the sword: the up polsci review of political science
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Academic Year 2014-2015 "Meditations on Politics"TRANSCRIPT
the up political society review of political scienceThe Sword
meditations on politics
Volume 1, Number 1First Semester 2014–15
Edcel John A. Ibarra
Editor-in-Chief, Layout Artist
Alphonse G. Samson
Deputy Editor for Externals
Reiner S. Gallardo
Contributing Editor
Patricia S. Ignacio
Contributing Editor
Rodolfo L. Lahoy Jr.
Contributing Editor
Shiela Marie C. Malabanan
Deputy Editor for Internals
John Rey C. Alvior
Correspondent
Mark Ernest E. Mandap
Correspondent
Pauline Faye S. Fajardo
Illustrator
From the Editor-in-Chief
The Sword is the official external publication of the UP Political
Society featuring members’ political analytic compositions for
political science students. Consistent with the principles of ac-
ademic excellence, critical thinking, and political awareness, it
strives to advance the discipline of political science, to carefully
analyze relevant social issues for possible solutions, and to in-
still awareness of the current social and political developments.
There is another The Sword, the internal publication, which pub-
lishes news on the states of affairs of the organization for mem-
bers and non-members alike. With all due respect to the history
of the organization’s official publication, I settled to divide The
Sword into two parallel publications. You can read the internal
publication through this link: bit.ly/ts-inter-1415a. (I elabo-
rated in there my reasons for dividing the publication.)
For the external publication’s first issue, the editors find it but fit-
ting to start from the beginning. We decided to write on the concept
that is the root of our discipline: politics. There are a myriad of con-
ceptions of politics, many of which are incompatible with others in
terms of focus and scope; politics is after all a contested concept.
But amid this pool of options, we must eventually subscribe to one
particular conception, thereby implicitly contesting the contested-
ness of the concept. As critical thinkers, we do not indiscriminately
settle with conceptions provided for in books or by our professors.
Instead, we must investigate for ourselves what we mean when we
say that something is political. Not only does clarifying the concept
help us in our systematic pursuit of knowledge, but it also deter-
mines when and where human action becomes socially meaningful.
My fellow political science students, I hope the present contribu-
tions offer you insights for your own meditations on politics.
Breathing politics,
University of the Philippines Political Society (UP POLSCi)
www.uppoliticalsociety.com | [email protected] | facebook.com/up.political.society | twitter.com/up_polsci
Beside Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines–Diliman
Remember Foucault | 4Rodolfo L. Lahoy Jr. opens with an inquiry into the act of defining politics itself. The activity
is far from neutral, he argues, and it suits purposes beyond those of research. Instead, de-
fining politics is itself political in that it limits or expands the possibilities of social action.
Politics for Dummies | 8Patricia Joy S. Ignacio introduces the concept of politics, tracing its evolution from the
Greeks to the present, for pedestrians. Eventually defining it as power, she points to the
ubiquity and pervasiveness of politics in everyday life.
Politics in the Mundane: Love and Power | 10Reiner S. Gallardo locates the politics in romantic relationships. He contends that romantic
relationships begin, thrive, and end through politics: they are defined by decisions that
involve the exercise of power and the exercise of restraint from power.
Towards a Relevant Concept of Politicsin the Philippine Context | 14Alphonse G. Samson contextualizes the concept of politics in the Philippines. He traces how
Filipino political scientists have understood it over time. Ultimately, he argues for a pow-
er-based conception, maintaining that it better exposes the realities of Philippine politics.
After Power | 18Edcel John A. Ibarra closes with a critique of politics defined as power. He finds contradic-
tions in the attempt to bring out the ubiquity of politics and in the agenda to liberate the
individual from relations of power. He settles instead on the idea of collective existence.
Other Contributions | 22The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of Power Christine Joy L. Galunan
Endnotes | 26
Meditations on PoliticsVolume 1, Number 1
First Semester 2014–15
4 t h e s wor d
Remember FoucaultRodolfo L. Lahoy Jr.
The actors who call the shots within the academic
discipline have been keen to distinguish “political
science” as a field. Firstly, by referring to it as a
science, it is implied that the field follows fairly
reasonable methods that can result to reliable
knowledge. In short, political science has been set
apart as different from (and more valid than) the
analyses of your local
barber or taxi driver. In
the American context
of the 1960s, this sci-
ence of politics meant
a “logical positivist
behavioralism,”1 which
has not been free from
antagonists such as the movement, in the same
decade, towards a “New Political Science.”2
Another set of antagonisms can be seen in
defining the other word: politics. What has
been deemed as political has not been static
throughout history, especially in the 20th
century. Actors have since attempted to fix
the meaning of politics and the “political.”
In the context of the classroom, behind the
usual introductory inquiry into what is “polit-
ical,” defining is not only a mere practicality, a
mere necessity for us to know what exactly we
are studying with our scientific way of viewing
the world. There is a desire to delimit the scope
of what can be studied by political science as
a discipline. It is akin to specialization that is
typical of modernity, establishing a “division of
labor” among those who produce knowledge about
man and society. This question about what is
political is a second way of setting political sci-
ence apart, this time from other social sciences.
However, defining the term can serve a pur-
pose beyond that of an academic nature, and
thus matters in contexts outside the classroom.
Describing politics can be oriented towards de-
scribing a world that can be acted upon by agents.
This way, practice can later have a role in the
theoretical pursuit of inquiring about politics.
