afghanistan imbroglio

Afghanistan Imbroglio: Implications for Pakistan's Tribal AreasWritten by {ga=imtiazgul}

Policy Perspectives , Special Issue Afghanistan, 2008 Abstract [Pakistans Tribal Areas have continuously been accused of harboring Taliban and Al Qaedaremnants after the US led coalition ousted Taliban regime in late 2001. Pakistani security forcesare engaged in military operation in the area while, occasionally, allied forces based inAfghanistan, have attacked the local tribesmen and alleged foreign militants. Pakistan faces apolicy dilemma. It is a tough decision to go for an all-out war against its own territory as lossesfrom both sides have been colossal even in the limited operations. However, Islamabad remainsunder pressure to do more, being a part of international coalition. The tribal people not onlysuffer because of lack of basic necessities and draconian laws but are also being sandwichedby three-pronged war involving Pakistani, coalition forces and militants. The US led internationalcommunity is ignoring the fact that while Pakistan has suffered a lot in War on Terror, theresponsibility to prevent the militants from intruding into Pakistan has not been shared equallyby the Afghan government, and the coalition. The situation calls for taking into consideration apolitical approach rather a military action, besides taking due care of the development needs ofthis impoverished territory. Editors] Introduction The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) comprise one of the important geo-strategicparts of Pakistan. Lying adjacent to the countrys north-western border with Afghanistan, thisregion is inhabited by the proud Pashtun tribes, which have a long history of resistance againstinvaders such as the British Imperialists in the nineteenth century, and, more recently, theSoviets during their invasion of Afghanistan. Covering approximately 27,200 square kilometers, FATA is divided into seven regions, oragencies, called Khyber, Khurram, Bajaur, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Mohmand andOrakzai. Together, these agencies have an estimated population of 4.55 million, which ismulti-ethnic and comprised of numerous tribes. Constitutionally, FATA is a special region of Pakistan; while most of the rest of the country isgoverned by provincial governments under the Pakistan Penal Code, FATA is governed directlyby the federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations.The legal and governance system for FATA is over a century old and draconian; it denies basichuman rights to the people of FATA and has prevented the region from partaking in thesocioeconomic development that the rest of Pakistan has seen. Since the incidents of 9/11, and particularly after the resurgence of the Taliban in 20032004

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against foreign troops in Afghanistan, FATA has become a focal point for the internationalcommunity. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accuse thepeople of FATA of providing shelter and support to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Numerousoperations have been conducted in FATA, both by Pakistans own military forces and by AlliedForces from Afghanistan. These forays have not only wreaked significant collateral damage, buthave also triggered profound anti-government and anti-US sentiments. As the Pakistanigovernment struggles to regain the loyalty of FATAs people, it is also confronting accusationsthat it is deliberately not doing enough to stem the support from FATA to militants inAfghanistan. This article takes a closer look at the sort of criticism that has been leveled against Pakistan forthe role it has or hasnt played in assisting the US-led Allied Forces in the war againstterror in Afghanistan. It next looks at the measures the Pakistan government and military haveactually taken, and the costs these steps have entailed. The article then provides a briefdescription of the people at the center of the FATA crisis the local tribal communities outlining those historical, political and socio-cultural aspects of their lives which, on the onehand, make it difficult for them to make clear-cut choices about friends and foes, and on theother, limit the capability of the Pakistani government to take them along in its decision tosupport the US-led Coalition. Finally, recommendations are presented for addressing thelongstanding problems of FATAs people and thereby finding a lasting solution to the issue oftheir role in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. FATA under Fire FATA has been in the eye of a storm since the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan inDecember 2001. Accused of providing shelter and support to Taliban and al-Qaeda operativesfrom Afghanistan, local tribesmen have been embroiled in a war of attrition with Pakistanisecurity forces, and to a limited extent, the US-led Allied Forces in Afghanistan. In recent years,scores of military operations, insurgent attacks and sniper shootings have left a long trail ofdeath and destruction in the region. Little insight is available on some of the major and controversial operations that have beenconducted in the area. While these were mainly conducted by the Pakistani military, a few werealso executed by the Allied Forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military establishment hasalways claimed that none of the Allied Forces operations were conducted without their priorknowledge, but the facts on the ground tell a different story; international laws and rules,diplomatic norms and established military procedures of cooperation between two forces havebeen violated. Many a times, operations in FATA were executed by American forces alone,evoking strong reactions. The backlash has had to be borne by the Pakistani military in the formof suicide bombing attacks, the targets of which have ranged from one of the militarys safestbases in Tarbela to buses transporting defense forces personnel.

