the russian conquest of inner asia

8/13/2019 The Russian Conquest of Inner Asia

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The Russian Conquest o f Inner A s i a 1M.K. P a l a t *

The imperialism of t s a r i s t Russia has been neglected i n both the history of the Russian empire a ndi n general theories of imperialism. I n the history of Russia ha s been trivialized a s a posited essenceof the Russian tradition , of a Russia i n a s t a t e of endemic inflation since the sixteenth century, a ndas an instinctual, elemental, natural, ergo mindless process, akin t o the seasonal migration of birds , 2)or t o the revolution of the earth round the sun. 3) I n theories of imperialism ha s been ignored, perhapsowing t o an axiomatic Russian backwardness which denied her the possibility a nd the luxury of a t r u ecolonial career, or because the expansion occurred overland i n contrast t o the uropean overseas; otherwise

has been forgotten because the Soviet Union s paradoxically both a s o c i a l i s t a nd a t e r r i t o r i a l legateeof the t s a r i s t empire. However there s l i t t l e ground t o justify such t r i v i a l neglect since di d i n f a c toccur over a very large t e r r i t o r y and for a longer time than for example German imperialism overseas.Most of s doubly interesting for being the only colonial empire t h a t decolonized without p o l i t i c a ldisintegration, t h a t s unity remained but development occurred, a f t e r the Revolution of 1917, insteadof p o l i t i c a l independence a nd economic undervevelopment, a s i n the r e s t of the decolonized world.

The colonial expansion of Russia occurred i n many phases a nd i n many directions throughout thenineteenth century. The nomadic Kazakh steppe roughly modern Kazakhstan) was subjugated betweenthe 1820s a nd the 1850s; the sedentary Turkestani s t a t e s of Khiva, Bukhara. a n d Kokand comprisingmodern Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, an d Kirgiziia) were invested i n the 1960s an d 1870s: a nd f i n a l l y theTranscaspian desert largely modern Turkmeristan) i n the 1880s. I n addition, between 1858 a nd 1 860Russia grabbed the eastern seaboard of Siberia beyond the mur a nd the Ussuri from China i n true colonialfashion. I n the 1850s, a f t e r half a century of intermittent warfare, she consolidated her hold overTranscaucasia. After 1828, northern I r a n effectively became a Russian sphere of influence a nd Iran herselfpassed i n t o a s t a t e of near subordination t o Russia. Bu t these extraordinary successes were punctuatedby significant withdrawals a nd humiliating reversals i n other theatres. I n 1867 she sold Alaska t o theU i n the hope of making the l a t t e r challenge a nd hold off the Britis h i n North Pacific waters. Withher defeat i n the Crimean War i n 1856, her semi protectorate over the Rumanian provinces of Moldaviaand Wallachia was dismantled. And, i n the course of the nineteenth century, she l o s t her commandingposition i n Turkey, especially i n regard t o the S t r a i t s of the osphorus a nd the Dardanelles. establishedby the treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi i n 1833. She was compelled t o share t with the Europeans, especiallyher most determined challenger, the B r i t i s h . Of these changes we ar e now concerned only with theconquest o f I nn er Asia, t h a t s the Kazakh steppe a nd the Turkestani s t a t e s of Central Asia, Khiva, Bukhara,an d Kokand.

* Centre f o r H i s t o r i c a l S t u d i e s , Jawaharlal Nehru U n i v e r s i t y , Nova D e l h i , I n d i a

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The u s u a l explanations f o r t h i s p r o c e s s may h e c l a s s i f i e d i n t o t h r e e c l ea r c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t o rt h e O r i e n t a l i s t v e r s i o n hold t h a t t h e s e people were b a r b a r i a n s t h r e a t e n i n g R us si an p ea ce and l aw o n t h ef r o n t i e r a nd t h e r e f o r e i n need o f p a c i f i c a t i o n a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n . This i s t h e s t a n d a r d textbook a cco un t s t i l la v a i l a b l e i n t h e r e l at i ve l y r e c e n t wo rk s o f Khalfin i n t h e Soviet Un i o n , Geoffrey Wheeler i n B r i t a i n , a n dP i e r c e i n America. 4) The second i s t h e eco n o m i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , m u c h f av oured by Khalfin a n d mosto f Soviet h i s t o r i o g r a p h y b u t u l t i m a t e l y r e j e c t e d by t h e s i n g l e Soviet h i s t o r i a n with t h e most thoroughgrasp o f t h e e c o n o m i c s t a t i s t i c s a n d commercial a r c h i v e s o f t h e p e r i o d , M.K . Rozhkova 5). I n t h i s v e r s i o n ,a r a p i d l y developing Rus s i a n c a p i t a l i s m wa s n s e a r c h of necessary overseas markets which e x i s t e d i nTurkestan. The t h i r d o r t h e p o l i t i c a l i s t h e m o s t f a m o u s o r n o t o r i o u s , t h e c o l d wa r o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ,a n Anglo--Russian r i v a l r y described w i t h t y p i c a l c o l o n i a l l i g h t - h e a r t e d n e s s a s t h e Great Game i n A s i a .A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s, t h e Rus s i a n expansion wa s a pre-emptive move a g a i n s t t h e B r i t i s h inexorably reachingo u t i n t o C e n t r a l Asia from I n d i a and t h r e a t e n i n g t o approach Russian i n t e r e s t s ; simultaneously t wa sa n o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n s on t h e approaches t o I n d i a a s a d i v e r s i o n f ro m t h e B r i t i s h me n a cei n t h e E a s t e r n Question t h e S t r a i t s o f t h e Bosphorus a n d t h e D a r d a n e l l e s . A l l S o v i e t and westernhistoriography of t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t revolve around t h e s e i s s u e s . A l l t h r e e t y p e s o f explanation a r e whollyderived f ro m an d u s u a l l y congruent with c o l o n i a l arguments o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century a s a d v a n ced byt h e p l a y e r s of t h e g a m e t h e n . t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n h a s m o v e d forward s o l i t t l e from sucha n c i e n t polemic. For reasons o f s p a c e , w e w i l l touch u p o n only t h e f i r s t t wo h e r e , t h e O r i e n t a l i s t an de c o n o m i c p r e s e n t a t i o n s 6 .

