,,-' -··-

Methodology ( 137 )

Chapter VIII

€

The Sabda.

·~·

Sabda or verbal testimony is the next source of knowledge

with which we have to deal. In the Brahma-sutra Bha~yas,

this PramaJ).a bears considerable importance, because the Vedanta

system is mainly based on the testimony of scriptures. Brahma­

sfltra must be viewed from two aspects; it is an important

philosophical treatise setting forth the system called the Vedanta,

but never the less it is an authoritative interpretation of the

doubtful points in the Upani~ads. This explains why Sabda or verbal

testimony is considered to be a very important PramaJ).a in the

study of Brahma-sutra Bha~yas.

In the Nyaya system Sabda is defined as the right

knowledge, which we derive from utterances of infallible and

absolutely truthful persons. 1 An absolutely truthful person is

one, who possesses the direct and right knowledge of a thing, who

is moved by the desire to make known to others the thing as

1 "emflq~~: ~·~= 1 " Gautama's Nyiya-siitra1 I. i. 7.

Methodolagy ( 138 )

he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it. 1 Even

Mlecchas may have amidst them absolutely truthful persons

whose authority may be accepted. 2 Except in the case of an

omniscient being, the authoritativeness of tht! verbal testimony

depends on three factors, viz. ( 1 ) direct and right knowledge,

( 2) the desire to make known that knowledge and ( 3 ) the

ability to communicate it.

The trust-worthy verbal assertion

visible world ( Dr,tartha ) or the invisible

may relate to the

world ( Adr~tartha ).

The reliable words of ordinary truthful persons concerning things

belonging to this world fall in the first category, while those

of the .~;{~is, which refer to heaven and such other invisible things fall in the second. If only assertions concerning

visible things are considered reliable, then the Vedas would

become excluded. But the Vedas cannot be so excluded, because

the definition of Sabda Pramat;ta is fully applicable to them.

All knowledge derived from them is valid, for they are the

utterances of the infallible God. The Vedic knowledge is further

conveyed through the sages who are Aptas or reliable persons,

since they had intuitive perception of the truth, love for humanity

and the desire to communicate their knowledge.

Vatsyayana-bha~ya on Gautama's Nyaya-sutra, p. 21.

2 " !ifi1i~T~~,m~t e'IT<i (i5~1lJ~ 1 ., Vatsyayana-bha~ya on

Gautama's Nyaya-sutra, p. 21.

Methodology ( 139 )

There is another classification, according to which there

are two kinds of testimony, viz. Vaidika or scriptural and Laukika

or secular. Scriptural testimony is perfect and infallible by its

very nature, since it is the word of God. Of secular testimony,

only that which proceeds from trustworthy per3ons is valid, but

not the rest. 1 Classifying verbal testimony as Dr~tartha and

AdHtartha has reference to the nature of the objects of knowledge,

and as Laukika and Alaukika has reference to the source of the

knowledge.

The verbal assertions of a trustworthy person are not

in themselves sufficient to give us any knowledge of things.

The understanding of their meaning is necessary in acquirin:5

any knowledge from verbal statements. Hence while the validity

of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement

of a trustworthy person, its possibility depends on the under­

standing of the meaning of that statement.

As the knowledge of nrb:tl testi:n:lny d:!pends on the

understanding of the meaning of a sentence, the logical st-ructur ~

of a sentence and the relation of words in it deserve some

consideration. The Nyaya system defines a sentence as a

collection of significant words, which are endowed with (1) Akank~

or mutual interdependence to indicate the intended sense,

1 '' •n~ ftfcr~ 1 ~~ ~if<fi<ii :q 1 ~f~<tiiftxcrnu;tcm~~itcr JlifTilT+( 1

~TM ccrrn)Qi Slililllq_ I 61"'<l~JIIHII!ij", I '' Tarka-sangraha, p. 53.

,

Methodolo~y ( 140 )

(2) Yogyata or compatibility to accord with the sense of the

sentence and not render it futile and meaningless, and (3) Sannidhi

or the utterance of words in quick succes.sion without a long

pause between them. 1

A word is defined as a combination of significant letters.

The relation of the word and its meaning is due to convention.

The connntion that such and such a word should mean such

and such an object is established by God. 1

In addition to the three conditions, viz. Akaiik~, Yogyati

and Sannidhi, some N aiyayikas accept Tat puya as the fourth

condition of verbal knowledge. Titparya stands for the meaning

intended to be conveyed by a sentence. To understand the

meaning of a sentence we must consider the intention of the

writer or the speaker who uses it. Hence the understanding of

a sentence depends on the understanding of the Tatparya or the intended meaning.

The import of words according to the Nyaya system is

indivisual ( Vyakti ), form ( Akrti) and genus ( Jiti ). The Nyaya

holds that a word denotes all the three in different degrees.

1 '' ~~Jifu~llU ~)g: q~~~~T'l'lf;au~~t •n<fit~t "'"'~at srtftq­

'lr.IIIW'~ftf~~~~~JifuqJ«I•'If ~r.rftatwrt q~01t e"\V iflif~t{ 1 , Kesava-misra : Tarka-bha~a, p. 49.

p. so. 2 "~~~~~'l~T ifl••~ ~ffi~\6~~a: ~fm: I " Tarka-saiigraha,

.. ...

Methodology ( Hl )

The N yaya theory accepts that the wcrd is not eternal. 1

Hence the Naiyayikas do not depend on the eternity of word

for the authoritativeness of the Vedas. According to N yl'i.ya,

the authority of the Veda depends on the omniscience of God

who creates it and trustworthiness of the sages who manifest it.

Thus the authority of the Veda depends on the inference of the

trustworthiness of their authors.

The Vaise~ikas do not accept Sabda as a seperate Pramar;ta,

but they seek to establish the validity of verbal testimony on

the strength of inference, on the ground of its being the utterance

of an infallible person. The Vaise~ika-sutras, however, tacitly

admit the validity of the scriptures on their own authority.

The Sankhya system accepts that the Veda is impersonal.

The Veda on account of its non-personal authorship, is free

from doubts and discrepancies, and is regarded as of self-evident

validity. Even though it is impersonal we need not consider its

words to be eternal.

Apta-vacana or valid assertion is self-sufficient in its authority.

It is always right, inasmuch as it is brought about by the words

of the Veda, which being independent of human authorship, is free

1 "a:rrf<::;r~•n~fr.irll<litCfl({ ~oifiCJ!Sq';:mJ''ii I " Gautama'a Nyaya-

siHra, II. ii. 13.

Methodology ( 14 2 )

from all defects. It is for this very reason that the knowledge

derived from Itihasa and the Smrti which are based upon the

Veda is regarded as right. 1

The authority of Kapila, the founder of this system, is

accepted on the score of his remembering the revealed texts

that he had studied during the previous time-cycles, just as

things known on the previous day are remembered by the sleeper

waking on the next day. s

The Sailkhyas do not accept the validity of the verbal

testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons. It is not recognised

in the Sankhya as a seperate Pram3.r;la, since it depends on

perception and inference. It is the testimony of the Veda or the

Smrti that is admitted as the third independent Pramfu).a,

since it gives us true knowledge about supersensuous realities

which cannot be known through perception and inference.

The authority of the Vedas may not be questioned since

they are Apauru~eya or impersonal. But since the revelations

1 . " tj.:i:q' ~<It~: Slii'TtiTlJ. I Slqllilllt~~<fltfll~f;{a~~~ ~~~t:iT~6'"!iTM'f~"'ffi<!~ .... "' ....

llClfa 1 tzyt ~~'t_~H~arfa~I~!l~TurCI'TCfll~f;{a~fq ~r;f ~m ~Cfftr 1 '' Vacaspati-misra :

Tattva-kaumudi, p. 12.

2 ~' Sltf~fct~lil~ <tifq~~~ Cfi~trr~T <ti~trTPti~T~a~fa~;r~ure~if:, §lnr~~~i!Cf

'l~~~lifJTffi~Tqt(f;n;rq"t!: 1 '' Vacaspati-misra : Tattva-kaumudi, p. 12.

Methodology ( 143 j

of Kapila are considered to be authoritative, there arises the

question of testing the authority of the revelations of other sages

who claimed similar reverence. Saiikhyas argue that reason is to

be applied in finding out what revelations are true and what not.

Pseudo-revelations such as the scriptures of the Buddhists, the

Jainas, the materialists and others are not authoritative, because

these are not right. This can be inferred from internal con­

tradictions, being devoid of any sound basis, containing asser­

tions unsupported by proofs, and being accepted by only a few

low and beastlike persons, M!ecchas and others. 1

In the t~eatment of the Sabda-pramli.J,la the v1ews of the

Sii.Iikhya and those of the Nyaya-Vaise~ika are some-what similar.

The Siilkhyas never openly opposed the Vedas. By their acceptance

of the Vedas they kept up ;:·their orthodoxy. They, however, dis­

carded many old dogmas and silently ignored others.

With respect to the Sabda-pram3J;la the treatment of the

Yoga is similar to that of the Sankhya and there is nothing special

about it in this system.

