the united states and the north african imbroglio: balancing interests in algeria, morocco, and the...

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The United States and the North African Imbroglio:Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and theWestern SaharaYahia H. Zoubir a & Karima Benabdallah-Gambier ba Department of International Relations and Management , Euromed Marseille, BP921-13288 , Marseille, Franceb Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve , Louvain-la-Neuve, BelgiumPublished online: 23 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Yahia H. Zoubir & Karima Benabdallah-Gambier (2005) The United States and the North AfricanImbroglio: Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara, Mediterranean Politics, 10:2, 181-202, DOI:10.1080/13629390500124333

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The United States and the NorthAfrican Imbroglio: Balancing Interestsin Algeria, Morocco, and the WesternSahara

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR* & KARIMA BENABDALLAH-GAMBIER***Department of International Relations and Management, Euromed Marseille, BP 921-13288, Marseille,

France, **Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

ABSTRACT In this article, US policy towards the Western Sahara conflict is analysed from ageopolitical perspective. It is postulated that after 9/11, the US favoured a “compromise”that, while still favourable to Morocco’s interests, offered Algeria and the Polisario Front away out of the stalemate. Acceptance of the Baker Plan II would seem to promise areawakening of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Because the conflict is seen as an obstacleto other strategic goals, US hegemonic power seeks a solution that would continue to stronglysafeguard Morocco’s interests while also consolidating the pronounced rapprochement withAlgeria. The objective is the establishment of a regional trade bloc.

Although the United States traditionally has shunned the Maghreb region, there have

always been periods of regained, heightened political and economic interest despite

the fact that the Maghreb falls within Europe’s, mainly France’s, zone of influence.

One can identify at least three periods in which the US has paid particular attention

to North Africa: the Second World War, the period of decolonization in the 1950s

and 1960s (Zoubir, 1995) and the Western Sahara conflict from the 1970s. Since

9/11, the US has demonstrated even greater attention to the region due partly to the

fact that some members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, the so called “Arab

Afghans”, are of North African origin.

In recent years, US policy makers have expressed strong interest in the emergence

of a regional, market-based Maghreb entity. However, the non-resolution and

perpetuation of the conflict in the Western Sahara remains a source of tension in the

region and constitutes the main area of discord between Algeria and Morocco. These

two countries are the backbone of the regionalization process. For historical,

1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/05/020181-22 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/13629390500124333

Correspondence Address: Yahia H. Zoubir, Professor of International Relations and Management, Euromed

Marseille BP 921–13288 Marseille, Cedex 9, France. Email: [email protected]

Mediterranean Politics,Vol. 10, No. 2, 181–202, July 2005

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ideological and sheer geopolitical reasons, the Western Sahara conflict has,

since its inception in 1975, exacerbated Algerian-Moroccan relations (Zoubir,

2001). Thus, it is difficult to envision economic integration without prior resolution

of the conflict.

US Policy Objectives in the Maghreb

In the Maghreb, the United States supports a type of development of the states in the

region which would allow for sustained economic growth. As stated in United States

(2001), “the United States seeks the stability and prosperity of North Africa” and “to

strengthen our relations with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and to encourage

political and economic reform”. Because the Maghreb is not as important to the US

as the Gulf region is, it is clear that the United States does not intend to control the

Maghreb politically like it intends to control the Middle East and Gulf area. The

main US interest in the Maghreb is economic; the clearest indication is the so-called

Eizenstat Initiative as well as the multiplication of American-Maghrebi chambers of

commerce. In 1999 the United States launched the US-North Africa Economic

Partnership, which became known as the “Eizenstat Initiative”, after its main

advocate Stuart Eizenstat, undersecretary of state for Economic, Business and

Agricultural Affairs. The objective of the initiative – later renamed US North Africa

Economic Program – was “to link the United States and the three countries of North

Africa much closer together in terms of trade and investment, to encourage more

trade between our countries, to encourage more US companies to invest in the region

and create good-paying jobs. . .and to encourage the reduction in internal barriers

among and between the countries of North Africa which has impeded the normal

trade flows between those countries” (Eizenstat, 1999a).1 Implicit in this statement

is an encouragement of the three Maghreb countries to revive the UMA – excluding

Libya and Mauritania – and to reopen the Algerian-Moroccan border, closed since

1994. The US North Africa Economic Program, which is now part of the Greater

Middle East Partnership Initiative (GMEPI) – remains a constant reminder that the

United States wishes to look at the Maghreb as an integrated whole, which could

potentially expand eastward (Zoubir interviews, 2000). With recent developments in

US-Libyan relations, such expansion is no longer far-fetched. In addition, the US is

also interested in establishing free trade zones with the Maghreb countries; in 2004,

the US set up an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco and is apparently in

discussion with the Algerians for a similar arrangement. US emphasis on economic

partnership differs therefore from the political integration sought by the European

Union within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

During the post-Cold War transition, because of its world hegemonic position and

the challenges posed by globalization, the United States has had to find reliable

footholds in the developing world through the development of alliances. This

observation rests on a vision similar to the concept of “pivotal states” developed

in the 1990s to demonstrate the importance of the role that such states

could potentially play in the realization of US policy objectives (Chase et al.,

1996: 37).2 Scholars have put Algeria on the list of such states. The proponents of

182 Y. H. Zoubir & K. Benabdallah-Gambier

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this thesis – academics but also officials in the US government – argue that “the US

should assist those states so they could act to ensure stability and order in different

regions of the developing world” (Chase et al., 1996: 33). The post-9/11 period

seems to corroborate the thesis on the role of pivotal states in the implementation of

US foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the National Security Strategy released in

early 2003 makes it clear that the United States seeks to “strengthen alliances to

defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work

with others to defuse regional conflicts” (United States, 2003). The role of pivotal

states in accomplishing such goals is certainly a desired expectation.

The Geopolitics of Western Sahara

In its geopolitical dimension the Western Sahara conflict involves directly the Sahrawi

Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and Morocco, but also Algeria, Mauritania, France,

Spain and the United States. This protracted conflict, whose nature is essentially

regional, also involves an opposition of alliances. Thus, the alliance between France and

Morocco can be seen as an alliance that seeks to hinder the influence of the occasional

alliance between Algeria and Spain in the Mediterranean region. France has consistently

backed the Moroccan view in the conflict, whereas Spain and Algeria, for different

reasons, are more favourable to an independent Western Sahara.

For historical considerations, Spain has always maintained a good rapport with

the Maghreb states. With respect to the countries involved in the conflict, Spain has

adopted a bilateral policy of friendship and co-operation to establish a balance while

seeking to strengthen political and economic ties with the neighbouring states. Thus,

Morocco has remained, except under the premiership of Jose Marıa Aznar, Spain’s

privileged interlocutor, while relations with Algeria and Mauritania have remained

good. Until the early 1970s, Spain’s chief objective was to avoid an armed conflict

with the Sahrawi militants, then openly backed by Morocco and Mauritania. Spain

was preoccupied with opening a new page in its history, namely, the end of the

Francisco Franco regime and Spain’s progressive integration in the concert of

democracies. Nevertheless, Spain could ill afford to be antagonistic towards

Morocco because of the salience of Spain’s strategic interests: the enclaves of Ceuta

and Melilla; dependency of the mainland Spanish and Canary Islands’ fishing fleets

on Sahrawi waters, which required the signing with Morocco of fishing agreements;

participation in the phosphates mine company in Bu-Craa in Western Sahara; and

the presence of Spaniards living and working in Morocco. The Spanish government

was confronted with a difficult situation since it needed to maintain good rapport

with Morocco and to establish stronger ties with Algeria without, however,

neglecting the Western Sahara conflict for which Spain has direct responsibility

since the Spanish authorities failed to decolonize the territory as mandated by the

United Nations. Madrid’s position on the question of Western Sahara is, to say the

least, quite ambiguous. Indeed, whereas Spain has not recognized Morocco and

Mauritania’s sovereignty over the territory – it handed to them the “administration

of the Territory’ under the terms of the Madrid Accords of November 1975 – it

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nonetheless signed with these two countries fishing agreements so that Spanish

vessels could operate along the coasts of the disputed Western Sahara.