I n t h e O r i e n t a l i s t a c c o u n t , Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and o t h e r t r i b e s were accused o f r a i d i n g Rus s i a ns e t t l e m e n t s o n t h e f r o n t i e r , plundering Rus s i a n caravans i n t h e s t e p p e , a nd t r a d i n g i n Rus s i a n s l a v e s s e i z e dfrom S i b e r i a a n d C a s p i a n w a t e r s ; and t h e y w o u l d never r e s p e c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law o r t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s .The reasons f o r such wickedness l a y i n t h e i r c u l t u r a l decay, i n t e l l e c t u a l s t a g n a t i o n , r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c i s m ,t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r i m i t i v e n e s s , moral d i s s o l u t e n e s s , a n d p o l i t i c a l amorphousness 7). Russia t h e r e f o r e , i n o r d e rt o p r o t e c t h e r s u b j e ct s from s l a v e r y , h e r f r o n t i e r s from r a i d s , a n d h e r caravans from a s s a u l t , wa s compelledt o b r i n g peace and order a t t h e p o i n t o f t h e sword t o t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s . This d e m a n d e d expansion a c r o s s s e r i e s o f deliquescent s t a t e s u n t i l s h e a b u t t e d o n t h o s e w i t h f i r m i n s t i t u t i o n s and boundaries, presumablyt h o s e o f h e r c o l l a b o r a t i n g r i v a l , t h e B r i t i s h empire i n I n d i a 8 . t i s O r i e n t a l i s t i n t h a t t i s derived fromo r a n a s p e c t o f t h e s t e r e o t y p e c r ea t e d by O r i e n t a l i s t s c h o l a r s h i p about t h e O r i e n t o r t h e non-western world,o r , m o re p r e ci s el y , t h e world t h a t ha d n o t y et a t t a i n e d t h e t h r e s h o l d t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 9 . L e t u s t h e r e f o r eexami ne t h e problems o f s l a v e r y a n d brigandage.

The Russians c o m p l a i n ed t h a t K a z a k h a n d Turkemen tribesmen s e i z e d Rus s i a n peasants andfishermen from S i b e r i a a n d t h e Ca sp ia n a nd s o l d them o f f i n t o s l a v e r y i n Bukhara and Khiva. The f i g u r e sa r e u s u a l l y wild g u e s s e s ; b u t Mur a v e v claimed 3000 Rus s i a n s l a v e s i n K hi v a i n 1819 while Meicndorfopted f o r j u s t 600 o f them i n Bukhara, an d Conolly, t h e English o f f i c e r , s e t t l e d f o r around 300 o n l y 1 0 .The E n g l i shma n seems t o ha v e b een n e a r e s t t h e c o r r e c t f i g u r e , even i f h i s m o t i v e wa s only a n t i - Rus s i a npropagand a; f o r , when a l l Russian s l a v e s were e v e n t u a l l y r e l e a s e d by Kh i v a i n 1 8 4 0 , t h e r e were only416 1 1 . The s l a v e s were m o re I r a n i a n t h a n Russian, even i f t h e f i g u r e o f 30,000 f o r I r a n i a n s l a v e s , a sgiven by a l l o f them, seems a s h o t i n t h e d a r k .

Bu t t would b e more instructive t o s ee what was meant b y slaves. The d i p l o m a t i c c o r r e s p o n d e n c eo f the t i m e refers a l m o s t e x c l u s i ve l y t o m i / i t a r . v c a p t i ve s a n d p r i s o ner s ; publicist l i t e r a t u r e preferred s/aces. t i s known for example t h a t R u s s i a n s were highly v a l ue d i n these parts as g u n s m i t h s a n d met a l s m i ths ,a n d a s military instructors; C o n o l l y records t h a t a s many a s R u s s i a n s were employed i n the Iraniana r m y ; a n d Popov i n f o r m s us t h a t a n entire b attalion o f R u s s i a n a n d P o l i s h deserters u n d e r o n e SamsonKhan par tic ipated i n the seige o f Herat i n 1838 a n d was then a m n e s t i e d a n d w i t h d r a n t o the C a u c a s u s 1 2 .Thus t i s o n l y t o o l i k e l y t h a t a certain number o f R u ss ia ns ha d f o u n d s jo bs i n K h i v a a n d Bukhara i nt h i s m a n n e r . M o r e o v e r , a large number o f R u s s i a n prisioners ha d b een seized i n 1824 f r o m the T s i o l k o v s k im i s s i o n which ha d s e t out w i t h 1 7 7 7 c am el s a n d much equipment t o a s s i s t Bukhara i n a war w i t h Khi v a .These were the priso ners restored i n 1840. nd s i n c e frontier conflicts b e t wee n R u s s i a a n d K h i v a wereroutine, priso ners were e qu a l l y routinely t a ken b y b o t h s i d e s . These h a v e then been p a s s e d of t a s slavesb y R u s s i a . I t i s n ot s urp ri si ng t heref or e t h a t R u s s i a denounced o n l y K h i v a o f slavery where as Bu kh a ra ,the R u s s i a n a l l y , was i n f a c t t he chief s l a v e m a r k et a nd the more p r o s per o u s .

Although t h i s might appear b a n a l , t h e Rus s i a n h o r r o r a t K l i i v a n s l a v i n g ha d l i t t l e t o d o w i t h h u m a nr i g h t s . Russia l i c e n s e d t h e b r i s k s la ve t r a d e between t h e C au ca si a n m ou nt a in s a nd t h e I s t a n b u l s l a v e market,l e v i e d a n export t o l l shipped t h e s l a v e s under Rus s i a n p a s s p o r t , a n d f i n a l l y m a d e s l a v i n g a p r i v i l e g e

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of whntission t o Russia( 1 3 ) . L ik e s` se . u n t i l i t s I e e a l abolition i n 1822, Kazakh dcstitutcs I C I N I k i l , 0 1 dthemselves and t h e i r families i n t o Siberian slavery, an un Christian practice t h a t charitable Russiansreluctantly a c c epted f o r the benefit o f starving Kazakh children. But charity pr ove d more potent thanthe law; and the practice continued i n t o the l a t t e r half of the nineteenth century a t l e a s t ( 1 4 ) . Bu t mo re .Russian farmers i n Siberia would h i r e agricultural labour f r o m the i n t e r n a l provinces of Russia f o r summerseasonal work, arrange fo r t h e i r seizure b y Kazaakh tribesmen, and thus se cu re b oth the price of theslave and the f r e e labour. This we nt o n u n t i l a t l e a s t 1840, according t o Terent ev, j u s t a s Russia wasinvading Khiva t o suppress slavery(15). Finally Russia was renowned for having retained s e r f d o m u n t i l1861; and Russian s e r f d o m was very l i k e slavery, with the o p e n s a l e and purchase of human beings,despite innumerab l e l e g a l prohibitions( 1 6 ) .

