The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for the Stakeholders

Syed Adnan Ali Shah BukhariS.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Contents

• Importance of Afghanistan & Pakistan• Non-State Actors in the Af-Pak Theatre• Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan• Policies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and US-NATO• Conclusion

Non-State Actors

• The Two Taliban• Insurgency not monolithic, but united against

a “common enemy”• Religion-driven with an ethnic undercurrent,

but attempts by Taliban to downplay ethnic identity

US COIN Operations• Insurgency on the rise – “un-winnable war”,

“headed for failure”;• Operation “Moshtaraq” in Marjah, Helmand (Feb

2010)• Operation “Dragon Strike” in Kandahar (Sept 2010)• Lack of public support to COIN operations – 94%

Kandaharis opposed military confrontation with the Taliban – April 2010 (Inter-Press Service)

• Failure to deliver a “government-in-a-box”

FATA & NWFP2006

FATA & NWFP2008

Pakistan’s COIN Operations

• Pakistan’s COIN Strategy: “Clear, hold, build and transfer”

• Three Phases:– To encourage local population out of the area, clear the

area and maintain long-term presence;– Rebuild and restore basic amenities/infrastructure– Encourage the IDPs to return back; strengthen local

government; raise tribal Lashkars and safeguard the cleared area;

– Undertake economic development

Cont’d;

• Terrorist infrastructure destroyed; training camps, means of finances and recruitment largely affected due to military operations;

• Failure to contain conflict within the area of operation – Subsequently Taliban leadership remains evasive;

• Internally displaced persons refuse to return back to their native areas for fear of Taliban return and retribution (SECOND PHASE);

• Local governments remain weak and largely dependent on Pak Army to run day-to-day affairs;

• Economic development still a pipe dream and recent floods tend to take the focus away from FATA to flood affected areas (THIRD PHASE);

The Three Stakeholders• Main players – Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO• Other important players: Iran, CARs, Russia, India,

S.Arabia and UAE• Centrifugal forces at work; major disagreements

between Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO;• Afghanistan government largely failing– Corrupt and unable to provide even a semblance of

governance– Losing legitimacy – the presidential and parliamentary

elections– Karzai clan-dominated government , with strong

commercial interests

Cont’d• Major differences over the execution of war with US• Afghanistan emphasizes on CT instead of COIN –

pursue the terrorist sanctuaries outside Afghanistan;• Domestic opposition from non-Pushtuns regarding

peace overtures to the Taliban;• US-NATO in a Catch-22 situation;• International failure to stabilize Afghanistan• Reconstruction and rebuilding remains nominal on

the ground despite spending around $40 billion (IRIN March 2010);

Cont’d;• Total Cost of Afghan war from 2001-2010 is $336

billion (CRS-Sept 2010). The cost earmarked for war in 2010-11 is $65 billion

• $27 billion spent on raising Afghan National Army (ANA)

• Desertion/defection rate in ANA remains at roughly 23 percent and Afghan National Police at 17%;

• US and NATO under domestic compulsions to initiate withdrawal of troops

• Differences on CT and COIN

• US exasperation with Pakistan “ambivalence” over sanctuaries on the Af-Pak border;

• Pakistan’s descent into political, economic and social turmoil continues;

• Taliban-led violence in Pakistan spreading upto Karachi

• Differences over approach to the Afghan solution – with whom to talk and whom to boycott?

Cont’d:

• Attempts to drive a wedge between various insurgents in Afghan theatre;

• India as a factor, containment of China through not allowing establishment of railway and road structures