In 2002, Spain confronted Morocco over Parsley Island (also known as Perejil or

Leıla Island). The crisis was resolved owing to the mediation of US secretary of state

Colin Powell. In that same year, prime minister Jose Marıa Aznar, during talks with

President George W. Bush, declared his opposition to the annexation of Western

Sahara by Morocco. While in 1975 Spain gave way to the US resolve over the

Sahrawi question, in July 2002 Madrid publicly opposed a position that would

support Morocco’s intentions in Western Sahara, arguing that “Spain’s wish is that

there be a peaceful solution to this problem within the framework and resolutions of

the United Nations” (Hocine, 2002; Hernando de Larramendi & Lopez, 2004). Even

though the Spanish government sided with the US in its war against Iraq in 2003, this

alignment was linked to Madrid’s interest in obtaining US backing on more salient

issues, such as the security of Spain’s southern borders, the defence of the Spanish

enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco, or the Atlantic zones potentially

rich in hydrocarbon resources that surround the Canary Islands, which might some

day be claimed by Morocco.

The policy the United States pursued during these years of decolonization of the

Western Sahara seems to reflect a major ambivalence. In principle, the US supports

the right to self-determination as guaranteed in the UN Charter, which requires that

Spain hold a referendum on self-determination. At the same time, political and

economic realism dictates that the US should provide steadfast support to the

Moroccan kingdom, a reliable ally in the Arab world. This explains why the United

States has since the inception of the conflict sided with Morocco. Indeed, during the

height of the Cold War the US feared Soviet expansion into sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite the fact that the Soviets never supported the Sahrawi nationalist movement,

the US was worried about the potential emergence of a pro-Soviet state in Western

Sahara (Zoubir, 1987). These fears intensified US determination to support

Morocco. For instance, one can argue that “the 1979–1980 American decision to

reverse its arms sales policy in favour of aiding Morocco in its desert war was

justified more by the consideration of Morocco and its king as friendly to US

interests than by regional or decolonization concerns. Preoccupation with the

survival of the monarchy – as a guarantor of US and Western presence in the area –

overrode any other regional concerns” (Layachi, 1990: 29). In August 2004, James

Baker corroborated this point by stating that US support to Morocco was justified

because “in the days of the Cold War (. . .) the POLISARIO Front was aligned with

Cuba and Libya and some other enemies of the United States, and Morocco was very

close to the United States” (Baker, 2004)3.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, under President George Bush, US policy

towards the dispute was more even-handed than under the previous administrations.

A number of reasons could explain the relative shift in policy: i) considerable

progress in American-Algerian relations greatly diminished the perception of

Algeria as a revolutionary state opposed to US interests and Morocco; ii) growing

attention of the US Congress to the conflict played a role in the change of attitude

among Republicans and Democrats alike; and iii) the United States


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has supported, albeit in a partial way, the UN settlement plan since its introduction

in 1988.

Morocco and Western Sahara: A Brief Historical Background

Self-determination of Western Sahara, a non-autonomous territory, rests on

international law and on UN resolutions. The principle of self-determination is

inscribed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries

and Peoples contained in UN resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. In 1963,

the United Nations recognized the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination and it has

restated that right in every resolution ever since. The General Assembly’s Fourth

Committee on Decolonization discusses the case every year. In fact, on 11 February

2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared at the Special Committee Session

that: “in the twenty-first century, colonialism is an anachronism. I therefore hope

that, in the year ahead, all administering Powers will work with the Special

Committee, and with the people in the territories under their administration, to find

ways to further the decolonization process. After all, decolonization is a United

Nations success story, but it is a story that is not yet finished. I stand ready to provide

any support that I can to advance the work of the Committee, and I wish you every

success in the year ahead”.4

From 1976 until the ceasefire in September 1991, following the 1988 peace

plan brokered by the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Sahrawi

combatants, backed by Algeria, fought Moroccan and, until 1979, Mauritanian

troops. The Sahrawis never resorted to terrorism or to attacks against Moroccan

territory proper. On 19 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) finally passed resolution 690, which outlined a detailed plan for the

holding of a free and fair referendum and the setting up of a UN mission

(MINURSO) to conduct the referendum. Morocco’s King Hassan II declared to the

world in 1983 that he was favourable to the holding of a referendum in Western

Sahara. However, as became quickly apparent, Moroccans wanted a referendum that

would confirm the integration of Western Sahara to the kingdom. The UN scheduled

a referendum for early 1992 but has subsequently postponed it time after time.

Morocco reneged on the conditions of the UN peace plan by adding thousands of

individuals to the list of potential voters to be identified by MINURSO, thus putting

off the holding of the referendum. Encouraged by the United Nations, Moroccans

and Sahrawis met a number of times in the 1990s in the hope of ironing out their

differences regarding the holding of the referendum. However, despite the

agreement reached in the 1997 Houston Accords (UN Report, 24 September 1997)5

through the mediation of James A. Baker, former US secretary of state and UN

secretary general’s special representative to Western Sahara, the stalemate has

prevailed to this date.

Of course, King Hassan II could not have succeeded in pursuing his policies had it

not been for the strong support he secured from France and the United States.

Indeed, despite its proclaimed neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict, the United

States has offered considerable political and material support to Morocco to sustain


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the war effort and prevent the nationalist movement from accomplishing its goal

(Zoubir & Volman, 1998; Zunes, 1998).

The United States and the Western Sahara Conflict Since the 1990s

For the greater part of the 1990s, the primary concern of the United States in the

Maghreb region was the highly volatile situation in Algeria. The uncertainty in

Algeria was the principal reason why merely maintaining the status quo in the

Western Sahara conflict became acceptable to all parties. The rise of radical

Islamism in Algeria and the chaos that analysts anticipated as a result of an Islamist

victory at the polls, or through armed insurgency, strengthened Morocco’s

importance in the eyes of the United States and many European countries, France in

particular, as a fortress of stability and bulwark against radical Islamism – just as it

was a bastion of anticommunism during the Cold War. The situation in Algeria at

least partially explains why some in the United States opposed the holding of a

referendum – especially one favourable to the Sahrawis – because it would

supposedly destabilize the Moroccan monarchy. In this reasoning, if both Algeria

and Morocco were destabilized, the consequences for Europe would be dire.

Furthermore, a destabilized Morocco would facilitate the rise of radical Islamism in

that country, which would result in migration to Europe. At the same time, however,

the United States could not allow Morocco to assume power in Western Sahara or to

hold a seemingly less-than-fair referendum to avoid a potential, direct conflict

between Morocco and the Sahrawi people.

