragua brochure, as an OAS

document,showsthisrecognitionbyportrayingNicaraguainapositive,democratic light,

andbyemphasizingitssocial,politicalandeconomicstability.

TheNicaraguanLaborMovementandTouristicPublicationsofthe1950s

The section “Labor, PublicHealth and SocialWelfare” in the PanAmericanUnion

pamphletsonNicaraguasaysthatthe1945Nicaraguanlaborcode“providesforunions,for

individualandcollectivelaborcontracts,andgrantstherightofassociationtoallemployer

33Ibid.,9‐10.34PanAmericanUnion,Nicaragua(Washington:OrganizationofAmericanStates,1956),10.35JeromeSlater,TheOASandUnitedStatesForeignPolicy(Ohio:OhioStateUPress,1967),3‐18.

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andemployeeorganizationsfoundedonthepurposeofadvancingtheiroccupational,social

andmoralinterests.”Accordingtothecode,“workersmayexercise[therighttostrike]”as

longastheyarenotgovernmentemployees.36Thepamphletalsoreadsthat“employersare

required to bear the cost of occupational accidents, diseases, etc. of employees, to take

preventivemeasuresofsanitationandaccident,toprovidelodgingsforworkerswholive

morethantwomilesfromavillage,andtoopenschoolsfortheworkers’children.”37The

pamphletdoesnotprovideinformationontheactualvalidityoftheLaborCodeandleaves

outthecomplexpoliticalrelationbetweenSomozaandtheNicaraguanlabormovement,in

whichtheLaborCodeplayedanimportantrole.

Somoza’sinvestmentinpublicworks,suchastheexpansionofthehighwaysystem,

whichincludedthePanAmericanHighway,hadledtoarapidgrowthoftheworkingclass.

Inaddition, thecottonboomof the1950s led tomajorsocioeconomicchanges.Somoza’s

economicreformsinthe1950spushedlargenumbersofpeasantsofftheirfarms,whenthe

elites took over these areas to cultivate cotton in response to the international demand.

Despite economic growth, the government’s policies prevented this growth to benefit

poorer Nicaraguans. The expansion of new export products in the Pacific Coast region

drove peasants to less fertile lands or towards the cities, especially Managua. Many

peasantsbecamelandlessagriculturalworkers.38Thegrowingdiscontentamongruraland

urban workers led to the formation of unions, through which the laborers not only

demandedbetterworkingconditionsbutalsobeganaddressingissuesofsocialjustice.

36PanAmericanUnion,Nicaragua,1950,12‐13.37Ibid.38Bulmer‐Thomas,"Nicaraguasince1930,"344.

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AlthoughtheLaborCodewasenactedin1945,asthepamphletstates,itdidnotlive

up to workers’ demands and was not officially enforced until the presidency of Luis

Somoza.Forexample,therighttoprotestwaslimited,workerswerenotallowedtostrike

duringplantingandharvest.As JeffreyGould’s researchshows, the relationshipbetween

thelabormovementandtheSomozaregimewasambiguousatbest.Somozarosetopower

by appropriating a populist ideology that workers identified with. Initially, workers

constitutedhis broadest base of support.However, as the labormovement developed, it

split intoasomocistaandaleftist faction,whichwasalliedwiththeSocialistparty(PSN)

and opposed Somoza’s government. As Somoza further accumulated industrial property,

hissupportofworkers’rightsbegantointerferewithhiscapitalistinterests.Thecreation

and enforcement of a labor code,which granted the freedom to strike and guaranteed a

minimumwage, directly affected capitalistswho owned factories. This, and his eventual

politicalalliancewiththeLiberalelite, ledtoSomoza’sdistancingfromtheworkingclass.