In the MirnalJlsa the discussion about the nature

of the Sabda-pramru;ta bears the greatest importance, as the

1 '' at~'fficci :ij~,li!'t fifm•nq_ f<Tf~'L~i<I'RllillUif.i'i~ltlifi:r·crFi~'tf ~f'-:q~cr

~~~rMll: ~~rcre~: tr~lll~: qf(H{l~ ii~o~i{ 1 '' Vacaspati-misra: Tattva­

kaumudi, p. 13

M~thodology ( II, 4 )

main doctrine of the Mirna:rpsa is to t~tablish the validity of the

Vedas above all means of knowledge. The discussion relates to

the question whether knowledge is presumably valid or not. The

Nyaya-Vai~e~ika system maintains that the validity or invalidity·

of knowledge can be established only externally; by itself it

vouchsafes for neither. The Mima:rpsakas hold exactly the opposite

view, viz. that knowledge by its very nature is valid. Suspicion

of defects in the means and conditions, and the contradiction .

of it by other knowledge engender doubt and suggest the need

for investigation. This doctrine of self-validity of knowledge

has an important bearing on the validity of Veda.

Sabda-pramii.J;la 1s defined as the means of knowedgc

that we get about things not within the purview of our perception

from relevant sentence~t by understanding the meaning of the

words, of which they are made up. 1

Verbal testimony 1s of two kinds, -viz. personal

( Pauruteya) and impersonal ( Apaurn~eya ). The words uttered

by men come under the first and the second denotes the Vedic

·words. 2 The first verbal testimony is valid if we are certain that

their authors are not untrustworthy, and the second is valid

in itself.

1 '' (I'S\' q~~crun~;:a~ ~~(lqG_q~~h.n;:'llfaCJi~~ ~~: q~r~~'!aT ~HIT<:!i ij't<~

'{~rtf: ~ij~~ml'ITI'<lQl~fCiq<:~<ti llf~f~gcrr<r~tq~r~~cr ira ~~ ~r·~1 ll'il't~"~ij 1 q'i~<~<fl: .. - "' ~·~: Sl;fT1fll, 1 " Cinnasvarni S1stri: Tantra-siddha:Ita-ratnaVJ.li, p. 63.

2 ":a;r:h~J;p:i Cll<l~ ~~: 1" Nyaya-kda, p. 803.

· Methodology ( 145 )

MimalJlsa has taken great pains to establish the impersonal

character of Veda, since that ensures its eternity and infaJlibility.

It is pointed out that in the case of the Veda there is no

tradition of divine or human authorship. Against the view of

Nyii.ya that the Veda is the work of God, Mimii.IJlsakas argue

that God is incorporeal. It is possible that the transmission of

the Vedas may continue from times immemorial by an uninter­

rupted tradition of teachers and pupil9.. Even in the beginning

of a world-epoch the creator may remember the Vedas

in the previous epoch and teach them to the pupils. It is

stated that the }.{~is are not the authors of the Vedic Mantras

but they are only the seers, who are inspired with the eternal

truths, and they have apprehended and transmitted them.

The Mimii.lpsakas even interpret the historical references as

applicable to some universal phenomena. Thus the Veda is taken

to be infallible because it is impcrsoc.al and self-existent.

There is no possibility of any defect or error since it had

no beginning and end in time and since it is not written by

any one. As Kumarila says " Then too, in the case of Veda,

the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put

forward, because there is no speaker in this case; and for this

reason the authoritativeness of the Veda can never even be

imagined. " 1 Thus the Veda is free from all the defects due

to the incapability of the author.

1 Kumarila-qha~~a: Sloka:-vartika, English Trans. by

Gailganatha jha, p. 31.

Methodology ( 146)

The impersonal nature of the Veda IS based on the

doctrine of the eternal character of words in general and the

Vedic words in particular. Jaimini refutes in detail the argue­

ments advanced against the eternal character of words. He

accepts that words exist for ever m an unperceived form.

They are not created when they are uttered; they are made

only manifest. Uttering the same word at the same time by

different persons at different places does not contradict the

eternal character of words, because it is porDsible in the case

of an eternal omnipresent entity. Words do not undergo

modifications, but other words are substituted for those which

go out of use. So also utterance by different persons does

not cause any decrease or increase m the volume of words,

since the apparent decrease or increase is due to the sound

uttered by the speaker. 1

Both Prabhn.kara and Kurnarila argue that the signifi­

cance of words belongs to the significance of the letters

themselves. 2 When a word is uttered each letter leaves behind

the impressions of its significance and these combine and bring

about the idea of the whole word, which has the power to

denote the meaning. The potency of the word originates in

1 J aimini : Pflrva-rnima!Jlsii-sfltras, I. i. 12-17.

2 S. Dasgupta: A hislory of Indian Philosophy Vol. I,

p. 393.

Methodology ( 147 )

the separate potencies of letters. Thus the letters are the direct

cause of verbal cognition according to the Mimii:rpsa system.

Mima:rpsakas do not accept the doctrine of Spho~a, as is done

by the grammarians.

According to the Mimarpsa the relation between the

word and its meaning is etemal. 1 It is natural and not created

by convention. Words and the objects denoted by them are

both eternal and so such relationship of words and their meanings

is naturally possible. If we are not able to understand the

meaning of a word, it is because the accessories of its cognition

are not accepted, not because it lacks expressiveness.

The process of understanding the meaning of words according to the theory of Prabhakara is called Anvitabhidhana-

v;'i.da. This view accepts that the meanings can only be known

from words occurmg in injunctive sentences. Words denote

things only as related to other factors of injunction.

Kumarila, however, thinks that words independently express

separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a

sentence expressing one connected idea. This theory is called

Abhihitanvaya-vada. The N yiiya also accepts the Abhihitanvaya

theory of acquiring the meaning of words.

1 ":aiitqf~<ii~ ~-~~lii<t ~i{<'~: I " slitra, I. i. 5.

J aimini : Purvamimaxp.sa-

Methodology ( 148)

As the Mima:rp.sakas accept a permanent relation of words

and their meanings, it is impossible to accept that words

denote individuals. If a word means a single individual only,

there cannot be an eternal connection between the word and

its meaning. So Mima:rp.sakas assert that words denote classes

and not individuals. Form ( Akrti ) which is eternal is capable.

of relation with eternal word. 1

As is said above, verbal testimony is divided into two

v1z. Laukika and Alaukika. Prabhakara holds that classes,

Laukika or

inference.

non-Vedic verbal cognition is . of the nature of

He does not include this division of verbal testimony

in. Sabda-pramiit;ta. Kumarila, however, considers the non-Vedic

verbal testimony also as Sabda-pramat;ta.

The Mima:q1sa holds that the purport of Veda is action. 2

The sole use of Veda lies in directing us to some ritual.

Vedas by means of their injunctions prompt men towards certain

ritualistic actions by declaring that such actions are beAeficial.

They may also prohibit us from actions which lead to harmful

effects. The part of Veda which does not contain such directions,

1 Kumarila-bhai!i!a : Sloka-vartika, English translation by

Gailganatha Jha, p. 281 f.

2 ' 1 a") f( ~~ttl~: Cfi'llct~roro:m, , " Sa':>ara-bha~ya on Jaimini­

sutra, I. i. 1.

-•

Method~logy ( 149)

but only gives information about already existing things would

be useless. So such parts which are apparently unconnected with

actions are to be interpreted as bearing on a ritual injunction.

The Mima~p.sa theory may be called ritualistic pragmatism, for

according to it the value of Vedic knowledge is for ritualistic

activities.• Mimalp.sakas attempt to prove that every part of

the scriptures refers to act! of duty. Dharma, for the ascertain·

ment of which the Mimaxp.sa aims, is of the nature of

action. 2

This Dharma is not cognised by perception or inference,

11ince it is beyond the apprehension through senses. 3 The Veda

is the only source of the knowledge of Dharma. Perception

and inference as also the other Pramir;tas are not useful in

giving rise to the knowledge of Dharma. They are useful in

ordinary matters and for repudiating wrong views.

1 Chatterjee and Datta : An introduction to Indian

Philosophy, p. 369.

Purva-mima~p.sa-s,iltra,

I. 1. 2.

3 "~~ qW~-~ISIT&lmcr.~~sfq ~ ~rrrtilor 'tl;(m 1 ....

~~:eNW~aT itlilt fO\~~ ~~ Sl~~ij I

a~t~OT :q 'clllt~ a~~fr:~TIT'ii~: II '' ... Cinnasvami-sastri: Tantra-siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 7.

Methodology (no)

The Mim§.qlsakas broadly divide the Veda into ( 1 ) Vidhi

or injunctions, ( 2) Mantra or hymns, ( 3) Nii.madheya or names,

( 4) Ni~edha or prohibitions, and ( 5) Arthavada or explanatory

passages. 1 All these five parts refer to action. Injunctions