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Pakistan and its army are in a quandary: since FATA is a part of the federation, it cannot be thecenter of an all-out military operation; at the same time, being an active member of the US ledcoalition against terrorism, Pakistan cannot afford to look the other way when FATAs residentsare accused of supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This is especially important given thatTaliban forces in Afghanistan have often shown their prowess against the weak, uncommittedand disorganized Afghan National Army. Nonetheless, the failure to maintain law and order and security in Afghanistan gets connected tothe disorder in FATA. FATAs people are paying the price of being sandwiched between localmilitants, the Pakistani military and Allied forces in Afghanistan. By the end of 2007, this disorder and threat to international peace was not showing any signsof abating. Currently, the region remains under tight international scrutiny for al-Qaeda andTaliban activity, and Pakistan- and US-led operations continue to be carried out against theseelements and their sanctuaries. Allegations against the Government of Pakistan From the beginning of the Karzai era in Kabul, there have been numerous occasions wherePakistan and Afghanistan have spit fire at each other for not doing enough to control terrorismin their respective territories. On December 13, 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai singledout Pakistan as the trouble-maker, saying I tell Pakistan to stop its animosity towards theAfghans and the Pashtoons. He added In reality, these (suicide) attacks are a message fromthe Pakistani government to scare us. On a different occasion, Karzai complained that theproblem in Afghanistan is not Taliban; the problem is with Pakistan. If the difficulty withPakistan is resolved, then the question of the Taliban will go away automatically. Although Pakistan, being the provider of logistical support to the US and Allied forces, hassuffered a great deal of violence since the beginning of the Karzi government in Kabul, theinternational community and intelligentsia across the world see Afghanistan as the only suffererand Pakistan, the only perpetrator. It is very noteworthy that the former US intelligence chief,John Negroponte, called FATA a main source and center of terrorism at a Senate IntelligenceCommittee hearing on January 11, 2007, conveniently ignoring that while Pakistan was makingconsiderable efforts, government in Kabul has failed to share its responsibility in thisconnection. In the same hearing, he added that Al-Qaeda terrorists are cultivating strongeroperational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders securehideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.

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Negroponte conceded that Pakistan as a frontline partner in the war on terror had capturedseveral al-Qaeda leaders, but alleged it remained a major source of Islamic extremism andharbored some top terrorist leaders. Negroponte added that eliminating the haven extremistshave found in Pakistans tribal areas is not sufficient to end the Afghan insurgency, but isnecessary. This statement amounted to a public indict-ment of the state and government ofPakistan, flying in the face, especially, of President Musharraf, who has long been perceived asWashingtons blue-eyed boy. President Musharraf has had to rebut such claims on more than one occasion with the reminderthat controlling terrorism in Afghanistan is as much the duty of the US-led forces and the AfghanNational Army as the Pakistan Army. While there is little doubt that there have been nearly4,000 deaths because of the Taliban activities in Afghanistan, the body count in Pakistan hasalso risen sharply. However, the international community appears to be deaf to these facts, and continues tosuspect the sincerity of Pakistans involvement in the war against terror in the region. Tracingthe long trail connecting global terrorism with militants based in Waziristan, one of the FATAagencies, most foreign experts and observers see Afghanistans growing insurgency as aconsequence of Pakistani weakness, if not outright complicity, with militants in the Pashtunborder areas. Allegations to this effect abound in the mainstream Western media and in thereports of various think tanks. In a testimony before a Congressional Committee in early October 2006, a leading Americanexpert on Afghanistan, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University, stated: The universalconsensus on the Afghan side of the border, among Americans, military and civilian, amongEuropeans, military and civilian, and Afghans, military and civilian, is that the headquarters ofthe Taliban are in fact in Pakistan. Newsweek also said in one of its investigative reports that In Ghazni and in six provinces tothe south, and in other hot spots to the east, Karzais government barely exists outside districttowns. Hard-core Taliban forces have filled the void by infiltrating from the relatively lawlesstribal areas of Pakistan from where they fled at the end of 2001. Once back inside Afghanistanthese committed Jihadi commanders and fighters, aided by key sympathizers who hadremained behind, have raised hundreds, if not thousands, of new local recruits, many for pay.

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The Economist, too, made similar comments in its early October 2006 edition, saying: Waziristan is now a regional magnet. In the past six months, up to 1,000 Uzbeks, escaping thecrackdown in Uzbekistan after last years massacre by government security forces in the townof Andijan have found sanctuary with al-Qaeda in Waziristan. The magazine added that all these fighters had found a safe sanctuary in FATA along withelements that are extremely close to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As if this were not enough, the British intelligence leaked a secret report to the BritishBroadcasting Corporation (BBC) hours before President Musharraf landed in London inmid-October 2006, claiming that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was secretlyproviding support to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The leaked document said the West had turneda blind eye to the indirect protection of al-Qaeda and promotion of terrorism by ISI. The memoalso called for dismantling the ISI and ending army rule in Pakistan. President Musharraf did not hide his reactions and, upon returning to Islamabad, disclosed tothe international media that two joint intelligence centers were operating in both Quetta andKabul, which were manned by officers of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (MI-6) andISI. If the insurgents were having such a free ride, he said, it meant that CIA is not doing its jobwell. This was by far the most direct response to such allegations in the Western media. Itastonished many analysts and observers, especially given the importance of keepingintelligence cooperation discrete and secure. The Council on Foreign Relations, a reputed US think tank, also questioned the solidity ofPakistans involvement in the international cooperation against terrorism and said that Pakistanwas not doing enough to come down hard on militants in its territory. Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation wrote that Pakistan is the only word that couldbe used interchangeably with the Taliban insurgency. He added that Not one senior Talibanleader has been arrested or killed in Pakistan since 2001. Pakistani forces in the predominantlyPashtun north do little to disrupt the cross-border flow of Taliban insurgents, clamp down on thecross-border drug trade, and rein in the most radical Madrassas in the region.