The conflict between Somoza’s capitalist interests and an interest in the working class’

politicalsupportresultedinamixofrepressiveandnon‐repressivereactionstoaseriesof

strikes in themid forties.While some strikeswere violently confronted by theNational

Guard and declared illegal, others were allowed. In 1947 the National Guard repressed

most urban leftist‐led strikes and also many rural unions.39 Somoza had now definitely

abandonedhispopulistrhetoricandturnedtotherightasaresponsetopressurefromthe

elitesandU.S.anti‐communism.Inthefifties,ruralunionswererepressedmoreoften,as

theyhinderedtheoligarchyfromexpandingtheirlandholdings.Unionswerenowvirtually

39JeffreyGould,“’ForanorganizedNicaragua’:SomozaandtheLaborMovement,1944–1948,”JournalofLatinAmericanStudies,19:2(Nov.1987),370–387.

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without political protection and hacendados could evict workers from privately and

community‐owned land(ejidos) tocultivateexportcotton.Thissocial injustice led to the

formation of new rural unions, which Somoza and the National Guard alternated in co‐

optingandrepressingfortherestofthedecade.40

Thus,the“peacefulandorderlypathtoprosperity”mentionedinthepamphletwas

in fact a rocky road of social upheavals and political repression at the end of which

prosperity was indeed achieved – for the Somoza family, foreign investors and the

landowningelite.

Attracting Investment: Touristic Publications, Advertising, Anti­Communism and theAllianceforProgress1956–1963 ThepamphletspublishedbythePanAmericanUnionfetishizedNicaraguainaway

thatmisrepresentedthenon‐democraticnatureoftheSomozagovernmentanditstiesto

the labormovement.Asaninternational institutionrepresentingU.S.andLatinAmerican

nations, the OAS discursively endorsed the governments it politically supported. In this

discourse,thefactthatmanyU.S.backedLatinAmericangovernmentsweredictatorships

wassuppressed.

At the same time, thepamphletsweredirected towards a specific kindof tourist:

onethatwasnotonlyinterestedinthenaturalbeautiesofNicaragua,butalsoininvesting

in that country. Thus, the pamphlets’ omission of Nicaragua’s labormovement could be

interpreted as tactic to not deter businessmen from investing. Instead the pamphlet

guarantees that “Nicaragua’s workers benefit from progressive social and labor

40SeeJeffreyGould,ToLeadasEquals:RuralProtestandPoliticalConsciousnessinChinandega,Nicaragua,1912­1979(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1990).

18

organization,”while “rules forstrikeand lock‐outproceduresareprovided.”41Put in this

way, thepamphletassures thepotential investor thatmeasureshavebeen taken tokeep

workersundercontrolinthecaseofprotest.

Most Pan American Union publications on Nicaragua include a long and detailed

description of Nicaragua’s economy, including photographs. The pamphlets include

information on Nicaragua’s agriculture, mining and textile industry, as well as on the

financialsituationofthecountry,whichisdescribedasa“soundframeworkforacontinued

boom.”42Indeed,from1949to1970theNicaraguaneconomyshowedconsiderablegrowth

and expansion. As in past decades, economic transformations were still dictated by the

export sector, which added several new products, such as cotton, beef and sugar.43 The

boominagro‐exportswasmadepossiblebyeconomicpolicies,whichgaveprioritytothis

branchofagriculture.Thedevaluationofthecórdobain1955gavefarmerspricestability.

Farmers also benefitted from the exploitation of workers, who had no minimum wage.

Agro‐exporters could get credit at very low interest rates. Nicaragua also exported

manufacturedproducts to the restofCentralAmerica through thenewlycreatedCentral

AmericanCommonMarket(1960)andattractedmultinationalcapitalwithtaxbreaks.The

cotton export boom led to a financial surplus of beneficiaries, who created two banks

outsidethecontroloftheSomozas:BANAMER,foundedbytheConservativePellasfamily,

and BANIC, linked to the Liberal party in Nicaragua.44 The local economy was now

controlled by these three groups, the Somoza family, the BANIC group and the

41PanAmericanUnion,Nicaragua,1956,23.42Ibid.,20.43Bulmer‐Thomas,"Nicaraguasince1930,"339‐341.44JohnA.BoothandThomasA.Walker,UnderstandingCentralAmerica,3rded.(Boulder:WestviewPress,1999),61‐68.

19

BANAMERICA group, which successfully monopolized export oriented production.