directly give the command or prompt a person to action.

Mantras remind the performer about the details and the sequence

of the action. At sacrifices they serve the purpose of recalling

to the mind of the performer the substance, the deity and other

things connected with them. The names serve the purpose of

distinguishing one ritual from another and thus they are u~eful

for action. The prohibitions are negative injunctions. The

Arthavida portion of the Vega is also subservient· to ritual.

It is made up of praise, blame or legends about certain ritual.

This portion is accepted as an authority on Dharma, chiefly

because it tends to the recognition of the excellence of the

enjoined duty. It is accepted as authority only so far as it is

capable of being taken' along with the injunction declaring that

particular ritual~

The MimaiJlsii. lays down many' rules of interpretation

by the help of which one can arrive at the right purport of

Vedic passages. It discusses the auxiliary Pramar;tas by which

one can decide as to how Vedic passages may be connected with

each other as principal and subordinate. Th~y are six, viz,

1 " lfi'li6'1il~ fqfi:J'IOf~~f.\iJt'oll~<rl<:;iley-~5"ffcl"l'~ ~ ~~: I ''

Nyaya-kosa, p. 807.

-.. ·~~~~--------- ----__,.....,----

Methodology ( 151 )

( 1) Sruti or direct assertion, ( 2) Liilga or indirect implication,

( 3) Vakya or syntactical connection,· ( 4) Prakaral}a or context,

( 5) Sthana or position, and ( 6) Sama~{hya or name. Each

preceding Pramal}a is of greater force than the subsequent one. 1

The Mima~p.sa discusses the auxiliary Prama~as which decide the

sequence of the detai!s of ritual from references in passages,

at times spread over at different places. It is explained that

the order of the performance of action is based on six

PramaQ.as, viz. ( 1 ) Sruti or direct assertion, ( 2 ) Artha or

purpose, ( 3) Pa~ha or sequence in mention, ( 4) Sthana or

po3ition, ( 5) Mukhya or the order of the principal, and ( 6) Pravrtti

or the performance. s The Mimiiip.sa has formulated the ]a w of

nomenclature which has been divided into four classes, as­

( 1) Tatprakhya or ba;;ed on the declaration, ( 2) Tadvyapadesya

or based on the mention of similarity, ( 3) Yaugika or based

on the etymology, and ( 4) Vakyarheda or based on the split

of the declaration. a Discussion of how a particular passage

may signify Vikalpa or option, Niyama or restriction of the

purport, Parisailkhya or precluding a particular meaning from it

occurs in the Mima~p.sa. All these and such other rules are

1 " ~faf~~rrcrt'fl~Jiifi{DT~t~Tc:rem~liRT eJJen~ qH~Jof(EllJiqf<~s:r<filSIT(( 1 "

Purva-mimalp.sa-sutra, II I. iii. 13

2 " (f?{ '<I e~~fDT s.tmlllT~ ~;:l{qqro~tJRIJ~~s;rC(~llJ~~Tf;J q-~ I " ':I - c. "'\

Cinnasvami-sastri: Tantra-siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 115.

3 Ganganatha Jha : Sloka-vartika, English trans., Intrc­

duction 1 p. xxxi.

'Methodology ( 152 )

discussed as subsidiary to the elucidation of ritual, since according

to this system action is the main purport of the Veda. Though

these rules are not very important from the philosophical point

of view, they hiive their special significance in the study of the

Brahma-siitra Bhafyas, since all the Bha~yakaras have tacitly

accepted them, and have employed them copiously in the inter­

pretation of scriptural authorities. They are of great value not only

to those who want to understand Vedic ritual but also to all

who are engaged in the work of finding out the exact import of

fixed texts. Intupreting the purpose of scriptures, according

to these cannons is recognised by Indian thinkers of different

shades of view.

The Sm:rtis propounded by M<~nu aad others are considered

authoritative. Their authority, however, is not independent, b;.tt

dependent on that of the Veda. Sages like Manu etc. being

well-versed in the meaning of the whole Veda remembered the

declarations spread over in its different branches, and put them

down in a simplified from in their books. 1 Thus the authority

of a Sm:rti text is based on some Vedic quotation, If it .is not

directly found, it is to be inferred. The Sm:rtis being based on

the Veda serve to giv~ us the knowledge of such religious duties as

are not mentioned directly in it. The Sm:rtis in contradiction

1 " ifrcn~~T f~ ~~~~qT: Olf'<1t~{lf"'!f~e~~ltl~H.~t~T -.:a(aa1 fC!~iffivrrf..l

'(ll~lra\TiaTf"'!' iilif~rr~~t~ ~'GJ;f,ra"ll"'li ifi-~~~l"'!l~~~~il ('!tC!T :q aRaT"'!'IlWJ:. ("~~;:~ ...... -at~f"'lilii"\l: 1" Cinnas,ami-sistri: Tantra·siddhanta-ratnavali, p. 30 . ..

Methodology ( 153)

to the Veda cannot be accepted as trustworthy. The Mimii.Ip.,;ii

is aware that the w called autbors of Srr:rtis may £erne-times be

contaminated with such defects as avarice etc.

The Advaita. VedAnta accepts most of the tenets of the

MimaJPsa school as regards verbal testimony as a means of

knowledge. A sentence whose purport is not falsified by any

other means of knowledge is considered to be valid. The two

divisions of the Sabda-pramii.Qa, viz. Laukika and Vaidika are

accepted.

Like the Mimaip.sakas, Sa:rikaradi.rya believes that the

word is eternal and its significance lies in the potency of the

lr.tters of which it is composed. He does not accept the Spho~a

theory of gramm'lrians. He accepts the doctrine of U pavar~a

that letters only are the word. 1 According to Sa:rikarf.carya, the

letters of which a word consists, assisted by certain order and

number, have through traditional use entered into a ·connection

with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed

they present themselves as such to the understanding,

which, after having apprehended the several letters m

succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they

thus unerringly intimate to the understanding their definite

1 11 CJUTi ~ Sl ~~: ~fa ~iiCJTOlqCJ~: 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-"'

bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

Methodology ( 1~4)

sense.1 Saiikaracarya asserts that individual letters have their

own intrinsic nature on account of which they are recognised

as the same. So they are considered to be eternal. Besides

being recognised as the same, it is the letters which have got

the meaning of the word, and so there 1s no necessity to

imagine the existence of Spho~a.

Acceptance of the doctrine of the eternity of word paves

the way for the proof of the theory of the eternity of the

Vedas. The position of Sankatacarya with respect to this point

is midway between the Mimi!psa and the N yaya-Vai~efika. He

admits that the Veda 15 Apaurufeya; · but he redefines that

word so as to make it signify that the eternal Veda is resus­

citated by God at the beginning of each Kalpa. At that time

there occur in the mind of the creator first the Vedic words

arid then corresponding to them he creates the universe. 2

In

support of this theory San~uacarya quotes from Mahibharata,

which mentions the self-born Being as having firc.ot produced

the eternal, celestial Vedic word, which again, in its turn,

produced all activities. 3 The 'l£das embody the ideal form of

1 "q~o~C!~it ~it CIOTT: >;ifi~T~1~Q:1or ~~IQ'T~f<iil151'61fr'Cfi: ~o:a: ~qs~q~S-.. l:~~l!i<iv1~~!1Jt~•at u~l:aq~~CI'lf~o:~t ~~1 cnnu Q;CI ~~<iC!l1l6il't~Ha a~w~fl:i"fl"tOT S((~l~f~1i~fo:a 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

2 " ~\1nqa\fq ~";: ~~~~: \~ ~fG:iiT: ~&G:r 'l<~fe m~~~<!:, _ qJ~::qT'Q~~-11m~tW6u~ftr il"''a 1 " Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

3 " ('ifa~fq- ' al~T~fCl'lil~l f.:Ii~T CIT~t~1i~T l:<i~l3.CIT I at~T ~~~1 ~~~ ~a:

601h ~<i~~: 1\' ~~ 1" Brahma-3litra ~a:1:rara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

c.

Methodology ( 155) , .. . . ~

the u.niverse, and so they are eternal. What is meant by the

production of this· beginningless and endless Vedic speech is that

it is being imparted orally from the teacher to the disciple. 1

Vedas, as a collection of words, begin to exist at the creation,

and cease to exist at the universal dissolution. This means that

only the texts are not eternal, while their significance is eternal.

At the beginning of each Kalpa, when the creator reveals them,

he does not interfere either with their contents or with the order

of their words. God, the first promulgator of the Veda in

every cycle repeats it anew, but precisely as it was in earlier

cycles. The Siitra :a:Ja ~<I ::q ~~11~41~ 1 2 confirms the conclusion

that the Veda is not merely the source, but the eternal source

of the universe. The J;tgveda. tells us how the eternal speech

which was dwelling in the sages was found out by those who

performed the sacrifice. Sankarikii.rya quotes from Mahabhii.rata

which declares that, being permitted by Svayambhu, the sages

obtained by means of penance, the Vedas and Itihasas, which

were hidden at the close of the world epoch. • The origination of the world from the Sabda means the actullisation of the same