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The paper also quoted the US Institute of Peace report as saying that Since the US-ledinvasion in 2001, Pakistan has become the chief sanctuary for remnants of the Taliban regimethat previously governed Afghanistan. Some 30 members of the Talibans top leadership,including supreme leader Mullah Omar and the groups 10-12 member Shura Council, arebased in Pakistani strongholds, mainly Quetta, Miranshah and Peshawar. Over the past few months, the Pakistani government has finally taken a slightly moreaggressive stance vis--vis the allegations coming from Afghanistan and the internationalcommunity. It has emphasized the need to further strengthen cooperation between nations andtheir militaries, as well as reciprocity of action from all of the involved countries. To determine whether the allegations against Pakistan hold truth or reflect a bias, two aspectsneed to be considered: firstly, the measures the Government of Pakistan has taken sinceDecember 2001 to assist Allied Forces in the war in Afghanistan, including the costs of thesemeasures; and, secondly, the factors within FATA that make this region the hot spot it is today.These facets are discussed in the following two sections. Pakistan as a Frontline Partner in the War on Terror Pakistan agreed to cooperate with the United States in its war in Afghanistan in six areas: itallowed the United States to fly sorties from the south over Pakistani airspace, which was vitalbecause of Irans unwillingness to open its airspace to US planes; it granted US troops accessto select Pakistani military bases, on the condition that the bases would not be utilized foroffensive operations; it provided the force protection of tens of thousands of Pakistani troops forthese bases and for US ships in the Indian Ocean; it provided logistical support to the US wareffort, including vast amounts of fuel for coalition aircraft and port access for the delivery of vitalsupplies; it deployed its own military to its western border in a mostly failed effort to cut offretreat for al-Qaeda and Taliban members fleeing Afghanistan; and, finally, Islamabad providedWashington access to Pakistani intelligence assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bulk ofthis cooperation continues today through the special investigation cell set up at the ISIheadquarters in Islamabad, comprising of ISI and FBI officials, and through at least four regionalcells in Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore. Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001, most of the retreating AfghanTaliban and their foreign friends headed for Pakistans tribal areas, particularly North and SouthWaziristan, both of which share a very long and inhospitable border with Afghanistans Paktiaand Paktika provinces. These provinces also provide relatively safe, vastly unguarded routesthrough Balochistan to Iran and the Arabian Sea. The author was told in North and SouthWaziristan that a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda stalwarts, like Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeeri,

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Ramzi bin al Shaiba, and Abu Faraj al-Libi, transited through Wana (South Waziristan) andMiranshah (North Waziristan) during their journey through Balochistan to Karachi and somedestinations in the Gulf. Some chose to remain in Pakistan. Pakistan began deploying troops in FATA soon after the US-led Allied Forces seizedAfghanistan after ousting the Taliban in December 2001. During their flight from Afghanistan, alarge number of alleged foreign al-Qaeda operatives about 300, according to official claims were killed in several encounters with Pakistani security forces in and around the Waziristanregion. Many others were captured. Pakistan has currently deployed about 80,000 troops and set up close to 1,000 posts along theborder with Afghanistan. Of these, about 100 are located in North Waziristan alone, with veryhard terrain and conditions. By mid-March 2007, suspected Taliban had executed at least 75 people in FATA on charges ofespionage for the US or Pakistani government. More than 200 pro-government tribal elders andseveral dozen government officials, including intelligence operatives, had also been killed.Nearly 1,000 Pakistan army and para-military troops have fallen to militant attacks. About a hundred operations have been conducted in FATA by Pakistani as well as US troopsbased across the Durand Line in Afghanistans Paktia and Paktika provinces. Many of theoperations were carried out in South Waziristan. The first of these, conducted near Wana,inflicted heavy losses on the Pakistan army. Until then, some 230 foreigners had been arrestedwhile crossing the border and handed over to the United States. On December 1, 2005, the Pakistan military forces attacked a village outside North Waziristan,killing a leading al-Qaeda figure, Hamza Rabia. On January 13, 2006, a similar raid wasconducted on the Damadola village in Bajaur in search of Dr. Zawahiri. The worsening situation embedded in strong resentment among tribesmen eventually forced thegovernment into the September 5, 2006 peace deal with the militants. This was seen as aface-saver for the Pakistani government, while the international community, particularly theUnited States, took special interest. On more than one occasion, Washington clearly expressedits discomfort with Pakistans decision to go soft on the militants in FATA. While President