However, as JaimeWheelockRomán has pointed out, all three groups still depended on

foreign capital and the U.S. political and military aid and intervention.45 Thus, constant

effortstoattractinvestorswerenecessaryforthemaintenanceofeliteprosperity.

Between 1955 and 1972, the Nicaraguan government released a series of

advertisements in theNewYorkTimes,whichnotonlyportrayedNicaraguaasbeautiful

placethatwasworthvisiting,butalsoasacountryof investmentopportunities.Theads,

whichappearedthroughoutthetermsofeachsuccessoroftheSomozadynasty,werelarge

in size and included pictures and detailed information. The first series of ads, published

from 1955 until Somoza’s death the following year, was titled “A message from the

PresidentofNicaragua…forgoodforeigntradeandgoodforeigninvestments”andshowsa

largepictureofAnastasioSomoza’sprofile.46Theadincludespicturesofattractivesitesin

Nicaragua, such asManagua’s cathedral, a ”tropical scenery” inGranada, and thePort of

SanCarlosontheSanJuanRiver.Thetextoftheadgivesinformationaboutagricultureand

the cattle industry, the improvement of highway conditions, the “good” condition of the

Nicaraguan credit, the strength of the economy and the betterment of the education

system. In short, as the Pan American Union pamphlets, it shows Nicaragua’s advanced

statusonitswaytomodernity.Moreimportantly,“Nicaraguawelcomesforeigninvestors

andprovidesthemwithmanyattractiveguarantees.Includedistherighttotransferprofits

totheinvestor’scountryoforigin.”471954,Somozahadpassedtwonewlawsthatreflected

45JaimeWheelockRomán,Nicaragua:ImperialismoyDictadura(LaHabana:EditorialdeCienciasSociales,1980),147.

46“AmessagefromthePresidentofNicaragua,”NewYorkTimes(Jan5,1955),63.47ibid.

20

thementioned“attractiveguarantees:”theLawonForeignInvestmentsandtheLawforthe

Protection of Industrial Development. Under these legal protections, foreign investors

receivedtaxreductionsofupto90%percentandwereexemptedfromcustomsduties.48

In addition, there is an effort to create a cultural and political bond between

NicaraguaandtheU.S.bystressingtheirsimilarities.Oneofthepoliticaladvantagesbeing

promotedisanti‐communism.InSomoza’sintroductorylettertotheAmericanpublicofthe

ad,itreadsthat“(B)ecauseouraimsofpeaceandprosperityarethesame,ourtwonations

stand solidly together in the fight against Soviet imperialismandexpansion.”Notonly is

Nicaraguabeingpromotedasanattractivedestinationfortourismandastableandfriendly

economy for foreign investment, but also as a political ally.Anticipating the spirit of the

Alliance for Progress, the ad guarantees that “Nicaragua has successfully prevented the

spreadofcommunism.Thegovernmentbelievesthateducatingthepeopleandpromoting

theireconomicwell‐beingisfarmoreeffectivethanstrongarmtactics.”49Inreality,leftist

rebelgroupsandunionswerebeingviolently repressedby theNationalGuard.As faras

educationandeconomicwellbeinggo,80%oftheruralpopulationwasilliterateandmost

of the economic growth Nicaragua experienced during the cotton boom never trickled

down to themajorityof thepopulation.50After theassassinationofAnastasioSomoza in

1956, his two sons took over the government. Luis Somoza Debayle became president

throughfraudulentelectionsandAnastasio(Tachito)becameheadoftheNationalGuard.

TheassassinationofSomozaGarcíawasusedtojustifyatighteningofthedictatorialrule

andastageofsiegewasdeclared.Awaveofpoliticalrepressionfollowedandopposition

48Nicaragua:LandofLakesandVolcanoes,(León:InstitutodeFomentoNacional,1965).49“AmessagefromthePresidentofNicaragua,”NewYorkTimes.50Crawley,NicaraguainPerspective,121.

