the uk and the joint strike fighter: an acquisition programme in crisis?

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The two decades since the end of the Cold War have seen signifi-cant changes to both the civilian and defence aerospace sectors. The civilian market has become dominated by the US-based Boeing

Corporation and the European consortium of Airbus, while the defence market, although slower with regard to its pace of consolidation, has seen both mergers and acquisitions. For example, Lockheed and Martin Marietta merged in 1995, while McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in 19972. The defence sector is still dominated by companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Thales and BAE Systems, but this rationalisation,

The UK and the Joint Strike Fighter: an Acquisition Programme in Crisis?Peter D Antill and Pete Ito from Cranfield University’s Centre for Defence Acquisition (CfDA), based at the Defence Academy of the UK, examine the progress of the F-35 programme and suggest that the UK Government still has some difficult decisions to make in the future

in conjunction with the ‘peace dividend’ sought by most countries in the West, has resulted in a diversion of resources away from defence.

On top of that, weapons systems have become ever more sophisticated, and therefore expensive, meaning smaller and smaller numbers from each successive generation can be afforded. Within this environment, both countries and companies have been looking at opportunities to cooperate and/or collaborate, with the US Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF) programme hav-ing eight partner countries, at least three export opportunities and a wide range of national defence-industry participation. This article looks at the UK’s involvement, the problems that have been encountered, the difficul-ties in predicting the JSF programme development with regard to cost and schedule, the risk inherent in UK Minsitry of Defence (MoD) decisions, and the policy options available to the UK going forward.

The F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation fighter offers both opportunities and risks for those involved in the programme

“The Joint Strike Fighter will be the world’s premier strike platform beginning in 2008 and lasting until 2040.”1

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The broader origins of the JSF lie in the NATO studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, which posited that its airfields in western Europe would be major targets for any Warsaw Pact attack, meaning that any airfield so hit could well be put out of action until substantial repair and clearance work could be effected. Thus, there was a drive to develop an aircraft that could land and take off using very short distances or vertically, therefore being able to use almost any flat piece of ground. The major problem was cost3, with only the two generations of Harrier and the Yak-38 being brought into service.

The JSF’s immediate origins lie in a number of programmes that arose during the 1980s and 1990s that were designed to replace a large number of legacy systems operated by the US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC), and, by extension, a large number of allies who also operated these systems. These programmes included the Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL, 1983-94), Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) Strike Fighter (1987-94), Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF, 1993-94), Multi-Role Fighter (MRF, 1990-93), Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA, 1983-91), Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF, 1990-91), Advanced-Attack/Advanced/Fighter-Attack (A-X/A/F-X, 1992-93) and the Joint Advanced Strike Technology ( JAST) programme4. It was found that the objectives behind the ASTOVL, CALF and JAST programmes were

well aligned (the eventual production of a high-tech, STOVL strike fighter useable by all three services that use fast jets), and so the programmes were amalgamated in October 1994 to become the JSF programme. The UK, being involved in both the ASTOVL and CALF programmes in order to find a replacement for the Harrier, remained involved with the project.

The JSF programme takes shapeThe programme was set up with a tough mandate – to develop a highly capable, supportable and affordable aircraft that would be used by all three services to nominally replace aircraft originating in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the F-15, F-16, A-10, F-117, A-6 and AV-8B5. Requests for Proposals (RfP) were issued to three of the four teams that had been involved with the CALF studies, these being led by Boeing, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, on 22 March 1996. The three teams put forward three different, innovative designs and submitted bids for the $2.2 billion Concept and Development Phase (CDP)6, but it was Boeing and Lockheed Martin that were selected to go forward on 16 November 1996, receiving $718 million and $667 million respectively to build two full-scale flying demonstrators over a period of 51 months.

A $96 million multi-year contract was awarded to a team led by General Electric (including Allison Engines and Rolls-Royce) to develop an alterna-tive engine, as Congress was concerned over the lack of competition in that area (Pratt & Whitney had been selected to build the primary engine7). Finally, on 26 October 2001, it was announced that Lockheed Martin had

Not only was the JSF programme designed to be multi-service, it was also international in character

won the CDP and would go onto the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase – later renamed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase.