Surprisingly, it was the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton that, at least

until 1996, strengthened this position in favour of Morocco and its wishes about

Western Sahara. Officials at the Department of State and Department of Defense,

though conceding that Sahrawi claims were legitimate, argued that integrating the

former colonial territory into Morocco might prove the best solution. However, they

admitted that a UN settlement agreed to by the warring parties, namely, Morocco

and the Sahrawi nationalist movement Polisario, would probably be less costly

politically for all parties involved, including the neighbouring countries and outside

powers (Zoubir interviews, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000). The disinclination of the US

Congress to keep funding UN operations also accounted for the administration’s

lack of resolve to bring an end to the deadlock.

Immediately after assuming his role as secretary general of the United Nations in

1997, Kofi Annan signalled his intention of finding a solution to the Western Sahara

conflict. Annan decided to choose a credible American statesperson to serve as his

special representative for Western Sahara. Annan hoped that appointing Baker

would accelerate the process of resolving the long drawn-out conflict. Clearly, a

consensus existed in Washington and other major capitals that the lack of resolution

of the conflict in Western Sahara was a source of regional instability in the Maghreb,

especially at a time when the situation in Algeria was still volatile. In Washington,

Baker’s nomination drew the attention of the US Congress to Western Sahara.

Thus, Ed Royce, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, introduced


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a resolution, adopted as Resolution 245, which enjoined the administration to

support a free and transparent referendum (House of Representatives, 1997).

Following Morocco’s obvious refusal to allow the holding of a referendum, Kofi

Annan and Baker, along with the US, France and the UK, began backing the

so-called “third way” – namely, a solution other than independence from or

integration to Morocco – to settle the Western Sahara question. Indeed, subsequent

to the results of voter identification, Annan announced in March 2000 that the

referendum would not take place before 2002. He said that Baker needed to further

investigate the feasibility of implementing the Houston Accords and the specific

problems obstructing the execution of the UN settlement plan. After a face-to-face

meeting of the parties in London in May 2000, Annan observed that the Moroccan

and Sahrawi views on the referendum were widely divergent and suggested another

way “to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute over

Western Sahara” (UN Security Council 2000). The Security Council, approving

Annan’s report, expected that the parties would offer Baker “specific and concrete

proposals... to resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the

Settlement Plan and explore all ways and means to achieve an early, durable and

agreed resolution to their dispute” (UN Security Council, 2000). Security Council

Resolution 1301, confirming Baker’s search for an alternative to the UN settlement

plan, generated disquiet within the UN General Assembly, the majority of whose

members were still in support of that plan.

The battle was rejoined in the summer of 2001. Polisario argued that the

settlement plan did not envision any enforcement mechanism (UN Security Council,

2001a). When, according to Annan, neither Morocco nor Polisario came up with

concrete proposals for implementing the referendum, Baker believed that a

negotiated agreement could produce a solution somewhere between full integration

and full independence, without however abandoning the possibility of a political

solution that “would permit a successful implementation of the settlement plan” (UN

Security Council 2001a). But, in a surprising development, Baker and Annan

championed the so-called “third way”, submitting it to the parties as a UN

“Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara”.

The Security Council encouraged “the parties to discuss the draft Framework

Agreement and to negotiate any specific changes they would like to see in this

proposal, as well as to discuss any other proposal for a political solution, which may

be put forward by the parties, to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement” (UN

Security Council, 2001b). UN Resolution 1359 adopted the latter option, but the

Council recognized implicitly that it could not bring the parties to agree on the

results of the UN voter identification.

For Sahrawis, implementation of the peace plan, including the referendum,

remains the most viable and just solution to the conflict (UN Security Council,

2001a). Polisario considered Baker and Annan’s promotion of the Framework

Agreement as a breach of the 1991 UN Peace Plan and the Houston Accords.

Algeria, home to more than 165,000 Sahrawi refugees, has maintained a rather

constant position in support of a referendum in Western Sahara, though ambiguities

in its stance have emerged occasionally.


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Members of the Security Council did not endorse the Framework Agreement and

requested that Baker produce another plan. In Washington, Senators Edward

Kennedy, Patrick Leahy and John Kerry wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell

expressing their concern that the UN would “abandon the referendum and support a

solution that proposes integrating the Western Sahara into Morocco against the will

of the Sahrawi people” (Zoubir, personal file).

Morocco: America’s Long-standing Ally

In US foreign policy making, Morocco remains a support for the American presence

in North Africa and the Near East, especially for the US Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean, and for the Middle East “peace process”. With the notable exception

of Egypt, Morocco has, since its independence in 1956, received more US aid than

any other Arab country. Indeed, since the beginning of the war over Western Sahara

in 1975, Morocco has obtained more than one-fifth of all US aid to the continent,

totalling more than $1bn in military assistance alone. The US played a major role in

reversing the war over Western Sahara in Morocco’s favour through large-scale

economic and military aid, military advisers and logistical assistance.

The end of the Cold War made Morocco’s strategic location less significant.

Algeria’s more moderate policy and moves towards democratization, coupled with

the belated acknowledgement by US analysts that the Polisario Front could not be

completely defeated militarily by the Moroccan armed forces, provided a different

assessment of US-Moroccan relations. The US began quietly urging Morocco to

seek a compromise on Western Sahara and undergo needed economic and political

reforms. In the late 1980s, George Bush, as vice president and president, asked the

Department of State and European leaders to encourage the king to accelerate the

process for holding the referendum in Western Sahara. The dramatic decline of

Marxism-Leninism in Africa lessened the need for Morocco as a surrogate or proxy

state.

Following the end of the Cold War, US military and economic assistance

remained at a relatively low level, but Morocco has since rebounded as a major ally.

The first reason for this rebound was Moroccan support for the 1991 Gulf War,

including sending 2,000 Moroccan troops to Saudi Arabia. Morocco supported the

allies despite previous collaboration with the Iraqi government. The second reason

was the instability in Algeria for the most part of the 1990s. The Algerian regime

was fighting for its very survival; its capacity to counter Moroccan ambitions was

thus limited. The spectre of a radical Islamist revolution in North Africa placed

Morocco once again in the role of bulwark against extremist, anti-western forces.

King Hassan II’s success in curbing radical Islamist movements in his own country

made him a particularly useful buffer against such forces. The third reason was the

relative weakness of Polisario against Morocco (Pazzanita, 1994) because of the

ceasefire and the stalemate in the peace process, which clearly worked to Polisario’s

disadvantage – Morocco used that period to consolidate its position in the disputed

territory. The predominant view in diplomatic circles in Rabat was that King Hassan

would lose his throne if he lost the referendum. The fourth reason Morocco regained


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its importance as a US ally relates to Morocco’s role in US-led peace initiatives in

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, clearly showing that King Hassan could still play an

important part in supporting US strategic interests. Morocco has supported the

Middle East peace process and contributed armed forces to UN peacekeeping

missions in Bosnia, Somalia and elsewhere. A fifth reason for US support to

Morocco can be linked to the increase in free-market economic reforms, which

include large-scale privatization that coincides with American ideological goals.

These reforms have also made Morocco more attractive to US-based multinational

corporations.

