armed insurgency in india

DEVELOPMENT A generic panacea for Armed Insurgency in

India?

MBA RM

2015-17

Prepared by-

Group 4

Nimesh Nayak (UR15061)

Shobhan Kumar Meher (UR15078)

Vaishali B Mahapatra (UR15089)

Submitted to-

Prof. T. Kumar

2 Development: A generic panacea for Armed insurgency in India?

Nimesh Nayak, Shobhan Meher, Vaishali Mahapatra

Sl. No TOPIC Page

1 Introduction 3

2 Conflict theory 5

3 Support for insurgency 6

4 Inception and growth of Maoist Movements 7

5 Causes of Formation 9

6 Government Tactics 11

7 Global Perspective 12

8 Counter Insurgency 14

9 The Future of Armed Insurgency 15

10 References 17



INTRODUCTION

Insurgency is a form of rebellion against a constituted authority i.e. an authority recognised as

such by the UN or other forms of formal organizations and those taking part in the rebellion are

not recognized as belligerents. Insurgency can tackled via counter-insurgency warfare, and may

also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of

various kinds which focuses at undermining the insurgents' claims against the existing regime.

Every rebellion cannot be termed as insurgency. There are many cases of non-violent protests

in history, which used civil resistance as an armor, as was the case in the People Power

Revolution in the Philippines in the 1980s that overthrew then President Marcos and

the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. When a revolt takes the shape of an armed rebellion, it might

not be termed as insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between the sovereign states and the

rebel forces. Exempli gratia during the American Civil War, the Confederate States of

America was not recognized as a sovereign state per se, but it was recognized as a belligerent

power. Thus Confederate warships were given equal rights as United States warships were

given in foreign ports.

“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

The man fighting is he a terrorist or a freedom fighter? It is very to look from an eye of an

empiricist and brand them as miscreants but it is not as it seems or looks. From our cuddly sofas

we only see what is shown to us and belief on evidence. We see the evidence of Maoists

bursting police vans and government offices up but never try to delve deep into the cause of

such atrocious behavior. To understand the nitty-gritty of such rebellions one needs to adopt a

phenomenological approach. It is very important to look below the skin and see what has forced

them to take this route.

“Power grows through the barrel of the gun”

These famous lines of the Chinese rebel leader Mao Tse Tung is what gave these rebellions the

colour it currently possesses. He believed that only violence perpetrated at the authorities can

overthrow capitalism. The main aim of such rebel leaders was and remains achieving equity

both socially and economically they stand against capitalism and root for a more egalitarian

distribution of the factors of production. It is worth noting that wars of revolutions and

revolutionaries are inevitable in a classed society, and sans them it is not possible to make any

leap in social development, to overthrow the bourgeois classes and therefore impossible for

commoners to win political power

Insurgency in India comes in the form of Naxalism. Naxalites are a rebel group of far-left

radical communists, who are supportive of Maoist political sentiments and ideology. Their

inception can be traced back to the splittingof the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in the

60s, leading to the inception of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). Initially the



movement centered in West Bengal. But in recent years, it has spread into other less developed

areas of rural central and eastern India, such asOdisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra through the

activities of undercover groups such as the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

In 2007, it was said that Naxalitesat one point were active across "half of the India's 28 states[3]"

which accounts for about 40 percent of India's cartographic area. The area which later came to

be known as "Red Corridor"

Motivation of the Maoists comes largely through their cause. The suffering that they face and

see in their vicinity propels them to stand up against such a system which favours increasing the

disparity between the rich and the poor i.e. the bourgeois and the proletariats. The we feeling

that they have, the feeling of doing something not for themselves but for each other works as a

great motivational force. They foster a gemeinschaft kind of relation.



CONFLICT THEORY:

Introduced by Karl Marx these theories are the perspectives in social science and social

psychology that emphasizes on the social, political, economic and material inequality in the

society. He underlined that human behavior in social contexts results from conflicts between

competing group. These conflicts are sometimes embedded in the system so much so that it

becomes a part of the social interaction.