The reason f o r s e l e c t i n g s l a v e r y a s t h e weapon f o r t h e propaganda o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Khiva i s n o td i f f i c u l t t o f i n d . Slave emancipation wa s t h e n a l i v e i s s u e i n Europe, enlivened by t h e h o r r o r s o f Americans l a v e r y , t h e African s l a v e t r a d e , and C h r i s t i a n martyrdom i n Roman a n t i q u i t y . n England, i t wa s t h es i n g l e most important i s s u e f o r mass m o b i l i z a t i o n b e f o r e Chartism i n t h e 1 8 4 0 s . The mass s i g n a t u r ecampaigns o f 1 8 1 4, 1 8 2 3 , 1 8 3 0 , and 1 8 3 3 , t o l i s t t h e peaks o f m o bi l i t z a t i o n , a t t a i n e d t h e l e v e l s o f t h o s ef o r parliamentary r e f o r m , C a t h o l i c emancipation, Chartism, and a g a i n s t t h e Corn l a w s . t even mobilizedwomen a s never b e f o r e ; and i n 1 8 3 3 , a p e t i t i o n of 187,000 l a d i e s o f England - a huge f e a t h e r b e d o fa p e t i t i o n wa s hauled i n t o Parliament by f o u r s t u r d y menibers(17). And, s i n c e B r i t a i n wa s R u s s i a scompetitor i n I n n e r A s i a , B r i t i s h p u b l i c opinion was a n important t a r g e t . The s t r a t e g y was s u c c e s s f u lenough f n - B r i t i s h p l a n n e r s i n I n d i a t o admit t h e i r h e l p l e s s n e s s ; hence t h e somewhat d e s p e r a t e B r i t i s hhumanitarianism i n n e g o t i a t i n g t h e r e l e a s e o f Russian c a p t i v e s i n 18400 8 F i n a l l y , i t i s worth n o t i n gt h a t t h e p ro blem vanished by 1 8 4 0 ; y e t t h e c onquest occurred i n t h e 1 8 6 0 s , s et t in g t h e s e i z u r e o f Tashkenti n 1865 a s a d a t e .

The o t h e r Russian charge a g a i n s t Kazakhs and Uzbe ks was brigandage. Once a g a i n , l i k e s l a v e r y .t h i s wa s a d i s g u i s e f o r i n t er n a t i o n a l t e n si o n s. F i r s t , t h e y could b e g u e r i l l a wars by t h e Kazakh t ri be s a sRussia advanced i n t o t h e s t e p p e . The most important o f t h e s e were l e d by S r ym Batyr o f t h e L i t t l e Hordehetwecn 1783 and 1 7 9 5 , by Kaip-Galii Ishimov, a g a i n o f t h e L i t t l e Horde i n 1824-1836, by I s a t a i Taintanovand Makhamhet Utemisov o f t h e L i t t l e Horde i n 1836-1838, by S u l t a n Kenesary Qasim-uli o f t h e MiddleHorde i n 1 83 6- 18 45 , a nd t h e l a s t by s e t Kutehar-uli o f t h e Middle Horde i n t h e 1 8 5 0 s . As Russianf o r c e s advanced, c o n s t r u c t e d f o r t s , and a t t a c k e d i n t h e s t e p p e , t h e s e Kazakh tribesmen ma d e t h e i r d e s p e r a t el a s t s t a n d s , going down one by one i n h i s t o r y a s brigands while Russians wrote t h e i r h i s t o r y ( 1 9 ) .

Second, t h e y were wa rs and f r o n t i e r skirmishes between Russia and Khiva. Khiva, l i k e R u s s i a , wa sexpanding a t t h e expense o f t h e nomadic t r i b e s ; and she moved northward beyond t h e Syrand northwestwardt o t h e C asp ian and t h e Emba, meeting Russian advance p o s t s everywhere. Each f u l l y i n s t i g a t e d o r usedt h e Kazakh t r i b e s a g a i n s t t h e o t he r. This wa s e s p e c i a l l y s o when Russian i n t e l l i g en c e o r m i l i t a ry missionse n t e r e d t e r r i t o r i e s claimed by Khiva.

t h i r d , and very frequent, was the Russian entry o n o ne side during an international war b etw e enTurkestani s t a t e s , usually o n the sid e o f Bukhara against Khiva. Russian fo rc es or missions were thennaturally attacked b y Khiva. Thus i n 1803, the Gaverdovskii mission t o Bu kha r a was plundered; andi n 1824, C o l o n e l I s i o l k o v s k i i s ostentatious military c a ravan t o Bu kha r a me t a similar f a t e . etween18 16 and 1823, trade i n the steppe was disrupted bec a use of war b etw e en Khiva and Sultan rmtgazyA bd u lga ziev. etween 1 8 2 2 a nd 1824, owing t o similar s t r i f e , there wer e no caravans f r o m Orenburgt o Bu khara, and, such a s did s e t o u t , wer e attacked b y tribesmen.

F o u r t h , caravans were t r a p p e d i f t h e y sought t o evade customs d u t i e s , which mer chants and a ni n t e r e s t e d Russian government i n s t a n t l y described a s r o b b e r y . Russians disputed Khivan claims t osovereignty i n t h e s t e p p e by t r y i n g t o evade d u t i e s o r t o change r o u t e s ; h u t , a s l o n g a s Khiva wa s i na p o s i t i o n t o enforce i t s c l a i m s , i t ha d t o s uf fe r t h e o dium o f su ch a buse from Russia a l s o . t i s i n t e r e s t i n gt h a t a l l t h i s should h e s o d e s p i t e d u t i e s being minimal, a mere 1.5 i n e f f e c t a s Pavel Nebol sin recordedi n t h e 1 8 5 0 s , and t h a t t h e r e was complete s e c u r i t y i n t h e s t e p p e a f t e r 1 8 4 0 ( 2 0 ) .

s opposed t o l l t h i s , the victims of such conflicts were the nomads and Turkestanis, not the Russians.This i s only t o he e x p e cte d , given the dispr oportion of resources. Al l encounters took place i n the steppe,never i n Russia; Russian punitive expeditions wer e h o r r i f i c ev en b y Russian admission; Russia ha d theadvantage of being able t o p r o m o t e i n t e r - t r i b a l r i v a l r i e s and massacres, a s i n the 1750s b etw e en the Bashkirsand the Ka za khs; a nd R ussia c o ul d a r r e s t trade t o he r advantage and t o Khivan disadvantage, a s when7 Khivan me r c ha nts we r e l l imprisoned i n Russia i n 1 8 3 6 and released only i n 1 8 4 0 i n e x c h ang efo r Russian prisoners.

