the legacy of perón

8/13/2019 The Legacy of Pern.

1/6

ough statem ent anyw ay, to make

icial pu t it, we re still con spirin g and telling

nists. Thoug h the American press had been initiallyng Guzm an as a leftist, an experienced USdescribed him as a Teddy Ken nedy typ e.Balaguer began freely giving vent to his bitternessPro-g ove rnm ent new spapers spoke ofinterv entio n, and Balaguer personally made this

right to refuse sup po rt to gov ernm ents of

whose policies it disapproves. The Carter policy, whichisn't always consistent, is that aid should be givenprincipally to democratic regimes.C o m m e n d a b l e a s t h e r e s c u e of D o m i n i c a ndemo cracy app ears to be, particularly in light of the pa stUS record th er e. Ca rte r is open to cri t icism forreleasing economic aid funds to Nicaragua, where theopposition is engaged in a bloody battle with theSomoza dictatorship, and to Chile, where PresidentAugusto Pinochet runs a very repressive regime.The issue of aid to dictatorial countries remainshighly controversial in the Carter administration. Oneview is tha t so-called basic hu ma n nee ds assistan ceshould be maintained and that, in the long run, itencou rages dem ocracy. The con troversy is not likely tobe resolved soon, but Jimmy Carter's action in theDom inican crisis points to the kind of policies em ergin gin the administration. Antonio Guzman can thankCarter if, as expected, he is inaugurated as president ofthe Dominican Republic on August 16. And, ironically,Balaguer will be the first elected Dominican presidentever to turn over the government to a freely electedsuccessor.

Tad Szulc

Argentina Today, IThe egacy of Peronby Peter Witonski

eron ist legacy, as well as the even older legacy ofno Sarmiento wrote

The Argentine c a u d i l l o is a Mohamm ed who could changethe dominant religion at will andsetupane wonein itsstead.He is omnipotent. His injustice isa misfortune for his victimhul il is not considered an abu se because the c a u d i l l o ispermitted lobeunjust. Indeed he must necessarilybeunjust.He has always been so.

caudillo: el Lider el jefe el Com paflero. H e

Witonskiis a histo rian and polit ical scie ntist , and is The Wisdom of onservatism(Arl ington

was,at various tim es, the champion of thecabecitas negra(the slum-dwellers of Buenos Aires) and the defenderof their landlords; a socialist, a capitalist, a Marxist, afascis t; a devo ut Ca thol ic , an ex-c om mu nicatedCatholic; a revolutionary, a counterrevolutionary; apopulist, a reactionaryamong other things. Heborrowed his ideas freely from the other dictators andideologues of his generation . In retrospec t, he remind sone of an uneasy amalgam of Hitler, Stalin, Franco,Ataturk and Beatrice Webb. He was also a thief whorobbed his countrymen blind; a sexual adventurerwhose acts of dissipation included the seduction of 13-year-old girls ( I'm n ot sup ers titio us , he joked); and abrutal tyrant whodisposedof hisenemies with ruthlessefficiency. Pero n is the air we bre ath e, Per6n is ou rsun , Per6n is life, his second wife, Evita, enth use d inh e r b o o k . L a Razon de mi Vida.