Conflict theory judges the broad socio-political paradigm, or which otherwise detracts

from structural functionalism and from ideological conservativism. Conflict theories mainly

underline the concept of power differentials, such as conflict of class, and generally challenge

historically dominant ideologies. It is therefore a systemic level analysis of the society. Karl

Marx is considered as the father of conflict theory, which is one of the 4 components of the

paradigms of sociology. Certain conflict theories set out for highlighting the ideological aspects

inherent in orthodox thoughts. Whilst many of these perspectives have a parallel theory to go

by, but conflict theory does not stick to a unified school of thought, and shall not be confused

with, peace and conflict studies, or any other very specific theory of social conflict.

Types of conflict theories applied to insurgency:

Realistic: Human nature is selfish and it is this flaw in human nature that results in

conflicts

Biological: Innate to humans as we have descended from animals who were

instructively violent

Physiological: When violence occurs, there is the possibility that it is being manipulated

by a combination of factors within and outside the individual’s control.

Psycho cultural: Cultural reasons such as the opposition to modernity and

westernization.

Economic: Economic disparity of two closely related group leads to conflicts

Relational: Conflict arising at one point of time or place gets related and gets fuelled

elsewhere.

Human needs-: Conflict arising when basic human needs like food and clothing are not

fulfilled.

Structural Conflict Theory: Conflict embedded in a system or structure due regular

oppression due to incompatible interests based on competition of resources which are scarce.



SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY:

Insurgents generally require 2 types of support: Human and material and these Insurgents may

receive many other forms of support, but the result of this assistance varies a lot. Some forms of

support allow insurgents to survive government onslaught or to weather a fall in popular

support. Other types may be useful but they contribute very little to the overall success of the

movement.

Sponsors of insurgents are those who draw a benefit out of it externally. The main support

comes from other radical groups who have established themselves and want to expand their

base and political parties who draw political benefits by supporting or appeasing the cause of

these insurgents..

There are two broad types of support insurgents enjoy:

Passive: Supporters who don’t risk taking centre stage &quietly sympathize with the

insurgents.

Active: Active support encompasses those who willingly make sacrifice and risk

personal harm.

Some passive support techniques include:

Safe havens, provided by the nation itself be it inside the country where the insurgents can

operate or across international boundaries, are very essential to the success of any insurgent

groups especially when they are in their initial phases and practice guerrilla movement.

Sanctuaries shield the group’s leaders and important members; provide for a place where

insurgents can take some rest, recuperate from exhausting operations, and plan for future

operations.

Political Support: Political parties often extend important political support for insurgent

movements. Cataloguing the entire plethora of this type of backing is not within the scope of

this SADA report.

Direct Military Support: The States at sometimes provide direct military support, using their

own military forces to fight alongside insurgents, such direct assistance though rare isn’t

surprising at all, but when it does take place it usually has a tremendous impact on the fighting.



INCEPTION AND GROWTH OF MAOIST MOVEMENTS

The first rebellion led by a group of communist revolutionaries had taken place in May 1967 in

a small village in Siliguri, Darjeeling (West Bengal). A section of the communist party of India,

CPI (Marxist) led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Ram Prabhav Singh and JangalSanthal

became a reason for a violent uprising of the peasants and the local landlords. The Siliguri

Kishan Sabha adopted arms to redistribute land to the landless. The protest soon spread to parts

of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, and infuenced popular actions in other parts of rural India. It

came to be known as the Naxalite movement (led by the Communist revolutionaries who

formed the CPI-Marxist Leninist party in 1969). The Indian state's suppression of the Naxalites

during the late 1960-early 1970 period and the imposition of the Emergency by the Indira

Gandhi led Congress government all over India in June 1975 snuffed out all opposition

activities , brought to an end its first phase. By the end of the 1980s, several Naxalite groups

following the latter course succeeded in building up a militant farmers movement with strong

bases in Andhra Pradesh (in the south), Madhya Pradesh (in the centre), Maharashtra (in the

west) and Bihar and Orissa (in the east). In the course of the next two decades, they extended

their influence to some 160 districts in at least ten states of India, spanning some 400,000 sq.

km (equivalent to one-eighth of the total Indian land mass. The reasons for the rising farmers

movement in India was because of eviction of tenants, nominally splitting lands into below

ceiling levels, and unfavourable land man ratio in capitalist relations. Because of absolute

deprivation, the objective of Maoists is to smash the apparatus and create a Marxist

(communist) state.