US policy in Morocco seeks to safeguard the very old friendship and co-operation

with Morocco, which is still perceived as a stable state in the Maghreb region.

Support for Morocco in the US Congress is also significant, not least because

Morocco is also seen as less antagonistic to Israel. Rightly or wrongly, Morocco is

considered a privileged interlocutor in the search for a solution to the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict. In September 2003, for instance, King Mohamed VI, who succeeded

his deceased father Hassan II in July 1999, reaffirmed to Israeli foreign minister

Sylvan Shalom “Morocco’s attachment to a just, global, and long-lasting peace”,

hence expressing Morocco’s willingness to do everything it can in resolving the

conflict.6 It is Morocco’s position towards Israel and its pro-western orientation that

various American administrations have appreciated. Under the Clinton adminis-

tration, US officials gave high marks to the changes taking place in Morocco. Hence,

Edward Gabriel, US Ambassador to Morocco stated that, “with regard to Morocco,

we’re very excited about its democratic experiment. We in the US State Department

believe that Morocco probably is the best democratic experiment that currently is

going on in the Middle East”.7 President George W. Bush reiterated appreciation for

Morocco in April 2002, reaffirming during a conversation with Mohamed VI the

strong ties that bind the United States and Morocco and underlining the latter’s “long

history of leaning toward the West and the good alliance with the United States”.8

While it is true that Bush’s positive characterization of Morocco is part of

diplomatic discourse, one can still raise the question as to the type of democracy

Bush is referring to. Questioning Clinton and Bush’s description of Morocco as a

democracy is legitimate because the path to democratization in Morocco has been

rather arduous. Although attempts to address the rights of women and the adoption

of the new family law9 are praiseworthy, violations of human rights in Morocco10

and in occupied Western Sahara11 – which the US Department of State reports

yearly – are a reminder of Moroccan reality.

Clearly, the United States maintained the same policy vis-a-vis Morocco and the

Bush administration strengthened economic and military co-operation with the

Kingdom of Morocco. This co-operation was most conspicuous in the area of

antiterrorism. In December 2003, during his trip to the Maghreb region, including

Morocco, secretary of state Colin Powell restated US willingness to assist

Morocco at all levels. Powell expressed the administration’s satisfaction with respect

to the social, economic, and political reforms that Morocco has undertaken. King

Mohamed VI, for his part, did not miss the opportunity to emphasize the “extremely

touchy nature of the question of “Moroccan Sahara”” (read Western Sahara).


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The king also insisted on the necessity for dialogue between Morocco and its

neighbour Algeria in order to “reach a definitive solution conducive to the building

of the Arab Maghreb Union”.12 It should be noted, however, that despite the strong

support for Morocco, the United States refuses to recognize Moroccan sovereignty

over the disputed territory. In fact, the new free trade agreement between Morocco

and the United States “will cover trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as

recognized internationally, and will not include Western Sahara” (Zoellik, 2004).

This unambiguous stand allowed the FTA with Morocco to be approved by the

Congress.

In sum, US-Moroccan relations remain quite strong even though the old

perceptions of Morocco as a pole of stability in the Maghreb may be fading away.

The unmistakable rise of jihadism throughout the country, the Islamist suicide

bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, as well as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in

May 2004 perpetrated essentially by Moroccans, may induce a shift in the US

perception of Morocco as a stable country and generate greater interest in improved

relations with a stabilizing Algeria.

The Evolution of US-Algerian Relations

In spite of US steadfast support for Morocco and despite clashes over such issues as

support for national liberation movements, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Vietnam,

Western Sahara, Nicaragua, Cuba and Grenada, the United States and Algeria have

maintained pragmatic relations marked by mutual respect. Because of its

revolutionary credentials, Algeria held a position of leadership in the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and other international

organizations. Algeria’s principled views and their influence among Third World

countries disrupted western interests. Moreover, Algeria’s privileged political ties

with the former USSR, the West’s adversary, resulted in confrontation over regional

and international concerns with many western countries, the United States in

particular. In the early 1990s, suspicions that Algeria was developing nuclear

capabilities added yet another dimension to the importance of that country (Charef,

1994: 68-74). However, notwithstanding the ideological and political differences

that characterized relations with Algeria until the late 1980s, US policy makers

pursued a pragmatic policy that did not allow foreign policy clashes to undermine

advantageous economic relations. Substantial commercial interests, mainly in the

hydrocarbons sector, induced this pragmatism. Occasionally, this pragmatism also

stemmed from mutual willingness to find common ground on a number of political

issues, especially as they pertained to the Maghreb and the Near East, such as the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iran-Iraq war and the Lebanese civil war.

In the late 1990s, there were major developments in US-Algerian relations at all

levels, the best illustration being President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s official visit to

the United States in July 2001. In addition to the success of the policy of Civil Concord,

which the US strongly endorsed, Algeria had scored some other good marks in

Washington. Indeed, the US appreciated Algeria’s success in December 2000 in


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brokering an end to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.13 Algeria’s growing influence

within the OAU, coupled with the emerging axis of Algeria-Nigeria-South Africa,

impressed Washington. Furthermore, American policy makers are aware that resolution

of the conflict in Western Sahara is impossible without Algeria’s acquiescence.14 Even

with respect to the Middle East, Algeria’s influence is not negligible, which explains why

Washington has nudged Algerians to establish lines of communications with Israel. Last,

but not least, the US saw the necessity of co-operating with Algeria on matters of global

terrorism well before 9/11.

Security and Political Co-operation

The 9/11 attacks on the US brought Algeria and the United States closer, particularly

in regards to security co-operation. Algeria condemned unequivocally the horrific

attacks and agreed to join the US-led international coalition, although arguing that a

military coalition should be under the United Nations umbrella and not be aimed

against “a country, a religion, a people, a culture or a civilization”.15 From Algeria’s

perspective, the September events justified the government’s decade-long position

on the global nature of terrorism and its capacity to threaten states (El Moudjahid, 22

September 2002). Algerian authorities handed Washington a list of hundreds of

suspected Algerian militants on the run in Europe and the United States and offered

their co-operation in security and intelligence matters.

President George W. Bush invited President Bouteflika to go to Washington on 5

November 2001, a visit which, though focused on the issue of international

terrorism, was a great opportunity for the Algerian regime to improve its image

abroad. Undoubtedly, President Bouteflika’s objective in meeting with President

Bush was to convince the latter that US-Algerian relations should be strengthened

but also to persuade him that the fight against terrorism would be in vain unless the

roots are dealt with, that is, the poverty and inequality that, in his view, globalization

exacerbated. Thus, the US should help Algeria economically, perhaps transforming

the debt into investments, so that the country could regain its stability and eliminate

one of the sources of political extremism. Also high on the agenda was the question

of Western Sahara. Algeria argued that regional stability is impossible to achieve

without a resolution of that conflict.16 While Algerians did not receive support on

this issue, there is no doubt that Algerians obtained positive political results from the

visit: support for the antiterrorist struggle in Algeria, support for the OAU Algiers

manifesto on the fight against terrorism, condemnation of violent seizures of power

in Africa, and backing for Algeria’s present diplomacy in Africa and the

Mediterranean.17

Although co-operation in the area of antiterrorist struggle preceded 9/11, it has

been strengthened since that event. Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA)

have sought assistance from Algerians who have acquired valuable experience in

this domain.18 More importantly, although it will not sell Algeria lethal weapons,

the United States decided to provide Algerian security forces with effective

equipment to assist them in eliminating the remaining pockets of armed militants


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in rural areas.19 This decision is a logical result of the objectives stated in the

National Security Strategy 2002, which stipulates that: “We will continue to

encourage our regional partners to take up a co-ordinated effort that isolates the

terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we

will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial

tools necessary to finish the task” (United States, 2003).