Not only was the programme designed to be multi-service, it was also international in character, as it not only enhanced the programmes overall chances of survival, but was also important for both operational (enhanc-ing the interoperability of equipment with allies) and economic (increased foreign sales would lower the aircraft’s unit costs) reasons8. International participation in the programme has not varied greatly until recently, with the eight partner nations being at either Level I (UK), Level II (Italy and the Netherlands) or Level III (Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark and Canada), which also determines the amount of influence that a country has within the programme itself. Countries are also able to join as a Security Cooperation Participant (SCP) and buy the aircraft as foreign military sales, and these include Singapore, Israel and Japan9. The UK is the only Level I participant in the SDD Phase, contributing over $2 billion10.

Early problemsGiven that the programme involves cutting-edge technology, multi-service and multinational collaboration, on top of international industrial involve-ment, problems were always going to emerge. One of the earliest difficul-ties involved industrial work share. For smaller nations, such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, collaboration had already worked with the F-16 European Co-Production Contract, signed on 7 June 1975, in which the


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three countries collectively ordered 348 aircraft11, and many saw it as a way to break into the US defence market, something that has been difficult in the past12. However, while all the partner nations had signed up to the principles of best-value resourcing, it quickly became apparent that many were unprepared for what that meant in practice. Even though the whole reason behind the programme was to reduce development times, reduce unit costs and fully integrate industry into the supply chain, so that the latest Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology is incorporated into the design, it was quickly realised that many of the partner acquisition struc-tures (especially the European partners) were still rooted in defined work share agreements arranged at the inter-governmental level13.

During the first few years of the SDD Phase, it was clear that the JSF Program Office was sticking quite rigidly to the industrial participation rules and the concept of best-value resourcing. Even so, only a small percentage of the total contracts awarded had been to non-partner nations such as Japan, Germany and Israel, which worked out (by 2003, for example) at $44 million out of a total of $14 billion awarded14. Of the partners, the Canadians proved to be clear winners with a return of around 4,000%15, while the UK reaped 24.2 per cent of the contract awards with an outlay of 6.2 per cent of the developmental costs16.

As could be expected, such a huge disparity eventually led to complaints, especially from Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Turkey. Lockheed Martin, responsible for balancing partner expectations against programme goals, also had to ensure that the requirements of international politics

were met in order to secure continued support for the programme, and so resorted to an increasing use of ‘strategic best-value sourcing methodol-ogy’, which allows for a certain number of contracts to be placed in partner countries where contract awards have not met national expectations.

Secondly, there has been criticism of the US Government’s unwillingness to share sensitive technology – a promise that was made at the start of the programme17. Even Lockheed Martin commented that this was a major issue as it entered negotiations for the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Phase, which was backed by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO)18. For the UK, this was also linked to its access (or lack thereof) to the millions of lines of software coding that controls the aircraft. This issue first arose to prominence in late 200419, was suppos-edly settled after it was escalated to the Prime Minister-Presidential level in 2007 (which also saw the signing of the US-UK Defence Cooperation Treaty), but spectacularly reignited towards the end of 2009 when the Reuters news agency20 conducted an interview with Jim Schreiber, head of international affairs at the JSF Program Office, in which he revealed that the US would indeed keep the codes all to itself, saying that “nobody’s happy with it”, a situation that was also reported to Congress21 and as yet, has not been clearly resolved to the partners’ satisfaction.

Thirdly, and clearly linked to the above, has been the operation of the US Export Control and Technology Transfer Regime, embodied in the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). While most countries expect the US to protect its most cutting-edge military technology, what

The Royal Navy has reverted to the F-35B variant, which requires ramps on the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, as seen in this illustration



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may not have been appreciated in Washington, DC (until recently) is the degree to which the regime has been harming other countries’ desire to collaborate with the US, for if “the United States and the UK, the two closest of allies, are unable to overcome the continuing obstacles to the efficient sharing of defence-related technologies, what hope is there for broader transatlantic defense industrial and technological cooperation?22”

The Pentagon itself has recognised the damage that is being done to US defence and security interests, calling the regime “a relic of the Cold War” that “must be adapted to address current threats”23. One study indi-cated that almost every interview conducted highlighted “US defense trade controls as a ‘barrier’ significantly impeding transatlantic cooperation24”. The problem generated four key concerns, these being the impact on operational sovereignty, any reliance on ITAR-controlled systems generat-ing risks of schedule delays and cost increases, re-export restrictions, and the complications that the regulations generate for multinational facilities. There was even evidence of a move to design around components subject to ITAR regulations starting to have an adverse impact on US subsystem and component suppliers25.