Jammu and Kashmir separatist movement:

The insurgency in Kashmir, the most notable one, has existed in various forms. Thousands of

lives have been sacrificed since 1989 due to the exponential growth of both the insurgency and

the fight against it. A widespread armed insurgency began in Kashmir with the disputed 1987

election with some elements from the State's assembly forming militant wings which acted as a

driving force for the influx of armed insurgency in the region.Farooq Abdullah was declared the

winner. The Muslim United Front (MUF) alleged that the polls were rigged/ biased and it is

well acknowledged by the national and international media as well, resulting in wide protests

and disillusionment.

The Inter-services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accusedof supporting and training and

supporting Mujahideen to fight J&K .According to official figures released in Jammu and

Kashmir assembly, there were disappearance cases and the conflict has caused

causalities..Human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed territory administered

by India, are an ongoing issue. The abuses include mass killings, forced disappearances,

torture, rape and sexual abuse to political suppression of freedom of speech. The Indian army,

central reserve police force, border security personnel and various militant groups have been



alleged and held accountable for committing severe human rights abuses against Kashmiri

civilians.

CPI- Maoists

The formal inception of Communist Party of India (Maoist) was declared on Sept. 21, 2004, at

a public meeting before an assembly of peoples’ guerrilla fighters, party activists and activists

of mass organizations. The two parties which earlier existed, the Maoist Communist Centre of

India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [People’s War] were incorporated to

form the new joint partyParty, the CPI(Maoist). The creation of this new Party has fulfilled the

desires and dreams of the marginalised masses of the country for a genuine proletarian party

that can lead them to revolutionary change for the foundation or establishment of a new

democratic society, moving towards socialism and communism.



CAUSES OF FORMATION

The merger is the consequences of initiatives by PWG approaching MCC with a proposal.

Since its inception on April 22, 1980, PWG had been trying to bring all the Left Wing extremist

groups (also called Naxalite) in India under its purview with the objective of ousting 'the

bureaucrat comprador bourgeois and big landlords classes who control state power in

connivance with imperialism' and 'to lay foundation in its place the New Democratic State

under the leadership of the proletariat' with the ultimate motive of establishing socialism and

communism.The MCC had been its foremost target and talks had been on since the early

1980's. However, the discussions failed to progress initially due to turf wars and disparity at the

leadership level. Despite ideological commonalities and mutual objectives, the pathways to the

merger have been full of hindrances, with territorial and leadership clashes giving rise to an

internecine conflict that continued through much of the 1990s, as the two groups struggled for

supremacy in different parts of then undivided Bihar, resulting in the death of hundreds of

sympathizers. However, continuous interaction resulted in declining agitation between the two

groups over time, and gradually increased operational harmonyand consolidation. The

formation of Jharkhand State in November 2000 and anti-Maoist operations launched by the

administration pushed the MCC and PWG into closer cooperation, and a temporary cessation

was announced between them three years ago. Significantly, the PWG had earlier merged with

the CPI-ML (Party Unity) of Bihar in August 11, 1998.

United Liberation Front Of Asom (ULFA)

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) came into existence on April 7, 1979, by Bhimakanta

Buragohain, Rajiv Arabinda Rajkhowa, Anup Chetia, Samiran Gogoi, Bhadreshwar Gohain and

Paresh Baruah at the Rang Ghar in Sibsagar to establish a "sovereign socialist Assam" by

means of an armed struggle. Their ultimate aim was to create an independent socialist sovereign

Assam and bear the historic responsibility of spearheading the armed democratic struggle.