In October 2003, William Burns made yet another visit to the Maghreb. The

statements he made during his two-day stay in Algiers is revealing as to the

evolution in Algerian-American relations. He declared that he was “very impressed

with the good development in many areas. Our bilateral relations never were so

strong in the last forty years [i.e., since Algeria’s independence] as they are today”.20

With respect to security and military co-operation, Burns stated that “the United

States supplied non-offensive military equipment to Algeria”, while emphasizing

that “military cooperation has witnessed continuous and stable growth”.21 Burns

acknowledged that co-operation between the two countries has been not only

“remarkable” and “of great value”, but that “Algeria’s assistance (to the United

States) helps in saving American lives and we are grateful”. As to the American side,

“we are doing our best to help Algeria put an end to the terrorist phenomenon which

has devastated Algeria for 10 years”.22

Shortly after Burns’ visit to Algiers, it was Colin Powell’s turn to go to the region

to discuss with Algerians issues of military co-operation and economic exchanges.

This was quite a change from the 1990s when the United States decided, following

the lead of other western nations, not to provide any military equipment to the

Algerian authorities, confronted with a savage guerrilla war. Undoubtedly, Powell’s

visit confirmed Algeria’s status as a credible partner in the region.

An analysis of US official documents, especially those from the National Security

Council, shows that the concerns that the United States had towards Algeria have

dissipated. Indeed, according to some news reports, the United States considers that

“Algeria’s instability is relative because there is nothing alarming about it; state and

society have resisted well and the zones of turbulence are fading away”.23

Undoubtedly, the geostrategic transformations that 9/11 caused have also

contributed to the strengthening of Algeria’s role in the Mediterranean.

Economic Cooperation

Economic relations between Algeria and the United States have also witnessed

considerable expansion. During President Bouteflika’s American visit in July 2001,

the two countries signed a Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment.

The accord put in place a consultative procedure on trade and investment that will

result in a bilateral investment treaty, mutual trade benefits and a double taxation

arrangement, and effectively opened up Algeria’s profitable oil and gas resources

more broadly to multinational corporations. The objective of the agreement was to

double the volume of exchanges and to allow US companies to take a greater share

of the Algerian market, especially in hydrocarbons – the US being currently the

largest investor in that sector. However, it seems that in recent years US businesses


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have become interested in other sectors than energy.24 Indeed, American businesses

are now investing in such hot economic sectors as finance, pharmaceuticals,

telecommunications and computers.

The new National Security Strategy of the United States (2003) document devotes a

large section to economics, entitled “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth

through Free Markets and Free Trade”, because “a strong world economy enhances

our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world”.

With respect to the Middle East and North Africa, the United States has devised the

so-called Broader Middle East Partnership Initiative (BMEPI), an “initiative (that)

strives to link Arab, US, and global private sector businesses, non-governmental

organizations, civil society elements, and governments together to develop

innovative policies and programs that support reform in the region”.25 In September

2002, US Commerce Deputy Secretary Sam Bodman visited North Africa, an

initiative which the US government described as “evidence of the commitment by

the Bush administration to a strong partnership of trade and investment with the

region and achieving the goal of integrating Egypt and the Maghreb into the global

economy”.26 The objective of such interest is obviously to create an integrated

Maghreb economy that is open to US and European investments. Therefore, the

support that the US government gave James Baker until his resignation in June 2004

should be seen within this context.

Clearly, in the eyes of the United States, Algeria has gained a new status, that of a

“friend of the United States”, which might also confirm its elevated status as a

“pivotal state”. The participation of President Bouteflika in June 2002 at the G8

meeting in Canada was probably not mere coincidence. Moreover, the creation in

July 2002 of an Algerian-American Business Council presided over by Albert

Zapanta and Richard Holmes is yet another sign of Algeria’s new standing in

Washington.27 Indeed, this organization has encouraged Algeria to look towards the

United States for business opportunities. Hence, in March 2003 Albert Zapanta

suggested that there was no need to wait for a Maghreb market: “Algeria first; then

the Arab Maghreb. The determination of Algerians to open a market of 30 million

consumers is stronger”.28

In the economic sphere, Algeria has great expectations from its relations with the

United States. However, in spite of a positive evolution, US investments outside the

hydrocarbons sector remain relatively small. Algeria’s instability in the 1990s partly

explains the low level of US foreign direct investments (FDI); but the sluggish

economic reforms, coupled with the infrastructural and bureaucratic hurdles, are

other important factors that have kept away US investors. It is also true, though, that

North Africa in general has an insignificant world share of FDI, estimated at $5bn

annually.

Algeria’s Diplomatic Role

Richard W. Erdman, American Ambassador to Algeria, has described Algeria as “an

important partner in the building of a world where peace, security, and democracy

can prosper”. He added that Algeria is a key diplomatic interlocutor in the Middle


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East, Africa, and the United Nations’.29 There is no doubt that US-Algerian relations

are consolidating, albeit at a slower pace than Algerians had hoped for. What is

remarkable, though, is how the US now describes Algeria. Whereas in the past,

American officials only emphasized Morocco as the country that recognized the

young American republic in 1777, they now acknowledge that Algeria, too,

recognized that republic early on, in 1795 and that Algeria has been helpful to the

United States in defeating global terrorism (Erdman, 2003).

For Algerians, better relations with the United States offer the possibility of

expanding their circle of friends around the world and to decrease their dependence

on the European economic sphere. The US is also willing to help Algeria integrate in

the process of globalization. Thus, during his visit to the Maghreb in October 2003,

assistant secretary of state William Burns underlined the fact that the United States

was providing technical assistance to Algeria in its negotiations with the World

Trade Organization, which constitutes a prelude to the creation of a free trade zone

(La Tribune, 31 December 2003).

The Maghreb as a Regional Entity in US Foreign Policy

In November 2003, George W. Bush insisted that Algeria and Morocco find

“creative and pragmatic ways to resolve their differences”.30 He announced that the

“United States is taking many important measures to strengthen its relations with the

kingdom (of Morocco), in particular measures aimed at developing economic and

military cooperation, as well as cooperation in the antiterrorist struggle. The US is

also about to grant Morocco the status of long-time ally”.

Clearly, the main objective for the United States is to develop in the Maghreb

close military, economic and security cooperation. American decision makers

believe that antiterrorist co-operation is in the best interest of all. An examination of

official statements, press conferences and documents shows that the US seeks to

develop economic partnership with the Maghreb through an acceleration of

structural reforms in each country, offering a greater role to the private sector, and

dismantling intra-regional barriers that hinder trade and investment. Furthermore,

Americans are also cognizant of the importance of oil and natural gas in the region.