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Musharraf boasted this deal as according to the culture of the areas, its results have beensomewhat disappointing, as the continued fighting in FATA and attacks in settled districts onPakistans defense forces continue. It also seems that the United States has tired of waiting forthe deal to yield fruit. Shortly after the peace deal, a strike was made on the Zamazola village in Bajaur on October29, 2006, which tragically left about 83 students dead. In mid-December, 2006, a large group of infiltrators crossed into Afghanistan from this area andwere attacked by NATO forces. About 130 of the militants were killed, a US commanderreported. Several more were killed when Pakistani forces attacked the remaining infiltrators asthey fled back to Pakistan. Pressure for a Change in Strategy Despite its efforts, the world continued to suspect Pakistans will in the war on terror. Officialsand tribal journalists familiar with the situation confirmed that the Waziristan region had turnedinto a Taliban state after the September 2006 peace deal between local authorities, tribesmenand militants in North Waziristan. As a result, the Pakistani military had abandoned broad-scalemilitary operations in favor of negotiated peace deals with the militants over the past two years. The pressure to change this situation began shortly after the US general elections gaveDemocrats a numerical majority, with which they began questioning the unquestioned USsupport for the Musharraf government. Vice President Dick Cheney was, in fact, one of themany US bigwigs to descend on Islamabad to display their displeasure over the Pakistani effort.Before him, the CIA chief, Robert Gates, and US Secretary of State Condolizza Rice had cometo Islamabad with the same message. As if to confirm Americas worst fears, the Taliban lefttheir latest calling card a suicide bomber at the gate of the mighty US Air Force base atBagram, near Kabul, shortly after Mr. Cheney arrived. Over 20 people were killed, including anAmerican and two foreigners. This kicked off another round of Pakistan-bashing within andoutside the United States. Many Pakistani policymakers termed this a mindless approachtowards a common problem and said that conveying diplomatic concerns via the media willnot help. At this stage, American military and intelligence officials were of the view that despite heavymilitary and economic assistance, Pakistan lacked sincerity in the anti-terror war and was moreinterested in retaining its Taliban proxies to undermine the Coalition war against al-Qaeda and

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destabilize Afghanistan. Unlike President George W. Bush and his state department officials,such critics both within the establishment and outside had a different yardstick to measurePakistans performance: the results of the more than 10 billion dollars provided to Pakistan inaid. Resumption of US aid to Pakistan had followed the latters agreement to extend support to theinternational Coalition soon after the 9/11 attacks. According to some reports, by March 2007,57 percent of the $10 billion had gone toward Coalition Support Funds, which are intended toreimburse US partners for their assistance in the War on Terror. Roughly 18 percent, or $1.8billion, had gone toward security assistance, mostly on purchases of major weapons systems.Another 16 percent has gone toward budget support as direct cash transfers to the Governmentof Pakistan with few real accountability mechanisms built in. This left less than 10 percent fordevelopment and humanitarian assistance, including the US response to the catastrophicOctober 2005 earthquake in Northern Pakistan. As a result of its agreement to deploy almost 80,000 troops along the 2,460-kilometer borderwith Afghanistan, Pakistan also became one of the four countries that receive budget supportfrom the United States. Earlier, only Israel, Egypt, and Jordan had enjoyed this source offunding. Washington also helped Pakistan in raising 12 new wings of the Frontier Corps (FC) in theprovince of Balochistan, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, as well as a fewadditional wings of FC in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for additional security alongthese borders. Reportedly, the United States also plans to raise more of the FC unitscomprising of tribal youth, to create more job opportunities for FATAs people along withensuring stronger security. The New Strategy By March 2007, over five years since Pakistan entered into the international Coalition againstTerrorism, history had moved almost full circle; a few weeks after Vice President Dick Cheneyslate February (2007) visit to Islamabad, accompanied by leaks through the Pentagon and theFederal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) that Cheney delivered a tough message to PresidentGeneral Pervez Musharraf doing more in the tribal areas as well as pave way for fullrestoration of democracy, the Waziristan region once again sprang into the internationallimelight. Journalists based in the Waziristan region say a rift had emerged between a local commanderand Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in November 2006, and both the military as well asintelligence agencies leapt to exploit the growing differences between locals and foreign

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militants. The latter were accused of criminal activities like extortions and murders to which theyhad resorted for their survival in the ever-narrowing space available for them. Local elders alsoalleged that rather than fighting foreign troops in Afghanistan, the Uzbek militants preferred totarget pro-American Pakistanis, whether tribal elders or government members. Early in March, a tribal lashkar (army of local tribesmen) mounted a jihad against foreignmilitants still hiding in the region. The target was Sheen Warsak, Azam Warsak and Kaloosha small forested hamlets situated south of Wana, the administrative headquarters of SouthWaziristan where al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, predominantly of Uzbek and Afghan origin,were dug in. After several weeks of bloody pitched battles and skirmishes beginning, Pakistanarmy officials reported that the tribesmen had turned the tables on foreign militants; thecommander of the Pakistani troops in the tribal areas, Major General Gul Muhammad, claimedthe tribal army had put down up to 200 foreign militants. Although the numbers of fatalities reported by both sides conflicted, it had become clear by theend of this period that the Pakistan army, which had been hamstrung by sniper attacks andambushes, and suffered heavy losses in the Waziristan region since March 2004, did play amore crucial role in these latest operations than was acknowledged. Although the controversialSeptember 2006 deal with militants in North Waziristan had provided a face-saver to the army,its problems had never ended, and it had been forced to work on like-minded tribesmen led byMaulvi Nazir Ahmed, known for his close links to the Afghan Taliban and Arab members ofal-Qaeda. With these tribesmen, the Pakistan army had eventually engineered the lashkar, andthis became the face for the armys renewed assault on Uzbeks and Arabs in the Waziristanregion, which had remained perilous and practically out of bound even for Pakistanis. Foreignjournalists are also not permitted to visit the tribal areas, except a few selected ones understrictly controlled visits. We did provide them support, there was no way around it, said a major general. He admittedthat army sharp-shooters and strategists were part of the lashkar. Following the assault by the lashkar, military and paramilitary forces moved in swiftly to occupystrategic hilltops and ridges in areas like Sheen Warsak, Kaloosha and Tora Gola that had, untilmid-March 2007, been in the hands of militants.