ULFA represents, as its name is self-explanatory not only the Assamese nation but also the

entire independent minded struggling people, immaterial of different race-tribe-caste-and

religion nationality of Assam.

The front remained inactive till 1986, except recruiting its cadres between late 1983 to early

1984. Soon after networking with Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Nationalist

Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in the year 1986 for training and importing arms, ULFA

raised funds through a train of extortion from a circle of traders, businessmen, tea gardens, both

Indian and foreign owned, and others. It went on to set camps in Tinsukhia and Dibrugarh

districts of the state. In view of ULFA's increasing militant activities in the state, New Delhi

imposed President's Rule on November 7. The full State of Assam was declared a "disturbed

area”. ULFA was banned under the clause of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and

Indian army introduced Operation Bajrang in the constitution.



Causes Of Insurgency In Assam

ULFA was mere a student union group in the beginning (1979) which had unexpectedly

undergone a spate of violence. As a matter of fact it did not develop all of a sudden in Assam

but first originated in Nagaland in 19501 where failure to tackle problems led the people to take

arms. This feeling spread in other areas also that unless forced by an armed uprising, nobody

would pay attention to their craving for justice and fair play. Assam, which had long been

virgin to violent rebellion and was always regarded as part of the Indian 'national mainstream',

also witnessed insurgency on the issue of entrance of large scale illegal migrants from

neighbouring Bangladesh. Though this problem existed before the birth of Bangladesh, but the

independence war resulted in further influx of Bengali refugees in to Assam. The influx was in

its peak during the 1970-72 period; but the Assamese people did not react at that time as India

had just attained victory over Pakistan and Bangladeshis were considered as party to this

victory. This relationship lasted till Sheikh Mujib was in power. Once the Sheikh was killed in

1974, and a not so friendly rule towards India came to power, reaction against the Bangladeshis

went on rising. This was the time when emergency was announced and the political energy of

the Assamese people was directed towards 'save democracy project'. Once emergency was

removed, the anti- Bangladeshi Muslim agitation started growing and by that time Bangladesh

had moved towards an Islamic order seemingly revolted against India.As the pr of these people

posed a deep threat to the cultural, political and economic life of Assam, the All Assam

Students Union (AASU) for the first time came up with the issue of foreigners and demanded

their deportation in 1979.

AASU leaders calculated the number of such foreigners or Bangladeshis as they described them

at four million. The youths in the state felt that even though Assam was blessed with rich

natural resources, it continued to be a backward state 'only because of continuing unjust

exploitation of natural resources'. Day by day, the youth became more frustrated and felt

marginalised and insecure. It was because of these factors that the AASU launched a large-

scale protest for detection and deportation of foreigners. This agitation by the Assamese people

kept increasing for the next six years demanding their own fundamental rights and recognition.

From the early 1990s, the front embarked on a more aggressive campaign to further its motive

by targeting security forces, blasting rail links, killing political opponents and weakening basic

infrastructures. Throughout the 1990s, the front was involved in many terrorist activities. Also,

it is believed that ISI and other terrorist groups have been assisting them in performing such

violating activities across the country. After lying low for some time during the year 2002,

ULFA had begun resuming its terrorist violence. Events of the first three months of the year

2003 prove that no respite for the people in Assam from ULFA's terrorist activities. It initiated a

series of attacks on the major public installations and civilian aims towards the latter part of the

last year, and which still continue into the present year, in what appeared to be a coordinated

bid to reestablish the fact that it is still a force to be reckoned with in Assam.



GOVERNMENT TACTICS

A number of steps have been taken uptill now to combat the activities of Maoists and weaken

their future plans. But in-spite of such efforts government has failed to control their recent

activities like killing of non-Hindi speaking people, assassination of trade union or cabinet

ministers, extortion of money and planning future activities with Taliban and Al-Qaida

(Afghani). Some of the measures taken by government in recent times are as under:

• The government has mostly relied on the military presence without the support of whom

controlling the activities of Maoists was not possible. Be it operation Bajrang or

countering terrorist attacks in Jharkhand or J&K, it is the military or Indian armed

forces which bring peace.