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Indeed Khiva earned such Russian h o s t i l i t y p r e c i s e l y because s h e was p u t a t i v e mod e r n s t a t e , n o tt h e p r i m i t i v e b r ig an d d ep ic t ed by c o l o n i a l h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . Khiva and Kokand, l i k e R u s s i a , were sedentarys t a t e s expanding a t t h e expen se o f t h e i r nomadic neighbours. Like t h e Russians, Muhammad R a h im Kha nof Khiva I806-1825), t h e Russian b e t e n o i r e , b u i l t f o r t r e s s e s i n t h e s t e p p e a s a t C h i r k a i l y , Kandzhabai,and Aidos- k a l a t o c ow t h e nomads and c o n t r o l caravan r o u t e s ; l i k e th em h e appointed khans of t h e Kazakhs,meddled i n t h e i r p ol i t i c s , and inflamed i n t e r - t r i b a l c o n f l i c t s . I n Kokand, a s e r i e s o f a b l e khans i n t h ef i r s t h a l t o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century s i m i l a r l y u n i f i e d Ferghana, annexed Tas hke nt an d Chimkent, mo v e du p along t h e Syr and t h e n i n t o t h e I l i v a l l e y and Semirech e, colonizing and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e Kazakh andK i r g i z s t e p p e , c o n s t r u c t i n g f o r t s , and c r e a t i n g v a s s a l s . These f o r t s w er e me r ch an d is e d e p o t s , t h e f i r s tn u c l e i o f sedentary Uzbeks i n nomadic t e r r i t o r y , and c e n t r e s o f a g r i c u l t u r e an d h o r t i c u l t u r e and t h edissemination o f n e w technology, comm e r ce , i n d e b t e d n e s s , and I s l a m . Khiva and Kokand were t h u semulating R u s s i a , hence t h e v i t r i o l i c abuse h u r l e d a t them. I n t y p i c a l responses t o t h e t h r e a t and promiseo f European modernity, t h e y modernized t h e i r armies and f i s c a l systems, e s t a b l i s h e d p e r s o n a l a u t o c r a c i e sand where p o s s i b l e bureaucracies a g a i n s t f e u d a l c h a l l e n g e r s , and sought t o import technology a s b e s tt h e y c o u l d . The y were t h e cousins o f Tipu S u l t a n o f Mysore, t h e l a t e r Marathas, and f i n a l l y t h e S i k h s ,a l l o f whom had s o e f f e c t i v e l y r e s i s t e d t h e B r i t i s h i n I n d i a : t h e i r o t h e r c o u n t e r p a r t s were MuhammadA l i of Egypt, and more d i s t a n t l y , A b b a s Mirza o f I r a n and Selim I l l o f Turkey. I n t h e Eurasian steppeworld t h e f i r s t o f th em was Sahin Girey o f t h e Crimea i n t h e 1770s an d t h e l a s t o f t he m was YakubKhan o f Kashgar 1864-1877). A s d yn amic reformers t h e y challenged Russia most s e r i o u s l y ; and t h e i ri n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s with Russia were u n i v e r s a l l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y described i n both c o l o n i a l and mod e r nh i s t o r i o g r a p h y a s s l a v e r y and brigandage. nd t h a t d e p i c t i o n c a r r i e d t h e imprimatur o f O r i e n t a l i s t s c h o l a r l ya u t h o r i t y which had discovered o r c r e a t e d t h e s t e r e o t y p e k n o wn a s t h e o r i e n t a l .

The economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e R us si an c on qu es t pursues s i mi l a r l o g i c o f n e c e s s i t y . I t mayb e summed u p i n t h e t wo t h e o r i e s o f I Asia a s a compensation an d s u b s t i t u t e o f t h e Russian exclusionfrom Europe, and 2 t h e c omp e lli ng n e ed f o r a f o r e i g n market f o r Russian c a p i t a l i s m . A s u s u a l b o t harguments d a t e from t h e e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h century wh e n t h e expansion began.

The t he or y of A s ia a s a subst it ut e for t he l o s t European mark e t der i v ed f r o m R u s s i a s decline i nE u r o p e with the English industrial revolution. R u s s i a was the leading iron p r o d u c e r i n the e i g h t e e n t hc e n t u r y a nd e xp or te d heavily t o Eu rope . The other two staples were naval s t o r e s , especially t o E n g l a n d ,an d l i n e n . All t he se r an i n t o crises i n t he early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y but for different reasons a n d with differentc o n s e q u e n c e s . Engli sh revolutions i n t he t e c hnolog y of i ro n- sm el t i ng b a s e d on c o k i n g coal made t h e i rp ro du c t c he ap er an d s u perior t o the R u s s i a n iron s mel te d with wood coal i n the Urals. The Urals ironindust ry s u ffered a serious slump f r o m 1 8 0 0 t o 1830 a f t e r which i t revived. The r e co v er y was b a s e dhowever not on a C e n t ral A s i a n export m a r k e t bu t on the e x p a n s i o n of R u s s i a n d om e s t i c demand i t s e l fder i v ed f r o m the f i r s t st ep s a t industrial development i n R u s s i a 2 As f o r naval s t o r e s , i t l o s t i t s ma r k e t swith another technological revolution, t h a t of s t e a m s h i p navigation replacing s ai li ng s hi ps . Obviou s l y,A s i a was not a n d n e v e r could he a s ub st it ut e f or t h i s l o s s . Finally, linen l o s t t o cotton the world ove ran d l i d not find an A s i a n substitute a t a l l The e x po r t s t o A s i a were cloth t o hina a n d cotton t o C e n t ralAsia. Cloth was a traditional R u s s i a n p ro d u c t, bu t withou t a European market, only a d om e s t i c market,chiefly the State ordering f o r the ar my . Th at now expanded with me cha n iza tion an d f o u n d an additionalm a r k e t i n China. C o t t o n on the other h a n d was an entirely new p ro d u c t, t h e r es u lt of the ind u s trial revolutioni n E n g l a n d , n e ve r e xp or t ed t o Eu rop e f rom Ru s sia, but now increasingly ex porte d t o Inner Asia. I n n oway t h e n was A s ia a substitute for European markets. Mo r e o v e r , the v oc i fe r ou s ou t c ry against the l o s sof ma r k e t s l i d not b e g i n when t h e y w e r e actually l o s t a t the tu rn of the c e n t u r y but i n the 1 8 2 0 s whenthe new c ot t on i nd us t ry e m e r g e d , e x p o r t e d t o Asia, a n d b eg an t o face periodic c a p i t a l i s t c r i s e s . Nor wasthe protest voic e d b y the l o s e r s , the Ural iron m a g n a t e s , t he naval stores i n t e r e s t , or linen p ro du c er s,but b y the cotton lobby i n Moscow The losers w e n t down s i l e n t l y , but the w i n n e r s c o m pl a i n e d noisilya bo u t losses t h e y had not s u s t a i n e d h i s t o r i c a l l y . The l o s s of a European mark e t a n d the r i s e of an A s i a non e l i d not d e n o t e a s h i f t f r o m the on e t o t he other, inst ea d only the d ec lin e of R u s s i a s precapitalistindust ry a n d t he r i s e of a c a p i t a l i s t industry. Bu t i t suited m e r c h a n t s t o u s e t he a r g u m e n t t o p r e s s b u r ea u c r a t sfor a more active policy of c o n q u e s t i n Asia; b u r ea u c r a t s w e r e happy t o find an elegant argument t or e co v er l o s t R u s s i a n grea tness; a n d g e n e rals on the frontier t u r n e d e c o n o m i s t s v er y f a s t i n the h o p e ofmaking t h e i r careers cheaply.