words in the form of objects. The will of Sarp.sii.ra as a whole

1 " 3tarilSC<~~ cn:;:r: ~:h:r~t~ll•nl:m;r<fi') S::!a~:, at;nfc:;f;I~::tl~T a:r-:lll{~~ll)­

(~i~ra~cmt 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bh~ya, I. iii. 28.

2 Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 29.

3 " ~mo:as~itar4~rr~fij~6J~~~= 1 "' ~f~ ((IJ6l 'i,.~ilif:tll((T: ~C(~~:arr u ' '

Brahma-siitra Sankara-bhafya, I. iiL 29.

Methodolo:y ( l56)

is eternal in spite of dissolutions ana creations. So the eternity

of the Vedas is not affected, because the names and forms of

each new creation are the same as those of the preceding worlds

that were dissolved. 1 The whole world including the sun, the

moon etc. is arranged by the highest God on the pattern of

the arrangement of the previous world 2 So in the period of

dissolution of the universe the continuation of the Veda is not

stopped, inasmuch as there is the certainty of the perpetual

vision of the Veda by HiraQ.yagarbha and by other gods ind ];{~is on account of the grace of the highest God. Thus the Veda is

self-existent; only it is not the self-same Veda, but a series of

re-issues of an eternal edition which goes back to the beginning­

less time. Its validity is self-evident and direct, since it:

constitutes the word of God.:~

According to Sai1karacarya, Brahman is the source of the

great body of the scripture comprising the l;tgveda etc. supple­

mented by innumerable disciplines, illuminating all things like

a lamp, and which is itself omniscient as it were. Such a body of scripture cannot originate from any one eh;e except the

1 " 01~ 1!:<~ f<'~~~a~<~T~ima1 ~~~·~~'ijCJc<JTG; ~~·~ fotc~ccrllftl s:Jtir~~il..l "

Brahma·siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 29.

2 "~'1r:q~q~;i) '<Tial ~tll'i_~Cfi~q~?t I '' Brahma-siitra Sankara-

bhii~ya, I. iii. 30.

3 " 6m;r-{l'l'~q(<JJ'i"'TCI'al'ffq iiQJ6~'f~l~~wl51llT~f ~lJCIT~i~Vll~;rJo:JAj -'1 .. "' iif~:;uiQtliiTU~Tf~•r{N: 1 , Brahma-siltra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 30.

Methodology ( 157)

omniscient Being. Sankaricarya believes that the vast mass of

the holy Vedic texts has originated from that great Being,

even without an effort, in sport as it were, like human breath,

as is declared in the BrhadaraJ;lyakopani~ad. 1 Thus it may be

seen that the authoritativeness of the Veda is defended on grounds

other than those urged by the Mimihpsa system.

His firm belief in the authority of the Vedas urged

Sankaracarya to find out a cons·stent view of the universe in

all the Upani~ads regarded as one whole. He insists on inter­

preting the U pani~ads in a single coherent manner. According

to him the knowledge of Reality which we gain from the

Upani~ads is uniform throuhout, and it is without contradiction.

Thus Sa:ilkaracarya accepts the; main position of the

Mimatpsi with respect to the Veda, by asserting that it is

self-existent and eternal. As regards the purport of the Veda,

however, the view of Sankaradi.rya is far different from that of

the Mimatpsii.. He does not accept that the purport of the Veda

is action. He advances several arguments to refute the

position of Jaimini and Sahara, who declare that activity being

the aim of Sruti, passages which have no such aim would be

1 " :al'~PH~;f<.f <!5'1<!5T~l~~ 3;l.lilf.:r:,;:m.JCJ(\ ?.l~ifl"'"~T li_ijT~)i'f: ~~<f:, ' Of~l{

~1 i!._ij~~ f"I:l!:<fl6(1it~ l!E:rct~: ' ~~lllf~ \la: 1 " Brahma-siitra SJ.nkara-

bha~ya, I. i. 3.

Methodology ( 158 )

useless, 1 and that the purpose of the Veda is to give the knowledge of some kind of activity. 2 He does not restrict the

validity of Vedic texts to injunctive statements. According to

him the truth revealed by the s-:ripture is fundamental unity of

Being. The only harmonious and cumulative conclusion of

Upanifadic passages is the declaration of the nature of Brahman.

The words in these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to

Brahman, so it would be improper to imagine that they refer

to an altogether different thing, v1z. action. To do so is to

commit error in two ways; it is to rejec~ the Brahman which is

categorically indicated and to accept the action which is not

so stated."'

$ankaradirya pbints out that even the Mi:mi'i.Ip.sa recog­

nises that there are certain passages in the Veda called Artha­

vadas, which refer to already existing things. The Mimal}lsa

system interprets these passages as subordinate to some action,

since they serve no purpose of their o\vn. So Sankaricarya

asserts that the passages declaring Brahman must be considered

1 "Ofll<tFH7.1 Pti?:~l~t'f~qiif<r+ta~qhnil,l ,, Jaimini: Piirva-mimalJl;a­

~iitra, I. ii. '1.

2 '"t2T fit a~?:~T'~: <Ri<rUcrw:tl{ I" Sa~ara-bha~ya on Jaimini­

sutra, I. i. 1.

3 " e'i:il:{ f~ ~o:a• m-qT~ anqii~a~7.{T~(?:I ~faqr~'6t~w:t ~;r.:rmnf.I 1 ,, ~ ~ ~

Brahma-sutra Sankara-bh~ya, I. i. 4.

4 " w:t :q o~Tw:ti q~W{j ili"GH<J~qf~lifq frlfJit'<{j ~'l'<'Cil.lS"fll~?:l'l'l;rSqfo:a{CfiEtfOJT

~viT, ~a{l<'7.f~o~tfOJT~R~rn(( 1 " Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha•ya, I. ·i. 4.

.... -:---- ._..

Methodology ( 159)

equally valid as portions of Veda. Moreover as the.y serve the

great purpese of being helpful in the realisation of the summum

bonum of man's life by making him free from all pains, the

U pani~adic passages declaring Brahman need not be considered subordinate to action. So in the Advaita Vedanta statements

like ' Tattvamasi ' acquire an independent logical value.

Sankaradl.rya is prepared to concede that action may be

the purport of the Bdihmal)a portion of the Veda, but as regards

the U pani~ads he firmly asserts that their main purpose is to

declare the eternal reality viz. Brahman. 1 According to him

the teachings of the KarmakaQ.qa were intended for inferior

types of as pi rants, whereas the teachings of the U panifads or

J:M.nakal)qa were intended only for superior aspirants, who have

transcended the limits of sacrificial duties, and who have no

desire for any earthly blesl:lings or for any heavenly joy.

Karmakanda is intended for those who are still under ·the spell

of Avidya, and Jnanakfu;l4a for those that have seen the hollow­

ness of the activities it commends and are striving to transcend

them.2 Thus Sankaracarya gets over the antithesis between the

]nanaka1;1qa and the Karmaka:r;~4a by assuming that they are

addressed to different classes of people. What IS considered

----·----------------------------------------------------

1 '• iiil\<il~ ~o<~T ~•11 ~~l:'-1 ~~ g; llci 'f;Jcl(CI'\i if~ ~~~l(filfa 1 '' "'

Brahma-sutra Sankara-bhf.~;a, I. i. 4

2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,

p. 436.

Methodology ( 160)

de&irable and true from a lower stand-point 1s undesirable and

not altogether true from the higher.

The acceptance of such a gradation of teachings is faci­

litated by Sailkaracarya's acceptance of the doctrine of the

relative authority of Pramiil}.as. Sailkaracarya does not give

equal validity to all PramaQ.as. Perception etc. which speak

of diversity are considered to be invalid when

conflict with the teaching of the revelation

they come in

that all is one.

The primary aim of all PramaQ.as is to serve empirical purposes.

Common knowledge is true only as long as the identity of

oneself with Brahman is not realised, as dreams are, until one

does not awake. In the same way the validity of all Vedic

texts is not absolute but relative. The Vedic texts which speak

of action and thus teach diversity are only for empirical purposes.

These teachings are not true m the ultimate sense. 1 The

Veda does not thereby vouch for the ultimate reality of Svarga

or anything connected with it. Only the Upani~adic statements

that teach the unity of all beings are true in the absolute sense.

Though Sailkariidi.rya accepts the doctrine of inherent self-validity

of PramaQ.as, he thus modifies it by the doctrine of their

relative authority.

Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhr~ya, Introduction.

Methodology ( 161 )

In the opm10n of Sankar!i.carya scriptural testimony is

most important in metaphysical matters. Again and again he

reiterates that Brahman cannot be known through perception or

other means of knowledge, for the fact that Brahman is the

self of all cannot be understood except by means of Sruti passages

such as- 1 That thou art '. 1 The ultimate oneness of thing

taught in the U pani~adic texts cannot be negated by the percep-:

tual experience of men. Inferences being dependent on perception

cannot contradict the non-duality taught, in the Upani~ads. As

all Vedanta passages declare the fundamental unity of Being,

there is no proof to contradict it. Thus in metaphysical matters

such a1 the nature of Brahman Sastra supercedes all other

Pramat;tas. In this sphere perception, inference etc. may be service­

able when they do not come in conflict with the Sruti texts!.