2/6

Tlie eciectic ideoiogy he dubbed justicinlismo wasequaliy muitifarious. It appeaied, or seems to haveappealed, to virtuaily every hue of the ideologicalspectrumfrom the fanatical Montonero guerrillas onthe far left to the fascist gunmen of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance on the far right. His followersincluded an incongruous assortment of orthodoxCommunists, conservative businessmen, trade un-ionists, moderate churchmen and dedicated Nazis. Hehimself w as neve r easy to pin do wn . If I define, Iexclude, he once declared. The bulk of his supportcame from theguarangos, those Argentines who werebeyond the social pale, and he dub bed them thedescamisndos, or shirtless ones. His mentor was BenitoMussolini. As a young officer he spent several years inMussolini's Italy, where he received advanced militarytraining, pondered the virtues of the corporate stateand absorbed il Duce'shistrion ic s tyle. Long afterMussolini had been defeated and disgraced, Per6nwro te, Mu ssolini was the greate st man of our cen tury,but he made some disastrou s mistakes. I, who have hadthe advantage of witnessing what he did, shall follow inhis footsteps w ithou t falling into his err ors . He alsoadmired Hitler, and in 1944, when it was clear toeveryone else that Hitler was finished, Per6n advisedhis countrymen to Turn your eyes to the trium phan tGermany of Hitler.JL erdn was a kind of ge nius , but, as some of hiscoun tryme n were beginning to discover, his genius wasfor public relations,notgov erning. He ruled his factiouscountry by playing class against class: the oligarquinagainst thedescamisndos, rural Argentines against urbanArgentines, left-wing Peronists against right-wingPeron i s t s . Alpueblo,los tangos los cantosyo, was his wa y ofsaying, I rep res en t th e general will because I call thepeople's tun e. Ultimately this philosoph y led toPer6n's downfal l in 1955 and to the downfal l ofArgentina. In a revealing letter to his friend CarlosIbafiez, w ho became pres iden t of Chile in1953,he cameas close as he has ever come to explaining whatjusticialismowas all abo ut. Give to the people, especiallythe worke rs, all that is possible, he wro te. Wh en itseems to you that you are giving them too much, givethem mo re. You will see the resu lts. Everyone will tryto scare you with the spectre of an economic collapse.But all of this is a lie. Th ere is noth ing mo re elastic thanthe economy which everyone fears because no oneunderstands it .

Such was the essence of Peronism. It is an absurdlyfrivolous and idiotic philosophy, and yet Argentinacannot seem to get it out of its system. When the agedPeron was retu rned to power in 1973, after 18 years ofexile, even he seemed to recognize that the problem s hehad crea ted in the 1950s wi th hi s Thermidor iannos trum s could not be solved by rhetoric alone; but, atthe same time, he knew that he could no t survive if heturned too far from the path of au then tic Per6n ism.

He found Argentina to be even more deeply divthan it had been at the time of his ous ter. He abandosome of his old methods and tr ied to enl ist opponents in the Armed Forces and the traditipolitical parties to aid him in unifying the countrybringing back some semblance of order to the sha tteconomy.But the dictator could not undo the damage hedone in the 1950s, and Argentina became even mdivided after his return. Indeed, on the very day otriumphal return to Buenos Aires in 1973, fighbroke out between the extreme factions of his mo vem ent, leaving m any people dead or woun ded;the undeclared civil war that had plagued Argensince his overthrow became even more intense. aging dictator was n o longer the man he once had bWith his yellow skin and black-stained hair, he loomore like a badly embalmed corpse than his counsavior. El ider had become, simply,elViejo; the

who had once mesmerized thedescamisadoscoulbe heard by the crowds that massed around the CRosada (the Argentine White House) for his speeches. When he died in bed in 1974 it wasanticlimax. But before dying Per6n played one last on the people of Argentina: he arranged for his twife, Isabel Mart inez de Per6na womanmy sterious origins, possessing no education to speand no political experienceto become the counvice pres ident , and, under the cons t i tu t ion,successor as president.Under Isabelita things went from bad to w

Peronism ceased to be political movement and beca kind of political gang, controlled by the sinister Lopez Rega, a former traffic cop and fortune teller flattered his way in the Peronist circle duringdictator's exile in Madrid. Du ring Per6n's last daysnefarious Lopez Rega followed him like a shadowtold him what to say. According to several witneon the day of the dictator's death Lopez Rega trieraise him from the dead by magic. Under the reigLopez Rega and Isabelita the so-called Argentine ACommunist Alliance, a goon squad financed byPeron i s t movement , murde red opponen t s o fregime with brutal frequency. One criticized Per6n and Lopez Rega only in polite terms; to bectoo harsh meant certain physical injury. By the Isabel i ta was f inal ly overthrown in 1976 byreluctant General Jorg^ Videla, the nation was onverge of collapse. Inflation had risen to close to percent, and the government had been printing moso rapidly that its pressis and coin-stamping machhad begun to break down from overwork.