T h e o t h e r i s t h e t h e o r y o f t h e poverty of t h e Russian domestic market n e c e s s i t a t i n g a f o r e i g n market.This was e n e r g e t i c a l l y advocated by e x p a n s i o n i s t l o b b i e s ; b u t i t i s s t i l l upheld by m u c h Soviet

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historiography. l l i s i s curious since i t reads a s a t he or y o f undercon uniption, so favoured by t i r e Nmodniktia t the e n d of th e nineteenth century a n d mercilessly d e m ol i s h e d by Leni n then. Soviet historians, a sLeninists, can not be Narodnik underconsumptionists. They cannot therefore be suggesting th eunderconsumptionist c o nt r adi ct i on wi t hi n capitalism; instead they mig h t be, a n d i ndeed must b e , proposi ngth e feudal a n d backward e nv i r o nm e n t which hi nder ed capitalism i n Russia. I f t h a t i s s o , a n d i t cannotbe a n y other, then they seem t o be s ug ge st in g n o more than th e banality t h a t capitalism must emergef r o m within feudalism a n d must overcome i t But t h a t do es n ot n ec es si ta te a foreign market a s acompe n sation . Indeed, i t would mean t h a t h ad R u s si a n f e u d al i sm bee n feebler a n d capitalism more vigorous,Russia would not have n e e d e d foreign markets a n d m i g h t not have l au nc he d o n her colonial career. Thatwould i ndeed be absurd. On the other han d, were i t said t h a t c a p i t a l i s t development now gave Russiath e capacity a n d opportunity t o penetrate a pre-capitalist colonial market rather than im p o s i n g o n herth e n ec es si ty , t he rgument mig h t h ave be e n more s o u n d an d acceptable.

Th e p e n e t r a t i o n ofthe I n n e r Asian ma rke t a nd t h e transformation o f t h e commercial r e l a t i o n s betweenI n n e r Asia and Russia must now b e examined. I t i s important t o n o t e t h a t by t h e time o f t h e conquesto f C e n t r a l Asia t h e 1 8 6 0 s , a recognizably c o l o n i a l t ra d i n g r el a ti o n s h i p had emerged. Turkestan o r t h eC e n t r a l Asian s t a t e s , who used t o e x p o r t mainly c o t t o n goods t o R u s s i a , had become, by t h e 1 8 6 0 s , as u p p l i e r o f raw c o t t o n and importer o f c o t t o n goods. This occurred independently o f t h e m i l i ta r y conquesti t s e l f and e s s e n t i a l l y b e f o r e i t I t would appear t h a t i n Russia t h e y were l a r g e l y unaware o f t h e degreea nd i mp or ta nc e o f t h e change while n o t i n g only t h e f a c t o f t h e conquest i t s e l f i n t h e 1 8 6 0 s . A n d t h o s ewho d i d argue t h e economic importance o f Turkestan t o R u s s i a , a s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f or t h e c o n q u e s t , s e e kt o s h o w t h e growing market, which cannot be adequately demonstrated, and i g n o r e t h e change i n t h er e l a t i o n s h i p , which can f a c t b e amply documented. That m i s t a k e , o r misleading emphasis, i s c u r r e n tam ong h i s t o r i a n s t o d a y . The change i n t h e t r a d i n g r el a t i o n s h i p , n o t t h e s t a t i s t i c a l growth o f a market,exposes t h e Russian i n t e r e s t and s t r e n g t h i n t h e a r e a . That w i l l now b e shown.

Several appare n t p ar a do xe s a pp e ar f r o m the outset. F i r s t , A sia was insignificant i n Russia s foreignt r a d e . Between 1802 a nd 1867, i t grew f r om 5 t o 10 of t o t a l Russia n foreign commerce. The g r o w t hwas absolute bu t relatively insignificant, with urope being by f a r the gratest trading partner. This d o e snot mean t h a t i t was irrelevant or unimporta nt t o industry, a s too often imagined. I t i s th e f a c t of growth,not merely i t s volume, w h i c h matters i n t h i s case, f o r , i n international t r a d e , t h a t with l e s s d e v e l o p e dareas l i k e colonies mus t a lw ay s be l e s s than t h a t with the more d e v e l o p e d l i k e E ur op e. R us si an foreigntrade was n o exception t o t h i s general pattern. However more significant t o our purpose, Russia s exportof manufactures t o A sia a s a p ercentag e of t o t a l exports t o Asia, steadily grew i n t h i s period, while Russia nimport of manufactures f r om A sia a s a p ercentag e of t o t a l imports f r om A sia slowly declined. This suggestsa growing Russia n strength i n t he r el at io ns hi p, whatever th e volume. Equally interestingly, a n d i nparenthesis, Russia n exports move steadily while Turke s t an i e x po r ts fluctuate violently annually. Russiawas clearly i n control of i t s circumstances; Turkestan was th e victim of numerous contingencies.

The s ec on d p ar ad ox i s the Russia n we kness i n t he s in gl e region of i t s military might, Tran scaucasia.I t was f u l l y incorporated i n t o th e e m p i r e b e t w e e n th e 1780s an d th e 1820s: ye t she failed t o make i ti n t o a Russia n export market. Until th e 1820s, planners i n S t Petersburg did not think beyond stimulatingcast-west trade through th e region, w it ho ut n ec es sa ry p re fe re nc es fo r R us si an g oo ds, but i n the h o p eof Russia em e r g i n g as the profit -making ca rr ie r f or such t r a d e . The Moscow t e x t i l e lobby a n d Kankrin,th e finance minister, w a n t e d t o convert i t into i t protected area for Russia n exports through high t a r i f f s ;bu t other l i k e Nessel rode, th e foreign minister, a n d Er mo lo v, th e commander-in-chief of th e Caucasus,anxious t o a p p e a s e th e l o c a l population a n d f i g h t of f insurgency, demanded free trade through th e region.The r e s u l t was a compromise i n the 1831 t a r i f f of a 5 i mp or t d ut y o n foreign goods, which benefitedRussia n industry l i t t l e or not a t a l l The importa nce of th e region a s a market fo r Russia n g o o d s plummettedsharply eve n a s th e Russia n was consolidated. Table

Similary Russia f a i l e d i n h e r o t h e r a r e a o f m i l i t a r y s u p er i o ri t y, nothern I r a n . A f t e r t h e t r e a t y o fTurkmanchai i n 1 8 2 8 , Russian hegemony i n n o r t h e r n I r a n was acknowledged by t h e B r i t i s h , t h e Caspianbecame a Russian l a k e , and I r a n was e f f e c t i v e l y a subordinate Russian a l l y . Kankrin hoped t o t u r n t h es i t u a t i o n t o commercial advantage, urged t h e merchants o f Astrakhan t o p e n e t r a t e I r a n , and ma de h e r o i ce f f o r t s t o c o n s t r u c t a merchant f l e e t a t A st rakhan. But i t a l l came t o nought, and B r i t i s h t e x t i l e s reignedsupreme i n T a b r i z , w i t h B r i t i s h contraband f r e e l y e n t e r i n g Transcaucasia.