Stumbling onIn the move towards Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full-Rate Production (FRP), a major problem has turned out to be concurrent devel-opment. The US Department of Defense (DoD) could procure almost 400 aircraft, at a cost of around $54 billion, before the final phases of flight testing are complete in 201426. Compounding this risk is the move to speed up validation of F-35 components by replacing a large percentage of flight tests with simulations, desk studies and the use of a flying software test bed known as CATBird. Such a rush to build new aircraft before the test air-craft have flown a significant amount of test flights has led to cost increases as additional problems have been found and have had to be fixed over a larger and larger number of aircraft, rather than testing and modifying a small number of aircraft and then incorporating those solutions into a final production design.

Another factor that is likely to affect costs are changes to the planned quantities that customers decide to buy, which are dependent on any increases in unit cost. In a time of recession, pressure on the West’s defence budgets has been severe, along with (for some) a rise in operational com-mitments overseas. Given the rapid pace of production, any changes to the overall number to be manufactured could have a substantial impact. Despite the programme being set up to counter the effects of defence infla-tion that has plagued the procurement of major weapons systems since the Second World War, changes in the numbers to be produced between 2001 and 2009, as well as increases in the cost of labour and certain mate-rials and programme delays due to technical problems, contributed to a rise of 38 per cent in the JSF’s unit cost27.

Current estimates have increased even further to well over $100 mil-lion, with a total programme cost approaching $400 billion28. The result of this was that the DoD had to inform Congress on 26 March 2010 that the programme had committed a ‘Nunn-McCurdy’ breach, detailed in the yearly Selected Acquisition Report, released by the DoD on 1 April 201029. This relates to what is known as the Nunn-McCurdy Provision contained within the 1982 Defense Authorization Act that requires the DoD to certify to Congress that, once a programme has passed a certain cost threshold, it is still vital to national security. Such certification was signed by the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Ashton Carter, and passed to Congress on 1st June 2010.

It is this pressure on defence budgets, increased operational commit-ments and the inability of the US to halt the continual increase in the cost

of the aircraft30 that has seen murmurings across the partners, including the UK, about the total number of aircraft that may be procured. As it stands, the UK is still scheduled to procure three test aircraft (two in 2011 and one in 2012) and then start receiving small numbers of aircraft for training purposes as the programme moves through the LRIP Phase and gears up for FRP. While the UK is still looking at a final figure of 138 opera-tional aircraft, the PSFD Memorandum of Understanding (signed in 2006) did not contractually commit any nation to buying a specified number of aircraft31, leaving the door open for the UK under the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of October 2010, to change from buying the STOVL ‘B’ variant, to the conventional carrier ‘C’ variant.

This decision itself was under review for some time32, as the estimated costs of modifying the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to have ‘cats and traps’ had increased from £400 million to £1.8 billion with the (hopefully) final decision taken in May 2012 to move back to the ‘B’ variant33 with all the consequences that will have for through-life costs, the range, perfor-mance and in-service date of the aircraft, and interoperability with our key allies. In this age of austerity, a final figure of 138 aircraft is looking increas-ingly unlikely, especially with the current dispute between the MoD and the Treasury over who will pay for the replacement of the Trident nuclear submarines. Historical precedent has meant that that the initial procure-ment cost has usually come out of central funds, with the MoD covering the day-to-day running costs. The statement by the Chancellor, George Osborne, that the MoD should pick up the total bill has set the two depart-

ments against each other34. Italy, too, affected by the additional pressures brought about by the crisis in the eurozone, has decreased the number it plans to order by 4135, Canada has started to debate about reducing its planned order or even pulling out the programme altogether36, and Japan, which only recently selected the F-35 as the winner of its 42 aircraft F-X competition, has also been warning the US of that possibility if the cost of the aircraft increases substantially37.