• Curtailment of civil liberties is the democratic view point of the government to control

threats from terrorist groups.

• Imposing President’s rule where the situations have been out of control is the ultimate

step taken by the government in order to restore peace and bring things back to law and

order.

• More attention to local elections and panchayats has been one of the major steps to curb

Maoism in the country. It leads to decentralization of powers at the lower hands which

urges a sense of belonging to the bottom of pyramid people. Thus help in reducing

outbreak of activities to harness the prevailing laws.

• More attention to political views of kashmiri people will help in particular the activities

of Maoists in Jammu and Kashmir.

• PDP-BJP alliance to bridge J&K divide is also one of the crucial steps in curbing Maoist

in J&K.

• Seeking external help like Myanmar, China etc will help the Indian government in

identifying terrorist activities planned with the support of external linkages of these

Maoist groups.

• Initiating peace talks with insurgentshave proved few times to bring activities of

violence and destruction at halt. Many times it has so happened that government have

allowed to meet the demands of Maoist and regulated some laws with amendments in

favor of them.



GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

IRAQI INSURGENCY:

An insurgency began in Iraq after the 2003 takeover, and lasted throughout the evolving Iraq

War (2003–2011). The first stage of insurgency began just after the 2003 invasion and prior to

the formation of the new Iraqi government. From around 2004 to May 2007, the insurgency

primarily focused Coalition armies, while latterly, Iraqi security forces, seen as collaborators

with the coalition, were also focused.

With the full-scale breakout of the sectarian civil war in February 2006, numerous militant

attacks in American-controlled central Iraq were coordinated at the Iraqi police and military

forces of the Iraqi government. The attacks had continued the transitional recreation of Iraq, as

the Iraqi government attempted to build up itself. Common war violence diminished in late

2008 and the insurgency move forward through the United States withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

After the American withdrawal in December 2011, a re-established flood of sectarian and anti-

government insurgency has swept Iraq, bringing about a huge number of losses in 2012.

Increasing violence in 2013 raised reasons for alarm of another civil war.

The insurgents in Iraq have been compromised of a different blend of militias, remote warriors,

all-Iraqi units or blends restricting the American-drove Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I)

and the post-2003 Iraqi government. Amid the stature of the Iraq War in 2006 to 2008, the

fighting seemed both as armed clash against the American-drove military coalition, and also

sectarian violence among the diverse ethnic gatherings within the population. The insurgents

were included in uneven warfare and a war of weakening against the American-supported Iraqi

government and American powers in central Iraq, while leading coercive strategies against

rivals or different civilian armies. Iraq's profound sectarian partitions have been a major

element in the insurgency, with backing for the insurgents changing among distinctive portions

of the population.

BOKO HARAM:

Boko Haram, also known as “WilāyatGharbIfrīqīyyah” was formerly called Jamā'atAhl as-

Sunnah lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihād', is an Islamic extremist group operating in north-eastern Nigeria,

also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. The group is headed by AbubakarShekau.

The group comprises of 7,000 and 10,000 fighters. The group initially had contacts with al-

Qaeda, however in 2014; it showed support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant before

vowing formal devotion to it in March 2015.

After its establishing in 2002, Boko Haram's expanding radicalization prompted a violence

uprising in July 2009 in which its pioneer was summarily executed. Its surprising resurgence,

taking after a mass jail break in September 2010, was joined by progressively complex attacks,

at first against easy objectives, and advancing in 2011 to incorporate suicide bombings of police



structures and the United Nations office in Abuja. The administration's foundation of a highly

sensitive situation toward the start of 2012, reached out in the next year to cover the whole

northeast of Nigeria, prompted an increment in both security power misuse and activist attacks.

Boko Haram has killed more than 17,000 individuals since 2009, incorporating more than

10,000 in 2014, in attacks happening for the most part in northeast Nigeria. 650,000 individuals

had fled the contention zone by August 2014, an increment of 200,000 since May; before the

year's over 1.5 million had fled. Corruption in the security administrations and human rights

misuse conferred by them has hampered endeavors to counter the unrest. The groups have

completed mass abductions comprising the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April

2014.

