the “surge” …and beyond. what triggered insurgency in iraq? short preparation; not enough...

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The “Surge” …and beyond

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The Sunni Insurgents and Al-Qaeda:  The two shared a common goal: to reverse the triumph of the Shiites and restore the Sunnis to their lost position of power.  For the Sunni insurgents, the presence of foreign jihadists also helped divert the attention of U.S. forces.

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Page 1: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

The “Surge”

…and beyond

Page 2: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

What triggered insurgency in Iraq? Short preparation; Not enough “boots on the ground”; Disbanding the military; De-Baathification; Unguarded weapons depots; Unguarded borders.

Page 3: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

The Sunni Insurgents and Al-Qaeda: The two shared a common goal: to reverse the

triumph of the Shiites and restore the Sunnis to their lost position of power.

For the Sunni insurgents, the presence of foreign jihadists also helped divert the attention of U.S. forces.

Page 4: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

Al Qaeda associated with the insurgents for two reasons: The first was to establish an al Qaeda-dominated

ministate:

The second was to seize a leading position within the insurgency and thereby block a power-sharing arrangement between Baghdad and the Sunni nationalists.

Page 5: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

The “Surge”1. The last effort to secure Baghdad;2. 25-30 thousand additional troops;3. American troops remained in the cleared areas “24/7; 4. Coalition troops move into both Shiite and Sunni

neighborhoods;5. Made enough of a difference within three to four

months of the new deployments;6. American troops were pulled back to the periphery of

Baghdad leaving Iraqi forces to carry on the fight in the capital.

Page 6: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

James Fearon: the Bush administration's political objective in

Iraq is unrealistic; No military solution is possible; Civil wars are rarely ended by stable power-

sharing agreements.

Page 7: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

Fearon’s recommnedations: By pulling out troops from the central theaters the

US would increase its military leverage; This would allow the US to play a balancing role; If the Iraqis ever manage to settle on the power-

sharing agreement that is the objective of current U.S. policy, it will come only after bitter fighting in the civil war that is already under way.

Page 8: The “Surge” …and beyond. What triggered insurgency in Iraq?  Short preparation;  Not enough “boots on the ground”;  Disbanding the military;  De-Baathification;

Could Iraq be one of the cases in which power sharing ends a civil war?

Two distinctive features that make power sharingfeasible: a stable agreement is typically reached only after a

period of fighting has clarified the relative military capabilities of the various sides;

a power-sharing deal tends to hold only when every side is relatively cohesive.