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The operation gave the Pakistan military control over most parts around Wana, and MajorGeneral Gul Muhammad said the progress made in clearing the area of foreign militants, mainlyUzbeks and other Central Asians who have been allied with al-Qaeda, would serve as a modelfor similar actions in the rest of the region. But the fact that foreign journalists saw the vacated areas, Azam Warsak and Sheen Warsak,from a distance of several kilometers from a military-controlled hilltop, also explained theauthorities predicament; they were not sure whether the hamlets were clear of miscreants(This is the term Pakistani military officials invoke to denote al-Qaeda and Taliban militants). On April 12, 2007, the New York Times noted that The military has now set upon a third way totackle the problem of militancy in its tribal regions, backing local armed tribesmen who haveturned against the foreigners and their local protectors. Officials dealing with the tribal areas at the militarys General Headquarters (GHQ) inRawalpindi said the lashkar operation was part of a new strategy comprising three elements,i.e. coercive deployment, political engagement and socio-economic development, to win overthe hearts and minds of the people. A More Lasting Solution So far, aid from the United States has been utilized primarily to strengthen Pakistans militarycapabilities. However, it is unlikely that this exclusive concentration on raising the armed wingsof paramilitary forces will end the problem of terrorism and extremism in FATA. The fact is thatterrorism or extremism are only the tip of an iceberg of poverty and deprivation; lack of social,political and economic stakes; and the resultant disappointment and disenchantment. TheUnited States, particularly, needs to address the root causes of the growing extremism in FATAby engaging in a long-term commitment to not only alleviate the issues of poverty, deprivationand ignorance but also provide the necessary structural development to build the stakes andinterests of the common people. It is certainly a welcome sign that the United States announceda development and aid package worth 750 million US dollars for the next five years, which is tobe spent on the development of social and technical capacities in FATA through the creation oftwo Reconstruction Opportunities Zones (ROZs). However, this will not be a simple path to tread. The hostile image of both the Pakistani militaryand the United States in this region makes it difficult to undertake any positive developmentwork that might enable the local people to think differently. The high level of hostility in the

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region was exhibited recently in North Waziristan when medicines, food and other supplies sentby an American NGO to ensure the health of women and children in the area were burntpublicly on the orders of local Taliban leaders. Given this social hostility against anything US, itmay be imagined that asking the local people to participate in US-sponsored social andstructural development will be an uphill task. The Pakistani government also has much at stake. The large number of recent suicide attackson government installations and public places in Pakistan underscores how those being huntedare ready to die for what they perceive as a holy cause. This is certainly a dangerous situationthat needs creative socio-political management. The chances of success would be higher if development on the ground is preceded by an effortto make hearts and minds more receptive. The United States and Pakistan should considerusing modern means of communication to reach out to ordinary people in the region andgradually lead them away from a doctrine of hatred towards a life of possibilities. Even this willbe a long haul and demand effort and commitment. However, it is an inevitable undertaking.The return to normalcy in FATA is in the interests of Pakistan, the United States, and the worldcommunity. The following section describes the peculiar social, cultural and political setup of FATA and thecomplexities that the Pakistani government as well as the United States have to take intoaccount in their effort to secure the cooperation of the local people in ridding the area ofterrorism. What Makes FATA Different and Difficult FATA has been governed by a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)since the British colonial rulers brought it under their control in 1890. Following numerous failed attempts to capture and tame the tribes living in this region, Britishcolonialists drew a border called the Durand Line in 1893, which is still disputed. Thus, sincewell before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, this area has been treated as a special territory forgovernance and management: a central distinguishing factor is the principle of collectiveresponsibility, wherein the entire locality and tribe is considered responsible for the criminalactions of its individuals.

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Social Codes The local social practices are regulated by strong and entrenched customs and traditions thatare based on centuries-old dogmas, beliefs and practices. The four key sources of these are Pashtunwali, melmastia (hospitality and protection), riwaj (tradition), and badal (revenge). Pashtunwali is the Pathans tribal code of social conduct. Melmastia, the second mostimportant component of the Pakhtun honor code, makes it incumbent on local people to extendhospitality and protection to guests. This can go to embarrassing proportions; if an enemy gainsentrance to his foes house, he can even claim asylum from the host. Riwaj is a mixture of Islamic and local principles for the conduct of day-to-day affairs. In thecase of inheritance, riwaj supercedes the Islamic injunctions. Finally, badal representsthe local concept of revenge, which is to be sought regardless of the cost or consequences.This is considered an obligation on an individual or family that has been insulted or injured. System of Governance In 1901, British Viceroy Lord Curzon created NWFP as a new province and enforced a revisedversion of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) which had been in force there for more than adecade. The system comprises of three parties: the Political Agent, the Malik and the tribesmen. ThePolitical Agent is the pivot of the entire administrative setup in the tribal areas. He representsthe federal government and serves as a bridge between the local people and the government.He is in charge of the tribes within the agency, and administers justice in accordance with localand tribal customs, without directly interfering with the domestic affairs of the tribes, which areregulated by tough unwritten codes of conduct or, more appropriately, codes of honor, keyelements of which have been outlined above. The sanctity and invability of this code of honor ischerished by the local people above all else. Someone has aptly said, Frontier Tribes are