21

leaders, such as the Conservative editor of the newspaper La Prensa, Pedro Joaquín

Chamorro,wereimprisoned.51LuisSomoza’stermwasmarkedbyevenstrongertiestothe

U.S.TheCubanRevolution(1959)focusedtheU.S.’swaragainstcommunismevenmoreon

Latin America. This allowed Luis Somoza to take advantage of the Eisenhower

administration’ssupportofanti‐communistregimes.TheNationalGuardreceivedfurther

financialaidandmilitarytrainingfromtheU.S.andplayedanimportantroleattheBayof

Pigs(1961).Atthesametime,LuisSomozadirectedhisanti‐communisteffortsinwards,as

Nicaraguan rebel groups, most prominently the FSLN under the leadership of Carlos

Fonseca,beganemerging.

In1961PresidentKennedy launchedtheAlliance forProgressasanalternativeto

the strong arms tactic to fight the spread of communism. The AfP was meant to make

revolutionary movements less attractive to the impoverishedmajority of Latin America

through economic development. The 20 billion dollar program was meant to prevent

communismwhileat thesametimepromotingU.S.values. In thespiritofmodernization

theory, “success in the Alliance for Progress would demonstrate that U.S. ideas about

political organizationwere universally applicable andwould naturally lead to economic

growth.”52 In response to this turn in U.S. foreign policy, Luis Somoza launched a

democratic reform in tune with the non‐militaristic approach of the AfP. The ban on

reelection was reinstated, political prisoners released, and the press censorship was

relaxed.Moreover, the Somoza administration implemented amoderate agrarian reform

51Bulmer‐Thomas,"Nicaraguasince1930,"344.52JeffreyF.Taffet,ForeignAidasForeignPolicy:TheAllianceforProgressinLatinAmerica(NewYork:Routledge,2007),6.

22

andpromisedtogranttherightsforworkersintheLaborCode.53LuisSomoza’sadsinThe

New York Times heavily promoted his agrarian reform, stating that it “joins together in

wisemannerexistingrealitieswiththemostadvancedcurrentanddemocraticdoctrinesof

the modern world” coinciding with the “principles and spirit of the PUNTA DEL ESTE

chart.”54Theadistitled“UnprecedentedAgrarianReformInitiatedbyPresidentSomozain

Nicaragua” and contains four columns of densely printed information, aswell as a small

photograph of Luis Somoza. The legitimization of the ad for theAmerican public is thus

providedby the umbrella ofU.S. foreignpolicy in the shape of theAfP, and formally, by

givingtheinformationtheobjectiveappearanceofanewspaperarticle.

Specialemphasisisputonthenon‐revolutionarynatureoftheagrarianreform,on

its effort to also promotedevelopment in the areas of health care and education, on the

“Guarantees toForeignCapital,”andon the fact that the “PrincipleofPrivateProperty is

NotViolated.”55InacountrylikeNicaragua,whereasmalleliteownedthemajorityofthe

landandindustryandwheretheSomozafamilywasthewealthiestandmostcorruptinthe

country,56 the concept of an agrarian reform in which the land is redistributedwithout

violating theprinciple of privatepropertybecomes a contradiction.This contradiction is

valid for theAfP ingeneral,whichpretended topromotedevelopmentand thevaluesof

U.S. democracywhile concentrating financial aid in thehandsofdictators.AsPaulDosal

53Crawley,NicaraguainPerspective,125.54“UnprecedentedAgrarianReformInitiatedbyPresidentSomozainNicaragua,”NewYorkTimes(Jan10,1962),81.

55Ibid.56WheelockRomán,Nicaragua:ImperialismoyDictadura.

23

haspointedout, theAfPdidnot challenge the economicdominationofNicaraguaby the

eliteanditservedtomaintainandexpandthesomocistastate.57

According to the Punta del Este agreement, the U.S. would provide financial aid

under the condition that Latin American governments “agree to devote a steadily

increasingshareoftheirownresourcestoeconomicandsocialdevelopment,andtomake

thereformnecessarytoassurethatallsharefullythefruitsoftheallianceforProgress.”58

However,thisconditionwasnotbindingforLatinAmericangovernments,sincethecharter

didnotcreaterulestoensureAfPsponsoredreformsthatwouldbenefitthemajorityofthe

population.SincetheSomozaadministrationcontrolledthestateapparatusinitsentirety,

italsodecidedwhoreceivedU.S.aidandhowmuch.