In the opinion of Sankaradirya the authority of perception

is held to be supreme in the practical world. In this sphere

even Sruti cannot supercede the facts given by perception

As 1·egards the properties of matter ordinary science is to be

accepted as authoritative.

1 " Of 'if qf~f"lf63't!<Hg;~q-~q~~sfq Slfl{I5JfG.f<llil~cci ~&lOT:, 1 a;;Cfqfu ' ~fa

t1ll~'ll11C{t'l ~l~il<'a'tano:t<in~'lill"lc<ll~ I" Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 4.

2 " 0{ 'iHif~~l~T~Tfifq ~1.11~1.1 ~'{ Sllfllli i'&If~I6T'lli( I fiist ~t~T~IiTSOI-"' "' ""

~CIT~~'-"q 'l't\el1Cifil~ S{qyoi', Sl~l1CITC1610{t<ilil 1!_qq~fqlifl:{i:C{J'i"'f ~~lll"lt~ 1 "

Brahma-sutra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 2.

Methodology ( 162)

As all the Pramii;las including the Veda are only empiri­

cally true, when the Sastra speaks of the fundamental unity

of Being, we have to accept that a false means may lead to

a true end. Sankaracarya accepts even this untenable position

and points out many instances in life where an unreal thing

indicates the real. This position does not go against his central

doctrine, because all Pramai;las including the Sastra ultimately

vanish at the realisa.tion of the real nature of At man. 1

As Sankaracarya believes that only Srutis can reveal

super-sensuous matters, 2 he does not give absolute validity to

Sm:rtis. They are considered valid in so far as they confirm

to the Sruti. Even though composed by revered sages, Srn:rtis

cannot attain authoritative status, if their statements are not

based on Sruti texts. 3 As regards the question, which of the

conflicting Srn:rtis should be accepted and which should be

rejected, Sankaracarya follows the view of J aimini. He accepts

Brahma-siitra Eankara-bha~ya, I. i. 4.

Also- " ~tHii'Slt?.I?.~T ?.~acQ~OJc~~ ifi~a: 1

w&fifi<i ~~( 11'1T'li' ~<IRiff.lll?.~T\l. II "

bha~ya, I. i. 4.

Brahrna-siitra Sankara-

· 2 " -. =<mfiFI~<~'fi~~~~;a'tor ~fk~qw~a ~a ~ifq ~hn<~f?.~si f.rtl:i!ijJ­

~<~l<l. 1 ,, Brahma-siitra San~{ara-bha~ya, II. i. 1.

3 " m?.~e ~fa:, sn'llo~ src~iftt'Sc<IJ<l. 1 ~;rr-i ~~fa: sn~Jro4 Slfa ~nct~to~l<l. 1 "

Brahma-siitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

Methodology ( 163)

the Sm:rti which is harmonious in teaching with the Sruti, and he

rejects that which comes in conflict with it. 1

In discussing the theory of the eternal nature of words,

Sankaradtrya accepts that the words denote the class and not

the individual. 2 The relation between the words and the classes

is eternal, since the classes are eternal. The individuals have

origin and destruction and not the classes. a

Though Sankaracarya accepts the concept of Jati, later

Advaitins like Citsukha do not accept it. Citsukha refutes the

notion of class-concept on the ground that it cannot be proved

either by perception or by inference. Moreover it 1s difficult to

prove how it can be related with the individuals.

Sankaracarya generally accepts the various rules . of

intervretation evolved by the Purva-mimaiJlsa system; and he

shows considerable skill m their application to U pani~1dic

statements without making them subservient to ritual. A fe\v

1 '' fcft~fa~R~T :q ~ila~ctlllCI'l\~ifiijoliS~a~qf\~SO:lla\qf((Gilit :q ~(ll;y~ . .nftull: ' ~ ~

~all: Sl'llatilct~~T ~au: 1 '' Brahma-sutra Sankara· bhafya, I I. i. 1. ' ~

2 " arr~fqf~ll:~ {l~ctt ~if<''<i'r ct o~ftfifl1: 1 '' :grahma-sutra Sankara-

bha~ya, I. iii. 28. 3 '' O<lf~q(q~mctJ~qCGjJfi<lt"'li fit(Git<I'F« il<llf<::{l•~lil ififKqfi(UcJT ~'l\~ij I 'I

~ ~

Brahma-l:liitra Sankara-bha~ya, I. iii. 28.

Methodology ( 164)

cases may be cited here as typical illustrations. In Sutra

II I. iii. 44, he refers to the J aimini·sfitra- ~fttf~~l'fqlif1.1SI'ii~Ui~6'11-"" "'

~'-ITo:tf 6~~ qro::rtl~1.1~Plf1iSI~ 1, 1 and proves that the indicatory

marks ( Linga) in the Vedic texts quoted by him are of greater

force than the leading subject matter { Prakaral).a ) of the portion

where they occur. In Brahma-sfitra III. iii. 25, he quotes the

same Jaimini-sfitra and proves that Mantras which, either by

indicatory mark ( Liilga ) or syntactical relation ( Vakya ) or

some other means vf proof, are shown to be subordinate to

certain sacrificial actions, cannot, because they occur in the

Upani~ads also, be connected with the Vidyas on the ground of

mere proximity ( Sannidhi ). Proximity as a means of proof

regarding the connection of subordinate matters with the principal

matter is weaker than direct enunciation ( Sruti ). 2

Sailkaracarya refers to the law of nomenclature discussed

in the Purva-mimarpsa and points out that in the meditation

advised by the Vedanta it is not applicable. Following Badarayal}a

he asserts that the cognitions intimated by all the Vedanta

texts are identical, on account of the non-difference of injunction

and so on. 3

1 J aimini : Purva-mimarpsa-sfitra, I I I. iii. 13.

2 " ~~') far 6f<t~: ~c1.1T~~ll 'tll~ Sl~ a~ 1 " Brahma-sfitra ~ ~ ~ ~

Sankara-bha~ya, III. iii. 25.

3 " i\ s ;:IHI'~tm;'!l) it~~rcrr~ne1~ij S(qq ~<I 'iilq ' ~ ~T~T ~liT~R;rr­

f~'CJT'lc~' ~liT~~ qf~'t!T: 1 '' Brahma-sfitra Sankara-bhafya, II I. iii. 1.

M ethodolegy

According to the system of Ramanuja

is defined as the instrument which produces

( J 65 )

Sabda-pramat;ta

the knowledge

obtained from sentences not uttered by an untrustworthy person

or that which is exempt from sense-errors ( Karat;ta-do~a ) and

contraries ( Badhaka·pratyaya ).1 It is classified into two

divisions, viz~ Paurufeya and Apauru~eya,

All the texts which depend upon the free will of man

are classed as Pauruf~ya and their authority depends on their

being trustworthy.

Amongst the scriptures the authority of the Veda stands

unquestioned. The Vedas are considered to be eternal. At

every world-epoch Isvara only gives utterance to them. At the

outset of a creation God evolves out of his consciousness what

past orders of the Vedas have lain there and teaches them to

Caturmukha. This assures the eternality and the super-human

origin of the Vedas and thus there is absence of errors and

contraries.

The Smrtis, the, epics and the Purat;tas are considered

to be authoritative, since they expound the ideas contained in

the Vedas. Paficaratra Agamas also are accepted as valid since

1 Srinivasa: Yatindramata-dipika, III.

----------- ..._,...------- ---- -

Methodology ( 166)

they owe their origin to the divine Vasudeva. 1 Thus Ramanuja

reckons not only the Veda as revealed but also the Paiicaratra

Agama, regarding the whole of it as eventually going back to

a Vedic or some equally untainted source. Thus he places the

Paiicaratm Agamas on the same footing as the Vedas.

In this respect the view of Ramanujadi.rya greatly differs

from that of Sankaradi.rya. In the last Adhikara~a of . Brahma­

sutra II. ii, Sankaradi.rya remarks that the Bhagavata doctrine

deserves only partial acceptance, in so far as it holds that Isvara

is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

He, however, asserts that the doctrine cannot be accepted entirely

owing to the numerous contradictions in it and owing to its

containing many passages contradictory to the Vedas. 2 But

Ramanuja strongly attacks this position. He defends the

authority of the Paiicara~ra Agama by saying that it is the essence

of the Vedas and it explains more easily their hidden purport. 3

He quotes many texts to support his view that the Lord himself,

1 " <ijijl ~~Fo~: lfUlij~l!oT ~H.T~IIT: ~CI~~CI q3-1'i'U";£~~ 'l·~~~~~ ~fa,

ot~CI~cra~cri~~~f~·.;nf~ t~'Q?1~fa =<~ af~JJ~o\o<'Simlll;:li ~ ~~pq~G;~Pj[f~ij ~if~il.l ''

Ramanuja : Sri-bhal;lya, II. ii. 42.

2 " fctSifo6il:l~=<J(~sm~ iisfctocr ~q~+~ij ........ ~~fCJSifije.'if~=<I il<lfa 1 "

Brahma-sfitra Sankara bha~ya, l I. ii. 45.

3 '' ~~ SJi'~~l:6111l'l~i:l~fil-'211~qft.fJJo~T~IOJ.. fcp•~qCJ1~11?1~crTOJ,. ~ito'«l~­

§\~~\<lrn~i3iJCJ'ifT~ ij~q~l'lltll!TOI~lf'if qSt{\1";£~1~ ~q~~q f~\f+~ifi~,fu f~~CIV'( I "

Ramanuja : Sr1-bha~ya, II. ii. 4 ~-

... -.. --.,

Methodology ( 167)

being compassionate to the devotees, has summarised the U pa­

ni~ads in the form of Pailcaratra Agamas.1 He winds up the

Adhikara:r;ta with a long ~iscussion on the authoritativeness of

the Bhagavata doctrine, and argues that it is strongly recommended

in the Mahabharata by Vyasa himself, the author of the Siitras.

He remarks that the statement that Sa:r;t<}ilya, not finding any

satisfaction in the Sruti and Smrti, at last found it m this

doctrine is opposed in no way to the latter, 2 on the othEr

hand it means a high eulogy of them.

It is very difficult to decide who of the two Bha~yakaras

has interpreted the Sutra f<l"ijT;nfc=:~~ ~r~qf([~'<l: 1 3 correctly; and

consequently it is also difficult to decide whether the Adhikara:r;ta

is only a refutation of the Bhagavata doctrine or whether it

aims at establishing it. Dr. Thibaut prefers Ramanuja's inter-

1 '' ~~"'~·~ ?.i~T ~R ~~~ lll!CI'T"l,. ~f~: I