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implacable enemies should anyone violate their code of honor: Swift and merciless is thepunishment that descends on the transgressor. The second most important pillar of governance and control are the 35,000 or so tribal eldersand notables, who in turn act as a bridge between the political agent and their respective tribeswhenever the situation demands. Malik is the title that the government confers on them againsta symbolic currency denomination like One Rupee or Five Rupees. The Frontier Crimes Regulation The FCR introduced the concept of collective responsibility in FATA, which was applied for thedistribution of wrath and favors in the region by the federal government. Thus, the law does notdistinguish between the individual, family, locality and tribe. An individual act is taken to be theact of the entire local group. Under this arrangement, the government agreed to allow thepeople of FATA to carry on unlawful activities, such as, gunrunning and drug smuggling; inreturn, the tribesmen were expected to refrain from attacking or undermining the federalgovernments authority. As a result of this policy, the areas became dens of crime andsanctuaries for criminals and fugitives from other areas of the country. The Frontier Crimes Regulation is, in many ways, a draconian law. In Section 38 (4), it gives thelocal administration right to cause the death of a person against whom those portions of theFCR 1901, which are not of general application, may be forced. By permitting the killing ofsomebody found guilty of a heinous crime, the law opens the door to genocide. I find no parallel in any other existing law, which legitimizes the use of undue force as a normaladministrative measure. It is the presence of this inhuman clause of law, which is responsiblefor there being no inquiries for the violence of the state apparatus against its own people, saysKhalid Aziz, a former Political Agent who retired as a chief civil servant and now runs a researchinstitute. Then, Section 38 (I) gives the right to privately arrest anyone suspected of an offence under theFCR. This is a much abused provision today; influential Maliks sometimes use it against weakeropponents. Under Section 21 (IV), once the Political Agent has determined that a person or tribe is hostile,

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he may choose one of five terrible options: - the seizure, wherever they may be found, of all or any of the members of such a tribe andof all or any property belonging to them or any of them; - the detention in safe custody of any person or property so seized and; - the confiscation of any such property; and may, with the like sanction by publicproclamation; - debar all or any members of the tribe from all access into British India; and - prohibit all or any persons within the limits of British India from all inter-course orcommunication of any kind whatsoever, or of any specified kind with such tribe or any sectionsor members thereof. Under Section 31, tribesmen cannot set up any settlement or undertake construction within 5miles of any district of Pakistan. Under Section 32, if a village or habitation is found dangerous on military grounds, it has to beremoved. No hujra (village male guest house) can be constructed or used as such without theapproval of the Political Agent under Section 33. Under Section 40, the Political Agent can ask any one to provide security if it is determined byhim that this would prevent murder or sedition. If the person made responsible fails to do so orthe Political Agent finds the securities inadequate, the responsible person may be imprisonedfor three years. This period of imprisonment can be extended to six years, and it is for thePolitical Agent to decide whether the imprisonment is to be simple or rigorous. It is tragic that the FCR treats a tribesman as almost sub-human. Under Section 38 (4), atribesman may be killed and no questions asked. No judicial oversight is permitted, since thereis a bar to the jurisdiction of superior courts. The Political Agent and his associates can wreakhavoc with the lives of individuals by either throwing them in jails on mere suspicion; penalizingthem heavily; or imposing heavy fines on the entire tribe (in case of a crime in their area) underthe principle of collective responsibility. To complicate matters, the administration has beenenabled to enter the honor code of Pashtunwali, and has thus opened itself as a possible partyagainst which badal can be exacted. On the other hand, the FCR makes no allowance for the local norm of melmastia. If a tribesman

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or clan has provided refuge to a guest, the law permits the government to demand that theyrenege from their commitment to protect him. If they comply, however, their honor would bedeemed tainted. Therefore, the FCRs construct is of such a type that the Pathan is alwaysforced to resist. And when he does so, he must be punished. Although it has been over a century since this law was proclaimed, it is conveniently forgottenthat it was basically meant to control people in FATA like slaves, and not to serve them ascitizens. This practice of control continued even after Independence, and despite many claimsand promises by various governments, the region remains in need of a serious uplift andassurance of an honorable life. With such a discriminatory political dispensation, it is sheer navet on the part of Islamabadand the world community to expect the results that would be realistic in established and settledsocio-political systems. Essentially, FATA and FCR amount to anachronisms in this cyber age;they represent a system designed by colonial rulers to suit the circumstances of more than acentury ago. Khalid Aziz asked on one occasion: In which civilized country is the use ofexcessive force permitted against its people? Perhaps the Pathans are children of a lesserGod! The anguish reflected in this comment was not merely about ethnicity; it was about ahuman rights issue. In the context of the ongoing war in terror, what needs to be borne in mind is that the FCR, byits very nature, is bound to evoke hatred and violence among the people of FATA. It fuels the badaltendencies of the Pathan. In the long run, it weakens the state rather than strengthening it.Today, perhaps more than ever before, it is critical that the federal and NWFP governmentsunderstand the need for change. FATAs Perspective on the War on Terror When their centuries-old social codes and profound political deprivations are taken into account,it becomes easier to understand the hostile reaction of FATAs people to the US-led crackdownagainst al-Qaeda and Taliban. One would have to be blind or an eternal optimist to believe thatthe local people could simply forgive and forget when their loved ones become mere statisticsunder the euphemism of collateral damage. It would be more realistic to expect them to hatethose responsible and to seek revenge. A tribal friend told this author during a visit to Wana in April 2004: Even our brother wouldnt