A moving targetUpon receiving a 2011 DoD forecast reporting that the total cost of own-ing and operating a fleet of JSFs would be more than $1 trillion over 50 years, US Senator John McCain described the figure as “jaw-dropping”, particularly when compared with the costs of operating other aircraft38. For the other participating states, the increase in costs has come to dominate deliberations on the JSF, overshadowing issues such as jobs and interoper-ability with the US.

Ultimately, the primary concerns of the UK and all the other states con-templating acquisition of the F-35 are the twin factors of predictability and risk. Whether the issue is the final cost, the delivery schedule or even the ultimate performance of the JSF, there would appear to be serious ques-tions about whether the MoD is in a position to properly plan for and make cogent decisions regarding the acquisition of F-35s. In that regard, the

The primary concerns of states contemplating acquisition of the F-35 are the twin factors of predictability and risk


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20 March 2012 testimony to Congress of the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the US Government Accountability Office (the GAO, which is the US equivalent of the UK National Audit Office) indicates the extent of the uncertainty regarding the JSF programme.

The testimony notes that JSF restructuring is now into its third year, with a total cost increase from June 2010 of $15 billion, with increased costs of $5 billion on development and $10 billion on procurement39. The cost increases are obviously of serious concern to a cash-strapped MoD. It may be more unnerving, however, that the programme will undergo further changes, generating additional uncertainty. The GAO assessment is that “there will likely be additional changes when the Department of Defense approves a new program baseline, expected soon”40. Perhaps more critically for UK officials tasked with planning to bring the JSF into service, the GAO analysis indicates that “initial operating capability dates are now unsettled because of program uncertainties”41.

In light of the fact highlighted by the GAO that the US has reduced near-term F-35 procurement quantities for three consecutive years and that, since 2002, the Pentagon has reduced procurement quantities through 2017 from 1,591 to 365 F-35s (a reduction of approximately 75 per cent), there would appear to be cause for UK concern regarding changes in the timeline of the programme42. Moreover, an overarching political and finan-cial issue that could have an impact not just on the US, but also on the

UK, is how the Pentagon will fit future JSF funding within tightened DoD budgets. The GAO estimate is that, due to cost increases and delays, the projected annual funding level for the JSF is more than $13 billion annually through 203543. Despite the repeated claims of senior DoD officials about the centrality of the F-35 for US defence capabilities, it would appear to be a serious question whether the DoD can sustain that level of funding for the F-35 for such an extended period.

Programme challengesWith regard to the main causes of these problems, the GAO emphasises the significance of the DoD decision noted above to pursue concurrent devel-opment and production of the F-35. Frank Kendall, acting DoD procurement chief, stated on 6 February 2012 that putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was a serious mistake44. The GAO expresses its acceptance of that judgment by commenting that “most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concur-rent development, testing and production”45. This was underlined by Vice Admiral David Venlet, Program Executive Officer (PEO), for the F-35 admit-ting “fundamentally, that was a miscalculation”46. That decision obviously cannot be reversed at this juncture, but its impact is apparent in the GAO review of the current status of the programme. In 2011, that process gener-ated the result that the programme achieved six of 11 primary objectives47.

UK defence secretary Philip Hammond, taking delivery of the UK’s first F-35B Lightning II during a ceremony in July at Fort Worth, Texas



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Analysing those primary objectives in detail, the GAO notes that five of the objectives “were specific test and training actions tied to contractual expectations and award fees” while the other six objectives were “asso-ciated with cost, schedule, contract negotiations and sustainment”48. The programme successfully met two important test objectives: the STOVL vari-ant accomplished sea trials, and the carrier variant (CV) completed static structural testing49. However, two other test objectives were not met: the CV “did not demonstrate shipboard suitability because of problems with the tail hook, which requires redesign”, and “software was not released to flight test on time”50. The programme successfully completed objectives “related to sustainment design reviews, schedule data, manufacturing pro-cesses, and cost control”51. However, the GAO adds that the programme did not meet a training deadline or complete contract negotiations52.