InalaterNewYorkTimesadfeaturingthedevelopmentofNicaraguaundertheAfP,

health care, housing and education are presented as major priorities in Luis Somoza’s

government.Forexample, theadsays thatunderLuisSomozaover110,000pupilswere

registered inschools in1963,comparedto23,000 in1928.However,around70%of the

ruralpopulationwasstillilliteratein1963andregistrationnumberswerenotnecessarily

synonymouswith attendance numbers. Given themagnitude of development loans that

Nicaragua received,59 the achievements publicized by the Nicaraguan government are

rathermodest.60

57PaulDosal,“AcceleratingDependentDevelopmentandRevolution:NicaraguaandtheAllianceforProgress,”Inter­AmericanEconomicAffairs38:4(Spring1985),80.

58“DeclarationofthePeoplesofAmerica,”CharterofPuntadelEste,citedinDosal,“AcceleratingDependentDevelopment,”79.

59Between1962and1966Nicaraguareceived117milliondollarsinAfPaid.AllianceforProgress,ProfileofProgressofSocialandEconomicDevelopmentandIntegrationinCentralAmericaandPanama(AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,1966),2.

60Dosal,“AcceleratingDependentDevelopment,”93.

24

At the same time, U.S. aid came with restrictions that often benefitted the U.S.

economy more than it did Latin American economies. In Nicaragua, materials and

equipment for infrastructural development projects financed by the AfP had to be

purchasedintheU.S.Thus,inmanyindustrialdevelopmentprojects,AfPcapitalneverleft

theU.S.61

Luis Somoza publicized his agrarian reform through the New York Times ad in

attempttoshowtheeffectivenessoftheAfP.Indoingso,therevolutionaryalternativefor

change that was embraced by leftist groups who saw the AfP as another instrument of

imperialistdominationbecomesinvisible,andsodotherepressivemeasuresusedagainst

these groups. At the same time, the ad legitimizes U.S. foreign policy, “proving” that the

importofmodernizationispossibleandwillleadtodevelopment.FromaU.S.government

perspective,theAfPwasalsopromotedaseffectiveinaseriesofpamphletspublishedby

theOASanddiffusedthroughtheAmericanembassiesinCentralAmerica.Thepamphlets

werepublishedincooperationwiththeKennedyandJohnsonadministrationstopublicize

the success of the AfP and the Central American CommonMarket. The 32‐page booklet

contains information on the economic and social integration of the Central American

countriesandtheiradvancementsineducation,publichealth,housing,electricpowerand

transportation,andagricultureandruraldevelopment.Photographsofindustrialandrural

workers,teachersandchildren,andpeoplebeingtreatedinbrandnewhospitalsillustrate

the progress of the AfP development programs. One photograph shows the interior of a

largesupermarketstackedwithawidevarietyofgoods.Thecaptionreads:

61Ibid.,83.

25

This supermarket in Managua exemplifies emergence [sic] of supermarkets andshopping centers in Central America. “Operation Market,” a six‐country Alianzaproject, encourages a shift in distribution methods to bring more food andmerchandise at lowerprices into thehandsof consumers and also teaches youngmenmodernmarketing.62

Interestingly,therearenoconsumersinthephotograph.Mostofthepeopledepictedwear

uniforms;theyeitherworkforthesupermarketorworkforsomeonewhoisaconsumer,

like a dark skinned nanny carrying a light skinned infant. In a way, the pictures are

metaphoricforthenatureofprogressundertheAfP.Whilecreatinglow‐incomejobs,the

realbenefitsgototheconsumingelites,thestateandthemultinationalcorporationsthat

investinCentralAmerica.

AnExampleofNon­governmentalU.S.RepresentationsofNicaragua:LIFE

Both the Nicaraguan and U.S. government promoted the image of Nicaragua as a

prospering and democratic nation. But how credible was this vision from a non‐

governmental perspective? In the 1960s newspapers andmagazines regularly published

articlesonCentralAmericaandNicaragua.Towhichdegree,ifatall,wasthegovernment‐

constructedimageofNicaraguapubliclyreproduced?