Argentine historians and political scientists long sought to explain why their country, despitvast wealth, failed to develop a successful politradition like the United States, the country founders of Argen tina most admired. We Argenthave succeeded at every thing except politics,


3/6

rian Julio Irazu sta once told me. O ur failure toe political system has n egated o ur oth eror na tion. Arge ntina is a land of plenty wh erees of Bueno s Aires abut the squalidvillasmisirias

ent ina is a p lace wh ere conse rvat iv e R omanerful official in the gove rnm ent w asancer w ho believed himself to be the reinca rna-

y the early 20th century visitors to Argentina wereled by its failure to become a great nation. Du ring ochentathe Argentine Gilded Age that

Buen os Ai res . The term as rich as an oligarquiag ined a wide currency inthe contrary, as new industries flourish-

caudilloand his loyalpeones

Perhaps because so much of the old 19th centuryodernization, 20th century Argentines have been

ns. For the Arg entines , the m ilitary coup is a caudillos andically th ey have never received much from them .

was the on e exception. Althoug h he was in many caudillo he arousedcaudillobefore him.

Two factors, above all, distinguish Per6n from his

junta that seized power in he transformed the moribund General Con-

base; and he initiated d rastic reforms in working

bargaining. All of this made Perdn very popular; but hismost important asset was his partnership with thewoman who became his second wifeEva Duarte.Before meeting Per6n Evita was already an establishedperform er in B movies, and the star of a weekly radiosoap opera. She was attractive, determined and veryambitious. These were all qualities Per6n lacked. Shealso understood the common people, and possessedpolitical instincts that no professional soldier couldhope to have. She combined the qualities of a beautifulfashion model with those of a secular madonna and aTammany Hall ward heeler. When Per6n becamepresident she was only 25. She had risen from humbleorigins and had come to hate the old oligarquia whichshe blamed for her childhood poverty. The poor wereher constituency (it is said that she knew thousands ofBuenos Aires slum-dwellers by name), and her powerlay in her ability to remain in touch with them in a waythat her husband could never hope to do. Quite oftenshe would wander through thevillas mis as of BuenosAires simply tossing small bundles of money at th e p oorwho flocked to her side. She gave them a sense ofdignity even as her husband's policies lowered theiralready low standard of living; and the poor, for theirpart, made Evita into a kind of goddess. When she diedof cancer in 1952, at the age of 3 3, Peron ism lost itsmost powerful weapon.

Under the influence of Evita, Per6n began an era ofreform that revolutionized Argentine society. He gavewomen the vote, he gave the workers a 48-hour weekand 13 months ' pay for 12 months ' work. Heestablished a minimum wage , he set up elaborate publicwo rks p rojects, and he greatly expanded social services.At the same time, however, he totally ignored theagricultural sector of the economy (which was then asnow the backbone of Argentina) and, at great cost, henationalized ind ustries simply because they belonged tohis enemies. He also began a reign of terror that haspoisoned political debate in Argentina to the presentday.

Peron was finally ousted in 1955, but only after hehad ruined the economy, tortured and imprisonedthousands of his fellow countrymen and been ex-communicated by the Catholic Churcha develop-ment that cost him dearly, even among the descamisados.The series of military and civilian governments thatruled Argentina in Per6n's wake did little to improvematters, and as economic conditions worsened andpolitical violence grew more savage the na stier aspectsof his rule began to fade. The old dictator's popularityincreased with each passing year , and by 1971Argentines of all classes could look back to his regimewith almost sentimental longing. The jailings andbeatings were forgotten; only the memory of falseprosperity remained. Even the leaders of theoligarquiahad come to believe that Argentina could only be savedby Per6n's return to power.

At first, in an attempt tocalm the fears of the military


4/6

and conservative elements of the oligarquia he ruledthroug h H ector Campora, a left-wing dentist who ranin Perdn's place for president. But whe n C amp ora, in afit of Jacobinical zeal, emp tied A rge ntin a's jails of bothpolitical prisoners and common criminals, Per6ndecided to dump him and run for the presidencyhimself. With his third wife, Isabelita, as his running-ma te, he was easily elected. But his rule was short andhis death was well timed. The economy was on theverge of ruin; the Montoneros, who had suspendedtheir violent activities temporarily upon his return,were killing and kidnapping once again; and a guerrillawar w as und erwa y in Tucu ma n Province. His followerscould always believe that he might have saved hiscountry had he lived longer. Just as the 1955 coupenabled him to escape the consequences of his misrule,so his death rescued him from those same conse-quences in 1974. The responsibility for saving Argen-tina was shifted to his widow, wom an whose previousprofessional experience had been w orking as a hostessin clip joints like the Panama City nigh t club whe re shemet her husband during the early days of his exile.