~:q;Ff<fill:f?1T fer~ ~fs:q~q ?.i'fl§'"'ll.. II ""

Also- l.~ 'f{lqf;jet~ "'H!~~'f~([1J.. I

61~·~'li?1Tfi~([Jra-. qs:q~J?~FnnfiG:all.. 11 '' ~ ~

Ramanuj~ : Sri-bha~ya, II. ii. 42.

2 " 6l'!~L~ ~~~ ~~liltqf;j60T -. ~·~fij cr"t;nif:~fcf~ ei?li!_- l.f6, ~~?1-

wn~..lle~~<~:q6T'f-.T<fif~ae~ q~q_ot"'?.il?.i<fi~TqT;jt 'l:;:mT•Ifcr~ fl.l1([: 1 ''

Ramanuja : Sii-bhi.i~ya, I I. ii. 42.

3 Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhafya, II. ii. 44, & Sri-bhafya,

II. u. 41.

Methodology ( 168)

pretation of the Adhikara:Q.a. 1 Dr. Belvalkar, however, thinks

that Ramanuja's explanation lacks conviction. 2 Dr. Ghate also

holds the view that the opinion of Thibaut is not acceptable.ll

According to the system of Ramanuja, the authority of

the Srn:rtis is considered to be dependent on the Vedas. Sm:rtis

only help to clarify the purport of the U pani~adic sentences.

The help of Sm:rtis is necessary for those who are not so

well-versed in the Vedic lore. But only those Sm:rtis which

do not contradict the Vedic doctrine are to be accepted as

authoritative, while those which go against the purport of the

Vedas are to be disregarded. 4 The authority of the Purar;tas

and epics is also dependent on Srutis in a similar way. It may

be noted that the doctrine of Ramanuja draws upon the

Pural)as and Paficaratra Agamas for support to a very large

extent.

1 G. Thibaut : The Vedanta Siitras with the commentary

by Sankaracarya, Introduction, p. Iii.

2 Belvalkar : Brahmasiitras of Badaraya:Q.a with the

comment of Sankatadl.rya, Ch. II Q. ii Not~s, p. 205.

3 G hate : The Vedanta, p. 89.

4 " <I~fq ~O!'l~CJN?.Il;:r(iJRtiifili'ijSit?.l f5Tf~Cii~~HSHI1UJ6il1!<FH~ fifl1Cil~SI faqR~-"\ .... ....

quCJl~ a~t1~~~11.1T<:q~ar~t srfijq~urt ij!l;q~~urifttf~all., ijttrsfq ij~tti:!~.nf\OJ1"1TifTRoif·

SI«rraRt il~ift"lf ~a'l~t a?t;q~~OJT<I Si<i~T"!Tif~CJ<pretci ~ sre1~~~~fa ~fa~~~~t Clifq~~qfa~tt~OJ'l?.il 1 " Ramanuja : Sri-bha~ya, II. i. 1.

Methodology ( 169)

In the opinion of Ramanuja, the Veda is the only

authority for the knowledge of super-sensuous matters and

Brahman can be known only through it, 1 Its veracity .lies in

a region beyond that which can be actually observed or uP.der­

stood by finite intelligence. Scripture is our only source

regarding super-sensuous matters, though reason may be employed

in its support.

In the system of Ramanuja there is no necessity of

considering the relative authority of different Pramar;ns, since

valid PramaQ.as cannot contradict each other. The perception

of· diversity in the world ·is valid, so also 1s the scriptural

testimony of the unity of Atman and Brahman. These two

PramaQ.as are only to be reconci:ed by considering the diversity

as the embodiment of the Lord. This view is supported by the

Sruti text of the Antarya:ni Bra~ma:t;J.a, where the world is

spoken of as the body of God. 2 Here the testimony of the

Vedic text must prevail; it cannot be set aside by ordinary

perception.

1 " JmO'JT~~-=arn1f.:it~t~C'f SH~~~~!:(illllflf~'-la~T, 'llltiJf: ~T~Cfi!:['ITO'J~crTa, l "

Ramanuja: Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 3.

Also:- " iii' ~O'J: Il'IIO'Jtra~Ts:r~raat ~'-Ita', (I~ <im WI ~•nfq Il'ITOJWJ o-q:q;q 1 '' ... Ramanuja: Vedanta-dipa, III. ii. 22.

2 Abhyankar :

duction, p. 65-56.

Sarvadauhna-sailgraha, Sanskrit intra-

Methodology ( 170)

As there is no mutual antagonism between any two

Pramfi.JJ.as, scriptural testimony cannot be said to be superior in

Talidity to perceptual experience. Therefore scriptures are to

be interpreted in such a way that they do not come in conflict

with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. So the perception

of the reality of the outside world cannot be set aside by the

statements of the scriptural texts which speak of its falsity.

Those texts are to be interpreted so as to accord with valid

perception. Thus according to the Ramanuja system all PramaQ.as

are absolutely valid upto ~he end.

Sailkaradirya's view, that even scriptures are false in the

ultimate ,sense and there is possibility of attaining knowledge by

false means, is not subscribed by the followers of Ramanuja.

It is asserted that falsehood can never lead to truth. Only

from one right knowledge we can come to another.

In the opmwn of Ramanuja all words ultimately denote

God.l. They need not, on that account, be considered as

synonymous, since the outward form of the denoted object is

Sarvadarsana-sailgraha,

P• 104. Also- '' -.:t Sl e<Jf~qift: q~"f~~~ f;(~f'i~SI~o~<f q~•ic(ffi\

a~SI<m:: q~'IS¥1: e11ro ~-~~?;J •fij PcriN: 1 '' Ramanuja : Sri-bhi\fya,

I. i. I, p. 117.

Methodology ( 171 )

diverse, while the internal self of all is the Lord. In explaining

the Vedic text concerning the creation of the name and form

Ramanuja has explained his doctrine in detail.

The principle that every word eventual!y signifies God

enunciated by Rarnanuja helps us to understand- the meaning

of the Upani~adic statement "That thou art 1' according to the

Visi~tadvaita system. Here the word 1 that 1 finally denotes God

having the entire world as his body; and 1 thou 1 denotes God

having the individual soul as his body. Thus the whole state­

ment declares the identity of the embodied God in both.

As regards the antithesis between the Karmakat;tga and

the Jiinnakat;tga, the view of Ramanujacarya is different from

that of Sankaracarya. He does not consider that they are

really antithetical, and maintains that the two portions of the

Veda together form a single teaching intended for the same

class of persons • .~ The scripturul injunctions are but commands

of God. The scripturLs only show what actions would be!

pleasing to God and what are against his command. The

object of scriptural sacrifices is the worship of God and all

the different deities that are worshipped in these &;acrifices are

1 '' ttiij~~f:O"faH'(~~<ltJ'!~h t" Wimanuja: Sri-bha~ya 1 I. i. I, p.5.

Also-" og;;:;f ~I{ :q t'lT~IJ{~~~'~'l'fT~f~tll~f~f•'fiCfiqfll: q~q~~"'TU'l"'l~~:

q~q!l~" Hn~ur iillll~ tft~ 'l~If<=:"'IT f<~fcrf~.~~flfa ~1~ur llfaqiva 1 I'

Karnanuja: S.i-bha~ya, I I I. iv. 26.

M~thodology ( 172)

but different names of God himself.l Thus the PiirvakaQ.ga

dwells upon the modes of worshipping God; and the Uttaraklii)IJa

upon the nature of God. Ramanuja thus co-ordinates the two

sections of Veda ry considering them to be complementary.

As Ramanuja gives equal importance to the Piirvakii.Q.ga

and the JfianakaQ.ga, his view is different from the Advaita view

as well as the Mima~p.sa view. Like the Mima~p.sa he does not

believe that the ultimate purport of Veda is only action. He con­

sider& that the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote

action is not binding 2 Accordingly the doctrine that the Vedanta

aignifies the highest Brahman as the purport of the Jiiiina-kaQ.cJ.a

stands uncontradicted.

The bearing of the doctrine of the co-ordination of the

JMna-kaQ.ga and the KarmakaQ.ga is very great on the practical

discipline of the Ramanuja school. Mere. understanding of the

words of the scriptures is not considered sufficient. Actions that are

taught in the Vedas are to be performed, not for obtaining respective

fruits but for securing the grace of God. By it one can attain

emancipation. Man's actions cannot guarantee anything to

~~·;m1iilm~-!Qfa q:j~qa ~l~: ~~Sf srft:lqrG:f~~lla 1 " 1\.amanuja: Sri-bhaf;a, I.i.l,

p. 128 .,;f 2 "CliTliT~ -g;~ o~(qf6fda f""("'liiT fo:{~if"'Cf;J: 1 " Ra.r.a 'uja: Sri-bha~ya,

I. i. 1, p. 124.

~\1 e: hodology ( 173 )

him n:erely ac: the fruit of those actions, but good or bad

frui!s are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure

of God. By good actions and devotion there is an ultimate

expansion of one's intellect and finally in meditation bearing

the character of devotion a man has an intuition of reality. 1

Since the obje::t intuited is not directly presented, the nature

of Sak~atUi.ra. is said to be indirect in character; yet, so far as

its immediacy and clearness go, it is not inferior to perceptual

knowledge. This Sak~tkara is the means of emancipation and

it is acquired through the grace of God. 2 Scriptural texts

refer to the attainment of such Sak~tkara on the part of the

Eages Yam<Jdeva and others, who saw the one Brahman with

th~ material and immaterial objects for its distinguishing modes.'

Madhvacarya refers to the Sabda-prama1,1a only as is

employed in philosophical matters. He divides it into two kinds, viz.

valid and invalid. The valid verbal t(stimony consists of scriptures,

--which are free from defects. These scriptures are again divided

as Apauru~eya, or those which are not the compositions of

1 " :a:Jfq ::q ~~N~ ~"?1<fmOT~ +Ififa~lflq~ fWI~"?.iRirJ -g:ctr~lf ~~~lt'fiH:, WI1~€lfa

sqfa~qft\~?1lil<tfl~lla 1 " Riimanuja : Sri- bha~ya, II I. ii. 23. "- c:.

2 " ~;j ::q <tl'f?.il~.,..l~~frQ~ll_ci \<ITo:IT'tJRfi~Tf~~<tl•~ f<t~~Qlmfll~ffiqil-