T h i r d , R u s s i a s g r e a t e s t Asian export boom i n mid-century was i n t h e one r e g i o n t h a t was n e i t h e rs u b j e c t m i l i t a r i l y l i k e Transcaucasia, nor t o become a c o l o n y , l i k e Turkestan, t h e Ch in e se emp ir e s e e

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Table 1 Russian manufactures exports a s percentage o f manufactures t o Asia Annual averages

Years I r a n Turkey I nner A si a China

1825-1829 46.5 40.0 1 3 . 11845-1850 4 . 9 24.6 7 0 . 5

Source: Rozhkova, Ekon. P o l . , t a b l e 1 5 , p 6 9 ; t a b l e 3 7 , p 1 8 3 ; t a b l e 5 5 , p 3 0 1 .

t a b l e 1 China was a t r a d i t i o n a l importer o f Russian c l o t h ; now s h e took c o t t o n a l s o ; and she was t h emost important t r a d i n g p a r t n e r i n Asia u n t i l t h e r i s e o f Turkestan a f t e r 1 8 6 0 . I f Russia had a s t a t i s t i c a l l ygrowing market i n t e r e s t , t was i n China; i f Russia was m i l i t a r i l y supreme, t was n Transcaucasia andI r a n : y e t t h e c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p developed i n I n n e r Asia Kaz akhstan and Turkestan even a s t wasd e c l i n i n g s t at i s c al l y a s a market. t a b l e I

There i s perhaps one f i na l s ta ti st i ca l p ara do x wo rth n o t i n g . Within I n n e r A s i a , Kazakhstan, n o tTurkestan, was t h e t r a d i n g p ar t n e r o f importance u n t i l t h e r e v e r s a l o f t h e s i t u a t i o n c i r c a 1860 t a b l e s2 and 3Table 2 Russian exports a s a percentage o f t o t a l t o Inner Asia Annual averages

Years To Kazakhstan To Turkestan

1833-1835 60.0 39.91851-1855 68.6 31.41856-1860 6 5 . 7 3 4 . 31861-1865 37.8 62.2

Sources: Rozhkova, Ekon. P o l . , t a b l e 4 7 , p 1 9 2 . , t a b l e 6 1 , p 3 0 6 . Ekon. S v i a : i , t a b l e 6 , p 5 0 , t a b l e1 9 , p 6 6 .

t a b l e 3 Russian cotton goods exports t o Kazakhstan a s a percentatge o f t o t a l manufactures exportst o I nner Asia Annual averages

1833-1835 6 8 . 51846-1850 66.81851-1855 67.21856-1857 73.8

Sources: Rozhkova Ek on . Pol.,table 37, p . 183, table 55, p . 301, table 50 , p . 195, table 6 2, p . 307./ikon. S ylazi , table 20 , p . 66.

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Kazakhstan was more important even i n t h a t s i n g l e commodity, c o t t o n goods. Froma l l such s t a t i s t i c s t might appear t h a t Turkestan was an a r e a o f s t e a d i l y d e c l i n i n g commercial importancet o Russia j u s t b e f o r e t h e conquest. At an y r a t e , t suggests t h a t m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y was no guaranteeo f commercial s u c c e s s .

Let u s now examine t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e p e n e t r a t i o n . t appeared t h a t Kazakhstan was more importantt h a n Turkestan. However, t h e Turkestani producers had a s t h e i r market t h e whole o f I n n e r Asia a s w e l la s t h e Russian S i b e r i a n f r o n t i e r and t h e Chinese I n n e r Asian f r o n t i e r . Consequently, t h i s e n t i r e r e g i o nshould b e t r e a t e d a s a s i n g l e u n i t y , n o t bro ken u p a s Kazakhstan and Turkestan. I n which c a s e t h e r e wouldbe nothing s u r p r i s i n g about Russia p e n e t r a t i n g f i r s t Kazakhstan an d t h e n Turkestan: t was a l l a n incrementale n t r y i n t o t h e same market, t h e s i n g l e one o f I n n e r Asia commanded by Turkestan.

This i s c l e a r e r from a c o rr e l a t i o n a na l y si s o f t h e Russian c o t t o n t r a d e with I n n e r A s i a , t a b l e 4

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ble 4 . orrelatiun between Russian import of urkest ni raw cotton and Russian exports of cottongoods t o Turkestan and Kazakhstan R2

Years Turkestan Kazakhstan

1833-1867 0.71141833-1853 0.06341854-1867 0.60221833-1857 0.1167 0.401

Russia was now importing Turkestani raw c o t t o n and exporting t h e f i n i s h e d product t o Kazakhstanan d Turkestan. T he h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n f o r Turkestan alone f o r t h e wole p e r i o d 1833-I867 s u g g e s t s t h e u s eo f Turkestani raw c o t t o n f o r t h e f i n i s h e d c o t t o n goods being exported during t h i s p e r i o d . However, t h ed i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e two sub-periods a r e s i gn i fi c a nt . For 1833-1853 t h a t c o r r e l a t i o n i s l o w , b u t f o r 1854-1867 t i s once again h i g h . This s u g g e s t s t h a t Turkestani raw c o t t o n was b eing used f o r e x p o r t o f c o t t o n goodst o Turkestan only from 1 8 5 4 ; before t h a t d a t e i s was e v i d e n t l y being used f o r another m a r k e t . T he f i n a lf i g u r e s o f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n shows u s which market i n f a c t : Kazakhstan. For t h e p e r i o d 1833-1857, t h ec o r r e l a t i o n i s low f o r Turkestan b u t h i g h f o r Kazakhstan. I n o t h e r words, f o r t h i s f i r s t p e r i o d , Turkestaniraw c o t t o n was used f o r c o t t o n goods e x p o r t s t o Kazakhstan. I n Kazakhstan t h e n , Russian c o t t o n goodsdisplaced Turkestani c o t t o n goods u n t i l t h e y e a r s 1854-I 8 5 7 , an d t h e n m o v e d on t o do t h e same i n Turkestani t s e l f Therefore, i f t h e whole o f I n n e r Asia b e t r e a t e d a s a s i n g l e market belonging t o Turkestan, t h egrowth o f Kazakhstan and t h e d e c l i n e o f Turkestan t a b l e 3 would appear a s t h e growth o f t h e Turkestanimarket i n f a c t f o r R u s s i a . Russian c o l o n i a l propaganda t h e r e f o r e was n o t t o o f a r o f f t h e mark when t h e yproclaimed t h e growing importance of Turkestan t o Russia although u n t i l 1860 China was t h e mores i g n i f i c a n t p a r t n e r t h a n I n n e r A s i a . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Turkestan was growing i n importance i n a way t h a tChina was n o t , v i z . , i n t h e i n t e r n a l n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f China was only a market; b u t Turkestanwas t h e s u p p l i e r o f t h e v e r y raw m a t e r i a l which was t h e n f i n i s h e d i n Russia f o r e x p o r t t o Turkestan.