In mid-2014, the activists picked up control of swaths of region in and around their home state

of Borno, evaluated at 50,000 square kilometres (20,000 sq mi) in January 2015, however did

not capture the state capital, Maiduguri, where the group was initially based. A military

coalition including Chad and Niger have since dislocated the group from the vast majority of its

owned areas, despite everything it controls southern parts of Borno State.

TALIBAN:

Derived from the Pashto word for "students", Taliban is surely understood for being one of few

militant organizations to have been responsible for a country – Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.

Established by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban took Afghanistan over into the medieval

times with their strict burden of Sharia and Islamic laws. It got dynamic backing of the Al-

Qaeda, and was ousted in the US-led attack of Afghanistan.

After the September 11 assaults, the Taliban were toppled by the American-drove intrusion of

Afghanistan. Later it regrouped as an insurgency development to battle the American-sponsored

Karzai organization and the NATO-drove International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

ideological and political objectives. As per the United Nations, the Taliban and their associates

were in charge of 75% of Afghan regular citizen setbacks in 2010, 80% in 2011, and 80% in

2012.



COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN)

As per the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) counter-insurrection or

counterinsurgency (COIN) "may be characterized as 'exhaustive civilian and military efforts

taken to simultaneously overcome and contain insurgency and address its main causes'".

"Insurgency is the composed utilization of subversion and violence to seize, invalidate or

challenge political control of a district. All things considered, it is basically a political battle, in

which both sides utilize armed forces to make space for their political, financial and impact

activities to be effective."

A major question facing the United States and allied governments today is whether and how

foreign aid can play a role in rebuilding social and political order. Beyond Iraq and

Afghanistan, unstable areas in the Middle East, Asia, South America, and Africa pose security

threats, and aid is often a major part of the strategies to address instability in these regions. The

papers reviewed indicate foreign aid can both play a highly effective role in the short-term

counterinsurgency effort and increase violence and instability in the same countries it attempts

to pacify through manipulating civilian and insurgent incentives.

Currently, there are two major competing theories of counterinsurgency:

Hearts and Minds:

Because insurgents engage in terrorist or guerrilla tactics, a counterinsurgency is only as

effective as the information it has. And, while counterinsurgents do not have a general

knowledge of where attacks will occur or who is an insurgent, civilians do. Winning over the

population’s hearts and minds means the civilians will give counterinsurgents the necessary

information to prevent attacks and apprehend insurgents. When aid is used to establish relations

between the local population and troops by developing projects desired by local populations,

aid can increase the flow of information to government forces and be a positive tool in fighting

counterinsurgencies.

Cost-Benefit Theory:

Civilians and insurgents respond to incentives, and aid can alter those incentives. Aid that

increases economic development, for example, can reduce the pull of financial incentives for

joining insurgencies. This theory highlights the dangers of aid; if, for example, reconstruction

projects increase income disparities in a conflict zone, then poorer civilians may have more

incentives to join the rebellion if they are able to extort funds from the richer elite.

Lessons from Counterinsurgency show how effective use of small-scale aid can reduce

violence. By examining data from Iraq and Greece, these papers show that only aid projects

executed on local levels or which are labour intensive are successful in reducing violence.



THE FUTURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY:

The fight between the Indian state and the Maoists is being battled about two fundamental

requests which ought to have been comprehended years ago- land reforms and social justice for

the rural poor. Rather, by taking after the neoliberal model of development, the Indian state is

making more current and more up to date unstable purposes of question between a far reaching

corporate part and a contracting living space from which vast masses of poor people are being

uprooted. Establishment of SEZs (Special Economic Zones) on agrarian area, introduction of

commercial crops (with fluctuating market value) by multinational companies, expanding

exploitation of forest reserves for industrial development, all are guaranteed by the state as

indications of monetary development in statistical terms. But for those at the receiving end, in

bread-and-butter terms, they mean growing impoverishment. Workers removed from their

territories by SEZs (in West Bengal, Orissa) and farmers exploited by the discriminatory terms

of free market economy (which are driving numerous among them to confer suicide in

Vidharba in Maharashtra, and parts of Andhra Pradesh) are swelling the positions of the

disappointed. Reports of starvation deaths and flare-ups of popular demonstrations back to the

explosions of peasant discontent in the late 1960s which proclaimed the Naxalite movement.