Returning to the central issue of whether the F-35 programme is in a state which allows the MoD to make critical acquisition decisions, it is notable that the GAO emphasises that while developmental flight testing has moved ahead, it is only 20 per cent complete, with “the most challeng-ing tasks still ahead”53. Returning to an important caveat that is frequently cited by the GAO, it stresses its anticipation that there will still be more changes to aircraft design and manufacturing processes54.

It is notable that even where there has been progress in the programme, the GAO has been cautious in reporting results. That is particularly appar-ent concerning the critical issue noted above of the UK selection of the STOVL or CV version of the F-35. The GAO comments that the STOVL variant has improved to the point that it has been taken off probation, although it emphasises that “several fixes are temporary and untested”55. With regard to the specifics of that finding, the GAO makes the point that “while several technical issues have been addressed and some potential

solutions engineered, assessing whether the deficiencies are resolved is ongoing, and, in some cases, will not be known for years”56. The GAO goes on to note that, according to the Program Office, “two of the five specific problems cited are considered to be fixed, while the other three have tem-porary fixes in place”, and adds that “until the proposed technical solutions have been fully tested and demonstrated, it cannot be determined if the technical problems have been resolved”57.

The argument can be made that the difficulties facing the UK regard-ing JSF decisions have been encapsulated in the STOVL versus CV issue. Decisions need to be made by the UK regarding the construction of the aircraft carrier. Such decisions are obviously influenced by which version of the JSF that the UK elects to acquire. The fact that the STOVL version was on probation may have played an important part in the decision in the 2010 SDSR to change course and buy the CV version, and the fact it is no longer on probation may well have played an important role in the change of heart58 over which version of the F-35 to buy. However, if that decision regarding probation of the STOVL variant is not clear cut and is based on solutions that are not yet fully tested and demonstrated, the UK will have found itself having made a critical decision based on incomplete informa-tion punctuated with question marks.

Complexity and capabilityIt is important to note at this juncture the daunting complexity of the F-35, which reinforces the programme’s unpredictability and raises questions about the ultimate performance of the aircraft. The GAO highlights the fact that management and development of more than 24 million lines of software code “continue to be of concern” and “late software releases have delayed testing and training”59. The significance of the software code issue

A GR9 Harrier lands at RAF Cottesmore following a ceremony to mark the retirement of the long-serving aircraft


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is emphasised by a comparison with other US fighters. The GAO comments that it is not just that JSF requirements have grown to over 24 million lines of code, but that 9.5 million are on board the aircraft60. It then remarks that this is three times more on-board lines of code than the F-22A Raptor and six times more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet61. While supporters of the F-35 would certainly point to these numbers as an indication of the sophistication of the JSF, a fair case could be made that they also indicate the level of risk that is being accepted by the DoD, and, by extension, the MoD, with regard to such a technologically challenging fighter.

On the issue of performance and capabilities, the GAO provides a candid assessment, judging that development of the critical mission systems that give the JSF its core combat capabilities “remains behind schedule and risky62”. At this point, the GAO reports that “only four per cent of the mission system requirements for full capability has been verified”63. Critically for the UK as it makes long-term decisions and commitments, the testing of a fully integrated F-35 is now anticipated by GAO in 2015 at the earliest64 (although 2017 as the more likely schedule for testing is noted below).

With regard to the specific technological challenges facing the JSF, the GAO assesses that deficiencies with the Helmet Mounted Display (HMD), “integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation” are “most problematic”65. In addition, it judges that the autonomic logistics information system, which it describes as “a key ground system for improv-ing aircraft availability and lowering support costs” is “not yet fully devel-oped66”. Such caution and hesitation on the part of the GAO regarding such critical technology indicate the level of uncertainty faced by UK policy-makers at this important juncture. Indeed, the HMD is but one of five major issues, the other four being the Fuel Dump System, the Integrated Power Pack, the Arresting Hook System and the aircraft’s stealth signature67.