As it stands, it is usual in political science to accept
the notion that politics is more-or-less concerned
Defining politics can
serve a purpose be-
yond that of an aca-
demic nature, and thus
matters in contexts
outside the classroom.
t h e s wor d 5
with power. As early as Niccolò Machiavelli’s The
Prince, gaining and maintaining power has been
important for the practice of rulers. Power, in this
sense, is tied to ruling particular socio-political
units (principalities or princedoms), to what we
now call “matters of the state.” What can be no-
ticed here is a conception of power as something,
in the first place, that can be gained or held.3 It can
also be a position: one can be “raised to power.”4
Akin to these is the notion of power as something
that can be “possess[ed] like a commodity” and
can be transferred, for instance, through a con-
tract.5 This is one of the two conceptualizations of
power in the modern era, as described by Michel
Foucault. This notion has been located within
a Hobbesian theory of sovereign, in which an
all-powerful state demands obedience after power
has been transferred to it. The second involves
power as something repressive, tied with the idea
of politics as war-like, consisting of struggles,
and involving relations of conflict.6 Foucault,
however, later seems to abandon this idea of
power-as-repression in “The Subject and Power,”
even though he still talks of power relations and
not merely power as such. In this later writing, a
power relationship is that which involves a person
attempting to guide the possibilities of another’s
actions. However, it does not imply domination or
complete determination of another’s actions, for
a freedom to refuse the other’s exercise of power
is always recognized.7 Conflict, struggle, or “ag-
onism” is the character of a power relationship.
In this conceptualization, politics as power is
definitely outside the limited realms of the state
and the polity. The exercise of power, as Foucault
demonstrated, can also be seen in micro-contexts
such as prisons and hospitals. It is through rules
that prescribe what is true and false, insane and
sane, proper and improper, which are acted upon
individuals (e.g., as delinquent or mentally ill) and
their relations (e.g., in the family). Power, with
rules of truth as one of its organs, has been shown
to affect actual, material bodies of individuals.
These ideas have had
some prominence in
classes of political and
social theory. Political
science, however, has
not really caught on to
adopting Foucauldian
analyses that focus
more on smaller insti-
tutions. This is not at
all surprising, given
Foucault’s eccentricity
as a thinker, how he
only provided “vague guidelines,”8 and the
differences of his methodological practices
with traditional political science approaches.
Mid-20th century American political scientists
have also thought of power as central to what
is political. Robert Dahl in “The Concept of
Power” defined the concept, like (and preceding)
Foucault, as a “relation between people.”9 It is
about A making B do something that B would
not have otherwise done. In the context of Dahl’s
time, the study of power is about making it mea-
surable and reducible to probabilistic rules.
Some, however, have altogether contested the
centrality of power. Jacques Rancière, a con-
temporary political philosopher, stated this
clearly in the first sentence of his “Ten Theses on
Politics”: “Politics is not the exercise of power.”10
What we traditionally deem to be political in-
stitutions (e.g., government) that hierarchize
Even in the act of
defining politics there
is politics. There is
an attempt to limit
individuals into partic-
ular ways of thinking
about a concept,
about a field, and
therefore also lim-
iting the possibilities
of their behavior.
6 t h e s wor d
and order individuals and groups in society, he
calls the “police” order.11 Instead, he defines
politics as a practice in opposition to this hier-
archized state of things. Politics is an act by the
excluded (the demos ) in intervening into this
order, disrupting, antagonizing, and disagreeing
with the supposedly contingent hierarchy, to
assert equality. In this, the notion of politics as
dissensus (compare “consensus”) does not serve
scientific inquiry, but that of political action.
Similarly, Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe
highlight contingency:
“to say contingent artic-
ulation is to enounce
a central dimension
of ‘politics.’”12 This
means that essential
to the notion of politics is a particular way of
constituting individuals and organizing society
through discourses (i.e., attempts at establishing
a closure and fixity of meanings in a socio-his-
torical context, and therefore constrain what
can be thought by individuals and groups).13
The hegemony of a particular order is therefore
not inevitable, and is open to be challenged.
In Foucault’s notion of a power relationship, and
in Rancière’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s notions
of politics, two common elements can be seen.
Firstly, there are attempts, inevitably, to constrain
individuals’ actions, their identities as subjects,
and the ideas that they engender. Therefore,
even in the act of defining politics there is pol-
itics. There is an attempt, conscious or other-
wise, to limit individuals into particular ways
of thinking about a concept, about a field, and
therefore also limiting the possibilities of their
behavior in regard or in response to that idea.
The second common feature of the three afore-
mentioned notions is a capacity to resist how
one is advised to behave, or an ability to disagree
with how a particular order is organized. Here,
the function of describing different notions of
power is to show that how we think of our con-
cepts now differs from how other people have
thought of them in other periods of history
– “what is” is therefore contingent. The function
of providing alternative notions of politics is
to attempt to suggest particular possibilities of
action: to loosen up a potentially rigid thinking
about the concept, or to encourage going beyond
the ideas given to us by academic institutions.
The value of Rancière and Laclau and Mouffe
in particular, is in their formulation of politics
as something not merely studied, not merely
a box into which we can peek and from which
derive descriptions and theories. The purpose
of an inquiry about politics can move away from
merely setting the limits of an academic dis-
cipline, and initiate thinking into what can be
done about how society is currently organized i
The function of pro-
viding alternative
notions of politics is
to attempt to suggest
particular possi-
bilities of action.
Note: The deadline has been extended to February 15, 2015.
*
8 t h e s wor d
Politics for DummiesPatricia Joy S. Ignacio
As I write this essay in a futile attempt of reaching
a deadline assigned to me by some higher au-
thority, I contemplate the choices I have at hand.
I could either, rather unwillingly, succumb to
the power of that higher authority by writing
this essay, or refuse to do so and face the conse-
quences it might bring
to me and my editor
afterwards. Of course,
by now you know my
choice. However, rather
than an actual choice,
it was more of a sense
of obligation and a fear of what might happen
upon my refusal to comply. Power. Politics.
In everyday life, how many times have you
mused over why you have to do chores when
you are too lazy to do them, why you have to
take a subject that you do not even like, or why
you follow laws even when sometimes they do
not make any sense at all? The reason may lie
in your respect for your parents, compliance to
school rules, or respect for the government and
its laws. Whatever it is, it all boils down to one
underlying fact: that we are all under or bidding
for the influence of someone else. Power. Politics.
The definition of concepts and terms evolves
through time. Words once used in the past may
now cease to exist or mean differently. Similarly,
the term “politics” has evolved through time.
Going back to the ancient Greeks, politics or poli-
tikos meant (1) of, for, or relating to citizens, (2) be-
longing to the state, and (3) the affairs of the cities.