In this overall context, marked by a rapidly changing environment in which the

US is seeking to implement a regional policy, the question of Western Sahara takes

on a new dimension because of the consequences that a non-resolution of the conflict

might produce. In particular, it is well known that the Sahrawi people practise a

moderate form of Islam and, despite their plight, have refrained from resorting

to terrorist actions. They have remained committed to the UN Settlement Plan

to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. This is precisely why an equitable resolution

is in the region’s best interests.

UN Security Council Resolution 1495 on Western Sahara

On 31 July 2003, the UN Security Council not only adopted Resolution 1495, which

endorsed the latest version of Baker’s plan, but the Council also established


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the enforceable character of the settlement plan on the two adversaries, Moroccans

and Sahrawis. To everyone’s surprise, both Algeria and Polisario accepted Baker’s

new plan, the so-called Baker Plan II, which was basically a modified version of the

“third way” with the notable addition of a referendum after a five-year transition

period. For Algerians, acceptance of this plan presupposes attachment to

“international legality” and support for the “UN Peace Plan”. For the Polisario

Front, the objective is to make every effort to avoid civil war. The Sahrawi

representative in Europe declared that: “the Polisario Front made the decision (to

accept Baker’s plan) as a logical and generous act to assure peace and reconciliation

with the Moroccan neighbour and the peoples of the Maghreb. We want the

Maghreb to be a sum of wills. It is unfortunate that Morocco did not seize the hand

we tendered” (Sidati, 2003). Morocco rejected Baker’s new proposal, declaring that

it was contrary to its “fundamental national interests and to peace and security in the

Maghreb region”.31

Since the inception of the conflict in 1975, Morocco has relied on France to

protect its interests (Zoubir, 1999: 207–208). With respect to the rejection of the

Baker Plan II, Morocco could once again count on France’s support. Indeed, during

his visit to Morocco, French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin confirmed “the

similitude of views and positions between Paris and Rabat concerning the question

of Western Sahara”.32 Furthermore, during his last visit to Morocco in early October

2003, President Jacques Chirac stated: “France wishes ardently a solution to the

(Western Sahara) conflict, which constitutes a barrier to the construction of a united

Maghreb. We defend a political solution... which takes fully into account Morocco’s

interests and regional stability”.33 For President Chirac, and most French politicians

for that matter, Western Sahara is an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco. The

French made it clear that they would use their veto power at the UN Security

Council should the UN decide to impose a solution that was not acceptable to

Morocco.34 Paris, which supported the United Nations in Iraq – in opposition to the

United States – demonstrates in this case that its foreign policy is deeply rooted in

realism. In this case, international law seems not to apply to what is classically

considered as France’s sphere of influence. Noticeable also is the fact that France

has taken a clear pro-Moroccan stance at a time when Franco-Algerian relations

have witnessed remarkable improvement.

What is interesting is that the US position as of late has been no less ambivalent

even though it fully endorsed the latest UN resolution. US officials such as William

Burns were careful to state that the US would “not impose a solution to Morocco or

any other party” (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 26 October 2003) and that the US remains

committed to the Baker Plan, as restated by William Burns during his latest visit to

the Maghreb.35 Yet, because of their friendship with Morocco, coupled with the

need to keep this country in the antiterrorist coalition, the US tries to soothe

Morocco’s fears by using a discourse that does not persuade Morocco to comply

with UN resolutions. Indeed, in a letter he sent to King Mohamed VI,

George W. Bush declared that he “understand(s) the sensibility of the Moroccan

people on the question of Western Sahara and would not try to impose a solution to

this conflict”.36


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Continuity in US Policy: Colin Powell’s Visit to the Maghreb

Colin Powell’s trip to the Maghreb in December 2003, underlined once again the

new dynamic in relations between the Maghreb countries and the United States.

However, it showed the preferential treatment of Morocco, which keeps its place as

an ally and friend of the United States, in opposition to Algeria, which must prove

itself worthy of US friendship. In addressing Algerians, Powell reiterated the

statements that Burns made in October 2003 that “never before had bilateral

relations been as good”, but he also reasserted US attachment to respect of human

rights, freedom of the press and free and transparent elections. According to Powell,

President Bouteflika displayed an extremely positive predisposition towards these

subjects. With respect to Western Sahara, though, Powell treated Morocco and

Algeria on an equal footing, calling on both Algiers and Rabat to initiate dialogue to

find a political solution that James Baker was trying carefully to get under way.37

Powell’s approach obviously overlooks Algeria’s long-lasting position that rejects

the conflict in Western Sahara as being a bilateral conflict between Algeria and

Morocco. Algerians have always rejected Morocco’s assertion that resolution of the

conflict should be negotiated between these two powerful neighbours. Although

Western Sahara is clearly part of Algeria’s national security, Algerian policy makers

argue that the conflict is the sole responsibility of the UN and outside the scope of

Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations. In a letter he sent to Kofi Annan on 3 August

2004, President Bouteflika unequivocally restated that position.38

A few points should be made about Powell’s trip to Algeria. Although secretary of

state Madeleine Albright had gone to Algiers in 2000, this was not an official visit;

she had gone to attend the signing of the peace agreement between Eritrea and

Ethiopia which the Algerians had brokered. Therefore, from an Algerian

perspective, Powell’s visit represented a sort of victory in that it marked the end

of the quasi-embargo that Algeria had experienced in the 1990s. The numerous visits

that high-level US officials have undertaken to Algeria have produced a deep

psychological impression. For Algerians, such visits mark not only an end to the

quasi-pariah status under which the country lived in the 1990s, but they also

vindicate Algerian diplomacy, whose motto in the 1990s was precisely that

terrorism was a global phenomenon against which Algerians warned the rest of the

world. Powell’s visit also comforted Algerian policy makers’ belief that Algeria is

indeed a strategic state that has generated rivalry between the United States and

France.39 Algerian diplomats, as well as public opinion (the media in particular), are

convinced of this competition between the United States and France in the Maghreb,

in general, and Algeria, in particular. This perception is so strong that it fails to take

notice of some harsh realities. Despite the undeniable advancement in Algerian-

American relations, such progress remains limited even in the domains of

“extraordinary co-operation” in security matters. While it is true that there is

considerable, tangible co-operation in the war on terrorism, there is no extradition

treaty between the two countries. Military assistance to Algeria is limited and

surrounded by conditions. Furthermore, this military assistance, limited as it were,

and insignificant compared to what the Moroccan neighbour receives, has taken


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forever to be delivered. Evidence shows that since the supply of night vision

equipment and other sophisticated materiel, the Algerian armed forces succeeded in

neutralizing armed groups before they could commit atrocities. The best illustration

is the foiling on 24 January 2004 of the armed bands of the Salafi Group for

Preaching and Combat (GSPC) – a group on Washington’s list of terrorist

organizations – in the Algerian desert, close to the border with Mali.40 Although

there has been talk about an American base in the Algerian desert to be built by

the National Security Agency for eavesdropping and surveillance purposes

(Le Quotidien d’Oran, 7 September 2003), Algerians are still reluctant to grant

Americans such a base. Algerians perceive the granting of military bases as a loss of

sovereignty. The Soviets had made great efforts to obtain bases in Algeria during the

Cold War; but Algerian officials never acceded to repeated requests. Here lies a

difference between Algeria and Morocco: while Moroccans have no objection to

granting military bases to the United States or to France, “Algerians have elevated

the notion of national sovereignty to the level of the sacred”.41

Conclusion

Although US-Algerian relations have improved considerably in recent years, there is

no doubt that the United States remains more sensitive to Morocco’s interests than it

is to Algeria’s, despite the importance of Algeria’s economic and political strategic

significance to US policy in the region. The main reasons are historical, ideological,

political and military. Indeed, the misperceptions caused by US support to France

during the Algerian war of independence and post-independence Algeria’s support

for national liberation movements were considerable. In fact, Algeria’s radical

foreign policy had such an impact that “the image of Algeria’s becoming a second

Cuba was frequently evoked in US policy circles” (Quandt, 1972: 114). From then

on, the perception in Washington was that Algeria was the “bad guy”, contrary to

Morocco and Tunisia which were viewed as the “good guys” (Anderson, 1988: 169).