Returning to the theme of the unpredictability of the F-35 programme, the future as viewed by GAO provides more than enough reason for con-cern by UK decision-makers about whether its projections regarding cost and delivery schedule will prove to be accurate. The GAO stresses that the manufacturing process “is still absorbing a higher-than-expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, which makes it dif-ficult to achieve efficient production rates”68. It also emphasises that “until engineering changes are reduced, there are risks of additional cost over-runs and retrofit costs”69.

Perhaps most critical for the MoD, the point at which the programme will achieve a measure of clarity and predictability appears to be still far off. The GAO view is that the “program now estimates that the number of changes will persist at elevated levels through 2019”70. Moreover, the Pentagon “is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight test-ing has years to go”71. The GAO assessment is that “the program has not yet demonstrated a stable design and manufacturing processes capable of efficient production. Engineering changes are persisting at relatively high

The F-35 decision may turn on the simple question of what the MoD can afford and how much risk it is willing to accept

rates and additional changes will be needed as testing continues”72. In that regard, it is important to note that “initial dedicated operational testing of a fully integrated JSF is tentatively scheduled to begin in 2017,”73 with a full rate production decision now expected in 201974.

ConclusionsThe history and background of the JSF indicate the extent to which a sensible policy decision taken decades ago (one common platform for a fighter to serve three US services) has become an example of an acquisition ‘hot potato’. Only in retrospect will academics and analysts determine whether the concept of a common platform was inherently flawed and ensured that the project would suffer cost overruns and delays. With regard to the decision to pursue concurrent development and production, the case could be made that a long-term perspective is not needed and the ques-tionable nature of that decision is already apparent. The GAO has concluded that most of the current JSF instability is a result of the attempt to pursue production without successfully completing development and testing, a point on which senior DoD officials have publicly expressed concurrence.

A review of the history of the JSF indicates that the decision of the UK and other states to participate in the F-35 programme had a solid rationale. There was every reason for governments to wish to participate in the development of a fifth-generation fighter with cutting-edge technology, and a reasonable basis for non-participating states to wish to acquire the JSF. There was the added attraction that as the US military was dependent on the success of the programme, the Pentagon was committed to ensur-ing that it would not fail and that it would commit the resources needed to bring a capable F-35 into service. There was also the added policy consider-ation for the UK and other states that acquisition of the JSF would enhance interoperability with the US. Finally, there was the prospect of new jobs, particularly for the UK, which was the only Level I participant in the JSF. Such new employment may still arise, but the economic benefit for the UK may now be greatly diminished by the cost of acquiring the F-35s.

If the problems in the JSF programme indicated above are indeed sig-nificant considerations for the UK and other governments, they are ampli-fied by the fact that virtually all defence budgets have taken a hit in recent years. Cost overruns and delays that might have been tolerable before 2008 have since became unacceptable. For the UK, all of these concerns come together at a particularly challenging time. Decisions about the aircraft car-rier are forcing decisions on F-35s at a point at which there is a shortage of good answers and solid data regarding programme cost and schedule.

As noted previously, the UK has yet to make a binding legal commitment regarding its purchase of F-35s. That decision will be influenced by a number of factors that go beyond cost and schedule. Interoperability with US forces is certainly a critical determination. That concern could be addressed by the acquisition of F/A-18 Super Hornets, but raises questions regarding the future production run by Boeing. Such a decision would also raise the issue of the impact of not acquiring the F-35 on possible work for BAE Systems, the largest subcontractor on the JSF, regarding JSF support arrangements.

In the current financial climate, the F-35 decision ultimately may turn on the simple question of what the MoD can afford and how much risk it is willing to accept with regard to future cost increases and programme delays. While the MoD would almost certainly wish to have the JSF in its inventory, acquiring such a capability involves taking a decision that the F-35s can be acquired on a schedule somewhat in alignment with the acqui-sition of the new carrier, and managed within a shrinking MoD budget, without stripping away other essential defence capabilities. As indicated above, such a UK decision carries a substantial amount of risk regarding a still-unpredictable JSF programme. n (See overleaf for footnotes)