It is associated with the Greek word polis, meaning
city-states. Aristotle said that “man by nature is
a political animal.”1 It is then assumed that the
characteristic of being political is already innate,
almost like second nature. This can be proven,
since humans can be seen as self-preserving
creatures who forward their own interests while
still, if superficially, seeking to create a better
society. Everything we do has involved the society
in which we live; politics is therefore a social act.
As time passed, different people began to have
different notions of politics. For most, politics
involves the government, policies, laws, and
other public institutions. They believe that what
Everything we do
has involved the
society in which we
live; politics is there-
fore a social act.
t h e s wor d 9
belongs to the public sphere is political – a no-
tion closely interrelated to that of the Greeks. A
shallower definition of the term connotes politics
as merely limited to the acts of voting, cam-
paigning, and the use of power while in position.
It is for this reason that politics is commonly
described as “dirty” by the common person.
Within the academe, scholars also have different
conceptions of politics. Rather than defining it
and giving limitations to its scope, the term has
extended so vastly that we sometimes become
confused as to what is considered political and
what is not. What can be observed, however,
is that the most basic conception of politics
equates it to power. Robert Dahl defines power
as the ability of person A to make person B do
something that he/she would not have other-
wise done.2 Going back to the Greeks’ original
definition, politics is associated with the concept
of society and man is considered as a political
animal. In any society, it would be normal for
humans to have conflicting interests. To resolve
them, however, they must come to a conclu-
sion either by lobbying, persuasion, force, or
whatever means they have at hand. Power.
Some may argue, however, that choice
is just an illusion. As Samantha Borgens
says in the film Stuck in Love,
As we equate power to the ability to influence
another person, we also create the notion that
that other person has a choice as to whether or
not he/she would succumb to the interests him/
her who tries to exercise power. We then create a
hierarchy in society where there is a person at a
level higher than us in some aspect who is able to
influence us. Subsequently, there may be another
person higher than her who can exercise power
over her and influence her decisions. Delusions
and illusions. We believe that we do have options –
freedom to decide for ourselves when to be influ-
enced by some higher
authority; the ability to
do something on our
own volition – when
in reality, we may not
even have the luxury of
choice. We think we act
based on our own free will when, in fact, we
may be under the influence of someone else.
But politics does not always work that way. Politics
is not always a zero-sum game and power does
not travel in only one direction. There is no need
for a higher authority or a prime mover because
power can come from any individual as long as he/
she is able to influence the decisions of others. For
this reason, politics is understood to be no longer
limited to what is social and what is public. The
concept has certainly evolved through the years.
Politics now involves both the public and the pri-
vate spheres – you can exercise power anywhere.
Power relations show us that politics is ev-
erywhere. It is neither limited to the govern-
ment and its laws, nor to acts of voting or
campaigning. It is present wherever power
is present – in my relationship with my ed-
itor, in a person’s relationship with his/her
parents, in a student’s constant struggle with
required subjects, and in our everyday life
as a citizen of whichever country. As long as
power is present, politics is present as well i
We believe that we do
have options, when
in reality, we may
not even have the
luxury of choice.
Society, government, money, religion, careers, nu-
clear families, monogamy. These are all just highly
creative, socially accepted delusions that we impose
on reality to try and gain some semblance of control
over our lives. It gives us the illusion of choice.
10 t h e s wor d
Politics in the Mundane: Love and PowerReiner S. Gallardo
Politics has always been connected to the concept
of power. Politics as the study of power is one of
the most commonly used conceptions to describe
what we concern ourselves with in our discipline.
We acknowledge something as political if it in-
volves power relations. We are not talking about
power as understood in physics, but rather power
as in authoritative power, defined as having A to
“get B to do something
that B would not oth-
erwise do,”1 or having
the ability to “realize
their will, even if others
resist it,”2 or “the acts
of men going about the
business of moving
other men to act in relation to themselves or in
relation to organic or inorganic things.”3 We are
dealing with power as having others do what
we want them to do regardless if they want to
do it or not. It is the activity that manifests an
exercise of power that we regard as political.
While we can define power, it is not at all always
directly observable. One clear manifestation
of power is through the decisions we make.
Decisions are exercises of power. Every day we
are unaware that our interactions are a result of
our positions within power relations. Sometimes,
we have power over others, like in the case of
having to choose where to eat during a group
outing. At other times, we are subjected to the
power of others. For instance, academic require-
ments and deadlines are clear indicators of some
people having power over you. Aware or not, it is
undeniable that power guides our everyday in-
teractions – even interactions concerning love.
Romantic relationships, or what we often refer to
as “love”, are nothing more than a set of decisions
we do every now and then. While I do not deny
that philosophical love transcends romantic love,
I shall focus on the latter, since it is more apparent
and more commonly known. Moreover, unlike
philosophical love, which could be described as
unconditional, endless, and even perhaps, true,
romantic relationships are ridden with struggles.
Struggles are clear demonstrations of power. They
are proofs of a system of authority that decides
Aware or not, it is
undeniable that
power guides our
everyday interactions
– even interactions
concerning love.
t h e s wor d 1 1
the actions the rest of us should take. From the
start, human interests have always been so di-
verse. While individuals of presumably similar
interests gather to form a society, these individ-
uals are not unified all the time. This is why it is
necessary for an order, a system to hold society
together. However, our rigid social structure
makes sure that our interests remain divided,
that with a concurrence of scarcity of resources,
people must strive in order to get their needs to
be addressed, bringing forth the need to compete
for opportunities. Power directs these struggles.
Having power means getting to decide which
interests should be given attention and pursued.
Similarly, romantic relationships are never
without struggles. Interacting and having rela-
tionships with people who are not exactly like us
are more likely than finding a person who is in all
aspects similar to us. At some point, there would
be some minor, or even perhaps, major differ-
ences in preference, attitude, and many other
things. Problems arise from these differences.
In order to address differences, individuals in a
romantic relationship must arrive at a decision
that would be binding to the involved. Hence,
power gets involved at this phase. It is not at
all times that both parties in a relationship
equally contribute to the decision that binds
them. At some point, one must submit to the
other, building up some sort of authority within
the relationship. However, in a romantic setting,
this “authority” would not hold for all decisions
– though we may encounter “authoritarian” rela-
tionships where one gets to decide for the other
in all circumstances. Of course, there is a higher
chance that this kind of relationship would not
last (for several reasons that I will talk about
later). In most functional relationships, the idea
of submitting to an authority is not for the sake
of interest, but rather, of arriving at a decision.