~~~fij~q f.l\Rt~?.if~?1ill{~~~~l~?.iTfa~?.ii!TSI?.i10TT~<tijlfJOi ~~~'if;jf;JC~'Qiil'~lf+I: 1{..~<4 I'' c:. _.

Ramanuja: Sri-bh~ya, III. iv. 26. 3 " lfo: ~~~~~a~na<t~qTOTi '-llil'~<fR'\;rt ~~if Sl<fil~nf~1fC!_ ~;riG:tf~~~q-

Cf"tQt~taff~qqs"ff<tflil2aT?.it ~fq i'~~urt~T~~~?.j Slffiifij I " Ramanuja: Sri· bha?ya, ~ ....

II I. ii. 24.

Mcthocology ( 17-4 )

persons, and Pauru~ !ya or those which are the compositions

of persons. All these scriptl'l·res are considered to be valid and

irrchaded under the name Agama or Sastra. The Apauru~eya scripture has absolute validity, and is considered to be infallible.

The Pauru~eya scripture may be fallible.

In the Apauru~eya Sastra, Madhva includes all the Vedic

literature consisting of the four Vedas, the Brahma:r;tas and the

Upani~ads. In the Pauru~;ya Sastra he includes Mahabharata,

Ramaya:r;ta and the Paficaratra Agamas. Whatever scriptures are

harmoneous In purport to these are considered authoritative,

while others are not so. 1

l\Iadhvacarya considers that the purport of the Veda

and that of the Pancaratra Agamas is identical and so they

are authoritative. 2 In his v1ew about scriptural testimony

Madhva, like Ramanuja, shows greater leaning towards Agamas

and PuraQ.as than Sankara do,::s.

1 " ~~~~: ~Tilltt<ri :q llH([ qJS'tfU'S{ifiil I ~ ~

"~(Tm~oi ~q ~Rilyqi~f'il'Cft~a 11 ... ~"''tf~ili~~iffi(~ Q'i't{ ~t~ s:r::ttma~ 1

aTmY<i) ~t"'t~~tatir ~q flit~ ~qtq aa u " ~

Brahma-Sfltra Madhva-bha~ya, I. i. 3.

Also:- Sarvadarsana-sangraha, p. 274.

2 " ~~'tS'f\r-f<IT~'i~tfl1tnilur qscr(T?f(~q !:llij'JVlJil~'l 1 " Brahma-sfttra "" "\

Madhva- bha~ya, I. i. 3·.

Methodology · l ~r::

I~ .

Like other Bhafyakaras, Madhvacarya believes that

PramaQas hke perception and inference are not helpful m

knowing the nature of reality. We have to depend on scriptures

in general and the Vedas in particular for the true !mowledge

of Brahman.

Madhvadi.:-ya gives equal importance to all the parts

of Veda and considers that the hymns and the Brahma"Qas are

as useful and valid as the Upani~ads. He does not consider

that there is any antithesis between the KarmakaQ4a and the

JfianakaQ4a.

Invalid verbal testimony as is found in pseudo-scriptures

( Agamabhasa) consists of defects and discrepancies. These

defects are of many kinds. Not being capable to denote the

intended meaning, denoting it in the wrong way, repeating

what is already obvious, not being directed to a purpo~e,

being directed to an undesirable purpose, directing impossible

means, directing more difficult means when easier ones are

available are some of the defects of verbal testimony which make it invalid.

Following Badarayat;la, Nimbarkacarya also asserts that

the nature of Brahman can be expressed only by a scriptural

text, 1 as the signifying powers of such text directly originate

1 11 f;;mT~<i ~il ~l~SiillllfCli~ illHISI'ITUf'fi'l_ , ~'l(ij~d\;ft 6T~q(q~~T eft

a~CI ~1ffil 1 " Brahma-sutra Nimbarka-bha~ya, I. i. 4. "\

_ _j

Methodology ( 176)

from God. Perception ~nd inference cannot be employed in

super-sensuous matters.

In scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts.

The only way in which the claims of both these types of texts

can be reconciled is by coming to a position of. comr r )mis~ that Brahman is at once different from and identical with the

world of spirit and matter. The scriptural texts that speak of

duality refer to the duality that subsists between ultimate sub­

stance, the Brahman, which alone has independent existence,

and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence.

The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate

entity \vhich has independent existence and which forms the

common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts

that refer to Brahman by negations signify how it is different

from all other things which are limited by material conditions.t

Nimbarka does not accept the Mimfi.~p.sa view that the

purport of Veda consists in enjoining the performance of the

Vedic duty. According to Nimbarka, the goal of the performance

of all duties is the attainment of emancipation. The result

of all deeds ultimately produces a desire for knowing Brahman

and through it produces the fitness for the attainment of eman­

cipation. The obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the

1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III,

p. 431.

Methodology ( 177)

,mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge; and

voluntary deeds are subservient to Brahman by producing a

part of the bliss of the unity of Brahman or by producing

superhuman bodies for the performer making him more fit for

emancipation. Thus Nimbarkadi.rya s"C~ordinates the Purvakii."Q.ga

to the Joanakanga. 2

According to the system the doctrine of Bhedl.bheda

is the fundamental doctrine. Nimbarka interprets the famous

sentence " Tattvamasi" in the light of this doctrine. According

to him the word " Tat " signifies the eternal omnipresent

Brahman, and "Tvam" refers to the individual soul whose existence

d~pends on Brahman, and "Asi'~ bring out the relation between the

two which is one of difference compatible with non-difference.

Nimbarka accepts the necessity of Smrtis for the eluci­

dation of Srutis, but according to him the authority of Smrtis is

is dependent on Vedic texts. Only those Smrtis which are not

contradictory to the V cdas are considered authoritative, the rest

are invalid. Srinivasa quotes from Manu and points out that all

1 " t.l~~~f~<ii~~~"j :q1f'if<ii1Re~t~~~6~1~00 JlGtfiilil~~~f~{Ciilfu~ "'

.-ll~quurt ~~q~ElW~Tf.l "l_atf.f 'IPil!qifrq.:~fa ~lil ~lwt~~~fq JI&IWC::~~~~~

~ rnr qv~~n;ii~: ' fli•'f ifil~t ~i)l&lff.I~~~~·uf~uq'R\Of~~~ ·~~u~ '\ ..

•'~"iif'1: 1" Srbivasa: Vedanta-kau&tubha on Niml.arkabhafya, I. i. 4.

Methodology ( 178)

heterdox Srrq:tis should be left out of consideration since they mis­

guide the people. 1

Vallabhad.rya also asserts that the Sastra is the fina]

authority in metaphysical matters. The nature of Brahman as

is described in the Veda must be accepted as it is, since it is

known only from that source. • In the system of Vallabhacarya

the authority of scriptures stands supreme. Other PramaQ.as

are useful only if they do not come in conflict with the Sruti

texts. So far as they are in consonance with the Sruti their

authority is accepted.