Unlike Morocco, perceived as a key ally in blocking Soviet penetration in the

Maghreb, US policy makers perceived Algeria as a friend of the Soviet Union. The

argument in this article is clearly that the perceptions and images that US officials

built during the Cold War have not died out. As seen earlier, this point was

reasserted in Baker’s interview in August 2004. In many ways, the misperceptions

accumulated by both Algerians and Americans for decades provide a partial

explanation as to why US-Algerian relations are still marked by a degree of

hesitation. Furthermore, regardless of its “new pragmatism” in world affairs, Algeria

will still clash with the United States over foreign policy issues, especially those

pertaining to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to the Western Sahara, simply

because Algerians’ historical experience overlaps with Palestinian and Sahrawi

nationalisms. Thus, regardless of the imperatives dictated by political realism,

Algerians cannot simply reject values, such as support for self-determination, that

make up their own identity.

The question of Western Sahara sits on the geopolitical chessboard as a peripheral

“low intensity” conflict. Nonetheless, this conflict is marked by complex relations


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among various actors and has international implications. Indeed, Morocco’s refusal to

abide by the latest UN resolution could have unpredictable consequences for the

region. Resumption of military hostilities would ignite the entire region, thus ruining

any hope to establish a free trade zone, at a time when perspectives for economic

integration seem so near. The vehement Moroccan reaction to South Africa’s

recognition in September 2004 of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a case in

point. The Moroccans were so displeased with that decision that they blamed Algeria

for being the instigator of Morocco’s misfortunes in Western Sahara. The current

tension between the two neighbours resembles the near-war situation of the 1970s.42

But, the current status quo is frustrating for US hegemonic power only to the

extent that the current imbroglio has prevented the emergence of an integrated

market. Thus, one can only concur with Daniel Volman, a keen observer of US

foreign policy in Africa that:

US Policy makers don’t care at all how the Western Sahara turns out or

whether international law is respected, except to the extent that the situation

has an impact on the stability of the Moroccan monarchy and efforts to

promote regional economic development. From their perspective, current US

policy doesn’t cause any real problems for US relations with Algeria and the

only real issue, from their viewpoint, is the impact that a continued stalemate

will have on Morocco, compared to a settlement that allows for the possibility

that the Sahrawis will be allowed to vote on a referendum that will lead to the

Western Sahara becoming an independent state. So long as they are convinced

that the current situation is better than the alternatives and so long as they

don’t have to pay any price for allowing the impasse to continue, policy isn’t

going to change.43

While the status quo brings comfort to the United States, the conditions of the

Sahrawis in the refugee camps have become tragic. The sooner this conflict is

definitively resolved, the faster genuine Maghreb integration process could begin.

Once the conflict is resolved in a fair manner, the possibility for the United States to

balance its interests in the region will be better served in a Maghreb that is more

stable, economically prosperous, and where co-operation rather than conflict is the

norm.

Notes

1 Further published information on the Eizenstat Initiative is available in Eizenstat (1999b).2 According to Chase, Hill, and Kennedy (1996: 37), “a pivotal state is so important regionally that its

collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and

so on. A pivotal state’s steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its

region’s economic vitality and political soundness.”3 http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/sahara/transcript.html (accessed 22 August 2004).

National Public Radio (PBS, USA), 19 August 2004: former US Secretary of State and former

Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Western Sahara, James A. Baker III, discusses the

protracted conflict in Western Shara with host Mishal Hosain.


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4 Sixteen non-self-governing territories, including Western Sahara, remain on the Committee’s list.

Quotation from UN Press Release SG/SM/9155-GA/COL/3091, 11 February 2004.5 In the Houston Accords, both Morocco and Polisario agreed to fulfil their commitments concerning the

identification process, repatriation of refugees, prisoners, detainees and confinement of their respective

troops, as well as the code of conduct for the referendum campaign. They also agreed that the

United Nations, as stipulated in the settlement plan, “is required to organize and conduct a referendum

that is free, fair and transparent and free from all constraints, both for participants and accredited

observers.”6 Rabat participera au dialogue entre Israeliens et Palestiniens [Rabat will participate in the dialogue

between Israelis and Palestinians], Le Matin du Maroc, 2 September 2003.7 US Embassy in Israel.8 “Le president Bush recoit Mohamed VI, le roi du Marco, a la Maison Blanche”, Rapport, 23 April

2003.9 The Moroccan Parliament adopted the Law on Reform of the Family Code – known as Mudawana –

on 23 January 2004. The Mudawana aims at consecrating “judicial equality between man and woman”.10 “Although there was important progress in some areas, the human rights record remained poor in other

areas. Citizens lacked the full ability to change their government. . . There were deaths in police

custody. Impunity remained a problem. Authorities, at times, arbitrarily arrested and detained persons

. . .”, United States Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Morocco 3,

released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 25 February, 2004

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27941pf.htm).11 The same country report on human rights (see note 10) states that: “Political rights for the residents of

Western Sahara remained circumscribed. Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly

and association remained very restricted in the Western Sahara. . . The civilian population living in

the Western Sahara under Moroccan administration was subject to Moroccan law. Sahrawis had

difficulty obtaining Moroccan passports. UN observers and foreign human rights groups maintained

that the Moroccan Government monitored the political views of Sahrawis more closely than those of

other groups, and that the police and paramilitary authorities reacted especially harshly against

those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario. Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/

rls/hrrpt/2003/27941pf.htm.12 S.M. le roi recoit le secretaire d’Etat americain, M. Colin Powell, [H.M. the king welcomes the

American Secretary of State], Le Matin du Maroc, 3 December 2003.13 Secretary of state Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake, Clinton’s special envoy, attended in Algiers

the signing ceremony of the peace agreement between the two warring countries.14 In the interviews conducted by Zoubir (see References), US officials have frequently asserted, “With

respect to Western Sahara, we will do nothing that would alienate Algerians.”15 “Editorial”, El Moudjahid, 22 September 2001.16 Zoubir’s interviews with high officials following Bouteflika’s trip to the United States in November

2001.17 Miloud, D., Bouteflika-Bush, au-dela d’une rencontre [Bouteflika-Bush, beyond a meeting], Le

Quotidien d’Oran, 7 November 2001.18 Mounir, B., Visite d’une mission americaine a Alger – Le FBI, la CIA et la NSA sollicitent le DRS,

[Visit of an American mission to Algiers – the FBI, CIA, NSA solicit the DRS], Le Quotidien d’Oran,

10 February 2003.19 Weisman, S. R., US to sell military gear to Algeria to help it fight militants, New York Times, 10

December 2002.20 Lokmane, S., Presidentielle 2004. Ce que Washington veut. . . [2004 presidential election, What

Washington wants. . .], Liberte (Algiers), 26 October 2003.21 Debbouz, K., Le secretaire d’etat adjoint aux affaires de l’Afrique du Nord et du Proche-Orient etait

hier a Alger, [The Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and North Africa was in Algiers

yesterday], Le Matin (Algiers), 26 October 2003.22 H.B., Burns se prononce sur la prochaine presidentielle, [Burns gives his opinion on the next

presidential election], Le Jeune Independant (Algiers), 26 October 2003.