Love is like politics. It is full of problems that
many people claim to understand, but only a few
really do. It is also used
by people to justify their
domination over the
weak and the ignorant.
Some would want to
dominate in it, some
would not care about it,
some would want to be
in it, some would want
to stay away from it, and
some would want to un-
derstand it. It is every-
where, yet it can hardly
be understood because
of its complexities and paradoxes. Metaphor and
hugot aside, love, like politics, involves power.
In societies, those who have power, such as the
authorities, decide which goals will be collec-
tively pursued, which interests will be addressed,
and many other binding actions. While this may
resemble romantic relationships, it is not for the
same reason in most cases. Bickering couples find
it more beneficial to submit to the other in order
to arrive at a decision, rather than risk losing the
relationship. We have to note that unlike in the
case of government-governed relationship, where
power is attained for the purpose of addressing
interests, in some cases of romantic relationships,
it is necessary to “assign” power to come to a
decision in order not to jeopardize the system.
Everyday interactions of love involve the exer-
cise of power. All relationships start with the
decision of one party to acknowledge the pres-
Love is like politics. It
is full of problems that
many people claim to
understand, but only
a few really do. It is
used to justify one’s
domination over the
weak and the igno-
rant. It is everywhere,
yet it can hardly be
understood because
of its complexities.
1 2 t h e s wor d
ence of the other. A girl deciding whether to talk
to a boy or not clearly is an exercise of power.
Power drives people to do things within rela-
tionships. Love in itself is an exercise of power.
Relationship, based on mutual dependence, re-
lies on power to stabilize it. Love is when one
person lets his or her loved one overcome his own
reason. Love is when one puts his or her loved
ones needs before his own. Love is when one
recognizes the power of the other over the self.
To illustrate, let us
analyze the traditional
love-at-first-sight-then-
everything-happens-
like-destiny story. In
this case, I assume
heterosexual roles for
the sake of simplicity.
Imagine a guy meeting a girl at class. This is not
just a girl – she’s the one who fits perfectly the
description of the guy’s dream girl. While we
commonly assume that the beginning of this
romantic relationship resides on the girl’s decision
to entertain the guy, it would be equally accept-
able to assume the other way around: the start of
the relationship lies on the decision of the guy to
gather his balls and talk to the girl. (I am being
traditional here. There may be cases where girls
would take the first step, but the point is that the
relationship starts when one decides to talk to the
other.) This is followed by the decision of the girl
to entertain the guy. At this point, the decision to
interact with one another, as well as the decision
to entertain such interaction, commands some
sort of authority, as far as this relationship is
concerned. It is observable that the beginning of
the relationship depends a lot on mutual recog-
nition of power. No progress can occur if not for
one exercising power and the other recognizing it.
This is also the same in maintaining relationships.
Real relationships are not exactly the same as
those depicted in fairy tales. Not all that is “ever
after” in relationships are happy, in the same
manner that not all matches are ideal. Our signif-
icant other may not be the person that we have
expected him or her to be. It may be the case that
our significant other would not get along with us.
Even more, there is no guarantee that being with
your special one would be like heaven on earth.
Being in a romantic relationship does not elimi-
nate the human side of us – meaning, we would
still feel pain, hunger, and so on. Responsibilities
are still there. There is a lot more that we have
to do other than be in love. Couples encounter
problems that may endanger their relationships.
Sometimes it is caused by external factors, like
workload of a partner or rumors. In some cases,
it arises internally, like jealousy or misunder-
standing (e.g., the vagueness of “okay,” which can
mean either “do it” or “do not it”). But neverthe-
less, relationships work. Why? Because of power.
Contrary to the popular belief that power is det-
rimental to love, the opposite is actually truer:
power stabilizes love. When power is exercised
and recognized, relationships work. Conflict
arises as some people tend to overuse “love” in
relationships and take the better out of the
other. Conflict in love, like in politics, can only
be “constrained by a balance of power.”4 Since
relationships are expressions of mutual depen-
dence, it would work only when there is mutual
recognition of power. It is the love for the other
person that drives us to do things that we would
not otherwise do. It is for love that we make de-
cisions. It is for love that we exercise power i
Contrary to the
popular belief that
power is detrimental
to love, the opposite
is actually truer:
power stabilizes love.
1 4 t h e s wor d
Towards a Relevant Concept of Politics in the Philippine ContextAlphonse G. Samson
There is no settled definition of politics.1 Even
after almost four years, I still find difficulty in
defining the very term whose referent I have long
been studying. Despite the apparent lack of defi-
nitional clarity, students of politics are still able
to engage in academic discussions. This made me
think that the definition of politics can depend on
context. I believe that
the greater purpose of
studying politics is in the
manner that it can be
applied, such as political
analysis, which has to
be context-based. Thus,
my objective in this essay, instead of indiscrim-
inately listing down definitions of politics, is
to situate the act of defining politics in the
Philippine context and thereafter provide a con-
ception of politics which suits that context.
To my disappointment, whenever I would scan
introductory political science textbooks in major
bookstores in the country, it appears that de-
fining politics is as easy as equating it to matters
of government and state institutions. Rarely do
I find a definition that does not include “govern-
ment,” “states,” and “institutions.” Meanwhile,
political science has been defined as the study
of these matters. Worse, you will find these text-
books placed on a shelf along with law books.