The state has reacted to these demonstrations by violent retaliation, bringing in the killing of the

poor members in the agitations.

This vast disaffected range of Indian society is crying out for an alternative programme of

radical change, and a responsive political initiative that will be different from the present crop

of parties which are rich and consummate in crime and corruption and barren of any

humanitarian belief system. Will the Maoists have the capacity to possess all the necessary

qualities and react to their cry in this political vacuum in the Indian heartland? The conditions

are opening up new possibilities for Maoist involvement in zones outside their formerly

strongholds in the backward underdeveloped districts, and quire another arrangement in the

planes of the advanced districts, as different from their isolated hideouts in forests and hills.

Until now, the Maoists have been generally missing from the movements of the industrial

working class, the agitations against environmental pollution and gender biasing, the day-to-day

hurdles of the large sections of urban slum dwellers for better living conditions, the protests of

the middle class against corruption and crime. That apart, their major failure has been their

powerlessness in putting up a constructive opposition to the Hindu religious totalitarian forces

which have imposed an era of terror over members of the Muslim and Christian religious

minorities.

At the end, however, the Indian Maoists cannot remain detached from the new trends that are

emerging in the world Left movement in reaction to the challenges posed by the March of

globalization by neoliberal economic forces. It is being felt that the old tools to oppose

capitalism that were accepted and successful in the twentieth century, need to be replaced by

more sophisticated systems that have to be rooted in a post-Marxian ideology of socialism that



is suited for the twenty-first century. Another model of economic development from a socialist

point as opposed to hegemonization by neoliberal economy is being tried out through various

experiments in Venezuela, Bolivia and other Latin American countries, where a combination of

both armed struggles and participation in parliamentary elections has paved the way for the

disclosure of a new generation of socialist leaders. Indian Maoists can contribute to this

ongoing struggle for a new socialist alternative by reformulating their own strategy and tactics

to respond to the needs of the complex Indian reality.

In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the Naxalites the "single biggest internal

security challenge ever faced by our country". In June 2011, he said, "Development is the

master remedy to win over people", adding that the government was "strengthening the

development work in the 60 Maoist-affected districts.

Development is the best antidote to Maoism.



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Rahul Karmakar, Hindustan Times, Guwahati | Updated: Jul 21, 2015 15:14 IST

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Docs/Statements/PressStatementOnMerger.htm

Press Release by- Kishan, General Secretary, Central Committee, Maoist Communist

Centre of India

7. "Meeting Resistance: New Doc Follows Iraqis Fighting U.S. Occupation of Their

Country". Democracy Now!. Retrieved 2008-08-01. "Know Thine Enemy" | New York

Times |October 21, 2007.

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State. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

9. "Nigeria: Victims of Abductions Tell Their Stories". Human Rights Watch. 27 October

2014. Retrieved November 2014.

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12. Abrams, Dennis (2007). Hamid Karzai. Infobase Publishing. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-7910-

9267-5. As soon as it took power though, the Taliban imposed its strict interpretation of

Islamic law on the country

13. USAID Evidence Summit Analysis for Development, Development to Counter

Insurgency

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http://twocircles.net/2011jun30/development_master_remedy_against_maoists_pm.html

#.VeskGfQhNzl

15. Reflections of a one-time Maoist activist Author(s): Sumanta Banerjee Source:

Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 33, No. 3/4, Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies

of Maoism in South Asia (December 2009), pp. 253-269

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http://twocircles.net/2011jun30/development_master_remedy_against_maoists_pm.html#.VeskGfQhNzl

http://www.jstor.org/stable/29790888

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