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Footnotes

1. PeteAldridge,U.S.Under-SecretaryofDefenceforAcquisitionasquotedinThe Daily News,

LosAngeles,27October2001

2. See,forexample,www.globalsecurity.org/military/industry/mergers.htm

3. Keijsper,G.Joint Strike Fighter: Design and Development of the International Aircraft,Barnsley:

Pen&SwordBooks,2007,pp7-8

4. OfficialJSFWebsite,Historywebpage,www.jsf.mil/history

5. Mason,T.The Aerospace Revolution,London:Brasseys,1998,p139

6. Warwick,G.‘JointEndeavour’inFlight International,3-9July1996,pp25-28

7. Bolkom, C. Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine,

18February2009,CongressionalResearchService(CRS)RL-33390

8. USGAO. Joint StrikeFighterAcquisition:ManagingCompetingPressures IsCriticalTo

AchievingProgramGoals,testimonyfromKatherineV.Schinasi,Director–Acquisitionand

SourcingManagement,21July2003,GAO-03-1012T,p4

9. Seewww.scramble.nl/sg.htm;www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-advances-f-35-

contract-talks-with-japan-israel-369506/.

10.OpCit.GAO,21July2003,p5

11. USCongress.ArmingOurAllies:CooperationandCompetitioninDefenseTechnology,Of-

ficeofTechnologyAssessment,OTA-ISC-449,USGPO:WashingtonDC,May1990,p41

12.Hewson, R. ‘Joint Strike Fighter –Happily Ever After?’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, dated

13October2004,posted6October2004onwww.janes.com

13.Mulholland, D. ‘US Industry: Bucking the Trend?’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, posted

18February2004onwww.janes.com

14. LaFrenchi,P.andTrimble,S.‘ShareDealing’inFlight International,13-19July2004,pp70-74

15.Mulholland,Detal.‘NotAllJSFPartnersAreReapingContractAwards’inJane’sDefence

Weekly,posted21May2004onwww.janes.com

16.OpCit.LaFrenchiandTrimble,13-19July2004,p71

17. HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee.StrategicExportControls,HC145,London:TSO,

24March2005,pp49-51.

18.Trimble,S.andWarwick,G.‘JointJourney’inFlight International,28June-4July2005;US

GAO.JointStrikeFighter:ManagementoftheTechnologyTransferProcess,March2006,

GAO-06-364,WashingtonDC.

19. OpCit.Hewson,dated13October2004

20.Wolf,J.‘UStowithholdF-35fightersoftwarecodes’,Reuters,24November2009

21.Gertler, J. F-35 Joint StrikeFighter (JSF)Program:Background and Issues forCongress,

22December2009,CongressionalResearchService,RL-30563

22.Chao,P.&Niblett,R.TrustedPartners:SharingTechnologywithin theUS-UKSecurity

Relationship,CSIS,26May2006

23.USDepartmentofDefense.QuadrennialDefenseReview2010,February2010,pp83-84

24.Bailos,J.,Fisher,C.andKoehl,S.FortressesandIcebergs:TheEvolutionoftheTransatlan-

ticDefenseMarketandtheImplicationsforUSNationalSecurityPolicy,December2009,

CenterforTransatlanticRelations,WashingtonDC,p37

25.Ibid.p2

26.Sullivan,M.StrongRiskManagementEssentialasProgramEntersMostChallengingPhase,

TestimonybeforetheSubcommitteeonAirandLandForces,CommitteeonArmedServices,

HouseofRepresentatives,GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,20May2009,GAO-09-711T.

27. Harrington,C.‘TheJSFBigBet:F-35JointStrikeFighterUpdate’inJane’sDefence Weekly,

postedon5June2009atwww.janes.com

28.Potter,M.‘JSFCostIncreasesMayImperiltheFighterProgram–andLockheed’,25May

2010,locatedathttp://industry.bnet.com;Grant,G. ‘JSFPriceTagNow$112MillionPer

Plane; Program $382 Billion’, 1 June 2010, www.dodbuzz.com/2010/06/01/jsf-price-tag-

now-112-million-per-plane/#comment-25859

29.US DoD. ‘Department of Defense Announces Selected Acquisition Reports’, News

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60-66.Ibid,p.11

67.OpCit.George,pp.8-9


69-74.Ibid

Three F-35A test aircraft fly over Edwards Air Force Base in California


the uk and the joint strike fighter: an acquisition programme in crisis?

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