Should textbook authors and bookstores be
blamed for this definitional blunder? I believe
not. Rather, I think that cultural underpinnings of
defining politics are liable. Students of politics like
me have experienced the burden of being asked
several times by many people regarding our ca-
reers after graduation. Short of making their own
questions futile, these people already expect an
answer: political science graduates are destined
to become lawyers, politicians, diplomats, or civil
servants – nothing else; otherwise, our four years
have been simply pol-sayang. To wit: “You are
studying political science? So you will proceed to
law?” Quite interestingly, those aforesaid careers
are connected to the definition of politics as mat-
ters of government, states, and institutions. This
particular observation is in accordance with the
fact that through history, several politicians and
government officials – some prominent – have
Historically, the
realm of politics was
never limited to the
government, the state,
and institutions.
t h e s wor d 1 5
taken a degree in political science, along with eco-
nomics, business, and law. Hence, a Filipino pe-
destrian would not expect “politics” to go beyond
the arena of government, states, and institutions.
Historical adaptation of the definition of politics
and political science can also be liable. According
to Remigio Agpalo in his discussion of the history
of political science in the country, the discipline
was brought to the country by the Americans
when it was the high time for statist, legalistic,
and institutionalist paradigms in politics.2 In ad-
dition, the discipline, when it was first established
as a department in the University, had its roots
in the College of Law, with its first department
chair, who was also the acting Law Dean and an
American, George Malcolm.3 However, Agpalo
further discusses paradigmatic changes in the dis-
cipline in response to the exigencies of the times.4
During the 1930s, for instance, the behavioralist
paradigm became influential in its critique of the
legalistic paradigm that rules and laws alone do
not determine the behavior of actors. During the
1960s, the Marxist paradigm likewise became
prominent because of two factors: the influence
of Maoism from China, and the response against
Marcos’ dictatorship. The point here is simple:
historically, the realm of politics was never lim-
ited to the government, the state, and institutions.
To discount the fact that the discipline may have
been introduced in the country and developed
in some other way is dangerous, however. This is
because Agpalo mostly focused on the develop-
ment of the discipline in the University.5 Thus, it
is possible that the paradigm of politics for other
educational institutions may have remained
statist, legalistic, and institutionalist – not all
political science scholars and authors in the
country were able to carry on with the paradig-
matic developments in the discipline. There is,
however, a problem with the continued adoption
of the old paradigm. These paradigms gained
prominence because the country was reeling
from foreign occupation and the Second World
War; hence, there was
a need for a paradigm
that would aid state-
building, which I argue
is no longer the concern
of the country today.
There can indeed be
many realms of poli-
tics, yet many people
have not removed their
focus on the arena of
politics. Most of the
concerns, issues, and problems that the nation
faces nowadays are not matters of government,
state, or institutions in their entirety. Instead,
these are matters of processes within, but not
limited to, these arenas. In saying these, I echo
Colin Hay’s perspective that analysis of politics
encompasses social relations, that which involves
the greater sphere of society.6 He was quick to
distinguish the political from other aspects, such
as the “cultural” or the “sociological,” both of
which also encompass the societal sphere. He
made clear that the political is concerned with
power, but not its distribution, exercise, or con-
sequences. Instead, it is concerned with relations
of power that is implied in social relations. Hence,
for Hay, “politics is not defined by the locus of
its operation but by its nature as a process.”7
In another chapter, Hay elaborates the concept of
power.8 There he speaks of three “faces” of power
in terms of dimensions. The one-dimensional
view conceptualizes power as decision-making,
Most of the concerns,
issues, and problems
that the nation is
facing nowadays
are not matters of
government, state, or
institutions. Instead,
these are matters
of processes within,
but not limited
to, these arenas.
16 t h e s wor d
which is observed in the formal political arena.
The two-dimensional view combines deci-
sion-making and agenda-setting, manifested in
both the informal and formal arenas (e.g., “behind
the scenes”). Lastly, the three-dimensional view
combines decision-making and agenda-setting
with preference-shaping,
which is implicated in
the public sphere or
civil society (e.g., dis-
courses and ideologies).
Thus, in contrast to
power conventionally
defined as the ability of
A to make B do an action
that B would not have
done otherwise, Hay
conceives power as the
ability of actors to influence the context which set
the range of possibilities for action of others. Thus,
the implications of this particular conception of
power allow the analysis of issues to go beyond
the formal arenas of the government and state
institutions towards the greater sphere of society.
Using this perspective of politics, the patron–
client framework (PCF) theory9 gains hold in
its analysis of Philippine politics10 as one that
is characterized by dyadic and reciprocal ties
between patrons and clients. The patrons are
typically elected government officials. Meanwhile,
the typical clients are the electorate, but public
officials can also become clients of their supe-
riors. PCF theory is seen in action especially
during the months before elections, during which
incumbent mayors would give dole-outs and
scholarships – as well as shoulder expenses for
baptisms, weddings, and funerals, among others
– to their constituents who, in turn, would sup-
port and vote for them. What PCF theory shows
is that these relations of power, while mutually
beneficial, allows patrons to strengthen and
extend their control and influence in their turfs.
Another application of the same perspective of
politics is on the issue of labor exportation. Here
we see that the government is encouraging more
Filipinos to become modern-day heroes ( mga
bagong bayani ) by becoming overseas contact
workers (OCWs). Jean Encinas–Franco argued
that this “labeling scheme” of the government is
simply a discourse that justifies labor exporta-
tion.11 Through this powerful discourse, Filipinos
are made to think that being an OCW is an act
of heroism while the government is able to hide
the fact that it is not providing enough and sus-
tainable jobs with competitive salaries within
the country when it should. In essence, by legit-
imizing labor export, the troubles that Filipino
OCWs face, such as estrangement from their
families, abuse by their foreign employers, and
discrimination, are being taken for granted.
These realities, among a plethora of other issues
and problems that this country currently faces,
have been revealed to us through a perspective
of politics that is not limited by a statist, institu-
tionalist, or legalist paradigm. I argue that using
a conception of politics based on power – not
on the arena of government and state institu-
tions – in political analysis is more relevant and
useful especially in the Philippine context i
The implications of
Hay’s conception
of power allow the
analysis of issues
to go beyond the
formal arenas of the
government and
its institutions and
towards the greater
sphere of society.
1 8 t h e s wor d
After PowerEdcel John A. Ibarra
Politics as power is fashionable.1 It makes us
students of politics take pride in our discipline,
for when politics is power, politics becomes
all-present and political science becomes an
emancipatory venture. I, however, cannot find
the same pride in politics as power. I only find
contradictions and re-
strictions, which I briefly
explore in this essay.