The 1976 coup that ousted Isabelita and her corruptgovernment had been long awaited. For months thepress had hinted that it was imm inent. But even as herregime neared i ts end Isabel i ta did not want forsupporters. She may have lacked Evita's passion, but,for the more ardent votaries of her husband, sheremained their movement's symbol.The gen erals saw clearly tha t Peronism would not beextinguished simply by overthrowing the Peronistgovernment, a fact that explains their unwillingness toact sooner. The main reason for the military's caution,however , was ideologica l spl in ter ing tha t haddeveloped in its own ranks during the short time sincePeron's return. The Argentine military included everypossible ideological faction. Some, like General Jorg^Videla, the chief of staff were old-fashioned conser-vatives, whose views had been formed long ago duringtheir days at the military academy. Many youngerofficers looked to Peru, where General AlvaradoVelasco was fashioning a populist dictatorship underarmy control. There were other officers who admiredthe so-called Brazilian "solution," and even a few whoderived inspiration from General Pinochet in Chile.General Videla is clearly popular with the bulk of thepeople. Of course, his pop ularity has been aided by thetemporary eclipse of the Peronist party. For the timebeing, Peron's henchmenthose who are still in thecountry are keeping a low profile. The leaders of theother political parties, most of whom encouraged themilitary to overth row Isabelita, are also quiet. But thepeople have not been quite so quiet. At the World Cu psoccer championships in Buenos Aires last week, thecrowds called for a return to Peronism. "We want thethieves back We want the thieves " they c hante d.Thejunta itself remains fragmented, but none of itsme mb ers is willing to retur n the nation to civilian rule.

and hence to Peronism. General Videla, whoreluctant to take power in the first place, has lgiven the impression of enjoying his presidential duHe has even talked abo ut r unn ing as a "civilian," iBrazilian mode. General Albano Harguindeguyregime's authoritarian interior minister, has saidthe politicians w ill have to cool their heels for at leayears before being allowed to return to power.most honest appraisal of the future was uttereGen eral R oberto Viola, the arm y chief ofstaff whpromised, in an aside worthy of Per6n himselfdemocracy would be restored "w hen the circumstaare right."Xhe "right circumstances," as far as the junconcerned, will not emerge until both politicaleconomic order have re turn ed , and tha t will clearlya long time. To sustain their po sition and to achievpacification they promised the people, agents o

regime continue to hunt down urban guerrillasthose suspected of sympathizing with them. Montonerosthe most powerful urban terrorisganizationhave been dealt a series of devastblows, but they continue to machine-gun businesand politicians and blow up their homes and According to the Permanent Assembly on HuRights, at least 6000 Argentines have been illeseized by the auth orities, while anoth er 6000 havearrested und er m ore orthodo x con ditions. Actuallyimpossible to measure the number of people whodisappeared without a trace. The country's famous political prisoner, Isabelita, is presently hoat a resort for officers and their wives, whereawaits her trial for misappropriating public funds.said that the symbol of the Peronist movement spmost of her time reading women's magazinestalking with the wives of visiting officers.

But the political oppression is of little conceaverage Argentines. The economy worries themmost. Until recently, thejunta was deeply dividethe pol icies advanced by their own ministeeconomy, the brilliant Dr. Jos^ M artinez de Hoz. Aregime's most powerful civilian, and as an intellewith a formidable international reputation, Marde Hoz did no t always see eye-to-eye with his micolleagues, none of whom possessed much knowof econom ics. Because he was forced to feed so me bmedic ine to the count ry 's sagging economygenerals tended to blame him for most of the naproblems. The old civilian politicians, who wouldnever dreamed of criticizing the generals, attaM artinez de Hoz w ith regu larity for his refusal tohimself of that old Peronist toolthe printing pAfter a period of painful economic transitioneconomy has begun to improve. Inflation is ddramaticallyfrom over 400 percent in 1976 topercent this yearand the economy is beginninshow signs of momentum.


