the power of cause and effect 2 by eliyahu goldratt

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    Copyright 2010, Eliyahu M. Goldratt

    The Power of Cause and Effect 2

    August 2010

    Eliyahu M. Goldratt

    In January 2009, the electronics component industry, facing an unprecedented drop in

    orders in December 2008 (by 50%) had planned to immediately react with a massive cut of its

    workforce. A proper analysis done at that time, [foot note 1: The power of cause and effect

    by Goldratt (January 2009)] revealed that this expected reaction was not needed and that it

    would lead to grave consequences. Unfortunately, most electronics component manufacturers

    did lay people off - just to face, less than three months later, a surge in demand. All the signs

    are indicating that these companies are now about to make a similar mistake which will lead to

    even graver consequences.

    In December 2008 the drop in demand for the component manufacturers was not a

    result of a drop in consumer demand for electronic consumer goods. As a matter of fact, the

    dollar value of purchases of electronic consumer goods, in all the major markets of the world,

    did not drop by more than 2 to 3 percent, and in terms of units sold actually increased. Rather,

    the drop in demand for the components manufacturer was an unavoidable result of retails

    reaction to the medias frantic declarations of an economic recession. Retailers, trying to avoid

    being stuck with surplusinventories (which in the case of electronics consumer goods will

    shortly become obsolete inventories) naturally took immediate actions to reduce their

    inventory levels. Which meant a drastic reduction in the amounts ordered by retailers. For

    those who realized that the drop had nothing to do with actual drop in consumer demand, itwas apparent that once retailers reduced their inventories the demand would jump back to the

    pre-economic-scare levels. Since the retailers (together with the wholesalers) are holding

    about three to four months of inventories it was obvious that around April 2009 the demand on

    component manufacturers would return to normal. That was exactly what actually happened.

    Alas, during the first half of 2009, not just the retailers reduced their inventories, the

    electronics assembly companies did it as well. When the scare was over and companies

    (retailers as well as electronic assemblies) had adjusted to the new reality they naturally

    wanted to gradually restore their inventories to the proper level; their orders reflected not just

    their current consumption but also the quantities needed to raise back their inventory levels.But, increasing back inventories is governed by different factors than reducing inventories.

    The speed at which inventories can be reduced is governed by the rate of clients purchasing.

    The speed at which inventories can be increased is governed by the amount of excess capacity

    the vendor has. Even if we assume that by mid 2009, electronic component manufacturers had

    succeeded to bring back their capacity to 2008 levels (and considering the time it takes to hire

    and train people, this is a very optimistic assumption) it means that, on average, the electronic

    component manufacturers had no more than 15% excess capacity. With this amount of excess

    capacity to refill even two months of inventory will take more than a year. The problem is that

    during that time, when the orders are inflated to reflect the need to increase inventories, the

    demand is higher than the capacity available; vendors have - for all practical purposesbottlenecks. When a vendor has a bottleneck, any upward fluctuation in demand translates

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    into longer lead time to satisfy client order. Any increase in supply lead time causes the client

    (electronics assembly) to realize that it should further increase its inventories. This phenomena

    opens the gates to inflated internal demand (orders from assembly to components) when

    actually the external demand (purchases by consumers) is relatively stable. Does it happen?

    Do we witness a surge in internal demand?

    A recent article published by Wall Street journal entitled: From snowmobiles to cell

    phones, a scramble for parts, reports on ongoing shortages of electronic components that is

    intensifying since the beginning of the year (2010). The most alarming fact that is reported in

    this article is that recently the supply lead time has elongated from ten weeks to twenty weeks.

    This phenomenon ensures that in the near future electronic assembly companies will continue

    to increase their inventories and the component manufacturers will become more and more

    confident that future demand is on the upswing. Not being able to supply all the demand and

    being under increased pressure from impatient clients will, no doubt, lead component

    manufacturers to the conclusion that continuing to operate with the existing level of capacity is

    limiting the profit that they can realize today. Moreover, since it also endangers their marketshare it is limiting the profit they will be able to make tomorrow. There is little doubt that, in

    the current frame, very few components manufacturers are not contemplating to heavily invest

    in increasing their capacity and many have already approved the needed investments.

    The problem is, of course, that the demand is not real. Its not a demand driven by the

    consumer purchases; consumer purchases of electronics consumer goods have remained

    relatively stable in the last two years. It is a demand driven by the supply chain internal

    adjustments. Once again companies that are participating in the supply chain ignore the most

    fundamental rule: As long as the end consumer hasnt bought, no one in the supply chain has

    really sold. But, this time the mistake, if not stopped now, will have much graver and more longlasting ramifications.

    It takes time to significantly increase capacity; to open new plants. These efforts have already

    started. It stands to reason that within one or maximum two years new capacity will be

    operational. What must happen then? Additional capacity will collapse the delivery lead times.

    When lead times plummet the client quickly reevaluates the amount of needed inventory levels

    and readjusts downward accordingly. Readjusting the inventory level downward will have an

    immediate and drastic impact on the quantities ordered, and as a result supply lead time will

    shrink further. From the above cause and effect logic it is clear that once the new capacity will

    be operational the strong demand that we witness now will, in almost no time, vanish. Wellswing into a period where the increased supply will be much higher than demand. And we all

    know what will happen then; prices will drop.

    Exactly when their investments (their expansion plans) have been completed, those

    companies will face a reality where , not only the demand vanishes but also prices drop. The

    problem is that not only those companies that have confused internal, supply-chain demand

    with consumer demand will suffer. The problem is that also companies that analyzed the

    situation properly and resisted the temptation to invest in more capacity will also suffer. They

    will suffer from the resulting too low prices. The increase of capacity of their less analytical

    competitors will also erode their prices, and significantly lower prices are poison to profitability.

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    Copyright 2010, Eliyahu M. Goldratt

    Convincing competitors to refrain from investing now in additional capacity should be

    the number one concern of any component manufacturer. I think that there is only one

    effective way to convince competitors to freeze their investments in additional capacity, and it

    is to convince the competitors that instead of investing heavily in more expensive capacity that

    will become productive a year or more from today, it is possible, within weeks, to reveal much

    more capacity from existing operations. I urge consumer electronics manufacturers that have

    done it to reveal their actual achievements: to release into the public domain, and in

    particularly to their competitors, the details of what they have done, the time that it took to

    increase production and the magnitude of the increase.