Politics as power re-
formulates politics as
the struggle over the
production, distribution,
and use of resources
by attempting to in-
fluence, dominate, or
control the behavior
of others.2 It is a reac-
tion against traditional
definitions that confine politics to the public
sphere. Politics also takes place at the private
sphere; indeed, it can be all-present, for power
can be located in all spheres of social interac-
tion. In addition, the reformulation also radically
changes the research agenda. The study of politics
should aim to expose asymmetrical relations
of dominance and control over resources, and
thereby, liberate the individual from those bonds.
If politics is power, then politics becomes ubiq-
uitous. Advocates claim that politics as power
does not render every relation of power political,
but only those that concern the production, dis-
tribution, and use of resources. Yet any relation
of power can be framed (and rather easily so) as
having an end of securing material resources. For
instance, in criticizing politics as power, this essay
may be charged by radical feminists and clas-
sical Marxists – the prime advocates of politics
as power – as an ideological weapon, a product of
male or bourgeois hegemony, that only serves to
silence gender or class struggles and perpetuate
the domination of men or the bourgeoisie over
resources that have long been denied to women
or the proletariat. (So be it; I will have my turn
later.) Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of power
without reference to some material end. Power
cannot be its own end, since the most effective
power relies on having material support, rein-
In criticizing politics
as power, this essay
may be charged by
radical feminists and
classical Marxists as
an ideological weapon
that only serves to
silence gender or class
struggles and perpet-
uate the domination of
men or the bourgeoisie
over scarce resources.
t h e s wor d 19
forcing and punishing, to augment one’s influence
over others. Moreover, even ideology is propa-
gated precisely to preserve the existing distribu-
tion of resources or legitimize a new one. Thus,
any power relation can be rendered political.
Similarly, any social relation can be rendered as
a power relation. As in above, any action can be
framed as having been caused by some external
power. If power is not already manifest, the an-
alyst can (and often does) resort to supposedly
latent, i.e., difficult-to-verify, forces. But it is a
truism that we are always somehow externally
influenced. Nothing we think is ever truly per-
sonal, for beginning with language, thought is
always socially mediated.3 And if thought breeds
action, nothing we do is also ever truly personal,
for not only does the supposedly private action
entail public consequences, but it is also either
socially motivated (i.e., there is a desire either to
change the behavior of others or to prove oneself
to others) or publicly learned. The determined an-
alyst will always find an external power to blame.
Thus, any social relation can be framed as a power
relation, just as any power relation can be framed
as political. Now, because social relations are
ubiquitous, politics itself also becomes ubiquitous.
But politics as power, while speaking of the
pervasiveness of relations of dominance and
control, and thus, of subservient behavior, also
simultaneously speaks of liberation from pre-
cisely those relations, and thus, of the possibility
of autonomous thought and action. Yet if power
is everywhere, then nowhere lies my liberation
from it. The premise of ubiquity contradicts the
promise of emancipation. Politics as power prides
itself on exposing the omnipresence of power, and
thus, of politics, in social relations; but how can
now an individual escape an all-present relation?
I can conceive of one way: death; but surely, that
cannot be emancipation. For the moment that we
remain alive, we cannot truly talk of liberation
from power, because power will persist even after
the supposed liberation. The aftermath of every
political revolution illustrate this supreme irony.
In fact, even during liberation, be wary of the sup-
posed liberator. Does she not exercise ideological
power over a population in defining the terms of
their oppression and their freedom from it? In this
sense, emancipation may
very well be subjugation
to the emancipator.
The absurdity is clearer
when we take “politics
as power” as itself an
ideology. It claims, as
do its begetters fem-
inism and Marxism, to be emancipatory, yet it
imposes its own terms of emancipation. It tells
us that the way to heaven begins with a recogni-
tion that politics is power, and when we reject its
sacramental bread, it tells us that we are uncon-
sciously enslaved by invisible demons. But who is
enslaving? My feminist and Marxist friends will
point to men and bourgeois hegemony, but surely,
they cannot deny that they themselves insist on
ideological domination. Politics as power and its
advocates claim to be empowering, but along the
way, they deny us of our autonomy and agency.
Advocates will retort that politics as power does
not aim to liberate the individual from relations
of power per se, but rather from unequal or unjust
relations of power. But how can there be a just or
an equal relation of power? Power imposes, ne-
glecting along the way the will of the recipient,
while justice and equality forge compromises,
acknowledging along the way the wills of the
If power is every-
where, then nowhere
lies my liberation
from it. The premise
of ubiquity contra-
dicts the promise
of emancipation.
2 0 t h e s wor d
people involved. A just or equal relation of power
is thus a contradiction of terms.4 Moreover, the
assumption remains that when all relations cease
to be relations of power, when they flatten to be
equal or realign to be just, society will reach its
most desirable form. But in the reduction, if not
absence, of power, the concepts of order (which
relies on power), society (which relies on order),
and politics (through
which societal order
is decided) lose their
meaning. If anything,
politics as power wants
to lead us into a world
with neither politics
nor power. Indeed, fem-
inists speak of a genderless heaven while
Marxists speak of a classless heaven.
Behind all pretensions, politics as power is ac-
tually apolitical: it politicizes everything only to
eventually depoliticize them. It also results in
unproductive discussions. What happens next
after exposing where or to whom power is con-
centrated? Often, the intent in exposing power
is to democratize it. And then? How – towards
what vision of collective life – should that power
be used? It does not end in genuine democracy,
with each having uniform power to define the
conditions that govern them, for democracy does
not solve collective problems: it only presents a
method to arrive at a solution.5 Politics as power
distracts us from focusing on the problems of
collective living, for the erosion of power does not
automatically lead to the erosion of the problems.