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know if we wanted to conceal something. This was Allah Noors reply when he was asked whythe political and military administration could not figure out who was taking shelter where. AllahNoor had told the author on another occasion that most of the tribesmen, beingultra-conservative and traditionalists, were loath to the idea of betrayal. Similar opinions were expressed by a tribesman in Miranshah, as Muslims and Pashtoons,people were willing to sacrifice a lot for their honor and dignity, and these had been threatenedon both sides of the Durand Line after the American invasion. He referred to scores ofstatements from Islamabad which spoke of terrorists and their hosts. Most of FATAs people are staunch believers in Islam and have a strong commitment to theircode of conduct and honor. They are unable to reconcile with the new perspective in whichyesterdays heroes, the mujahidinor Taliban who drove out the Soviet invaders, are now beinghunted down as terrorists. Repulsed by the urban pragmatism reflected in Pakistans policy changes, disliking America,and shackled under an oppressive political and legal system, FATA has seen risinganti-government and anti-military sentiment, and some people have resorted to providingshelter and even ammunition to the militants. Interviews with tribesmen, including educated ones, bring to light the following main lines ofthinking: - You might eliminate or arrest terrorists but the Islamic faith runs deep in the tribalsociety, which has been kept backward and ignorant by the administration for its own vestedinterests. - The tribal people are straightforward, averse even to the thought of betrayal, andstrangers to pragmatism or enlightened moderation. For them, al-Qaeda means standing upto the United States as staunch Muslims, and Pashtoonwali demands that brothers undersiege must be protected. - Importantly, the above sentiment does not necessarily translate into direct and activesupport of Taliban or al-Qaeda. People are generally wary of incessant government pressureand the continued army presence in the border areas, and ask why tens of thousands peopleshould suffer for the alleged crimes of a few dozen?

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FATAs people hold al-Qaeda followers in esteem, but privately concede they would do otherMuslims a great favor by moving out or abandoning their mission to save the common tribalpeople from the wrath of the government. Fear of reprisals also deters the common people fromconfronting the al-Qaeda/Taliban militants, who have begun knocking at the doors of biggercities like Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi. Numerous suicide attacks in these citiessince mid 2007 and the heightened state of security there underscores the new realities inPakistan, i.e. that Pakistan is much more dangerous today than it was before joining theinternational coalition against terrorism in September 2001. It was in this context that former governor of the NWFP, General Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai,told the author in February 2007 that the tribal people have been treated like caged monkeysfor too long and We are responsible for their plight today.General Orakzai possesses athinking mind and has served in both military and civilian capacity in the tribal areas. Being fromthe tribal areas himself, he understands not only the plight of FATAs people but also the rootcauses and reasons for the militancy that has had such a long-term negative effect on theregion and its people. Multiple factors are aggravating the overall situation in FATA, the most basic being thePashtoon tribal codes that require a brother to stand by another in times of need, a Pashtoonmilitant told the author in early 2007. Whether any power in the world agrees or not, thePashtoon factor in the matters of power sharing in Afghanistan has been terribly compromisedover the past few years. President Hamid Karzai is himself a Pashtoon, but a clear majority ofthe Pashtoons in Afghanistan do not own him as one of us; he continues to be seen as anAmerican puppet, installed to undermine the Pashtoon right to share power in Kabul. WhenPashtoons are attacked from both the Pakistani and the Afghan side, militants on both sides ofthe Durand Line are bound to unite to face the two common enemies: Pakistan and the US-ledcoalition. Given the cultural, historical, tribal and economic ties between the people living onboth side of the border, the problem of infiltration and mutual cooperation between the warringTaliban and al-Qaeda elements is bound to continue. While Pakistan needs fresh approaches to address the issues and problems in FATA,Afghanistan and the US-led Coalition also need to look into the gaps in their political policyregarding the war against insurgents. Tribal militancy is a coherent, socially accepted andreligiously motivated phenomenon. It can never be rooted out with the use of force alone. Moreneeds to be done. The Need for a Political Process Although the government did sign a peace deal with tribesmen and militants in North Waziristan