Now l e t u s examine t h e o t h e r a s p e c t o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p : Turkestan moving from e x p o r t o f c o t t o ngoods t o t h e e x p o r t o f raw c o t t o n t o R u s s i a . I n t h e c o t t o n goods t r a d e w i t h Turkestan, Russia becamea n e t exporter only i n 1 8 5 9 ; u n t i l t h e n s h e imported more c o t t o n g oo ds f ro m Turkestan t h a n s h e e x p o r t e d .Table Turkestan cotton exports t o Russia; thousands o f s i l v e r roubles Annual averages

Years Raw c o t t o n Cotton g o o d s

1833-1852 114 6001853-1861 590 6571862-1867 4,058 478

Sources: Rozhkova, Ekon. P o / . , t a b l e 4 9 , p 1 9 1 . Ekon. S v i a : i , t a b l e 9 p 5 4 , t a b l e 2 2 , p 6 9 .

I n t hr ee cl ea r phases tab le 5) then, Turkestan s h i f t s fro m being a cotton g o o d s t o a r w cottonsupplier for Russia. Until the Crimean War 1 8 5 3 - 1 8 5 6 , cotton g o o d s prevailed. The w r b locked Eg yptianand Indian raw cotton supplies through the Black Sea, so Russia turned t o Turkestani raw cotton instead,poor i n quality thou g h t was. The Crimean War en d e d i n 1856 but raw c ot to n d id not return t o the e a r l i e rl e v e l , although cotton g o o d s did not r i s e appreciably. But with the merican c i v i l w r i n 1861, worldraw cotton prices rose intolerably, and once again Russian industry turned t o Turkestan. The c i v i l w ren de d i n 1864 but the Turkestani raw cotton export t o Russia re maine d high, and the cotton g o o ds figuresslowly declined. I n these three phases, punctuated b y two international c r i s e s , Turkestan descended i n t oRussia s cotton colony. Y et none of t h i s was d ue t o Russian military m i g ht or t o any measures of Russianeconomic interference i n Turkestan.

Thus two s e t s o f r e l a t i o n s have b een presented t o show t h e s h i f t i n r e l a t i o n between Russia an dTurkestan. T he f i r s t was how Russia used Turkestani raw c o t t o n t o p e n e t r a t e t h e Turkestani I n n e r Asianmarket; t h e second was how Turkestan declined i n t o a p r i n c i p a l l y raw c o t t o n s u p p l i e r from i t s e a r l i e rand h e a l t h i e r s t a t u s a s a c o t t o n goods s u p p l i e r . t i s t h e s e r e l a t i o n s which show t h e importance o f t h i s