I am partial to Andrew Heywood’s conception
of politics as, paraphrasing, the activity through
which people determine the conditions of their
existence within a collectivity (i.e., a polis).6
Politics as power already recognizes this, but it
emphasizes power far too importantly in the
equation. Some relations of power are necessary,
for collective existence relies on some settled
order.7 (Think of that between the state and the
citizens.) Moreover, the definition suggested
above already fits to what politics as power at-
tempted to fulfill in the first place. That politics
concerns the settlement of collective existential
conditions does not mean that politics should
only concern the public sphere. Collectivity can
be defined such that there are overlapping collec-
tivities, from one as small as the family to one as
large as humanity as a whole. By extension, those
who determine collective existential conditions
need not always be state actors, and the method
need not always be formal decision-making.
Indeed, social movements are also sometimes able
to determine circumstances of collective living
through agenda-setting and preference-shaping.
As an alternative to politics as power, I suggest
that the idea of collective existence is far more
characteristic a conception – and far more opti-
mistic a depiction – of politics than power. In so
doing, I also suggest that the state should remain
central to political analysis, for with its resources,
it remains the entity most effectively able to
shape how we live with each other.8 Indeed, the
less radical advocates of politics as power like
the liberal feminists politicize personal relations
precisely to bring problems of collective exis-
tence at that sphere to the attention of the state.
Of course, power is an important currency in
setting collective existential conditions, but it is
simply that: a means towards some vision of how
best to manage a shared destiny with others i
Behind all pretensions,
politics as power is
actually apolitical: it
politicizes everything
only to eventually
depoliticize them.
2 2 t h e s wor d
Since I started out as a student of politics, I had
come to the conclusion that nothing is more
empowering than encountering an interesting
concept for the first time. The reaction is not
only a post-highlighting internal giddiness, but a
breakthrough with a newfound ease to commu-
nicate with people who speak the same language.
Not only do previous discussions with previously
unknown words finally make sense, but a linear
thought process, as in taxonomy, emerges and
becomes part of communal understanding.
It seems all fine and good – nothing more than
a tinkerer getting acquainted with her “toolbox,”
as Prof. Jean Paul Zialcita would put it – but the
other side finally reveals itself when our concepts
begin to intrude in experiences and people.
Waltzing with Waltz “If you expect that ev-
eryone has the capacity to hurt you, then you
would harden your shells as tough as you can that
when it does hit, you wouldn’t crumble as much,”
Prof. Amador Peleo IV started the class. He was
talking about the billiard-ball model, wherein
“you” and everyone else are states likened to
billiard balls that roll in perennial risk of collision.
States behave like people – so realists assume. It
means that if states reflect human nature, then
we can expect state behavior to mimic human
behavior. It leads to a(n) (il)logical conclusion that
human interactions exist within the billiard-ball
model: each person must fend for himself, and
build a wall of protection at the risk of being
completely destroyed. It takes root not only from a
realist view on human nature, but from a broader
worldview: if you expect things to turn out for
the good, you will always end up disappointed,
because there is inevitably a point when things
will fail. So expect the worst not just of outcomes,
but of people who are bound to hurt you anyway.
Under all hopes and expectations, there lies the
nagging realist constantly telling us that things
would have been better if only we believed less in
the possible. Earlier in the semester, I was under
duress of a potential connection with someone,
a connection which I thought was doomed from
the beginning. It seems almost natural, therefore,
that realism is the most compatible with situa-
tions that involve us, that even in the absence of
any perceivable threat on his part, for instance,
shields must always be up and expectations down.
Limited interaction, creating deterrence, and
maintaining a balance of power were strategies I
actually put to action with regards the potentiali-
ties, all in the intention of self-survival. However,
the “real” hook of realism, both its best and
worst feature, is its self-fulfilling character. With
this, the outcome can already be inferred. And
to tell you honestly: no, it did not hurt any less.
Bayan? It was naive of me to think that just
because a person or a group professes love for the
nation, the actor automatically holds the scepter
as a defender of rights, justice, or progress of (and
for) the people. I was seeing “the people” as a
concept, without knowing or understanding “the
people” as subject-agents rather than objects.
It is not merely a battle of positions in-themselves,
but between an array of discourses. While there
may be a scepter of authority, (the perception of)
its possession is not accorded through sharing or a
consensual division of interests, but won through
competition. The people is not a monolith, but
The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of PowerChristine Joy L. Galunan
t h e s wor d 2 3
certain actors lump competing interests under
the banner “with or for the people” and expect
their audiences to swallow it in whole and cheer
in response to a seemingly populist position.
When you actually interact with people out-
side these actors’ spheres of influence, there
emerges the question: who are included and
excluded in their view of “the people”? More
problematically, does it not run the risk of
treating “the people” as a detached group of ob-
ject-receivers, whose interests can only be rightly
perceived and defended by those above them?
For Paulo Freire, “to simply think about the
people, as the dominators do… to fail to think
with the people, is a sure way to cease being
revolutionary leaders.”1 To involve and fight at
the side of the oppressed, not merely for them as
their liberator, is a step towards answering the
first question, and more importantly, towards
beginning to conceive of “the people” as ac-
tors’ “constituent matrix”2 or as subject-agents.
This is particularly significant in Marxist thought.
Society’s preoccupation with objectification has
a discursive underpinning in its view on sub-
ject-object relations wherein subjects are reified
as objects. Reification renders the determinant
subjects (e.g., “the people”) to be abstractions
or objects who only obey laws or models of be-
havior assigned to them. Thus, lumping “the
people” as a concept creates a power relation
in which we, as subjects, may approach the
world in a controlled and reductionist manner.
What does Foucault say? Confronted with
the seemingly inescapable web of these power
relations (under which all of us appear to be
embedded in everyday interaction, relationships,
and principles), we may be tempted to assume
these relations as semi-permanent structural
arrangements that agents have little or no power
of subverting. At least, this is how many the-
orists frame Michel Foucault’s view on power
relations: their ubiquity implies inescapability.
However, in his article “The Subject and Power”
and in a 1980 interview, Foucault tells us oth-
erwise.3 Power relations are embedded, such
that they continue to exist between persons
in any circumstance, but they are also mal-
leable, convertible, and reversible. But does
this not mean that once one escapes a partic-
ular relationship of domination, one only en-
ters into another relation of power, either as
the subject or the object, the conceiver or the
concept, the controller or the controlled?