5/6

most of his countrymen. He understood their

influence the Argentine scene today. Perhaps they do.Before Isahelita's ouster, the authorities planned tohouse Juan and Evita in a massive Peronist shrine, notunlike the great tomb constructed by the Soviets tohouse Lenin's corpse. The two tyrants were to be joinedby the body of Juan Manuel Rosas, a brutal 19thcentury gaucho despot whose career was, in manyways, similar to Per6n's. It was to have been one morereminder to the descamisados that their leader was stillwith them. The Argentines tolerate General Videla,but they will never love him the way they continue tolove Per6n. They want the thieves back, and they areprepared to bide their time until the moment is right forPeronism to return.

II:The People are Afraidis a ravaged, desolate suburbthe west side of Buenos Aires, aofvacant lots,ofgarbage. and there lie the complejos im-pro- hal f shanty towns, p lanteddent betw een tw o rock

or a long t ime now, abou t 500setthemselvesupthereofpooror theunemployed w ho subsist$ 40amonth.Inspiteofthis,ly resisted th e intrusio ns offor a long time. Last March, the first time, things went wrong its way in to the

M. isbarely30years old,has a of children; her face is alreadyShereceivestiny room in to which the en tire is squeezed since the dis- of her husband. One day. . . not thepolicebutmenin

thedoorsorup the locks with dynamite. Each they forced the women tostrip. not all of the young ones, alwaysin of their husbands and children.if they wanted to kill us,even the or couldn't

d their ha nds up any longer, the poor And then , when they w ere theman,one

each time,22 inall. That went on everyday. They must have enjoyed comingback and frighteningusagain and ag ain.It was ter r ib le for us. You foundyourself waiting for them, like friendsyou expect to visit on Sunday . And everytime,youwonder if it isover this time,or willithappen again tom orrow.In thecomplejowe don't much like the police, butoncea woman went to them to reportwhat was going on. She never cameback. Now , we simply wa it. And we waitforher tocome back.Ifyou keep sayingthat, maybeit will help.

Where are these men and womentoday, these workers, simple people,who have become shadows since theywere carried off by the private militia?They haven't been officially arrested;they have swelled the r anks of thephantom army that ha unts the beautifulresidential neighborhoods of BuenosAires. Snatched out of their homes,from their families and tribes, alreadygrown old in all probability, namelessand faceless, they literally no longerexist, except perhaps on some secretregister in a jail infested with disease.This is approximately what wastoldwhen I wen t w i th a list of n a m e s ,accompanied by two lawyers, to thedistr ict police inspector . The policeofficer who saw us put on the mostaggrieved air as he told methat wastalking about a band of terroristswhohad gone underground. This iswhatIwas also toldby thepublisherof a gov-ernment-owned daily newspaper towhom Ibrought the same list.He was

amused, however,aknowing expressiononhisface.For himthere wereno twoways about it: these guys from omplejo17 were skirt chasers; theyhadsimplytakenoff totakeuptheir boyhoodwayof life again someplace else.Rober t Giudice , 50 years old, abusinessman by profession, lives onParaguay Street. He asked to see meand, despitemy hesitations, beggedmeto use his n a m e . We talked at theShera ton Ho te l , in a room that aJapanese sportswriter putatmy disposalf o r i m p o r t a n t o c c a s i o n s w h e n Ipreferred to avoid being overheardbyindiscreet witnesses. Hesatacross fromme, slumped in anarmchair. I had theodd feeling that all the time he wasspeaking to me he neithersaw me norh e a r d me. His v o i c e was d u l l ,monotonous, as if he were telling ananonymous s tory , separate f romhimself.And yet,hecametotellme hisown experience, a horrifying story,almost beyondbelief.It is thetestimonyofadeadman.

It all began one night last winter whena groupof menburst intohishouseonParaguay Street. Everybody was herdedinto a central room; Giudice and hiswife, the three younger children, ageseight, nine and 11, and the oldestdaughter, aged 22, whom they had cometo find. The next day, when Giudicewent to the police, they were barelywilling to register his demand for habeascorpus. Your daughter, they toldhim,has undoubtedly been kidnappedby anunderground group. We will find her


6/6

the legacy of perón

Documents