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23 Faycal Oukazi, La crise algerienne dans les rapports ultra secrets americains. L’instabilite politique est

due aux conflits d’interets, L’Expression, 4 December 2003.24 US Encourages Opening of Algerian Economy, Deputy secretary of commerce Bodman’s Press

Conference in Algiers, 25 September 2002. Available at http://usinfo.state.gove/xarchives/display.

htm?p=washfile-english&y=2002&m=September&[email protected].

893008E-02&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html.25 http://mepi.state.gov/ (accessed February 2004).26 http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/2002_Releases/Sept_20_Bodman_trip.htm (accessed 2003). This is

no longer available.27 Z.S., En presence de Chakib Khelil a Washington – Naissance d’un Conseil des affaires algero-

americain, [In the presence of Chakib Khelil in Washington – founding of an Algerian-American

Business Council]. Le Quotidien d’Oran, 24 July 2002.28 Bouakkaz, S., “Le developpement du marche algerien ne passe pas forcement par celui du Maghreb,

[The development of an Algerian market does not necessarily wait for the Maghreb market]. Le

Quotidien d’Oran, 6 March 2003.29 Le nouvel ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, l’Algerie est un partenaire cle, [The new US Ambassador,

Algeria is a key partner]. El Moudjahid (Algiers), 26 July 2003.30 George Bush appelle le Maroc et l’Algerie a faire preuve de creativite et de souplesse pour regler leurs

differends, [George Bush calls on Morocco and Algeria to be creative and flexible to resolve their

differences]. Associated Press (AP), Rabat, 20 November 2003.31 Samil, A., Solution de compromis pour le Sahara occidental, valse d’hesitation marocaine,

[Compromise solution for the Western Sahara, Morocco’s hesitancy]. El Watan (Algiers), 2 August

2003.32 Abdoun, M., Sahara-ONU-Plan Baker II, Paris defie Washington, [Sahara-UN-Baker Plan II, Paris

challenges Washington]. L’Expression, 27 July 2003.33 Entretien accorde par le President Jacques Chirac a l’Agence Maghreb Presse, [Interview granted by

president Jacques Chirac to Agence Maghreb Presse], Liberation (Morocco), 10 October 2003.34 Tuquoi, J. P., Paris soutient le Maroc, Washington affiche sa neutralite au sujet du Sahara occidental,

[Paris backs Morocco; Washington displays its neutrality on Western Sahara]. Le Monde, 6 November

2003.35 Mounir, B., William Burns a Alger – La Preference americaine, [William Burns in Algiers –

American preference]. Le Quotidien d’Oran, 26 October 2003.36 Agence France Presse (AFP), Rabat, 19 November 2003.37 Aıt-Hamadouche, L., La tournee de Colin Powell au Maghreb: Alger, escales a interets variables,

[Powell’s visit to the Maghreb, stopovers with uneven interests]. La Tribune (Algiers) 6 December

2003.38 Bouteflika: toute tentative d’inscrire le probleme du Sahara occidental dans un contexte algero-

marocain est un procede purement dilatoire, [Bouteflika: any attempt to include the problem of

Western Sahara in an Algerian-Moroccan context is doomed to failure]. Algerie Presse Service (APS),

3 August 2004.39 Oukaci, F., Lutte d’influence franco-americaine en Algerie, [Franco-American rivalry for influence in

Algeria]. L’Expression, 9 February 2005.40 Mounir, B., L’ANP intercepte un important arsenal. Coup de filet spectaculaire dans le desert, [The

ANP seize an important arsenal]. Le Quotidien d’Oran, 3 February 2004.41 The author owes this point to Louisa Aıt-Hamadouche, an Algerian researcher and journalist in a

private communication. This observation is accurate; it reveals some of the fixations that Algerian

policy makers inherited from the War of Liberation against France.42 See Memorandum of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Regional Dispute on the Sahara, dated 24

September 2004, addressed to Kofi Annan. The document was published by the Moroccan official

news agency, Maghreb Arabe Presse. Available at http://www.map.co.ma/mapeng/home_dep/

full-text-memorandum260904htm. The Algerian Permanent Representative to the UN responded to

Morocco’s Memorandum at the UN Fourth Commission on 7 October 2004. The harshest rebuke to

Morocco’s accusations was published in the Algerian government’s news agency Algerie Presse


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Service under the title, Algerie-Maroc: une veritable hysterie secoue le Makhzen, APS, 10 October

2004. Morocco raised the spectre of war in the region; Algerians dispelled Moroccan accusations of

Algerian troop movement along the border. See, L’Algerie dement officiellement un renforcement de

troupes a la frontiere – Alger tente de calmer un Maroc sur le pied de guerre, [Algeria denies officially

any strengthening of troops along the Algerian-Moroccan border – Algiers seeks to calm Morocco on

the brink of war]. Le Quotidien d’Oran, 14 October 2004.43 Daniel Volman, personal communication with the author, 27 May 2004.

References

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at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/20736.htm.

Hernando de Larramendi, M. & Lopez, B. (2004) Nouveau elan diplomatique au conflit du Sahara,

Afkar/Idees, Available at http://www/afkar-ideas.com/4/fsumari.php.

Hocine, T. (2002) Sahara–Occidental/clarifications espagnoles, El Watan, 24 July.

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Zoubir, Y. (1987) Soviet policy toward the Western Sahara conflict, Africa Today, 34(3), pp. 17–32.

Zoubir, Y. (1995) US and Soviet Policies toward France’s struggle with anti-colonial nationalism in North

Africa, Canadian Journal of History/Annales d’Histoire Canadiennes, 30(3), pp. 439–466.

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Newspaper Articles

Hafida, H., Cooperation Militaire Algero-americaine – Le GSPC Dans La Ligne De Mire [Algerian-

American military cooperation – the GSPC targeted], L’Expression, 17 February 2004.

Bouslimani C., L’Algerie entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis, l’annee de tous les enjeux [Algeria and the

United States, the year of all stakes], La Tribune, (Algiers), 31 December 2003.

Oukazi, F. La Crise Algerienne Dans Les Rapports Ultra Secrets Americains. L’instabilite Politique Est

Due Aux Conflits d’interets [The Algerian crisis in the American ultra-secret reports. The political

instability is due to conflicts of interests], L’Expression (Algiers), 4 December 2003.

Mounir, B. Une Station d’ecoute Americaine a Tamanrasset [An American eavesdropping station in

Tamanrasset], Le Quotidien d’Oran, 7 September 2003.

Interviews

Zoubir’s regular interviews with Algerian officials, Algiers, Washington, DC, European Capitals.


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the united states and the north african imbroglio: balancing interests in algeria, morocco, and the...

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