Foucault answers that it is not necessarily
so. It ultimately depends on how these rela-
tions are constructed between persons, and
whether these constructions turn out to be
despotic or dominating. As Foucault concurs,
“power is not always repressive. It can take a
certain number of forms. And it is possible
to have relations of power that are open.”4
This was certainly the most curious revelation to
me after taking a sociology class on the theory of
society of Foucault under Prof. Luis David. As he
pinned down in the last lecture, Foucault’s project
was precisely to demonstrate “the absurdity of our
label-producing proclivities, markers, producing
a social grid that instead of pulling us together,
explodes us apart.” Labels that trap people within
concepts take us farther from the “freshness
that actually subsists behind [human] masks.”
2 4 t h e s wor d
The final word, however, still rests on how
these power relations, instead of being re-
lations between subjects and objects, can
be reconstructed to be between agents in a
non-repressive form. Refusing to be prescrip-
tive in the “how”-sense, Foucault tells us a way:
through the resurrection of ethics – a person’s
relation with himself grounded in human re-
lationships – as a basis for action.5 In other
words, a way to subvert the modern project
of “mastering” people and the environment is
to master the self – our passions, inclinations,
and purpose – in the Greek tradition of arête
(virtue), that is by working in interdependently
in our community for the common good.
The problem here has already transcended how
one perceives the world as a personal subject,
but the question reflects the ever-present di-
lemma of the social scientist, of the tinkerer
with a toolbox. Do we approach the world
hoping to understand and predict social be-
havior using concepts and models, or should
we instead begin to approach “the people” as
they are, as impossible and unattainable an en-
tire body of knowledge about them may be?
The former leads to a comfortable setting where
we can claim to have a sense of security over re-
ality, but does this lead us to construct authentic
relationships? The latter gives us the option, but
only if we stop treating people as actors outside
ourselves that we need to study, and instead start
to regard them as humans with an equally com-
plex ethical substance. This distances us from
mere knowledge of one another and brings us
closer to what human relationships should really
be about: mutual support towards liberation from
relations of domination and towards the reali-
zation of one another’s potentials and purpose.
So nothing seems to be as empowering for the
student as the discovery of new concepts with
which we gain knowledge of the world. But this
experience have placed another meaning of
empowerment: to synergize being a student
and being a member of a polis, concerned not
only with knowing and mastering the world
around us, but also with relating with one an-
other in authentic and ethical terms of power,
that is, with concern and compassion i
Read the Internal Publication at bit.ly/ts-inter-1415a
Get aninsider
lookof the
org!
26 t h e s wor d
Remember Foucault** Excuses to Jean Baudrillard, and his essay, “Forget Foucault.”
1. Clyde W. Barrow, “The Intellectual Origins of New Political Science,” New Political Science 30, no. 2 (2008): 215-44.
2. Ibid., 238. This “New Political Science” espoused an “intellectual revolution” that called out the behavioralists’ supposed
methodological dogmatism and their implicit complicity with the status quo, with liberal-democracy.
3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Bantam, 1984), 9.
4. Ibid., 15.
5. Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings; 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New
York: Pantheon, 1980), 88.
6. Ibid., 90.
7. Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95; see esp. 789–90.
8. Paul Brass, “Foucault Steals Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 305-330.
9. Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–15.
10. Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5, no. 3 (2001). http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jacques-ranciere/
articles/ten-thesis-on-politics/.
11. Ibid.
12. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), xii.
13. Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse as Theory and Method (Sage: London, 2002), 36.
Politics for Dummies1. Aristotle, Politics, qtd. in Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3.
2. Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–15.
Politics in the Mundane: Love and Power** I would like to acknowledge the girl who exercised power over me. This article would not be written if not for you. I would like to
also acknowledge Carmille Romero for giving me the idea that love and power are intertwined.
1. Robert Dahl, The Concept of Power (1957), 202-3, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 86.
2. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956), 9, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 88.
3. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structures (1953), 2-3, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 85.
4. Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.
Endnotes
t h e s wor d 27
Towards a Relevant Concept of Politics in the Philippine Context1. The definition popularized in Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4 – “the activity
through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live” – is not even an agreed one.
2. Remigio Agpalo, “Political Science in the Philippines 1880-1998: A History of the Discipline,” Philippine Social Sciences Review 55
(1998): 1–4.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 20–4.
5. Agpalo made this clear in p. 11: “If one talks of political science in the Philippines, he must refer to political science in the
University of the Philippines.”
6. Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 3.
7. Ibid.; emphasis retained.
8. Ibid.
9. Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Review: Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the
Philippines,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 2 (2005): 229–50.
10. I am aware that the PCF theory has been contested, if not debunked, by subsequent theories (e.g., Bossism, Contested
Democracy, Oligarchic Patrimonialism, etc.), but my goal here is to illustrate how a statist, institutionalist, and legalist
perspective are unable to explain the phenomena of patron-client relations in the Philippines. This is also to provide the basic
view of politics in the Philippines.
11. Jean Encinas–Franco, “The Language of Labor Export in Political Discourse: ‘Modern-Day Heroism’ and Constructions of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs),” Philippine Political Science Journal 34, no. 1 (2013): 97–112.
After Power1. The other essays in this collection prove the point.
2. Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11.
3. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, esp. his skepticism with the possibility of a “private” language roughly at
secs. 243–351.
4. There is, however, a legitimate relation of power: that which is defined by authority.
5. Democracy cannot even function because politics as power in its extreme must eradicate the state, which is a bastion of coercive
power that is inherently dominating and controlling.
6. Heywood, Politics, 4: politics is “the activity through which people make, preserve, and amend the general rules under which
they live.”
7. Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); see esp. chap. 1.
8. Gene L. Pilapil, “Some Arguments for an Institutional Approach to Philippine Politics,” Philippine Political Science Journal 27
(2006): 89–124.
The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of Power1. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum, 2000), 132.
2. Ibid.
3. Michel Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual,” interview by Michael Bess, November 3, 1980; “The Subject and
Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95.
4. Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual.”
5. Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com (2007), http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/.
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POLITICAL SOCIETYuniversity of the philippines
UP POLSCi Leadership. Service. Excellence. Politics.
the up political society review of political scienceThe Sword