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market t o R u s s i a , n o t i t s a c t u a l s t a t i s t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n Russian t r a d e t u r n o v e r s , g l o b a l o r A s i a n . t wasn o t due t o any s u p e r i o r m i l i t a r y might which was f a r g r e a t e r i n t h e Caucasus, nor even p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h ,which wa s perhaps g r e a t e r i n I r a n . No r wa s t h e m i l i t a r y conquest which followed i n t h e 1860s n e c e s s a r y ,f o r t h i s process which had a l r e a d y been completed i n f a c t . Th e conquest wa s an a s p e c t o f Russian s u p e r i o r i t y ,n o t t h e cause o r t h e consequence o f t h e e c o n o m i c p e n e t r a t i o n . Russia e s t a b l i s h e d h e r s e l f h e r e becauses h e had t h e opportunity i n t h e circumstances and t h e productive c a p a c i t y t o do s o . Th e s u s t a i n e d argumento f compelling n e c e s s i t y t o do s o was i t s e l f a p a r t o f t h a t p r o c e s s , f o r h i s t o r i c a l a c t o r s must p r e s e n t t h e i ra c t i o n s a s necessary l e s t t appear immorally o p p o r t u n i s t i c . But t h e s e should b e n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h em o d e r n h i s t o r i a n t o r e p e a t t h a t a n c i e n t polemic, save a s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e a c t i t s e l fNotes Revised version of l e c t u r e delivered t o t h e Ec on om ic s Society o f t h e I n s t i t u t e o f Catalan S t u d i e s . Barcelona,3 J u l y 1 9 8 9 . 1 am m o s t g r a t e f u l t o Professor Joaq u i m uns t h e P r e s i d e n t , and Josep Verg6s, t h e S e c r e t a r y , f o r havings o kindly i n v i t e d me and given me t h i s opportunity t o address t h i s S o c i e t y . 2 ) Cited i n R . Wittram, Das r u s s i s c h e Imperium and s e i n Gestatwandel , Historische Z e i t s c h r i f t , n o . 1 8 7 , 1 9 5 9 ,pp 583-584. 3 ) G e o r g e N . Curzo n, Russia i n Central Asia i n 1 8 8 9 a n d t h e Anglo-Russian Question, Lo n d o n 1 8 8 9 , p 3 1 9 . 4 ) N . A . K h a l f in , Rossita i g khanstva pervaia pololvina XIX v e k a ) , oscow 1 9 7 4 , p p 1 6 , 2 4 , 41-45ff; s e e a l soh i s P o l i t i k a R o s s i i v Srednei A : i i 1857-1868), oscow 1 9 6 0 , p p 20 -27; G eo ff re y Wheeler, Th e Mo d e r n Historyof Central A s i a , Lo n d o n 1 9 6 4 , p 6 4 ; Richard A. P i e r c e , Russian Central A s i a , 1 8 6 7 - 1 9 1 7 . A Studs i n ColonialR u l e , Univ o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e ss 1 9 6 0 , pp 17-18. 5 ) M.K. R ozhk ov a, Ekonomicheskie . S v i a : i R o s s i i s o Srednei A : i i , 4 0 - 6 0 e g odv XI X v e k a , oscow 1 9 6 3 , pp 123-124.and i d e r n , Ekon om ic heska i a P o l i t i k a tsarskogo P r a v i t e l s t v a na srednern v os to ke v o v t o r o i c h e t v e r t i XIX veka russkaiahur:hua:iia, M o s c o w - L e n i n g r a d 1 9 5 0 , pp 174-176. 6 ) For a m o r e d e t a i l e d discussion o f a l l t h e s e a s p e c t s s e e M a d h a v a n K . P a l a t , T s a r i s t Russian Imperialism , Studiesi n h i s t o r y , v o l . 4 , n o . 1 - 2 , 1 9 8 8 , S a g e P u b l i c a t i o n s , New D e l h i , p p 1 57-297. 7 ) Th e l i s t i s n e c e s s a r i l y l a r g e , b u t s e e f o r example, Alexis de Levchine I L e v s h i n l , Description des H o r d e s e t Steppesdes Kirghiz-Ka:aks o u Kirghiz-Kaissaks, t r a n s . from t h e Russian by F e r r y de P igny , P a r i s 1 8 4 0 , o r i g i n a l Russianedn 1 8 3 2 ) ; IN.V.I Khanikoff, B o k h a r a : I t s A m i r a n d i t s People, t r a n s , from t h e Russian by B a r o n C l e m e n t A . D eRode, Lo n d o n 1 8 4 5 ; M. N . Mouraviev IMurav e vl, V o y a g e en Turc oman i e e t a Khiva f a i t en 18/9 e t 1820, t r a n s .fro m t h e Russian by M. G. Le co in te d e Laveau, P a r i s 1 8 2 3 ; B a r o n Georges de Mey endor f f IMeiendorfl, V o y a g ed Orenhur g d B o u k h a r a f a i t en 1820, d travers l e s steppes q u i s etendent a lest de l a m e r d Aral e t au dela deI a n c i e n J a v a r t e s. P a r i s 1 8 2 6 . 8 ) Best s t a t e d i n t h e c i r c ul a r Note t o t h e powers by A . M. G o r c h a k o v, t h e f o r e i g n m i n i st e r , i n 1 8 6 4 , c i t e d i n F i r u zKazemzadeh, Russia a n d B r i t a i n i n P e r s i a , 1 8 6 4 - 1 9 1 4 A Study i n Imperialism New H a v e n 1 9 6 8 , p . 8 . 9 ) See A n o u a r Abdel-Malek, L Orientalisme en c r i s e , i n h i s La Dialectique S o c i a l e , P a r i s 1 9 7 2 , pp 79-113; andEdward S a i d , Orientalism, Lo n d o n 1 9 7 8 . 1 0 ) Mouraviev, o p . c i t pp 355-356; Meyendorff, o p . c i t p 2 8 5 ; Arthur Conolly, Journey t o t h e North of I n d i aOverland f r o m Engl and thro ugh Russia, P e r s i a , a n d Afghanistan, 2n d e d n , v o l . I Lo n d o n 1 8 3 8 , pp 148-149. 1 1 ) K h a l f i n , Rossiia khanstva, p 253; M. A. Terent ev, I s t o r i i a Z a vo e va n ii a S r ed ne i A z i i , v o l 1 S t P e t e r s b u r g ,1 9 0 6 , p 1 7 5 . 1 2 ) K h a l f i n , Rossiia K h a n . s t v a , p 2 5 ; Mouraviev, o p . c i t p p 3 55 -3 56 ; M. P V i a t k i n , S r c m B a t v r , Moscow-Le n i n g r a d ,1 9 4 7 , pp 134-135; N . G. Apollova, Ekonomicheskie p o l i t i c h e s k i e s v i a : i Ka=akhstana s R o s s i i v XVI/I-nachaleXI X v oscow 1 9 6 0 , p 8 2 ; Conolly, o p . c i t v o l 1 p 214; A . K . Po po v, Bor ba z a s r e d n e a z i a t s k i i p l a t s d a r m ,I s t o r i c h e s k i e Z a p i s k i , n o . 7 1 9 4 0 , P P 205-206. 1 3 ) J H o f f m a n n Das P r o b l e m e e i n e r S e eb l o ka de Ka u ka s ie n s nach 1 8 5 6 , F or sc hunge n :ur Osteuro paischerGeschichte, v o l 1 ] , 1 9 6 6 , pp 163-164; Eh u d R . Toledano, Th e O t t o m a n Slave Trade a n d i t s Suppresion: 1 8 4 0 - 1 8 9 0 ,Princeton 1982 p p . 1 15 -1 23 , 1 38 -1 51 . 1 4 ) S . S . Shaskov, I , s t o r i c h e s k i e E t i u d v , v o l . 2 , S t P e t e r s b u r g , 1872, p p 105-126, 152-164; M. R a e f f , Siberia a n dt h e R e f o r m of 1822, S e a t t l e 1 9 5 6 , p p 13-14, 6 4 . 1 5 ) Terent ev, o p . c i t pp 1 7 5 . 1 6 ) J B l u m , Lord a n d Peasant i n Russia, A t h e n e u m , New York, 1 9 6 4 , pp 422-428. 1 7 ) S e y m o u r Drescher, ` P u b l i c Opinion and t h e Destruction o f B r i t i s h Colonial S l a v e r y , i n Ja m es W al vi n e d . , Slaverya n d B r i t is h S o c ie t y . /776-1846, Lo n d o n 1 9 8 2 , pp 22-48, c i t a t i o n p 3 3 ; s e e a l s o i n t h e s a m e v o l u m e chapter 2 byJames Wa lv in , Th e P r o p a g a n d a of a n t i - s l a v e r y ; and E d i t h F Hurewitz, P o l i t i c s a n d t h e Public C o nsensus. SlaveEmancipation a n d t h e A b o l i t i o n i s t Mo v e m e n t i n B r i t a i n Lon d o n 1 9 7 3 . passim., e s p . p p . 53-54, 9 6 . 1 8 ) M. F . Yapp, S t r a t e g i e s o f B r i t i s h I n d i a . B r i t a i n , I r a n , a n d Afghanistan, 1 79 8- 18 5 0, O xf o r d 1 9 8 0 , P P 3 92 -4 14 . 1 9 ) V i a t k i n , o p . c i t Levchine, o p . c i t pp 231-235; Shashkov, o p , c i t v o l 2 p p 1 28 -1 29; E . Allworth e d . CentralA s i a , A Century of R us si an R ul e New Y o r k 1 9 6 7 , p 1 1 . 2 0 ) Pavel Nehol sin, Vvedenie , pp 29-30 and S l e d o v a n i e , pp 9-12, i n Ocherki Torgov/i R o s s i i s Stranami . S r e n e tA z i i , K h i v o i , Bukharoi, okanom s o storonv Orenburgskoi l i n n i i ) , S t Petersburg 1 8 5 9 . See a l s o h i s PoriadokOchishcheniia i n I b i d . , pp 1 - 2 . 2 1 ) S . G. S t r u m i l i n , I s t o r i i a chernoi m e t a l l u r g i c v S S S R , v o l 1 Feodal nya period, 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 0 0 g g , M. 1 9 5 4 , pp374, 3 6 8 .

the russian conquest of inner asia

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