The LIFE World Library published a volume on Central America in 1964, which

amplydiscussestheSomozadynasty.Theauthor,HaroldLavine,isremarkablyambiguous

in his language.While the Somozas are clearly identified as dictators, the tone inwhich

theyaredescribedoscillatesbetween ironyand justification.ReferringtoSomozaGarcía,

Lavinewritesthat

62AllianceforProgress,ProfileofProgress,5.

26

actually, as dictators go, Tacho was a tower of benevolence. He rarely killed hisopponents; he preferred to put them in jail until they repented their sins.Occasionally tohelp themrepentmorequickly,hispoliceuseda little torture,butstillitcouldnotbesaidthatTachowasafiend. Tacho had a style of his own; contemporary Central American politicalleadersarerequired topresentamorecivilizedveneer.They live inanewworld,oneinwhichtheyhavetocopewithabusinessandprofessionalclass…theyhavetocopealsowithCommunistsandCastroites.63

Lavine justifies Somoza García’s dictatorial rulewith his anti‐communism. Similarly, the

NationalGuardunderTachitoisdescribedasanefficientmilitaryorgan,whichistosome

extentcorrupt,buthassucceededinsuppressing“nofewerthan75rebellionsandborder

crossings by armed exiles.”64 Generally, the volume recognizes the anti‐democratic

character of many Central American governments. Lavine highlights the power of the

oligarchyandcorrectlyidentifiesReneSchick,whobecamepresidentofNicaraguain1963,

asa“hand‐pickedcandidatebackedbytheSomozas.”Atthesametime,theauthorseemsto

suggestthatpositivechangesarebeingsetinmotionbyanewfocusondevelopment(read

Alliance for Progress). These changes are also seen as generational, as “the U.S. and

Europeaneducatedsonsanddaughtersofthewealthyhavenotonlybecomewelltravelled

andwellread,liketheirforefathers,butalso,unlikethembelieversinprogressiveconcepts

ofsocialjustice.”65AseriesofphotographsunderthiscaptionshowtheSanSalvadorPolo

Club,followedbypicturesof“youngmatronsperform[ing]volunteercharityworkamong

thechildrenofthepoor.”Thesonsanddaughtersoftheelitewouldindeedsoonbecome

more interested in “progressive concepts of social justice.” Ironically, the arena for this

63HaroldLavine,LIFEWorldLibrary:CentralAmerica(NewYork:TimeIncorporated,1964),11864Ibid.65Ibid.,110.

27

wouldnotbecharityorthedevelopmentprogramsoftheAfP,buttherevolutionarywave

thatsweptNicaraguaandElSalvadoryearslater.

TourismasanInstrumentforDevelopment:TheAllianceforProgressandtheCentralAmericanConferenceonTourism1964

The Alliance for Progress was also important for the development of a “touristic

conscience” in Central America and Nicaragua. In the 1960s the U.S. interest in Central

America andNicaragua as a travel destination grew.This can be attributed to the rising

popularity of tourism as a form of leisure. Latin America became an evenmore popular

tourist destination because of its proximity to the U.S. The construction of the Pan

AmericanHighwaymadeLatinAmerica,andespeciallyMexicoandCentralAmerica,more

accessible, geographically as well as financially. At the same time, Central American

governments took the initiative to develop the touristic potential of the region. As in

previous decades, the tourism planning and the advertising of Nicaragua as a tourist

destination remained deeply interconnected with the idea of tourism as a medium for

investmentanddevelopment.

In1964, the firstCentralAmericanConferenceonTourismwasheld inManagua.

The conference brought together experts in the field, such as Hernán Aróstegui, the

director of the Bureau of Central American Touristic Integration, and Francisco J.

Hernández,thedirectoroftheTravelDivisionofthePanAmericanUnion,whichwasthe

sameorganresponsibleforthepublicationofpamphletsadvertisingNicaraguaabroad.