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in September 2006, and made a similar arrangement in Bajaur in April 2007, these belatedmoves did little to control the damage that had already been done. They could not bridge thegulf created between the tribesmen and the authorities by the latters attack in late October2006 on a seminary in Bajaur Agency, followed by a couple more such attacks that left over ahundred alleged militants dead. This mistrust has been exploited by activists supporting theTaliban and al-Qaeda. Real political reform should have followed the surgical search and surveillance operations inthese areas in the aftermath of the Taliban defeat. By not integrating these areas into thefederation, Pakistan squandered a golden chance for transforming FATA. On May 12, 2007, a tribal jirga (a traditional Pushtoon gathering) representing the sevenagencies of FATA was held in Peshawar and demanded an independent council to legislate forFATA. We, the representatives of the tribesmen, cannot legislate for their areas. We represent them inparliament. We could formulate laws for the whole of the country except FATA, therefore, theestablishment of an empowered legislative council for FATA is inevitable, SenatorHameedullah Jan Afridi was reported as saying. James Dobbins, a former US envoy to the Afghan Northern Alliance, also offered an interestingperspective as well as advice on how to handle the situation in and around FATA. In March2007, presenting testimony before the US Senates Foreign Relations Committee, he requesteda deeper study of NATO and US policies towards Afghanistan and the role of Pakistan: We need to address the question that if America, Europe and India can be legitimatelong-distance players in Kabul, why not Pakistan, which is directly in the firing line of theblowback from Afghanistan? This will require greater Pakistani input into how to cobble a newAfghan political system and state that is adequately represented ethnically and is friendly toPakistan without being a Talibanised state. Second, America and NATO will have to expendresources in nation-building and on creating stakeholders, not just in Afghanistan, but also inthe tribal areas of Pakistan to woo people away from radicalism and extremism. Third, Americaand the international community will have to actively support the revival of democracy andmainstream politics in Pakistan urgently so that a greater national consensus can be developedon integrating it with the global economy and stopping it from sliding into widespreadanti-Americanism, religious extremism and consequent isolation.

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If this democratization isnt accomplished in Pakistan while the moderate and mainstreamparties still have roots in the masses, extremist religious groups will fill the vacuum of oppositionpolitics. Should that happen, Pakistan will degenerate like much of the Muslim world, ruled bymilitary-monarchial oligarchies in which the fundamentalists are constantly trying to break downthe gates of the failing state. In the event, al-Qaeda will have the last laugh. As Dobbins rightly pointed out, Pakistans tribal areas particularly the Waziristan region are at a crossroads. With the right combination of domestic and international policies, the regioncan become a bridge between Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Central Asia together with otherborderlands. But poor handling of the crisis and policies based on expedience and opportunismmight well backfire and result in large-scale instability. Although the tribesmen are resilient andwarlike, for the moment, external influences are determining their destiny. Mere lip service totheir problems will not do; nor will promises of development in which, in any case, the actualbeneficiaries may be only a few individuals, including the political administrators and some verysenior officials. It must also be noted that people in FATA are now looking forward to being treated as equalcitizens and not as pawns in the great game alone. Political involvement of ordinary people willcertainly ensure the cultivation of long-term social, political and economic stakes in the system,and this will eventually help the society to slip out of the clutches of those extremists andelements who want to keep the people tamed, ignorant and backward. High-handed handling of the chivalrous tribesmen might undermine their allegiance to the stateof Pakistan. It might not only deliver many of them into the hands of Pashtoon nationalists butalso expose them to the religio-political ambitions and goals of violent pan-Islamists. In thissituation, even if they are small in numbers, the peoples ability to keep the region embroiled inconflict in the form of the sort of low-intensity guerrilla warfare being witnessed in Waziristan,for example would ensure that the authorities are continually challenged. The leadership needs to act swiftly and listen, not to a few thousand bureaucrats and their tribalcronies, but to the aspirations of the majority of the five million people who yearn for theabolition of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations, and an end to their treatment assub-humans controlled by authorities through laws over a century old. It is time the anachronismof FATA was removed, and the inhabitants of this area were invited to lead honorable lives ascitizens of Pakistan.

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References Financial Times, London,December 14, 2006. BBC Online, January 11, 2007. The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007. The Friday Times, Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006. Newsweek, October 2, 2006. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/29/2006-09-29_pakistans_spies_aid_qaeda_brits_print.html. Accessed on 24/12 /2007 When all else fails, call a Jirga. The Friday Times. Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/12/news/pakistan.php http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/09/F5D5ECBF-B8E1-4EAE-BBB9-251CFACDAC16.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007 http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/10/931B0F7E-DD44-4707-A3C5-2B3F67B57D2D.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007

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New York Times, February 21, 2007. Authors interview, April 10, Rawalpindi. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/15/business/tribal.php#end_main,27/12/07 Khalid Aziz. Paper read at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conference, February2006. Senator Hameedullah Jan Afridi, Daily Times, May 13, 2007. Financial Times, December 14, 2006. BBC Online, January 11, 2007. The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007. The Friday Times, Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006. Newsweek, October 2, 2006. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/29/2006-09-29_pakistans_spies_aid_qaeda_brits_print.html.accessed on 24/12/2007 When all else fail, call a Jirga, for the writer, The Friday Times, Lahore Issue: October 6-12,2006. Ibid.

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http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/12/news/pakistan.php http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/09/F5D5ECBF-B8E1-4EAE-BBB9-251CFACDAC16.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007 http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/10/931B0F7E-DD44-4707-A3C5-2B3F67B57D2D.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007 New York Times, February 21, 2007. Press briefing near Wana South Waziristan, April 1, 2007. Authors interview, April 10, Rawalpindi. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/15/business/tribal.php#end_main,27/12/07 Khalid Aziz, paper read at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conference, February2006. Khalid Aziz. Allah Noor was gunned down along with another journalist, Amir Nawab, in early 2005. Senator Hameedullah Jan Afridi, Daily Times, May 13, 2007.

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