Vallabhacarya does not accept the allegorical method

of interpreting Vedic texts. He believes in the literal inter­

pretation of Veda. He asserts that every letter of Veda is to

be accepted as significant, otherwise it would result in the

non-belief in the authenticity of the scripture as a whole.

Even though the Mima:rp.sakas themselves accept the meta­

phorical interpretation of such portions of Veda as Arthavadas,

Vallabhacarya refuses to subscribe to their view.

1 '' ij'ITSS~ ~qr-:~: I ~·

~T ~mT: ~~) ~1~ ~T~t~ ~~!~:I .. .. at: ~.n ~'lfiWt: it~~ a~'OT f~ m: ~~~m: II ''

Srinivasa: Vedanta-kaustubha, II. i. 1.

2 "Ill H ~ftqf\;rll~ ~1~~ ~ stfijqTVa al~\l~~~cn;qtq 1" Valla bha: c. ..

A:Qu-bh~ya, I. i. 19,

Methodology ( 179)

Amongst the authoritative scriptures Va11abhadi.rya in­

cludes Bhagavata also. In this system instead of Prasthanatrayi,

there is Prasthana-catu,taya, viz. Veda, Bhagavadgita, Bada­

raya:t;lasiitra, and Srimadbhagavata. Each subsequent Prasthii.na

removes the doubt in the pr~:.-vious one and thus all of them

together manifest the true doctrine. 1

As Veda is authoritative in all its parts the reconci­

liation of apparently contradictory texts is an important

problem for Vallabhacarya. He believes that the whole of

Veda consisting of the two sections, Piirvakil}.ga, and Uttara­

k~ga, discusses only one topic, and it is the topic of God.

On this ground it must be considered that the two systems

of Jaimini and BadarayaJ;ta constitute one Sastra. In this

re'3pect, like Ramii.nuja, Vallabha follows the theory of Vrtti-

kara. He shows the two MimaJP.sii.s as forming one science

on the ground that both of them treat of one topic, VlZ.

God and have the sole purpose of giving liberation to

mankind.

According to Vallabhacarya, God possesses innumerable

divine qualities of which Kriyll and Jfiana are prominent. The

Piirvakii.J;tga describes God in the form of Kriya or Yajfia,

1 "~: ~"'fCfN~ ~RR{5{lfUr ~if ft I c.

elllf'1lll'ill eliRI~ !l'llui <r~·~t~~ II ~( ~~~;i q~ffi<t~ I" Tattvadipa-nibandha, I. 7

I

Methodology ( 180)

while the Uttarakii.J;lga describes him in the form of Jiiana,

known as Brahman. The Piirvak3J;tga thus represents one

aspect of God, while the U ttarak3J;tga represents another

aspect, and consequently the two K3J;tgas maintain their in­

dependence. This justifies the theory that the Piirva-mima~p.sa

and the Uttara-mimaip.sa are two independent branches of one

and the same science. Thus Vallabhadi.rya established the

harmony between action and knowledge. In this respect he

greatly differs from the Mimamsakas and the Advaitins of the

Sal').kara school.

In order to support his theory about the harmony

of Karman and Jiiana, Vallabhacarya adduces an important

argument by referring to the fact that Jaimini was a disciple

of Badarayal').a. 1 He considers that it is not possible for the

pupil to teach a doctrine that comes into conflict with the

theory of the teacher.

By the reconciliation of the Karmamarga and Jiiana­marga naturally a greater stress comes to be laid upon sacri­ficial action. As a staunch follower of the Vedic path this is quite natural in the case df Vallabhacarya. In this connection it may be noted that he has been described by

his son as Karma-marga-pravartaka. 2 Vallabhacarya believes

1 ~~~~ilc;r cs~re~ ur~eRT: ~ffiCilltt, t" AI.lu-bh:ifya, I. i. 3. 2 G."' H. Bhatt : Journal of the Oriental Institute, I. iv. 353.

Methodology

that the performance of sacrifices is

God, who gives the reward according

of the performer. If the performer of

( 181 )

calculated to please

to the qualifications

the sacrifice happens

to possess the knowledge of Brahman, God appears in person

and gives him gradual liberation. In the absence of know­

ledge, the God in the form of five sacrifices gives the

happiness of soul or the world of heaven. Vallabha.cii.rya

thus accepts the old theory of action cum knowledge in •

the path of Maryada, which is restricted

follow the ordinary orthodox method in

1iberation.1

to those who

their pursuit of

There ts, however, another path which transcend•

all limitations. This path is called Pu~~imarga. In it one

has to rely completely upon God's grace for liberation.

If a person qualifies himself for the grace of God through most intense love and devotion, the God may choose to

show his grace to the man, and then he gives him libera­

tion immediately :1 By this theory of the two paths, viz.

Maryada-marga and Pu.~irnarga, VaJlabhacarya comes in pos­

session of the spiritual legacy which reconciles action,

knowledge and devotion.

1 "iliQ~UiT: fsti11Tm~~')~q~~~Cfq'l(( ~~~mit f"Ucl: I" Vallabha­

dirya At;lu-bha~ya., I. i. 2.

2 ccfctftaeT'loi fcl~ct ~~ S~i!fll"il~k\T t'' At;1u- bha~ya, IV. ii. 7.

Also- 11Sf'~illt11s~~iii6T\1.l: Sl'llUiill'lif~:vnaUJ: 1" Aq u-bh~ya, IV. iv. 9.

Methodo[ogy ( J82 I

The theory of Vallabhadi.rya lays more stress on

the Sruti pas&ages which describe Brahman as possessed of

different attributes, since he believes that God possesselii

qualities. The nature of God can be summarised by his

attribute Saccidananda. The Highest, when viewed from ih

aspect of Sat, and when associated with action only, is

Yajfiapurufa, who can be propitiated by actions as stated

in the Brahmal)as. When the Highest is viewed from its

aspect of knowledge ( Cit ) and when associated with wisdom,

it is Brahman, and can be approached through Jfiina as

stated in the Upani~ads. The Highest, when viewed from its

aspect of bliss ( Ananda ), IS KffJ;la, the Supreme, and

he has to be worshipped according to the principles of

GWi. and Bhagavata.

Vallabhacarya is faced not only with the difficulty

of reconciling the contradictory Vedic passages rcfering to Karman and Jiiana respectively, but also with the difficulty

of reconciling the contradictory passages which speak of

Brahman as Sagul)a'. and Nirgul)a respectively. He asserts

that the Sruti passages which declare that the highest has

no qualities mean merely that he has not the ordinary

qualities. He believes that his main doctrine, that Brahman possesses extraordinary qualities and is such that in its nature even contradictory qualities are reconciled, stands unrefuted. 1

1 "a~ SJ~~;no:n~<it ~rn~ftl~t q) q UT<Iill.:~;aflllltJfta-vr itfa o:ns<iv.-"""'' ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~fa fo:t""'<i<i: 1" Al,lu-bha~ya, III. ii. 24. Also-"a~li9 faSI~<ii: ~~f.Rii:oq'li"l<i~~ij fliSHfla.\ fq-·(.N 1" AJ;lu-bha~ya, III.ii.21. ...

"'

Methodology ( 183 )

The importance of Sabda PramaJ.la in Indian philoso­

phy, and especially in the Vedanta system, does not deserve

to be minimised. It is often argued by critics that the

growth of Indian philosophical thought was stultified by the

limitations set on it by an undue reverence for the authority

of scriptures. Whether this objection is based on plausible

reasons becomes only a debatable point, when we see that

the great Acaryas of the Vedanta system, v1z. Sankaracarya

and others, upheld the authority of scriptures and yet

opened up astoundingly new avenues of thought. Here I

only intend to make out that the acceptance of Sabda

Pramava in the way of the Acharyas serves an important

purpose in philosophical method. In admitting Sabda as a

full-fledged means of knowledge, the Vedanta recognises

the value of intuitive thought. In doing this it also recog­

nises the fact that philosophical thought has a structure

of its own, and in its changes it obeys the laws of that

structure. 1

where

leads

In the realm of

it is suspected

us quite beyond

metaphysics, we arrive at a stage

that the chain of our arguments

the reach of our faculties. There

we have no reason to trust our common methods of· argu­

ment, or to think that our usual analogies or probabilities

have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such .

1 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p. 224.

Methodol.ogy ( 184 )

immense abysses. 1 At such a stage the right understanding

of the recorded intuitive experiences of an uninterrupted

tradition of mystics is the only recourse. The importance

of Sabda Pram~a must be viewed in this light.

Thus the Acaryas seem to be on the right path,

when they view the truths recorded m the Vedas as

authoritative, To them there. truths are the products of

spiritual intuition on the part of ~~is, the seers who

were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their

life spirit to the plane of universal spirit. Their value is

acquired from their adequacy to experience. 2 When the

Vedas are regarded as the highest authority, all that is

meant is that the most exacting of all authorities is the

authority of fact&. 3

1 Collingwood : An essay on philosophical method, p, 223.

( Hume's remark quoted by Collingwood).

2 S. Radhakrishnan : An Idealist View of life, p. 90.

3 Cf. Brahma·siitra Bhafyakaras interpreting the word

Pratyak~a in the Sutras as denoting Vedic texts.