AnotherguestspeakerwasCharlesT.Casey,oftheFirstNationalCityBankinNew

York. Casey shared his experience as the director of the travel agency of this bank,

28

providing first‐hand information on the North American tourist market. He emphasized

thatNorthAmericantouristlikecomfortablevacations,withaccesstoprivateshowersand

goodserviceandfood,andthatshoppingwasveryimportantforAmericanwomen.Casey

alsorecommendedthatNicaraguancustomservicesgotridoftouristvisasoranyformof

bureaucracy that could cause discomfort to the American tourist.66 The banker’s advice

reflectsNicaragua’s investmentpolicyatthetime, inthesensethatdevelopmentthrough

investmenthadtobeachievedatanyprice.InordertoobtainU.S.aidandattractinvestors,

the Somozas renounced Nicaragua’s national sovereignty by opening up the country

economically to U.S. companies andmultinationals through financial incentives, thereby

oftenharminglocalsmall‐scaleproducers,workers,andevenconsumers.67Similarly,Casey

suggests the openingofNicaragua’s borders to travelers,whose economic value justifies

theeliminationofnationalregulations.

ArecurringtopicinthespeechesoftheConferenceforTourismwastheAlliancefor

Progressandhowitwouldserveasamodeltoturntourismintoasuccessfulinstrumentof

development.Kennedyservedasasourceofinspirationforsomeofspeeches,Hernández

cites him as saying that “el turismo fomenta la paz.”68 In his opening speech, President

Schickrelatedtourismtocivilizationandmodernity,since“descubrirignoradosmundosha

sidoelresortemáspoderosoparaelprogresohumano”(2).Schickalsoseestourismasa

cultural practice in which neighboring countries get to know each other and learn to

66CharlesT.Casey,“Eldesarrollodelturismovistoporunbanquero,”RevistaConservadoradelPensamientoCentroamericano10:59(Agosto1965),27.

67OnecasewouldbeNestle’sintroductionofpowderedmilk,aproductofquestionablesafetyandusefulnessinacountryweremanypeoplehadnoaccesstopotablewater.SeeDosal,“AcceleratingDependentDevelopment,”84‐93.

68FranciscoJ.Hernández,“LaAméricaCentral,laCarreteraInteramericanayelturismo,”RevistaConservadoradelPensamientoCentroamericano10:59(Agosto1965),20.

29

invalidatestereotypes.At thesame time, the financialworthof tourismasan industry is

emphasized, as “millones de dólares vienen a vigorizar la industria y el comercio” (2).

Interestingly,forSchicktourismisamediumtoimportmodernity,comparingittothetime

of nation building in LatinAmerica, inwhich “the immigration of European settlerswas

encouraged to incite the indigenous population to adopt a better and more urban

culture.”69ThismentalitycorrespondswithaU.S.basedbeliefinmodernizationtheoryand

withtheSomoza’sobsessionwithallthingsNorthAmerican.

Severalgoalswerearticulatedat theconference,whichwould turn tourism intoa

major source of revenue for Central America. Some of the tasks of the newly created

Counsel of Central American Tourism were the organization of hotel associations and

travelagencies,theplanningofschoolstotrainhotelpersonnel,thestrengtheningoftiesto

internationalorganizationsandtheorganizationofawarenesscampaignstopublicizethe

economic importanceof tourism.70SincemostofNicaragua’s foreignvisitorswereNorth

Americans,advertisingwastobespecificallygearedtowardstheU.S.Themostimportant

goalsetupattheconferencewastoincreasethenumberofU.S.touristsinCentralAmerica

from25000 in1963 toover200000by1975.Thiswouldbring aprofit of 136million

dollarstotheCentralAmericaneconomies.Toreachthisgoal,anexpansionofthetouristic

infrastructure was necessary that required at least 50 million dollars in private

69“Enalgunamedida,contribuimosaeducaraquienesvisitannuestrapatria,perotambiénrecibimosenseñanzadenuestroshuéspedes.Nootracosapreconizaronlospadresdenuestrasnacionalidades,cuandoaconsejabansetrajeranaAméricacolonosdeEuropa,cuyoejemploincitaralaspoblacionesautóctonasaadoptarmejorespracticasdecultivoymodosmásurbanosdeconvivencia.”ReneSchick,“ElGobiernoyelTurismo,”RevistaConservadoradelPensamientoCentroamericano10:59(Agosto1965),2.

70HernánAróstegui,“LaSecretaríadeintegraciónturísticaCentroamericana,”RevistaConservadoradelPensamientoCentroamericano10:59(Agosto1965),3.

30

investments.71 Thus, the tourism industry became another sectorwhere the Nicaraguan

governmentprovidedattractiveconcessionstoforeigninvestors,includingtaxbreaksand

cheapland.Theseconcessionswereonlyofferedtoinvestmentsofavalueabove1million

dollars, discriminating many local small‐scale investors interested in the tourism

industry.72

InordertoreachthegoalssetupattheCentralAmericanConferenceforTourism,

Nicaragua promoted its friendly laws for foreign investments in a variety of ways. One

Nicaraguan tourist guidebook, for example, was published in English and Spanish and

includedmanyadsthatcateredtoNorthAmericanreaders.73Thesameguidebookincluded

reprintsinEnglishoftheLawofForeignInvestmentsandtheLawfortheProtectionand

Promotion of Industrial Development.74 These same laws were also reprinted in a

governmentpamphletpublishedbytheInstitutodeFomentoNacional.Theillustrationon

the cover of the pamphlet, entitled “Nicaragua: Land of Lakes and Volcanoes,” shows a

dozen of arrows labeled “INVESTMENT” pointing towards the geographic silhouette of

Nicaragua.AlthoughapamphletforthepromotionofinvestmentinNicaragua,itdoesnot

significantlydifferfromthetouristicbrochurespublishedbythePanAmericanUnion.The

pamphletprovidesinformationonthegeography,language,religions,population,climate,

and principal cities, with a special focus on the economy. Nicaragua is presented as an

excellent place for investment, as it “offers to investors… incentive legislation, liberal

investment law, industrial property protection, low taxes, confiscation prohibited, no

71Ibid.,572ArceSolórzano,Nicaragua:Undestinoturístico,93.73Forexample,theguideincludesseveraladsfortheAmericanCableandRadioSystem.74PacoGallegos,Nicaragua:TierradeMaravillas(Managua:CámaraNacionaldeComercioeIndustrias,1964),51–62.

31

discriminationto foreigncapital,specialgrantsandprivileges.”75Moreover,as inthePan

American Union publications, Nicaragua was described as “democratic representative

republic.”76

Conclusion

Sinceitsbeginningsinthe1930s,governmenteffortstobuildatourismindustryin

Nicaraguahadtogoals:toattractinvestors,andtousetouristadvertisingtolegitimizethe

Somoza dictatorships by presenting Nicaragua as a modern, egalitarian and democratic

country.AsajointeffortoftheNicaraguanandU.S.governments,thetouristicpublications

of the Pan American Union discursively smoothed over internal and external political

conflicts, giving an impression of stability and order. At the same time, the problematic

relationbetweenSomoza and the labormovementwas shownas one inwhich the state

grantedprogressiverightstotheworkingclass.

TheadvertisementspublishedintheNewYorkTimesbytheSomozasemphasized

commonalitieswiththeU.S.,especiallyanti‐communism.UnderLuisSomoza,theAlliance

forProgresswaspresentedasasuccessfulprogramthatwas leadingtothewell‐beingof

themajorityoftheNicaraguanpopulationandpreventedthespreadofcommunism.While

theAfPachievednoneofthesegoals,itisremarkablethattheLuisSomozaandReneSchick

administrationssupportedtheU.S. inpublicizingtheAfPasasuccess,eventhoughitwas

doomed to failure from the beginning due to its support of dictators like the Somozas.

Because the AfP development projects benefitted both U.S. corporations as well as the

75Nicaragua:LandofLakes,27.76Ibid.,11.

32

Nicaraguanelites,bothgovernmentscontributedinportrayingitastheultimateprogram

forsustainabledevelopment.

33

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